

THE

WAR OF THE REBELLION:


A COMPILATION OF THE
OFFICIAL RECORDS

OF THE
UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES.

PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, BY BVT. LIEUT.
COL. ROBERT N. SCOTT, THIRD U. S. ARTILLERY,

AND

PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO ACT OF CONGRESS APPROVED JUNE 16, 1880.




SERIES I—VOLUME XI—IN THREE PARTS.
PART I.—REPORTS.

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PREFACE.

By an act approved June 23, 1874, Congress made an appropriation "to enable the Secretary of War to begin the publication of the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, both of the Union and Confederate Armies," and directed him "to have copied for the Public Printer all reports, letters, telegrams, and general orders not heretofore copied or printed, and properly arranged in chronological order."

Appropriations for continuing such preparation have been made from time to time, and the act approved June 16, 1880, has provided "for the printing and binding, under direction of the Secretary of War, of 10,000 copies of a compilation of the Official Records (Union and Confederate) of the War of the Rebellion, so far as the same may be ready for publication, during the fiscal year"; and that "of said number, 7,000 copies shall be for the use of the House of Representatives, 2,000 copies for the use of the Senate, and 1,000 copies for the use of the Executive Departments.*"

This compilation will be the first general publication of the military records of the war, and will embrace all official documents that can be obtained by the compiler, and that appear to be of any historical value.

*Volume I to V distributed under act approved June 16, 1880. The act approved August 7, 1882, provides that—

"The volumes of the official records of the war of the rebellion shall be distributed as follows: One thousand copies to the executive departments, as now provided by law. One thousand copies for distribution by the Secretary of War among officers of the Army and contributors to the work. Eight thousand three hundred copies shall be sent by the Secretary of War to such libraries, organizations, and individuals as may be designated by the Senators, Representatives, and Delegates of the Forty-seventh Congress. Each Senator shall designate not exceeding twenty-six, and each Representative and Delegate not exceeding twenty-one of such addresses, and the volumes shall be sent thereto from time to time as they are published, until the publication is completed. Senators, Representatives, and Delegates shall inform the Secretary of War in each case how many volumes of those heretofore published they have forwarded to such addresses. The remaining copies of the eleven thousand to be published, and all sets that may not be ordered to be distributed as provided herein, shall be sold by the Secretary of War for cost of publication with ten per cent. added thereto, and the proceeds of such sale shall be covered into the Treasury. If two or more sets of said volumes are ordered to the same address the Secretary of War shall inform the Senators, Representatives or Delegates, who have designated the same, who thereupon may designate other libraries, organizations, or individuals. The Secretary of War shall report to the first session of the Forty-eighth Congress what volumes of the series heretofore published have not been furnished to such libraries, organizations, and individuals. He shall also inform distributees at whose instance the volumes are sent."

The publication will present the records in the following order of arrangement:

The **1st Series** will embrace the formal reports, both Union and Confederate, of the first seizures of United States property in the Southern States, and of all military operations in the field, with the correspondence, orders, and returns relating specially thereto, and, as proposed, is to be accompanied by an Atlas.

In this series the reports will be arranged according to the campaigns and several theaters of operations (in the chronological order of the events), and the Union reports of any event will, as a rule, be immediately followed by the Confederate accounts. The correspondence, &c., not embraced in the "reports" proper will follow (first Union and next Confederate) in chronological order.

The **2d Series** will contain the correspondence, orders, reports, and returns, Union and Confederate, relating to prisoners of war, and (so far as the military authorities were concerned) to State or political prisoners.

The **3d Series** will contain the correspondence, orders, reports, and returns of the Union authorities (embracing their correspondence with the Confederate officials) not relating specially to the subjects of the *first* and *second* series. It will set forth the annual and special reports of the Secretary of War, of the General-in-Chief, and of the chiefs of the several staff corps and departments; the calls for troops, and the correspondence between the National and the several State authorities.

The **4th Series** will exhibit the correspondence, orders, reports, and returns of the Confederate authorities, similar to that indicated for the Union officials, as of the *third* series, but excluding the correspondence between the Union and confederate authorities given in that series.

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

Major, Third Art., and Bvt. Lieut. Col.

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 23, 1880.

Approved:

ALEX. RAMSEY,

Secretary of War.

THE
WAR OF THE REBELLION:

A COMPILATION OF THE
OFFICIAL RECORDS
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UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS
TO

SERIES I—VOLUME XI.

(To be inserted in the volume. For explanation see General
Index volume, Serial No. 130, page XXVIII.)

PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF
The Hon. **ELIHU ROOT**, Secretary of War,
BY
BRIG. GEN. **FRED C. AINSWORTH**,
CHIEF OF THE RECORD AND PENSION OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,
AND
MR. **JOSEPH W. KIRKLEY**.

Mr. JOHN S. MOODEY, Indexer.

WASHINGTON:
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1902.

TEXT.

PART 1.

- Page 264. First line, insert * after *maps* and add foot-note, * *See Plate 18, Map 2, also Plate 19, Maps 1 and 3, of the Atlas.*
- Page 267. Thirteenth line, bottom, insert * after *Second Alabama Infantry* and add foot-note, * *An error. Second Alabama at Fort Pillow; disbanded March, 1862.*
- Page 363. Fourth line, bottom, insert * after *map* and add foot-note, * *For General Smith's map, see Plate 15, Map 2, of the Atlas.*
- Page 395. Forty-third line, top, insert * after *sketch* and add foot-note, * *See Plate 17, Map 2, of the Atlas.* Last line of report, and in foot-note to which it refers, change * to †.
- Page 462. McAlester's report, second line, insert * after *sketch* and add foot-note, * *See Plate 20, Maps 2, 3, and 4, of the Atlas.*
- Page 463. Thirteenth line, bottom, for *than* read *that*.
- Page 583. Fifteenth line, top, for *Donelsonville* read *Donaldsonville*.
- Page 666. Foot-note, for *10 officers*, wherever it appears, read *1 officer*.
- Page 667. Rush's report, sixteenth line, insert * after *forwarded* and add foot-note, * *See Plate 21, Map 1, of the Atlas.*
- Page 702. Thirty-first line, top, insert * after *diagram* and add foot-note, * *See Plate 21, Map 2, of the Atlas.*
- Page 722. Eleventh line, bottom, insert * after *sketch* and add foot-note, * *See Plate 21, Map 11, of the Atlas.*
- Page 727. Stryker's report, third line, insert * after *sketch* and add foot-note, * *See Plate 21, Map 3, of the Atlas.*
- Page 737. Second line, bottom, insert * after *day* and add foot-note, * *See Plate 21, Map 4, of the Atlas.*
- Page 758. Gorman's Brigade, for *Andrew Sharpshooters* read *2d Company Minnesota Sharpshooters (Russell)*. Insert * after *15th Massachusetts* and add foot-note, * *1st Company Massachusetts Sharpshooters attached.*
- Page 760. Transfer *Col. J. H. Hobart Ward* from First Brigade and insert in Second Brigade, following *Brig. Gen. David B. Birney*.
- Page 812. Erase foot-note *To appear in Atlas* and insert *Not found*.
- Page 820. Thirty-ninth line, top, for *Tenth* read *Seventieth*.
- Page 917. For *96th Pennsylvania* read *96th New York*.
- Page 1001. Seventh line, top, insert * after *position* and add foot-note, * *For map accompanying, see Plate 21, Map 6, of the Atlas.*
- Page 1052. Address, for *G. M. Lovel* read *G. M. Sorrel*.
- Page 1154. Foot-note, for *Hawes'* read *Haw's*.

PART 2.

- Page 36. Insert * after *6th U. S. Cavalry* and add foot-note, * *Detached with Stoneman's command.*
- Page 48. Third line, top, for *Been* [?] read *Behm*.
- Page 54. Eleventh line, bottom, for *New York* read *Pennsylvania*.
- Page 122. Sixth line, top, for *Fifth* read *Eighth*.
- Page 349. Twenty-first line, top, for *Ninety-third* read *Ninety-sixth*.
- Page 398. Erase foot-note and insert *See Plate 21, Maps 7 and 8, of the Atlas.*
- Page 438. Fourteenth line, bottom, for *words* read *woods*.
- Page 460. Twenty-seventh line, insert [*Raszewski*] after *major*.
- Page 466. Fifteenth line, top, insert a *semicolon* after *us* and before *to*.

- Page 488. Deshler's Artillery, first column, insert *Thomas B.* after *French's*.
Wise's Command, second column, for *Andrews' (Virginia) battery*
read *Andrews' (Alabama) battery*; insert *David A.* after *French's*.
- Page 507. For *First Battalion Light Artillery* read *Second Battery (Baltimore)*
Light Artillery.
- Page 513. Stuart's report, seventeenth line, insert [*Screven*] after *Scrivener*.
- Page 694. Fifth line, bottom, for *July 30* read *June 30*.
- Page 832. Grammer's report, sixth line, for *Hutson* read *Hudson*; twenty-sixth
line, for *Hudson* read *Hutson*.
- Page 852. Hill to Chilton, date line, for *1862* read *1863*.
- Page 915. Eighth line, top, for *D. A. French's* read *T. B. French's*.
- Page 923. Erase foot-note and insert *See Plate 66, Map 7, of the Atlas*.
- Page 942. Eighth line, top, for *point* read *part*.
- Page 944. Eighteenth line, bottom, insert to before *Maycox's*.
- Page 986. Under *Louisiana: 1st Infantry*, second line, for *June 15* read *June 25*.
- Page 988. Insert under *North Carolina: 38th Infantry*.—*Lieut. Miles M. Cowles,*
adjutant, died of wounds received June 26.
- Page 990. Under *South Carolina: 12th Infantry*, for *Delany* read *Delleney*.
- Page 1053. Under *Mississippi Troops*, insert *Regiments:* after *Cavalry* and before
Jeff Davis Legion.
- Page 1090. Sixth line, bottom, insert *Regiments:* before *1st*.

PART 3.

- Page 107. McClellan to Stanton, 2.30 a. m., second line, for *division* read *position*.
- Page 126. McClellan to Stanton, third line, for *battery* read *boyau*.
- Page 203. Keyes to Marcy, first line, insert *Lieutenant Washington* after *Chetwood*.
- Page 250. McClellan to Rodgers, fifth line, for *oxide* read *James River*; eleventh
line, for *oyster* read *Richmond*.
- Page 321. McClellan to Lincoln, date line, for *July 15* read *July 14*; first line,
erase [*July 13*].
- Page 366. Twenty-seventh line, top, for *officers* read *offices*.
- Page 403. Special Orders, No. 699, change Paragraph *XXI* to *XVI*.
- Page 493. Lee to Johnston, date line, for *May 3* read *May 5*.
- Page 529. Thirty-first line, top, for *Robinson's* read *Robertson's*.
- Page 615. For *Turner's battery, Richmond Howitzers*, read *Turner's battery, Vir-*
ginia Artillery.
- Page 650. Third line, bottom, for *William Nelson's* read *G. W. Nelson's*.
- Page 652. For *W. H. French's (Virginia) battery* read *Thomas B. French's (Vir-*
ginia) battery; for *Capt. B. H. Smith's company* read *Capt. C. L.*
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- Page 724. Sixteenth line, bottom, insert *Regiments:* before *1st*.

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
Insert all words and figures in *italics* and strike out all in [brackets]. An asterisk (*) following a correction indicates that "Additions and Corrections" to the text should be consulted. References are to parts of volume.

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CHAPTER XXIII.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VIRGINIA.

March 17–September 2, 1862.*

PART I.

REPORTS—March 17–June 24, 1862.

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.†

- Mar. 17, 1862.—Embarkation of the Army of the Potomac commenced at Alexandria, Va.
- 26, 1862.—Confederate Department of Henrico, under command of Brig. Gen. John H. Winder, extended to embrace Petersburg and vicinity.
- 27, 1862.—General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, ordered to re-enforce the Army of the Peninsula.
- 31, 1862.—Blenker's division ordered to Mountain (Frémont's) Department.
- April 1– 2, 1862.—Headquarters Army of the Potomac transferred to vicinity of Fort Monroe.
- 4, 1862.—The First Army Corps (McDowell's) detached from Army of the Potomac and merged into Department of the Rappahannock.
- The Fifth Army Corps (Banks') merged into the Department of the Shenandoah.
- Skirmish at Howard's Mill, near Cockletown.
- 5–May 4, 1862.—Siege of Yorktown.
- 11, 1862.—Confederate naval operations in Hampton Roads.
- 12, 1862.—Command of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, extended over the Departments of Norfolk and the Peninsula.
- 22, 1862.—Franklin's division arrives at Yorktown.
- May 4, 1862.—Skirmishes near Williamsburg.
- 5, 1862.—Battle of Williamsburg.
- 6, 1862.—Williamsburg occupied by the Union forces.
- 7, 1862.—Engagement at West Point, Barhamsville, or Eltham's Landing.
- 7– 8, 1862.—Reconnaissance to Mulberry Point, James River.
- 8, 1862.—Naval demonstration upon Sewell's Point.

* Including the transfer of the Army of the Potomac from the defenses of Washington to the Peninsula; the corresponding movements of the Army of Northern Virginia (Confederate) and its operations to August 13, 1862; and the return of the Army of the Potomac to the vicinity of Washington. The operations of the main portion of the Army of Northern Virginia from August 13 to September 2, 1862, will appear in the operations from March 17 to September 2, 1862, in Northern Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland. See Series I, Vol. XII.

† Of some of the minor conflicts noted in this "Summary" no circumstantial reports are on file.

- May 9, 1862.—Norfolk evacuated by the Confederate forces.
Skirmish at Slatersville.
- 10, 1862.—Norfolk and Portsmouth occupied by the Union forces.
- 13, 1862.—Skirmish at Baltimore Cross-Roads, near New Kent Court-House.
- 15, 1862.—Engagement at Fort Darling, James River.
- 17, 1862.—Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell ordered to move upon Richmond in co-operation with Major-General McClellan.
Expedition up the Pamunkey River.
- 18, 1862.—Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, U. S. Army, assumes command of Fifth Army Corps (reorganized).
Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. Army, assumes command of Sixth Army Corps.
- 18-19, 1862.—Reconnaissance toward Old Church.
- 19, 1862.—Skirmish at City Point, James River.
Skirmish at Gaines' Mill.
- 20-23, 1862.—Operations about Bottom's Bridge, Chickahominy River.
- 21, 1862.—Advance across Bottom's Bridge.
- 22, 1862.—Reconnaissance to New Castle and Hanover Ferry.
- 23, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Bottom's Bridge toward Richmond.
Reconnaissance from Bottom's Bridge to the Turkey Island Creek Bridge.
Skirmish at Ellison's Mill, near Mechanicsville.
Skirmish at Hogan's, near New Bridge.
- 24, 1862.—McDowell's orders to move upon Richmond suspended.
Skirmish at New Bridge.
Skirmish at Seven Pines.
Skirmish at Mechanicsville.
Reconnaissance toward Hanover Court-House.
- 25-26, 1862.—Expedition from Bottom's Bridge to James River.
- 26, 1862.—Reconnaissance toward Hanover Court-House.
- 27, 1862.—Skirmish at Slash Church.
Skirmish at White Oaks.
- 27-29, 1862.—Engagement at Hanover Court-House (27th) and operations (28th-29th) in that vicinity.
- 28, 1862.—Virginia Central Railroad Bridge, on South Anna River, destroyed by Union forces.
Destruction of Confederate supplies at Ashland.
- 29, 1862.—Skirmish near Seven Pines.
Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad Bridge, on South Anna River, destroyed.
- 30, 1862.—Skirmish near Fair Oaks.
Skirmish near Zuni.
- 31-June 1, 1862.—Battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines.
- June 1, 1862.—General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, assumes command of the Army of Northern Virginia.
The Department of Virginia extended and embraced in Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's command, Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, U. S. Army, being assigned to the Middle Department, and Maj. Gen. John A. Dix, U. S. Army, to command at Fort Monroe.
- 1-2, 1862.—Reconnaissance beyond Seven Pines.
- 2, 1862.—Expedition to Wormley's Ferry, Pamunkey River.
- 3-7, 1862.—Reconnaissance to the James River to communicate with the Union fleet.
- 5, 1862.—Skirmish at New Bridge.
- 7, 1862.—Reconnaissance on east bank of the Chickahominy.

- June 8, 1862.—Skirmish near Fair Oaks.
Major-General McDowell ordered, under conditions stated, to operate in the direction of Richmond.
Reconnaissance on the New Market Road.
- 11, 1862.—Re-enforcements sent from Army of Northern Virginia to the Valley District.
- 12-13, 1862.—McCall's division re-enforces the Army of the Potomac.
- 13-15, 1862.—Stuart's raid, including skirmishes at Hawes' Shop, Old Church, and Garlick's Landing.
- 15, 1862.—Reconnaissance to vicinity of New Market.
Skirmish near Seven Pines.
Parley between Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, C. S. Army, and Col. Thomas M. Key, U. S. Army.
- 17, 1862.—Jackson's command moves from vicinity of Staunton and Weyer's Cave for the Peninsula.
- 18, 1862.—Skirmish near Fair Oaks.
Skirmish on Nine Mile Road, near Richmond.
- 19, 1862.—Skirmish on the Charles City Road, near Richmond.
- 20, 1862.—Skirmish near New Bridge.
Affair at Gill's Bluff, James River.
- 21, 1862.—The Confederate Department of North Carolina extended to the south bank of James River.
Skirmish near Fair Oaks Station.
- 22-23, 1862.—Reconnaissance to the left of White Oak Swamp.
- 23, 1862.—Operations about New Kent Court-House.
- 24, 1862.—Skirmish near Mechanicsville.
- 25-July 1, 1862.—"The Seven-days' Battles."
- 27, 1862.—Jackson re-enforces Army of Northern Virginia.
- 28-July 4, 1862.—Expedition from Fort Monroe to open communication with Army of the Potomac.
- July 2, 1862.—Skirmish near New Kent Court-House.
Skirmish at Malvern Hill.
Affair near Haxall's Landing.
- 3, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Harrison's Landing, on Charles City Road.
- 3- 4, 1862.—Skirmishes near Herring Creek, or Harrison's Landing.
- 4, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Harrison's Landing.
Skirmish at Westover.
- 5- 6, 1862.—Operations against Union shipping, James River.
- 7- 9, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Yorktown.
- 9, 1862.—Reconnaissance on the Long Bridge Road.
- 10, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Harrison's Landing toward White Oak Swamp and skirmish.
- 11, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Harrison's Landing beyond Charles City Court-House, Va.
- 16, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Westover, on the Richmond Road.
- 22, 1862.—Maj. Gen. John A. Dix assumes command of the Seventh Army Corps, Department of Virginia.
Maj. Gen. A. E. Burnside assumes command of the Ninth Army Corps.
Affair near Westover.
- 22-30, 1862.—Scout in King William, King and Queen, and Gloucester Counties.
- 23, 1862.—Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck assumes command of the Armies of the United States.
- 29, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Harrison's Landing to Saint Mary's Church.

- July 30, 1862.—McClellan ordered to remove his sick, etc.
Reconnaissance from Harrison's Landing to Jones' Ford, Chickahominy River.
- 31-Aug. 1, 1862.—Attack on Union camps and shipping between Shirley and Harrison's Landing.
- Aug. 2- 8, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Harrison's Landing and reoccupation of Malvern Hill by the Union forces.
- 3, 1862.—Reconnaissance on south side of James River and skirmish at Sycamore Church.
McClellan ordered to withdraw his forces to Aquia Creek.
- 4- 5, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Coggins Point beyond Sycamore Church.
- 5, 1862.—Skirmish at White Oak Swamp Bridge.
Engagement at Malvern Hill.
- 6, 1862.—Skirmish at Malvern Hill.
- 13, 1862.—Preliminary orders issued for the movement of the Army of Northern Virginia from the Peninsula.
- 14-15, 1862.—The Third and Fifth Army Corps move from Harrison's Landing for Aquia Creek.
- 14-19, 1862.—Operations of the cavalry covering the rear of the Army of the Potomac from Harrison's Landing to Williamsburg.
- 17, 1862.—Reconnaissance toward Forge Bridge.
- 20, 1862.—The Fifth Army Corps embarked at Newport News.
- 21, 1862.—The Third Army Corps sail from Yorktown.
- 23, 1862.—The Sixth Army Corps embarked at Fort Monroe.
- 26, 1862.—The Second Army Corps left Fort Monroe.

GENERAL REPORTS.

- No. 1.—Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac.
- No. 2.—Brig. Gen. John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer, of operations from May 23, 1861, to August 15, 1862.
- No. 3.—Lieut. Col. Barton S. Alexander, U. S. Army, Engineer Officer, of operations from April 20 to July 12.
- No. 4.—Brig. Gen. Daniel P. Woodbury, U. S. Army, commanding Engineer Brigade, of operations from May 18 to June 30.
- No. 5.—Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, U. S. Army, Chief of Topographical Engineers.
- No. 6.—Col. Charles P. Kingsbury, U. S. Army, Chief Ordnance Officer.
- No. 7.—Brig. Gen. Stewart Van Vliet, U. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster, of operations from July 27, 1861, to July 10, 1862.
- No. 8.—Brig. Gen. Rufus Ingalls, U. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster, of operations from August, 1861, to September 2, 1862.
- No. 9.—Col. Henry F. Clarke, U. S. Army, Chief Commissary of Subsistence, of operations from August 1, 1861, to November 9, 1862.
- No. 10.—Surg. Charles S. Tripler, U. S. Army, Medical Director, of operations from March 17 to July 3.
- No. 11.—Surg. Jonathan Letterman, U. S. Army, Medical Director, of operations from July 4 to September 2.
- No. 12.—Maj. Albert J. Myer, Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army.
- No. 13.—E. J. Allen [Allen Pinkerton], Chief of Secret Service Division.
- No. 14.—Col. Robert O. Tyler, First Connecticut Heavy Artillery, commanding siege train.
- No. 15.—General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Department of Northern Virginia, of operations from April 15 to May 19.

No. 1.

Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac.

NEW YORK, August 4, 1863.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herein the official report of the operations of the Army of the Potomac while under my charge. Accompanying it are the reports of the corps, division, and subordinate commanders pertaining to the various engagements, battles, and occurrences of the campaigns, and important documents connected with its organization, supply, and movements. These, with lists of maps and memoranda submitted, will be found appended, duly arranged, and marked for convenient reference: *

* * * * *

SECOND PERIOD.

CHAPTER I.

The council composed of the four corps commanders, organized by the President of the United States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, adopted Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the movement of the Army of the Potomac upon Richmond.† For the prompt and successful execution of the projected operation it was regarded by all as necessary that the whole of the four corps should be employed, with at least the addition of 10,000 men drawn from the forces in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe; that position and its dependencies being regarded as amply protected by the naval force in its neighborhood and the advance of the main army up the Peninsula, so that it could be safely left with a small garrison.

In addition to the land forces, the co-operation of the Navy was desired in the projected attack upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, as well as in controlling the York and James Rivers, for the protection of our flanks and the use of the transports bringing supplies to the army. With these expectations, and for reasons stated elsewhere in this report, my original plan of moving by Urbana and West Point was abandoned, and the line with Fort Monroe as a base adopted. In the arrangements for the transportation of the army to the Peninsula by water the vessels were originally ordered to rendezvous mainly at Annapolis; but upon the evacuation of Manassas and the batteries of the Lower Potomac by the enemy it became more convenient to embark the troops and material at Alexandria, and orders to that effect were at once given.

In making the preliminary arrangements for the movement it was determined that the First Corps, General McDowell's, should move as a unit first, and effect a landing either at the Sand-box, some 4 miles south of Yorktown, in order to turn all the enemy's defenses at Ship Point, Howard's Bridge, Big Bethel, &c., or else, should existing circumstances render it preferable, land on the Gloucester side of York River and move on West Point.

The transports, however, arrived slowly and few at a time. In order,

* So much of this report as relates to the "First Period" will be found in Series I, Vol. V, pp. 1-66.

† See Series I, Vol. V, p. 55.

therefore, to expedite matters I decided to embark the army by divisions as transports arrived, keeping army corps together as much as possible, and to collect the troops at Fort Monroe. In determining the order of embarkation convenience and expedition were especially consulted, except that the First Corps was to be embarked last, as I intended to move it in mass to its point of disembarkation, and to land it on either bank of the York, as might then be determined.

On the 17th of March Hamilton's division, of the Third Corps, embarked at Alexandria, and proceeded to Fort Monroe with the following orders:

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 17, 1862.*

You will, on your arrival at Fort Monroe, report to General Wool, and request him to assign you ground for encamping your division. You will remain at Fort Monroe until further orders from General McClellan. Should General Wool require the services of your division in repelling an attack, you will obey his orders and use every effort to carry out his views.

R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

General C. S. HAMILTON,
Commanding Division.

On the 22d of March, as soon as transportation was ready, General Fitz John Porter's division, of the same corps, embarked. General Heintzelman was ordered to accompany it, under the following instructions:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Seminary, March 22, 1862.

GENERAL: Upon the disembarkation of Porter's division at Fort Monroe I have to request that you will move your two divisions (Porter's and Hamilton's) some 3 or 4 miles out from the fort, to find good camping places, where wood and water can be readily obtained, and where your positions will be good in a defensive point of view. You may find it advisable to place one division on or near the road leading to Yorktown from Newport News; the other upon that leading to Yorktown direct from Fort Monroe. If you find that the nature of the country will permit easy communication and mutual support between the two divisions it will be best to place one on each road. It will be best to remain pretty near the fort for the present, in order to give the impression that our object is to attack Norfolk rather than Yorktown. You will do well, however, to push strong reconnaissances well to the front, to ascertain the position of the enemy and his pickets. I will, as soon as possible, re-enforce you by the third division of your corps, and it is probable that a part or the whole of the Fourth Corps will also move from Fort Monroe. This will probably be determined before your disembarkation is completed, and you will be informed accordingly.

My desire would be to make no important move in advance until we are fully prepared to follow it up and give the enemy no time to recover.

The quartermaster of your corps will receive detailed instructions in regard to land transportation from General Van Vliet.

It will be advisable to mobilize your corps with the least possible delay and have it prepared for an advance. I have directed extra clothing, ammunition, &c., to be sent to Fort Monroe, so that all deficiencies may be supplied without delay.

Please report to me frequently and fully the condition of things on the new field of operations and whatever intelligence you gain as to the enemy.

Engage guides in sufficient numbers at once, and endeavor to send out spies.

I am, very truly, yours,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. S. P. HEINTZELMAN,
Commanding Third Corps.

The remaining divisions embarked as rapidly as transports could be supplied.

On the 1st of April I embarked with the headquarters on the steamer *Commodore*, and reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d.

In consequence of the delay in the arrival of the horse transports at

Alexandria but a small portion of the cavalry had arrived, and the artillery reserve had not yet completed its disembarkation.

I found there the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry and the Fifth Regular Cavalry. The Second Regular Cavalry and a portion of the First had arrived, but not disembarked. So few wagons had arrived that it was not possible to move Casey's division at all for several days, while the other divisions were obliged to move with scant supplies.

As to the force and position of the enemy, the information then in our possession was vague and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtained from the staff officers of General Wool, and was simply to the effect that Yorktown was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks, with strong water batteries on the York River, and garrisoned by not less than 15,000 troops, under command of General J. B. Magruder. Maps, which had been prepared by the topographical engineers under General Wool's command, were furnished me, in which the Warwick River was represented as flowing parallel to but not crossing the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, making the so-called Mulberry Island a real island; and we had no information as to the true course of the Warwick across the Peninsula nor of the formidable line of works which it covered.

Information which I had collected during the winter placed General Magruder's command at from 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of General Huger's force at Norfolk, estimated at about 15,000.

It was also known that there were strong defensive works at or near Williamsburg.

Knowing that General Huger could easily spare some troops to reinforce Yorktown—that he had, indeed, done so—and that Johnston's army of Manassas could be brought rapidly by the James and York Rivers to the same point, I proposed to invest that town without delay.

The accompanying map of Colonel Cram, U. S. Topographical Engineers, attached to General Wool's staff, given to me as the result of several months' labor, indicated the feasibility of the design.* It was also an object of primary importance to reach the vicinity of Yorktown before the enemy was re-enforced sufficiently to enable him to hold in force his works at Big Bethel, Howard's Bridge, Ship Point, &c., on the direct road to Yorktown and Young's Mill, on the road from Newport News. This was the more urgent, as it was now evident that some days must elapse before the First Corps could arrive.

Everything possible was done to hasten the disembarkation of the cavalry, artillery, and wagons in the harbor; and on the 3d the orders of march were given for the following day.

There were at Fort Monroe and in its vicinity on the 3d, ready to move, two divisions of the Third Corps, two divisions of the Fourth Corps, and one division of the Second Corps, and Sykes' brigade of regular infantry, together with Hunt's artillery reserve and the regiments of cavalry before named—in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns, besides the division artillery.

Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of the Second and Third Corps had not arrived, and Casey's division of the Fourth Corps was unable to move for want of wagons.

Before I left Washington an order had been issued by the War Department placing Fort Monroe and its dependencies under my control, and authorizing me to draw from the troops under General Wool

* Maps to appear in Atlas.

a division of about 10,000 men, which was to be assigned to the First Corps.

During the night of the 3d I received a telegram from the Adjutant-General of the Army stating that by the President's order I was deprived of all control over General Wool and the troops under his command and forbidden to detach any of his troops without his sanction. This order left me without any base of operations under my own control, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it.

On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James River was declared by the naval authorities closed to the operations of their vessels by the combined influence of the enemy's batteries on its banks and the Confederate steamers *Merrimac*, *Yorktown*, *Jamestown*, and *Teazer*. Flag-Officer Goldsborough, then in command of the United States squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it (and no doubt justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the *Merrimac*, and as he designed using his most powerful vessels in a contest with her, he did not feel able to detach to the assistance of the army a suitable force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was contrary to what had been previously stated to me and materially affected my plans. At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the Navy prepared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until after our land batteries had partially silenced the works.

I had hoped, let me say, by rapid movements to drive before me or capture the enemy on the Peninsula, open the James River, and press on to Richmond before he should be materially re-enforced from other portions of his territory. As the narrative proceeds the causes will be developed which frustrated these apparently well-grounded expectations.

I determined, then, to move the two divisions of the Fourth Corps by the Newport News and Williamsburg roads to take up a position between Yorktown and Williamsburg, while the two divisions of the Third Corps moved direct from Fort Monroe upon Yorktown, the reserves moving so as to support either corps, as might prove necessary. I designed, should the works at Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious resistance, to land the First Corps, re-enforced, if necessary, on the left bank of the York or on the Severn, to move it on Gloucester and West Point, in order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might have on the Peninsula, and compel him to abandon his positions.

In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe serious difficulties were encountered from the want of precise topographical information as to the country, in advance. Correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, though known in its general features, we found to be inaccurately described in essential particulars in the only maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. This difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of the State of Virginia through which my military operations have extended. Reconnaissances, frequently under fire, proved the only trustworthy sources of information. Negroes, however truthful their reports, possessed or were able to communicate very little accurate and no comprehensive topographical information.

On the 3d the following orders were given for the movement of the 4th :

Porter's and Hamilton's divisions and Averell's cavalry, of the Third Corps, and Sedgwick's division, of the Second Corps, under Brigadier-General Heintzelman, commanding Third Corps, will move to-morrow in the following order: Porter's division, with Averell's cavalry, at 6 a. m., over the New Market and New Bridges to Big Bethel and Howard's Bridge. This division will send forward to the batteries where the Ship Point road intersects the main Yorktown road a sufficient force to hold that point and cut off the garrison of the Ship Point batteries. The whole division may be used for this purpose if necessary, and if possible the batteries should be occupied by our troops to-morrow. The portion of the division not necessary for this purpose will encamp at Howard's Bridge.

Hamilton's division will march at 7 a. m. by the New Bridge road to Big Bethel, and will encamp on Howard's Creek.

Sedgwick's division will march at 8 a. m. by the New Market Bridge, taking the direct road to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Howard's Bridge.

Brigadier-General Keyes, commanding Fourth Corps, will move with Smith's and Couch's divisions at 6 a. m. (Smith's division in advance) by the James River road. The Fifth Regular Cavalry, temporarily assigned to this corps, will move with Smith's division, which will encamp at Young's Mill, throwing forward at least one brigade to the road from Big Bethel to Warwick. Couch's division will encamp at Fisher's Creek.

The reserve cavalry, artillery, and infantry will move at 8.30 a. m. by the New Market Bridge to Big Bethel, where it will encamp. On the march it will keep in rear of Sedgwick's division.

The following is an extract from the order issued on the 4th for the march of the 5th :

The following movements of the army will be carried out to-morrow (5th) :

General Keyes will move forward Smith's division at 6 a. m., via Warwick Court-House and the road leading near the old ship-yard, to the "Half-way House," on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road.

General Couch's division will march at 6 a. m. to close up on General Smith's division at the "Half-way House."

General Keyes' command will occupy and hold the narrow dividing ridge near the "Half-way House," so as to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown by land and prevent re-enforcements being thrown in.

General Heintzelman will move forward General Porter's two rear brigades at 6 a. m. upon the advance guard, when the entire division will advance to a point about 2½ miles from Yorktown, where the road turns abruptly to the north and where a road comes in from Warwick Court-House.

General Hamilton's division will move at 6 a. m., and follow General Porter's division, camping as near it as possible.

General Sedgwick's division will march at 5 a. m. as far as the Warwick road, which enters the main Yorktown road near Dr. Powers' house, and will await further orders.

The reserve will march at 6 a. m. upon the main Yorktown road, halting for further orders at Dr. Powers' house, the infantry leading, the artillery following next, and the cavalry in rear.

General Sedgwick's division will for the present act with the reserve, and he will receive orders from headquarters.

In giving these orders of march for the 4th and 5th it was expected that there would be no serious opposition at Big Bethel, and that the advance of the Third Corps beyond that point would force the enemy to evacuate the works at Young's Mill, while our possession of the latter would make it necessary for him to abandon those at Howard's Bridge, and the advance thence on Yorktown would place Ship Point in our possession, together with its garrison, unless they abandoned it promptly. The result answered the expectation.

During the afternoon of the 4th General Keyes obtained information of the presence of some 5,000 to 8,000 of the enemy in a strong position at Lee's Mill. The nature of that position in relation to the Warwick not being at that time understood, I instructed General Keyes to attack and carry this position upon coming in front of it.

Early in the afternoon of the 5th the advance of each column was brought to a halt; that of Heintzelman (Porter's division), in front of Yorktown, after overcoming some resistance at Big Bethel and Howard's Bridge; that of Keyes (Smith's division) unexpectedly before the enemy's works at Lee's Mill, where the road from Newport News to Williamsburg crosses Warwick River.

The progress of each column had been retarded by heavy rains on that day, which had made the roads almost impassable to the infantry of Keyes' column and impassable to all but a small portion of the artillery, while the ammunition, provisions, and forage could not be brought up at all.

When General Keyes approached Lee's Mill his left flank was exposed to a sharp artillery fire from the farther bank of the Warwick, and upon reaching the vicinity of the mill he found it altogether stronger than was expected, unapproachable by reason of the Warwick River and incapable of being carried by assault.

The troops composing the advance of each column were during the afternoon under a warm artillery fire, the sharpshooters even of the right column being engaged when covering reconnaissances.

It was at this stage and moment of the campaign that the following telegram was sent to me:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
April 4, 1862.

General McCLELLAN:

By direction of the President, General N. Dowell's army corps has been detached from the force under your immediate command, and the general is ordered to report to the Secretary of War. Letter by mail.

L. THOMAS,
Adjutant-General.

The President having promised, in an interview following his order of March 31, withdrawing Blenker's division of 10,000 men from my command, that nothing of the sort should be repeated—that I might rest assured that the campaign should proceed with no further deductions from the force upon which its operations had been planned—I may confess to having been shocked at this order, which, with that of the 31st ultimo and that of the 3d, removed nearly 60,000 men from my command, and reduced my force by more than one-third after its task had been assigned, its operations planned, its fighting begun. To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a different, and a less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. It was a fatal error.

It was now, of course, out of my power to turn Yorktown by West Point. I had therefore no choice left but to attack it directly in front, as I best could with the force at my command.

Reconnaissances made under fire on that and the following day determined that the sources of the Warwick River were near Yorktown, commanded by its guns, while that stream, for some distance from its mouth on the James River, was controlled by the Confederate gunboats; that the fords had been destroyed by dams, the approaches to which were generally through dense forests and deep swamps, and defended by extensive and formidable works; that timber felled for defensive purposes and the flooding of the roads, caused by the dams, had made these works apparently inaccessible and impossible to turn;

that Yorktown was strongly fortified, armed, and garrisoned, and connected with the defenses of the Warwick by forts and intrenchments, the ground in front of which was swept by the guns of Yorktown. It was also ascertained that the garrisons had been and were daily being re-enforced by troops from Norfolk and the army under General J. E. Johnston. Heavy rains made the roads to Fort Monroe impassable, and delayed the arrival of troops, ammunition, and supplies, while storms prevented for several days the sailing of transports from Hampton Roads and the establishment of depots on the creeks of York River near the army.

The ground bordering the Warwick River is covered by very dense and extensive forests, the clearings being small and few. This, with the comparative flatness of the country and the alertness of the enemy, everywhere in force, rendered thorough reconnaissances slow, dangerous, and difficult; yet it was impossible otherwise to determine whether an assault was anywhere practicable or whether the more tedious but sure operations of a siege must be resorted to.

I made on the 6th and 7th close personal reconnaissances of the right and left of the enemy's positions, which, with information acquired already, convinced me that it was best to prepare for an assault by the preliminary employment of heavy guns and some siege operations. Instant assault would have been simple folly. On the 7th I telegraphed to the President as follows :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
April 7, 1862.

Your telegram of yesterday is received.* In reply I have the honor to state that my entire force for duty amounts to only about 85,000 men. General Wool's command, as you will observe from the accompanying order, has been taken out of my control, although he has most cheerfully co-operated with me. The only use that can be made of his command is to protect my communications in rear of this point. At this time only 53,000 men have joined me, but they are coming up as rapidly as my means of transportation will permit.

Please refer to my dispatch to the Secretary of War to-night for the details of our present situation.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

To the PRESIDENT, *Washington, D. C.*

On the same day I sent the following :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
In Front of Yorktown, April 7, 1862—7 p. m.

Your telegram of yesterday* arrived here while I was absent examining the enemy's right, which I did pretty closely.

The whole line of the Warwick, which really heads within a mile of Yorktown, is strongly defended by detached redoubts and other fortifications, armed with heavy and light guns. The approaches, except at Yorktown, are covered by the Warwick, over which there is but one, or, at most, two passages, both of which are covered by strong batteries. It will be necessary to resort to the use of heavy guns and some siege operations before we assault. All the prisoners state that General J. E. Johnston arrived at Yorktown yesterday with strong re-enforcements. It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands—probably not less than 100,000 men, and probably more. In consequence of the loss of Blenker's division and the First Corps my force is possibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of position.

I am under great obligations to you for the offer that the whole force and material of the Government will be as fully and as speedily under my command as heretofore or as if the new departments had not been created.

Since my arrangements were made for this campaign at least 50,000 men have been taken from my command. Since my dispatch of the 5th instant five divisions have been in close observation of the enemy, and frequently exchanging shots. When my present command all join I shall have about 85,000 men for duty, from which a large

* See dispatches on p. 14.

force must be taken for guards, scouts, &c. With this army I could assault the enemy's works, and perhaps carry them, but were I in possession of their intrenchments and assailed by double my numbers I should have no fears as to the result.

Under the circumstances that have been developed since we arrived here I feel fully impressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing contest. I shall of course commence the attack as soon as I can get up my siege train, and shall do all in my power to carry the enemy's works; but to do this with a reasonable degree of certainty requires, in my judgment, that I should, if possible, have at least the whole of the First Corps to land upon the Severn River, and attack Gloucester in the rear. My present strength will not admit of a detachment sufficient for this purpose without materially impairing the efficiency of this column. Flag-Officer Goldsborough thinks the works too strong for his available vessels unless I can turn Gloucester.

I send by mail copies of his letter and one of the commander of the gunboats here.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

I had provided a small siege train and moderate supplies of intrenching tools for such a contingency as the present. Immediate steps were taken to secure the necessary additions. While the engineer officers were engaged in ascertaining the character and strength of all the defenses and the configuration of the ground in front of Yorktown in order to determine the point of attack and to develop the approaches, the troops were occupied in opening roads to the depots established at the nearest available points on branches of York River. Troops were brought to the front as rapidly as possible, and on the 10th of April the army was posted as follows:

Heintzelman's corps, composed of Porter's, Hooker's, and Hamilton's divisions, in front of Yorktown, extending in the order named from the mouth of Wormley's Creek to the Warwick road opposite Wynn's Mill; Sumner's corps—Sedgwick's division only having arrived—on the left of Hamilton, extending down to Warwick and opposite to Wynn's Mill works; Keyes' corps (Smith's, Couch's, and Casey's divisions), on the left of Sedgwick, facing the works at the one-gun battery, Lee's Mill, &c., on the west bank of the Warwick.

Sumner, after the 6th of April, commanded the left wing, composed of his own and Keyes' corps.

Throughout the preparations for and during the siege of Yorktown I kept the corps under General Keyes, and afterward the left wing, under General Sumner, engaged in ascertaining the character of the obstacles presented by the Warwick, and the enemy intrenched on the right bank, with the intention, if possible, of overcoming them and breaking that line of defense, so as to gain possession of the road to Williamsburg and cut off Yorktown from its supports and supplies. The forces under General Heintzelman were engaged in similar efforts upon the works between Wynn's Mill and Yorktown. General Keyes' report of the 16th of April, inclosing reports of brigade commanders engaged in reconnaissances up to that day, said "that no part of his (the enemy's line opposite his own) line, so far as discovered, can be taken by assault without an enormous waste of life."

Reconnaissances on the right flank demonstrated the fact that the Warwick was not passable in that direction except over a narrow dam, the approaches to which were swept by several batteries and intrenchments, which could be filled quickly with supports sheltered by the timber immediately in rear.

General Barnard, chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, whose position entitled his opinions to the highest consideration, expressed the judgment that those formidable works could not with any reasonable degree of certainty be carried by assault. General Keyes,

commanding Fourth Army Corps, after the examination of the enemy's defenses on the left, before alluded to, addressed the following letter to the Hon. Ira Harris, United States Senate, and gave me a copy. Although not strictly official, it describes the situation at that time in some respects so well that I have taken the liberty of introducing it here :

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS,
Warwick Court-House, Va., April 7, 1862.

MY DEAR SENATOR: The plan of campaign on this line was made with the distinct understanding that *four* army corps should be employed, and that the Navy should co-operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up James River.

To-day I have learned that the First Corps, which by the President's order was to embrace four divisions and one division (Blenker's) of the Second Corps, have been withdrawn altogether from this line of operations and from the Army of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am informed, the Navy has not the means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunboats up James River for fear of the Merrimac.

The above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by Major-General McDowell and Brigadier-Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and was concurred in by Major-General McClellan, who first proposed Urbana as our base.

This army being reduced by 45,000 troops, some of them among the best in the service, and without the support of the Navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for.

I command the James River column, and I left my camp near Newport News the morning of the 4th instant. I only succeeded in getting my artillery ashore the afternoon of the day before, and one of my divisions had not all arrived in camp the day I left, and for the want of transportation has not yet joined me. So you will observe that not a day was lost in the advance, and in fact we marched so quickly and so rapidly, that many of our animals were twenty-four and forty-eight hours without a ration of forage. But, notwithstanding the rapidity of our advance, we were stopped by a line of defense 9 or 10 miles long, strongly fortified by breastworks erected nearly the whole distance behind a stream or succession of ponds, nowhere fordable, one terminus being Yorktown and the other ending in the James River, which is commanded by the enemy's gunboats. Yorktown is fortified all around with bastioned works, and on the water side it and Gloucester are so strong that the Navy are afraid to attack either.

The approaches on one side are generally through low, swampy, or thickly-wooded ground, over roads which we are obliged to repair or to make before we can get forward our carriages. The enemy is in great force, and is constantly receiving re-enforcements from the two rivers. The line in front of us is therefore one of the strongest ever opposed to an invading force in any country.

You will then ask why I advocated such a line for our operations. My reasons are few, but I think good.

With proper assistance from the Navy we could take Yorktown, and then, with gunboats on both rivers, we could beat any force opposed to us on Warwick River, because the shot and shell from the gunboats would nearly overlap across the Peninsula; so that if the enemy should retreat—and retreat he must—he would have a long way to go without rail or steam transportation, and every soul of his army must fall into our hands or be destroyed.

Another reason for my supporting the new base and plan was that this line, it was expected, would furnish water transportation nearly to Richmond.

Now, supposing we succeed in breaking through the line in front of us, what can we do next? The roads are very bad, and if the enemy retains command of James River and we do not first reduce Yorktown it would be impossible for us to subsist this army three marches beyond where it is now. As the roads are at present it is with the utmost difficulty that we can subsist it in the position it now occupies.

You will see, therefore, by what I have said that the force originally intended for the capture of Richmond should be all sent forward. If I thought the four army corps necessary when I supposed the Navy would co-operate, and when I judged of the obstacles to be encountered by what I learned from maps and the opinions of officers long stationed at Fort Monroe and from all other sources, how much more should I think the full complement of troops requisite now that the Navy cannot co-operate, and now that the strength of the enemy's lines and the number of his guns and men prove to be almost immeasurably greater than I had been led to expect. The line in front of us, in the opinion of all the military men here who are at all competent to judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and the force of the enemy capable of being increased beyond the numbers we now have to oppose to him. Independently of the strength of the lines in front of us and of the force of the enemy behind them, we

cannot advance until we get command of either York River or James River. The efficient co-operation of the Navy is therefore absolutely essential, and so I considered it when I voted to change our base from the Potomac to Fort Monroe.

An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown, and if several strong gunboats could be sent up James River also our success will be certain and complete and the rebellion will soon be put down.

On the other hand, we must butt against the enemy's works with heavy artillery, and a great waste of time, life, and material.

If we break through and advance, both our flanks will be assailed from two great water-courses in the hands of the enemy; our supplies would give out; and the enemy, equal, if not superior, in numbers, would, with the other advantages, beat and destroy this army.

The greatest master of the art of war has said "that if you would invade a country successfully, you must have one line of operations and one army under one general." But what is our condition? The State of Virginia is made to constitute the command, in part or wholly, of some six generals, viz: Fremont, Banks, McDowell, Wool, Burnside, and McClellan, besides the scrap over the Chesapeake in the care of Dix.

The great battle of the war is to come off here. If we win it, the rebellion will be crushed; if we lose it, the consequences will be more horrible than I care to tell. The plan of campaign I voted for, if carried out with the means proposed, will certainly succeed. If any part of the means proposed are withheld or diverted, I deem it due to myself to say that our success will be uncertain.

It is no doubt agreeable to the commander of the First Corps to have a separate department, and as this letter advocates his return to General McClellan's command, it is proper to state that I am not at all influenced by personal regard or dislike to any of my seniors in rank. If I were to credit all the opinions which have been poured into my ears, I must believe that in regard to my present fine command I owe much to General McDowell and nothing to General McClellan. But I have disregarded all such officiousness, and I have from last July to the present day supported General McClellan and obeyed all his orders with as hearty a good-will as though he had been my brother or the friend to whom I owed most. I shall continue to do so to the last and so long as he is my commander; and I am not desirous to displace him, and would not if I could. He left Washington with the understanding that he was to execute a definite plan of campaign with certain prescribed means. The plan was good and the means sufficient, and without modification the enterprise was certain of success. But with the reduction of force and means the plan is entirely changed, and is now a bad plan, with means insufficient for certain success.

Do not look upon this communication as the offspring of despondency. I never despond, and when you see me working the hardest you may be sure that fortune is frowning upon me. I am working now to my utmost.

Please show this letter to the President, and I should like also that Mr. Stanton should know its contents.

Do me the honor to write to me as soon as you can, and believe me, with perfect respect, your most obedient servant,

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Army Corps.

HON. IRA HARRIS, *United States Senate.*

On the 7th of April, and before the arrival of the divisions of Generals Hooker, Richardson, and Casey, I received the following dispatches from the President and Secretary of War:

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862—8 p. m.

General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:

Yours of 11 a. m. to-day received.* Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's brigade, under your orders, is not, and will not, be interfered with. You now have over 100,000 troops with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. This will probably use time as advantageously as you can.†

A. LINCOLN,

President.

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862—2 p. m.

General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:

The President directs me to say that your dispatch to him has been received. General Sumner's corps is on the road to join you and will go forward as fast as possible.

* See "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

† Reply on p. 11.

Franklin's division is now on the advance toward Manassas. There is no means of transportation here to send it forward in time to be of service in your present operations. Telegraph frequently, and all in the power of the Government shall be done to sustain you as occasion may require.*

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

By the 9th of April I had acquired a pretty good knowledge of the position and strength of the enemy's works and the obstacles to be overcome. On that day I received the following letter from the President:

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.

MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it—certainly not without reluctance.

After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks' corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over 100,000 with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and *en route* to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all *en route* to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?

As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away.

I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time, and, if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and re-enforcements than you can by re-enforcements alone. And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

With great deference to the opinions and wishes of His Excellency the President, I most respectfully beg leave to refer to the facts which I have presented and those contained in the accompanying letter of General Keyes, with the reports of General Barnard and other officers, as furnishing a reply to the above letter. His Excellency could not

* Reply on p. 11.

judge of the formidable character of the works before us as well as if he had been on the ground; and whatever might have been his desire for prompt action (certainly no greater than mine), I feel confident if he could have made a personal inspection of the enemy's defenses he would have forbidden me risking the safety of the army and the possible successes of the campaign on a sanguinary assault of an advantageous and formidable position, which, even if successful, could not have been followed up to any other or better result than would have been reached by the regular operations of a siege. Still less could I forego the conclusions of my most instructed judgment for the mere sake of avoiding the personal consequences intimated in the President's dispatch.

The following extracts from the report of the chief engineer (Brig. Gen. J. G. Barnard) embody the result of our reconnaissances, and give with some degree of detail the character and strength of the defenses of Yorktown and the Warwick and some of the obstacles which the army contended against and overcame:

Extracts from General Barnard's report.

The accompanying drawing (map No. 2) gives with accuracy the outline and armament of the fortifications of Yorktown proper, with the detached works immediately connected with it.

The three bastioned fronts looking toward our approaches appear to have been earliest built, and have about 15 feet thickness of parapet and 8 feet to 10 feet depth of ditch, the width varying much, but never being less at top of scarp than 15 feet—I think generally much more.

The works extending around the town from the western salient of fronts just mentioned appeared to have been finished during the past winter and spring. They have formidable profiles, 18 feet thickness of parapet and generally 10 feet depth of ditch. The water batteries had generally 18 feet parapet; the guns in barbette. They were (as well as all the works mentioned) carefully constructed, with well-made sod revetments.

There were numerous traverses between the guns, and ample magazines; how sufficient in bomb-proof qualities I am unable to say. The two first guns of the work on the heights bear upon the water as well as the land, and were of heavy caliber. The list herewith gives all the guns in position or for which there were emplacements. The vacant emplacements were all occupied before the evacuation by siege guns, rifled 4½-inch 24-pounders and 18-pounders.

In Fort Magruder (the first exterior work) there were found one 8-inch columbiad, one 42-pounder, and one 8-inch siege howitzer, the two former in barbette. The sketch will show the emplacements for guns on field and siege carriages, making, I think, with the foregoing, twenty-two. Two of these were placed behind traverses, with embrasures covered by blindages. The two external redoubts, with the connecting parapets, formed a re-entrant with the fronts of attack, and all the guns bore on our approaches.

It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches were swept by the fire of at least forty-nine guns, nearly all of which were heavy, and many of them the most formidable guns known. Besides that, two-thirds of the guns of the water batteries and all the guns of Gloucester bore on our right batteries, though under disadvantageous circumstances.

The ravine behind which the left of the Yorktown fronts of attack was placed was not very difficult, as the heads formed depressions in front of their left, imperfectly seen by their fire, and from which access could be had to the ditches; but we could not be sure of this fact before the evacuation. The enemy held, by means of a slight breast-work and rifle trenches, a position in advance of the heads of these ravines as far forward as the burned house. The ravines which head between the Yorktown fortifications and the exterior works are deep and intricate. They were tolerably well seen, however, by the works which run westwardly from the Yorktown works, and which were too numerous and complicated to be traced on paper.

Fort Magruder, the first lunette on our left, appears to have been built at an early period. The external connection between this work was first a rifle trench, probably afterwards enlarged into a parapet, with external ditch and an emplacement for four guns in or near the small redan in the center. Behind this they had constructed numerous epaulements, with connecting *boyans* not fully arranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended, probably, to protect their camps and reserves against the destructive effects of our artillery. From the "redoubt" these trenches and epaulements

ments ran to the woods and rivulet which forms one head of the Warwick, and continue almost without break to connect with the works at Wynn's Mill. This stream just mentioned, whatever be its name (the term "Warwick," according to some, applying only to the tidal channel from the James River up as high as Lee's Mill), was inundated by a number of dams from near where its head is crossed by the epaulements mentioned down to Lee's Mill.

Below Lee's Mill the Warwick follows a tortuous course through salt marshes of 200 yards or 300 yards in width, from which the land rises up boldly to a height of 30 or 40 feet.

The first group of works is at Wynn's Mill, where there is a dam and bridge. The next is to guard another dam between Wynn's and Lee's Mills. (This is the point attacked by General Smith on the 16th ultimo, and where Lieutenant Merrill was wounded. The object of the attack was merely to prevent the further construction of works and feel the strength of the position.) A work, of what extent is not now known, was at the sharp angle of the stream just above Lee's Mill, and a formidable group of works was at Lee's Mill, where there was also a dam and bridge. From Lee's Mill a line of works extends across Mulberry Island, or is supposed to do so. At Southall's Landing is another formidable group of works, and from here, too, they extend apparently across to the James River. These groups of field works were connected by rifle trenches or parapets for nearly the whole distance. They are far more extensive than may be supposed from the mention of them I make, and every kind of obstruction which the country affords, such as abatis, marsh, inundation, &c., was skillfully used. The line is certainly one of the most extensive known to modern times.

The country on both sides of the Warwick, from near Yorktown down, is a dense forest, with few clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impassable during the heavy rains we have constantly had, except where our own labors had corduroyed them.

If we could have broken the enemy's line across the isthmus we could have invested Yorktown, and it must, with its garrison, have soon fallen into our hands. It was not deemed practicable, considering the strength of that line and the difficulty of handling our forces (owing to the impracticable character of the country), to do so.

If we could take Yorktown or drive the enemy out of that place the enemy's line was no longer tenable. This we could do by siege operations. It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault.

The plan of the approaches and their defenses, as determined upon and finally executed, is exhibited on the accompanying map. It was, in words, to open the first parallel as near as possible to the works of the enemy, and under its protection to establish almost simultaneously batteries along the whole front, extending from York River on the right to the Warwick on the left, a chord of about 1 mile in length. The principal approaches were directed against the east end of the main work, which was most heavily armed, and bore both on the water and land, and lay between Wormley's Creek and York River. There, also, were placed the most of the batteries designed to act against the land front, to enfilade the water batteries and to act upon Gloucester.

I designed at the earliest moment to open simultaneously with several batteries, and as soon as the enemy's guns which swept the neck of land between Wormley's Creek and the Warwick were crippled and their fire kept down, to push the trenches as far forward as necessary and to assault Yorktown and the adjacent works.

The approaches to the batteries, the necessary bridges, and the roads to the depots had been vigorously pushed to completion by the troops under Generals Heintzelman and Sumner, and were available for infantry, and in some instances for artillery, on the 17th of April, when the batteries and their connections were commenced and labor upon them kept up night and day until finished. Some of the batteries on easy ground and concealed from the view of the enemy were early completed and armed and held ready for any emergency, but not permitted to open, as the return fire of the enemy would interfere too much with the labor on other and more important works. The completion of

the more exposed and heaviest batteries was delayed by storms, preventing the landing of guns and ammunition.

It having been discovered that the enemy were receiving artillery stores at the wharf in Yorktown, on May 1 Battery No. 1 was opened with effect upon the wharf and town.

On the 22d of April General Franklin, with his division from General McDowell's corps, had arrived and reported to me. The garrison of Gloucester Point had been re-enforced and the works strengthened; but as this division was too small to detach to the Severn and no more troops could be spared, I determined to act on Gloucester, by disembarking it on the north bank of the York River, under the protection of the gunboats. The troops were mainly kept on board ship while the necessary preparations were made for landing them and supporting them in case of necessity. For a full account of this labor I refer to the report of Lieut. Col. B. S. Alexander, of the Engineer Corps, detailed for this expedition.

While the siege works were being rapidly completed, the roads on the left wing necessary for communication and advance were opened and corduroyed over the marshes, batteries were erected to silence the enemy's guns and drive him from his works at Wynn's and Lee's Mills, preparatory to the general attack. Active reconnaissances were continually going on and attempts in force made to drive the enemy from the banks.

The result of various reconnaissances, made under the immediate direction of General W. F. Smith, commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, led to the belief that the weakest point of that part of the enemy's lines was opposite a field where it was ascertained that there was a dam covered by a battery known to contain at least one gun.

It was determined to push a strong reconnaissance on this point, to silence the enemy's fire, and ascertain the actual strength of the position. Being prepared to sustain the reconnoitering party by a real attack, if found expedient, General W. F. Smith was directed to undertake the operation on the 16th of April. He silenced the fire of the enemy's guns, discovered the existence of other works previously concealed and unknown, and sent a strong party across the stream, which was finally forced to retire with some loss. Smith intrenched himself in a position immediately overlooking the dam and the enemy's works, so as to keep them under control and prevent the enemy from using the dam as a means of crossing the Warwick to annoy us.

Many times toward the end of the month the enemy attempted to drive in our pickets and take our rifle pits near Yorktown, but always without success.

As the siege progressed it was with great difficulty that the rifle pits on the right could be excavated and held, so little covering could be made against the hot fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry. Their guns continued firing up to a late hour of the night of the 3d of May.

Our batteries would have been ready to open on the morning of the 6th May at latest; but on the morning of the 4th it was discovered that the enemy had already been compelled to evacuate his position during the night, leaving behind him all his heavy guns, uninjured, and a large amount of ammunition and supplies. For the details of the labors of the siege I refer to the accompanying reports and journals of Brig. Gen. J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, charged with the selection, laying out, and completion of the approaches and batteries; of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, chief of artillery, charged with arming and supplying with ammunition all the siege and field batteries; and of Brig. Gen.

Fitz John Porter, director of the siege, to whom was assigned the guarding of the trenches, the assembling and distribution of the working parties, &c.

Early in the morning of the 4th, upon the enemy's abandoning his lines at Yorktown, I ordered all the available cavalry force, with four batteries of horse artillery, under Brigadier-General Stoneman, chief of cavalry, in immediate pursuit, by the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, with orders to harass the enemy's rear and try to cut off such of his forces as had taken the Lee's Mill and Williamsburg road.

General Heintzelman was directed to send Hooker's division forward on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road to support General Stoneman, and Smith was ordered to proceed with his division on the Lee's Mill and Williamsburg road for the same purpose. Afterward the divisions of Generals Kearny, Couch, and Casey were put *en route*, the first on the Yorktown road and the others on the Lee's Mill road. These roads unite about a quarter of a mile south of Fort Magruder, and are connected by cross roads at several points between Yorktown and Williamsburg. After these directions had been given General Sumner (the officer second in rank in the Army of the Potomac) was ordered to proceed to the front and take immediate charge of operations until my arrival.

General Stoneman moved forward promptly with his command, consisting of four batteries of horse artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, the First and Sixth United States Cavalry, the Third Pennsylvania, and Eighth Illinois, and Barker's squadron, meeting with but little opposition until he arrived in front of the enemy's works about 2 miles east of Williamsburg.

At a point about 8 miles from Yorktown, in accordance with my instructions, he detached General Emory, with Benson's battery, the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry (Colonel Averell), and Barker's squadron to gain the Lee's Mill road, and endeavor, with the assistance of General Smith, to cut off the portion of the enemy's rear guard which had taken that route. General Emory had some sharp skirmishes with a regiment of cavalry and a battery under General Stuart, and drove them in the direction of Lee's Mill.

General Smith, having met with obstructions in his front, had transferred his column by a cross road to the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, so that General Emory, finding no force to co-operate with him, was unable to cut off the rear guard, and they succeeded in escaping by a circuitous route along the bank of the James River.

The position in which General Stoneman encountered the enemy is about 4 miles in extent, the right resting on College Creek and the left on Queen's Creek, nearly three-fourths of its front being covered by tributaries of these two creeks, upon which there are ponds.

The ground between the heads of the boundary streams is a cultivated plain, across which a line of detached works had been constructed, consisting of Fort Magruder, a large work in the center with a bastion front, and twelve other redoubts and epaulements for field guns.

The parapet of Fort Magruder is about 6 feet high and 9 feet thick, the ditch 9 feet wide and 9 feet deep, filled with water. The length of the interior crest is about 600 yards. The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of small dimensions, having faces of about 40 yards. The woods in front of the position were felled and the open ground in front of the works was dotted with numerous rifle pits.

The roads leading from the lower part of the Peninsula to Williamsburg—one along the York River (the Yorktown road) and the other

along the James (the Lee's Mill road)—unite between the heads of the tributary streams a short distance in front of Fort Magruder, by which they are commanded, and debouch from the woods just before uniting. A branch from the James River road leaves it about $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles below Fort Magruder, and unites with the road from Allen's Landing to Williamsburg, which crosses the tributary of College Creek over a dam at the outlet of a pond and passes just in rear of the line of works, being commanded by the three redoubts on the right of the line. At about the same distance from Fort Magruder a branch leaves the York River road and crosses the tributary of Queen's Creek on a dam, and passing over the position and through the works in its rear finally enters Williamsburg. This road is commanded by redoubts on the left of the line of the works.

General Stoneman debouched from the woods with his advance guard (consisting of a part of the First U. S. Cavalry and one section of Gibson's battery, under the command of General Cooke), and the enemy immediately opened on him with several field pieces from Fort Magruder, having the correct range, and doing some execution. Gibson's battery was brought into position as rapidly as the deep mud would permit and returned the fire, while the Sixth U. S. Cavalry was sent to feel the enemy's left. This regiment passed one redoubt, which it found unoccupied, and appeared in the rear of a second, when a strong cavalry force, with infantry and artillery, came down upon it; whereupon the regiment was withdrawn. The rear squadron, under command of Captain Sanders, repelled a charge of the enemy's cavalry in the most gallant manner. In the mean time the enemy was being reinforced by infantry, and the artillery fire becoming very hot, General Stoneman, having no infantry to carry the works, ordered the withdrawal of the battery. This was accomplished, with the exception of one piece, which could not be extricated from the mud. The enemy attempted to prevent the movement, but their charges were met by the First U. S. Cavalry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Grier, and they were driven back, losing several officers and one stand of colors. General Stoneman then took up a defensive position a short distance in the rear of the first, to await the arrival of the infantry.

The advance of General Smith's column reached Skiff Creek about 11.30 o'clock, and found the bridge over that stream in flames and the road impassable. A practicable route to the Yorktown road having been discovered, the division, by order of General Sumner, moved on by that road, and reached General Stoneman's position about 5.30 o'clock. General Sumner, arriving with it, assumed command.

Generals Heintzelman and Keyes also arrived. During the afternoon of the 4th, near the Half-way House, the head of General Hooker's column encountered Smith's division filing into the road, and was obliged to halt between three and four hours until it had passed. General Hooker then followed on, and at Cheesecake Church turned off, by General Heintzelman's direction, taking a cross road, and moved out on the Lee's Mill road, thus changing places with General Smith. Marching part of the night, he came in sight of Fort Magruder early in the morning of the 5th.

General Smith's division having been deployed, General Sumner ordered an attack on the works in his front; but the lines having been thrown into confusion while moving through the dense forest and darkness coming on, the attempt for that night was abandoned. The troops bivouacked in the woods, and a heavy rain began, which con-

tinued until the morning of the 6th, making the roads, already in very bad condition, almost impassable.

During the morning of the 5th General Sumner reconnoitered the position in his front, and at 11 o'clock ordered Hancock's brigade, of Smith's division, to take possession of a work on the enemy's left, which had been found to be unoccupied. The remainder of Smith's division occupied the woods in front without being actually engaged.

The divisions of Couch and Casey had received orders during the night to march at daylight, but on account of the terrible condition of the roads and other impediments were not able to reach the field until after 1 o'clock p. m., at which time the first brigade of Couch's division arrived, and was posted in the center, on Hooker's right. The other two brigades came up during the afternoon, followed by Casey's division.

In the mean time General Hooker, having reconnoitered the enemy's position, began the attack at 7.30 a. m., and for a while silenced the guns of Fort Magruder and cleared the ground in his front; but the enemy being continually re-enforced, until their strength greatly exceeded his, made attack after attack, endeavoring to turn his left.

For several hours his division struggled gallantly against the superior numbers of the enemy. Five guns of Webber's battery were lost, and between 3 and 4 o'clock his ammunition began to give out. The loss had been heavy and the exhaustion of the troops was very great. At this time the division of General Kearny came up, who at 9 a. m. had received orders to re-enforce Hooker, and who had succeeded by the greatest exertions in passing Casey's troops and pushing on to the front through the deep mud. General Kearny at once gallantly attacked and thereby prevented the loss of another battery, and drove the enemy back at every point, enabling General Hooker to extricate himself from his position and withdraw his wearied troops. Peck's brigade, of Couch's division, as has been mentioned before, was immediately on its arrival ordered by General Sumner to deploy on Hooker's right. This was promptly done, and the attacks of the enemy at that point were repulsed. General Peck held his position until late in the afternoon, when he was relieved by the other two brigades of Couch's division, and they were in quiet possession of the ground, when night closed the contest. The vigorous action of these troops relieved General Hooker considerably. General Emory had been left with his command on the night of the 4th to guard the branch of the Lee's Mill road which leads to Allen's farm, and on the morning of the 5th it was ascertained that by this route the enemy's right could be turned. A request for infantry for this purpose was made to General Heintzelman, who late in the afternoon sent four regiments and two batteries of Kearny's division—the first disposable troops he had—and directed General Emory to make the attack. With these re-enforcements his force amounted to about 3,000 men and three batteries. General Emory, on account of want of knowledge of the ground and the lateness of the hour, did not succeed in this movement. It involved some risks, but if successful might have produced important results.

At 11 a. m., as before mentioned, General Smith received orders from General Sumner to send one brigade across a dam on our right, to occupy a redoubt on the left of the enemy's line. Hancock's brigade was selected for this purpose. He crossed the dam, took possession of the first redoubt, and afterward finding the second one vacated he occupied that also, and sent for re-enforcements to enable him to advance farther and take the next redoubt, which commanded

the plain between his position and Fort Magruder, and would have enabled him to take in reverse and cut the communication of the troops engaged with Generals Hooker and Kearny.

The enemy soon began to show himself in strength before him, and as his rear and right flank were somewhat exposed, he repeated his request for re-enforcements. General Smith was twice ordered to join him with the rest of his division, but each time the order was countermanded at the moment of execution, General Sumner not being willing to weaken the center. At length, in reply to General Hancock's repeated messages for more troops, General Sumner sent him an order to fall back to his first position, the execution of which General Hancock deferred as long as possible, being unwilling to give up the advantage already gained and fearing to expose his command by such a movement.

During the progress of these events I had remained at Yorktown to complete the preparations for the departure of General Franklin's and other troops to West Point by water and to make the necessary arrangements with the naval commander for his co-operation.

By pushing General Franklin, well supported by water, to the right bank of the Pamunkey, opposite West Point, it was hoped to force the enemy to abandon whatever works he might have on the Peninsula below that point or be cut off. It was of paramount importance that the arrangements to this end should be promptly made at an early hour of the morning. I had sent two of my aides (Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzer and Major Hammerstein) to observe the operations in front, with instructions to report to me everything of importance that might occur. I received no information from them leading me to suppose that there was anything occurring of more importance than a simple affair of a rear guard until about 1 p. m., when a dispatch arrived from one of them that everything was not progressing favorably. This was confirmed a few minutes later by the reports of Governor Sprague and Major Hammerstein, who came directly from the scene of action.

Completing the necessary arrangements, I returned to my camp without delay, rode rapidly to the front, a distance of some 14 miles, through roads much obstructed by troops and wagons, and reached the field between 4 and 5 p. m., in time to take a rapid survey of the ground. I soon learned that there was no direct communication between our center and the left, under General Heintzelman. The center was chiefly in the nearer edge of the woods, situated between us and the enemy. As heavy firing was heard in the direction of General Hancock's command, I immediately ordered General Smith to proceed with his two remaining brigades to support that part of the line. General Naglee, with his brigade, received similar orders. I then directed our center to advance to the farther edge of the woods mentioned above, which was done, and I attempted to open direct communication with General Heintzelman, but was prevented by the marshy state of the ground in the direction in which the attempt was made.

Before Generals Smith and Naglee could reach the field of General Hancock's operations, although they moved with great rapidity, he had been confronted by a superior force. Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited their onset and then turned upon them, and after some terrific volleys of musketry he charged them with the bayonet, routing and dispersing their whole force, killing, wounding, and capturing from 500 to 600 men; he himself losing only 31 men. This was one of the most brilliant engagements of the war, and General Hancock merits the

highest praise for the soldierly qualities displayed and his perfect appreciation of the vital importance of his position.

Night put an end to the operations here, and all the troops who had been engaged in this contest slept on the muddy field, without shelter and many without food.

Notwithstanding the report I received from General Heintzelman during the night that General Hooker's division had suffered so much that it could not be relied upon next day and that Kearny's could not do more than hold its own without re-enforcements, being satisfied that the result of Hancock's engagement was to give us possession of the decisive point of the battle-field, during the night I countermanded the order for the advance of the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson, and directed them to return to Yorktown, to proceed to West Point by water.

Our loss during the day, the greater part of which was sustained by Hooker's division, was as follows: Killed, 456; wounded, 1,400; missing, 372. Total, 2,228.*

On the next morning we found the enemy's position abandoned, and occupied Fort Magruder and the town of Williamsburg, which was filled with the enemy's wounded, to whose assistance eighteen of their surgeons were sent by General J. E. Johnston, the officer in command. Several guns and caissons, which the enemy could not carry off on account of the mud, were secured. Colonel Averell was sent forward at once with a strong cavalry force to endeavor to overtake the enemy's rear guard. He found several guns abandoned and picked up a large number of stragglers, but the condition of the roads and the state of his supplies forced him to return after advancing a few miles.

It is my opinion that the enemy opposed us here with only a portion of his army. When our cavalry first appeared there was nothing but the enemy's rear guard in Williamsburg. Other troops were brought back during the night and the next day to hold the works as long as possible, in order to gain time for the trains, &c., already well on their way to Richmond, to make their escape. Our troops were greatly exhausted by the laborious march through the mud from their positions in front of Yorktown and by the protracted battle through which they had just passed. Many of them were out of rations and ammunition, and one division, in its anxiety to make a prompt movement, had marched with empty haversacks. The supply trains had been forced out of the roads on the 4th and 5th to allow the troops and artillery to pass to the front, and the roads were now in such a state, after thirty-six hours' continuous rain, that it was almost impossible to pass even empty wagons over them. General Hooker's division had suffered so severely that it was in no condition to follow the enemy, even if the roads had been good. Under these circumstances an immediate pursuit was impossible.

Steps were at once taken to care for and remove the wounded, and to bring up provisions, ammunition, and forage.

The condition of the roads, as has been said, rendered it next to impossible to accomplish this by land from Yorktown. A temporary depot was therefore promptly established on Queen's Creek, and supplies drawn, and the wounded shipped from that place.

The divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson were sent from Yorktown by water to the right bank of the Pamunkey, in the vicinity of West Point. The remaining divisions, the trains, and the reserve artillery moved subsequently by land.

* But see revised statement, p. 450.

Early on the morning of the 7th General Franklin had completed the disembarkation of his division, and had placed it in a good position to cover the landing place, both his flanks and a large portion of the front being protected by water.

Dana's brigade, of Sedgwick's division, arrived during the morning.

At about 9 a. m. a large force of the enemy appeared, consisting of Whiting's division and other troops, and between 10 and 11 they attacked the part of the line held by Newton's brigade. The action continued until 3 p. m., when the enemy retired, all his attacks having been repulsed. This affair, the most important in which the division had yet been engaged, was highly creditable to General Franklin and his command. For the details I refer to his report, which is herewith submitted. Our loss was 49 killed, 104 wounded, and 41 missing. Total, 194, which includes a large proportion of officers.*

Cavalry reconnaissances were sent out from Williamsburg on the 6th and 7th, and on the 8th General Stoneman moved with an advance guard of cavalry, artillery, and infantry to open communication with General Franklin.

As soon as our supplies had been received and the condition of the roads had become a little better, though still very bad, the advance of the remaining troops was begun, Smith's division moving on the 8th. On the 10th headquarters were at Roper's Church, 19 miles from Williamsburg, all the divisions which had moved by land, except Hooker's, being in the vicinity of that place.

We were now in direct communication with the portion of the army which had gone by water, and we began to draw supplies from Eltham.

On account of the small number and narrowness of the roads in this neighborhood movements were difficult and slow.

On the 15th headquarters and the divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sykes, and Smith reached Cumberland, which was made a temporary depot. Couch and Casey were then near New Kent Court-House, Hooker and Kearny near Roper's Church, and Richardson and Sedgwick near Eltham.

On the 14th and 15th much rain fell.

On the 15th and 16th the divisions of Franklin, Smith, and Porter were with great difficulty moved to White House, 5 miles in advance. So bad was the road that the train of one of these divisions required thirty-six hours to pass over this short distance. General Stoneman had occupied this place some days before, after several successful skirmishes, in which our cavalry proved superior to that of the enemy. The reports of these affairs are appended.

About this time, with the consent of the President, two additional corps were organized, viz, the Fifth Provisional Corps, consisting of the divisions of Porter and Sykes and the reserve artillery, under the command of General F. J. Porter, and the Sixth Provisional Corps, consisting of the divisions of Franklin and Smith, under the command of General W. B. Franklin.

Headquarters reached White House on the 16th, and a permanent depot was at once organized there.

On the 19th headquarters and the corps of Porter and Franklin moved to Tunstall's Station, 5 miles from White House.

On the 20th more rain fell.

On the 21st the position of the troops was as follows: Stoneman's advance guard 1 mile from New Bridge; Franklin's corps 3 miles from New Bridge, with Porter's corps at supporting distance in its rear;

* But see revised statement, p. 618.

Sumner's corps on the railroad, about 3 miles from the Chickahominy, connecting the right with the left; Keyes' corps on New Kent road, near Bottom's Bridge, with Heintzelman's corps at supporting distance in the rear.

The ford at Bottom's Bridge was in our possession, and the rebuilding of the bridge, which had been destroyed by the enemy, was commenced. On the 22d headquarters moved to Cold Harbor.

On the 26th the railroad was in operation as far as the Chickahominy, and the railroad bridge across that stream nearly completed.

CHAPTER II.

When, on the 20th of May, our advanced light troops reached the banks of the Chickahominy River at Bottom's Bridge, they found that this, as well as the railroad bridge about a mile above, had been destroyed by the enemy. The Chickahominy in this vicinity is about 40 feet wide, fringed with a dense growth of heavy forest trees, and bordered by low, marshy bottom-lands, varying from half a mile to a mile in width.

Our operations embraced that part of the river between Bottom's and Meadow Bridges, which covered the principal approaches to Richmond from the east. Within these limits the firm ground lying above high-water mark seldom approaches near the river on either bank, and no locality was found within this section where the high ground came near the stream on both sides. It was subject to frequent, sudden, and great variations in the volume of water, and a rise of a few feet overflowed the bottom-lands on both sides. At low water it could be forded at almost any point, but during high water it rose above a fording stage, and could then be crossed only at the few points where bridges had been constructed. These bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy on our approach, and it was necessary not only to reconstruct these, but to build several others.

The west bank of the river opposite the New and Mechanicsville Bridges was bordered by elevated bluffs, which afforded the enemy commanding positions to fortify, establish his batteries, enfilading the approaches upon the two principal roads to Richmond on our right, and resist the reconstruction of the important bridges. This obliged us to select other less exposed points for our crossings.

As the enemy was not in great force opposite Bottom's Bridge on the arrival of our left at that point, and as it was important to secure a lodgment upon the right bank before he should have time to concentrate his forces and contest the passage, I forthwith ordered Casey's division to ford the river and occupy the opposite heights. This was promptly done on the 20th, and reconnaissances were at once pushed out in advance.

These troops were directed to throw up defenses in an advantageous position to secure our left flank. General Heintzelman's corps was thrown forward in support, and Bottom's Bridge immediately rebuilt.

In the mean time our center and right were advanced to the river above, and on the 24th we carried the village of Mechanicsville, driving the enemy out with our artillery, and forcing them across the bridge, which they destroyed. General Naglee, on the same day, dislodged a force of the enemy from the vicinity of the "Seven Pines," on the Bottom's Bridge road, and our advance on the left secured a strong position near that place.

All the information obtained from deserters, negroes, and spies indicated that the enemy occupied in force all the approaches to Richmond from the east, and that he intended to dispute every step of our advance beyond the Chickahominy and the passage of the stream opposite our right. That their army was superior to ours in numbers did not admit of a doubt. Strong defenses had been constructed around Richmond.

Impressed by these facts with the necessity of strengthening the army for the struggle, I did not fail to urge repeatedly upon my superiors the importance of re-enforcing the Army of the Potomac with every disposable man in order to insure the success of our attack upon the rebel capital.

On the 10th of May I telegraphed as follows :

CAMP AT EWELL'S FARM,
Three miles beyond Williamsburg, May 10, 1862—5 a. m.

From the information reaching me from every source I regard it as certain that the enemy will meet us with all his force on or near the Chickahominy. They can concentrate many more men than I have, and are collecting troops from all quarters, especially well-disciplined troops from the South. Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much reduced our numbers, and will continue to do so. I shall fight the rebel army with whatever force I may have, but duty requires me to urge that every effort be made to re-enforce me without delay with all the disposable troops in Eastern Virginia, and that we concentrate all our forces as far as possible to fight the great battle now impending and to make it decisive.

It is possible that the enemy may abandon Richmond without a serious struggle, but I do not believe he will, and it would be unwise to count upon anything but a stubborn and desperate defense—a life-and-death contest. I see no other hope for him than to fight this battle, and we must win it. I shall fight them whatever their force may be, but I ask for every man that the Department can send me. No troops should now be left unemployed. Those who entertain the opinion that the rebels will abandon Richmond without a struggle are in my judgment badly advised, and do not comprehend their situation, which is one requiring desperate measures.

I beg that the President and Secretary will maturely weigh what I say, and leave nothing undone to comply with my request. If I am not re-enforced, it is probable that I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers, strongly intrenched. I do not think it will be at all possible for me to bring more than 70,000 men upon the field of battle.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

On the 14th of May I sent the following telegram to the President :

CAMP AT CUMBERLAND, *May 14, 1862.*

I have more than once telegraphed to the Secretary of War, stating that in my opinion the enemy were concentrating all their available force to fight this army in front of Richmond, and that such ought to be their policy. I have received no reply whatever to any of these telegraphs. I beg leave to repeat their substance to Your Excellency, and to ask that kind consideration which you have ever accorded to my representations and views. All my information from every source accessible to me establishes the fixed purpose of the rebels to defend Richmond against this army by offering us battle with all the troops they can collect from east, west, and south, and my own opinion is confirmed by that of all my commanders whom I have been able to consult.

Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much weakened my force, and will continue to do so. I cannot bring into actual battle against the enemy more than 80,000 men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in position, probably intrenched, a much larger force, perhaps double my numbers. It is possible that Richmond may be abandoned without a serious struggle, but the enemy are actually in great strength between here and there, and it would be unwise, and even insane, for me to calculate upon anything but a stubborn and desperate resistance. If they should abandon Richmond it may well be that it is done with the purpose of making the stand at some place in Virginia south or west of there, and we should be in condition to press them without delay. The Confederate leaders must employ their utmost efforts against this army in Virginia, and they will be supported by the whole body

of their military officers, among whom there may be said to be no Union feeling, as there is also very little among the higher class of citizens in the seceding States.

I have found no fighting men left in this Peninsula. All are in the ranks of the opposing foe.

Even if more troops than I now have should prove unnecessary for purposes of military occupation, our greatest display of imposing force in the capital of the rebel Government will have the best moral effect. I most respectfully and earnestly urge upon Your Excellency that the opportunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you will cause this army to be re-enforced without delay by all the disposable troops of the Government. I ask for every man that the War Department can send me [by water*]. Any commander of the re-enforcements whom Your Excellency may designate will be acceptable to me, whatever expression I may have heretofore addressed to you on that subject.

I will fight the enemy, whatever their force may be, with whatever force I may have, and I firmly believe that we shall beat them, but our triumph should be made decisive and complete. The soldiers of this army love their Government and will fight well in its support. You may rely upon them. They have confidence in me as their general and in you as their President. Strong re-enforcements will at least save the lives of many of them. The greater our force, the more perfect will be our combinations and the less our loss.

For obvious reasons I beg you to give immediate consideration to this communication, and to inform me fully at the earliest moment of your final determination.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President of the United States.

To which, on the 18th of May, I received this reply: †

WASHINGTON, May 18 [17]—2 p. m.

GENERAL: Your dispatch to the President asking re-enforcements has been received and carefully considered.

The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely, and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac and York Rivers than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered—keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all possible attack—so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate, so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond. It is believed that this communication can be safely established either north or south of the Pamunkey River. In any event you will be able to prevent the main body of the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond and falling in overwhelming force upon General McDowell. He will move with between 35,000 and 40,000 men.

A copy of the instructions to General McDowell are with this. The specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any danger to the capital of the nation.

At your earnest call for re-enforcements he is sent forward to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington; and you will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with each other by telegraph or otherwise as frequently as may be necessary for sufficient co-operation. When General McDowell is in position on your right his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff officers to be prepared to supply him by that route.

The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock and of the forces with which he moves forward.

By order of the President:

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Commanding Army of the Potomac, before Richmond.

* The words "by water" are in the dispatch as received at War Department.

† See also Lincoln to McClellan, May 15, in "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

It will be observed that this order rendered it impossible for me to use the James River as a line of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on the Pamunkey and to approach Richmond from the north.

I had advised and preferred that re-enforcements should be sent by water, for the reasons that their arrival would be more safe and certain, and that I would be left free to rest the army on the James River whenever the navigation of that stream should be opened.

The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to secure the junction, and as the order for General McDowell's march was soon countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of campaign. Had General McDowell joined me by water I could have approached Richmond by the James, and thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one body, instead of being necessarily divided by that stream.

The following is a copy of the instructions to General McDowell : *

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 17, 1862.

GENERAL: Upon being joined by General Shields' division, you will move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, co-operating with the forces under General McClellan now threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey and York Rivers.

While seeking to establish as soon as possible a communication between your left wing and the right wing of General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such position as to cover the capital of the nation against a sudden dash of any large body of the rebel forces.

General McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish communication with your left wing and to prevent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving Richmond and throwing itself upon your column before a junction of the two armies is effected.

A copy of his instructions in regard to the employment of your force is annexed.

By order of the President:

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

General McDOWELL,
Commanding Department of the Rappahannock.

Having some doubts, from the wording of the foregoing orders, as to the extent of my authority over the troops of General McDowell and as to the time when I might anticipate his arrival, on the 21st of May I sent this dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Tunstall's Station, Va., May 21, 1862—11 p. m.

Your dispatch of yesterday, respecting our situation and the batteries of Fort Darling, was received while I was absent with the advance, where I have been all this day. I have communicated personally with Captain Goldsborough and by letter with Captain Smith. The vessels can do nothing without co-operation on land, which I will not be in condition to afford for several days. Circumstances must determine the propriety of a land attack.

It rained again last night, and rain on this soil soon makes the roads incredibly bad for army transportation. I personally crossed the Chickahominy to-day at Bottom's Bridge Ford and went a mile beyond, the enemy being about half a mile in front. I have three regiments on the other bank, guarding the rebuilding of the bridge. Keyes' corps is on the New Kent road, near Bottom's Bridge. Heintzelman is on the same road, within supporting distance. Sumner is on the railroad, connecting right with

*An indorsement, in Secretary Stanton's handwriting, on the original draught of these instructions, states that they were prepared by General Meigs, on consultation of the President, Generals Totten, Meigs and Ripley, and Colonel Taylor. See also memorandum of May 17, in "Correspondence, etc.," Part III, p. 176.

left. Stoneman, with advance guard, is within 1 mile of New Bridge. Franklin, with two divisions, is about 2 miles this side of Stoneman. Porter's division, with the reserves of infantry and artillery, is within supporting distance. Headquarters will probably be at Cold Harbor to-morrow, 1 mile this side of Franklin. All the bridges over the Chickahominy are destroyed. The enemy are in force on every road leading to Richmond within a mile or two west of the stream. Their main body is on the road from New Bridge, encamped along it for 4 or 5 miles, spreading over the open ground on both sides. Johnston's headquarters are about 2 miles beyond the bridge.

All accounts report their numbers as greatly exceeding our own. The position of the rebel forces, the declaration of the Confederate authorities, the resolutions of the Virginia Legislature, the action of the city government, the conduct of the citizens, and all other sources of information accessible to me give positive assurance that our approach to Richmond involves a desperate battle between the opposing armies.

All our divisions are moving toward the foe. I shall advance steadily and carefully, and attack them according to my best judgment and in such manner as to employ my greatest force.

I regret the state of things as to General McDowell's command. We must beat the enemy in front of Richmond. One division added to this army for that effort would do more to protect Washington than his whole force can possibly do anywhere else in the field. The rebels are concentrating from all points for the two battles at Richmond and Corinth. I would still most respectfully suggest the policy of our concentrating here by movements on water. I have heard nothing as to the probabilities of the contemplated junction of McDowell's force with mine. I have no idea when he can start, what are his means of transportation, or when he may be expected to reach this vicinity. I fear there is little hope that he can join me overland in time for the coming battle. Delays on my part will be dangerous. I fear sickness and demoralization. This region is unhealthy for Northern men, and unless kept moving I fear that our soldiers may become discouraged. At present our numbers are weakening from disease, but our men remain in good heart.

I regret also the configuration of the Department of the Rappahannock. It includes a portion even of the city of Richmond. I think that my own department should embrace the entire field of military operations designed for the capture and occupation of that city.

Again, I agree with Your Excellency that one bad general is better than two good ones.

I am not sure that I fully comprehend your orders of the 17th instant, addressed to myself and General McDowell. If a junction is effected before we occupy Richmond, it must necessarily be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg and within my department. This fact, my superior rank, and the express language of the Sixty-second article of war, will place his command under my orders, unless it is otherwise specially directed by Your Excellency; and I consider that he will be under my command, except that I am not to detach any portion of his forces or give any orders which can put him out of position to cover Washington. If I err in my construction, I desire to be at once set right.

Frankness compels me to say, anxious as I am for an increase of force, that the march of McDowell's column upon Richmond by the shortest route will in my opinion uncover Washington as to any interposition by it as completely as its movement by water. The enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg on Washington. Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas.

I desire that the extent of my authority over McDowell may be clearly defined, lest misunderstandings and conflicting views may produce some of those injurious results which a divided command has so often caused. I would respectfully suggest that this danger can only be surely guarded against by explicitly placing General McDowell under my orders in the ordinary way, and holding me strictly responsible for the closest observance of your instructions. I hope, Mr. President, that it is not necessary for me to assure you that your instructions would be observed in the utmost good faith, and that I have no personal feelings which could influence me to disregard them in any particular.

I believe that there is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as I can, but in any event I shall fight it with all the skill, caution, and determination that I possess, and I trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my Government or that it may close my career.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President of the United States.

On the 24th I received the following reply:*

MAY 24, 1862—(*From Washington, 24th.*)

I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields' command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces under General Anderson now opposing General McDowell's advance have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly 15,000 men, and if you succeed in saving the bridges you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the 21st.

A. LINCOLN,
President.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

This information that McDowell's corps would march from Fredericksburg on the following Monday (the 26th), and that he would be under my command, as indicated in my telegram of the 21st, was cheering news, and I now felt confident that we would on his arrival be sufficiently strong to overpower the large army confronting us.

At a late hour on the same day I received the following:

MAY 24, 1862—(*From Washington, 4 p. m.*)

In consequence of General Banks' critical position I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Frémont's force and part of General McDowell's in their rear.†

A. LINCOLN,
President.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

From which it will be seen that I could not expect General McDowell to join me in time to participate in immediate operations in front of Richmond, and on the same evening I replied to the President that I would make my calculations accordingly.

It then only remained for me to make the best use of the forces at my disposal and to avail myself of all artificial auxiliaries, to compensate as much as possible for the inadequacy of men. I concurred fully with the President in the injunction contained in his telegram of the 24th, that it was necessary with my limited force to move "cautiously and safely." In view of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy and the liability of its bottom-land to sudden inundation it became necessary to construct between Bottom's Bridge and Mechanicsville eleven new bridges, all long and difficult, with extensive log-way approaches.

The entire army could probably have been thrown across the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications or to protect our right and rear. If the communication with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated upon the right bank of the

* See also Lincoln to McClellan, May 21, in "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

† McClellan's reply, of same date, appears in "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

Chickahominy, and the stage of water as it was for many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not furnishing a single day's supplies in advance, the troops must have gone without rations and the animals without forage, and the army would have been paralyzed.

It is true I might have abandoned my communications and pushed forward toward Richmond, trusting to the speedy defeat of the enemy and the consequent fall of the city for a renewal of supplies; but the approaches were fortified and the town itself was surrounded with a strong line of intrenchments, requiring a greater length of time to reduce than our troops could have dispensed with rations.

Under these circumstances I decided to retain a portion of the army on the left bank of the river until our bridges were completed.

It will be remembered that the order for the co-operation of General McDowell was simply suspended, not revoked, and therefore I was not at liberty to abandon the northern approach.

A very dashing and successful reconnaissance was made near New Bridge on the 24th of May by Lieutenant Bowen, Topographical Engineers, escorted by the Fourth Michigan Volunteers and a squadron of the U. S. cavalry, commanded respectively by Colonel Woodbury and Captain Gordon.

Our troops encountered a Louisiana regiment, and with little loss drove it back upon its brigade, killing a large number and capturing several prisoners. Great credit is due to the staff officers, as well as to Colonel Woodbury, Captain Gordon, and their commands, for their conduct on this occasion.

The work upon the bridges was commenced at once and pushed forward with great vigor; but the rains, which from day to day continued to fall, flooded the valley, and raised the water to a greater height than had been known for twenty years.

This demolished a great amount of our labor, and our first bridges, with their approaches, which were not made with reference to such extreme high water, were carried off or rendered impassable. We were obliged, with immense labor, to construct others, much longer, more elevated, and stable. Our men worked in the water, exposed to the enemy's fire from the opposite bank.

On the 25th of May I received the following telegram:

WASHINGTON, *May 25, 1862.*

Your dispatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg, with about 6,000 men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 7,000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th (yesterday) pushed on to get north of Banks, on the road to Winchester. General Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which General Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal, with 10,000 troops, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped bare, as we are here, I will do all we can to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. McDowell has about 20,000 of his forces moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and Frémont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry; the rest of his forces remain for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their places in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States. We

also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach we should be entirely helpless. Apprehensions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, have always been my reason for withholding McDowell's from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have.

A. LINCOLN,
President.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

On the 25th the following was also received:

WASHINGTON, *May 25, 1862—2 p. m.*

The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive General Banks before him—precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg, and Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, from both north and south—in precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as would not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly.

A. LINCOLN,
President.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

To which I replied as follows:

COLD HARBOR, *May 25, 1862.*

Telegram received. Independently of it, the time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. The object of the movement is probably to prevent re-enforcements being sent to me. All the information obtained from balloons, deserters, prisoners, and contrabands agrees in the statement that the mass of the rebel troops are still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to defend it. I have no knowledge of Banks' position and force nor what there is at Manassas; therefore cannot form a definite opinion as to the force against him.

I have two corps across Chickahominy, within 6 miles of Richmond; the others on this side at other crossings within same distance, and ready to cross when bridges are completed.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

On the 26th I received the following:

WASHINGTON, *May 26, 1862—12.40 a. m.*

We have General Banks' official report. He has saved his army and baggage and has made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably safe at Williamsport. He reports the attacking force at 15,000.

A. LINCOLN,
President.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

On the 26th I received the following:

WASHINGTON, *May 26, 1862.*

Can you not cut the Aquia Creek Railroad? Also, what impression have you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?

A. LINCOLN,
President.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

On the same day I sent the following:

COLD HARBOR, *May 26, 1862.*

Have cut the Virginia Central Road in three places between Hanover Court-House and the Chickahominy. Will try to cut the other. I do not think Richmond intrenchments formidable, but am not certain. Hope very soon to be within shelling distance.

Have railroad in operation from White House to Chickahominy. Hope to have Chickahominy Bridge repaired to-night. Nothing of interest to-day.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

The interruption of the railroad here referred to was effected by the command of Brigadier-General Stoneman, and was intended to prevent the enemy from drawing supplies by that route or from sending reinforcements to Anderson or Jackson.

At 10 a. m. I sent also the following dispatch:

Telegrams of last night received. I am glad to know affairs are not so bad as might have been. I would earnestly call your attention to my instructions to General Banks of March 16, to General Wadsworth of same date, and to my letter of April 6 to the Adjutant-General. I cannot but think that a prompt return to the principles there laid down would relieve all probability of danger. I will forward copies by mail. I beg to urge the importance of Manassas and Front Royal in contradistinction to Fredericksburg.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

Later on the 26th I sent the following:

CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE,
May 26, 1862—7.30 p. m.

Have arranged to carry out your last orders. We are quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle. Situated as I am, I feel forced to take every possible precaution against disaster and to secure my flanks against the probably superior force in front of me. My arrangements for to-morrow are very important, and, if successful, will leave me free to strike on the return of the force detached.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

On the same day I received intelligence that a very considerable force of the enemy was in the vicinity of Hanover Court-House, to the right and rear of our army, thus threatening our communications, and in a position either to re-enforce Jackson or to impede McDowell's junction, should he finally move to unite with us. On the same day I also received information from General McDowell, through the Secretary of War, that the enemy had fallen back from Fredericksburg toward Richmond, and that General McDowell's advance was 8 miles south of the Rappahannock. It was thus imperative to dislodge or defeat this force, independently even of the wishes of the President, as expressed in his telegram of the 26th. I intrusted this task to Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, commanding the Fifth Corps, with orders to move at daybreak on the 27th.

Through a heavy rain and over bad roads that officer moved his command as follows:

Brig. Gen. W. H. Emory led the advance, with the Fifth and Sixth Regiments U. S. Cavalry and Benson's horse battery of the Second U. S. Artillery, taking the road from New Bridge, via Mechanicsville, to Hanover Court-House.

General Morell's division, composed of the brigades of Martindale, Butterfield, and McQuade, with Berdan's regiment of Sharpshooters and three batteries, under Capt. Charles Griffin, Fifth U. S. Artillery, followed on the same road.

Col. G. K. Warren, commanding a provisional brigade, composed of the Fifth and Thirteenth New York, the First Connecticut Artillery,

acting as infantry, the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, and Weedén's Rhode Island Battery, moved from his station at Old Church by a road running to Hanover Court-House parallel to the Pamunkey.

After a fatiguing march of 14 miles through the mud and rain General Emory at noon reached a point about 2 miles from Hanover Court-House where the road forks to Ashland, and found a portion of the enemy formed in line across the Hanover Court-House road.

General Emory had before this been joined by the Twenty-fifth New York (of Martindale's brigade) and Berdan's Sharpshooters. These regiments were deployed, with a section of Benson's battery, and advanced slowly toward the enemy until re-enforced by General Butterfield with four regiments of his brigade, when the enemy was charged and quickly routed, one of his guns being captured by the Seventeenth New York, under Colonel Lansing, after having been disabled by the fire of Benson's battery. The firing here lasted about an hour. The cavalry and Benson's battery were immediately ordered in pursuit, followed by Morell's infantry and artillery, with the exception of Martindale's brigade. Warren's brigade having been delayed by repairing bridges, &c., now arrived, too late to participate in this affair. A portion of this command was sent to the Pamunkey to destroy bridges, and captured quite a number of prisoners. The remainder followed Morell's division. In the mean time General Martindale, with the few remaining regiments of his brigade and a section of artillery, advanced on the Ashland road, and found a force of the enemy's infantry, cavalry, and artillery in position near Peake's Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad. He soon forced them to retire toward Ashland.

The Twenty-fifth New York having been ordered to rejoin him, General Martindale was directed to form his brigade and move up the railroad to rejoin the rest of the command at Hanover Court-House. He sent one regiment up the railroad, but remained with the Second Maine, afterward joined by the Twenty-fifth New York, to guard the rear of the main column.

The enemy soon returned to attack General Martindale, who at once formed the Second Maine, Twenty-fifth New York, and a portion of the Forty-fourth New York, with one section of Martin's battery, on the New Bridge road, facing his own position of the morning, and then held his ground for an hour against large odds until re-enforced.

General Porter was at Hanover Court-House, near the head of his column, when he learned that the rear had been attacked by a large force. He at once faced the whole column about, recalled the cavalry sent in pursuit toward Ashland, moved the Thirteenth and Fourteenth New York and Griffin's battery direct to Martindale's assistance, pushed the Ninth Massachusetts and Sixty-second Pennsylvania, of McQuade's brigade, through the woods on the right (our original left), and attacked the flank of the enemy, while Butterfield, with the Eighty-third Pennsylvania and Sixteenth Michigan, hastened toward the scene of action by the railroad and through the woods farther to the right, and completed the rout of the enemy. During the remainder of this and the following day our cavalry was active in the pursuit, taking a number of prisoners. Captain Harrison, of the Fifth U. S. Cavalry, with a single company, brought in as prisoners two entire companies of infantry, with their arms and ammunition. A part of Rush's Lancers also captured an entire company, with their arms.

The immediate results of these affairs were some 200 of the enemy's dead buried by our troops, 730 prisoners sent to the rear, one 12-pounder howitzer, one caisson, a large number of small-arms, and two

railroad trains captured. Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded and missing.*

The force encountered and defeated was General Branch's division of North Carolina and Georgia troops, supposed to have been some 9,000 strong. Their camp at Hanover Court-House was taken and destroyed.

Having reason to believe that General Anderson, with a strong force, was still at Ashland, I ordered General Sykes' division of regulars to move on the 28th from New Bridge toward Hanover Court-House, to be in position to support General Porter. They reached a point within 3 miles of Hanover Court-House, and remained there until the evening of the 29th, when they returned to their original camp.

On the 28th General Stoneman's command of cavalry, horse artillery, and two regiments of infantry were also placed under General Porter's orders.

On the same day I visited Hanover Court-House, whence I sent the following dispatch:

HANOVER COURT-HOUSE, *May 28—2 p. m.*

Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glorious victory. Too much credit cannot be given to his magnificent division and its accomplished leader. The rout of the rebels was complete—not a defeat, but a complete rout. Prisoners are constantly coming in; two companies have this moment arrived, with excellent arms.

There is no doubt that the enemy are concentrating everything on Richmond. I will do my best to cut off Jackson, but am doubtful whether I can.

It is the policy and duty of the Government to send me by water all the well-drilled troops available. I am confident that Washington is in no danger. Engines and cars in large numbers have been sent up to bring down Jackson's command. I may not be able to cut them off, but will try. We have cut all but the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. The real issue is in the battle about to be fought in front of Richmond. All our available troops should be collected here—not raw regiments, but the well-drilled troops. It cannot be ignored that a desperate battle is before us. If any regiments of good troops remain unemployed it will be an irreparable fault committed.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Having ascertained the state of affairs, instructions were given for the operations of the following day.

On the 28th a party under Major Williams, Sixth U. S. Cavalry, destroyed the common-road bridges over the Pamunkey and the Virginia Central Railroad Bridge over the South Anna.

On the 29th he destroyed the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad Bridge over the South Anna and the turnpike bridge over the same stream.

On the same day, and mainly to cover the movement of Major Williams, General Emory moved a column of cavalry toward Ashland from Hanover Court-House. The advance of this column under Captain Chambliss, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, entered Ashland, driving out a party of the enemy, destroyed the railroad bridge over Stony Creek, and broke up the railroad and telegraph.

Another column of all arms, under Colonel Warren, was sent on the same day by the direct road to Ashland, and entered it shortly after General Emory's column had retired, capturing a small party there.

General Stoneman on the same day moved on Ashland by Peake's Station, covering well the movements of the other columns.

* But see revised statement, p. 685.

The objects of the expedition having been accomplished and it being certain that the First Corps would not join us at once, General Porter withdrew his command to their camps with the main army on the evening of the 29th.

On the night of the 27th and 28th I sent the following dispatch to the Secretary of War:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near New Bridge, May 28, 1862—12.30 a. m.

Porter has gained two complete victories over superior forces, yet I feel obliged to move in the morning with re-enforcements to secure the complete destruction of the rebels in that quarter. In doing so I run some risk here, but I cannot help it. The enemy are even in greater force than I had supposed. I will do all that quick movements can accomplish, but you must send me all the troops you can, and leave to me full latitude as to choice of commanders. It is absolutely necessary to destroy the rebels near Hanover Court-House before I can advance.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

In reply to which I received the following from the President:

WASHINGTON, *May 28, 1862.*

I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's victory. Still, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central from Richmond to Hanover Junction without more is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond I think cannot be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, informs us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewell's, forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. General King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that 15,000 left Hanover Junction Monday morning to re-enforce Jackson. I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard to all points.

A. LINCOLN.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

At 6 p. m. of the 29th I sent the Secretary of War the following dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 29, 1862—6 p. m.

General Porter has gained information that General Anderson left his position in vicinity of Fredericksburg at 4 a. m. Sunday with the following troops: First South Carolina, Colonel Hamilton; one battalion South Carolina Rifles; Thirty-fourth and Thirty-eighth North Carolina; Forty-fifth Georgia; Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth South Carolina; Third Louisiana; two batteries, of four guns each—namely, Letcher's Virginia and McIntosh's South Carolina batteries. General Anderson and his command passed Ashland yesterday evening *en route* for Richmond, leaving men behind to destroy bridges over the Telegraph road, which they traveled. This information is reliable. It is also positively certain that Branch's command was from Gordonsville, bound for Richmond, whither they have now gone.

It may be regarded as positive, I think, that there is no rebel force between Fredericksburg and Junction.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

The following was also sent on the same day:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 29, 1862.

A detachment from General F. J. Porter's command, under Major Williams, Sixth

Cavalry, destroyed the South Anna Railroad Bridge at about 9 a. m. to-day. A large quantity of Confederate public property was also destroyed at Ashland this morning.

R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

In reply to which the following was received:

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862.

Your dispatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized by our forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, I heartily congratulate the country, and thank General McClellan and his army for their seizure.

A. LINCOLN.

General R. B. MARCY.

On the 30th I sent the following:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 30, 1862.

From the tone of your dispatches and the President's I do not think that you at all appreciate the value and magnitude of Porter's victory. It has entirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously threatened; routed and demoralized a considerable portion of the rebel forces; taken over 750 prisoners; killed and wounded large numbers; one gun, many small-arms, and much baggage taken. It was one of the handsomest things in the war, both in itself and in its results. Porter has returned, and my army is again well in hand. Another day will make the probable field of battle passable for artillery. It is quite certain that there is nothing in front of McDowell at Fredericksburg. I regard the burning of South Anna bridges as the least important result of Porter's movement.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

The results of this brilliant operation of General Porter were the dispersal of General Branch's division and the clearing of our right flank and rear. It was rendered impossible for the enemy to communicate by rail with Fredericksburg or with Jackson via Gordonsville except by the very circuitous route of Lynchburg, and the road was left entirely open for the advance of McDowell, had he been permitted to join the Army of the Potomac. His withdrawal toward Front Royal was, in my judgment, a serious and fatal error. He could do no good in that direction, while, had he been permitted to carry out the orders of May 17, the united forces would have driven the enemy within the immediate intrenchments of Richmond before Jackson could have returned to its succor, and probably would have gained possession promptly of that place. I respectfully refer to the reports of General Porter and his subordinate commanders for the names of the officers who deserve especial mention for the parts they took in these affairs, but I cannot omit here my testimony to the energy and ability displayed by General Porter on this occasion, since to him is mainly due the successes there gained.

On the 20th of May a reconnaissance was ordered on the south side of the Chickahominy toward James River. This was accomplished by Brig. Gen. H. M. Naglee, who crossed his brigade near Bottom's Bridge and pushed forward to within 2 miles of James River without serious resistance or finding the enemy in force. The rest of the Fourth Corps, commanded by General E. D. Keyes, crossed the Chickahominy on the 23d of May.

On the 24th, 25th, and 26th a very gallant reconnaissance was pushed by General Naglee with his brigade beyond the Seven Pines, and on the

25th the Fourth Corps was ordered to take up and fortify a position in the vicinity of the Seven Pines. The order was at once obeyed, a strong line of rifle pits opened, and an abatis constructed a little in the rear of the point where the Nine-mile road comes into the Williamsburg road.

On the same day General Heintzelman was ordered to cross with his corps (the Third) and take a position 2 miles in advance of Bottom's Bridge, watching the crossing of White Oak Swamp, and covering the left and the rear of the left wing of the army. Being the senior officer on that side of the river, he was placed in command of both corps, and ordered to hold the Seven Pines at all hazards, but not to withdraw the troops from the crossings of White Oak Swamp unless in an emergency.

On the 28th General Keyes was ordered to advance Casey's division to Fair Oaks, on the Williamsburg road, some three-quarters of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, leaving General Couch's division at the line of rifle pits. A new line of rifle pits and a small redoubt for six field guns were commenced, and much of the timber in front of this line was felled on the two days following. The picket line was established, reaching from the Chickahominy to White Oak Swamp.

On the 30th General Heintzelman, representing that the advance had met with sharp opposition in taking up their position and that he considered the point a critical one, requested and obtained authority to make such dispositions of his troops as he saw fit to meet the emergency. He immediately advanced two brigades of Kearny's division about the fourth of a mile in front of Savage Station, thus placing them within supporting distance of Casey's division, which held the advance of the Fourth Corps.

On the 30th the troops on the south side of the Chickahominy were in position as follows: Casey's division on the right of the Williamsburg road, at right angles to it; the center at Fair Oaks; Couch's division at the Seven Pines; Kearny's division on the railroad from near Savage Station toward the bridge; Hooker's division on the borders of White Oak Swamp. Constant skirmishing had been kept up between our pickets and those of the enemy. While these lines were being taken up and strengthened large bodies of Confederate troops were seen immediately to the front and right of Casey's position.

During the day and night of the 30th of May a very violent storm occurred; the rain, falling in torrents, rendered work on the rifle pits and bridges impracticable, made the roads almost impassable, and threatened the destruction of the bridges over the Chickahominy.

The enemy, perceiving the unfavorable position in which we were placed and the possibility of destroying that part of our army which was apparently cut off from the main body by the rapidly-rising stream, threw an overwhelming force (grand divisions of Generals D. H. Hill, Huger, Longstreet, and G. W. Smith) upon the position occupied by Casey's division.

It appears from the official reports of General Keyes and his subordinate commanders that at 10 o'clock a. m. on the 31st of May an aide-de-camp of General J. E. Johnston was captured by General Naglee's pickets. But little information as to the movements of the enemy was obtained from him, but his presence so near our lines excited suspicion and caused increased vigilance, and the troops were ordered by General Keyes to be under arms at 11 o'clock. Between 11 and 12 o'clock it was reported to General Casey that the enemy were approaching in considerable force on the Williamsburg road. At this time Casey's

division was disposed as follows: Naglee's brigade extending from the Williamsburg road to the Garnett field, having one regiment across the railroad; General Wessells' brigade in the rifle pits, and General Palmer's in the rear of General Wessells'; one battery of artillery in advance with General Naglee; one battery in rear of rifle pits to the right of the redoubt; one battery in rear of the redoubt, and another battery unharnessed in the redoubt. General Couch's division, holding the second line, had General Abercrombie's brigade on the right along the Nine-mile road, with two regiments and one battery across the railroad near Fair Oaks Station; General Peck's brigade on the right, and General Devens' in the center.

On the approach of the enemy, General Casey sent forward one of General Palmer's regiments to support the picket line, but this regiment gave way without making much, if any, resistance. Heavy firing at once commenced and the pickets were driven in. General Keyes ordered General Couch to move General Peck's brigade to occupy the ground on the left of the Williamsburg road, which had not before been occupied by our forces, and thus to support General Casey's left, where the first attack was the most severe. The enemy now came on in heavy force, attacking General Casey simultaneously in front and on both flanks. General Keyes sent to General Heintzelman for re-enforcements, but the messenger was delayed, so that orders were not sent to Generals Kearny and Hooker until nearly 3 o'clock, and it was nearly 5 p. m. when Generals Jameson and Berry's brigades, of General Kearny's division, arrived on the field. General Birney was ordered up the railroad, but by General Kearny's order halted his brigade before arriving at the scene of action. Orders were also dispatched for General Hooker to move up from White Oak Swamp, and he arrived after dark at Savage Station.

As soon as the firing was heard at headquarters orders were sent to General Sumner to get his command under arms and be ready to move at a moment's warning. His corps, consisting of Generals Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions, was encamped on the north side of the Chickahominy, some 6 miles above Bottom's Bridge. Each division had thrown a bridge over the stream opposite to its own position.

At 1 o'clock General Sumner moved the two divisions to their respective bridges, with instructions to halt and await further orders. At 2 o'clock orders were sent from headquarters to cross these divisions without delay and push them rapidly to General Heintzelman's support. This order was received and communicated at 2.30 o'clock, and the passage was immediately commenced. In the mean time General Naglee's brigade, with the batteries of General Casey's division, which General Naglee directed, struggled gallantly to maintain the redoubt and rifle pits against the overwhelming masses of the enemy. They were re-enforced by a regiment from General Peck's brigade. The artillery, under command of Col. G. D. Bailey, First New York Artillery, and afterward of General Naglee, did good execution on the advancing column. The left of this position was, however, soon turned, and a sharp cross-fire opened upon the gunners and men in the rifle pits. Colonel Bailey, Major Van Valkenberg, and Adjutant Rumsey, of the same regiment, were killed; some of the guns in the redoubt were taken, and the whole line was driven back upon the position occupied by General Couch. The brigades of Generals Wessells and Palmer, with the re-enforcements which had been sent them from General Couch, had also been driven from the field with heavy loss.

and the whole position occupied by General Casey's division was taken by the enemy.

Previous to this time General Keyes ordered General Couch to advance two regiments to relieve the pressure upon General Casey's right flank. In making this movement General Couch discovered large masses of the enemy pushing toward our right and crossing the railroad, as well as a heavy column which had been held in reserve, and which was now making its way toward Fair Oaks Station. General Couch at once engaged this column with two regiments; but, though re-enforced by two additional regiments, he was overpowered, and the enemy pushed between him and the main body of his division. With these four regiments and one battery General Couch fell back about half a mile towards the Grapevine Bridge, where, hearing that General Sumner had crossed, he formed line of battle facing Fair Oaks Station, and prepared to hold the position.

Generals Berry's and Jameson's brigades had by this time arrived in front of the Seven Pines. General Berry was ordered to take possession of the woods on the left, and push forward so as to have a flank fire on the enemy's lines. This movement was executed brilliantly, General Berry pushing his regiments forward through the woods until their rifles commanded the left of the camp and works occupied by General Casey's division in the morning. Their fire on the pursuing columns of the enemy was very destructive, and assisted materially in checking the pursuit in that part of the field. He held his position in these woods against several attacks of superior numbers, and after dark, being cut off by the enemy from the main body, he fell back toward White Oak Swamp, and by a circuit brought his men into our lines in good order.

General Jameson, with two regiments (the other two of his brigade having been detached—one to General Peck and one to General Birney), moved rapidly to the front, on the left of the Williamsburg road, and succeeded for a time in keeping the abatis clear of the enemy. But, large numbers of the enemy pressing past the right of his line, he, too, was forced to retreat through the woods toward White Oak Swamp, and in that way gained camp under cover of night.

Brigadier-General Devens, who had held the center of General Couch's division, had made repeated and gallant efforts to regain portions of the ground lost in front, but each time was driven back, and finally withdrew behind the rifle pits near Seven Pines.

Meantime General Sumner had arrived with the advance of his corps, General Sedgwick's division, at the point held by General Couch with four regiments and one battery. The roads leading from the bridge were so miry that it was only by the greatest exertion General Sedgwick had been able to get one of his batteries to the front.

The leading regiment (First Minnesota, Colonel Sully) was immediately deployed to the right of Couch to protect the flank, and the rest of the division formed in line of battle, Kirby's battery near the center, in an angle of the woods. One of General Couch's regiments was sent to open communication with General Heintzelman. No sooner were these dispositions made than the enemy came in strong force and opened a heavy fire along the line. He made several charges, but was each time repulsed with great loss by the steady fire of the infantry and the splendid practice of the battery. After sustaining the enemy's fire for a considerable time General Sumner ordered five regiments (the Thirty-fourth New York, Colonel Suiter; Eighty-second New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Hudson; Fifteenth Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball;

Twentieth Massachusetts, Colonel Lee; Seventh Michigan, Major Richardson—the three former of General Gorman's brigade, the two latter of General Dana's brigade) to advance and charge with the bayonet. This charge was executed in the most brilliant manner. Our troops, springing over two fences which were between them and the enemy, rushed upon his lines and drove him in confusion from that part of the field. Darkness now ended the battle for that day.

During the night dispositions were made for its early renewal. General Couch's division and so much of General Casey's as could be collected, together with General Kearny's, occupied the rifle pits near Seven Pines. General Peck, in falling back on the left, had succeeded late in the afternoon in rallying a considerable number of stragglers, and was taking them once more into the action, when he was ordered back to the intrenched camp by General Kearny. General Hooker brought up his division about dark, having been delayed by the heaviness of the roads and the throng of fugitives from the field, through whom the colonel of the leading regiment (Starr) reports he "was obliged to force his way with the bayonet." This division bivouacked for the night in rear of the right of the rifle pits on the other side of the railroad. General Richardson's division also came upon the field about sunset. He had attempted the passage of the Chickahominy by the bridge opposite his own camp, but it was so far destroyed that he was forced to move Generals Howard's and Meagher's brigades, with all his artillery, around by General Sedgwick's bridge, while General French's brigade, with the utmost difficulty, crossed by the other. General Sedgwick's division, with the regiments under General Couch, held about the same position as when the fight ceased, and General Richardson, on his arrival, was ordered to place his division on the left, to connect with General Kearny; General French's brigade was posted along the railroad and Generals Howard's and Meagher's brigades in second and third lines. All his artillery had been left behind, it being impossible to move it forward through the deep mud as rapidly as the infantry pushed toward the field, but during the night the three batteries of the division were brought to the front.

About 5 o'clock on the morning of the 1st of June skirmishers and some cavalry of the enemy were discovered in front of General Richardson's division. Captain Pettit's battery (B, First New York), having come upon the ground, threw a few shells among them, when they dispersed. There was a wide interval between General Richardson and General Kearny. To close this General Richardson's line was extended to the left and his first line moved over the railroad. Scarcely had they gained the position when the enemy, appearing in large force from the woods in front, opened a heavy fire of musketry at short range along the whole line. He approached very rapidly with columns of attack formed on two roads which crossed the railroad. These columns were supported by infantry in line of battle on each side, cutting General French's line. He threw out no skirmishers, but appeared determined to carry all before him by one crushing blow. For nearly an hour the first line of General Richardson's division stood and returned the fire, the lines of the enemy being re-enforced and relieved time after time, till finally General Howard was ordered with his brigade to go to General French's assistance. He led his men gallantly to the front, and in a few minutes the fire of the enemy ceased and his whole line fell back on that part of the field. On the opening of the firing in the morning General Hooker pushed forward on the railroad with two regiments (Fifth and Sixth New Jersey), followed by General Sickles'

brigade. It was found impossible to move the artillery of this division from its position on account of the mud. On coming near the woods, which were held by the enemy in force, General Hooker found General Birney's brigade, Col. J. H. Hobart Ward in command, in line of battle. He sent back to hasten General Sickles' brigade, but ascertained that it had been turned off to the left by General Heintzelman to meet a column advancing in that direction. He at once made the attack with the two New Jersey regiments, calling upon Colonel Ward to support him with General Birney's brigade. This was well done, our troops advancing into the woods under a heavy fire, and pushing the enemy before them for more than an hour of hard fighting. A charge with the bayonet was then ordered by General Hooker with the Fifth and Sixth New Jersey, Third Maine, and Thirty-eighth and Fortieth New York, and the enemy fled in confusion, throwing down arms and even clothing in his flight. General Sickles, having been ordered to the left, formed line of battle on both sides of the Williamsburg road and advanced under a sharp fire from the enemy, deployed in the woods in front of him. After a brisk interchange of musketry fire while crossing the open ground, the Excelsior Brigade dashed into the timber with the bayonet and put the enemy to flight.

On the right the enemy opened fire after half an hour's cessation, which was promptly responded to by General Richardson's division. Again the most vigorous efforts were made to break our line, and again they were frustrated by the steady courage of our troops. In about an hour General Richardson's whole line advanced, pouring in their fire at close range, which threw the line of the enemy back in some confusion. This was followed up by a bayonet charge, led by General French in person, with the Fifty-seventh and Sixty-sixth New York, supported by two regiments sent by General Heintzelman, the Seventy-first and Seventy-third New York, which turned the confusion of the enemy into precipitate flight. One gun captured the previous day was retaken.

Our troops pushed forward as far as the lines held by them on the 31st before the attack. On the battle-field there were found many of our own and the Confederate wounded, arms, caissons, wagons, subsistence stores, and forage, abandoned by the enemy in his rout. The state of the roads and impossibility of maneuvering artillery prevented farther pursuit. On the next morning a reconnaissance was sent forward, which pressed back the pickets of the enemy to within 5 miles of Richmond; but again the impossibility of forcing even a few batteries forward precluded our holding permanently this position. The lines held previous to the battle were therefore resumed. General J. E. Johnston reports loss of the enemy in Longstreet's and G. W. Smith's divisions at 4,283; General D. H. Hill, who had taken the advance in the attack, estimates his loss at 2,500; which would give the enemy's loss 6,783. Our loss was, in General Sumner's corps, 1,223; General Heintzelman's corps, 1,394; General Keyes' corps, 3,120; total, 5,737.*

Previous to the arrival of General Sumner upon the field of battle, on the 31st of May, General Heintzelman, the senior corps commander present, was in the immediate command of the forces engaged. The first information I received that the battle was in progress was a dispatch from him stating that Casey's division had given way. During the night of the 31st I received a dispatch from him, dated 8.45 p. m., in which he says:

* But see revised statement, pp. 757-762.

I am just in. When I got to the front the most of General Casey's division had dispersed. * * * The rout of General Casey's men had a most dispiriting effect on the troops as they came up. I saw no reason why we should have been driven back.

This official statement, together with other accounts received previous to my arrival upon the battle-field, to the effect that Casey's division had given way without making a proper resistance, caused me to state, in a telegram to the Secretary of War on the 1st, that this division "gave way unaccountably and discredibly." Subsequent investigations, however, greatly modified the impressions first received, and I accordingly advised the Secretary of War of this in a dispatch on the 5th of June.

The official reports of Generals Keyes, Casey, and Naglee show that a very considerable portion of this division fought well, and that the brigade of General Naglee is entitled to credit for its gallantry. This division, among the regiments of which were eight of comparatively new troops, was attacked by superior numbers; yet, according to the reports alluded to, it stood the attack "for three hours before it was reinforced." A portion of the division was thrown into great confusion upon the first onslaught of the enemy; but the personal efforts of General Naglee, Colonel Bailey, and other officers, who boldly went to the front and encouraged the men by their presence and example at this critical juncture rallied a great part of the division, and thereby enabled it to act a prominent part in this severely-contested battle. It therefore affords me great satisfaction to withdraw the expression contained in my first dispatch, and I cordially give my indorsement to the conclusion of the division commander, "that those parts of his command which behaved discredibly were exceptional cases."

On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks commenced, we had two of our bridges nearly completed; but the rising waters flooded the log-way approaches and made them almost impassable, so that it was only by the greatest efforts that General Sumner crossed his corps and participated in that hard-fought engagement. The bridges became totally useless after this corps had passed, and others on a more permanent plan were commenced.

On my way to headquarters, after the battle of Fair Oaks, I attempted to cross the bridge where General Sumner had taken over his corps on the day previous. At the time General Sumner crossed this was the only available bridge above Bottom's Bridge. I found the approach from the right bank for some 400 yards submerged to the depth of several feet, and on reaching the place where the bridge had been I found a great part of it carried away, so that I could not get my horse over, and was obliged to send him to Bottom's Bridge, 6 miles below, as the only practicable crossing.

The approaches to New and Mechanicsville Bridges were also overflowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries, established upon commanding heights on the opposite side. These batteries were supported by strong forces of the enemy, having numerous rifle pits in their front, which would have made it necessary, even had the approaches been in the best possible condition, to have fought a sanguinary battle, with but little prospect of success, before a passage could have been secured.

The only available means, therefore, of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Richmond soon after the battle was to march the troops from Mechanicsville and other points on the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bottom's Bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about 23 miles.

In the condition of the roads at that time this march could not have been made with artillery in less than two days, by which time the enemy would have been secure within his intrenchments around Richmond. In short, the idea of uniting the two wings of the army in time to make a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only 5 miles distant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I presume, never for a moment seriously entertained by any one connected with the Army of the Potomac. An advance, involving the separation of the two wings by the impassable Chickahominy, would have exposed each to defeat in detail. Therefore I held the position already gained and completed our crossings as rapidly as possible.

In the mean time the troops at Fair Oaks were directed to strengthen their positions by a strong line of intrenchments, which protected them while the bridges were being built, gave security to the trains, liberated a larger fighting force, and offered a safer retreat in the event of disaster.

On the 2d of June I sent the following dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
New Bridge, June 2, 1862—10.30 a. m.

Our left is everywhere advanced considerably beyond the positions it occupied before the battle. I am in strong hopes that the Chickahominy will fall sufficiently to enable me to cross the right. We have had a terrible time with our communications—bridges and causeways, built with great care, having been washed away by the sudden freshets, leaving us almost cut off from communication. All that human labor can do is being done to accomplish our purpose.

Please regard the portion of this relating to condition of Chickahominy as confidential, as it would be serious if the enemy were aware of it. I do not yet know our loss; it has been very heavy on both sides, as the fighting was desperate. Our victory complete. I expect still more fighting before we reach Richmond.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

On the same day I received the following from the Secretary of War:

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1862.

Your telegram has been received, and we are greatly rejoiced at your success—not only in itself, but because of the dauntless spirit and courage it displays in your troops. You have received, of course, the order made yesterday in respect to Fortress Monroe. The object was to place at your command the disposable force of that department. The indications are that Frémont or McDowell will fight Jackson to-day, and as soon as he is disposed of another large body of troops will be at your service.

The intelligence from Halleck shows that the rebels are fleeing, and pursued in force, from Corinth. All interest now centers in your operations, and full confidence is entertained of your brilliant and glorious success.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

On the 3d I received the following from the President:

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862.

With these continuous rains I am very anxious about the Chickahominy—so close in your rear and crossing your line of communication. Please look to it.

A. LINCOLN,
President.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

To which I replied as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
New Bridge, June 3, 1862.

Your dispatch of 5 p. m. just received. As the Chickahominy has been almost the only obstacle in my way for several days Your Excellency may rest assured that it has not been overlooked. Every effort has been made, and will continue to be, to perfect the communications across it. Nothing of importance, except that it is again raining.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President, Washington.*

My views of the condition of our army on the 4th are explained in the following dispatch to the President:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
New Bridge, June 4, 1862.

Terrible rain-storm during the night and morning; not yet cleared off. Chickahominy flooded; bridges in bad condition. Are still hard at work at them. I have taken every possible step to insure the security of the corps on the right bank, but I cannot re-enforce them here until my bridges are all safe, as my force is too small to insure my right and rear, should the enemy attack in that direction, as they may probably attempt. I have to be very cautious now. Our loss in the late battle will probably exceed 5,000. I have not yet full returns. On account of the effect it might have on our own men and the enemy I request that you will regard this information as confidential for a few days. I am satisfied that the loss of the enemy was very considerably greater; they were terribly punished. I mention these facts now merely to show you that the Army of the Potomac has had serious work, and that no child's play is before it.

You must make your calculations on the supposition that I have been correct from the beginning in asserting that the serious opposition was to be made here.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

And in the following to the Secretary of War on the same day:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
New Bridge, June 4, 1862.

Please inform me at once what re-enforcements, if any, I can count upon having at Fortress Monroe or White House within the next three days, and when each regiment may be expected to arrive. It is of the utmost importance that I should know this immediately. The losses in the battle of the 31st and 1st will amount to 7,000. Regard this as confidential for the present.

If I can have five new regiments for Fort Monroe and its dependencies I can draw three more old regiments from there safely. I can well dispose of four more raw regiments on my communications. I can well dispose of from fifteen to twenty well-drilled regiments among the old brigades in bringing them up to their original effective strength. Recruits are especially necessary for the regular and volunteer batteries of artillery as well as for the regular and volunteer regiments of infantry. After the losses in our last battle I trust that I will no longer be regarded as an alarmist. I believe we have at least one more desperate battle to fight."

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Also in my dispatch to the Secretary of War on the 5th:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
New Bridge, June 5, 1862.

Rained most of the night. Has now ceased, but is not clear. The river is still very high and troublesome. Enemy opened with several batteries on our bridges

"This dispatch, as received, continues as follows:

"Our loss has been greater than I had first supposed. The publication of this at this particular time might have an unfavorable effect upon the spirits of our army and give confidence to the enemy, although they undoubtedly suffered much more than we did. I therefore submit it to your judgment whether it will be policy to make it public until after the next battle."

near here this morning. Our batteries seem to have pretty much silenced them, though some firing still kept up. The rain forces us to remain *in statu quo*. With great difficulty a division of infantry has been crossed this morning to support the troops on the other side should the enemy renew attack. I felt obliged to do this, although it leaves us rather weak here.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*.

On the 5th the Secretary telegraphed me as follows:

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1862—8.30 p. m.

I will send you five new regiments as fast as transportation can take them; the first to start to-morrow from Baltimore. I intend sending you a part of McDowell's force as soon as it can return from its trip to Front Royal; probably as many as you want. The order to ship the new regiments to Fort Monroe has already been given. I suppose that they may be sent directly to the fort. Please advise me if this be as you desire.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

On the 7th of June I telegraphed as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 7, 1862—4.40 p. m.

In reply to your dispatch of 2 p. m. to-day I have the honor to state that the Chickahominy River has risen so as to flood the entire bottoms to the depth of 3 or 4 feet. I am pushing forward the bridges in spite of this, and the men are working night and day up to their waists in water to complete them. The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, entirely impassable for artillery, or even cavalry, except directly in the narrow roads, which renders any general movement either of this or the rebel army entirely out of the question until we have more favorable weather.

I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward re-enforcements so vigorously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. I have advanced my pickets about a mile to-day, driving off the rebel pickets and securing a very advantageous position.

The rebels have several batteries established commanding the *débouchés* from two of our bridges and fire upon our working parties continually, but as yet they have killed but very few of our men.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*.

As I did not think it probable that any re-enforcements would be sent me in time for the advance on Richmond, I stated in the foregoing dispatch that I should be ready to move when General McCall's division joined me; but I did not intend to be understood by this that no more re-enforcements were wanted, as will be seen from the following dispatch:

JUNE 10, 1862—3.30 p. m.

I have again information that Beauregard has arrived, and that some of his troops are to follow him. No great reliance—perhaps none whatever—can be attached to this; but it is possible, and ought to be their policy.

I am completely checked by the weather. The roads and fields are literally impassable for artillery; almost so for infantry. The Chickahominy is in a dreadful state. We have another rain-storm on our hands. I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit; but there will be a delay, the extent of which no one can foresee, for the season is altogether abnormal.

In view of these circumstances I present for your consideration the propriety of detaching largely from Halleck's army to strengthen this, for it would seem that Halleck has now no large organized force in front of him, while we have. If this cannot be done, or even in connection with it, allow me to suggest the movement of a heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. If but the one can be done, it would better conform to military principles to strengthen this army. And even although the re-en-

forcements might not arrive in season to take part in the attack upon Richmond, the moral effect would be great, and they would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior movements.

I wish to be distinctly understood that whenever the weather permits I will attack with whatever force I may have, although a larger force would enable me to gain much more decisive results.

I would be glad to have McCall's infantry sent forward by water at once, without waiting for his artillery and cavalry.

If General Prim returns via Washington please converse with him as to the condition of affairs here.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Our work upon the bridges continued to be pushed forward vigorously until the 20th, during which time it rained almost every day, and the exposure of the men caused much sickness.

On the 11th the following was received from the Secretary of War:

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1862.

Your dispatch of 3.30 yesterday has been received. I am fully impressed with the difficulties mentioned, and which no art or skill can avoid, but only endure, and am striving to the uttermost to render you every aid in the power of the Government. Your suggestions will be immediately communicated to General Halleck, with a request that he shall conform to them. At last advices he contemplated sending a column to operate with Mitchel against Chattanooga, and thence upon East Tennessee. Buell reports Kentucky and Tennessee to be in a critical condition, demanding immediate attention. Halleck says the main body of Beauregard's force is with him at Okolona. McCall's force was reported yesterday as having embarked and on its way to join you. It is intended to send the residue of McDowell's force also to join you as speedily as possible.

Frémont had a hard fight day before yesterday with Jackson's force at Union Church, 8 miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, but was pretty badly handled. It is clear that a strong force is operating with Jackson for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging as fast as possible the new levies.

Be assured, general, that there never has been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, and strength since the hour we first met; and whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arms.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

On the 12th and 13th General McCall's division arrived.

On the 13th of June two squadrons of the Fifth United States Cavalry, under the command of Captain Royall, stationed near Hanover Old Church, were attacked and overpowered by a force of the enemy's cavalry, numbering about 1,500 men, with four guns. They pushed on towards our depots, but at some distance from our main body, and, though pursued very cleverly, made the circuit of the army, repassing the Chickahominy at Long Bridge. The burning of two schooners laden with forage and fourteen Government wagons, the destruction of some sutlers' stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at Garlick's Landing, some little damage done at Tunstall's Station, and a little *éclat* were the precise results of this expedition.

On the 14th I sent the following to the Secretary of War:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Lincoln, June 14, 1862—midnight.

All quiet in every direction. The stampede of last night has passed away. Weather now very favorable, I hope two days more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed and the ground fit for artillery to move. At the same time I would be glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. I can use several new regiments to advantage.

It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival. That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed General McDowell should wish the general interests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command. If I cannot fully control all his troops I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results.

The department lines should not be allowed to interfere with me, but General McDowell and all other troops sent to me should be placed completely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other way can they be of assistance to me. I therefore request that I may have entire and full control. The stake at issue is too great to allow personal considerations to be entertained. You know that I have none.

The indications are, from our balloon reconnaissances and from all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily increasing in numbers, and determined to fight desperately.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

On the 20th the following was communicated to the President:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Lincoln, June 20, 1862—2 p. m.

Your Excellency's dispatch of 11 a. m. received, also that of General Sigel.

I have no doubt that Jackson has been re-enforced from here. There is reason to believe that General R. S. Ripley has recently joined Lee's army with a brigade or division from Charleston. Troops have arrived recently from Goldsborough. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the enemy intends evacuating Richmond. He is daily increasing his defenses. I find him everywhere in force, and every reconnaissance costs many lives, yet I am obliged to feel my way foot by foot at whatever cost, so great are the difficulties of the country. By to-morrow night the defensive works covering our position on this side of the Chickahominy should be completed. I am forced to this by my inferiority in numbers, so that I may bring the greatest possible numbers into action and secure the army against the consequences of unforeseen disaster. I would be glad to have permission to lay before Your Excellency, by letter or telegraph, my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country. In the meantime I would be pleased to learn the disposition as to numbers and position of the troops not under my command in Virginia and elsewhere.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

To which I received this reply:

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1862—6 p. m.

Your dispatch of yesterday (2 p. m.) was received this morning. If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under your immediate command I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of the troops not under your command in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with accuracy, which I cannot, I would rather not transmit either by telegraph or letter, because of the chances of its reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave your camp and I cannot well leave here.

A. LINCOLN,
President.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

To which I sent the following reply:

CAMP LINCOLN, June 22—1 p. m.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of 8 p. m. yesterday. Under the circumstances, as stated in your dispatch, I perceive that it will be better at least to defer for the present the communication I desired to make.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

His Excellency the PRESIDENT.

All the information I could obtain previous to the 24th of June regarding the movements of General Jackson led to the belief that he was at Gordonsville, where he was receiving re-enforcements from Richmond via Lynchburg and Staunton; but what his purposes were did not appear until the date specified, when a young man, very intelligent, but of suspicious appearance, was brought in by our scouts from the direction of Hanover Court-House. He at first stated that he was an escaped prisoner from Colonel Kenly's Maryland regiment, captured at Front Royal, but finally confessed himself to be a deserter from Jackson's command, which he left near Gordonsville on the 21st. Jackson's troops were then, as he said, moving to Frederick's Hall, along the Virginia Central Railroad, for the purpose of attacking my rear on the 28th. I immediately dispatched two trusty negroes to proceed along the railroad and ascertain the truth of the statement. They were unable, however, to get beyond Hanover Court-House, where they encountered the enemy's pickets, and were forced to turn back without obtaining the desired information. On that day I sent the following dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 24, 1862—12 p. m.

A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from the enemy. The party states that he left Jackson, Whiting, and Ewell (fifteen brigades) at Gordonsville on the 21st; that they were moving to Frederick's Hall, and that it was intended to attack my rear on the 28th. I would be glad to learn, at your earliest convenience, the most exact information you have as to the position and movements of Jackson, as well as the sources from which your information is derived, that I may the better compare it with what I have.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

The following is his reply :

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1862.

We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's force. General King yesterday reported a deserter's statement that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, 40,000 men. Some reports place 10,000 rebels under Jackson at Gordonsville; others, that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg, and Luray. Frémont yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened, and General Kelley that Ewell was advancing to New Creek, where Frémont has his depots. The last telegram from Frémont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray. The people decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Frémont, who are at Middletown, appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted to the Department yesterday, purporting to be dated Gordonsville, on the 14th instant, stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington and Baltimore as soon as you attacked Richmond, but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now is toward Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on this subject that may be received here.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

On the 25th, our bridges and intrenchments being at last completed, an advance of our picket line of the left was ordered, preparatory to a general forward movement.

Immediately in front of the most advanced redoubt on the Williams-

burg road was a large open field; beyond that a swampy belt of timber, some 500 yards wide, which had been disputed ground for many days. Farther in advance was an open field, crossed by the Williamsburg road and the railroad, and commanded by a redoubt and rifle pits of the enemy.

It was decided to push our lines to the other side of these woods, in order to enable us to ascertain the nature of the ground and to place Generals Heintzelman and Sumner in position to support the attack intended to be made on the Old Tavern on the 26th or 27th by General Franklin by assailing that position in the rear.

Between 8 and 9 o'clock on the morning of the 25th the advance was begun by General Heintzelman's corps. The enemy were found to be in strong force all along the line and contested the advance stubbornly, but by sunset our object was accomplished. The troops engaged in this affair were the whole of Heintzelman's corps, Palmer's brigade of Couch's division of Keyes' corps, and a part of Richardson's division of Sumner's corps. For the details I refer to the report of General Heintzelman.

The casualties (not including those in Palmer's brigade, which have not been reported) were as follows: Officers killed, 1; wounded, 14; missing, 1; enlisted men killed, 50; wounded, 387; missing, 63; total, 516.*

The following telegrams were sent to the Secretary of War during the day from the field of operations:

REDOUBT No. 3, June 25, 1862—1.30 p. m.

We have advanced our pickets on the left considerably, under sharp resistance. Our men behaved very handsomely. Some firing still continues.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON.

REDOUBT No. 3, June 25, 1862—3.15 p. m.

The enemy are making a desperate resistance to the advance of our picket lines. Kearny's and one-half of Hooker's are where I want them.

I have this moment re-enforced Hooker's right with a brigade and a couple of guns, and hope in a few minutes to finish the work intended for to-day. Our men are behaving splendidly. The enemy are fighting well also. This is not a battle; merely an affair of Heintzelman's corps, supported by Keyes, and thus far all goes well. We hold every foot we have gained.

If we succeed in what we have undertaken it will be a very important advantage gained. Loss not large thus far. The fighting up to this time has been done by General Hooker's division, which has behaved as usual—that is, most splendidly.

On our right Porter has silenced the enemy's batteries in his front.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

REDOUBT No. 3, June 25, 1862—5 p. m.

The affair is over, and we have gained our point fully and with but little loss, notwithstanding the strong opposition. Our men have done all that could be desired. The affair was partially decided by two guns that Captain De Russy brought gallantly into action under very difficult circumstances. The enemy was driven from the camps in front of this place and is now quiet.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

* But see revised statement, Part II, pp. 37, 38.

Also, on the same day, the following :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Lincoln, June 25, 1862—6.15 p. m.

I have just returned from the field, and find your dispatch in regard to Jackson. Several contrabands just in give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court-House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong re-enforcements, in Richmond yesterday.

I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true; but this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack.

I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of re-enforcements; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs.

Since I commenced this I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defense on that side. I feel that there is no use in again asking for re-enforcements.*

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

The report of the Chief of the Secret Service Corps, herewith forwarded, and dated the 26th of June,† shows the estimated strength of the enemy, at the time of the evacuation of Yorktown, to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The same report put his numbers on the 26th of June at about 180,000, and the specific information obtained regarding their organization warrants the belief that this estimate did not exceed his actual strength. It will be observed that the evidence contained in the report shows the following organizations, viz: Two hundred regiments of infantry and cavalry, including the forces of Jackson and Ewell, just arrived; eight battalions of independent troops; five battalions of artillery; twelve companies of infantry and independent cavalry, besides forty-six companies of artillery; amounting in all to from forty to fifty brigades. There were undoubtedly many others, whose designations we did not learn.

The report also shows that numerous and heavy earthworks had been completed for the defense of Richmond, and that in thirty-six of these were mounted some two hundred guns.

On the 26th, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final advance, the enemy attacked our right in strong force, and turned my attention to the protection of our communications and depots of supply. The event was a bitter confirmation of the military judgment which had been reiterated to my superiors from the inception and through the progress of the Peninsular Campaign.

I notified the Secretary of War in the following dispatch :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1862—12 m.

I have just heard that our advanced cavalry pickets on the left bank of Chickahominy are being driven in. It is probably Jackson's advance guard. If this be true, you may not hear from me for some days, as my communications will probably be cut off. The case is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort to desperate measures, and

* See Lincoln to McClellan, Part III, p. 259. † See p. 269.

will do my best to outmaneuver, outwit, and outfight the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be discouraged if you learn that my communications are cut off, and even Yorktown in possession of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1862—2.30 p. m.

Your dispatch and that of the President received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, &c., on the other side of the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell where re-enforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of approaching battle. It will probably be better that they should go to Fort Monroe, and thence according to state of affairs when they arrive.

It is not probable that I can maintain telegraphic communication more than an hour or two longer.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

On the same day I received the following dispatches from the Secretary of War:

WASHINGTON, *June 25, 1862—11.20 p. m.*

Your telegram of 6.15 has just been received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the Government to send you any more re-enforcements than has been done have been so distinctly stated to you by the President, that it is needless for me to repeat them.

Every effort has been made by the President and myself to strengthen you. King's division has reached Falmouth; Shields' division and Ricketts' division are at Manassas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, *June 26, 1862—6 p. m.*

Arrangements are being made as rapidly as possible to send you 5,000 men as fast as they can be brought from Manassas to Alexandria and embarked, which can be done sooner than to wait for transportation at Fredericksburg. They will be followed by more, if needed. McDowell's, Banks', and Frémont's force will be consolidated as the Army of Virginia, and will operate promptly in your aid by land. Nothing will be spared to sustain you, and I have undoubting faith in your success. Keep me advised fully of your condition.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

But 5,000 of the re-enforcements spoken of in these communications came to the Army of the Potomac, and these reached us at Harrison's Bar after the seven days.

In anticipation of a speedy advance on Richmond, to provide for the contingency of our communications with the depot at the White House being severed by the enemy, and at the same time to be prepared for a change of the base of our operations to James River if circumstances should render it advisable, I had made arrangements more than a week previous (on the 18th) to have transports with supplies of provisions and forage under a convoy of gunboats sent up James River. They reached Harrison's Landing in time to be available for the army on its arrival at that point. Events soon proved this change of base to be, though most hazardous and difficult, the only prudent course.

In order to relieve the troops of the Sixth Corps, on the 19th of June General Reynolds' and General Seymour's brigades, of General McCall's

division (Pennsylvania Reserves), were moved from Gaines' farm to a position on Beaver Dam Creek, General Meade's brigade being held in reserve in front of Gaines' farm. One regiment and a battery were thrown forward to the heights overlooking Mechanicsville, and a line of pickets extended along the Chickahominy River between the Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges. As has been already stated, I received, while engaged on the 25th in directing the operations of Heintzelman's corps, information which strengthened my suspicions that Jackson was advancing with a large force upon our right and rear. On this day General Casey, at the White House, was instructed to prepare for a vigorous resistance, and defensive works were ordered at Tunstall's Station. Early on the 25th General Porter was instructed to send out reconnoitering parties toward Hanover Court-House to discover the position and force of the enemy, and to destroy the bridges on the Totopotomoy as far as possible.

Up to the 26th of June the operations against Richmond had been conducted along the roads leading to it from the east and northeast. The reasons (the President's anxiety about covering Washington from Fredericksburg, McDowell's promised co-operation, partial advance, and immediate withdrawal) which compelled the choice of this line of approach and our continuance upon it have been alluded to above.

The superiority of the James River route as a line of attack and supply is too obvious to need exposition. My own opinion on that subject had been early given, and need not to be repeated here. The dissipation of all hope of the co-operation by land of General McDowell's forces, deemed to be occupied in the defense of Washington, their inability to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy, and a new danger to my right and to the long line of supplies from the White House to the Chickahominy, and forced an immediate change of base across the Peninsula. To that end from the evening of the 26th every energy of the army was bent. Such a change of base in the presence of a powerful enemy is one of the most difficult undertakings in war. I was confident of the valor and discipline of my brave army, and knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat or advance and to fight the series of battles now inevitable whether retreating from victories or marching through defeats; and, in short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, even against superior numbers, to fight its way through to the James River, and get a position whence a successful advance upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb conduct through the next seven days justified my faith.

On the same day General Van Vliet, chief quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, by my orders telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls, quartermaster at the White House, as follows:

Run the cars to the last moment, and load them with provisions and ammunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, and send them to Savage Station by way of Bottom's Bridge. If you are obliged to abandon White House burn everything that you cannot get off. You must throw all our supplies up the James River as soon as possible, and accompany them yourself with all your force. It will be of vast importance to establish our depots on James River without delay if we abandon White House. I will keep you advised of every movement so long as the wires work; after that you must exercise your own judgment.

All these commands were obeyed. So excellent were the dispositions of the different officers in command of the troops, depots, and gunboats, and so timely the warning of the approach of the enemy, that almost everything was saved, and but a small amount of stores destroyed, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.

General Stoneman's communications with the main army being cut

off, he fell back upon the White House and thence to Yorktown, when the White House was evacuated.

On the 26th orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank of the Chickahominy to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare on the following day to the left bank of the river, as will be seen from the appended telegrams. General Franklin received instructions to hold General Slocum's division in readiness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direction of General Porter, to move it at once to his assistance without further orders.

At noon on the 26th the approach of the enemy, who had crossed above Meadow Bridge, was discovered by the advanced pickets at that point, and at 12.30 p. m. they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn.

Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve in rear of the line, and shortly after Martindale's and Griffin's brigades of Morell's division were moved forward and deployed on the right of McCall's division, toward Shady Grove Church, to cover that flank. Neither of these three brigades, however, were warmly engaged, though two of Griffin's regiments relieved a portion of Reynolds' line just at the close of the action.

The position of our troops was a strong one, extending along the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, the left resting on the Chickahominy and the right in thick woods beyond the upper road from Mechanicsville to Cold Harbor. The lower or river road crossed the creek at Ellison's Mill. Seymour's brigade held the left of the line from the Chickahominy to beyond the mill, partly in woods and partly in clear ground, and Reynolds' the right, principally in the woods and covering the upper road. The artillery occupied positions commanding the roads and the open ground across the creek.

Timber had been felled, rifle pits dug, and the position generally prepared with a care that greatly contributed to the success of the day. The passage of the creek was difficult along the whole front, and impracticable for artillery, except by the two roads where the main efforts of the enemy were directed.

At 3 p. m. he formed his line of battle, rapidly advanced his skirmishers, and soon attacked our whole line, making at the same time a determined attempt to force the passage of the upper road, which was successfully resisted by General Reynolds. After a severe struggle he was forced to retire with very heavy loss.

A rapid artillery fire, with desultory skirmishing, was maintained along the whole front, while the enemy massed his troops for another effort at the lower road about two hours later, which was likewise repulsed by General Seymour with heavy slaughter.

The firing ceased, and the enemy retired about 9 p. m., the action having lasted six hours, with entire success to our arms. But few, if any, of Jackson's troops were engaged on this day. The portion of the enemy encountered were chiefly from the troops on the right bank of the river, who crossed near Meadow Bridge and at Mechanicsville.

The information in my possession soon after the close of this action convinced me that Jackson was really approaching in large force. The position on Beaver Dam Creek, although so successfully defended, had its right flank too much in the air, and was too far from the main army to make it available to retain it longer. I therefore determined to send the heavy guns at Hogan's and Gaines' houses over the Chickahominy

during the night, with as many of the wagons of the Fifth Corps as possible, and to withdraw the corps itself to a position stretching around the bridges, where its flanks would be reasonably secure, and it would be within supporting distance of the main army. General Porter carried out my orders to that effect.

It was not advisable at that time, even had it been practicable, to withdraw the Fifth Corps to the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, placed as between two fires, and enabled Jackson's fresh troops to interrupt the movement to James River, by crossing the Chickahominy in the vicinity of Jones' Bridge before we could reach Malvern Hill with our trains. I determined then to resist Jackson with the Fifth Corps, re-enforced by all our disposable troops in the new position near the bridge heads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to give time for the arrangements to secure the adoption of the James River as our line of supplies in lieu of the Pamunkey.

The greater part of the heavy guns and wagons having been removed to the right bank of the Chickahominy, the delicate operation of withdrawing the troops from Beaver Dam Creek was commenced shortly before daylight and successfully executed.

Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the first to leave the ground. Seymour's brigade covered the rear with the horse batteries of Captains Robertson and Tidball, but the withdrawal was so skillful and gradual and the repulse of the preceding day so complete, that although the enemy followed the retreat closely and some skirmishing occurred, he did not appear in front of the new line in force till about noon of the 27th, when we were prepared to receive him.

About this time General Porter, believing that General Stoneman would be cut off from him, sent him orders to fall back on the White House, and afterwards rejoin the army as best he could.

On the morning of the 27th of June, during the withdrawal of his troops from Mechanicsville to the selected position already mentioned, General Porter telegraphed as follows:

I hope to do without aid, though I request that Franklin, or some other command, be held ready to re-enforce me. The enemy are so close that I expect to be hard pressed in front. I hope to have a portion in position to cover the retreat. This is a delicate movement, but relying on the good qualities of the commanders of divisions and brigades, I expect to get back and hold the new line.

This shows how closely Porter's retreat was followed.

Notwithstanding all the efforts used during the entire night to remove the heavy guns and wagons, some of the siege guns were still in position at Gaines' house after sunrise, and were finally hauled off by hand. The new position of the Fifth Corps was about an arc of a circle, covering the approaches to the bridges which connected our right wing with the troops on the opposite side of the river.

Morell's division held the left of the line in a strip of woods on the left bank of the Gaines' Mill stream, resting its left flank on the descent to the Chickahominy, which was swept by our artillery on both sides of the river, and extending into open ground on the right toward New Cold Harbor. In this line General Butterfield's brigade held the extreme left, General Martindale's joined his right, and General Griffin, still farther to the right, joined the left of General Sykes' division, which, partly in woods and partly in open ground, extended in the rear of Cold Harbor.

Each brigade had in reserve two of its own regiments. McCall's division, having been engaged on the day before, was formed in a second

line in the rear of the first, Meade's brigade on the left near the Chickahominy, Reynolds' brigade on the right, covering the approaches from Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Sumner's bridge, and Seymour's in reserve to the second line, still farther in rear. General P. St. George Cooke, with five companies of the Fifth Regular Cavalry, two squadrons of the First Regular and three squadrons of the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry (Lancers), was posted behind a hill in rear of the position and near the Chickahominy, to aid in watching the left flank and defending the slope to the river.

The troops were all in position by noon, with the artillery on the commanding ground and in the intervals between the divisions and brigades. Besides the division batteries there were Robertson's and Tidball's horse batteries, from the artillery reserve; the latter posted on the right of Sykes' division, and the former on the extreme left of the line, in the valley of the Chickahominy. Shortly after noon the enemy were discovered approaching in force, and it soon became evident that the entire position was to be attacked. His skirmishers advanced rapidly, and soon the firing became heavy along our whole front. At 2 p. m. General Porter asked for re-enforcements. Slocum's division, of the Sixth Corps, was ordered to cross to the left bank of the river, by Alexander' bridge, and proceed to his support.

General Porter's first call for re-enforcements, through General Barnard, did not reach me, nor his demand for more axes, through the same officer.

By 3 p. m. the engagement had become so severe, and the enemy were so greatly superior in numbers, that the entire second line and reserves had been moved forward to sustain the first line against repeated and desperate assaults along our whole front.

At 3.30 p. m. Slocum's division reached the field, and was immediately brought into action at the weak points of our line.

On the left the contest was for the strip of woods running almost at right angles to the Chickahominy, in front of Adams' house, or between that and Gaines' house. The enemy several times charged up to this wood, but were each time driven back with heavy loss. The regulars, of Sykes' division, on the right, also repulsed several strong attacks. But our own loss under the tremendous fire of such greatly superior numbers was very severe, and the troops, most of whom had been under arms more than two days, were rapidly becoming exhausted by the masses of fresh men constantly brought against them.

When General Slocum's division arrived on the ground it increased General Porter's force to some 35,000, who were probably contending against about 70,000 of the enemy. The line was severely pressed in several points, and as its being pierced at any one would have been fatal, it was unavoidable for General Porter, who was required to hold his position until night, to divide Slocum's division and send parts of it, even single regiments, to the points most threatened.

About 5 p. m., General Porter having reported his position as critical, French's and Meagher's brigades of Richardson's division (Second Corps) were ordered to cross to his support. The enemy attacked again in great force at 6 p. m., but failed to break our lines, though our loss was very heavy.

About 7 p. m. they threw fresh troops against General Porter with still greater fury, and finally gained the woods held by our left. This reverse, aided by the confusion that followed an unsuccessful charge by five companies of the Fifth Cavalry, and followed as it was by more determined assaults on the remainder of our lines, now outflanked, caused

a general retreat from our position to the hill in rear, overlooking the bridge.

French's and Meagher's brigades now appeared, driving before them the stragglers who were thronging toward the bridge. These brigades advanced boldly to the front, and by their example, as well as by the steadiness of their bearing, reanimated our own troops and warned the enemy that re-enforcements had arrived. It was now dusk. The enemy, already repulsed several times with terrible slaughter, and hearing the shouts of the fresh troops, failed to follow up their advantage.

This gave an opportunity to rally our men behind the brigades of Generals French and Meagher, and they again advanced up the hill ready to repulse another attack.

During the night our thin and exhausted regiments were all withdrawn in safety, and by the following morning all had reached the other side of the stream. The regular infantry formed the rear guard, and about 6 o'clock on the morning of the 28th crossed the river, destroying the bridge behind them.

Our loss in this battle in killed, wounded, and missing was very heavy, especially in officers, many of whom were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners while gallantly leading on their men or rallying them to renewed exertions. It is impossible to arrive at the exact numbers lost in this desperate engagement, owing to the series of battles which followed each other in quick succession and in which the whole army was engaged. No general returns were made until after we had arrived at Harrison's Landing, when the losses during the whole seven days were estimated together.

Although we were finally forced from our first line after the enemy had been repeatedly driven back, yet the objects sought for had been obtained. The enemy was held at bay. Our siege guns and material were saved, and the right wing had now joined the main body of the army.

The number of guns captured by the enemy at this battle was twenty-two, three of which were lost by being run off the bridge during the final withdrawal.

Great credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with which this important arm of the service (the artillery) was fought, and it was not until the last successful charge of the enemy that the cannoners were driven from their pieces or struck down, and the guns captured. Diederichs', Knieriem's, and Grimm's batteries took position during the engagement in the front of General Smith's line on the right bank of the stream, and with a battery of siege guns, served by the First Connecticut Artillery, helped to drive back the enemy in front of General Porter.

So threatening were the movements of the enemy on both banks of the Chickahominy that it was impossible to decide until the afternoon where the real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day near the Old Tavern, on Franklin's right, and threatening demonstrations were frequently made along the entire line on this side of the river, which rendered it necessary to hold a considerable force in position to meet them.

On the 26th a circular was sent to the corps commanders on the right bank of the river, asking them how many of their troops could be spared to re-enforce General Porter, after retaining sufficient to hold their positions for twenty-four hours.

To this the following replies were received :

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS, *June 26—4 p. m.*

I think I can hold the intrenchments with four brigades for twenty-four hours. That would leave two brigades disposable for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and worn-out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance. * * *

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,
Brigadier-General.

General R. B. MARCY.

Telegrams from General Heintzelman, on the 25th and 26th, had indicated that the enemy was in large force in front of Generals Hooker and Kearny, and on the Charles City road (Longstreet, Hill, and Huger), and General Heintzelman expressed the opinion, on the night of the 25th, that he could not hold his advanced position without reinforcements.

General Keyes telegraphed :

As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty-four hours, I must answer, all I have, if the enemy is as strong as ever in front, it having at all times appeared to me that our forces on this flank are small enough.

On the morning of the 27th the following dispatch was sent to General Sumner :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 27—8.45 a. m.

General Smith just reports that six or eight regiments have moved down to the woods in front of General Sumner.

R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

General E. V. SUMNER, *Commanding Second Army Corps.*

At 11 a. m. General Sumner telegraphed as follows :

The enemy threaten an attack on my right, near Smith.

At 12.30 p. m. he telegraphed :

Sharp shelling on both sides.

At 2.45 p. m. :

Sharp musketry firing in front of Burns. We are replying with artillery and infantry. The man on the lookout reports some troops drawn up in line of battle about opposite my right and Smith's left ; the number cannot be made out.

In accordance with orders given on the night of the 26th, General Slocum's division commenced crossing the river to support General Porter soon after daybreak on the morning of the 27th ; but as the firing in front of General Porter ceased the movement was suspended. At 2 p. m. General Porter called for re-enforcements. I ordered them at once, and at 3.25 p. m. sent him the following :

Slocum is now crossing Alexander's Bridge with his whole command. Enemy has commenced an infantry attack on Smith's left. I have ordered down Sumner's and Heintzelman's reserves, and you can count on the whole of Slocum's. Go on as you have begun.

During the day the following dispatches were received, which will show the condition of affairs on the right bank of the Chickahominy :

JUNE 27, 1862.

General Smith thinks the enemy are massing heavy columns in the clearings to the right of James Garnett's house and on the other side of the river opposite it. Three regiments are reported to be moving from Sumner's to Smith's front. The arrangements are very good, made by Smith.

W. B. FRANKLIN,
Brigadier-General.

Col. A. V. COLBURN, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

Afterwards he telegraphed :

The enemy has begun an attack on Smith's left with infantry. I know no details.

Afterwards the following :

The enemy has opened on Smith from a battery of three pieces to the right of the White House. Our shells are bursting well, and Smith thinks Sumner will soon have a cross-fire upon them that will silence them.

Afterwards (at 5.50 p. m.) the following was sent to General Keyes :

Please send one brigade of Couch's division to these headquarters without a moment's delay. A staff officer will be here to direct the brigade where to go.

Subsequently the following was sent to Generals Sumner and Franklin :

Is there any sign of the enemy being in force in your front? Can you spare any more force to be sent to General Porter? Answer at once.

At 5.15 p. m. the following was received from General Franklin :

I do not think it prudent to take any more troops from here at present.

General Sumner replied as follows :

If the general desires to trust the defense of my position to my front line alone, I can send French with three regiments, and Meagher with his brigade, to the right. Everything is so uncertain that I think it would be hazardous to do it.

These two brigades were sent to re-enforce General Porter, as has been observed.

At 5.25 p. m. I sent the following to General Franklin :

Porter is hard pressed. It is not a question of prudence, but of possibilities. Can you possibly maintain your position until dark with two brigades? I have ordered eight regiments of Sumner's to support Porter; one brigade of Couch's to this place; Heintzelman's reserve to go in rear of Sumner. If possible send a brigade to support Porter. It should follow the regiments ordered from Sumner.

At 7.35 p. m. the following was sent to General Sumner :

If it is possible send another brigade to re-enforce General Smith. It is said three heavy columns of infantry are moving on him.

From the foregoing dispatches it will be seen that all disposable troops were sent from the right bank of the river to re-enforce General Porter, and that the corps commanders were left with smaller forces to hold their positions than they deemed adequate. To have done more, even though Porter's reverse had been prevented, would have had the still more disastrous result of imperiling the whole movement across the Peninsula.

The operations of this day proved the numerical superiority of the enemy, and made it evident that while he had a large army on the left bank of the Chickahominy, which had already turned our right and was in position to intercept the communications with our depot at the White House, he was also in large force between our army and Richmond. I therefore effected a junction of our forces.

This might probably have been executed on either side of the Chickahominy, and if the concentration had been effected on the left bank it is possible we might with our entire force have defeated the enemy there; but at that time they held the roads leading to the White House, so that it would have been impossible to have sent forward supply trains in advance of the army in that direction, and the guarding of those trains would have seriously embarrassed our operations in the battle. We would have been compelled to fight if concentrated on that bank of the river. Moreover, we would at once have been followed by

the enemy's forces upon the Richmond side of the river operating upon our rear, and if in the chances of war we had been ourselves defeated in the effort, we would have been forced to fall back to the White House, and probably to Fort Monroe, and as both our flanks and rear would then have been entirely exposed, our entire supply train, if not the greater part of the army itself, might have been lost. The movements of the enemy showed that they expected this, and, as they themselves acknowledged, they were prepared to cut off our retreat in that direction. I therefore concentrated all our forces on the right bank of the river. During the night of the 26th and morning of the 27th all our wagons, heavy guns, &c., were gathered there.

It may be asked, why, after the concentration of our forces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, with a large part of the enemy drawn away from Richmond upon the opposite side, I did not, instead of striking for James River, 15 miles below that place, at once march directly on Richmond. It will be remembered that at this juncture the enemy was on our rear, and there was every reason to believe that he would sever our communications with the supply depot at the White House. We had on hand but a limited amount of rations, and if we had advanced directly on Richmond it would have required considerable time to carry the strong works around that place, during which our men would have been destitute of food, and even if Richmond had fallen before our arms the enemy could still have occupied our supply communications between that place and the gunboats and turned the disaster into victory. If, on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated all his forces at Richmond during the progress of our attack, and we had been defeated, we must in all probability have lost our trains before reaching the flotilla.

The battles which continued day after day in the progress of our flank movement to the James River, with the exception of the one at Gaines' Mill, were successes to our arms, and the closing engagement at Malvern Hill was the most decisive of all.

On the evening of the 27th of June I assembled the corps commanders at my headquarters and informed them of my plan, its reasons, and my choice of route and method of execution.

General Keyes was directed to move his corps, with its artillery and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp Bridge and to seize strong positions on the opposite side of the swamp, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains.

This order was executed on the 28th by noon. Before daybreak on the 28th I went to Savage Station and remained there during the day and night, directing the withdrawal of the trains and supplies of the army.

Orders were given to the different commanders to load their wagons with ammunition and provisions and the necessary baggage of the officers and men, and to destroy all property which could not be transported with the army.

Orders were also given to leave with those of the sick and wounded who could not be transported a proper complement of surgeons and attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations and medical stores.

The large herd of 2,500 beef cattle was by the chief commissary, Colonel Clarke, transferred to the James River without loss.

On the morning of the 28th, while General Franklin was withdrawing his command from Golding's farm, the enemy opened upon General Smith's division from Garnett's Hill, from the valley above, and from Gaines' Hill, on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, and shortly

afterwards two Georgia regiments attempted to carry the works about to be vacated, but this attack was repulsed by the Thirty-Third New York and the Forty-Ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers on picket and a section of Mott's battery.

Porter's corps was moved across White Oak Swamp during the day and night, and took up positions covering the roads leading from Richmond toward White Oak Swamp and Long Bridge. McCall's division was ordered on the night of the 28th to move across the swamp and take a proper position to assist in covering the remaining troops and trains.

During the same night the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman and the division of Smith were ordered to an interior line, the left resting on Keyes' old intrenchments and curving to the right, so as to cover Savage Station.

General Slocum's division, of Franklin's corps, was ordered to Savage Station, in reserve.

They were ordered to hold this position until dark of the 29th, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and then to fall back across the swamp and unite with the remainder of the army.

On the 28th I sent the following to the Secretary of War :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Savage Station, June 28, 1862—12.20 a. m.

I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war.

The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely and suffered most are still in the best order. My regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use to-morrow I could take Richmond, but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and *personnel* of the army.

If we have lost the day we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small.

I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes, but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large re-enforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have.

In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of 10,000 fresh men, I could gain a victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result.

I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost.

If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington.

You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

Hon. E. M. STANTON.

The headquarters camp at Savage Station was broken up early on the morning of the 29th, and moved across White Oak Swamp. As the essential part of this day's operations was the passage of the trains across the swamp and their protection against attack from the direction of

New Market and Richmond, as well as the immediate and secure establishment of our communications with the gunboats, I passed the day in examining the ground, directing the posting of troops and securing the uninterrupted movement of the trains.

In the afternoon I instructed General Keyes to move during the night to James River, and occupy a defensive position near Malvern Hill, to secure our extreme left flank.

General F. J. Porter was ordered to follow him, and prolong the line toward the right. The trains were to be pushed on toward James River in rear of these corps, and placed under the protection of the gunboats as they arrived.

A sharp skirmish with the enemy's cavalry early this day on the Quaker road showed that his efforts were about to be directed toward impeding our progress to the river, and rendered my presence in that quarter necessary.

BATTLE OF ALLEN'S FARM.

General Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oaks on June 29 at daylight, and marched his command to Orchard Station, halting at Allen's field, between Orchard and Savage Stations. The divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick were formed on the right of the railroad, facing toward Richmond, Richardson holding the right and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzelman's corps. The first line of Richardson's division was held by General French, General Caldwell supporting in the second. A log building in front of Richardson's division was held by Colonel Brooke with one regiment (Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers), with Hazzard's battery on an elevated piece of ground, a little in rear of Colonel Brooke's command.

At 9 a. m. the enemy commenced a furious attack on the right of General Sedgwick, but were repulsed. The left of General Richardson was next attacked, the enemy attempting in vain to carry the position of Colonel Brooke. Captain Hazzard's battery, and Pettit's battery, which afterward replaced it, were served with great effect, while the Fifty-third Pennsylvania kept up a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compelling them at last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the attack three times, but were as often repulsed.

BATTLE OF SAVAGE STATION.

General Slocum arrived at Savage Station at an early hour on the 29th, and was ordered to cross White Oak Swamp and relieve General Keyes' corps. As soon as General Keyes was thus relieved he moved toward James River, which he reached in safety with all his artillery and baggage early on the morning of the 30th, and took up a position below Turkey Creek Bridge.

During the morning General Franklin heard that the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, was crossing the Chickahominy in large force and advancing toward Savage Station. He communicated this information to General Sumner, at Allen's farm, and moved Smith's division to Savage Station. A little after noon General Sumner united his forces with those of General Franklin, and assumed command.

I had ordered General Heintzelman, with his corps, to hold the Williamsburg road until dark at a point where there were several field-works, and a skirt of timber between these works and the railroad, but he fell back before night, and crossed White Oak Swamp at Brackett's Ford.

General Sumner, in his report of the battle of Savage Station, says:

When the enemy appeared on the Williamsburg road I could not imagine why General Heintzelman did not attack him, and not until some time afterward did I learn, to my utter amazement, that General Heintzelman had left the field, and retreated with his whole corps (about 15,000 men) before the action commenced. This defection might have been attended with the most disastrous consequences, and although we beat the enemy signally and drove him from the field, we should certainly have given him a more crushing blow if General Heintzelman had been there with his corps.

General Heintzelman, in his report of the operations of his corps, says:

On the night of the 28th of June I received orders to withdraw the troops of my corps from the advanced position they had taken on the 25th of June, and to occupy the intrenched lines about a mile in rear. A map was sent me, showing the positions General Sumner's and General Franklin's corps would occupy.

About sunrise the next day our troops slowly fell back to the new position, cautiously followed by the enemy, taking possession of our camps as soon as we left them.

From some misapprehension General Sumner held a more advanced position than was indicated on the map furnished me, thus leaving a space of about three-fourths of a mile between the right of his corps and General Smith's division of General Franklin's corps.

At 11 a. m. on the 29th the enemy commenced an attack on General Sumner's troops, a few shells falling within my lines. Late in the forenoon reports reached me that the rebels were in possession of Dr. Trent's house, only $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Savage Station. I sent several cavalry reconnaissances, and finally was satisfied of the fact. General Franklin came to my headquarters, when I learned of the interval between his left and General Sumner's right, in which space Dr. Trent's house is; also that the rebels had repaired one of the bridges across the Chickahominy and were advancing.

I rode forward to see General Sumner, and met his troops falling back on the Williamsburg road through my lines. General Sumner informed me that he intended to make a stand at Savage Station, and for me to join him to determine upon the position.

This movement of General Sumner's uncovering my right flank, it became necessary for me to at once withdraw my troops. * * * I rode back to find General Sumner. After some delay from the mass of troops in the field I found him, and learned that the course of action had been determined on; so I returned to give the necessary orders for the destruction of the railroad cars, ammunition, and provisions still remaining on the ground.

The whole open space near Savage Station was crowded with troops—more than I supposed could be brought into action judiciously. An aide from the commanding general had in the morning reported to me to point out a road across the White Oak Swamp, starting from the left of General Kearny's position and leading by Brackett's Ford.

The advance of the column reached the Charles City road at 6.30 p. m. and the rear at 10 p. m. without accident.

The orders given by me to Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin were to hold the positions assigned them until dark. As stated by General Heintzelman, General Sumner did not occupy the designated position; but as he was the senior officer present on that side of the White Oak Swamp, he may have thought that the movements of the enemy justified a deviation from the letter of the orders. It appears from his report that he assumed command of all the troops near Savage Station and determined to resist the enemy there, and that he gave General Heintzelman orders to hold the same position as I had assigned him.

The aide sent by me to General Heintzelman to point out the road across the swamp was to guide him in retiring after dark.

On reaching Savage Station, Sumner's and Franklin's commands were drawn up in line of battle in the large open field to the left of the railroad, the left resting on the edge of the woods and the right

extending down to the railroad. General Brooks, with his brigade, held the wood to the left of the field, where he did excellent service, receiving a wound, but retaining his command.

General Hancock's brigade was thrown into the woods on the right and front. At 4 p. m. the enemy commenced his attack in large force by the Williamsburg road. It was gallantly met by General Burns' brigade, supported and re-enforced by two lines in reserve, and finally by the New York Sixty-ninth, Hazzard's and Pettit's batteries again doing good service. Osborn's and Bramhall's batteries also took part effectively in this action, which was continued with great obstinacy until between 8 and 9 p. m., when the enemy were driven from the field.

Immediately after the battle the orders were repeated for all the troops to fall back and cross White Oak Swamp, which was accomplished during the night in good order. By midnight all the troops were on the road to White Oak Swamp Bridge, General French, with his brigade, acting as rear guard, and at 5 a. m. on the 30th all had crossed, and the bridge was destroyed.

On the afternoon of the 29th I gave to the corps commanders their instructions for the operations of the following day. As stated before, Porter's corps was to move forward to James River, and, with the corps of General Keyes, to occupy a position at or near Turkey Bend, on a line perpendicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to Richmond, opening communication with the gunboats, and covering the passage of the supply trains, which were pushed forward as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's plantation. The remaining corps were pressed onward and posted so as to guard the approaches from Richmond, as well as the crossings of the White Oak Swamp, over which the army had passed. General Franklin was ordered to hold the passage of White Oak Swamp Bridge and cover the withdrawal of the trains from that point. His command consisted of his own corps, with General Richardson's division and General Naglee's brigade, placed under his orders for the occasion. General Slocum's division was on the right of the Charles City road.

On the morning of the 30th I again gave to the corps commanders within reach instructions for posting their troops. I found that, notwithstanding all the efforts of my personal staff and other officers, the roads were blocked by wagons, and there was great difficulty in keeping the trains in motion.

The engineer officers whom I had sent forward on the 28th to reconnoiter the roads had neither returned nor sent me any reports or guides. Generals Keyes and Porter had been delayed—one by losing the road and the other by repairing an old road—and had not been able to send me any information. We then knew of but one road for the movement of the troops and our immense trains. It was therefore necessary to post the troops in advance of this road, as well as our limited knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to cover the movement of the trains in the rear. I then examined the whole line from the swamp to the left, giving final instructions for the posting of the troops and the obstructions of the roads toward Richmond, and all corps commanders were directed to hold their positions until the trains had passed, after which a more concentrated position was to be taken up near James River. Our force was too small to occupy and hold the entire line from the White Oak Swamp to the river, exposed as it was to be taken in reverse by a movement across the lower part of the swamp, or across the Chick-

ahominy, below the swamp. Moreover, the troops were then greatly exhausted, and required rest in a more secure position.

I extended my examination of the country as far as Haxall's, looking at all the approaches to Malvern, which position I perceived to be the key to our operations in this quarter, and was thus enabled to expedite very considerably the passage of the trains and to rectify the positions of the troops. Everything being then quiet, I sent aides to the different corps commanders to inform them what I had done on the left, and to bring me information of the condition of affairs on the right. I returned from Malvern to Haxall's, and having made arrangements for instant communication from Malvern by signals, went on board of Captain Rodgers' gunboat, lying near, to confer with him in reference to the condition of our supply vessels and the state of things on the river. It was his opinion that it would be necessary for the army to fall back to a position below City Point, as the channel there was so near the southern shore that it would not be possible to bring up the transports should the enemy occupy it. Harrison's Landing was, in his opinion, the nearest suitable point. Upon the termination of this interview I returned to Malvern Hill, and remained there until shortly before daylight.

BATTLE OF NELSON'S FARM, OR GLENDALE.

On the morning of the 30th General Sumner was ordered to march with Sedgwick's division to Glendale (Nelson's Farm). General McCall's division (Pennsylvania Reserves) was halted during the morning on the New Market road, just in advance of the point where the road turns off to Quaker Church. This line was formed perpendicularly to the New Market road, with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on the left, and Reynolds' brigade, commanded by Col. S. G. Simmons, of the Fifth Pennsylvania, in reserve; Rande's regular battery on the right, Kerns' and Cooper's batteries opposite the center, and Diederichs' and Knieriem's batteries of the artillery reserve on the left, all in front of the infantry line. The country in General McCall's front was an open field, intersected toward the right by the New Market road and a small strip of timber parallel to it. The open front was about 800 yards, its depth about 1,000 yards.

On the morning of the 30th General Heintzelman ordered the bridge at Brackett's Ford to be destroyed and trees to be felled across that road and the Charles City road. General Slocum's division was to extend to the Charles City road. General Kearny's left to connect with General Slocum's left. General McCall's position was to the left of the Long Bridge road, in connection with General Kearny's left. General Hooker was on the left of General McCall. Between 12 and 1 o'clock the enemy opened a fierce cannonade upon the divisions of Smith and Richardson and Naglee's brigade at White Oak Swamp Bridge. This artillery fire was continued by the enemy through the day, and he crossed some infantry below our position. Richardson's division suffered severely. Captain Ayres directed our artillery with great effect. Captain Hazzard's battery, after losing many cannoneers and Captain Hazzard being mortally wounded, was compelled to retire. It was replaced by Pettit's battery, which partially silenced the enemy's guns.

General Franklin held his position until after dark, repeatedly driving back the enemy in their attempts to cross the White Oak Swamp.

At 2 o'clock in the day the enemy were reported advancing in

force by the Charles City road, and at half past 2 o'clock the attack was made down the road on General Slocum's left, but was checked by his artillery. After this the enemy in large force, comprising the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, attacked General McCall, whose division, after severe fighting, was compelled to retire.

General McCall, in his report of the battle, says :

* * * * *

About half past two my pickets were driven in by a strong advance, after some skirmishing, without loss on our part.

At 3 o'clock the enemy sent forward a regiment on the left center and another on the right center, to feel for a weak point. They were under cover of a shower of shells and boldly advanced, but were both driven back—on the left by the Twelfth Regiment and on the right by the Seventh Regiment.

For nearly two hours the battle raged hotly here. * * * At last the enemy was compelled to retire before the well-directed musketry fire of the reserves. The German batteries were driven to the rear, but I rode up and sent them back. It was, however, of little avail, and they were soon after abandoned by the cannon-eers. * * * The batteries in front of the center were boldly charged upon, but the enemy were speedily forced back. * * * Soon after this a most determined charge was made on Randol's battery by a full brigade, advancing in wedge-shape without order, but in perfect recklessness. Somewhat similar charges had, I have stated, been previously made on Cooper's and Kerns' batteries by single regiments without success, they having recoiled before the storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was anticipated by Randol's battery, and the Fourth Regiment was requested not to fire until the battery had done with them. Its gallant commander did not doubt his ability to repel the attack, and his guns did, indeed, mow down the advancing host ; but still the gaps were closed, and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzle of his guns. It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were in his battery before the guns could be removed. Two guns that were, indeed, successfully limbered had their horses killed and wounded and were overturned on the spot, and the enemy dashing past drove the greater part of the Fourth Regiment before them. The left company (B) nevertheless stood its ground, with its captain, Fred. A. Conrad, as did likewise certain men of other companies. I had ridden into the regiment and endeavored to check them, but with only partial success.

* * * * *

There was no running ; but my division, reduced by the previous battles to less than 6,000, had to contend with the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, considered two of the strongest and best among many of the Confederate Army, numbering that day 18,000 or 20,000 men, and it was reluctantly compelled to give way before heavier force accumulated upon them.

* * * * *

General Heintzelman states that about 5 o'clock p. m. General McCall's division was attacked in large force, evidently the principal attack ; that in less than an hour the division gave way, and adds :

General Hooker being on his left, by moving to the right repulsed the rebels in the handsomest manner, with great slaughter. General Sumner, who was with General Sedgwick in McCall's rear, also greatly aided with his artillery and infantry in driving back the enemy. They now renewed their attack with vigor on General Kearny's left, and were again repulsed with heavy loss.

* * * * *

This attack commenced about 4 p. m., and was pushed by heavy masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Captain Thompson's battery, directed with great precision, firing double charges, swept them back. The whole open space, 200 paces wide, was filled with the enemy. Each repulse brought fresh troops. The third attack was only repulsed by the rapid volleys and determined charge of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Hays, and half of the Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers.

General McCall's troops soon began to emerge from the woods into the open field. Several batteries were in position, and began to fire into the woods over the heads of our men in front. Captain De Russy's battery was placed on the right of General Sumner's artillery, with orders to shell the woods. General Burns' brigade was then advanced to meet the enemy, and soon drove him back. Other troops began to return from the White Oak Swamp. Later in the day, at the call of

General Kearny, General Taylor's First New Jersey Brigade, Slocum's division, was sent to occupy a portion of the position from which General McCall's division had been forced back by the attack of superior numbers, a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back the enemy, who shortly after gave up the attack, contenting themselves with keeping up a desultory firing till late at night. Between 12 and 1 o'clock at night General Heintzelman commenced to withdraw his corps, and soon after daylight both of his divisions, with General Slocum's division and a portion of General Sumner's command, reached Malvern Hill.

On the morning of the 30th, General Sumner, in obedience to orders, had moved promptly to Glendale, and upon a call from General Franklin for re-enforcements, sent him two brigades, which returned in time to participate and render good service in the battle near Glendale. General Sumner says of this battle:

The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About 3 o'clock p. m. the action commenced, and after a furious contest, lasting until after dark, the enemy was routed at all points and driven from the field.

The rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery of the army reached Malvern Hill about 4 p. m. At about this time the enemy began to appear in General Porter's front, and at 5 o'clock advanced in large force against his left flank, posting artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern Hill, while with his infantry and some artillery he attacked Colonel Warren's brigade. A concentrated fire of about thirty guns was brought to bear on the enemy, which, with the infantry fire of Colonel Warren's command, compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel Warren. The gunboats rendered most efficient aid at this time, and helped to drive back the enemy.

It was very late at night before my aides returned to give me the results of the day's fighting along the whole line and the true position of affairs. While waiting to hear from General Franklin, before sending orders to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman, I received a message from the latter that General Franklin was falling back, whereupon I sent Colonel Colburn, of my staff, with orders to verify this, and, if it were true, to order in Generals Sumner and Heintzelman at once. He had not gone far when he met two officers, sent from General Franklin's headquarters, with the information that he was falling back. Orders were then sent to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman to fall back also, and definite instructions were given as to the movement which was to commence on the right. The orders met these troops already *en route* to Malvern. Instructions were also sent to General Franklin as to the route he was to follow.

Generals Barnard and A. A. Humphreys then received full instructions for posting the troops as they arrived.

I then returned to Haxall's, and again left for Malvern soon after daybreak. Accompanied by several general officers, I once more made the entire circuit of the position, and then returned to Haxall's, whence I went with Captain Rodgers to select the final location for the army and its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting commenced, and after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity.

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.

The position selected for resisting the farther advance of the enemy on

the 1st of July was with the left and center of our lines resting on Malvern Hill, while the right curved backwards through a wooded country toward a point below Haxall's, on James River. Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau about a mile and a half by three-fourths of a mile in area, well cleared of timber, and with several converging roads running over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, and the ground slopes gradually toward the north and east to the wood-land, giving clear ranges for artillery in those directions. Toward the northwest the plateau falls off more abruptly into a ravine which extends to James River. From the position of the enemy his most obvious lines of attack would come from the direction of Richmond and White Oak Swamp, and would almost of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing the troops and collecting the principal part of the artillery. Porter's corps held the left of the line (Sykes' division on the left, Morell's on the right), with the artillery of his two divisions advantageously posted, and the artillery of the reserve so disposed on the high ground that a concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be brought to bear on any point in his front or left. Colonel Tyler also had, with great exertion, succeeded in getting ten of his siege guns in position on the highest point of the hill.

Couch's division was placed on the right of Porter; next came Kearny and Hooker, next Sedgwick and Richardson, next Smith and Slocum, then the remainder of Keyes' corps, extending by a backward curve nearly to the river. The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps was held in reserve, and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown to the left on the low ground to protect that flank from any movement direct from the Richmond road. The line was very strong along the whole front of the open plateau, but from thence to the extreme right the troops were more deployed. This formation was imperative, as an attack would probably be made upon our left. The right was rendered as secure as possible by slashing the timber and by barricading the roads. Commodore Rodgers, commanding the flotilla on James River, placed his gunboats so as to protect our flanks and to command the approaches from Richmond.

Between 9 and 10 a. m. the enemy commenced feeling along our whole left wing with his artillery and skirmishers as far to the right as Hooker's division.

About 2 o'clock a column of the enemy was observed moving toward our right within the skirt of woods in front of Heintzelman's corps, but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrangements were at once made to meet the anticipated attack in that quarter, but, though the column was long, occupying more than two hours in passing, it disappeared and was not again heard of. The presumption is that it retired by the rear, and participated in the attack afterward made on our left.

About 3 p. m. a heavy fire of artillery opened on Kearny's left and Couch's division, speedily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with good effect by our own, and the infantry of Couch's division remained lying on the ground until the advancing column was within short musket range, when they sprang to their feet and poured in a deadly volley, which entirely broke the attacking force and drove them in disorder back over their own ground. This advantage was followed up until we had advanced the right of our line some 700 or 800 yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us a stronger position and a better fire.

Shortly after 4 o'clock the firing ceased along the whole front, but no disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw from

the field. Caldwell's brigade, having been detached from Richardson's division, was stationed upon Couch's right by General Porter, to whom he had been ordered to report. The whole line was surveyed by the generals, and everything held in readiness to meet the coming attack. At 6 o'clock the enemy suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward his columns of attack to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade, formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several instances our infantry withheld their fire until the attacking column, which rushed through the storm of canister and shell from our artillery, had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley and dashed forward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in confusion from the field.

About 7 o'clock, as fresh troops were accumulating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher and Sickles were sent with their brigades, as soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's troops, to re-enforce that part of the line and hold the position. These brigades relieved such regiments of Porter's corps and Couch's division as had expended their ammunition, and batteries from the reserve were pushed forward to replace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to take the position so tenaciously defended; but despite his vastly superior numbers his repeated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and darkness ended the battle of Malvern Hill, though it was not until after 9 o'clock that the artillery ceased its fire.

During the whole battle Commodore Rodgers added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy by throwing shell among his reserves and advancing columns.

As the army in its movement from the Chickahominy to Harrison's Landing was continually occupied in marching by night and fighting by day, its commanders found no time or opportunity for collecting data which would enable them to give exact returns of casualties in each engagement. The aggregate of our entire losses from the 26th of June to the 1st of July, inclusive, was ascertained, after arriving at Harrison's Landing, to be as follows:

*List of killed, wounded, and missing in the Army of the Potomac from the 26th of June to the 1st of July, 1862, inclusive.**

Corps—	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
1st, McCall's division (Pennsylvania Reserves)	253	1,240	1,581	3,074
2d, Sumner's	187	1,076	848	2,111
3d, Heintzelman's	189	1,051	833	2,073
4th, Keyes'	69	507	201	777
5th, Porter's	620	2,460	1,198	4,278
6th, Franklin's	245	1,313	1,179	2,737
Engineers	2	2	21	23
Cavalry	19	60	97	176
Total	1,582	7,709	5,958	15,249

* But see revised statement of losses from June 25 to July 1 in Part II, pp. 24-41.

Although the result of the battle of Malvern was a complete victory, it was nevertheless necessary to fall back still farther, in order to reach a point where our supplies could be brought to us with certainty. As before stated, in the opinion of Captain Rodgers, commanding the gunboat flotilla, this could only be done below City Point. Concurring in his opinion, I selected Harrison's Bar as the new position of the army. The exhaustion of our supplies of food, forage, and ammunition made it imperative to reach the transports immediately.

The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for Harrison's Landing during the night of the 30th of June and 1st of July, the order for the movement of the troops was at once issued upon the final repulse of the enemy at Malvern Hill. The order prescribed a movement by the left and rear, General Keyes' corps to cover the maneuver. It was not carried out in detail as regards the divisions on the left, the roads being somewhat blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able to move out as early as had been anticipated, and Porter found it necessary to place a rear guard between his command and the enemy. Colonel Averell, of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, was intrusted with this delicate duty. He had under his command his own regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan's brigade of regular infantry and one battery. By a judicious use of the resources at his command he deceived the enemy so as to cover the withdrawal of the left wing without being attacked, remaining himself on the previous day's battle-field until about 7 o'clock of the 2d of July. Meantime General Keyes, having received his orders, commenced vigorous preparations for covering the movement of the entire army and protecting the trains. It being evident that the immense number of wagons and artillery carriages pertaining to the army could not move with celerity along a single road, General Keyes took advantage of every accident of the ground to open new avenues and to facilitate the movement. He made preparations for obstructing the roads after the army had passed, so as to prevent any rapid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey Bridge, on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches temporarily impassable by felling trees across them. He kept the trains well closed up, and directed the march so that the troops could move on each side of the roads, not obstructing the passage, but being in good position to repel an attack from any quarter. His dispositions were so successful that, to use his own words:

I do not think more vehicles or more public property were abandoned on the march from Turkey Bridge than would have been left, in the same state of the roads, if the army had been moving toward the enemy instead of away from him. And when it is understood that the carriages and teams belonging to this army, stretched out in one line, would extend not far from 40 miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from the presence of an enemy vastly superior in numbers will be appreciated.

The last of the wagons did not reach the site selected at Harrison's Bar until after dark on the 3d of July, and the rear guard did not move into their camp until everything was secure. The enemy followed up with a small force, and on the 3d threw a few shells at the rear guard, but were quickly dispersed by our batteries and the fire of the gunboats.

Great credit must be awarded to General Keyes for the skill and energy which characterized his performance of the important and delicate duties intrusted to his charge. High praise is also due to the officers and men of the First Connecticut Artillery, Colonel Tyler, for

the manner in which they withdrew all the heavy guns during the seven days and from Malvern Hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads the teams could not be brought within a couple of miles of the position, but these energetic soldiers removed the guns by hand for that distance, leaving nothing behind.

THIRD PERIOD.

On the 1st July I received the following from the President:

WASHINGTON, *July 1, 1862—3.30 p. m.*

It is impossible to re-enforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country and will bring it out.

A. LINCOLN.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

In a dispatch from the President to me, on the 2d of July, he says:*

If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. Try just now to save the army, material, and *personnel*, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The Governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000, which I accept.

On the 3d of July the following kind dispatch was received from the President:†

WASHINGTON, *July 3, 1862—3 p. m.*

Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received.‡ I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it.

* * * * *

A. LINCOLN.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

On the 4th I sent the following to the President:§

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Harrison's Bar, James River, July 4, 1862.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 2d instant.

I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor to give my men the repose they so much require.

After sending my communication on Tuesday the enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lasting until night. They were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their attack succeeded the consequences would have been disastrous in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting, which had continued from the afternoon of the 26th ultimo in a daily series of engagements wholly unparalleled on this continent for determination and slaughter on both sides. The mutual loss in killed and wounded is enormous; that of the enemy certainly greatest.

On Tuesday morning, the 1st, our army commenced its movement from Haxall's to this point, our line of defense there being too extended to be maintained by our

* The entire dispatch appears in "Correspondence, etc.," Part III. The original reads: "If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material," &c.

† The entire dispatch appears in "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

‡ See "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

§ See also McClellan to Lincoln, 1 p. m. July 4, in "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

weakened forces. Our train was immense, and about 4 a. m. on the 2d a heavy storm of rain began, which continued during the entire day and until the forenoon of yesterday. The roads became horrible. Troops, artillery, and wagons moved on steadily, and our whole army, men and material, was finally brought safe into this camp. The last of the wagons reached here at noon yesterday. The exhaustion was very great, but the army preserved its *morale*, and would have repelled any attack which the enemy was in condition to make.

We now occupy a line of heights about 2 miles from the James, a plain extending from there to the river. Our front is about 3 miles long. These heights command our whole position, and must be maintained. The gunboats can render valuable support upon both flanks. If the enemy attack us in front we must hold our ground as we best may, and at whatever cost. Our positions can be carried only by overwhelming numbers. The spirit of the army is excellent. Stragglers are finding their regiments, and the soldiers exhibit the best results of discipline. Our position is by no means impregnable, especially as a morass extends on this side of the high ground from our center to the James on our right. The enemy may attack in vast numbers, and if so, our front will be the scene of a desperate battle, which, if lost, will be decisive. Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wounded, and prisoners. I cannot now approximate to any statement of our losses, but we were not beaten in any conflict. The enemy were unable by their utmost efforts to drive us from any field.

Never did such a change of base, involving a retrograde movement, and under incessant attacks from a most determined and vastly more numerous foe, partake so little of disorder. We have lost no guns except twenty-five on the field of battle, twenty-one of which were lost by the giving way of McCall's division under the onset of superior numbers.

Our communications by the James River are not secure. There are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or musketry and command the river, and where it is not certain that our gunboats can drive them out. In case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will still make every effort to preserve at least the *personnel* of the army, and the events of the last few days leave no question that the troops will do all that their country can ask. Send such re-enforcements as you can. I will do what I can. We are shipping our wounded and sick and landing supplies. The Navy Department should co-operate with us to the extent of its resources. Captain Rodgers is doing all in his power in the kindest and most efficient manner.

When all the circumstances of the case are known it will be acknowledged by all competent judges that the movement just completed by this army is unparalleled in the annals of war. Under the most difficult circumstances we have preserved our trains, our guns, our material, and, above all, our honor.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

The PRESIDENT.

To which I received the following reply :

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1862—9 a. m.

A thousand thanks for the relief your two dispatches, of 12 and 1 p. m. yesterday,* gave me. Be assured the heroism and skill of yourself and officers and men is, and forever will be, appreciated.

If you can hold your present position we shall hivy the enemy yet.

A. LINCOLN.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

The following letters† were received from His Excellency the President :

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, D. C., July 4, 1862.

I understand your position as stated in your letter and by General Marcy. To re-enforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac, about 10,000 men, I suppose, and about 10,000 I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and about 5,000 from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances the defensive for the present must be your only care. Save the army, first, where you are, if you can; secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion that with the

* For that of 1 p. m., see "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

† Only one dispatch follows.

aid of the gunboats and the re-enforcements mentioned above you can hold your present position, provided, and so long as, you can keep the James River open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James River open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

P. S.—If at any time you feel able to take the offensive you are not restrained from doing so.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

The following telegram was sent on the 7th:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, July 7, 1862—8.30 a. m.

As boat is starting I have only time to acknowledge receipt of dispatch by General Marcy. Enemy have not attacked. My position is very strong, and daily becoming more so. If not attacked to-day I shall laugh at them. I have been anxious about my communications. Had long consultation about it with Flag-Officer Goldsborough last night. He is confident he can keep river open. He should have all gunboats possible. Will see him again this morning. My men in splendid spirits, and anxious to try it again. Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and don't lose confidence in this army.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

While General-in-Chief, and directing the operations of all our armies in the field, I had become deeply impressed with the importance of adopting and carrying out certain views regarding the conduct of the war, which, in my judgment, were essential to its objects and its success. During an active campaign of three months in the enemy's country these were so fully confirmed, that I conceived it a duty, in the critical position we then occupied, not to withhold a candid expression of the more important of these views from the Commander-in-Chief, whom the Constitution places at the head of the armies and navies, as well as of the Government of the nation.

The following is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862.

MR. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in our front with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before Your Excellency for your private consideration my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.

The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.

This rebellion has assumed the character of a war. As such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State

in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment.

In prosecuting the war all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations; all private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes, all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military toward citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form you will require a Commander-in-Chief of the Army—one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker I have written this letter with sincerity toward you and from love for my country.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

I telegraphed the President on the 11th as follows: *

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, July 11, 1862—3 p. m.

* * * * *

We are very strong here now, so far as defensive is concerned. Hope you will soon make us strong enough to advance and try it again. All in fine spirits.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

These telegrams were sent on the 12th, 17th, and 18th to His Excellency the President:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, July 12, 1862—7.15 a. m.

Hill and Longstreet crossed into New Kent County, via Long Bridge. I am still ignorant what road they afterward took, but will know shortly.

* Entire dispatch appears in "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

Nothing else of interest since last dispatch. Rain ceased, and everything quiet. Men resting well, but beginning to be impatient for another fight.

I am more and more convinced that this army ought not to be withdrawn from here, but promptly re-enforced and thrown again upon Richmond. If we have little more than half a chance we can take it.

I dread the effects of any retreat upon the *morale* of the men.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, July 17, 1862—8 a. m.

I have consulted fully with General Burnside, and would commend to your favorable consideration the general's plan for bringing seven additional regiments from North Carolina by leaving New Berne to the care of the gunboats. It appears manifestly to be our policy to concentrate here everything we can possibly spare from less important points to make sure of crushing the enemy at Richmond, which seems clearly to be the most important point in rebeldom. Nothing should be left to chance here. I would recommend that General Burnside, with all his troops, be ordered to this army, to enable it to assume the offensive as soon as possible.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, July 18, 1862—8 a. m.

No change worth reporting in the state of affairs. Some 20,000 to 25,000 of the enemy at Petersburg, and others thence to Richmond.

Those at Petersburg say they are part of Beauregard's army. New troops arriving via Petersburg. Am anxious to have determination of Government, that no time may be lost in preparing for it. Hours are very precious now and perfect unity of action necessary.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

The following was telegraphed to General Halleck on the 28th:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, July 28, 1862—8 a. m.

Nothing especially new except corroboration of reports that re-enforcements are reaching Richmond from south. It is not confirmed that any of Bragg's troops are yet here. My opinion is more and more firm that here is the defense of Washington, and that I should be at once re-enforced by all available troops to enable me to advance. Retreat would be disastrous to the army and the cause. I am confident of that.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

On the 30th I sent the following to the General-in-Chief:*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, July 30, 1862—7 a. m.

* * * * *

I hope that it may soon be decided what is to be done by this army, and that the decision may be to re-enforce it at once. We are losing much valuable time, and that at a moment when energy and decision are sadly needed.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

* Entire dispatch, with another to Halleck of same date, appears in "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

About half an hour after midnight, on the morning of August 1, the enemy brought some light batteries to Coggins' Point and the Cole's house, on the right bank of James River, directly opposite Harrison's Landing, and opened a heavy fire upon our shipping and encampments. It was continued rapidly for about thirty minutes, when they were driven back by the fire of our guns. This affair was reported in the following dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 2, 1862—8 a. m.

Firing of night before last killed some 10 men and wounded about 15.

No harm of the slightest consequence done to the shipping, although several were struck. Sent party across river yesterday to the Cole's house; destroyed it and cut down the timber. Will complete work to-day, and also send party to Coggins' Point, which I will probably occupy. I will attend to your telegraph about pressing at once. Will send Hooker out. Give me Burnside, and I will stir these people up. I need more cavalry; have only 3,700 for duty in cavalry division.

Adjutant General's Office forgot to send Sykes' commission as major-general with those of other division commanders; do me the favor to hurry it on.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

To prevent another demonstration of this character, and to insure a *débouché* on the south bank of the James, it became necessary to occupy Coggins' Point, which was done on the 3d, and the enemy, as will be seen from the following dispatch, driven back toward Petersburg:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 3, 1862—10 p. m.

Coggins' Point was occupied to-day, and timber felled so as to make it quite defensible. I went over the ground myself, and found that Duane had, as usual, selected an admirable position, which can be intrenched with a small amount of labor, so as to make it a formidable *tête-de-pont*, covering the landing of a large force.

I shall begin intrenching it by the labor of contrabands to-morrow. The position covers the Cole's house, which is directly in front of Westover. We have now a safe *débouché* on the south bank, and are secure against midnight cannonading. A few thousand more men would place us in condition at least to annoy and disconcert the enemy very much.

I sent Colonel Averell this morning with 300 cavalry to examine the country on the south side of the James, and try to catch some cavalry at Sycamore Church, which is on the main road from Petersburg to Suffolk, and some 5 miles from Cole's house. He found a cavalry force of 550 men, attacked them at once, drove in their advance guards to their camp, where we had a sharp skirmish, and drove them off in disorder. He burned their entire camp, with their commissary and quartermaster's stores, and then returned and recrossed the river. He took but 2 prisoners, had 1 man wounded by a ball and 1 by a saber cut. Captain McIntosh made a handsome charge. The troops engaged were of the Fifth Regulars and the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry.

Colonel Averell conducted this affair, as he does everything he undertakes, to my entire satisfaction.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Comdg. U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.*

On the 1st of August I received the following dispatches:

WASHINGTON, *July 30, 1862—8 p. m.*

A dispatch just received from General Pope says that deserters report that the enemy is moving south of James River and that the force in Richmond is very small. I suggest he be pressed in that direction, so as to ascertain the facts of the case.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, *July 30, 1862—8 p. m.*

In order to enable you to move in any direction, it is necessary to relieve you of your

sick. The Surgeon-General has therefore been directed to make arrangements for them at other places, and the Quartermaster-General to provide transportation. I hope you will send them away as quickly as possible, and advise me of their removal.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

It is clear that the General-in-Chief attached some weight to the report received from General Pope, and I was justified in supposing that the order in regard to the removing the sick contemplated an offensive movement rather than a retreat, as I had no other data than the telegrams just given from which to form an opinion as to the intentions of the Government.

The following telegram strengthened me in that belief:

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1862—10 a. m.

General Pope again telegraphs that the enemy is reported to be evacuating Richmond and falling back on Danville and Lynchburg.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

In occupying Coggins' Point, as already described, I was influenced by the necessity of possessing a secure *débouché* on the south of the James, in order to enable me to move on the communications of Richmond in that direction as well as to prevent a repetition of midnight cannonades.

To carry out General Halleck's first order of July 30 it was necessary first to gain possession of Malvern Hill, which was occupied by the enemy, apparently in some little force, and controlled the direct approach to Richmond. Its temporary occupation, at least, was equally necessary in the event of a movement upon Petersburg or even the abandonment of the Peninsula. General Hooker, with his own division and Pleasonton's cavalry, was therefore directed to gain possession of Malvern Hill on the night of the 2d of August. He failed to do so, as the following dispatch recites:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 3, 1862—10.20 p. m.

The movement undertaken up the river last night failed on account of the incompetency of guides. The proper steps have been taken to-day to remedy this evil, and I hope to be ready to-morrow night to carry out your suggestions as to pressing, at least to accomplish the first indispensable step.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Major-General HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army.

On the 4th General Hooker was re-enforced by General Sedgwick's division, and having obtained a knowledge of the roads, he succeeded in turning Malvern Hill and driving the enemy back toward Richmond.

The following is my report of this affair at the time:

MALVERN HILL, August 5, 1862—1 p. m.

General Hooker, at 5.30 this morning, attacked a very considerable force of infantry and artillery stationed at this place and carried it handsomely, driving the enemy toward New Market, which is 4 miles distant, and where it is said they have a large force. We have captured 100 prisoners, killed and wounded several, with a loss on our part of only 3 killed and 11 wounded—among the latter 2 officers.

I shall probably remain here to-night, ready to act as circumstances may require,

after the return of my cavalry reconnaissances. The mass of the enemy escaped under the cover of a dense fog, but our cavalry are still in pursuit, and I trust may succeed in capturing many more. This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond and only 14½ miles distant, and I feel confident that with re-enforcements I could march this army there in five days.

I this instant learn that several brigades of the enemy are 4 miles from here, on the Quaker road, and I have taken steps to prepare to meet them.

General Hooker's dispositions were admirable, and his officers and men displayed their usual gallantry.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army.

MALVERN HILL, August 5, 1862—8 p. m.

Since my last dispatch Colonel Averell has returned from a reconnaissance in the direction of Savage Station toward Richmond. He encountered the Tenth Virginia Cavalry near White Oak Swamp Bridge, charged and drove them some distance toward Richmond, capturing 28 men and horses, killing and wounding several.

Our troops have advanced 12 miles in one direction and 17 in another toward Richmond.

To-day we have secured a strong position at Coggins Point, opposite our quartermaster's depot, which will effectually prevent the rebels from using artillery hereafter against our camps.

I learn this evening that there is a force of 20,000 men about 6 miles back from this point, on the south bank of the river. What their object is I do not know, but will keep a sharp lookout on their movements.

I am sending off sick as rapidly as our transports will take them. I am also doing everything in my power to carry out your orders to push reconnaissances toward the rebel capital, and hope soon to find out whether the reports regarding the abandonment of that place are true.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army.

To the dispatch of 1 p. m., August 5, the following answer was received:

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1862—3 a. m.

I have no re-enforcements to send you.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

And soon after the following:

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1862.

You will immediately send a regiment of cavalry and several batteries of artillery to Burnside's command at Aquia Creek. It is reported that Jackson is moving north with a very large force.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

On the 4th I had received General Halleck's order of the 3d (which appears below), directing me to withdraw the army to Aquia, and on the same day sent an earnest protest against it. A few hours before this General Hooker had informed me that his cavalry pickets reported large bodies of the enemy advancing and driving them in, and that he would probably be attacked at daybreak.

Under these circumstances I had determined to support him; but as I could not get the whole army in position until the next afternoon I concluded, upon the receipt of the above telegram from the General-in-Chief, to withdraw General Hooker, that there might be the least

possible delay in conforming to General Halleck's orders. I therefore sent to General Hooker the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 6, 1862—10 p. m.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I find it will not be possible to get the whole army into position before some time to-morrow afternoon, which will be too late to support you and hold the entire position, should the enemy attack in large force at daybreak, which there is strong reason to suppose he intends doing. Should we fight a general battle at Malvern it will be necessary to abandon the whole of our works here, and run the risk of getting back here. Under advices I have received from Washington, I think it necessary for you to abandon the position to-night, getting everything away before daylight. Please leave cavalry pickets at Malvern, with orders to destroy the Turkey Creek Bridge when they are forced back. The roads leading into Haxall's from the right should be strongly watched, and Haxall's at least held by strong cavalry force and some light batteries as long as possible. I leave the manner of the withdrawal entirely to your discretion. Please signal to the fleet when the withdrawal is about completed. Report frequently to these headquarters.

General Sumner was ordered up to support you, but will halt where this passes him, and will inform you where he is.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

General J. HOOKER, *Commanding at Malvern Hill.*

And the following reply was sent to General Halleck:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 6, 1862—11.30 p. m.

Dispatch of to-day received. I have not quite 4,000 cavalry for duty in cavalry division, so that I cannot possibly spare any more. I really need many more than I now have to carry out your instructions. The enemy are moving a large force on Malvern Hill. In view of your dispatches and the fact that I cannot place the whole army in position before daybreak, I have ordered Hooker to withdraw during the night if it is possible. If he cannot do so I must support him. Until this matter is developed I cannot send any batteries. I hope I can do so to-morrow if transportation is on hand. I will obey the order as soon as circumstances permit. My artillery is none too numerous now. I have only been able to send off some 1,200 sick. No transportation. There shall be no delay that I can avoid.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Commanding U. S. Army.*

Five batteries, with their horses and equipments complete, were embarked on the 7th and 8th, simultaneously with General Hooker's operations upon Malvern. I dispatched a cavalry force, under Colonel Averell, toward Savage Station to ascertain if the enemy were making any movements toward our right flank. He found a rebel cavalry regiment near White Oak Swamp Bridge and completely routed it, pursuing well toward Savage Station. These important preliminary operations assisted my preparations for the removal of the army to Aquia Creek, and the sending off our sick and supplies was pushed both day and night as rapidly as the means of transportation permitted.

On the subject of the withdrawal of the army from Harrison's Landing the following correspondence passed between the General-in-Chief and myself while the reconnaissances toward Richmond were in progress:

On the 2d of August I received the following:

WASHINGTON, *August 2, 1862—3.45 p. m.*

You have not answered my telegram of July 30, 8 p. m., about the removal of your sick. Remove them as rapidly as possible and telegraph me when they will be out of your way. The President wishes an answer as early as possible.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

To which this reply was sent:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 3—11 p. m.

Your telegram of 2d is received. The answer to dispatch of July 30 was sent this morning. We have about 12,500 sick, of whom perhaps 4,000 might make easy marches. We have here the means to transport 1,200, and will embark to-morrow that number of the worst cases. With all the means at the disposal of the medical director the remainder could be shipped in from seven to ten days. It is impossible for me to decide what cases to send off, unless I know what is to be done with this army. Were the disastrous measures of a retreat adopted, all the sick who cannot march and fight should be dispatched by water. Should the army advance, many of the sick could be of service at the depots. If it is to remain here any length of time, the question assumes still a different phase.

Until I am informed what is to be done I cannot act understandingly or for the good of the service. If I am kept longer in ignorance of what is to be effected, I cannot be expected to accomplish the object in view. In the mean time I will do all in my power to carry out what I conceive to be your wishes.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

The moment I received the instructions for removing the sick I at once gave the necessary directions for carrying them out. With the small amount of transportation at hand the removal of the severe cases alone would necessarily take several days, and in the mean time I desired information to determine what I should do with the others. The order required me to send them away as quickly as possible, and to notify the General-in-Chief when they were removed.

Previous to the receipt of the dispatch of the 2d of August, not having been advised of what the army under my command was expected to do, or which way it was to move, if it moved at all, I sent the following dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 3, 1862.

I hear of sea steamers at Fort Monroe. Are they for removing my sick? If so, to what extent am I required to go in sending them off? There are not many who need go. As I am not in any way informed of the intentions of the Government in regard to this army, I am unable to judge what proportion of the sick should leave here, and must ask for specific orders.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Comdg. U. S. Army, Washington.*

If the army was to retreat to Fort Monroe it was important that it should be unencumbered with any sick, wounded, or other men who might at all interfere with its mobility; but if the object was to operate directly on Richmond, from the position we then occupied, there were many cases of slight sickness which would speedily be cured and the patients returned to duty.

As the service of every man would be important in the event of a forward offensive movement, I considered it to be of the utmost consequence that I should know what was to be done. It was to ascertain this that I sent the dispatch of 11 p. m. on the 3d, before receiving the following telegram:

WASHINGTON, *August 3, 1862—7.45 p. m.*

I have waited most anxiously to learn the result of your forced reconnaissance toward Richmond, and also whether all your sick have been sent away, and I can get no answer to my telegram.

It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek. You

will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement the best you can. Its real object and withdrawal should be concealed even from your own officers. Your material and transportation should be removed first. You will assume control of all the means of transportation within your reach, and apply to the naval forces for all the assistance they can render you. You will consult freely with the commander of these forces. The entire execution of the movement is left to your discretion and judgment.

You will leave such forces as you may deem proper at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, and other places, which we must occupy.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

I proceeded to obey this order with all possible rapidity, firmly impressed, however, with the conviction that the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from Harrison's Landing, where its communications had by the co-operation of the gunboats been rendered perfectly secure, would, at that time, have the most disastrous effect upon our cause.

I did not, as the commander of that army, allow the occasion to pass without distinctly setting forth my views upon the subject to the authorities in the following telegram:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 4, 1862—12 m.

Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Aquia Creek will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this, and while they are in progress I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statements.

This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a *débouché* on both banks of the James River, so that we are free to act in any direction; and with the assistance of the gunboats I consider our communications as now secure.

We are 25 miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched 15 to 18 miles, which brings us practically within 10 miles of Richmond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point 25 miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army by water during its advance certainly to within 12 miles of Richmond. At Aquia Creek we would be 75 miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way.

From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about 70 miles, for I regard it as impracticable to withdraw this army and its material except by land.

The result of the movement would thus be a march of 145 miles to reach a point now only 25 miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gunboats and water transportation. Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the terribly depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign powers to recognize our adversaries, and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge in the strongest terms afforded by our language that this order may be rescinded, and that far from recalling this army, it may be promptly re-enforced to enable it to resume the offensive.

It may be said that there are no re-enforcements available. I point to Burnside's force; to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry; to those portions of the Army of the West not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here; a decided victory here and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere. Here is the true defense of Washington. It is here, on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should be decided.

Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by the love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now, what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this order may be rescinded.

If my counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad heart obey your orders to the ut-

most of my power, directing to the movement, which I clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess. Whatever the result may be—and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings—I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to avert disaster from my country.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army.

Soon after sending this telegram I received the following in reply to mine of 11 p. m. of the 3d :

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1862—12.45 p. m.

My telegram to you of yesterday will satisfy you in regard to future operations. It was expected that you would have sent off your sick as directed without waiting to know what were or would be the intentions of the Government respecting future movements. The President expects that the instructions which were sent you yesterday with his approval will be carried out with all possible dispatch and caution. The Quartermaster-General is sending to Fort Monroe all the transportation he can collect.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

To which the following is my reply :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 5, 1862—7 a. m.

Your telegram of yesterday received, and is being carried out as promptly as possible. With the means at my command no human power could have moved the sick in the time you say you expected them to be moved.

* * * * *

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army.

My efforts for bringing about a change of policy were unsuccessful, as will be seen from the following telegram and letter received by me in reply to mine of 12 m. of the 4th :

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1862—12 m.

You cannot regret the order of the withdrawal more than I did the necessity of giving it. It will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute it with all possible promptness. It is believed that it can be done now without serious danger. This may not be so, if there should be any delay. I will write you my views more fully by mail.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

The letter was as follows :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, August 6, 1862.

GENERAL: Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed you a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail.

You, general, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview; and even after that interview I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. I assure you, general, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious thoughts than any other of my life; but after full and mature consideration of all the pros and

cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued. There was to my mind no alternative.

Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the case. You and your officers at one interview estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then you and others report that they have received and are receiving large re-enforcements from the South. General Pope's army covering Washington is only about 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are 30 miles from Richmond, and General Pope 80 or 90, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect. Neither can re-enforce the other in case of such an attack.

If General Pope's army be diminished to re-enforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula is, under present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two armies can be united.

Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged. You say that the withdrawal from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, "which is now in excellent discipline and condition." I cannot understand why a simple change of position to a new and by no means distant base will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist in that demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court-House to your present position was over 30 miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it. A new base on the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg brings you within about 60 miles of Richmond, and secures a re-enforcement of 40,000 or 50,000 fresh and disciplined troops. The change, with such advantages, will, I think, if properly represented to your army, encourage rather than demoralize your troops. Moreover, you yourself suggested that a junction might be effected at Yorktown, but that a flank march across the isthmus would be more hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. You will remember that Yorktown is 2 or 3 miles farther than Fredericksburg is. Besides, the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and covers Washington from any attack of the enemy. The political effect of the withdrawal may at first be unfavorable; but I think the public are beginning to understand its necessity, and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separated fragments.

But you will reply, why not re-enforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this you said at our interview that you required 30,000 additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought that you would have "some chance" of success with 20,000. But you afterward telegraphed me that you would require 35,000, as the enemy was being largely re-enforced. If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable, but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. To keep your army in its present position until it could be so re-enforced would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James River, and even after you received the re-enforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time General Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you.

In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula now advise its abandonment.

I have not inquired, and do not wish to know, by whose advice or for what reasons the Army of the Potomac was separated into two parts, with the enemy between them. I must take things as I find them. I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a better plan I certainly should have adopted it. But all of your plans require re-enforcements, which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for re-enforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command.

I have written very plainly as I understand the case, and I hope you will give me credit for having fully considered the matter, although I may have arrived at very different conclusions from your own.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,
Commanding, &c., Berkeley, Va.

On the 7th I received the following telegram:

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1862—10 a. m.

You will immediately report the number of sick sent off since you received my order, the number still to be shipped, and the amount of transportation at your disposal; that is, the number of persons that can be carried on all the vessels which by my order you were authorized to control.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

To which I made this reply:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
August 7, 1862—10.40 p. m.

In reply to your dispatch of 10 a. m. to-day I report the number of sick sent off since I received your order as follows: 3,740, including some that are embarked to-night and will leave in the morning. The number still to be shipped is, as nearly as can be ascertained, 5,700.

The embarkation of five batteries of artillery, with their horses, wagons, &c., required most of our available boats, except the ferry-boats. All the transports that can ascend to this place have been ordered up; they will be here to-morrow evening. Colonel Ingalls reports to me that there are no transports now available for cavalry, and will not be for two or three days. As soon as they can be obtained I shall send off the First New York Cavalry.

After the transports with sick and wounded have returned, including some heavy-draught steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this point, we can transport 25,000 men at a time. We have some propellers here, but they are laden with commissary supplies and are not available.

The transports now employed in transporting sick and wounded will carry 12,000 well infantry soldiers. Those at Fort Monroe, and of too heavy draught to come here, will carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. Several of the largest steamers have been used for transporting prisoners of war, and have only become available for the sick to-day.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Commanding U. S. Army.*

The report of my chief quartermaster upon the subject is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Office of Chief Quartermaster, Harrison's Landing, August 7, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to return the papers herewith which you sent me with the following remarks:

We are embarking five batteries of artillery, with their horses, baggage, &c., which requires the detailing of most of our available boats, except the ferry-boats. The medical department has ten or twelve of our largest transport vessels, which, if disposable, could carry 12,000 men. Besides, there are some heavy-draught steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this point, but which can carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry.

I have ordered all up here that can ascend to this depot. They will be here to-morrow evening. As it now is, after the details already made, we cannot transport from this place more than 5,000 infantry.

There are no transports now available for cavalry. From and after to-morrow, if the vessels arrive, I could transport 10,000 infantry. In two or three days a regiment of cavalry can be sent if required. If you wait, and ship from Yorktown or Fort Monroe after the sick and wounded transports are at my disposal, we can transport 25,000 at a time. The number that can be transported is contingent on circumstances referred to.

Most of the propellers here are laden with commissary or other supplies, and most of the tugs are necessary to tow off sail craft also laden with supplies.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

RUFUS INGALLS,
Chief Quartermaster.

General R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

On the 9th I received this dispatch:

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1862—12.45 p. m.

I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them and move forward to the Potomac. You must send re-enforcements instantly to Aquia Creek. Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

To which I sent the following reply:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 10, 1862—8 a. m.

Telegram of yesterday received. The batteries sent to Burnside took the last available transport yesterday morning. Enough have since arrived to ship one regiment of cavalry to-day. The sick are being embarked as rapidly as possible. There has been no unnecessary delay, as you assert—not an hour's—but everything has been and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to carry out your orders.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army.

The following report, made on the same day by the officer then in charge of the transports, exposes the injustice of the remark in the dispatch of the General-in-Chief, that "Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory:"

ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Harrison's Landing, Va., August 10, 1862.

Colonel Ingalls, being himself ill, has requested me to telegraph to you concerning the state and capacity of the transports now here. On the night of the 8th I dispatched eleven steamers, principally small ones, and six schooners, with five batteries of heavy horse artillery, none of which have yet returned.

Requisition is made this morning for transportation of 1,000 cavalry to Aquia Creek. All the schooners that had been chartered for carrying horses have been long since discharged or changed into freight vessels.

A large proportion of the steamers now here are still loaded with stores, or are in the floating hospital service, engaged in removing the sick. To transport the 1,000 cavalry to-day will take all the available steamers now here not engaged in the service of the harbor. These steamers could take a large number of infantry, but are not well adapted to the carrying of horses, and much space is thus lost. Several steamers are expected here to-day, and we are unloading schooners rapidly. Most of these are not chartered, but are being taken for the service required, at same rates of pay as other chartered schooners. If you could cause a more speedy return of the steamers sent away from here it would facilitate matters.

C. G. SAWTELLE,
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, Commanding Depot.

General M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General U. S. Army, Washington.

Our wharf facilities at Harrison's Landing were very limited, admitting but few vessels at one time. These were continually in use as long as there were disposable vessels, and the officers of the medical and quartermaster's departments, with all their available forces, were incessantly occupied day and night in embarking and sending off the sick men, troops, and material.

Notwithstanding the repeated representations I made to the General-in-Chief that such were the facts, on the 10th I received the following:

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1862—12 p. m.

The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to-day. There must be no further delay in your movements. That which has already occurred was entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily explained. Let not a moment's time be lost, and telegraph me daily what progress you have made in executing the order to transfer your troops.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

To which I sent this reply:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 10, 1862—11.30 p. m.

Your dispatch of to-day is received. I assure you again that there has not been any unnecessary delay in carrying out your orders. You are probably laboring under some great mistake as to the amount of transportation available here. I have pushed matters to the utmost in getting off our sick and the troops you ordered to Burnside.

Colonel Ingalls has more than once informed the Quartermaster-General of the condition of our water transportation. From the fact that you directed me to keep the order secret, I took it for granted that you would take the steps necessary to provide the requisite transportation.

A large number of transports for all arms of service and for wagons should at once be sent to Yorktown and Fort Monroe.

I shall be ready to move the whole army by land the moment the sick are disposed of. You may be sure that not an hour's delay will occur that can be avoided. I fear you do not realize the difficulty of the operation proposed.

The regiment of cavalry for Burnside has been in course of embarkation to-day and to-night. Ten steamers were required for the purpose. Twelve hundred and fifty-eight sick loaded to-day and to-night. Our means exhausted, except one vessel returning to Fort Monroe in the morning, which will take some 500 cases of slight sickness.

The present moment is probably not the proper one for me to refer to the unnecessarily harsh and unjust tone of your telegrams of late. It will, however, make no difference to my official action.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Commanding U. S. Army.*

On the 11th this report was made:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 11, 1862—11.30 p. m.

The embarkation of 850 cavalry and one brigade of infantry will be completed by 2 o'clock in the morning. Five hundred sick were embarked to-day. Another vessel arrived to-night, and 600 more sick are now being embarked. I still have some 4,000 sick to dispose of. You have been grossly misled as to the amount of transportation at my disposal.

Vessels loaded to their utmost capacity with stores, and others indispensable for service here, have been reported to you as available for carrying sick and well. I am sending off all that can be unloaded at Fort Monroe, to have them return here. I repeat that I have lost no time in carrying out your orders.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Commanding U. S. Army.*

On the same day I received the following from the quartermaster in charge of the depot:

ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Harrison's Landing, August 11, 1862.

COLONEL: In reply to the communication from General Marcy, which was referred to me by you, I have to state that there are now in this harbor no disposable trans-

ports not already detailed, either for the use of the hospital department, for the transportation of the First New York Cavalry, or for the necessary service of the harbor. I think the steamers loading and to be loaded with cavalry could take in addition 3,000 infantry. These boats are, however, directed to leave as fast as they are loaded; some have already started. The embarkation of this cavalry regiment is going on very slowly, and it is not in my power to hurry the matter, although I have had several agents of the department and one commissioned officer at the wharf, to render all the assistance possible. The entire army is this morning turning in, to be stored on vessels, knapsacks, officers' baggage, and other surplus property, and with our limited wharf facilities it is impossible, unless the regular issues of forage, &c., are suspended, to avoid great confusion and delay with what is already ordered to be done. Of course, if any infantry is ordered to embark on these cavalry transports, the confusion and difficulties will be increased.

I know of no boats that may be expected here to-day, except the South America and Fanny Cadwallader, a propeller which was ordered to be sent back from Fort Monroe.

The transports with the artillery left for Aquia Creek on the night of the 8th and the morning of the 9th. They were ordered to return immediately.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. G. SAWTELLE,

Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, Commanding Depot.

Lieut. Col. RUFUS INGALLS,

Aide-de-Camp and Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac.

On the 12th I received the following :

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1862—12 m.

The Quartermaster-General informs me that nearly every available steam vessel in the country is now under your control. To send more from Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York would interfere with the transportation of army supplies and break up the channels of travel by which we are to bring forward the new troops. Burnside moved nearly 13,000 troops to Aquia Creek in less than two days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you. All vessels in the James River and the Chesapeake Bay were placed at your disposal, and it was supposed that 8,000 or 10,000 of your men could be transported daily.

In addition to steamers, there is a large fleet of sailing vessels which could be used as transports.

The bulk of your material on shore it was thought could be sent to Fort Monroe, covered by that part of the army which could not get water transportation. Such were the views of the Government here. Perhaps we were misinformed as to the facts; if so, the delay could be explained. Nothing in my telegram was intentionally harsh or unjust, but the delay was so unexpected that an explanation was required. There has been and is the most urgent necessity for dispatch, and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington.

H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

I telegraphed the following reply :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Berkeley, August 12, 1862—11 p. m.

Your dispatch of noon to-day received. It is positively the fact that no more men could have been embarked hence than have gone, and that no unnecessary delay has occurred. Before your orders were received Colonel Ingalls directed all available vessels to come from Monroe. Officers have been sent to take personal direction. Have heard nothing here of Burnside's fleet.

There are some vessels at Monroe, such as Atlantic and Baltic, which draw too much to come here. Hospital accommodations exhausted this side of New York. Propose filling Atlantic and Baltic with serious cases for New York, and to encamp slight cases for the present at Monroe. In this way can probably get off the 3,400 sick still on hand by day after to-morrow night.

I am sure that you have been misinformed as to the availability of vessels on hand. We cannot use heavily-loaded supply vessels for troops or animals, and such constitute the mass of those here which have been represented to you as capable of transporting this army.

I fear you will find very great delay in embarking troops and material at Yorktown and Monroe, both from want of vessels and of facilities of embarkation. At least two additional wharves should at once be built at each place. I ordered two at the latter some two weeks ago, but you countermanded the order.

I learn that wharf accommodations at Aquia are altogether inadequate for landing troops and supplies to any large extent. Not an hour should be lost in remedying this.

Great delay will ensue there from shallow water. You will find a vast deficiency in horse transports. We had nearly two hundred when we came here; I learn of only twenty provided now; they carry about 50 horses each. More hospital accommodations should be provided. We are much impeded here because our wharves are used night and day to land current supplies. At Monroe a similar difficulty will occur.

With all the facilities at Alexandria and Washington six weeks, about, were occupied in embarking this army and its material.

Burnside's troops are not a fair criterion for rate of embarkation. All his means were in hand, his outfit specially prepared for the purpose, and his men habituated to the movement.

There shall be no unnecessary delay, but I cannot manufacture vessels. I state these difficulties from experience, and because it appears to me that we have been lately working at cross purposes because you have not been properly informed by those around you, who ought to know the inherent difficulties of such an undertaking. It is not possible for any one to place this army where you wish it, ready to move, in less than a month. If Washington is in danger now this army can scarcely arrive in time to save it. It is in much better position to do so from here than from Aquia.

Our material can only be saved by using the whole army to cover it if we are pressed. If sensibly weakened by detachments the result might be the loss of much material and many men. I will be at the telegraph office to-morrow morning to talk with you.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

To the reasons given in the foregoing dispatch to show why General Burnside's movement from Fort Monroe was not a fair criterion for our operations the following may be added:

He was not encumbered by either sick or wounded men. He had no cavalry, artillery, wagons, or teams. His force consisted of infantry alone, with a few ambulances and officers' horses. His baggage was already on the transports, where it had remained since his arrival from North Carolina, and his men had only to resume their places on board.

The cavalry and artillery mentioned in my dispatches of the 7th, 10th, and 11th were sent to supply his total deficiency in those arms.

I may also repeat that the vessels used by General Burnside had not returned from Aquia Creek when the army left Harrison's Bar.

It will be seen by the concluding paragraph of the foregoing dispatch that in order to have a more direct, speedy, and full explanation of the condition of affairs in the army than I could by sending a single dispatch by steamer to the nearest telegraph office at Jamestown Island, some 70 miles distant, and waiting ten hours for a reply, I proposed to go in person to the office. This I did. On my arrival at Jamestown Island there was an interruption in the electric current, which rendered it necessary for me to continue on to Fort Monroe and across the Chesapeake Bay to Cherrystone Inlet, on the Eastern Shore, where I arrived late in the evening, and immediately sent the annexed dispatches:

CHERRYSTONE, *August 13, 1862—11.30 p. m.*

Please come to office; wish to talk to you. What news from Pope?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Washington.*

CHERRYSTONE INLET, *August 14, 1862—12.30 a. m.*

Started to Jamestown Island to talk with you; found cable broken and came here. Please read my long telegram. (See above dispatch of August 12—11 p. m.) All quiet at camp. Enemy burned wharves at City Point yesterday. No rebel pickets within 8 miles of Coggins' Point yesterday. Richmond prisoners state that large force, with guns, left Richmond northward on Sunday.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Washington.*

To which the following reply was received:

WASHINGTON, *August 14, 1862—1.40 a. m.*

I have read your dispatch. There is no change of plans. You will send up your troops as rapidly as possible. There is no difficulty in landing them. According to your own accounts, there is now no difficulty in withdrawing your forces. Do so with all possible rapidity.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

Before I had time to decipher and reply to this dispatch the telegraph operator in Washington informed me that General Halleck had gone out of the office immediately after writing this dispatch, without leaving any intimation of the fact for me, or waiting for any further information as to the object of my journey across the bay. As there was no possibility of other communication with him at that time I sent the following dispatch, and returned to Harrison's Landing:

CHERRYSTONE INLET, *August 14, 1862—1.40 a. m.*

Your orders will be obeyed. I return at once. I had hoped to have had a longer and fuller conversation with you after traveling so far for the purpose.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

On the 14th and 15th, and before we had been able to embark all our sick men, two army corps were put in motion toward Fort Monroe. This was reported in the annexed dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 14, 1862—11 p. m.

Movement has commenced by land and water. All sick will be away to-morrow night. Everything being done to carry out your orders. I don't like Jackson's movements. He will suddenly appear when least expected. Will telegraph fully and understandingly in the morning.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

The phrase "movement has commenced," it need not be remarked, referred obviously to the movement of the main army after completing the necessary preliminary movements of the sick, &c. The perversion of the term to which the General-in-Chief saw fit to give currency in a letter to the Secretary of War should have been here rendered impossible by the dispatches which precede this, of the 14th, which show that the movement really began immediately after the receipt of the order of August 4.

The progress made in the movement of the 15th was reported in the following dispatches:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
August 15, 1862—12 m.

Colonel Ingalls this moment reports that after embarking the remaining brigade of McCall's division with the sick, who are constantly accumulating, the transports now disposable will be all consumed.

Two of my army corps marched last night and this morning *en route* for Yorktown—one via Jones' Bridge and the other via Barrett's Ferry, where we have a pontoon bridge. The other corps will be pushed forward as fast as the roads are clear, and I hope before to-morrow morning to have the entire army in motion.

A report has just been received from my pickets that the enemy in force is advancing on us from the Chickahominy, but I do not credit it; shall know soon. Should any more transports arrive here before my departure, and the enemy do not show such

a force in our front as to require all the troops I have remaining to insure the safety of the land movement with its immense train, I shall send every man by water that transports will carry.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Commanding U. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 15, 1862—1.30 p. m.

The advance corps and trains are fairly started. I learn nothing more in relation to reported advance of rebels via Jones' Bridge. Shall push the movement as rapidly as possible.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 15, 1862—10 p. m.

Coggins' Point is abandoned. The whole of McCall's division, with its artillery, is now *en route* for Burnside. We have not yet transportation sufficient for our sick. I hope we will get it to-morrow.

Porter is across the Chickahominy, near its mouth, with his wagons and reserve artillery. Heintzelman at Jones' Bridge with a portion of his corps. They will all be up by morning. Averell's cavalry on the other side. All quiet thus far. I cannot get the last of the wagons as far as Charles City Court-House before some time to-morrow afternoon.

I am hurrying matters with the utmost rapidity possible. Wagons will move all night.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

After the commencement of the movement it was continued with the utmost rapidity until all the troops and material were *en route* both by land and water on the morning of the 16th. Late in the afternoon of that day, when the last man had disappeared from the deserted camps, I followed with my personal staff in the track of the Grand Army of the Potomac, bidding farewell to the scenes still covered with the marks of its presence, and to be forever memorable in history as the vicinity of its most brilliant exploits. Previous to the departure of the troops I had directed Captain Duane, of the Engineer Corps, to proceed to Barrett's Ferry, near the mouth of the Chickahominy, and throw across the river at that point a pontoon bridge. This was executed promptly and satisfactorily under the cover of gunboats, and an excellent bridge of about 2,000 feet in length was ready for the first arrival of troops. The greater part of the army, with its artillery, wagon trains, &c., crossed it rapidly and in perfect order and safety, so that on the night of the 17th everything was across the Chickahominy except the rear guard, which crossed early on the morning of the 18th, when the pontoon bridge was immediately removed.

General Porter's corps, which was the first to march from Harrison's Landing, had been pushed forward rapidly, and on the 16th reached Williamsburg, where I had directed him to halt until the entire army was across the Chickahominy. On his arrival at Williamsburg, however, he received an intercepted letter, which led to the belief that General Pope would have to contend against a very heavy force then in his front. General Porter therefore very properly took the responsibility of continuing his march directly on to Newport News, which place he reached on the morning of the 18th of August, having marched his corps 60 miles in the short period of three days and one night, halting one day at the crossing of the Chickahominy.

The embarkation of this corps commenced as soon as transports were ready, and on the 20th it had all sailed for Aquia Creek. I made the following report from Barrett's Ferry:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Barrett's Ferry, Chickahominy, August 17, 1862—11 a. m.

Everything is removed from our camp at Harrison's Bar. No property or men left behind. The Fifth Corps is at Williamsburg, with all its wagons and the reserve artillery. The Third Corps is on the march from Jones' Bridge to Williamsburg via Diascund Bridge, and has probably passed the latter before this hour. Averell's cavalry watches everything in that direction. The mass of the wagons have passed the pontoon bridge here and are parked on the other side. Peck's wagons are now crossing; his division will soon be over. Headquarters wagons follow Peck's. I hope to have everything over to-night and the bridge removed by daylight. May be delayed beyond that time. Came here to see Burnside, otherwise should have remained with the rear guard. Thus far all is quiet, and not a shot that I know of since we began the march. I shall not feel entirely secure until I have the whole army beyond the Chickahominy. I will then begin to forward troops by water as fast as transportation permits.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Comdg. U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.*

On the 18th and 19th our march was continued to Williamsburg and Yorktown, and on the 20th the remainder of the army was ready to embark at Yorktown, Fort Monroe, and Newport News. The movement of the main body of the army on this march was covered by General Pleasonton with his cavalry and horse artillery. That officer remained at Haxall's until the army had passed Charles City Court-House, when he gradually fell back, picking up the stragglers as he proceeded, and crossed the bridge over the Chickahominy after the main body had marched toward Williamsburg. His troops were the last to cross the bridge, and he deserves great credit for the manner in which he performed this duty. General Averell did a similar service, in the same satisfactory way, in covering the march of the Third Corps.

As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated here, I cannot close this part of my report without giving an expression of my sincere thanks and gratitude to the officers and men whom I had the honor to command.

From the commencement to the termination of this most arduous campaign the Army of the Potomac always evinced the most perfect subordination, zeal, and alacrity in the performance of all the duties required of it. The amount of severe labor accomplished by this army in the construction of intrenchments, roads, bridges, &c., was enormous; yet all the work was performed with the most gratifying cheerfulness and devotion to the interests of the service. During the campaign ten severely-contested and sanguinary battles had been fought, besides numerous smaller engagements, in which the troops exhibited the most determined enthusiasm and bravery. They submitted to exposure, sickness, and even death without a murmur. Indeed, they had become veterans in their country's cause, and richly deserved the warm commendation of the Government.

It was in view of these facts that this seemed to me an appropriate occasion for the General-in-Chief to give in general orders some appreciative expression of the services of the army while upon the Peninsula. Accordingly on the 18th I sent him the following dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
August 18, 1862—11 p. m.

Please say a kind word to my army, that I can repeat to them in general orders, in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court-

House, and on the Chickahominy, as well as in regard to the Seven Days and the recent retreat. No one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself. Say nothing about me. Merely give my men and officers credit for what they have done. It will do you much good, and will strengthen you much with them if you issue a handsome order to them in regard to what they have accomplished. They deserve it.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

As no reply was received to this communication, and no order was issued by the General-in-Chief, I conclude that suggestion did not meet with his approbation.

All the *personnel* and material of the army had been transferred from Harrison's Landing to the different points of embarkation in the very brief period of five days without the slightest loss or damage. Porter's troops sailed from Newport News on the 19th and 20th. Heintzelman's corps sailed from Yorktown on the 21st. On that day I received the following telegram from the General-in-Chief:

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1862—6 p. m.

Leave such garrisons in Fort Monroe, Yorktown, &c., as you may deem proper. They will be replaced by new troops as rapidly as possible.

The forces of Burnside and Pope are hard pushed, and require aid as rapidly as you can send it. Come yourself as soon as you can.

By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition. We have no time here to supply them. Moreover, they may have to fight as soon as they land.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.

General McCLELLAN.

To which the following are replies:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fort Monroe, August 21, 1862—7.30 p. m.

Your dispatch of 6 p. m. received. I have not lost an hour in sending troops, nor will I. Franklin is here, and I will try to get some of his troops on board to-night. I had already ordered all the ammunition forward.

I will put headquarters on board ship early to-morrow morning, so that I can leave at a moment's notice. I hope that I can get off to-morrow. Shall I go in person to Aquia, or do you wish to see me first at Washington? If you wish it, I can probably ship quite an amount of ammunition for other troops than this army.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fort Monroe, August 21, 1862—10.25 p. m.

I have ample supplies of ammunition for infantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. I can supply any deficiency that may exist in General Pope's army. Quite a number of rifled field guns are on hand here.

The forage is the only question for you to attend to. Please have that ready for me at Aquia. I want many more schooners for cavalry horses. They should have water on hand when they come here.

If you have leisure, and there is no objection, please communicate to me fully the state of affairs and your plans. I will then be enabled to arrange details understandingly.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington.*

Immediately on reaching Fort Monroe I gave directions for strengthening the defenses of Yorktown to resist any attack from the direction of Richmond, and left General Keyes, with his corps, to perform the work and temporarily garrison the place.

I telegraphed as follows on the 22d:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fort Monroe, August 22, 1862—2.15 p. m.

Dispatch of to-day received. Franklin's corps is embarking as rapidly as possible. Sumner's corps is at Newport News, ready to embark as fast as transportation arrives. Keyes is still at Yorktown, putting it in a proper state of defense. I think that all of Franklin's corps will get off to-day, and hope to commence with Sumner to-morrow. I shall then push off the cavalry and wagons.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fort Monroe, August 22, 1862—3.40 p. m.

Two good ordnance sergeants are needed immediately at Yorktown and Gloucester. The new defenses are arranged and commenced.

I recommend that 5,000 new troops be sent immediately to garrison York and Gloucester. They should be commanded by an experienced general officer, who can discipline and instruct them. About 900 should be artillery. I recommend that a new regiment, whose colonel is an artillery officer or graduate, be designated as heavy artillery, and sent there. A similar regiment is absolutely necessary here.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army.

On the 23d Franklin's corps sailed. I reported this in the following dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fort Monroe, August 23, 1862—1.30 p. m.

Franklin's corps has started. I shall start for Aquia in about half an hour. No transports yet for Sumner's corps.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army.

On that evening I sailed with my staff for Aquia Creek, where I arrived at daylight on the following morning, reporting as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Aquia Creek, August 24, 1862—[6 a. m.]

I have reached here, and respectfully report for orders.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army.

I also telegraphed as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Aquia Creek, August 24, 1862—2 p. m.

Your telegram received. Morell's scouts report Rappahannock Station burned and abandoned by Pope, without any notice to Morell or Sykes. This was telegraphed you some hours ago. Reynolds, Reno, and Stevens are supposed to be with Pope, as nothing can be heard of them to-day. Morell and Sykes are near Morrisville Post-Office, watching the lower fords of the Rappahannock, with no troops between them and Rappahannock Station, which is reported abandoned by Pope.

Please inform me immediately exactly where Pope is and what doing; until I know that I cannot regulate Porter's movements. He is much exposed now, and decided measures should be taken at once. Until I know what my command and position are to be, and whether you still intend to place me in the command indicated in your first letter to me and orally through General Burnside at the Chickahominy, I cannot de-

cide where I can be of most use. If your determination is unchanged I ought to go to Alexandria at once. Please define my position and duties.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Commanding U. S. Army.*

To which I received the following reply :

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1862—11.10 p. m.

You ask me for information which I cannot give. I do not know either where General Pope is or where the enemy in force is. These are matters which I have all day been most anxious to ascertain.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

On the 26th I received the following :

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1862—11 a. m.

There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a large force into the Shenandoah Valley. Reconnaissances will soon determine. General Heintzelman's corps was ordered to report to General Pope, and Kearny will probably be sent to-day against the enemy's flank. Don't draw any troops down the Rappahannock at present; we shall probably want them all in the direction of the Shenandoah. Perhaps you had better leave General Burnside in charge at Aquia Creek and come to Alexandria, as very great irregularities are reported there. General Franklin's corps will march as soon as it receives transportation.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

On receipt of this I immediately sailed for Alexandria, and reported as follows :

ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862—8 a. m.

I arrived here last night, and have taken measures to ascertain the state of affairs here, and that proper remedies may be applied. Just received a rumor that railway bridge over Bull Run was burned last night.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Commanding U. S. Army.*

ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862—9.40 a. m.

The town is quiet, although quite full of soldiers, who are said to be chiefly convalescents. The affairs of the quartermaster's department are reported as going on well. It is said that the Bull Run Bridge will be repaired to-morrow. The disembarkation of Sumner's corps commenced at Aquia yesterday afternoon. I found that he could reach Rappahannock Station earlier that way than from here.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Commanding U. S. Army.*

On the same day I received the following :

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1862.

Telegrams from General Porter to General Burnside, just received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville; McDowell, Sigel, and Ricketts near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton Junction to re-enforce Pope. Nothing said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad. Perhaps you may prefer some other road than to Centreville. Colonel Haupt has just telegraphed about sending out troops. Please see him, and give him your directions. There has been some serious neglect to guard the railroad, which should be immediately remedied.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

I replied as follows :

ALEXANDRIA, *August 27, 1862—10 a. m.*

Telegram this moment received. I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here in person to inform me as to his means of transportation.

Kearny was yesterday at Rappahannock Station, Porter at Bealeton, Kelly's, Barnett's, &c. Sumner will commence reaching Falmouth to-day. Williams' Massachusetts cavalry will be mostly at Falmouth to-day.

I loaned Burnside my personal escort (one squadron Fourth Regulars) to scout down Rappahannock.

I have sent for Couch's division to come at once. As fast as I gain any information I will forward it, although you may already have it.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

I also received the following telegrams :

WASHINGTON, *August 27, 1862.*

Direct General Casey to furnish you about 5,000 of the new troops under his command.

Take entire direction of the sending out of the troops from Alexandria.

Determine questions of priority in transportation, and the places they shall occupy.

Pope's headquarters are near Warrenton Junction, but I cannot ascertain the present position of his troops.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, *August 27, 1862.*

I can get no satisfactory information from the front, either of the enemy or of our troops. There seems to have been great neglect and carelessness about Manassas. Franklin's corps should march in that direction as soon as possible. A competent officer should be sent out to take direction of affairs in that vicinity.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

Upon the receipt of these I immediately sent the following telegram to Generals Heintzelman and Porter :

ALEXANDRIA, *August 27, 1862—10.30 a. m.*

Where are you and what is state of affairs—what troops in your front, right, and left? Sumner is now landing at Aquia. Where is Pope's left, and what of enemy? Enemy burned Bull Run Bridge last night with cavalry force.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HEINTZELMAN, *Warrenton.*

Major-General PORTER, *Bealeton.*

P. S.—If these general officers are not at the places named, nearest operator will please have message forwarded.

I also telegraphed to the General-in-Chief as follows :

ALEXANDRIA, *August 27, 1862—10.50 a. m.*

I have sent all the information I possess to Burnside, instructing him to look out well for his right flank between the Rappahannock and Potomac, and to send no trains to Porter without an escort. I fear the cavalry who dashed at Bull Run last night may trouble Burnside a little. I have sent to communicate with Porter and Heintzelman via Falmouth, and hope to give you some definite information in a few hours. I shall land the next cavalry I get hold of here, and send it out to keep open the communication between Pope and Porter, also to watch vicinity of Manassas. Please send me a number of copies of the best maps of present field of operations. I can use fifty to advantage.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Commanding U. S. Army.*

ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862—11.20 a. m.

In view of Burnside's dispatch, just received, would it not be advisable to throw the mass of Sumner's corps here to move out with Franklin to Centreville or vicinity? If a decisive battle is fought at Warrenton, a disaster would leave any troops on Lower Rappahannock in a dangerous position. They would do better service in front of Washington.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862—12.05 p. m.

My aide has just returned from General Franklin's camp; reports that Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washington. He gave the order to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once. I learn that heavy firing has been heard this morning at Centreville, and have sent to ascertain the truth. I can find no cavalry to send out on the roads. Are the works garrisoned and ready for defense?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington.*

ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862—12.20 p. m.

What bridges exist over Bull Run? Have steps been taken to construct bridges for the advance of troops to re-enforce Pope or to enable him to retreat if in trouble?

There should be two gunboats at Aquia Creek at once. Shall I push the rest of Sumner's corps here, or is Pope so strong as to be reasonably certain of success? I have sent to inspect the works near here and their garrisons.

As soon as I can find General Casey or some other commanding officer, I will see to the railway, &c. It would be well to have them report to me, as I do not know where they are. I am trying to find them, and will lose no time in carrying out your orders. Would like to see Barnard.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Washington.*

ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862—1.15 p. m.

Franklin's artillery have no horses except for four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defense? I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves.

Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front?

Should not Burnside take steps at once to evacuate Falmouth and Aquia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction?

I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the valley?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major General HALLECK, *Washington.*

ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862—1.35 p. m.

I learn that Taylor's brigade, sent this morning to Bull Run Bridge, is either cut to pieces or captured; that the force against them had many guns and about 5,000 infantry, receiving re-enforcements every minute; also that Gainesville is in possession of the enemy. Please send some cavalry out toward Dranesville, via Chain Bridge, to watch Lewinsville and Dranesville, and go as far as they can. If you will give me even one squadron of good cavalry here, I will ascertain the state of the case. I think our policy now is to make these works perfectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possible, but not to advance them until they can have their artillery and cavalry. I have sent for Colonel Tyler to place his artillerymen in the works.

Is Fort Marcy securely held?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

General HALLECK.

ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862—2.30 p. m.

Sumner has been ordered to send here all of his corps that are within reach. Orders have been sent to Couch to come here from Yorktown with the least possible delay.

But one squadron of my cavalry has arrived; that will be disembarked at once and sent to the front.

If there is any cavalry in Washington it should be ordered to report to me at once.

I still think that we should first provide for the immediate defense of Washington on both sides of the Potomac.

I am not responsible for the past, and cannot be for the future, unless I receive authority to dispose of the available troops according to my judgment. Please inform me at once what my position is. I do not wish to act in the dark.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army.

ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862—6 p. m.

I have just received the copy of a dispatch from General Pope to you, dated 10 a. m. this morning, in which he says: "All forces now sent forward should be sent to my right at Gainesville." I now have at my disposal here about 10,000 men of Franklin's corps, about 2,800 of General Tyler's brigade, and Colonel Tyler's First Connecticut Artillery, which I recommend should be held in hand for the defense of Washington. If you wish me to order any part of this force to the front, it is in readiness to march at a moment's notice to any point you may indicate. In view of the existing state of things in our front, I have deemed it best to order General Casey to hold his men for Yorktown in readiness to move, but not to send them off till further orders.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army.

On the 28th I telegraphed as follows:

HEADQUARTERS CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 28, 1862—4.10 p. m.

General Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not yet in condition to move; may be by to-morrow morning. Pope must cut through to-day or adopt the plan I suggested. I have ordered troops to garrison the works at Upton's Hill. They must be held at any cost. As soon as I can see the way to spare them I will send a corps of good troops there. It is the key to Washington, which cannot be seriously menaced as long as it is held.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

I received the following from the General-in-Chief:

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1862.

I think you had better place Sumner's corps as it arrives near the fortifications, and particularly at the Chain Bridge. The principal thing to be feared now is a cavalry raid into this city, especially in the night-time. Use Cox's and Tyler's brigades and the new troops for the same object, if you need them. Porter writes to Burnside from Bristoe, 9.30 a. m. yesterday, that Pope's forces were then moving on Manassas, and that Burnside would soon hear of them by way of Alexandria. General Cullum has gone to Harper's Ferry, and I have only a single regular officer for duty in the office.

Please send some of your officers to-day to see that every precaution is taken at the forts against a raid; also at the bridge. Please answer.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

On the 29th the following dispatch was telegraphed:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—10.30 a. m.

Franklin's corps is in motion; started about 6 a. m. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to Upton's Hill to hold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna, via Freedom Hill and Hunter's Lane. Cox has two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether

this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the Engineer Brigade, to hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached last night two regiments to vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. Meagher's brigade is still at Aquia. If he moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived; have but three squadrons. Franklin has but 40 rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish much if he meets with serious resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing order of last night. What have you from Vienna and Dranesville?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

To which the following is a reply:

WASHINGTON, *August 29, 1862—12 m.*

Upton's Hill arrangement all right. We must send wagons and ammunition to Franklin as fast as they arrive. Meagher's brigade ordered up yesterday. Fitzhugh Lee was, it is said on good authority, in Alexandria on Sunday last for three hours. I have nothing from Dranesville.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

On the same day the following was received from His Excellency the President:

WASHINGTON, *August 29, 1862—2.30 p. m.*

What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What generally?

A. LINCOLN.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

To which I replied as follows:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—2.45 p. m.

The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This by no means reliable.

I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications with Pope; Second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe.

No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President.*

And copy to General Halleck.

To which the following is a reply:

WASHINGTON, *August 29, 1862—4.10 p. m.*

Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit, "to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope," is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels.

A. LINCOLN.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

It had been officially reported to me from Washington that the enemy in strong force was moving through Vienna in the direction of the Chain Bridge, and had a large force in Vienna. This report, in connection with the dispatch of the General-in-Chief on the 28th, before noted, in-

duced me to direct Franklin to halt his command near Annandale until it could be determined by reconnaissances to Vienna and toward Manassas whether these reports were true. General Cox was ordered to send his small cavalry force from Upton's Hill toward Vienna and Dranesville in one direction and toward Fairfax Court-House in the other, and Franklin to push his two squadrons as far toward Manassas as possible, in order to ascertain the true position of the enemy. With the enemy in force at Vienna and toward Lewinsville it would have been very injudicious to have pushed Franklin's small force beyond Annandale. It must be remembered that at that time we were cut off from direct communication with General Pope; that the enemy was, by the last accounts, at Manassas in strong force, and that Franklin had only from 10,000 to 11,000 men, with an entirely insufficient force of cavalry and artillery.

In order to represent this condition of affairs in its proper light to the General-in-Chief, and to obtain definite instructions from him, I telegraphed as follows:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—12 m.

Have ordered most of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry to report to General Barnard for scouting duty toward Rockville, Poolesville, &c.

If you apprehend a raid of cavalry on your side of river, I had better send a brigade or two of Sumner's to near Tennallytown, where, with two or three old regiments in Forts Allen and Marcy, they can watch both Chain Bridge and Tennallytown.

Would it meet your views to post the rest of Sumner's corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran, whence they can either support Cox, Franklin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tennallytown?

Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 for duty.

How far do you wish this force to advance?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington*.

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—1 p. m.

I anxiously await reply to my last dispatch in regard to Sumner. Wish to give the order at once.

Please authorize me to attach new regiments permanently to my old brigades. I can do much good to old and new troops in that way. I shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and Marcy—at least with strong advance guards. I wish to hold the line through Prospect Hill, Mackall's, Minor's, and Hall's Hill. This will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, who I really think ought not, under present circumstances, to advance beyond Annandale?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

General HALLECK.

On the same day I received a dispatch from the General-in-Chief, in which he asks me why I halted Franklin in Annandale, to which I replied as follows:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—8 p. m.

By referring to my telegrams of 10.30 a. m., 12 m., and 1 p. m., together with your reply of 2.48 p. m., you will see why Franklin's corps halted at Annandale. His small cavalry force—all I had to give him—was ordered to push on as far as possible toward Manassas. It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Annandale, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna.

General Franklin remained here until about 1 p. m., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow.

I have sent to Colonel Haupt to push out construction and supply trains as soon as possible; General Tyler to furnish the necessary guards.

I have directed General Banks' supply trains to start out to-night at least as far as Annandale, with an escort from General Tyler.

In regard to to-morrow's movements I desire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders when I have simply exercised the discretion you committed to me.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

On the same evening I sent the following dispatches:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—10 p. m.

Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to General Franklin to place himself in communication with General Pope as soon as possible, and at the same time cover the transit of Pope's supplies. Orders have been given for railway and wagon trains to move to Pope with least possible delay.

I am having inspections made of all the forts around the city by members of my staff, with instructions to give all requisite orders. I inspected Worth and Ward myself this evening; found them in good order. Reports, so far as heard from, are favorable as to condition of works.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington.*

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—10 p. m.

Your dispatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here. Cox's brigade of four regiments is here, with two batteries of artillery. Men of two regiments, much fatigued, came in to-day. Tyler's brigade of three new regiments, but little drilled, is also here. All these troops will be ordered to hold themselves ready to march to-morrow morning, and all except Franklin's to await further orders. If you wish any of them to move toward Manassas please inform me.

Colonel Wagner, Second New York Artillery, has just come in from the front. He reports strong infantry and cavalry force of rebels near Fairfax Court-House. Reports rumors from various sources that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, are at Manassas; that the enemy with 120,000 men intend advancing on the forts near Arlington and Chain Bridge, with a view of attacking Washington and Baltimore.

General Barnard telegraphs me to-night that the length of the line of fortifications on this side of the Potomac requires 2,000 additional artillerymen, and additional troops to defend intervals, according to circumstances. At all events, he says, an old regiment should be added to the force at Chain Bridge, and a few regiments distributed along the lines, to give confidence to our new troops. I agree with him fully, and think our fortifications along the upper part of our line on this side of the river very unsafe with their present garrisons, and the movements of the enemy seem to indicate an attack upon those works.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 30, 1862—11.30 a. m.

Your telegram of 9 a. m. received. Ever since General Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria he has been endeavoring to get transportation from the quartermaster at Alexandria, but he has uniformly been told that there was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After the departure of his corps, he procured twenty wagons to carry some extra ammunition by unloading Banks' supply train.

General Sumner endeavored, by application upon the Quartermaster's Department, to get wagons to carry his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was obliged to march with what he could carry in his cartridge boxes.

I have this morning directed that all my headquarters wagons that are landed be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin, but they will not go far toward supplying the deficiency.

Eighty-five wagons were got together by the quartermasters last night, loaded with

subsistence, and sent forward at 1 a. m. with an escort via Annandale. Every effort has been made to carry out your orders promptly. The great difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the greater part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons. Such is the state of the case as represented to me by the quartermasters, and it appears to be true. I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to you.*

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

On the morning of the 30th heavy artillery firing was heard in the direction of Fairfax Court-House, which I reported to the General-in-Chief.

At 11 a. m. the following telegram was sent:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 30, 1862—11 a. m.

Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest via Columbia pike on Annandale and Fairfax Court-House. Is this the route you wish them to take? He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move out also when he arrives?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington.*

On the same day I received the following:

WASHINGTON, *August 30, 1862—1.45 p. m.*

Ammunition, and particularly for artillery, must be immediately sent forward to Centreville for General Pope. It must be done with all possible dispatch.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

General McCLELLAN.

To which this reply was made:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 30, 1862—2.10 p. m.

I know nothing of the calibers of Pope's artillery. All I can do is to direct my ordnance officer to load up all the wagons sent to him. I have already sent all my headquarters wagons. You will have to see that wagons are sent from Washington. I can do nothing more than give the order that every available wagon in Alexandria shall be loaded at once.

The order to the brigade of Sumner that I directed to remain near Chain Bridge and Tennallytown should go from your headquarters to save time. I understand you to intend it also to move. I have no sharpshooters except the guard around my camp. I have sent off every man but those, and will now send them with the train as you direct. I will also send my only remaining squadron of cavalry with General Sumner. I can do no more. You now have every man of the Army of the Potomac who is within my reach.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK.

At 10.30 p. m. the following telegram was sent:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 30, 1862—10.30 p. m.

I have sent to the front all my troops with the exception of Couch's division, and have given the orders necessary to insure its being disposed of as you directed. I hourly expect the return of one of my aides, who will give authentic news from the field of battle.

* See also McClellan to Halleck, August 30, in "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask that, if there is a probability of the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to be with my own men, if nothing more; they will fight none the worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. Please reply to this to-night.

I have been engaged for the last few hours in doing what I can to make arrangements for the wounded. I have started out all the ambulances now landed. As I have sent my escort to the front, I would be glad to take some of Gregg's cavalry with me, if allowed to go.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

To which, on the following day, I received this answer:

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1862—9.18 a. m.

I have just seen your telegram of 11.5 last night. The substance was stated to me when received, but I did not know that you asked for a reply immediately. I cannot answer without seeing the President, as General Pope is in command, by his orders, of the department.

I think Couch's division should go forward as rapidly as possible and find the battlefield.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

On the same day the following was received:

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1862—12.45 p. m.

The Subsistence Department are making Fairfax Station their principal depot. It should be well guarded. The officer in charge should be directed to secure the depot by abatis against cavalry. As many as possible of the new regiments should be prepared to take the field. Perhaps some more should be sent to the vicinity of Chain Bridge.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

At 2.30 p. m. the following dispatch was telegraphed:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 31, 1862—2.30 p. m.

Major Haller is at Fairfax Station with my provost and headquarters guard and other troops. I have requested four more companies to be sent at once and the precautions you direct to be taken.

Under the War Department order of yesterday I have no control over anything except my staff, some 100 men in my camp here, and the few remaining near Fort Monroe. I have no control over the new regiments—do not know where they are, on anything about them, except those near here. Their commanding officers and those of the works are not under me.

Where I have seen evils existing under my eye, I have corrected them. I think it is the business of General Casey to prepare the new regiments for the field, and a matter between him and General Barnard to order others to the vicinity of Chain Bridge. Neither of them is under my command, and by the War Department order I have no right to give them orders.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

General HALLECK, *Washington.*

To which the following is an answer:

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1862—10.7 p. m.

Since receiving your dispatch, relating to command, I have not been able to answer any not of absolute necessity. I have not seen the order as published, but will write

to you in the morning. You will retain the command of everything in this vicinity not temporarily belonging to Pope's army in the field.

I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am utterly tired out.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

General McCLELLAN.

The order referred to in the preceding dispatch was as follows :

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 30, 1862.*

The following are the commanders of the armies operating in Virginia :

General Burnside commands his own corps, except those that have been temporarily detached and assigned to General Pope.

General McClellan commands that portion of the Army of the Potomac that has not been sent forward to General Pope's command.

General Pope commands the Army of Virginia and all the forces temporarily attached to it.

All the forces are under the command of Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

I was informed by Colonel Townsend that the above was published by order of the Secretary of War.

At 11.30 p. m. I telegraphed the following :

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,

August 31, 1862—11.30 p. m.

The squadron of Second Regular Cavalry that I sent with General Sumner was captured to-day about 2 p. m., some 3 miles from Fairfax Court-House, beyond it on the Little River pike, by Fitzhugh Lee, with 3,000 cavalry and three light batteries. I have conversed with the first sergeant, who says that when he last saw them they were within a mile of Fairfax. Pope had no troops on that road, this squadron getting there by mistake. There is nothing of ours on the right of Centerville but Sumner's corps. There was much artillery firing during the day. A rebel major told the sergeant that the rebels had driven in our entire left to-day. He says the road is filled with wagons and stragglers coming toward Alexandria. It is clear from the sergeant's account that we were badly beaten yesterday, and that Pope's right is entirely exposed.

I recommend that no more of Couch's division be sent to the front, that Burnside be brought here as soon as practicable, and that everything available this side of Fairfax be drawn in at once, including the mass of the troops on the railroad. I apprehend that the enemy will or have by this time occupied Fairfax Court-House and cut off Pope entirely unless he falls back to-night via Sangster's and Fairfax Station.

I think these orders should be sent at once. I have no confidence in the dispositions made as I gather them. To speak frankly—and the occasion requires it—there appears to be a total absence of brains, and I fear the total destruction of the army. I have some cavalry here that can carry out any orders you may have to send. The occasion is grave and demands grave measures. The question is the salvation of the country. I learn that our loss yesterday amounted to 15,000. We cannot afford such losses without an object.

It is my deliberate opinion that the interests of the nation demand that Pope should fall back to-night if possible, and not one moment is to be lost. I will use all the cavalry I have to watch our right.

Please answer at once. I feel confident that you can rely upon the information I give you. I shall be up all night, and ready to obey any orders you give me.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

General HALLECK, *Washington.*

To which this reply was received :

WASHINGTON, *September 1, 1862—1.30. a. m.*

Burnside was ordered up very early yesterday morning. Retain remainder of Couch's forces, and make arrangements to stop all retreating troops in line of works or where you can best establish an outer line of defense. My news from Pope was up to 4 p. m. He was then all right. I must wait for more definite information before I can order a retreat, as the falling back on the line of works must necessarily be directed in case of

a serious disaster. Give me all additional news that is reliable. I shall be up all night, and ready to act as circumstances may require. I am fully aware of the gravity of the crisis, and have been for weeks.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

FOURTH PERIOD.

On the 1st of September I went into Washington, where I had an interview with the General-in-Chief, who instructed me verbally to take command of its defenses, expressly limiting my jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, and prohibiting me from exercising any control over the troops actively engaged in front under General Pope. During this interview I suggested to the General-in-Chief the necessity of his going in person or sending one of his personal staff to the army under General Pope, for the purpose of ascertaining the exact condition of affairs. He sent Colonel Kelton, his assistant adjutant-general.

During the afternoon of the same day I received a message from the General-in-Chief to the effect that he desired me to go at once to his house to see the President.

The President informed me that he had reason to believe that the Army of the Potomac was not cheerfully co-operating with and supporting General Pope; that he had "always been a friend of mine," and now asked me, as a special favor, to use my influence in correcting this state of things. I replied, substantially, that I was confident that he was misinformed; that I was sure, whatever estimate the Army of the Potomac might entertain of General Pope, that they would obey his orders, support him to the fullest extent, and do their whole duty. The President, who was much moved, asked me to telegraph to "Fitz John Porter, or some other of my friends," and try to do away with any feeling that might exist; adding that I could rectify the evil, and that no one else could.

I thereupon told him that I would cheerfully telegraph to General Porter, or do anything else in my power to gratify his wishes and relieve his anxiety; upon which he thanked me very warmly, assured me that he could never forget my action in the matter, &c., and left.

I then wrote the following telegram to General Porter, which was sent to him by the General-in-Chief:

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1862.

I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, and the old Army of the Potomac, that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our arms, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful co-operation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to my friends in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is, that for their country's sake they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever have to me.

I am in charge of the defenses of Washington, and am doing all I can to render your retreat safe, should that become necessary.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

Major-General PORTER.

To which he sent the following reply:

FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, September 2, 1862—10 a. m.

You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given, to General Pope their cordial co-operation and constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our devoted duty.

F. J. PORTER.

General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, *Major-General, Comdg., Washington.*

Neither at the time I wrote the telegram nor at any other time did I think for one moment that General Porter had been or would be in any manner derelict in the performance of his duty to the nation and its cause. Such an impression never entered my mind. The dispatch in question was written purely at the request of the President.

On the morning of the 2d the President and General Halleck came to my house, when the President informed me that Colonel Kelton had returned from the front; that our affairs were in a bad condition; that the army was in full retreat upon the defenses of Washington; the roads filled with stragglers, &c. He instructed me to take steps at once to stop and collect the stragglers, to place the works in a proper state of defense, and to go out to meet and take command of the army when it approached the vicinity of the works; then to place the troops in the best position—committing everything to my hands.

I immediately took steps to carry out these orders, and sent an aide to General Pope with the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS, *Washington, September 2, 1862.*

GENERAL: General Halleck instructed me to repeat to you the order he sent this morning to withdraw your army to Washington without unnecessary delay. He feared that his messenger might miss you, and desired to take this double precaution.

In order to bring troops upon ground with which they are already familiar it would be best to move Porter's corps upon Upton's Hill, that it may occupy Hall's Hill, &c.; McDowell's to Upton's Hill; Franklin's to the works in front of Alexandria; Heintzelman's to the same vicinity; Couch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable, to the Chain Bridge; Sumner either to Fort Albany or to Alexandria, as may be most convenient.

In haste, general, very truly, yours,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE, *Commanding Army of Virginia.*

In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and rode to the front, and at Upton's Hill met the advance of McDowell's corps, and with it Generals Pope and McDowell. After getting what information I could from them, I sent the few aides at my disposal to the left to give instructions to the troops approaching in the direction of Alexandria, and hearing artillery firing in the direction of the Vienna and Langley road, by which the corps of Sumner, Porter, and Sigel were returning, and learning from General Pope that Sumner was probably engaged, I went with a single aide and three orderlies by the shortest line to meet that column. I reached the column after dark, and proceeded as far as Lewinsville, where I became satisfied that the rear corps (Sumner's) would be able to reach its intended position without any serious molestation. I therefore indicated to Generals Porter and Sigel the positions they were to occupy, sent instructions to General Sumner, and at a late hour of the night returned to Washington.

Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, and was engaged in rectifying the positions of the troops and giving orders necessary to secure the issuing of the necessary supplies, &c. I felt sure on this day that we could repulse any attack made by the enemy on the south side of the Potomac.*

* * * * *

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General U. S. Army.

* The whole of McClellan's report for the "Fourth Period" will appear in Chapter XXXI, embracing operations of the Army of the Potomac from September 2 to November 9, 1862.

No. 2.

Reports of Brig. Gen. John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer of operations from May 23, 1861, to August 15, 1862.

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1863.

GENERAL: In compliance with the request of Major-General McClellan, I make the following report of the engineer operations of the Army of the Potomac executed under my direction as chief engineer of that army from the time of its organization to the date at which it was withdrawn from the James River:

On the night of the 23d-24th of May, 1861, a portion of the force which had been raised under the different calls of the President for three-months' and three-years' volunteers crossed the Potomac by the Long Bridge, by the Aqueduct Bridge, and by steamers to Alexandria, seized the city of Alexandria, the heights of Arlington, and intermediate connecting points. As *têtes-de-pont* to the Long Bridge and Aqueduct, Forts Runyon and Corcoran (the sites of which had been previously reconnoitered under my direction) were commenced at daylight on the morning of the 24th. The same day a reconnaissance was made in the vicinity of Alexandria by Captain Wright, Engineers (now major-general U. S. Volunteers), and Fort Ellsworth, to secure our possession of that city, was commenced. A couple of weeks later I laid out Fort Albany (intended to command the Columbia turnpike and the Aqueduct and Alexandria roads, and to give greater security to our *débouché* by the Long Bridge), which was commenced under Captain Blunt, Engineers.

These works were all of considerable magnitude (Fort Runyon having a perimeter of 1,500 yards). They were not entirely completed, though very nearly so, and quite defensible at the date of the advance of the army under General McDowell, July 16. I give this brief account of these preliminary works because they formed the initiation of the system of the defenses of Washington.

On the return of the army from the campaign of Bull Run the policy of surrounding Washington by a complete system of defensive works was no longer doubtful. Major-General McClellan, on his assumption of the command of the Army of the Potomac, was prompt to recognize the necessity of further fortifications, especially urgent at that time. In as rapid succession as possible, and in the order of the most urgent importance, new works were commenced. The interval between Fort Corcoran and Fort Albany was filled by a series of works forming a continuous line within supporting distances, protecting the heights of Arlington. At the same time the most prominent points on the north of the Potomac and those controlling the important routes leading to the capital were occupied by strong works.

It was soon apparent that Fort Ellsworth, important as that work still is, was inadequate for the defense of Alexandria. It was found necessary to occupy with a powerful work the heights over Hunting Creek, and to form a line of works embracing the Seminary Heights, and connecting with our Arlington lines at Fort Albany.

About the middle of September a portion of the army crossed the Chain Bridge and occupied the south shore of the Potomac at that point. The same night strong works, the site of which had previously been reconnoitered by Major (now Brigadier-General) Woodbury, were commenced for holding this *débouché*.

On the 29th of September (I think it was) the army advanced to the

position of Upton's and Munson's Hills, and the works of Forts Ramsay, Buffalo, &c., were commenced and speedily finished.

In September the fortification of the heights over the Eastern Branch was commenced.

During the subsequent months of the autumn and winter the engineers, assisted by large details of troops and also by large gangs of hired laborers, were busily engaged in completing the system, which, as you will observe, now extended from a point below Hunting Creek, near Alexandria, to the Chain Bridge, thence from the Potomac to the Eastern Branch near Bladensburg, and thence along the heights south of the Eastern Branch to a point nearly opposite Alexandria, making a total development of 33 miles.

I refrain from making here an exact enumeration or a minute description of the works. A report to the Chief Engineer, U. S. Army, made by me December 10, 1861, in compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives (a copy of which was furnished to General McCiellan), will furnish all such details. They should not be made public. I incorporate in this report the following extract:

The aggregate perimeter of all the works is about 15,500 yards, or nearly 9 miles (including the stockaded gorges, which, however, form a small proportion of the whole), requiring, computed according to the rule adopted for the lines of Torres Vedras, 22,674 men (about) for garrison.

The number of guns (most of which are actually mounted) is about 480, requiring about 7,200 men to furnish three reliefs of gunners. The permanent garrisons need consist of only these gunners, and even in case of attack it will seldom be necessary to keep full garrisons in all the works.

The total garrisons for all the works (152 in number) of Torres Vedras amounted to 34,125 men, and as the total perimeters are nearly proportional to the total garrisons, it appears that the lines about Washington involve a magnitude of works of about two-thirds of that in the three lines of Torres Vedras.

The works themselves, fewer in number, are generally much larger than those of Torres Vedras, and involve, I believe, when the amount of bomb-proof shelter is considered, more labor per yard of perimeter, but the latter lines involved a far greater amount of auxiliary work, such as the scarping of mountain slopes, palisading, abatis, roads, &c., than we have had occasion to make.

The lines of Torres Vedras were armed with 534 pieces of ordnance (12, 9 or 6 pounders, with a few field howitzers); ours with 480 pieces, of which the greater number are 32-pounders on barbette carriages, the rest being 24-pounders on the same carriages, 24-pounder siege guns, 10, 20, and 30 pounder rifled guns (Parrott), with a few field pieces and howitzers.

As to number of guns, therefore, our armament approaches to equality with the famous lines mentioned. In weight of metal it more than doubles it.

The above applies to our works as now nearly completed, and has no reference to the additional works I have elsewhere mentioned as hereafter necessary. (Very considerable changes in works, armament, &c., have been made since the above account was written, which applies to their state when the Army of the Potomac left Washington, March, 1862.)

* * * * *

It remains with me to express my sense of the zeal and efficiency with which the officers of engineers serving with me since last April have discharged their duties.

The theory of these defenses is that upon which the works of Torres Vedras were based, the only one admitted at the present day for defending extensive lines. It is to occupy the commanding points within cannon range of each other by field forts, the fire of which shall sweep all approaches. These forts furnish the secure emplacements of artillery. They also afford cover to bodies of infantry. The works may be connected by lines of light parapets, or the ground (where practicable) may be so obstructed that the enemy's troops cannot penetrate the in-

terval without being exposed for considerable time to the destructive effects of the artillery or musketry fire of the forts.

With such a system established, the defense against a powerful attack requires that all the forts shall be garrisoned; that a certain amount of infantry, cavalry, and movable artillery be distributed along the lines sufficient to hold them until reserves can be brought to their support; and, finally, it requires a movable force held as a reserve which may be shifted from point to point to meet the enemy's effort wherever it may be made, and where, aided by the works, they can repel superior numbers.

It is evident that without fortifications a place cannot be considered secure unless held by considerably greater numbers than the enemy can bring to assail it. No less an authority than Napoleon says that, aided by fortifications, 50,000 men and 3,000 artillerymen can defend a capital against 300,000 men, and he asserts the necessity of fortifying all national capitals.

The engineer forces attached to the Army of the Potomac as it was constituted during its campaign on the Peninsula consisted of a brigade of two regiments of volunteer engineers (the Fifteenth New York, Col. John McLeod Murphy, and the Fiftieth New York, Col. Charles B. Stuart), commanded by Brigadier-General (Major of Engineers, U. S. Army) D. P. Woodbury, and of a battalion (three companies) of regular engineer troops, commanded by Capt. J. C. Duane, Engineers.

The two regiments of volunteers had been placed under charge of Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp (Captain of Engineers, U. S. Army) B. S. Alexander in October, 1861, for instruction in the duties of engineer troops. The same officer had superintended, assisted by Captain Duane and Lieutenant Comstock, the getting up of pontoon trains and other engineer equipage. Previous to the embarkation of the army he was taken sick, and was thereby prevented from taking charge of the brigade, though he rejoined the army soon after its arrival before Yorktown.

The battalion of regular engineers was organized and instructed by Captain Duane, assisted by First Lieuts. C. B. Reese, C. E. Cross, and O. E. Babcock, which three last-named officers commanded the several companies of the same.

The engineer equipage consisted of about 160 bateaux, or wooden pontoons of the French model, with the necessary balks, chess, anchors, cordage, &c. There were also a certain number (of which I do not now find any exact statement) of Birago trestles and Russian canvas boats. As originally got up, this bridge equipage was organized in trains, of which there were six regular trains, consisting each of thirty-four French pontoons and eight Birago trestles, calculated to make a bridge of about 250 yards in length, and an advanced guard train composed of Birago trestles and Russian canvas boats. The wagons for but four of the regular trains and for the advanced guard train were provided.

All or nearly all the above bridge equipage was taken to the isthmus, but it did not retain its organization, except, I believe, one regular train taken along with the Engineer Battalion. The miscellaneous demand for bateaux for bridging Wormley's Creek at the siege of Yorktown, for quartermaster's use at Cheeseman's Landing, for the disembarkation of General Franklin's division, &c., rendered impossible and unnecessary the preservation of such an organization. A large portion of this equipage was in actual use for the purposes above named during the siege of Yorktown. On the advance of the army the single bridge train of the Engineer Battalion accompanied it, part of the remaining equipage

being in depot at Fort Monroe and the rest taken up by water to White House.

Thirty wagons for engineer tools were prepared, containing the special tools required for engineer troops. Twenty of these accompanied the Engineer Brigade and ten accompanied the Engineer Battalion. Besides these tool-wagons were provided to carry intrenching tools sufficient for the engineer troops. For the general service of troops in intrenching or siege work tools were supplied by the Quartermaster's Department.

The works prepared by the enemy to resist a landing at any point of the Peninsula south of Yorktown or an advance from Fort Monroe having been abandoned, the engineer operations of the army commenced with the siege of Yorktown. These works, however, such as that at Ship Point and others near the mouth of Wormley's Creek, were of considerable magnitude.

My special report of the siege of Yorktown (a copy of which is furnished you) will preclude the necessity of any further account in this place.

I should have mentioned that beside the engineer officers and troops already enumerated the following engineer officers accompanied the army:

Lieut. Col. (Aide-de-Camp) B. S. Alexander, First Lieut. C. B. Comstock, First Lieut. M. D. McAlester, and First Lieut. W. E. Merrill.

Capt. C. S. Stewart, Second Lieut. F. U. Farquhar. These two officers were temporarily detached from their duties at Fort Monroe, and joined the army about the middle of April.

First Lieut. H. L. Abbot, Topographical Engineers. This officer having been detailed for engineer duty on the defenses of Washington, accompanied me as an aide throughout the campaign.

At the commencement of the siege operations, Colonel Alexander (assisted by Lieutenant McAlester) was charged with the very important duty of constructing the roads through the various ravines of Wormley's Creek, which formed our main communication with the siege works. On the 20th of April he was attached to the headquarters of Brigadier-General Franklin, whose division was then preparing for a landing on some point of the enemy's shores.

Lieutenant Comstock during the siege acted most of the time under the immediate orders of Captain Duane, with whom he continued until after the battle of Fair Oaks. He was afterward attached to the headquarters of General Sumner.

Lieutenant McAlester was attached to the headquarters of General Heintzelman throughout the campaign.

Lieutenant Merrill was attached to the headquarters of General Keyes. At the action in front of the one-gun battery, April 16, he was severely wounded in the arm. He was *hors de combat* for the remainder of the campaign, and was brevetted for gallant services on that occasion.

Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Farquhar were attached to General Sumner's headquarters during the siege. On the advance of the army they accompanied the advance guard under Brigadier-General Stoneman, with whom they remained until the arrival on the Chickahominy, where Captain Stewart was taken sick from overexertion and was obliged to return to Fort Monroe. Lieutenant Farquhar was subsequently assigned to duty with General Sumner's headquarters.

I directed full plans of the works constituting the strong defensive line extending across the Peninsula at Williamsburg to be prepared, but they were never made. A sketch, however, showing the general char-

acter of this line and the positions of the works was made from the reconnaissances of Lieutenant McAlester, and it is, I believe, in the possession of the commanding general.

Previous to the fall of Yorktown the division of Brig. Gen. W. B. Franklin had been held in readiness to be embarked and landed at such a point on York River as subsequent events might dictate. The preparations for these operations had been directed by Lieut. Col. B. S. Alexander. The division actually made a landing nearly opposite West Point, which was followed by a severe engagement with a portion of the enemy's forces. I inclose a report of Colonel Alexander herewith concerning the engineer operations.*

In the movements of the army in its advance from Yorktown the officers of engineers were employed in various reconnaissances of the routes of the York and Pamunkey Rivers, &c., while detachments from General Woodbury's Engineer Brigade repaired roads and bridges. After reaching a point near Roper's Church, on the Williamsburg and Richmond road, the right wing, consisting of the corps of Porter and Franklin, took the road via Cumberland and the White House, striking the Chickahominy at New Bridge, while the left (corps of Heintzelman and Keyes) kept the Richmond road to Bottom's Bridge. The advance guards reached these points about the 16th or 17th of May.

On the 20th I proceeded, by orders of the commanding general, to make a forced reconnaissance of the position of Bottom's Bridge, accompanied by Lieutenants Comstock and McAlester. On arriving, I found the ground already occupied by a portion of the division of General Casey, and I dismissed the force I had ordered. The result of the reconnaissance was the acquiring of a perfect knowledge of the character of the Chickahominy as an obstacle, and the presumption that at this point (Bottom's Bridge) no serious resistance was contemplated; in fact, the next day our troops crossed and occupied the other bank.

General Woodbury, with his brigade, was ordered to this point to repair the old bridge and the railroad bridge and to establish others, while Lieutenants Comstock and McAlester made a reconnaissance in force on the right bank, with the view of establishing a *tête-de-pont* to cover both Bottom's Bridge and the railroad bridge. This work was begun, but never entirely finished.

On the 22d the general headquarters reached Cold Harbor, and I proceeded immediately to the New Bridge to reconnoiter that position. A word is proper here concerning the Chickahominy, which at the season we struck it was one of the most formidable obstacles that could be opposed to the advance of the army—an obstacle to which an ordinary river, though it be of considerable magnitude, is comparatively slight.

The Chickahominy, considered as a military obstacle, consists of a stream of no great volume, a swamp, and bottom land. The stream flows through a belt of heavily-timbered swamp, which averages 300 to 400 yards wide. A few hundred yards below New Bridge is a short length of the stream not margined by swamp timber, but everywhere else between New and Bottom's Bridges the belt of swamp timber is continuous and wide. The tops of the trees rise just about to the level of the crests of the high lands bordering the bottom, thus perfectly screening from view the bottom lands and slopes of the high lands on the enemy's side. The disappearance in the place indicated of swamp timber near New Bridge, and the dwindling away of the same at some

* See No. 3, Alexander's report, dated January 28, 1863.

points above the bridge to isolated trees, gave us some glimpse of the enemy's side near this point. Through this belt of swamp the stream flows, sometimes in a single channel, more frequently divided into several, and when but a foot or two above its summer level overspreads the whole swamp.

The bottom lands between the swamp and the high lands are little elevated at their margins above the swamp, so that a few feet rise of the stream overflows large areas of them. They rise very gently toward the foot of the high-land slopes. These bottom lands are generally cultivated, intersected by deep ditches, and their lower portions are in wet weather, even when not overflowed, spongy, and impracticable for cavalry and artillery. The total width of bottom land varies from three-quarters to one and a quarter miles. The crests of the opposite high-land spurs are about one and a half or one and three-quarter miles apart. The road via Cold Harbor to Richmond crosses the stream by a wooden bridge on piles, which had been destroyed. After passing the bridge the road or causeway takes a direction oblique to the course of the stream, having reaches nearly parallel with it, and ascends the opposite heights by a ravine at a point nearly a mile from the bridge. Above New Bridge the character of the stream and margins is not much different from what has been described, though the swamp was somewhat less regular in its width and density. The Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges each consisted of several bridges, crossing different arms of the stream, the swamp being wide at both places. These were the only bridges and roads crossing the stream in the vicinity of the positions of the army.

The distance from New Bridge to Bottom's Bridge is 8 miles. In this space there were two or three indifferent summer fords or places where a pedestrian could make his way through the swamp and stream, but it was currently reported at the time of our arrival that the stream was nowhere fordable.

The knowledge of the Chickahominy gained at Bottom's Bridge showed me that the stream might be reached at almost any point with little risk and thoroughly examined, provided the enemy's pickets did not actually hold our side. Taking with me Lieutenant Custer, of Fifth U. S. Cavalry, I reached it at a point three-fourths of a mile below New Bridge, and caused him to enter it. He waded across without any difficulty (the depth being about 4 feet), and a few days afterward, emboldened by this experiment, he caused the length of the stream to be waded from the bridge for a half a mile down. The attack and capture of the enemy's pickets by him and Lieutenant Bowen was founded upon these reconnaissances, to which the successful results are due.

Although it was thus shown that the stream was no obstacle for infantry, the swamp and the bottom lands were impracticable to cavalry and artillery. It was necessary to provide bridges, and (except at the site of the New Bridge) to corduroy a certain length of road on each margin. Three points were selected: New Bridge, a point a mile above, and another the same distance below. The bridge materials and corduroy stuff were collected and deposited at convenient points. At the same time General Sumner, whose corps had been stationed at a point intermediate between New Bridge and Bottom's Bridge, constructed two corduroy bridges across the stream and swamp, one of which was completed on or before the 28th and the other on or before the 30th of May. So far as engineering preparations were concerned, the army could have been thrown over as early as the 28th, Sumner

uniting his corps to those of Heintzelman and Keyes, and taking the enemy's position at New Bridge in flank and rear. Thus attacked, the enemy could have made no formidable resistance to the passage of our right wing.

I had twice reconnoitered the other side of the Chickahominy, and on the 28th found General Naglee's (Casey's division) pickets holding the very edge of the large wheat field occupying the high lands immediately facing our position at New Bridge. On the 30th I repeated the reconnaissance, and reached Golding's house, a point overlooking our *débouché* from the New Bridge at a distance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles. I returned from that reconnaissance in the torrents of rain which commenced to fall that afternoon and which continued during the night, completely changing the whole aspect of affairs.

On the afternoon of the 31st the enemy threw himself upon our left wing, doubtless believing that it was, by the swollen condition of the Chickahominy, entirely isolated. Fortunately General Sumner succeeded in getting over both divisions of his corps and one battery, though Richardson, finding the lower bridge impassable, was obliged to make a detour to the upper one, and did not arrive in time to take part in the action that evening. Soon after the upper bridge became impassable.

Orders from headquarters were given for throwing that night the bridges at the points selected at and near New Bridge. The night was intensely dark, and the dense foliage of the swamp excluded any little light there was in the heavens. The stream, which during the day had slowly exhibited the effects of the storm, rose rapidly during the night. Captain Duane, who at the New Bridge had the simplest task of all—that of bringing his pontoons into position between existing abutments—found the darkness, the powerful current, and the rising stream too much to contend with, and postponed his operations till daylight.

At the upper point the bridge materials (trestles), which had been deposited near the site, under cover of the swamp timber, were found to be afloat. This, with the much more difficult character of the task than that of Captain Duane's, prevented any progress during the night.

At the lower point the same or even greater difficulties were encountered. The direction of the bridge, chosen while the water was down and well chosen, was found inadmissible after a rise of a couple of feet.

Detachments of General Woodbury's brigade had charge of the construction of these two last-named bridges. He reports to me:

At 1.30 p. m., when the battle began over the river, I was at work 2 miles below New Bridge on a bridge or set of bridges over the Chickahominy. I comprehended in an instant the full import of the attack, and hastened back to prepare for bridges. The six teams left to me I caused to be harnessed up and added to them as many as I could raise in my brigade. * * * About 10 o'clock on the night of the 31st ultimo I received orders to commence bridges immediately.

The three sub-reports herewith, numbered 3, 4, 5,* of the officers charged with the construction, will show the difficulties encountered. General Woodbury adds:

No fault can be found with the officers or men of the Engineer Brigade. I have never seen officers work with more zeal or men work harder than they have done during the last two days. Only by more familiarity with the drill could they have had more experience available for the recent emergency.

The result of the operation was that at 8.15 a. m. (June 1) the pontoon bridge at the site of New Bridge was complete and passable to infantry, cavalry, and artillery. About noon the upper trestle bridge

* See reports of Captains Brainerd, Ketchum, and Spaulding, inclosures to No. 4.

was practicable for infantry. It was not till night that a practicable bridge for infantry was obtained at the lower trestle bridge.

In reference to these two trestle bridges it must be observed that the bottom-land adjacent, dry, or nearly so, when we selected the sites, was overflowed or rendered boggy for a half mile on one or the other side, and could only be made passable to cavalry or artillery by corduroying—a work which could not be done over so much water-covered ground in one day or two days, nor done at all on the enemy's side under his unsubdued fire, as subsequent experience proved.

At 8.15 a. m., the moment when the New Bridge pontoon bridge was being completed, I was on the spot. I have observed that the road crossing at this point was a raised causeway. On our own side the water had overflowed this causeway in two or three places near the bridge. On the other side were similar places. Anxious to ascertain how practicable the route was, I directed Lieutenant Babcock to proceed with a few of his sappers as far as he safely could on the other side. He proceeded perhaps 200 yards, when he was fired upon by sharpshooters ambuscaded in the vicinity and one of his men shot through the lungs. Supporting the wounded man himself, he withdrew, followed by repeated volleys. The intense anxiety I felt at this moment was partially relieved when I ascertained that it were not Lieutenant Babcock himself, as I supposed, who was shot.

Although these overflows of the causeway existed on both sides, the road surface was hard and at that time practicable for artillery. Later in the day the water continuing to rise and flowing over with a powerful current, cuts were made so deep that artillery could not pass until these were bridged. Whether this happened, too, on the enemy's side (where the road, as stated, was likewise overflowed) there were no means of knowing.

At a late hour (perhaps 10 or 12 o'clock, for I find no record) I was again at these bridges. Of the results of the battle we knew (or I knew) nothing. The enemy held with artillery, and undisturbed, the opposite heights. It was evidently impossible to pass here with our infantry, artillery, and cavalry confined to this narrow causeway, for I do not believe that even infantry in any numbers, in fighting order, could have passed over (opposed by the enemy's fire) the overflowed and ditched lands that interposed between the two trestle bridges and the enemy's positions. I so reported (in writing, I think, though I find no copy) to yourself. There was one way, however, to unite the army on the other side; it was to take advantage of a victory at Fair Oaks, to sweep at once the enemy from his position opposite New Bridge, and simultaneously to bring over by the New Bridge causeway our troops of the right wing, which would then have met with little or no resistance.

It should have been observed that soon after passing the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge General Keyes was directed to advance and to select and fortify a strong position on the Richmond road. He commenced fortifying a position about a mile in advance of Savage Station and $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles behind the Seven Pines. It was deemed necessary by the commanding general to hold the position of the Seven Pines (the junction of the Nine-mile road with the Williamsburg road), and by his order I directed Lieutenant McAlester to select and fortify a position. Lieutenant McAlester found the point held by Brigadier-General Casey's division and some slight rifle pits, abatis, &c., made. He selected a position a half mile in advance of the Seven Pines, which he deemed more tenable than the first. On visiting this ground on the

28th I directed the commencement of a redoubt, rifle pits, felling of trees, &c. Lieutenant McAlester was unable to procure an adequate force to throw up rapidly a defensive line, and this redoubt was quite incomplete when the attack at this point was made, about 1.30 p. m. of the 31st. A few pieces of artillery were placed in it behind the unfinished parapet, and in attempting to spike them, I think it was, the gallant Colonel Bailey lost his life.

By the rise of the Chickahominy the two bridges built by General Sumner became impracticable by the night of the 31st. The bridges at Bottom's Bridge with difficulty were preserved from destruction, but the rising waters overflowed the adjacent road, and soon those bridges became useless for wagons or horses. Fortunately the railroad bridge had been repaired, and by this alone the left wing of the army was supplied. By means of planks laid between the rails, infantry and, with some risk, horses could pass. This for several days was the only communication between the two wings of the army.

Immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks Lieutenant McAlester was directed to complete the redoubt already mentioned, and to extend the defensive line to the right, to embrace Fair Oaks, and to the left, to connect with the White Oak Swamp. At the same time Colonel Sully, under General Sumner's orders, commenced a line of barricades, continuing the line toward Golding's house. Lieutenants Comstock and Farquhar were ordered to General Sumner's headquarters to aid in this work, make reconnaissances, &c.

Colonel Alexander took by your orders immediate charge of the bridges, and a vigorous effort was made to corduroy the approaches on each side—a thing indispensable to making the two trestle bridges practicable. The labor was completely thrown away. After being permitted to go on for a few days it was arrested by the enemy's fire, and the approaches on the enemy's side to these two bridges never did become practicable.

Two days after the battle of the 1st—viz, June 3—I was directed to join General Sumner's headquarters temporarily. Previous to leaving I had urgently recommended the construction of a bridge at a point not far below the lower trestle bridge, where the *débouchés* on each side could be completed out of view of the enemy and under the protection of our own forces, now holding Golding's house. General Woodbury and Colonel Alexander made an exploration of the stream under direct orders from headquarters, and selected a point for a bridge favorable enough otherwise, but failing in the important object of bringing the two wings of the army into immediate connection, it being but 300 or 400 yards above Sumner's upper bridge. This bridge was built over the stream upon framed trestles; through the swamp it was supported by cribs. The approaches to the bridge over the low bottom lands were either raised corduroy or on the north side simply earth raised 2 or 3 feet, the soil being here sandy, with a layer of brush 1 foot below the upper surface, deep lateral ditches being made. The whole structure of the bridge and approaches was about 1,400 yards long. The trestle-work and crib-work bridge was mostly done by troops of the Engineer Brigade, under Woodbury; the approaches on the north by the Ninth and Twenty-second Massachusetts Regiments, Colonels Cass and Gove, both of whom were killed in the battles following; those on the south side by the Third Vermont. The bridge was ready for the passage of teams on the 14th, covered with earth, and the approaches entirely completed on the 17th. The bridge proper was 1,080 feet long, roadway 11 feet wide, number of cribs 40, of framed trestles 6. Simultaneously two infantry

bridges were made across the swamp by the Engineer Brigade—one a short distance below the lower trestle bridge, and one nearly opposite Golding's, where an old summer ford had been found, and where General Naglee had commenced a bridge previous to the battle of Fair Oaks.

To complete the history of bridges, I would add that on my return from General Sumner's headquarters I still urged the necessity of a more direct communication, practicable for all arms, between the two wings of the army, the two trestle bridges having been virtually abandoned. The point suggested by me being considered too much exposed, the commanding general himself selected a point somewhat lower down, where the *débouché* was entirely covered by our lines near Golding's, and this bridge was commenced by Captain Duane's Engineer Battalion (assisted by troops of General Porter's and General W. F. Smith's commands) on the 10th or 11th. The structure was about equal in magnitude to that already described. It was finished on the 18th or 19th. Besides the work described, detachments of the Engineer Brigade or Engineer Battalion were at work on the corduroy communication with the bridges commenced the night of 31st, repairing and corduroying road, rebuilding Bottom's Bridge, &c.

We had, June 19, the following bridges :

Upper trestle bridge. *Débouchés* held by enemy, and incomplete on his side.

The New Bridge. Two pontoon bridges, Captain Duane having built a second one alongside the one completed June 1. The road was held on south side of Chickahominy by the enemy.

The lower trestle bridge. *Débouchés* held by enemy, and incomplete on his side.

The foot bridge. Available for infantry under certain circumstances. It was on the shortest line between the two wings of the army.

Duane's bridge. A fine structure, practicable for all arms, and affording a very direct communication.

The infantry bridge (of Woodbury). Available for infantry.

Woodbury and Alexander's bridge. For all arms.

Sumner's upper bridge, or the grapevine bridge. This had been put in condition to be used in emergency by all arms.

Sumner's lower bridge I think had never been repaired.

The railroad bridge was the means of bringing the most of the supplies to the left wing. Bottom's Bridge was kept up and the *tête-de-pont* held.

While at General Sumner's headquarters, June 4 to June 7, I laid out a redoubt at Golding's (No. 6 in Campaign Map No. 3) and directed Lieutenant McAlester to lay out two others (Nos. 4 and 5) and to complete No. 3, the one first commenced, and where Colonel Bailey was killed.

Lieutenant Comstock, assisted by Lieutenant Farquhar, was directed to have the lines complete from No. 6, to connect with McAlester's works. The woods in front were extensively slashed, as shown on the campaign map. Lieutenant McAlester, in reconnoitering on the 5th, had his horse shot under him by the enemy's pickets, and narrowly escaped capture.

Subsequently redoubts Nos. 1 and 2 were constructed, carrying the left to the White Oak Swamp.

The redoubts may be described as follows: No. 1, a lunette with open gorge, 8 guns; No. 2, a redan with open gorge, 6 guns; No. 3, an inclosed redoubt (irregular pentagon), 5 guns; No. 4, an inclosed re-

doubt, 9 guns; No. 5, an inclosed redoubt, 6 guns; No. 6, an inclosed square of 30 yards wide, 6 guns. These works were connected by rifle pits or barricades. The object of these lines, over 3 miles long, was to hold our position of the left wing against the concentrated force of the enemy until communications across the Chickahominy could be established, or, if necessary, to maintain our position on this side while the bulk of the army were thrown upon the other, should occasion require it; or, finally, to hold one part of our line and communications by a small force, while our principal offensive effort was made upon another. Such an offensive effort it was the understood purpose of the commanding general to make upon our right, driving the enemy from the large wheat field (where he opposed the passage of our right wing) and from his position at the Old Tavern, thus putting ourselves upon the Nine-mile road to Richmond and within 5 miles of that city. Reconnaissances with this view were constantly made by the engineers, roads and bridges across the ravine which separated our right wing from the enemy prepared, &c.

At the same time several batteries were constructed under the direction of Captain Duane on the left bank of the Chickahominy, either to operate upon the enemy's positions and batteries opposite or to defend our bridges, &c. They were: No. 1, near Dr. Gaines' house, 6 guns; No. 2, on left of road near New Bridge, 6 guns; No. 3, on right of road, near New Bridge, 6 guns; No. 4, on right of Hogan's house, 6 guns. This last was armed with 4½-inch siege ordnance, I think, and used with success against the enemy's batteries. Several of these siege guns and the two 8-inch siege mortars were brought up to put either in or in the vicinity of redoubts Nos. 3, 4, and 5.

Our reconnaissances showed that the enemy was throwing up works in the farther side of the large wheat field and in the neighborhood of Old Tavern, also in front of our lines from redoubt No. 2 to No. 5. It was impossible to distinguish the exact character of these works, though most of them were probably little more than rifle pits.

In order, as I understood it, to drive back the enemy's pickets and to throw forward our own, General Hooker was ordered on the 25th to push his division forward through the woods to the clearing three-fourths of a mile beyond his lines, and between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. Hearing the firing in the afternoon I went to that locality and pushed forward on the Williamsburg road to the farther edge of the woods (then held by our troops) with a hope of getting some better knowledge of the ground and works of the enemy. An opening of 1,200 or 1,500 yards extended before me, and I saw guns in position and tents partially hid by a depression in the ground, but no appearance of works. In returning, my horse was struck by a shell and disabled.

In view of an advance to drive the enemy from the wheat field on our right it was decided as a preliminary to construct an epaulement for putting our guns on a commanding point on the edge of the field and near our picket lines. Colonel Alexander with a large detail broke ground at dark on the night of the 26th within musket range of the enemy's pickets, and succeeded by morning in obtaining cover without loss. The enemy did not interfere in any manner with the execution of this work, having probably other designs.

It had been known some days previous to this that Jackson's command had reached Frederick's Hall Station on its way from the Shenandoah, and there was presumptive evidence that an attack on our right wing was meditated by the concentrated forces of the enemy, and that,

too, on the 27th. It was understood by me to be the intention of the commanding general to concentrate our own forces either on one side or other of the Chickahominy, and, so far as I could infer from a conversation in which no positive decision was announced on his part, the plan to which preference was given was, after the enemy's plans should be sufficiently developed, to withdraw from the left bank of the Chickahominy, concentrate on the right bank, and attack Richmond while the enemy was massed on the other side. Indeed, the work thrown up on the night of the 26th was understood to be a preparation for an attack to be made on the morning of the 27th.

On the afternoon of the 26th I was told by the commanding general that in case of withdrawing from the other side (left bank) he would still be glad to maintain his hold on that side, in order to be able to recross should events make it necessary or desirable. I said to him that I thought with any small force it was impracticable to hold the *débouchés* of all our bridges, or even those from Duane's down to Sumner's upper bridge, but that possibly the heads of the two important bridges, Alexander's and Woodbury's, and Sumner's upper bridge (which were within a few hundred yards of each other), might be held. He desired me to go that afternoon and reconnoiter the ground for a position for that purpose. This was probably about 4 p. m.

I left the headquarters camp (then rear of Dr. Trent's) as soon as I could get my horses, and proceeded on this reconnaissance. I had passed the Chickahominy, when I was overtaken by an aide-de-camp (Lieutenant Custer), who informed me that the commanding general desired to modify his instructions; that he wished me to reconnoiter a position extending from near Dr. Gaines' to Barker's Mill Pond. He (Lieutenant Custer) asked for my map, and sketched with a pencil a line extending between those limits. How or by what forces it was intended to occupy that position I was not informed. I took the road by McGee's house to New Cold Harbor and to Dr. Gaines', thence back on to the spur on the right of Dr. Gaines'; thence through the woods to New Cold Harbor again; thence to Old Cold Harbor; thence by the road to Dispatch Station to near where I started; thence by the same road to near Barker's saw-mill.

It was late when I commenced, and I had been obliged to ride fast. When I reached Barker's Mill it was getting dark, and I proceeded from there back to camp. I thought that a position moderately favorable for a large force to fight a battle in equal or not greatly-inferior numbers might be taken along this line, but not one which gave any very decided advantages. According to the force in which it was occupied, its left would rest on the first spur to the right (east) of Dr. Gaines' house, embracing the woods, or, contracting the front, rest on the spur where Watts' house is, partially embracing the woods in front, and running in front of McGee's house. The right would extend past McGee's house along the Dispatch Station road through the woods to the eminence near where a house is marked on the map, or, perhaps still better, keep along the edge of the woods toward the Chickahominy. When I returned to headquarters camp after dark I found that the commanding general had left for General Porter's camp, having been summoned either by General Porter himself or by the sound of the attack made late that afternoon. At 10 p. m. I received a telegram directing me to repair at once to General Porter's headquarters. I reached there about midnight, and found the commanding general and General Porter together in bivouac (all camp equipage, wagons, &c., having been sent to the other side). After explaining on the map to the commanding

general what I had done in the afternoon, he rose to leave, intimating that he desired me to remain with General Porter.

On his leaving General Porter seemed to be in doubt whether he should withdraw his troops from their actual positions. Finding that he had no positive instruction, I told him that I supposed it indispensable to fall back at least to the position covering the bridges, in order to put himself in communication with the rest of the army, and he issued his orders to this effect about 1 a. m. (27th), and at dawn or early daylight the troops were in motion near us, falling back.

At this time the doubts seemed to have revived in General Porter's mind as to the expediency of the movement, he alleging the probability of McCall's division being cut to pieces in the operation. I could only repeat my conviction that it was indispensable in order to put himself in connection with the rest of the army, and it was continued, and we proceeded together to the ground I visited the evening before. On the way, or before starting, he asked me how many troops I thought he ought to be re-enforced with. I replied substantially that I could not answer the question; that, according to any understanding I had of the matter, I supposed that the whole army was to fight on one side or the other; that I had all along supposed that he was to retire to the other side.

After reaching the ground he put his left on the spur of Watts' house, and riding farther along the position he concluded he could not extend his right beyond the clearing and spur where McGee's house is. After this I returned to headquarters, presuming that in reference to the arrangements of the day the commanding general might have further instructions for me. I reached headquarters about 9 or 10 a. m., and being informed that the commanding general was reposing, I went to my tent, and remained there until afternoon.

I have gone somewhat minutely into the history of my connection with that battle-field, because upon this battle—fought by General Porter with 27,000 men—hinged the fate of the campaign.

On the afternoon of the 26th Lieutenant Reese was sent by Captain Duane (who had orders, I presume, direct from headquarters) to destroy the upper trestle and New Bridge. He found the first already taken up by a detachment of the Engineer Brigade, the trestles being destroyed and the flooring collected on the bank for burning. He took up the pontoons of the two bridges at New Bridge, loaded them with the flooring, and attempted to float them down the stream to the lower trestle bridge, but being unable to get them along the channel, scuttled and sank them 100 or 200 yards below the bridge site. The afternoon of the 27th Colonel Alexander thoroughly destroyed Duane's bridge. General Porter's forces passed over the two lower bridges in the night, and Captain Duane had orders to see all those bridges destroyed.

That night it was understood, I believe, that the army was to march to the James River. General Woodbury received orders from headquarters to proceed immediately to the White Oak Swamp and construct bridges, and I was ordered at an early hour the next morning to send out all the engineers to aid in the same and to explore the roads. Having retired to the headquarters camp at Savage Station, suffering with a violent headache, I was unable to go out in person in the morning. In the course of the day Captain Duane's battalion, which had been engaged destroying the lower bridges, arrived at the headquarters camp. I directed him to continue on, by the shortest route he could find, to the vicinity of points of crossing the White Oak Swamp, and myself started by the beaten road to White Oak Bridge. I found that

General Woodbury had rebuilt the bridge (with the addition of side bridges, for infantry or cavalry) and repaired the corduroy road through the swamp, and that at a point about a mile and a quarter farther up the stream he had built another bridge. This point, it should be observed, was the site of an old ford (Brackett's), to which a road conducted on each side.

In reference to the White Oak Swamp it may be observed that the stream itself is quite insignificant, but that, like the Chickahominy, it is bounded by swamp on each side, of which the width is about 200 yards. The extensive wooded region shown on the Henrico County map on the north side of the swamp, and usually included in that designation by us, was generally dry and firm, affording good roads. To make a bridge across the swamp involved, of course, not merely bridging the stream, but the cutting of heavy timber and the making of a raised corduroy over this 200 yards of swamp. Besides which, unless each bridge had an independent wagon road through the forest, it added little to our facilities, since the moving of our immense wagon trains was the principal difficulty of the problem.

I found the upper bridge I have mentioned pretty well advanced to completion, and Major Magruder, of the Fifteenth New York, in charge of the work, promised it should be done before he left off work that night. I was not satisfied with the approaches, however, and feared that the first few wagons which passed would make them impracticable. I found, too, that there was as yet no established connection or fixed route by which the troops and trains near Savage Station were to reach this bridge. I started back to make this connection, and met Captain Duane with his battalion. I directed him to make it his business to keep this bridge and corduroy practicable, and to examine the vicinity to see if there was any other practicable crossing, after which I continued the exploration of the road to connect with the Williamsburg road near the blacksmith's shop. It was owing to this personal reconnaissance that a connection with the New Bridge was established and troops and wagons put upon this route that night. (General Heintzelman's corps reached this bridge by another route, but this would not have answered for other portions of the army nor for wagon trains.)

In the evening I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander to take with him Lieutenants Comstock and Farquhar and reconnoiter the country in reference to the march and probable new positions of the army. The accompanying extract from his report* will make known his services.

The headquarters left Savage Station between 2 and 3 a. m. June 29. I separated from them, and proceeded at once to the camp of Captain Duane, following the route I had examined the night before, and over which General Sykes' division had passed during the night. (This route is not delineated on the campaign map.) The road was in good condition, but I found the corduroy over the swamp required constant attention, and recognizing the inutility, or rather impossibility, of constructing for the emergency any other crossing (Captain Duane's officers having been making additional explorations), I directed him to make it his especial business to keep this route practicable. Portions of the wagon trains and General Heintzelman's corps passed at this bridge during the day. From this point I proceeded to the White Oak Swamp Bridge, and found the trains and troops rapidly passing. I then rejoined the headquarters at the house just beyond, south side of the swamp. As the passage of the army through or over this swamp

* See No. 3, Alexander's report of July 12, 1862.

was one of the difficulties of the march, I deem these particulars worthy of record.

General Keyes' corps had crossed on the 28th, with orders to take a position to cover our *débouchés* from the swamp and our line of march toward the James. General Woodbury had been directed to communicate with him and assist him by reconnaissances, and Lieutenant McAlester had been ordered by me to proceed to his positions and make such arrangements there, such as slashings, obstructing roads, &c.; as he could. Colonel Alexander had also, in execution of the duties assigned him, been on this ground and communicated with the commanding general concerning it.*

On the morning of the 30th General Woodbury made a reconnaissance between the Charles City and Long Bridge roads, assisting Generals Kearny and McCall in posting their troops, and I went out on all the different roads, arriving at 12 or 1 p. m. at Malvern Hill. At this time the danger seemed to me that the Quaker road, over which our trains were passing, would be taken in flank by the cross roads which I had observed to exist from near Bulten's or Warriner's, striking the Quaker road near Malvern Hill (See Campaign Map No. 3.) I did not know what the general arrangement of troops was, nor could I see the commanding general, who was not on the field, but I mentioned the circumstance to General Porter, whose troops held the hill. Later in the day you directed me to post some of the reserve artillery, and I took it to the right and front of Dr. Mellert's house, facing the *débouché* from the woods of the dangerous roads of which I speak and through which I had previously penetrated to within a half or three-quarters of a mile of the New Castle road. While I was posting these batteries General Porter joined me and established Morell's brigade on this line. About this time (perhaps 4 p. m.) the action commenced on the New Castle road. So near to us was it, that a shell (whether from friend or foe could not be known) struck near where we were.

Shortly after the enemy opened upon us with his artillery from the woods which skirted the bottom lands to the left or west of Malvern Hill. A brisk cannonade took place, in which we had the better. The gunboats took part in this, and though there seemed to be indications of force on the Richmond road, our position was found too strong to be assailed from this quarter.

I passed the night at Drew's house (General Porter's headquarters), where the commanding general came and remained until 12 or 1 o'clock of the night. The Engineer Brigade (a detachment of which had destroyed the White Oak Swamp Bridge) and Engineer Battalion had proceeded to camp near the headquarters, Haxall's Landing.

The news of the action on the New Market road had been favorable. Subsequently and at a late hour it was reported that McCall's division had been routed with the loss of its general officers, and somewhat later, probably about midnight, it was known that General Franklin was falling back and that Sumner and Heintzelman were necessarily following his example. This left no latitude of judgment as to the arrangements for the next day. I was ordered to reconnoiter and assist in putting the troops in position as they came in. I went out early to get a more general view of the hill and its connections, and afterward, assisted by Brigadier-General Humphreys, Chief of Topographical Engineers, Colonel Hudson, Captain Mason, and one or two other aides of the commanding general, I directed the formation of the line.

Leaving the dispositions to be made here by others, I then went to

* See No. 3, Alexander's report of July 12, 1862.

Haxall's, to see how our communications with the James River were to be covered. I found the commanding general had put Franklin's corps in position for this purpose. I directed General Woodbury and Captain Duane to make "slashings" on the roads intersecting our long line, which, exceedingly strong at Malvern, was weak elsewhere. In the mean time Brigadier-General Humphreys, with very great labor, had succeeded in running a line through the dense woods of the Turkey Creek Bottom, and posting troops so as to connect our left on Malvern Hill with our right in front of Haxall's.

A further retreat to Harrison's Landing was ordered for that night (July 1), it being difficult to keep open our communication with the transports at Malvern. I made a reconnaissance at daylight, July 2, to form some idea of the position. Entirely ignorant of the locality, having arrived in the darkness of the night, it took some time to get a clear idea of it; a pouring rain, which commenced soon after sunrise, being unfavorable to distant vision. Finding a broad estuary to the northward, I followed it down beyond Westover, to ascertain that there was neither bridge nor ford leading out of it. I then hastened back to find at the entrance of this *cul-de-sac* a temporary position, where our rear guard could cover its mouth, for the main body of the army was now pouring in. Having done this, I returned to the camp, and reported as speedily as possible to the commanding general, who accompanied me in the afternoon to the position, directing General Keyes, whose corps had covered the retreat, to occupy it.

It is in place here to remark that in moving up from Yorktown to the Chickahominy the only pontoon equipage which accompanied the march of the army was the train with Captain Duane's command. All the other material which had been used at Yorktown or by General Franklin in his disembarkation was taken up to the White House.

The pontoons of Captain Duane's train were all used in the various bridges on the Chickahominy, and several more (twenty-four, I believe) were brought up from White House (on abandoning the White House the bridge material remaining there was sent back, I think, to Fort Monroe); also a train consisting of thirty Birago trestles and four Russian canvas pontoons.

The pontoons at New Bridge were, with the flooring and other accessories, sunk in the stream, and the upper and lower trestle bridges destroyed. What remained of bridge equipage, say thirty French and two canvas pontoons and ten trestles, was packed and collected on the south side of the Chickahominy by Captain Spaulding (under General Woodbury's orders), but for want of transportation part of it was destroyed here and part after crossing the White Oak Swamp. About fifteen pontoons (with balks and chess) and a few trestles were brought safely through to Harrison's Landing.

On the retreat from Malvern Hill and Haxall's a portion of the Engineer Brigade was directed to keep the road in order. The crossing of Kimage's Creek (much swollen by the rain) in particular required incessant labor during the whole period of the passage of the army and trains to keep it practicable. One pontoon and four bays of balks and chess were used there in two bridges, all of which, with the wagons, were afterward destroyed by our own troops.

On the 3d of July the army commenced moving out to more eligible positions. The brief reconnaissance of the preceding day had shown me that it was necessary to occupy heights on the other side of Herring Creek and to extend our lines. The engineer officers were employed this day in assisting in placing the troops in new positions and in recon-

noitering for a defensive line. A very satisfactory one was found, which is tolerably well delineated on the Campaign Map No. 3. The left stretched for upwards of a mile along the left bank of Kimage's Creek, which excavated a deep ravine in the table-land through which it flowed, and the lower half of the stream was so deep and marshy as to make an impassable obstacle. In front were cleared fields exposed to the fire of our gunboats, while on our own side were woods, which covered our movements and concealed our positions. From near the head of the creek the line turned at right angles and stretched three-quarters of a mile to the eastward to the mill-dam. From a point half a mile still farther to the eastward, on the mill-pond, the line was resumed, ran easterly through the woods about half a mile, and thence southeasterly a mile and a quarter through the cultivated fields of Westover, and then southerly a half mile to a point on Herring Creek, near Westover Church.

It will be seen that of this line, 4 miles long, that portion on Kimage's Creek was naturally very strong, and with the aid of the flanking fire of the gunboats might throughout be considered (with proper defensive arrangements) unassailable, and of that portion of the line parallel to James River the mill-pond covered nearly a mile of front, so that it could not be assailed, and that the half mile of line constituting our right flank and the approaches thereto by the Charles City road were flanked by the fire of our gunboats. The points at which attack was most practicable were where the two roads from the northward came in—one on the left of the mill-pond and one on the right.

Between the mill-pond and the road on the left a strong redoubt, consisting of two redans connected by a curtain, was laid out; thence rifle pits extended to the mill-dam on the right, barricades extended to the left toward Kimage's Creek, and at the salient angle a redoubt for artillery was designed.

On the right, through the open fields, the line consisted of rifle pits of strong profile, with two large redoubts or lunettes—one where the road intersected the line and the other at the right salient angle, and both designed to contain a numerous artillery.

Through the woods behind Kimage's Creek and elsewhere the line consisted of timber barricades covered with earth, with numerous emplacements for artillery, having thick earthen epaulements in front, and everywhere, except through the open fields of Westover, the front of these lines was covered by extensive abatis of felled timber.

The works thus described were commenced by the troops themselves as soon as they got into position, who in a single night would cover themselves by quite a respectable obstacle in the shape of a barricade. The redoubts required more time, and though not entirely finished for two or three weeks, they were soon in condition to aid powerfully in the defense. The troops of both the Engineer Brigade and Engineer Battalion aided in these works. The general supervision of these works was given by me to Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, who distributed the immediate supervision between Lieutenants Comstock, McAlester, and Farquhar.

While this work was going on myself and other of the engineer officers were engaged in reconnaissances of the river or adjacent country. In company with General Woodbury I examined very carefully the right bank of the James River from City Point to the mouth of the Chickahominy, in view of an occupation on our part and to ascertain the most dangerous points. The defensive qualities of Coggins' Point were clearly ascertained by me. In company with General Woodbury,

Colonel Alexander, Lieutenants Reese, Cross, and Farquhar, I reconnoitered the Peninsula just below Charles City Court-House, with a view to its eligibility as a defensive position. Subsequently General Woodbury examined the country from Wilson's Wharf across to the Chickahominy, and caused a map of the roads leading from Harrison's Landing to various points on the Chickahominy to be made by officers of his brigade.

On the 10th of August Lieutenant Comstock received orders from yourself to make an examination of the Chickahominy at Barrett's Ferry and roads leading to it, and on his return that night orders were issued for the construction of a bridge. The material (which consisted of sixty-one new pontoons and thirty-one old ones) was at Fort Monroe, and it took till the morning of the 12th to get it up to the point mentioned.

At noon of the 13th the material was all unloaded and the bridge commenced at both ends and in the middle, Captain Spaulding, Fiftieth Regiment New York Volunteers, being in charge of the western end, Lieutenant Comstock of the middle, and Lieutenant Cross of the eastern end; Captain Duane being in charge of the whole. As the pontoniers had been severely worked during the two preceding days the work was suspended during the night and resumed in the morning, the bridge being finished at 9.30 a. m. on the 14th, and a squadron of cavalry crossing at 10 a. m. The bridge was 1,980 feet long. The western end was built by successive pontoons, the rest by rafts. At times there was difficulty in maneuvering the rafts, from the depth of the water and the strength of the tidal currents. After its completion it was covered with straw to prevent the wear of the flooring.

Excepting Heintzelman's corps, the whole Army of the Potomac, with its artillery and baggage wagons, crossed the bridge. There was no interruption to travel, the accidents being that a few horses got overboard without injury to the bridge. The straw proved a perfect protection to the flooring, scarcely a plank being found injured. The advance guard of General Porter passed on the morning of Friday, the 15th, and at 10 a. m. August 18 the extreme rear guard had passed. At 2.30 p. m. the boats were all out of the bridge, and at 3 p. m. all the bridge material was in tow of steamers bound for Old Point. Besides the officers already mentioned, Captain Duane was assisted by Lieutenant Reese.

On Friday, the 15th, I left Harrison's Landing by steamer for Fort Monroe, under orders from the commanding general, and on the 16th I received a telegram from the Headquarters at Washington relieving me from duty with the Army of the Potomac.

Some allusion to the services of officers and troops during the campaign is called for from me in such a report as this. The account here given and in the report of the siege of Yorktown and the various sub-reports which accompany this will give a pretty clear idea of the amount and character of their services.

In Brig. Gen. D. P. Woodbury I found an able and zealous coadjutor. The duties of his brigade did not give him a prominent part in the actual siege works of Yorktown, the Battery No. 4. of 13-inch mortars, being the only one laid out and superintended by him, but in the construction of the numerous bridges and roads and in the making of gabions and fascines, the services of himself and brigade were arduous and important; and from Lieutenants Hassler and Farrell I received valuable assistance in reconnoitering the works.

The sub report No. 2* gives a fair idea of the services of the brigade as connected with the marches of the army, and the sub-report No. 1† shows that a portion of the brigade under Colonel Murphy rendered valuable services in the preparations for the landing of General Franklin's division and in executing the same. On the Chickahominy and on the retreat to the James the duties of the brigade were arduous, as have been described, and I found in its chief throughout the campaign an officer prompt and fertile in expedients, daring and assiduous in execution, and always exhibiting a wise foresight.

The following officers of the Volunteer Engineer Brigade have been mentioned to me by their commander as particularly deserving of notice:

Lieut. Col. W. H. Pettes, Fiftieth New York, for constant and efficient attention to his duties.

Capt. (now Maj.) Ira Spaulding, Fiftieth New York, for unremitting and successful work in the construction of military bridges.

Capt. O. E. Hine, Fiftieth New York, for habitual good conduct and for maintaining Bottom's Bridge under difficult circumstances.

Captains Beers, Ford, and Brainerd, for untiring energy and fidelity.

Maj. (now Lieut. Col.) James A. Magruder, Fifteenth New York, for energy and perseverance.

Capt. (now Maj.) E. C. Perry, for energy and perseverance.

Capt. W. A. Ketchum, Fifteenth New York, for energy and hard work in the construction of roads and bridges.

Lieut. (now Capt.) H. V. Slosson, Fifteenth New York, for good conduct throughout the campaign.

Lieut. T. M. Farrell, Fifteenth New York, for skill and perseverance.

Lieut. F. R. Hassler, aide-de-camp, Fifteenth New York, for constant energy and intelligence in the performance of his duties.

Capt. H. W. Bowers, assistant adjutant-general, for intelligence and perseverance in the discharge of his laborious duties.

Lieut. C. S. Webster, Fifteenth New York, died of disease contracted on the Chickahominy.

Lieut. H. C. Yates, Fiftieth New York, died from disease contracted in the trenches at Yorktown.

The services of Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander are so frequently alluded to, besides being exhibited in his own reports (see sub-reports Nos. 1 and 6),‡ that it is hardly necessary to say that he sustained as a military engineer in the field the high professional character which he had previously acquired.

Capt. C. S. Stewart rendered valuable services at Yorktown, and at the battle of Williamsburg he discovered the unoccupied works on the enemy's left, ascertained the existence of and reconnoitered the route by which they might be gained, and by which Lieutenant Farquhar (who had accompanied him) led Hancock's brigade. To him, therefore, the decided successes on that part of the field are in a great measure due. Afterwards, with the advance guard under General Stoneman, he was so unsparing of himself in his reconnaissances and reports of the character of the country, roads, &c., as to induce the sickness which compelled him to leave the field.

If I should have to mention any single individual as distinguished above any other in the army for unceasing toil and unsparing devotion it would be Capt. J. C. Duane. In the trenches at Yorktown, in the dangerous and laborious works in the swamps and floods of the Chicka-

* See Woodbury's report, No. 4.

† See No. 3, Alexander's report, dated January 28, 1863.

‡ See No. 3, both reports.

hominy, he seemed to know no fatigue and to allow himself no repose. The pontoon bridge built by him over the Lower Chickahominy was one of the most extensive known to military history.

Lieuts. C. B. Comstock and M. D. McAlester rendered most gallant and valuable services in the siege works of Yorktown, and the latter had again an opportunity at the battle of Williamsburg of exhibiting his gallantry and rendering important aid to his commanding general.

On reaching the Chickahominy these two officers were with me at the first armed reconnaissance of Bottom's Bridge, and the works for the *tête-de-pont* were laid out and executed by them. Lieutenant Comstock accompanied the advance under General Keyes until it took its first position near Savage Station. While the other engineer officers were mainly confined to specific works, a larger part of the duty of reconnaissances, particularly on the right bank of the Chickahominy, fell on these two, and under their immediate supervision the works described on that side were built, as subsequently at Harrison's Landing they had charge of considerable portions of those lines. They both exhibited unwearied assiduity and great gallantry.

Lieut. W. E. Merrill has been mentioned as having been severely wounded on the 16th of April in an attack upon a portion of the enemy's lines near Yorktown. He has been already brevetted for gallant conduct on that occasion.

Lieutenants Reese, Cross, and Babcock commanded the three companies constituting the Engineer Battalion under Capt. J. C. Duane, and though sometimes available for general reconnaissances, their duties were usually with their command. They vied with their chief in their unwearied assiduity and in their gallantry. Upon them as upon their immediate chief devolved much of the most exposed service in the laying out and executing the trenches and batteries before Yorktown.

An instance of great gallantry and magnanimity on the part of Lieutenant Babcock has been mentioned by me as occurring in my presence at the New Bridge on the morning of June 1. On the Chickahominy and subsequently their duties in construction of bridges, batteries, &c., were arduous and exposed.

Second Lieut. F. U. Farquhar rendered valuable services at the siege of Yorktown. He was one of the three engineer officers present at the battle of Williamsburg, accompanied Captain Stewart in his reconnaissances which discovered the enemy's unoccupied redoubts, and led General Hancock's brigade thereto. He was sent back to the commanding general in the evening with the colors captured. With the advance guard of General Stoneman, and subsequently in the various engineer works and duties on the right bank of the Chickahominy he was daring and indefatigable.

First Lieut. (now Capt.) H. L. Abbot, Topographical Engineers, was attached to my person throughout the campaign as an aide. His services were particularly noticeable during the siege of Yorktown by his valuable reconnaissances and by his skill in combining the information gained by others into maps of the works and of topography of the ground. During the march to the Chickahominy, and while the army was encamped on the river, his time was principally occupied in making up the map of the country, founded on the reconnaissances of the officers of both Engineer Corps and others, in which duty he was under the immediate direction of Brigadier-General Humphreys. His health, which had suffered from the miasma of the Potomac while serving on the defenses of Washington, was further impaired at York-

town and on the Chickahominy, and he was unable to bear much physical labor or exposure. After reaching the James River he was compelled to leave the army by an illness which prostrated him for two months, during which time, however, he superintended the preparation of the campaign maps.

First Lieut. N. J. Hall, Fifth Artillery (now colonel of the Seventh Michigan Volunteers), was assigned to duty with me as adjutant before Yorktown, and accompanied me in that capacity. Besides his services in this capacity, he executed valuable reconnaissances both at Yorktown and on the Chickahominy. During the march of the army to the James River he was employed by yourself as bearer of dispatches, &c., between the different corps.

I have enumerated twelve officers of the Engineer Corps (including Lieutenant Abbot, Topographical Engineers). Of these one possessed the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers, another of lieutenant-colonel, aide-de-camp (the first is a major, the second a captain in the corps), and two were captains, seven others first lieutenants, and one a second lieutenant. The brigadier-general was so made expressly to enable him to command the brigade of volunteer regiments. The battalion of Regular Engineers was commanded by a captain, and each of its three companies by a single first lieutenant.

It will be thus seen that the Corps of Engineers as now organized does not furnish adequate rank even to command the limited number of engineer troops brought into the field. The engineers attached to the army corps (with the single exception of Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, who derived his rank not from the corps, but from a law having no particular relation to engineers, and since repealed) were but lieutenants. In a European service the chief engineer serving with an army corps would be a field officer, generally a colonel.

There is a twofold evil in this want of rank: First, the great hardships and injustice to the officers themselves, for they have, almost without exception, refused or been refused high positions in the volunteer service (to which they have seen their contemporaries of the other branches elevated) on the ground that their services as engineers were absolutely necessary. Second, it is an evil to the service, since an adequate rank is almost as necessary to an officer for the efficient discharge of his duties as professional knowledge. The engineer's duty is a responsible one. He is called upon to decide important questions, to fix the positions of defensive works (and thereby of the troops who occupy them,) to indicate the manner and points of attack of fortified positions. To give him the proper weight with those with whom he is associated he should have, as they have, adequate rank.

The campaign on the Peninsula called for great labor on the part of the engineers. The country, notwithstanding its early settlement, was a *terra incognita*. We knew the York River and the James River, and we had heard of the Chickahominy, and this was about the extent of our knowledge. Our maps were so incorrect, that they were found to be worthless before we reached Yorktown. New ones had to be prepared, based on reconnaissances made by the officers of engineers. The siege of Yorktown involved great responsibility, besides exposure and toil. The movements of the whole army were determined by the engineers. The Chickahominy again arrested us, where, if possible, the responsibility and labor of the engineer officers were increased. In fact, everywhere and on every occasion, even to our last position at Harrison's Landing, this responsibility and labor on the part of the engineers was incessant.

I have stated above in what manner the officers of engineers performed their duties; yet thus far their services are ignored and unrecognized, while distinctions have been bestowed upon those who have had the good fortune to command troops. Under such circumstances it can hardly be expected that the few engineer officers yet remaining will willingly continue their services in this unrequited branch of the military profession. We have not sufficient officers of engineers at this time with any of our armies to commence another siege, nor can they be obtained. In another war, if their services are thus neglected in this, we will have none.

Another evil of no inconsiderable magnitude was experienced in this campaign, growing out of the want of a properly-organized engineer service in this country. In a European service every *corps d'armée* (or division, if this were the highest unit of command) would have its proper proportion of engineer troops, and to their charge would be committed the engineer train, carrying the intrenching tools for the use of the troops. For example, a corps of 30,000 or 40,000 men would have in the French service a train of 41 wagons, of which 30 would carry 10,000 intrenching tools. This train would be under the immediate charge of a company of sappers, whose business it would be to issue them to the troops where wanted, to be with the working parties, directing the same, and to receive the tools back again when the work was completed.

For want of such an organization the issue of intrenching tools to the army was necessarily left to the Quartermaster's Department. This department, burdened with its immense duties, could not give especial attention to this, in consequence of which important works were frequently delayed, as at Yorktown, where details assembled to make roads were sent back for want of tools, though they were in ample quantities on board the transports. Furthermore, it was impossible to maintain any system of responsibility for the tools. The soldier found an ax or a shovel a very convenient thing to have at his camp, and carried one off with him. When the army moved he found it inconvenient to carry and threw it away. Thus, notwithstanding the number of tools issued to the army at Yorktown and on the Chickahominy, we were almost wholly dependent in making the works at Harrison's Landing upon new supplies from the transports sent to the James River.

The pontoon equipage which accompanied the army was got up, as already mentioned, by Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, assisted by Capt. J. C. Duane. The former had acquired an enviable reputation as the builder of the Minot's Ledge light-house, possessed great practical ingenuity, and had had the means of knowing the best results arrived at in other services in this branch of military art. Captain Duane possessed a more extensive and thorough practical and experimental knowledge of military bridges than any other man in this country. They gave, after full consideration of the subject, their preference to the French system. Even had they adopted this system blindly, because it was French, they would not have been without solid reasons, for the French have studied and experimented upon the best systems known to the world. Whatever may be said about the difference in the character of the country, roads, &c., the thing to be done here and in Europe (now that our armies have assumed European magnitude) is essentially the same. But these officers had before them the best modern inventions of Europe and America. The India-rubber pontoons they knew thoroughly; corrugated iron bodies and countless other inventions of American genius were before them, and the former experimented upon.

My own prepossessions had been in favor of the Birago system of sectional pontoons and Birago (so called) trestles. The experience we had proved the wisdom which adopted the system in question. Not to advance, by any means, that nothing better can be found (the substitution of iron for wood was one of the probable improvements well understood by the officers named, but not at that time adopted for substantial reasons), it is enough to say that the French pontoon was found to be most excellent, useful, and reliable for all military purposes. They were used by the quartermaster's department in discharging transports, were precisely what was needed for the disembarkation of General Franklin's division, constituted a portion of the numerous bridges built over Wormley's Creek during the siege of Yorktown, and were of the highest use on the Chickahominy, while over the Lower Chickahominy some 75,000 men, some 300 pieces of artillery, and the immense baggage trains of the army passed over a bridge of the extraordinary length of nearly 650 yards—a feat scarcely surpassed in military history.

The Birago trestle, of which I had formed so high an opinion, proved itself dangerous and unreliable—useful for an advance guard or detachment, unfit in general for a military bridge. Of the American India-rubber and the Russian canvas pontoon we had no fair experiment. They may both be useful, but, again, I think not reliable for a military bridge, considered in all its aspects and uses.

The weight of the French pontoons is objected to, but a certain floatation power is required which it is not easy to get, nor are the ways unobjectionable which seek to get it with less weight, and the vehicle which carries it is not heavier loaded than other vehicles of an army train. Less length would certainly make it more manageable on our narrow roads, while for advance guards and dashing minor enterprises greater lightness is requisite. Perhaps an iron sectional pontoon may be contrived which will meet these requirements, but prudence demands that the safety of an army shall not be jeopardized by giving it a bridge which experiment has not fully tested.

American genius is fertile in this as in all other expedients, but no genius can provide for an object which is not understood. The numerous proposers of flying bridges forget that if a military bridge is intended to be carried with an army it is also intended to carry an army, its columns of men, its cavalry, its countless heavy wagons, and its ponderous artillery. It must carry all these, and it must do it with certainty and safety, even though a demoralized corps should rush upon it in throngs. No make-shift expedient, no ingenious inventions not tested by severe experiment, nor light affair, of which the chief merit alleged is that it is light, will be likely to do what is required, and what the French pontoon has so often done.

Here, perhaps, I might close, but it occurs to me that this paper, purporting to give a history of the operations of engineers from the organization of the Army of the Potomac to the close of its campaign on the Peninsula, can hardly be considered complete without a retrospect, pointing out the mistakes that were made, and thus tracing the causes of its failure to their true sources.

One of the prominent among the causes of the ultimate failure was the inaction of eight months, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. More than any other wars, rebellion demands rapid measures. In November, 1861, the Army of the Potomac, if not fully supplied with all the material, yet was about as complete in numbers, discipline, and organization as it ever became. For four months the great marine avenue to

the capital of the nation was blockaded and that capital kept in a partial state of siege by a greatly-inferior enemy, in face of a movable army of 150,000 men. In the winter 1861-62 Norfolk could and should have been taken. The Navy demanded it, the country demanded it, and the means were ample. By its capture the career of the Merrimac, which proved so disastrous to our subsequent operations, would have been prevented. The preparation of this vessel was known, and the Navy Department was not without forebodings of the mischief it would do. Though delay might mature more comprehensive plans and promise greater results, it is not the first case in which it had been shown that successful war involves something more than abstract military principles. The true question was to seize the first practicable moment to satisfy the perhaps unreasonable but natural longing of an impatient nation for results to justify its lavish confidence, and to take advantage of an undivided command and untrammelled liberty of action while it was possessed.

When the army did move, a plan was adopted perfectly certain to invite, nay, to compel, interference, and when the army was to go by Annapolis to the Lower Chesapeake I felt confident that one-half would scarcely have embarked before the other half would be ordered back to Washington. The enemy was then at Manassas, and the feint (even if no reality) of an attack on Washington was so obvious, so certain to create a panic which no Executive could resist, that interference with the removal of the mass of the army was certain.

When the enemy had fallen back behind the Rappahannock and destroyed the railroad bridges the circumstances were greatly changed, and there were strong arguments for the line adopted; yet results have proved how many reasons there were to be considered besides the purely military ones which opposed themselves to the adoption of such a line. The facts connected with the withholding of McDowell's corps have been so completely exhibited in the proceedings of the McDowell Court of Inquiry that every one who wishes can form his own judgment. Whether it was wise or unwise, it was one of those things resulting from the taking a line of operations which did not itself cover Washington.

At the time the Army of the Potomac landed on the Peninsula the rebel cause was at its lowest ebb. Its armies were demoralized by the defeats of Port Royal, Mill Springs, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Roanoke Island, and Pea Ridge, and reduced in numbers by sickness, loss in battle, expiration of period of service, &c., while the conscription law was not yet even passed. It seemed as if it needed but one vigorous gripe to end forever this rebellion, so nearly throttled. How, then, happened it that the date of the initiation of the campaign of the magnificent Army of the Potomac was the date of the resuscitation of the rebel cause, which seemed to grow strong *pari passu* with the slow progress of its operations?

However I may be committed to any expression of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly did suggest it), my opinion now is that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that they were not held by strong force when our army appeared before them, and we know that they were far from complete. The prestige of power, the *morale*, was on our side. It was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We should probably have succeeded, and if we failed it may well be doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would have been more demoralizing than the labors

of the siege. Our troops toiled a month in the trenches or lay in the swamps of the Warwick. We lost few men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, impaired the *morale*. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there. Of the bitter fruits of that month gained by the enemy we have tasted to our hearts' content. They are not yet exhausted.

The siege having been determined upon, we should have opened our batteries on the place as fast as they were completed. The effect on the troops would have been inspiring. It would have lightened the siege and shortened our labors, and, besides, we would have had the credit of driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of arms, whereas, as it was, we only induced him to evacuate for prudential considerations. Yorktown having fallen, however, as it did, it was right to pursue the enemy with our whole force; but the battle of Williamsburg, fought as it was without reconnoitering the position, without concert of action among the different corps and division commanders, and almost without orders, was a blunder which ought not to have happened.

We knew of this position beforehand, and we knew it was fortified. We might have been sure, if the enemy made a stand there, that it would be a strong one, for he would be fighting for time to get his trains out of our reach. We fought, and we lost several thousand men, and we gained nothing. If we had not fought till next day, a battle would in all probability have been unnecessary; but if it had been, we could have had time to have brought up our resources, reconnoitered our position, and delivered our attack in such a way that some results might have flowed from it. We had every advantage. Franklin's division landed at West Point on the next day and Sedgwick's division on the day following. These two divisions, had the enemy waited another day at Williamsburg, could have cut his communication, and in that case we would have been superior in his front and have had two divisions in his rear. His hasty retreat and perhaps his capture must inevitably have followed, and the great object of keeping Franklin so long embarked, and finally sending him to West Point, would have been accomplished.

On leaving Williamsburg we should have crossed the Chickahominy and connected with the Navy in the James. We should have had a united army and the co-operation of the Navy, and probably would have been in Richmond in two weeks. The facts that we did not know the character of the Chickahominy as an obstacle (as it lay across our direct road to Richmond); that our transports were on the York River, and that the railroad furnished a good means of supply to the army; that we wished to connect with McDowell coming from Fredericksburg, &c., determined our route. In taking it we lost essentially all that was worth going so far to gain, viz, the James River approach and the co-operation of the Navy.

The route chosen, two weeks should not have been spent in traversing the 40 miles from Williamsburg to Bottom's and New Bridge; and the barrier of the Chickahominy being left unguarded at Bottom's Bridge, no time should have been lost in making use of the circumstance to turn and seize the passage of New Bridge, which might have been done by the 28th and even earlier had measures been pressed to prepare for it.

The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was one of those occasions which if not seized do not

repeat themselves. We now know the state of disorganization and dismay in which the rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing.

Although we did not then know all that we now do, it was obvious enough at that time that when the rebels struck a blow at our left wing they did not leave any means in their hands unused to secure success. It was obvious enough that they struck with their whole force, and yet we repulsed them in disorder with three-fifths of ours. We could have followed them up at the same time that we brought over the other two-fifths.

After it was known that McDowell was called off to another quarter there was no longer hope of an increase of force by the junction of his corps. There were no other re-enforcements to look for beyond what we received by the middle of the month of June. The rebel force was known or supposed to be constantly increasing by conscription, by the influx of troops from other parts, and by the breaking up of Beauregard's army.

At last a moment came when action was imperative. The enemy assumed the initiative, and we had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had Porter been withdrawn the night of the 26th, our army would have been concentrated on the right bank, while two corps, at least, of the enemy's force were on the left bank. Whatever course we then took, whether to strike at Richmond and the portion of the enemy on the right bank or move at once for the James, we would have had a concentrated army and a fair chance of a brilliant result in the first place, and, in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we would have been in the same case on the morning of the 27th as we were on that of the 28th, minus a lost battle and a compulsory retreat; or had the fortified lines (thrown up expressly for that object) been held by 20,000 men (as they could have been), we could have fought on the other side with 80,000 men instead of 27,000; or, finally, had the lines been abandoned, with our hold on the right bank of the Chickahominy we might have fought and crushed the enemy on the left bank, reopened our communications, and then returned and taken Richmond. As it was, the enemy fought with his whole force except enough left before our lines to keep up an appearance, and we fought with 27,000 men, losing the battle and 9,000 men. By this defeat we were driven from our position, our advance of conquest turned into a retreat for safety by a force probably not greatly superior to our own.

In view of the length of time which our operations before Richmond actually consumed, there is now no doubt that the depot at the White House should have been fortified, as well as one or two points on the railroad thence to the Chickahominy; that the *tête-de-pont* at Bottom's Bridge should have been completed, and likewise *têtes-de-pont* or strong positions prepared to cover the debouches from our bridges to the left bank of the Chickahominy. With these the army would have possessed freedom of motion and concentration on either side, and the disastrous battle of the 27th would scarcely have occurred.

When the army reached the James River it needed no prophet to predict the disasters which have since befallen our country's cause. If the army had sustained itself nobly it cannot be denied that so much fruitless toil and so much disaster had deprived it of the *élan* which results from success alone. It was, moreover (as well as our forces elsewhere), sadly diminished in numbers. On the other hand, the rebel army from its first low state had risen to be an army most formidable in numbers, excellent in organization, and inspired by a great success. Had its

numbers, indeed, approached to that attributed to it (200,000 men), there is little doubt that a march upon Washington would have speedily followed our withdrawal to the James. From such considerations, as well as those flowing from the results of past operations, I counseled the immediate withdrawal from the James to reunite with the forces covering Washington.

Respectfully submitted.

J. G. BARNARD,

Brig. Gen. and late Chief Engineer Army of the Potomac.

General R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near New Bridge, Va., June 10, 1862.

SIR: The officers of engineers on duty with the Army of the Potomac during the month of May are as follows:

Maj. D. P. Woodbury, brigadier-general of volunteers, commanding Engineer Brigade of volunteer engineer regiments (Fifteenth and Fiftieth New York).

Capt. B. S. Alexander, lieutenant-colonel and aide-de-camp, attached to the army corps of Brig. Gen. W. B. Franklin.

Cpts. C. S. Stewart and J. C. Duane, commanding Engineer Battalion of Regulars (Companies A, B, and C).

First Lieuts. C. B. Comstock and M. D. McAlester, attached to headquarters of General Heintzelman.

First Lieuts. C. B. Reese, C. E. Cross, and O. E. Babcock, commanding engineer companies under Captain Duane; Second Lieut. F. U. Farquhar.

The only engineer officers present at the battle of Williamsburg were Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Farquhar, attached to the headquarters of General Sumner, and Lieutenant McAlester, with General Heintzelman.

Captain Stewart was the first to point out, I believe, the unoccupied works on the enemy's left and to ascertain the route leading to them; a service which had a decided influence on the battle.

Lieutenant McAlester rendered valuable services in reconnoitering and aiding in the disposition of the troops.

Lieutenant Farquhar accompanied General Hancock in his occupation of the enemy's works, and was active throughout the day.

On the advance of the army Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Farquhar were attached to the advance guard under General Stoneman.

The engineer officers have been generally employed in reconnaissances during the month. The Engineer Brigade has done much work on roads and bridges.

On reaching the Chickahominy the passage of our left at Bottom's Bridge was undisputed by the enemy, and a portion of the Engineer Brigade, under General Woodbury, constructed two trestle bridges in place of the destroyed bridge at that point.

On arrival of the right wing and headquarters of the army near New Bridge (May 22) it was found to be held by the enemy. The Chickahominy bottom varies from a half to one mile in width, about equally distributed on either side of the stream. The bed of the stream is usually bordered by a swamp, usually 300 or 400 yards in width. The bed is not much depressed below the marginal bottom lands, and a rise

of 3 or 4 feet above the usual summer level overflows large areas. The bottom is usually cleared and cultivated, but intersected with deep ditches. The high lands rise on each side of the bottom with moderately steep slopes to a height of 70 or 80 feet. When we reached the New Bridge, and for a week thereafter, the stream, though somewhat swollen, did not overflow at all its margins, though the swamp proper was filled with water. The first day I caused it to be reached and forded, and a few days after, when we had driven the enemy's pickets from the immediate vicinity, I caused it to be waded from the New Bridge site down about a quarter of a mile. Materials for bridging the stream were deposited at three points under shelter of the swamp timber—the New Bridge site, three-quarters of a mile above, and about the same distance below.

The corps of Heintzelman and Keyes had advanced over Bottom's Bridge on the Williamsburg road to Seven Pines, a point from which the Nine-mile road diverged, running nearly north to its intersection with the New Bridge road at Old Tavern. General Sumner's corps was intermediate between New and Bottom's Bridges, and had thrown two log bridges across the swamp and stream in his front. It was believed that, with the co-operation of the left and center, the passage at this point could be forced. The expedition to Hanover Court-House probably delayed the execution.

On Friday, May 30, a violent rain-storm set in, and it rained in torrents during the night.

On Saturday the enemy attacked our left. Sumner with difficulty got his two divisions and one battery over. The commanding general directed the bridges here to be thrown that night. The attempt was made, but it was very dark; the stream was rising rapidly. A greater part of the night was spent in rescuing from the flood the materials of the upper bridge. Captain Duane succeeded in getting in a pontoon bridge at the site of New Bridge at 8.15 Sunday morning. At the lower bridge the darkness and rising waters prevented any progress in the night, and after making some progress during the day it was found that the direction, well adapted to the ordinary stage of the stream, had to be changed.

It was 2 a. m. of Monday before a bridge was completed. The upper trestle bridge had been made practicable for infantry by 12 m. on Sunday; but these bridges were all mere bridges in the air. The flow extended over the bottom lands and the single causeway of New Bridge partially submerged, and for half a mile, with water on each side, was the sole practicable route for troops or artillery, and it evidently [was] impracticable in the military sense to pass an army in column over the route while under fire of the enemy from the heights beyond. Since the date of the battle the approaches to the bridges have been improved and the *débouchés* corduroyed as far as the enemy's fire would permit and new bridges undertaken at other points.

The engineer officers are distributed as mentioned in the beginning of this letter. The only engineer officer with the corps engaged on Saturday and Sunday was Lieutenant McAlester. He was absent on a reconnaissance in the commencement of the battle on Saturday and on Sunday the engagement was mainly with Sumner's corps. Intrenchments had been commenced at the position occupied by General Casey's division under direction of Lieutenant McAlester, but they were very incomplete. Capt. C. S. Stewart was relieved, on account of sickness,

from duty with this army, and returned to Fort Monroe on the 3d instant.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. G. BARNARD,

Brigadier-General and Chief of Engineers, Army of the Potomac.

General J. G. TOTTEN, *Chief Engineer, &c., Washington, D. C.*

No. 3.

Reports of Lieut. Col. Barton S. Alexander, U. S. Army, Engineer Officer, of operations from April 20 to July 12.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 28, 1863.*

SIR: In compliance with your request I proceed to give you a sketch of the operations upon which I was engaged during the time I was detached from your command, while the army was before Yorktown, until I again joined you at Cumberland, on the Pamunkey River:

On April 20, 1862, the army then being actively engaged in prosecuting the siege of Yorktown, I was directed by General McClellan to join General Franklin as the engineer of his division, which had then arrived at Cheeseman's Landing. I had previously understood from the general that it was his intention at the proper time to throw General Franklin's division across to the north side of the York River, some 3 or 4 miles below Gloucester Point, and endeavor to seize the works there, or at least to turn them, and thus distract the attention of the enemy, while the main assault should be made at Yorktown.

A few days afterward Generals McClellan and Franklin, Captain Rodgers, of the Navy, and myself proceeded to reconnoiter the shore on the north side of the York River, and select, as near as possible, the exact spot where the proposed landing should be effected. This point being settled, I had some soundings taken to ascertain how near our transports could be taken to the shore, the depth of water, and nature of the bottom over the intervening space. I found that we could take vessels drawing 8 feet of water to within a certain distance—I think about 800 feet of high-water mark; that the bottom from this point to the shore was a very regular slope of sand, over which infantry could march when we should reach to within 250 feet of the shore, or to where the water was not over 2 feet 6 inches deep. This sand, however, was like that on the south shore of the river, and was of such a nature that I supposed it would not be prudent to trust artillery upon it, as there would have been danger of the carriages settling to their axle-trees. As soon as this information was obtained I set about preparing the means to effect a rapid landing when it should be ordered. Col. J. McLeod Murphy, with a detachment of 250 men of the Fifteenth New York Volunteer Engineer Regiment, was detailed to assist in these preparations.

Many schemes were proposed, which were thoroughly discussed by General Franklin, Captain Rodgers, of the Navy, Captain Arnold, of the artillery, and myself. As the plan which I finally decided to adopt was afterward successfully carried out at West Point, it may be proper to describe it here. In general terms it was this: We had a number (ten or twelve) of canal barges (boats, say, 14 feet wide and 70 to 80 feet long), drawing, when loaded, 5 feet of water; when light, 2 feet; of

about 80 tons burden. We also succeeded in picking up some four scows (flat-boats), say 12 feet wide and from 40 to 60 feet long. We also had, say, seventy pontoon-boats, with barks, ches, oars, anchors, &c.; in fact everything necessary to make a pontoon bridge, say, 1,400 feet long. In addition, we had all the lumber we wanted, for the precaution had been taken to load the canal barges with lumber of various dimensions before they left Washington. We also had cordage and an abundant supply of tools. By lashing two of the canal barges together, placing the boats some 12 feet apart, and throwing a false or additional deck over the whole, we had an area of some 40 feet wide and 45 feet long, upon which a whole battery of artillery could be placed. This boat, when so loaded, would draw only about 4 feet of water. Two more canal barges fixed in the same manner would carry the horses of a battery, or at least enough of them to move the pieces and caissons, leaving the remainder to follow afterward. Several of these double boats (four, I think) were thus prepared, and the men were drilled for two or three days in taking them as near to the shore as they would float and then making a bridge from there to the shore. When this bridge was completed, the artillerymen were drilled in bringing on their artillery and horses and afterward in taking them off.

As the shore on the south side of Cheeseman's Creek was similar to that where it was proposed to land, this experience proved that we could land artillery very rapidly in this way, and when it was landed each double canal-boat became a wharf head, alongside of which our light-draught vessels could discharge their cargoes. Four of them could, consequently, give us four wharves as soon as the artillery was discharged. I also prepared several rafts of pontoon-boats, each raft being made of two boats in the usual manner, except that the number of barks were doubled. Each of these rafts would carry one piece of artillery very conveniently, and as they did not, when so loaded, draw more than 9 inches of water, it was intended, when they grounded, to draw the pieces on shore by hand, putting about 200 men to each piece. Instead of drilling the men in the use of these rafts, they were permitted to use them for two or three days in landing both men and horses from the transports in Cheeseman's Creek. It was noticed that they soon became quite expert in handling them, and that they would carry 80 or 90 men with ease. Horses were also landed from them with considerable facility. These double canal-boats and rafts, with the necessary ground tackle and gang-planks, completed the arrangements for landing the artillery.

As it is frequently overlooked, it may be proper to state precisely what gang-planks are required under such circumstances. We prepared the following: Four gang-planks, built so that a carriage or anything else could be taken from the deck of a vessel up to the gunwale; four about 20 feet long, reaching from thence to the canal barges; four more about 30 feet long, reaching from thence to the flat-boats; four more about 14 feet long, reaching from thence to the pontoon bridges or rafts; four more about 12 feet long, reaching from thence to the shore. All these gang-planks were made 10 feet wide and very strong. Ropes were fastened to their corners, and the larger ones were placed on rollers.

For landing the infantry it was designed to use the pontoon-boats. Each boat, besides the 3 men to manage it, will carry 40 men, with their arms and knapsacks, very conveniently.

When a landing was to be effected, it was designed to move the fleet of transports from Cheeseman's Landing to the York River, and imme-

diately load about fifty boats with, say, 2,000 men, and let the boats at a given signal pull for the shore; the men manning the boats would then pull back for another load. The only preparations that it was necessary to make in reference to this operation was to provide proper facilities to enable the men to get from the transports into the pontoon-boats. It was at first proposed to leave this matter to the captains of the vessels, letting each captain provide the means of getting the men from his vessel into the pontoon-boats; but our experience at Cheeseman's Creek soon showed that this would not do, if any haste should become necessary.

It was observed when a vessel containing several hundred men would get permission to land the men for a day that the men had to climb down the sides of the vessel one by one, and that one man would not start until the man before him was in the pontoon-boat. In this way it was found that fully half a day would be consumed in landing the men from some of the larger transports, although they had plenty of boats to carry them at one trip, and they could have been landed in an hour if the proper facilities for getting from the vessel into the boats had been provided. I deemed it proper, therefore, to make a number of gang-planks, so that the men could walk in single file from the deck of the vessel up to the gunwales on either side and down the sides by an easy slope to the boats, the exterior gang-planks being supported from the vessels and extending down into the water, and not resting on the boats, but being entirely independent of them. Two planks of the proper length, each 1 foot wide and $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches thick, laid side by side and battened together on both sides with strips of boards about 3 inches wide and $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches thick, were found to be very convenient for this purpose.

All these preparations were about completed, and we were engaged in making scaling ladders, thinking we might be called upon to assault the works at Gloucester Point, when suddenly, on the morning of May 4, the news spread through the fleet that the enemy had evacuated Yorktown. Orders were received during the day by General Franklin to take his command around to Yorktown and prepare to proceed with it up the York River.

The next morning found most of the fleet at Yorktown, all the preparations we had made for landing accompanying it. This was the day of the battle of Williamsburg. During the forenoon General McClellan came over to Yorktown and held a consultation with General Franklin. It was decided that he should proceed with his command at once to West Point, at the head of the York River, and try and effect a landing on the right bank of that river, just at the mouth of the Pamunkey River. All the information we could obtain on the subject led us to believe that Brick-House Point offered the greatest advantages for this purpose.

A delay in the arrival of some of the transports prevented our leaving Yorktown during Monday, and it is probable that the general decided that it was not wise to move from that place until the result of the battle then going on at Williamsburg should be known. However this may be, orders were received from General McClellan late in the evening to proceed at once up the river; but it was then dark, and it was found impossible to communicate the proper orders for such a movement at night; besides, one or two of the large transports had run aground during the day, and as we were deficient in river pilots it was feared there would be danger of many more of them getting aground during a movement at night. In fact, the officers of the gunboats re-

fused to convoy the fleet during the night, so General Franklin was forced to postpone the movement till morning.

Soon after daylight on the morning of the 6th we got under way. It was a clear day, with a high wind. Nothing that was not foreseen happened on the voyage up the river. It may be mentioned, however, that the fleet was much scattered, and that some of the pontoons which were towed by the steamers broke loose, causing considerable delay. About 12 o'clock, however, the vessels began to arrive at their destination. One or two small boats were sent in close to shore to select the exact spot where we should land and take the necessary soundings. The water was found to be shoal for some considerable distance from the shore, and altogether the landing place was not unlike that for which preparations had been made below Gloucester. This being ascertained, the gunboats took up position so that they could bring a cross-fire to bear on the enemy, should the landing be opposed.

It may be remarked that the spot selected for the landing was a large, level plateau, only a few feet above the level of the river, and cleared for about a mile from the landing place. The only opposition that could have been made to the landing would have been from artillery, which might possibly be concealed in the wooded heights beyond. We knew that no troops in any force would show themselves on the open plateau so directly under the fire of the gunboats.

About 4 o'clock in the afternoon, everything being in readiness, the artillery beginning to arrive, and the tide suiting, orders were given to land the troops. About fifty pontoon-boats, manned at first by the detachment of the Fifteenth New York Regiment, moved to the transports containing the troops that were first to land; and now the preparations that we had made came into play. In less than an hour the boats were loaded and at a given signal they all pulled for the shore, carrying some 2,000 men, besides the oarsmen. As soon as the boats grounded the men jumped out and waded ashore, forming at once in line of battle. The oarsmen returned at once with the boats and continued afterward to land the troops as rapidly as possible, but without order, or at will, so to speak, for after the first trip each boat went about its work independently of the others. Care was taken, however, as much as possible to confine the boats to one brigade until it was all landed before the landing of another brigade was commenced. In three hours the main body of the infantry (say 8,000 men) was on shore, formed in order of battle, with pickets thrown out into the woods beyond the open plateau. The men carried their knapsacks and haversacks. The pontoon rafts were used by the officers to land their horses and baggage. The remainder of the infantry followed, but more slowly, as some of the boats were soon wanted for other purposes.

As soon as the infantry began to land I directed my attention particularly to the construction of a wharf. We first brought up one of the lightest of the double canal-boats, as before described, loaded with a battery of artillery, as near to the shore as possible. This was securely anchored in the proper position at high water when it once grounded. This raft was some 200 feet from the shore. Outside of it, parallel to it, and at a distance of some 20 feet from it, was placed and securely anchored the double canal-boat next lightest in draught of water, the space between the two being bridged by one of our heavy gang-planks. In the same manner was placed a third double canal boat or raft. Then we brought up a light-draught steamer, a ferry-boat, forming the pier head of our wharf. This barge also contained a battery of artillery. We then had left one of the double canal-boats with which

to form the pier head of another wharf, which we might want hereafter, and which we could build as soon as the pontoon-boats were set at liberty. These three double canal-boats and the barge carried us out some 220 feet farther into the stream than we were at the beginning, and at this point we had a sufficient depth of water for our light transports to come alongside and discharge. While this was going on outside the point of starting the work of making a roadway from there to the shore was also being done. First, a flat-boat or scow was brought up and secured on the line between the canal-boats and the shore and some 20 feet from the former, the connection between the two being made by a long gang-plank. Then three or four of the pontoon rafts were floated into position next to the scow, the connection between being soon made in the usual manner with balks and chess, so as to make a regular pontoon bridge. A gang-plank for an apron established the connection with the shore, and we were now ready to discharge. This wharf was finished before dark. Some of our artillery was already on the wharf, for a battery was in the first barge that had been placed. The artillerists, with a detail from the infantry to assist, soon took the batteries ashore without the aid of horses and placed them in position on the left of our line.

By 12 o'clock at night the four batteries with the command were landed and ready for action, and the transports containing their horses were alongside of our wharf and alongside of each other, all ready to land. The officers of the artillery were clamorous for their horses, particularly Captain Arnold, who displayed great energy and judgment during the whole operation. And here I ought also to mention Captain (now Major) Perry, of the Fifteenth New York, whom I left in charge of the wharf during the remainder of the night and the whole of the following day. To him more than to any one were we indebted for the rapidity with which the landing was effected.

Shortly after 12 o'clock at night I left the wharf, and when I returned in the morning I found the artillery nearly all landed.

I have entered into these details of the proposed landing below Gloucester and of the actual landing which was made at West Point not from any vanity, but to show precisely what was done with the means we had at hand. When the way of effecting a landing was first discussed I found officers of great intelligence entertained very crude notions on the subject, and many of them were disposed to leave such matters to the sailors on the transports. Having had a good deal of experience at different times in landing building materials, sometimes under difficult circumstances, I knew that it would not do to trust to the crews of the vessels to land their cargoes, and hence I applied for a detachment of the Fifteenth New York Regiment and established a workshop on one of the steamers at Cheeseman's Creek, where all our preparations were made. The results you have above.

Early the next morning (May 7) the enemy came in contact with our pickets, and about 9 o'clock the firing grew serious. The affair of that day was a musketry contest in the woods. Very little cannonading was done on either side. The plateau upon which we landed was separated from the high land by a stream and impracticable marsh on the west side and by a smaller stream and ravine on the south side, leaving, however, a peninsula about a quarter of a mile wide between the heads of the streams. This peninsula was thickly wooded; it was the key of the position, and it was there, or rather just in front of it, that the contest for its possession took place. Our troops held it throughout the day.

The division of General Sedgwick arrived on the morning of the 7th and were landed in the same manner during that day.

Finding our landing deficient in depth of water for a permanent depot for supplying the army, I examined the Pamunkey River during the next day, with a view of selecting a spot higher up, where we could make better wharf accommodations. For our immediate wants I selected Eltham, a point on the right bank of the Pamunkey, some 6 or 7 miles above its mouth.

The following day I reconnoitered the roads leading to it and from it, and commenced the construction of two temporary wharves. In the course of the day Colonel Ingalls and Colonel Clarke arrived with some of the quartermaster's and commissary transports.

On the 10th I received instructions from General McClellan through General Franklin to proceed up the river as high as Cumberland, and report as to the possibility of carrying our transports to that point. With two gunboats and a steamer we proceeded up the river to an island some few miles below Cumberland. Here we found the river obstructed by a line of sunken vessels extending from the island to either shore. The obstructions looked formidable; but a short reconnaissance in boats showed that we could pass with our vessels between two of the sunken vessels. We did so, and then anchored for the night.

Next morning, just at sunrise, we reached Cumberland, where we found General Stoneman had arrived the night before. The examination showed that there was sufficient water for our light transports as far up as Cumberland, and that we could easily make wharves there. I accordingly sent back Captain Arnold, of the artillery, to report to this effect. Learning here some particulars that led me to suppose we might go still higher up the river, I determined to proceed to White House, where the railroad from West Point to Richmond crosses the Pamunkey River. We reached there early in the day, and finding that General Stoneman had thrown forward a squadron of cavalry to that place, I was enabled to go on shore and make such a thorough examination as induced me to believe that this was the proper spot for our final depot of supplies. Deeming this information of great importance, I took the lightest-draught steamer and returned to Eltham the following night, and early next morning reported to General Franklin the result of my observations.

During the day (the 12th) I joined the army on the march towards Cumberland, and reported in person to General McClellan, when he reached that place on Tuesday, May 13.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. S. ALEXANDER,
Lieutenant-Colonel of Engineers.

Brig. Gen. J. G. BARNARD,
Late Chief Engineer Army of the Potomac.

CAMP NEAR HARRISON'S LANDING,
July 12, 1862.

SIR: The following is a short statement of the operations upon which I have been engaged since I last submitted a report to you. Events have been so crowded that I have found it impossible to report at an earlier day:

On Thursday, June 26, I laid out a battery for thirty guns on the

hill in advance of General Franklin's right, to the west of Golding's farm, intending that this should be the principal position for our artillery to drive the enemy from his positions at Old Tavern, Mrs. Price's, and the two Garnetts'. Thursday night we broke ground, with two regiments for the working party, two other regiments being the guards. Although we were within rifle-shot of the enemy's pickets, we were not disturbed, and by morning we were under good cover.

Friday, the 27th, General Porter was attacked in force on the other side (left bank of the Chickahominy), and a heavy cannonade being opened about noon on General Smith's position at Golding's, the working party was withdrawn, but the work was still held by our infantry, and it contributed materially in enabling us to repel the attacks of the enemy during the day. During the afternoon, seeing that General Porter was being driven back toward our lower bridges, I suggested to General Franklin the propriety of destroying Duane's bridge and the foot bridge below it. General Franklin acquiesced, and I put a regiment at Duane's bridge and a company at the foot bridge, and before sunset they were well torn to pieces. It is worthy of remark that when I proceeded to this work I found a small party had already commenced the work of destruction, about a platoon at Duane's bridge and six men at the foot bridge; by whose orders they had gone to work I did not learn.

Saturday, the 28th, General Franklin changed front, withdrawing from Golding's plain and the redoubt there. After assisting in the necessary slashing in front of the new line and in placing Carlisle's battery in position near Courtenay's house, I inspected our line of defense to the left as far as Fair Oaks. Returning in the afternoon, I was told by General Franklin that you wished to see me at headquarters, near Savage Station. I immediately proceeded thither, and received your instructions to take Lieutenants Comstock and Farquhar with me and proceed to James River and look for an eligible position to which the army might retreat and establish a new base of operations. While waiting for an escort the general-in-chief sent for me and reiterated your instructions. It may be remarked that the idea at that time was to take up a line joining the James and Chickahominy; at least such was my idea. Lieutenant Comstock and myself left Savage Station about 12 o'clock Saturday night. We stopped with General Woodbury near the White Oak Swamp Bridge.

On the morning of Sunday, the 29th, we proceeded to the headquarters of General Keyes, where we found the escort, under Major Pleasanton, of the Second Dragoons, had halted. Hearing firing in General Keyes' front, I rode forward to the *débouché* of the road over which General Sykes crossed the White Oak Swamp, and tried to get some axes to make a slashing across the roads leading from the Quaker road to Richmond, but in vain. Had 100 good axmen been put at work on these roads during that day we would probably have spared the subsequent battles of Monday and Tuesday. Returning, I saw General McClellan, for whom I sketched the roads as far as I had seen them, and from whom I received orders to try and communicate with our fleet on James River.

We started at 12 m. and arrived at Carter's Landing at 5 p. m. We met no enemy. Immediately procured a boat, and communicated with the gunboats below City Point.

Returning to Carter's about 7 o'clock, I reported in writing to General McClellan, and sent an officer and 10 men to act as guides in conducting columns to that place. I left a gunboat at Carter's to protect

the escort, and proceeded up the river to see Captain Rodgers, of the *Galena*, in command of the fleet. After stating to him the condition of affairs he sent a boat down the river to order up the supply vessels as far as Harrison's Landing; but finding him of opinion that the gunboats could not keep the river open for supplies above Fort Powhatan, and that the true position of the army was at Dancing Point, the mouth of the Chickahominy, we decided to proceed thither. As, however, I could not concur in this opinion at that time, and as it was then dark, we decided to remain where we were until morning.

Monday, the 30th, we proceeded up the river to the bend above the mouth of Turkey Creek, to the point where the bluffs on the right bank command the river and also the opposite shore. Returning, we stopped at Carter's, where I ordered Major Pleasonton to send out parties on all the roads, inform himself fully about them, and report direct to headquarters. I desired him to communicate, if possible, with the gunboats supposed to be up the Chickahominy, as I intended to return with one of his parties. I also instructed him to draw rations for the sick and wounded, several hundred of whom were already there. Leaving Carter's about 12 m. in the Port Royal, Lieutenant Morris commanding, we proceeded to the mouth of the Chickahominy, but in going over the bar we got aground and remained there until next morning.

Tuesday, July 1, we proceeded up the Chickahominy about 25 miles to the Window Shades. Here we found three boats, and learned that this point was the head of navigation. Stopping there only a few minutes, I took a smaller vessel and returned to Turkey Creek as soon as possible. Major Pleasonton's cavalry, although it had been within a few miles of the Chickahominy, did not reach its bank.

Wednesday, the 2d, I found General McClellan shortly after daylight on board the *Galena*, to whom I reported in writing, having prepared my report the evening before. As this report is a matter of record, it is unnecessary to allude to it further at this time. The general told me that he had determined to go to Harrison's Landing, and that I would be wanted there as soon as possible to look to our lines of defense. He left early in the morning. When he had gone I asked the captain of the *Delaware* to set me ashore at Carter's, some 3 miles below. This he thought it imprudent to do, as he was the only gunboat left behind, and he might want all his crew at any moment.

About 3 p. m. we landed at Carter's, but we found that Major Pleasonton had left with our horses early in the morning, so we were forced to go to Harrison's Landing by water. I found your tent just at dark, but did not succeed in seeing you until early next morning.

Tuesday, the 3d, in company with Captain McAlester and Lieutenant Comstock, I rode over the ground in our front, and before night, assisted by the sketch which you gave me that morning, I was enabled to give the general-in-chief such information as he desired to enable him to give orders about posting the troops. The nature of Herring, or Bird's, Creek and the necessity of holding its left bank I had ascertained from the mast-head when I went down the James River a few days before.

Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, the 5th, 6th, and 7th, I was engaged without intermission in fixing the details of our line of defense, in laying out works, directing the proper slashings, making communications, &c. To Captain McAlester I assigned the supervision of the work on the hill in front of our center; to Lieutenant Comstock the defense of the line of Kimage's Creek, on our left, and to Lieutenant Farquhar the construction of the works and rifle pits on our right. These works

are now well advanced toward completion. In two days more, if the troops do their duty, they will be finished.

Late in the evening of the 7th, just as I had finished laying out the last line, to which I thought it necessary to give my special attention, the withdrawing of General Kearny's right, so as to form a proper connection with General Franklin, the general-in-chief sent for me to meet him on the steamer *Metamora*. He wished me to make a more minute examination of the opposite shore with a view of occupying it. This I did on Tuesday, the 8th, and reported to him that I considered the most dangerous point for our flotilla to be the wooded shore on the opposite bank, just above Mr. Cole's house, nearly opposite the mouth of Herring Creek.

Wednesday and Thursday, the 9th and 10th, overcome by the great heat and my previous exertions and anxiety about our situation, I was warned to seek rest.

Friday, the 11th, I rode over the whole line, but as it was raining, the troops were doing but little.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

B. S. ALEXANDER,

Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

Brig. Gen. J. G. BARNARD,

Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac.

No. 4.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Daniel P. Woodbury, U. S. Army, commanding Engineer Brigade, of operations from May 18 to June 30.

HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE,
Camp, New Bridge, Va., May 29, 1862.

GENERAL: Pursuant to your circular of May 21, requiring reports of the operations of the Engineer Brigade, I have the honor to render the following report of the operations of the Fifteenth and Fiftieth Regiments, composing Engineer Brigade, since its arrival at White House Point, May 18.

The Fifteenth Regiment was divided into three detachments, assigned to Captains Perry, Ketchum, and Chester, respectively. Captain Perry's detachment was assigned the duty of collecting the canal barges loaded with engineer property at White House, fitting out pontoon trains, &c. A train of thirty-four pontoon-boats, with their accessories for the construction of a bridge, each boat containing the materials for one bay, was fitted out and securely anchored, ready for immediate use, and the extra pontoon-boats safely moored. Captain Perry, with his detachment, rejoined his regiment at Cold Harbor on the 25th instant. The second detachment, under Captain Ketchum, was assigned the duty of repairing roads and bridges on common roads. I condense from his daily reports as follows:

May 19.—Monday night built bridge where the main road from White House crosses Black Creek. Single span 26 feet; five 10-inch stringers; covering, 2 and 3 inch plank.

May 20.—Corduroyed 1,000 feet of road about 1 mile west of Black Creek. The same afternoon took up and rebuilt bridge over Mill Creek at the grist-mill. Two spans 18 and 20 feet; roadway, 12 feet; four pine stringers, 9 inches; covering, 2-inch oak plank.

May 21.—Overtook the advance; reported to General Franklin; received instructions from him to go ahead on New Bridge road. Went on and encamped about 1,000 feet inside our pickets; unab^l to get to the site of New Bridge on account of presence of the enemy on north side of the river.

May 22.—Unable still to take any measurement of the bridge, which condition of things continued until Sunday.

May 25.—Took measurement and commenced framing bridge.

May 26.—Completed framing of bridge.

May 27.—Getting out saw-logs to be cut into plank for covering bridge. Engaged all night in hauling timber to site of bridge.

May 28.—Finished hauling timbers and plank to site of bridge after night.

May 29.—Took possession of saw-mill; got out timber for permanent bridges. Length of bridge over the Chickahominy River, known as New Bridge, 114 feet, with seven spans; 10-inch stringers, four in number; width of roadway, 10 feet.

The third detachment, under Captain Chester, was also assigned to the duty of repairing roads and bridges. I condense from his daily reports as follows:

Since the 18th instant I have followed the road along which General Stoneman's command passed, repairing such as required it, laying corduroy, and building small bridges.

May 19 and 20.—Laid corduroy and graded about 150 feet of road near the first crossing of the turnpike road and the railroad after leaving White House; also built four small bridges and laid corduroy at various points on the road along which General Franklin's command passed from the crossing of Black Creek to a point half a mile beyond the blacksmith's shop; in all, about 1,000 feet of road corduroyed, and much ditching and grading. Finding the road crossing the valley about a mile and a half beyond the last point mentioned (about half a mile beyond the White Church) impassable at midnight, built the bridges across streams about 8 feet wide and 5 feet deep; used in each nine or ten stringers, of from 10 to 15 inches in diameter, laid on crib abutments; also laid corduroy over about 800 feet of road in manner as follows: Longitudinal stringers were first laid over these sticks averaging 7 inches in diameter, the interstices again filled with smaller sticks, and the whole covered with brush and dirt. A large portion of the force was kept constantly employed in ditching and grading, and the work thus performed was not less valuable than that before described. From this time until the present date my detachment has followed the roads over which General Franklin's division passed, leaving the Hanover road, however, at the cross road near present headquarters by General Woodbury's orders for a point nearly on Chickahominy Creek, about a mile above New Bridge. The work executed on the road since then is too various in character to describe in detail. I will mention, however, important work performed near each of the two mills; also that since we have been encamped near the Chickahominy roads have been cut through the woods in aggregate about three-fourths of a mile in length, about 50 feet in width, and have collected about 1,000 heavy sticks to be laid in the bottom for small bridges and corduroys. The men have worked cheerfully and faithfully at whatever hour I have called them out, and I am much indebted to the officers for their energetic co-operation.

The Fiftieth Regiment was also divided into several detachments. One detachment, under Lieutenant Roosa, was left at White House Point for the purpose of unloading the barges and guarding the engineer property at that point. A second detachment, under Captain Gilbert, was also left for the purpose of preparing a pontoon train. A train of thirty-four boats, with their accessories, for the construction of a bridge, one bay in each, was fitted out and anchored, ready for immediate use. Two pontoon trains complete are now moored at White House Point, ready for use for transport by land or water. A third detachment, under Captain Spaulding, was assigned to the duty of constructing trestle bridges. I condense from the report of Colonel Stuart, his commanding officer, as follows:

The detachment under Captain Spaulding, consisting of Companies C and E, put in a trestle bridge over the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge Crossing and made the necessary approaches on Thursday, May 22, and a second of the same character on Friday, May 23. These bridges were each 120 feet long. They are in constant use. Since the 23d this detachment has been making examinations for crossings; has made some roads and transported trestles, &c., for one bridge to a point one mile above New Bridge. Captain Spaulding reports that he has two trestle bridges ready to be thrown over the Chickahominy as soon as a crossing is decided upon.

To show the character of the bridges last referred to I will state that on Saturday last, May 24, seventy-nine regiments, more than 900 wagons, and several batteries of artillery passed over these two bridges at Bottom's Bridge Crossing between sunrise and sunset, as reported to me by First Lieutenant Hine, of Company E, in charge of guard at that crossing.

A fourth detachment, under Major Embick, was assigned to duty on Richmond and York River Railroad. He reports as follows :

I commenced work on the railroad bridge near Tunstall's Station on Monday, May 19, and on Saturday, the 24th, about 5.30 p. m., the first locomotive passed over. The bracing and filling up around mud-sills was completed on the 26th. This bridge consists of one span 50 feet, 21 feet high of trestle work, and would have been completed much sooner but for the lack of facilities for getting timber from the woods to the bridge, the scarcity and very indifferent assortment of tools, and some bad weather. The detachment also repaired a portion of the track, which work was finished on Tuesday, May 27.

A fifth detachment, under Colonel Stuart, was also assigned to the same duty. He reports as follows :

On Friday morning, May 23, I reached the railroad bridge over the Chickahominy with detachments from Companies I and K, where I found three spans of trestle work, each 11 feet wide and 15 feet high, and one truss span of 44 feet, same height, entirely destroyed by fire; two other trestle spans were partially destroyed. Found a hand car and a quantity of timber at a saw-mill 3 miles east of bridge, near the track, which were brought up and work commenced.

On Sunday, the 25th, Captain O'Grady and First Lieutenant Andrus, of this regiment, made a thorough examination of the bridge west of the portion destroyed, about 1,000 feet in length, and also of the track for 4 miles west to Fair Oak Station, and reported the bridge-work in safe condition for passing over.

On Monday morning the trestle spans were repaired and work commenced on truss span, when Engineer Charles McAlpine arrived with 40 bridge carpenters of the Government bridge-builders and a car load of sawed timber and a full supply of necessary tools. With their valuable aid the bridge was completed on Tuesday, May 27, at 7 p. m., when a locomotive passed over the bridge and went 3 miles beyond. I have left 10 men as a guard at the bridge until relieved, and respectfully recommend that a larger guard be sent there from some other regiment, as the bridge is long and high and requires a much larger guard.

RECAPITULATION.

Bridges built and repaired.—One bridge, single span, 26 feet, at Black Creek; one bridge, two spans, 18 and 20 feet, respectively, roadway 12 feet, at Mill Creek; four small bridges on the turnpike between Black Creek and a point half a mile beyond the blacksmith's shop; three bridges between the last point mentioned and half a mile beyond the White Church, over streams 8 feet in width and 5 in depth, built with stringers laid on crib abutments; two trestle bridges, 120 feet in length, across the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge; timber got out and framed for a bridge across the Chickahominy at New Bridge, 114 feet in length, seven spans; two trestle bridges ready to be thrown at the same spot.

Railroad bridges.—One bridge, one span, 50 feet in length, 21 feet in height, trestle work, near Tunstall's Station; one bridge, three spans, trestle work, each 11 feet in width, 15 feet in height; one truss span, 44 feet in width, 21 feet in height; two trestle spans repaired over the Chickahominy; assisted by forty Government bridge-builders.

Roads repaired.—One hundred and fifty feet graded and corduroyed on the turnpike from White House at railroad crossing; 1,000 feet ditched, graded, and corduroyed between Black Creek and a point half a mile beyond the blacksmith's shop; 800 feet ditched, graded, and corduroyed near White Church; 4,000 feet road, 50 feet in width, cut through the woods near the Chickahominy; 1,000 feet corduroyed 1

mile west of Black Creek; 1,000 sticks cut and collected for corduroying the road near New Bridge.

Respectfully submitted.

D. P. WOODBURY,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

General J. G. BARNARD,
Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac.

HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE,
Camp near New Bridge, Va., June 7, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to render the following report of the operations of the Fifteenth and Fiftieth Regiments, composing the Engineer Brigade, for the first week of the month of June:

A detachment of the Fifteenth Regiment, under Captain Ketchum, was employed for several days getting out lumber at the saw-mill, when the shaft of the balance-wheel broke and rendered the machinery useless. The lumber was delivered to Lieutenant Nichols, Fourth Vermont Volunteers, by order of Colonel Alexander. The further operations of Captain Ketchum's detachment are contained in Colonel Murphy's regimental report, from which I extract the following:

Captain Ketchum relieved Captain Brainerd, of the Fiftieth Regiment, to build a trestle bridge 2 miles below New Bridge. Owing to the character of the bottom and the sudden rise of water much delay was experienced; but at 2 a. m. on the 2d instant a bridge 330 feet in length, consisting of seven trestles and seven pontoon-boats, was constructed. Captain Ketchum was assisted in this work all night by a detail from the regiment under Major Magruder.

Until the 5th instant Captain Ketchum's men were employed in framing supplemental supports to trestle caps, lashing side rails, and straightening up trestles, &c., on account of the fall of the water. Subsequently he was detailed to relieve Captain Chester at the lower foot bridge, where he was again assisted by a detail under Major Magruder. This work was continued until 9 p. m. of the 5th, when, owing to the darkness and the cramped condition of the men from long-continued standing in the water, the work was stopped, after laying upwards of 500 feet of bridge.

Captain Ketchum is now framing the timber for a permanent structure (New Bridge), the bridge previously framed by him having been used by the United States Engineers under Captain Duane. In this work Captain Ketchum is assisted by a detail of carpenters from the Fiftieth Regiment. A second detachment of the Fifteenth, under Captain Chester, has been employed in cutting and preparing corduroy material, and also on the following pieces of work:

1st. A road leading from the rear of General Smith's headquarters to the New Bridge road. On this there was a distance of about half a mile that was graded by throwing out sand from ditches, and many spots were corduroyed and five small bridges built.

2d. A continuation of the trestle bridge laid by Captain Spaulding. In this Captain Chester's men were assisted by a detail from this camp, working at night. The road passing the skirt of woods approaching this bridge has been corduroyed for a long distance. Captain Spaulding's bridge terminated abruptly in deep water, and in order to continue it all the trestle and pontoon material that could be found was used before commencing with corduroy. The whole distance of crib and corduroy from the termination of the trestle bridge to the point now completed is 900 feet. Of this some 400 feet of corduroy requires adjusting before heavy artillery can safely pass, and one place of about 30 feet in length is still open, but will be closed to-day. Stringers are also partially in position in advance, and Captain Chester is quite confident that all the material portion of the bridge will be completed to-day.

3d. A foot bridge for infantry where General Naglee commenced a crossing of the creek. This bridge is now 760 feet in length, and crosses two deep channels, in which the water was respectively 7 and 9 feet deep. Last night when Captain Chester withdrew the detachment there was no spot between the end of the bridge to the one already constructed by General Naglee in which the water was over 1 foot deep, and as the distance is not over 250 feet in length, the water rapidly falling, and most of the

material already prepared, it will probably be entirely completed to-day. It is proper to state that the difficulty of constructing this bridge was materially increased for the following reasons, viz: All small corduroy or crib material was cut and prepared at a distance of more than a mile from the bridge. The road intervening was impassable for teams, at one time being covered with water for a distance of 100 yards from 14 inches to 3½ feet in depth. This detachment spent the whole of one stormy night in temporarily arranging this road in order that the teams furnished to haul corduroy could be rendered available. For this purpose they carried several thousand rails a distance of 400 yards. At daylight the same men commenced the bridge and completed a length of 140 feet during the morning, when they were relieved by a detachment under Major Magruder, who advanced the work about 500 feet more. Yesterday a further force of 65, men under Lieutenant Lubej, and six wagons were sent to assist.

In addition to the work done by these separate detachments a foot bridge, constructed on small trestles, has been built for a distance of about 1,200 feet across the river and overflowed bottom land near the bridge built by Captain Ketchum. The main stream was spanned by three canvas pontoons with their accessories. It is now in a condition for the passage of infantry in single file.

In obedience to your orders, during the storm on the night of June 3 Major Magruder, with 117 men, built a rifle pit across the west end of Captain Ketchum's bridge for the protection of those guarding it. Of the Fiftieth Regiment, one company is stationed at White House in charge of pontoon and intrenching property, engaged for the last few days in loading pontoons and their accessories on the cars to send to Dispatch Station. A detachment under Lieutenant Hine has been stationed at Bottom's Bridge for the purpose of guarding and strengthening the two trestle bridges at that point.

I give a short extract from Lieutenant Hine's report of the 1st and 2d instant:

During the day and night of the 1st the water remained stationary. At 3 a. m. on the 2d instant the river suddenly commenced rising at the rate of 6 inches per hour, and by 8 a. m. the bridges were impassable, all of the approaches being washed away. I applied last night in person to General Heintzelman, sent a dispatch to the nearest brigade (Third, Hooker's division) this morning, then went myself for men; but it was 10 o'clock before any were on the ground, and 1 o'clock before communication was open across the bridge.

At 10.30 a. m. the water was 3 feet and 2 inches higher than at 3 a. m., when it commenced rising, and the bridges in imminent danger of being swept away, when, as a last resort, I cut the dikes on both sides of the river between here and the railroad bridge, inundating the whole valley, but spreading the water so much that it rose no higher. By this the bridges are saved, and I have 200 men now at work raising the approaches and completing the timber bridges I had commenced. By daylight tomorrow morning I shall have a bridge 24 feet wide, capable of sustaining any required weight, completed. I have kept General Heintzelman apprised by telegraph during the day of the condition of the bridge, so that no serious interruption has occurred.

On the 4th instant Major Embick, with a detachment of two companies, was sent to Bottom's Bridge to assist Lieutenant Hine. This detachment has constructed a permanent bridge, double roadway of the strongest description; two spans, 30 feet; four spans, 15 feet; length, 120 feet; width of roadway, 24 feet. The approaches on either side have been corduroyed for the distance of 1,200 or 1,300 feet, under the direction of officers of this detachment. This bridge will render unnecessary the two trestle bridges at this point.

A detachment under Captain Spaulding was directed to construct a trestle bridge about half a mile above New Bridge. On the 2d instant Captain Spaulding reports:

Owing to the sudden rise of the river having floated all the bridge material at the point where it had been deposited, to prevent its being observed by the enemy it became necessary for me to remove all the material to higher ground to prevent its being carried off before it could be used in the bridge. As this work was nearly all done in the water, the operation was necessarily a slow one, so that I did not get to work at the construction of the bridge until about daylight. When I had the bridge about three-fourths complete the second trestle cap from the bank broke, making it necessary for me to dismantle all of the bridge except one span to put in a new cap.

When the bridge was again entirely completed across the main stream I found that the rapid current was fast undermining the legs of the trestle in the main channel, and I was compelled to dismantle 40 feet of the bridge about the center and put in one of the pontoon-boats. Owing to the delay caused by these reconstructions the time occupied in constructing the bridge was longer than I had expected, but the south abutment was put in and the bridge finished at noon yesterday.

When the bridge was completed yesterday I returned to camp, leaving the approach at the south side of the river to be built by Captain Chester. During the construction of the bridge the approach on this side was built by Captain Perry, of the Fifteenth, who also rendered me valuable assistance in securing the north end of the bridge. With the slight changes suggested by you to accommodate the bridge to the falling or lower stage of water, and which I hope to have finished before the south approach is ready for use, the bridge is perfectly secure for infantry in two ranks, and as safe for the passage of artillery as this plan of trestle can be made without strengthening it beyond the original plan. This bridge is — feet in length.

Colonel Stuart, in his regimental report, speaks in the highest terms of the skill, energy, and endurance exhibited by the officers and men engaged on this work, and of their great exposure in the stream, which had become very deep and rapid before the trestle could be placed and secured, and of their utter indifference in regard to the enemy's shot and shell, which fell at one time in close proximity to them.

The bridge has been strengthened by placing piles beneath the trestle caps, to prevent injury from the extreme high water.

A detachment under Captain Brainerd commenced the lower trestle bridge. Of the difficulties attending the construction of this bridge Colonel Stuart says:

One hundred feet of trestle bridge, which had been prepared for the stream when at low-water mark, and made up without a pontoon boat, which was not of sufficient length nor of the right character for the stream, swollen as it was by the recent rains on the night the work was commenced.

Added to this, the unlooked-for and remarkable rise of water on Sunday morning rendered it necessary for the men engaged in the construction of this bridge to work for nearly twelve hours in the cold water, frequently having to dive to place the legs of the trestles and swimming to reach the opposite bank; and this, too, mostly in the darkness of the night.

RECAPITULATION.

Bridges.—One permanent bridge at Bottom's Bridge; two spans, 30 feet; four spans, 15 feet; length, 120 feet; roadway, 24 feet. One trestle and pontoon bridge, about 1 mile above New Bridge, by a party of the Fiftieth, under Captain Spaulding; length, —; 900 feet of crib and corduroy on south approach; by various details from the army, assisted by a party of Fifteenth, under Captain Chester. One trestle and pontoon bridge, 1 mile below New Bridge, of seven trestles and seven pontoons; length, 330 feet; by a party of the Fifteenth, under Captain Ketchum. One foot bridge, about $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles below New Bridge, of small trestle, covered with plank. Three canvas-boats span the main channel; length across the river and overflowed bottom lands, 1,200 feet; by a detachment of the Fifteenth, under Colonel Murphy. One bridge for infantry, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles below New Bridge, connecting with General Naglee's bridge; length, 1,010 feet; width, 4 feet; by the Fifteenth, under Captain Ketchum and Captain Chester. Five small bridges, on the road from General Smith's headquarters to New Bridge, by detail from the Fifteenth, under Captain Chester.

Roads.—Two thousand five hundred feet graded and corduroyed on road from General Smith's headquarters to New Bridge by details from the Fifteenth, under Captain Chester. Five hundred feet corduroyed over bottom-land on the north approach to the infantry bridge by details from the Fifteenth, under Captain Chester. Rifle pit 50 yards in length, constructed for the protection of the south approach of the lower trestle bridge by details from the Fifteenth, under Major Magruder.

D. P. WOODBURY,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

General J. G. BARNARD,
Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac.

HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE,
Camp Lincoln, Va., June 19, 1862.

GENERAL: Since my last report, of June 7, the Engineer Brigade has been engaged chiefly in the construction of a permanent bridge across the Chickahominy nearly opposite Dr. Trent's. This bridge was commenced June 9, and completed so as to allow the passage of teams June 14. It was subsequently covered with earth, and the approaches, constructed under Colonel Alexander by other regiments, were completed on the 16th and 17th instant. The dimensions of the bridge are as follows: Length, 1,080 feet; roadway, 11 feet; number of cribs, 40; number of trestles, 6. The accompanying drawing will furnish any other details required.* The Third Vermont Regiment, Colonel Hyde commanding, furnished valuable assistance in covering a portion of the crib work after completing excellent approaches on the south side.

For the last week Captain Spaulding, with a detachment of 250 men, has been engaged in constructing an infantry bridge about 1 mile above the permanent bridge. Good progress has been made in the work.

June 17 and 18 several detachments of the brigade, amounting to some 400 men, were engaged in constructing bridges and corduroying on the road leading to the railroad station near Fair Oaks and the road from general headquarters to General Smith's division. I have not yet received the reports of the officers in charge of the work.

June 19, a detachment of 50 men, with their officers, still engaged on the road to Smith's division; a detachment of 500 men, with their officers, employed constructing fascines; 224 fascines were made on the line of the railroad near Fair Oaks Station.

D. P. WOODBURY,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

General J. G. BARNARD,
Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac.

HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE,
Near Falmouth, Va., February 7, 1863.

DEAR GENERAL: I referred some of the queries in your letter of the 3d to Major Spaulding,* whose camp is some 3 or 4 miles off. He hap-

* Not found.

pened to be absent building a pontoon bridge for Sigel's corps over Potomac Creek, and his answer did not come until last night. Most of our papers relative to the Chickahominy campaign are in Washington in the third story of the house adjacent to my residence. I answer your questions as well as I can, taking them up in order. Major Spaulding, of my brigade, left the White House in charge of about thirty pairs of trestles and four canvas-boats, with accessories complete. On the same day he built two trestle bridges over the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge of 80 feet span each. On the night of the same day the remainder of this bridge equipage was taken to Cold Harbor. This was the advance-guard train.

On June 28 I was directed to send away all my bridge teams to the White House. I took the liberty of keeping six of them. Duane turned over the balance of his bridge equipage to me after setting aside enough to build two bridges at New Bridge. The balance numbered but a few pontoons, which were all used at the lower trestle bridge. After the battle of Seven Pines I brought up about twenty-four pontoons, with accessories, but was never able to obtain more than half teams enough to move the equipage all together. I cannot now tell what became of the lower trestle bridge. In the foot bridge, a little below that trestle bridge, three canvas-boats were used, running lengthwise over the stream. I cannot tell what became of them. I think I can find out what became of this and of the lower trestle bridge, and will let you know as soon as I do. Major Spaulding's letter, which I inclose herewith, answers several of your questions. The trestle bridge, the crib bridge, and the two foot bridges over the White Oak Swamp, all at one place, were destroyed by a detachment of the Fifteenth New York, under Lieutenant-Colonel Colgate, assisted by a detachment of the Fifth New Hampshire, under Colonel Cross. Lieutenant Comstock I think has already answered your questions to him. I regret that I did not see you when I was last in Washington. Company prevented a call which I had intended to make on the night preceding my return. In your letter of the 4th you request the detail of some officer in the Engineer Brigade as your assistant. I am quite willing that Hargous should be detailed, but I do not even know him by sight. I think Farrell would not have recommended him unless he was a person pretty well qualified for the place. You can return him if you do not find him useful. I will ask General Hooker's permission to order him to join you.

Respectfully,

D. P. WOODBURY.

Brigadier-General BARNARD.

[Inclosure No. 1.]


Report of Capt. Wesley Brainerd, Fiftieth New York Engineers.

CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE, VA.,

June 2, 1862.

SIR: Agreeably to your instructions I proceeded on Saturday afternoon last (May 31) to make a reconnaissance of the Chickahominy in the direction previously indicated by you, with a view to determine the most favorable position for a bridge. I succeeded in finding a very

good approach to the stream at about dark. The following sketch shows the character of the spot selected as it then appeared :



A represents the road leading to the approach.
 B, a point of land opposite, apparently the main-land,
 C appeared to be a small swale, which at that time could have been crossed by one or two trestles or corduroy.
 D represents land partially covered by water and filled with brush or trees.
 H, a ditch running parallel with the road.

As I had but 120 feet of bridge, I concluded to place it in the direction of A B, and, in my opinion, had the water remained at the same height as at the time I made the reconnaissance, the bridge could have been laid with little difficulty. I received your order to construct the bridge at about 11 o'clock, and proceeding with the train to the spot, I found the stream somewhat swollen and rising rapidly. After cutting away the brush at the side of the stream I commenced laying the bridge three feet above the level of the water. The water continued rising very fast, and the current became so swift as to render the work extremely difficult.

At about 4.30 o'clock I had succeeded in placing three lengths of trestles, when I was relieved by Captain Ketchum, Fifteenth Regiment New York Volunteers, and returned with my men to camp. At that time the water had risen so as nearly to submerge the bridge.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WESLEY BRAINERD,

Captain Company C, Fiftieth Regiment New York Volunteers.

General D. P. WOODBURY, *Commanding Engineer Brigade.*

[Inclosure No. 2.]

DETACHMENT FIFTEENTH NEW YORK ENGINEERS,

Near New Bridge, Va., June 2, 1862.

GENERAL: Agreeably to your instructions I proceeded to the bridge below New Bridge, arriving there at about 7 o'clock in the morning of yesterday. My instructions were to relieve Captain Brainerd and his command, and then to make an examination to determine at what point the direction then being pursued would strike the opposite bank, the nature of the soil at such point, and the length of bridge required, and, if

I deemed it necessary, change the direction of the structure. Soon after my arrival on the ground a canvas pontoon was brought, of which I took possession and commenced making the examination above alluded to. When about half way across the stream I was ordered to return by Colonel Lansing, of the Seventeenth New York Volunteers, who said that he had special instructions from General McClellan to see that bridge completed, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Pettes, of your brigade. I returned to the shore and endeavored to find you to report the above facts. Not succeeding, I was ordered by both of the gentlemen above named to go to work on the bridge, which I did, and continued working in that direction until your arrival on the ground, at about 9 o'clock, when the necessary examination was made and the direction of the bridge changed.

Having commenced another bridge in the new direction, everything went on smoothly until I reached the sixth trestle, when, owing to the rapid rise of the water, I deemed it necessary to raise the abutment; in endeavoring to do which, having raised the shore ends of the balks, the whole structure surged inshore and fell with a crash. I immediately went to work clearing away the wreck, and am happy to state that nothing was either lost in the current or broken. When everything was cleared away I commenced rebuilding, and connected with the opposite shore at about 2 o'clock this morning.

I would also beg leave respectfully to report that I was very much annoyed by the constant interference of officers higher in rank than myself, who came to me ordering me to hurry up the work, and representing that they had the authority of the general commanding.

Hoping that you will deem this report satisfactory, I remain, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM A. KETCHUM,

Captain Fifteenth New York Engineers, Comdg. Detachment.

General D. P. WOODBURY, *Commanding Engineer Brigade.*

[Inclosure No. 3.]

CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE, VA.,

June 2, 1862.

GENERAL: In obedience to your orders I went to the river night before last with a part of my detachment at the point selected by you for the crossing, and commenced the necessary preparations for laying the bridge. Owing to the sudden rise of the river having floated all the bridge materials at the point where it had been deposited, to prevent its being observed by the enemy it became necessary for me to remove all the material to higher ground, to prevent its being carried off before it could be used in the bridge. As this work was nearly all done in the water, the operation was necessarily a slow one, so that I did not get to work at the construction of the bridge until about daylight. When I had the bridge about three-fourths completed the second trestle cap from the bank broke, making it necessary for me to dismantle all the bridge except one span to put in a new cap. When the bridge was again completed across the main stream I found that the rapid current was fast undermining the legs of the trestles in the main channel, and I was compelled to dismantle 40 feet of the bridge about the center and put in one of the pontoon-boats. Owing to the delay caused by these reconstructions, the time occupied in constructing the bridge was longer than I had expected, but the south abutment was put in and

the bridge finished at noon yesterday. When the bridge was completed yesterday I returned to camp, leaving the approach at the south side of the river to be built by Captain Chester. During the construction of the bridge the approach on this side was built by Captain Perry, of the Fifteenth, who also rendered me valuable assistance in securing the north end of the bridge. With the slight changes suggested by you to accommodate the bridge to the falling or lower stage of the water, and which I hope to have finished before the south approach is ready for use, the bridge is perfectly secure for infantry in two ranks, and as safe for the passage of artillery as this plan of trestle can be made without strengthening it beyond the original plan. Of the time required to complete the south approach I am not able to speak with any certainty, as I am not familiar with the ground.

Very respectfully,

I. SPAULDING,

*Captain Fiftieth New York Volunteer Engineers,
Commanding Detachment Engineer Brigade.*

Brig. Gen. D. P. WOODBURY,
Commanding Engineer Brigade.

No. 5.

Report of Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, U. S. Army, Chief of Topographical Engineers.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, FIFTH CORPS,
February 20, 1863.

GENERAL: In compliance with a request received through Brig. Gen. S. Williams, assistant adjutant-general, that I would make a report upon the operations carried on under my directions while serving as chief of topographical engineers with the Army of the Potomac, I submit the following hurried and imperfect sketch, regretting that the circumstances by which I am surrounded render it difficult for me to present even this meager account:

About December 1, 1861, I was assigned to special duty on the staff of Major-General McClellan, commanding the Army of the Potomac, and when that army took the field came into command of the officers of my corps serving with it. Previous to taking the field every available source was exhausted that promised to furnish information, general or special, respecting the character of the region in which the operations were to be conducted. The topographical information obtained was, however, very meager, and continued, careful reconnaissance was necessary to guide the march of the various portions of the army, to exhibit the relations between them, and to designate the positions for depots and the lines of supply. Reconnaissances were likewise made of the enemy's several positions—at and near Yorktown, on the Chickahominy, and on the approach to Richmond from that stream, and also of the positions occupied by our army at Yorktown, on the Chickahominy, and at Harrison's Landing. From these reconnaissances detailed maps of the scene of operations were prepared, multiplied by photography, and distributed to the commanders and staff officers of the various subdivisions of the army. It is not necessary that I should enumerate the various reconnaissances that were made and the particular object of each. A list of the chief maps that resulted from the

operations of that branch of the staff will sufficiently indicate the character and extent of its labors.

These maps were as follows, viz :

1. Of the position of Yorktown and Warwick Creek and River, with the approaches from James, York, and Poquosin Rivers.
2. Of the position of Williamsburg and the approaches and the adjacent country.
3. Of the approaches to Richmond between the Pamunkey and Chickahominy.
4. Of the positions on the Chickahominy.
5. Of the approaches to Richmond from the Chickahominy.
6. Of the position at Harrison's Landing and the approaches and the country adjacent from Malvern Hill to Charles City Court-House.

From these maps and the Coast Survey maps of the James and York Rivers and the State map of Henrico County a very detailed map was prepared in three parts, embracing the country between the James and York Rivers, and extending from Old Point Comfort to Richmond.

Since these maps can present comparatively little of the information required concerning a country that is the scene of military operations, they should be accompanied by a memoir. Notes were collected by me with the object of preparing one, and it was my intention to give so much of the physical geography of the region in which the campaign was carried on and the territory contiguous as was necessary to exhibit clearly the characteristic topographical and hydrographical features; the nature of the soil; its natural growth and degree and kind of cultivation, and the direction and character of the routes of communication, both by land and water. The characteristic features, natural and artificial, of the several positions of Yorktown, Williamsburg, the Chickahominy, Richmond, Malvern Hill, and Harrison's Landing, would likewise have been described.

Continued sickness during the occupation of the position of Harrison's Landing prevented my accomplishing this task, and immediately after the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the peninsula of the James and York Rivers I was, at my own request, assigned to the command of troops, and the division of new troops that I have commanded since that time has occupied all my time.

Besides the officers, Coast Survey assistants, and civil engineers, who constituted the more or less permanent force of the topographical engineer department of the Army of the Potomac, many officers of the Corps of Engineers and of the line of the army and volunteer force served temporarily under my orders. Their names will be found upon the maps prepared from the reconnaissances in which they assisted, but I should not permit the opportunity to pass without acknowledgment of the zeal and efficiency with which the duties assigned them were executed.

Those who served more permanently under my orders were, Lieut. Col. W. R. Palmer, Capt. H. L. Abbot, First Lieuts. Orlando G. Wagner and N. Bowen, Topographical Engineers; Lieut. George A. Custer, Fifth Cavalry; Capt. James Hope, Second Vermont Volunteers; First Lieut. Carswell McClellan, New York Volunteers; Messrs. F. W. Dorr and J. W. Donn, assistants United States Coast Survey; Messrs. Fred. Churchill, F. W. Vaughn, H. H. Humphreys, Walter Taylor, civil engineers, and Mr. James McMackin, draughtsman.

I should not omit to mention my indebtedness to Col. G. K. Warren, Fifth New York Volunteers (now brigadier-general of volunteers, cap-

tain Corps Topographical Engineers), for the valuable assistance he rendered in the reconnaissances and in the preparation of the maps.

It is not necessary that I should mention in detail the services performed by the gentlemen just named. Their duties were executed with energy, industry, and intelligence, and upon suitable occasions I have brought their conduct to the notice of the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac, and I hope their valuable services may yet meet with the reward they deserve.

In this connection I beg leave to submit herewith a copy of a letter dated June 19, 1862, addressed by me to Brig. Gen. S. Williams, assistant adjutant-general Army of the Potomac, recommending Lieuts. H. L. Abbot and N. Bowen, Topographical Engineers, for promotion by brevet, the former for highly meritorious conduct, and the latter for distinguished conduct in a reconnaissance of the Chickahominy, made by him near New Bridge on May 24. In that letter I likewise requested that some reward might be conferred upon Mr. F. W. Dorr, assistant United States Coast Survey, for the valuable services he rendered in reconnaissances of the enemy's positions.

Besides the duties they performed under my immediate orders, Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer served under General Stoneman; Lieutenant Abbot, throughout the siege of Yorktown, under General Barnard; Lieutenant Bowen under Generals Keyes and W. F. Smith, and Lieutenant Wagner under General Heintzelman. In the reports of those generals I have no doubt an appropriate acknowledgment of the value of the services rendered by those officers will be found.

The duties of the officers associated with me were not performed without severe loss, and it became my painful duty to report the death of Lieut. Col. W. R. Palmer, Topographical Engineers, on June 18, of disease caused by exposure in the zealous discharge of duty, and of First Lieut. Orlando G. Wagner, Topographical Engineers, on April 21, of a wound received while examining the enemy's works at Yorktown. In the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer the corps lost a gallant and accomplished officer, devoted to its interests; in the death of Lieutenant Wagner a gallant and highly promising young officer, whose brief term of duty with the Army of the Potomac gave earnest of a distinguished future.

I am sensible of the very imperfect manner in which I have complied with the request of Major-General McClellan, and regret extremely my inability at this time to present a paper more in accordance with his wishes, and exhibiting more clearly the nature and extent of the operations (and their results) of the topographical engineer department of the army commanded by him, their bearing upon the movements of that army, and their evidence of the great difficulties that army overcame.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Maj. Top. Engrs. and Brig. Gen. Vols., Comdg. Third Div.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY,

Chief of Staff of Major-General McClellan, New York.

No. 6.

Report of Col. Charles P. Kingsbury, U. S. Army, Chief Ordnance Officer.

PITTSBURGH, PA., January 24, 1863.

SIR: Nearly all the papers connected with my duties while serving with the Army of the Potomac were left, when I was detached there-

from, to my successor. I shall have to rely, therefore, upon memory for the statement asked for in your letter of the 20th, but which I hope will convey with sufficient minuteness of detail the information desired by General McClellan. The duties referred to extended through a period of about eleven months, and my object will be to give a brief abstract of the more prominent facts pertaining thereto. The want of arms was one of the principal difficulties to be overcome in the preparation of the Army of the Potomac for the field. From an inadequate appreciation of the magnitude of the impending conflict, or from some other cause, no provision was made at the commencement of the war for a supply of arms, except from the Springfield Armory. No encouragement was then offered to private manufacturers in the United States, and I believe no attempt was made to import arms until after General McClellan's arrival in Washington, in the latter part of July, 1861. Indeed, I have been informed that the appropriation made near the close of the extra session of that year for the purchase of arms was on the estimate of an officer not of the Ordnance Department. Most of the arms originally furnished were the altered percussion musket, to the reception of which there was an unconquerable aversion from almost the entire army, the objection to them being partly, perhaps, due to prejudice, but generally to their known inferiority. The alteration from flint to percussion was in many cases not well done, and from the hard usage to which they were subjected in the hands of raw troops they were so liable to become unserviceable that officers and men soon lost all confidence in them, and to a certain extent they were a prolific source of demoralization. Reports were constantly received from commanders of regiments and from military boards condemning them without discrimination, and not seldom expressing an unwillingness to engage the enemy with such weapons. Many of the foreign arms which were substituted for them were but little better, and after a brief trial in camp served only as a basis for the renewal of complaints. Thus experiments were going on for months in the exchange of one suspicious musket for another of similar quality.

Notwithstanding these continuous transfers and new issues [it was] about January 15, 1862, I believe, when two division commanders, by direction of the President, made an official inquiry as to the condition of their department, and whether that condition was such as to prevent an immediate advance. There were, I think, between thirty and forty regiments still armed with the altered musket, and others with foreign arms of perhaps inferior quality. Nor was this all. When the army left Washington two or three kinds or calibers of arms were often found in the same regiment, and in the entire army there were probably not less than ten varieties, and of almost as many calibers, from the manufactories of the United States, England, France, Belgium, Prussia, and Austria. This variety of caliber was a constant source of trouble and anxiety in keeping up a supply of suitable ammunition for the field, and as the wagons of the ordnance trains were not properly marked, so as to reveal their contents at a glance, extraordinary exertions were required to supply the troops during the movement from the Chickahominy to Harrison's Landing. Thus, with the exception of the inferior quality of a portion of the arms, and a dangerous variety of calibers, the infantry of the Army of the Potomac, I believe, took the field with an ample supply of ordnance material of unexceptional quality.

The armament of the cavalry was also attended with vexation and delay, but to some extent this was due to indecision or difference of opinion among some of the officers of that branch of service. It was

at one time determined to abandon the carbine and convert all the mounted troops into light cavalry; but soon after taking the field this arrangement was changed, and application was made for carbines, which had but recently been condemned as an incumbrance to mounted troops. These were furnished not as fast as they were wanted, but as fast as they could be procured from the department.

The supply of field artillery—smooth bore and rifle—was abundant and generally of excellent quality. At an early day I addressed a letter to General McClellan recommending that no more 6-pounders be received, and that the smooth-bore batteries be formed, as far as practicable, of light 12s or Napoleons. This suggestion was approved, and the army was thus liberally provided with what, perhaps, proved to be the most efficient part of our artillery. Of the rifle ammunition there was some complaint, and officers were divided in opinion as to the relative merits of the different kinds employed. It may be stated, however, that in some instances sufficient care had not been observed in the fabrication, and that its use was attended with but little less danger to ourselves than to the enemy.

After leaving Yorktown the principal depot was at the White House, and when the communications with that point were threatened several millions of cartridges for small-arms and artillery were rapidly transferred from thence to the vicinity of Savage Station and what was known as Forage Station. From these temporary depots such of the troops as had exhausted their ammunition in the various and protracted conflicts of June 26 and 27 were resupplied, and were thus enabled, without any lack of material, to fight and win the battles of Savage Station, White Oak Swamp, Glendale, and Malvern Hill, and when the army reached James River several steamboats laden with the remainder of the supplies from the White House were already at the landing.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. P. KINGSBURY.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, New York.

No. 7.

Report of Brig. Gen. Stewart Van Vliet, U. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster, of operations from July 27, 1861, to July 10, 1862.

QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE,
Washington, August 2, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit a brief report, for the information of the general commanding, of the operations of the quartermaster's department in connection with the Army of the Potomac from the commencement of its organization until its arrival on the banks of the James River at the termination of the sanguinary battles in front of Richmond:

The general commanding arrived in Washington and assumed command of the troops around that city toward the end of July, 1861, and I was detailed by him as chief quartermaster on the 27th of the same month. But a few weeks previous to this these troops had been defeated at Bull Run, where much of the material of the army had been

lost, and almost everything required in the organization of a large army had to be provided. As soon as I entered upon the discharge of my duties I commenced making preparations to collect together the vast and various supplies required by a large army. The depot for quartermaster's supplies in this city, under the able administration of Col. D. H. Rucker, of the Quartermaster's Department, had to be much extended to enable me to collect the requisite material, and notwithstanding the prompt approval of my requisitions by the Chief of the Quartermaster's Department, General Meigs, there were many obstacles to the successful discharge of these duties. Probably the greatest difficulties I had to encounter arose from the inexperience of the newly-appointed officers who were placed under me and of the new regiments.

The first thing to be done was to provide transportation. As the difficulties of subsisting the large number of animals required by the army in Washington were very great, owing to the want of sufficient channels of communication with it, it was decided to establish a depot of transportation at some point in the rear. In consultation with the general commanding, Perryville, on the left bank of the Susquehanna, at the point where the railroad connecting Baltimore and Philadelphia crosses that stream, was selected as the most suitable place, as it could be reached both by railroad and water, and was removed from all chance of interruption by the enemy. In accordance with this decision Capt. C. G. Sawtelle, assistant quartermaster, was ordered on the 8th of August to take post there and organize a train of 1,500 wagons.

New regiments from the loyal States were now arriving in great numbers, and were immediately furnished with supplies and put in camp around Washington. Transportation, &c., were issued to them as far as possible on the war allowance. Four wagons, drawn either by four horses or mules, were allowed each full regiment, one for the medical supplies of the regiment and one for the regimental headquarters, making in all six wagons to a regiment, and this was substantially the regimental allowance during the campaign, varied occasionally, however, by the exigencies of the service. Besides these wagons there were large trains organized for the transportation of subsistence, ammunition, pontoons, &c. An immense depot for clothing, camp and garrison equipage was likewise established in Washington, and vast amounts of these articles were hurried forward from New York and Philadelphia.

On the 19th of October the Potomac River, by which channel we had received most of our supplies, was closed by the enemy's batteries. From this time until the latter part of February, 1862, all the supplies, forage, subsistence, clothing, &c., required for the army, and all the supplies required for the city of Washington, were brought across the single-track railroad connecting Baltimore with Washington. The capacity of the road was taxed to its utmost, but the work was satisfactorily done. Some conception of the amount of work done may be formed when it is known that of forage alone about 400 tons were required daily.

In the latter part of February it was decided that the Army of the Potomac should move on Richmond by the way of the Peninsula. This made it necessary to procure a large number of vessels to transfer the army to its new base, Fortress Monroe, and the procuring of these vessels was intrusted to the Hon. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls, who had reported to me for duty soon after my arrival in Washington, and had been by me assigned as chief

quartermaster to the troops on the south bank of the Potomac, was ordered to report to Mr. Tucker, for the purpose of taking the immediate charge of the transports chartered, and to superintend the embarkation of the troops. As the Potomac was still closed by the guns of the enemy, arrangements were made for embarking the troops at Annapolis and Baltimore. I had the wharves at the former place enlarged, and the transports had commenced to arrive when the movements of the army opened the Potomac. Orders were immediately issued for the transports to rendezvous at Alexandria, and arrangements were pushed forward rapidly to embark the troops at that point. Everything was ready for a movement as regards the troops, but the transports, many of which were sailing vessels, could not reach Alexandria in sufficient numbers to move a division until the middle of March. On the 9th of March there had rendezvoused at Annapolis ten side-wheel steamers and five propellers.

On the evening of March 16th or morning of the 17th the troops commenced embarking at Alexandria, and in about twelve days the bulk of the Army of the Potomac, with its vast material, was transferred to the Peninsula. I had previously ordered Captain Sawtelle to break up his depot at Perryville, and to transfer the wagons, ambulances, animals, &c., to Fortress Monroe. Some two or three months previous to this I had ordered a large amount of forage to be purchased and stored in the city of New York. This had been put afloat just before the embarkation of the troops, and the vessels directed to repair to Fortress Monroe and keep their cargoes on board until further orders. In the mean time I had ordered Capt. C. W. Thomas, assistant quartermaster, to Fortress Monroe to take charge of the depot to be established there for the army.

As soon as everything was embarked at Alexandria I proceeded to Fortress Monroe and rejoined the general commanding, who had preceded me to that place. The magnitude of the movement can scarcely be understood except by those who participated in it. Each division took with it its own transportation as far as it was practicable, and the remainder, together with the supply trains, were pushed forward as rapidly as possible.

When the campaign of the Peninsula commenced the Army of the Potomac had with it 3,600 wagons and 700 ambulances and spring wagons, and this transportation remained complete until the army arrived on the banks of the James River, with the exception of ordinary losses and the loss of a few wagons by the raids of the enemy and on the march to the James River. In transferring the army and its material, and furnishing it with supplies during the campaign, the following number of vessels were employed, viz: 71 side-wheel steamers, 29,071 tons; 57 propellers, 9,824 tons; 187 schooners, brigs, and barks, 36,634 tons, and 90 barges, 10,749 tons, making in all 405 vessels, of a tonnage of 86,278 tons. Many of these vessels were discharged after the army was transferred to the Peninsula, but it was necessary to retain the greater number of them, as our supplies were obliged to be kept afloat to follow the advance of the army. Though Fortress Monroe was our main depot, the nature of the country and the condition of the roads rendered it impossible to haul our supplies by wagons from that point. As soon as the leading divisions of the army landed at Fortress Monroe they were pushed forward, and the enemy retiring behind their lines, stretching from the James River to Yorktown, opened to us the York River and its tributaries as far as Yorktown, enabling us thereby to establish our depot at the mouth of Cheeseman's Creek and at Ship

Point, near the mouth of the Poquosin River, which was done on the 6th of April.

I beg here to submit a copy of a letter to the Quartermaster-General (marked A), which will show the positions of these points and the difficulties which had to be overcome in supplying the army.

These depots remained unchanged during the siege of Yorktown, but when the enemy evacuated that place they were immediately broken up and everything transferred by water at once to Yorktown. As the army advanced up the Peninsula our depots were successively changed from Yorktown to the south bank of York River, opposite West Point, thence to Cumberland, on the Pamunkey, and finally, on the 20th May, they were established at White House, the point where the railroad from West Point to Richmond crosses the Pamunkey River, 23 miles from Richmond.

Extensive wharves were at once constructed by throwing our barges and canal-boats ashore at high water and bridging them over. The railroad bridge across the Pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, and the rolling stock of the road removed. From a reconnaissance in front the railroad was found to be uninjured, with the exception of two or three small bridges, which had been burned. In anticipation of moving along this road toward Richmond rolling stock for the road had been purchased, and a competent force employed to work it. Working parties were immediately put on the road and the engines and cars landed, and in a few days the road was again in running order, and cars loaded with supplies were constantly running to the front. The real troubles in supplying the army commenced at this point, owing to the condition of the roads, rendered almost impassable by frequent and long-continued storms. In reference to this I beg to submit copies of three reports, marked B, C, and D, made to the Quartermaster-General. At this point our large depots remained until the battle of Gaines' Mill, the 27th of June. During this time the army was in front of Richmond, from 15 to 20 miles in advance, and all of its immense supplies were thrown forward by the railroad and the large supply trains of the army. The frequent and heavy rains, by injuring the railroad and impairing the wagon roads, rendered it a matter of great difficulty at times to transport the large amount of necessary material and supplies, but in no instance, I believe, did our department fail in discharging the duty devolving upon it. Of forage and subsistence alone over 500 tons were daily required by the army. Adding to this the other necessary supplies swelled this amount to over 600 tons, which, rain or shine, had to be handled at the depots each day and forwarded to our lines. The difficulties of supplying an army of 100,000 men are not generally comprehended. Each man consumes 3 pounds of provisions per day, and every horse 26 pounds of forage. One hundred thousand men would therefore eat up 150 wagon loads of subsistence daily, and it can therefore be readily seen that an army of this size could leave its depots but a short distance in the rear in marching through a country destitute of supplies and depending on carrying everything with it.

The affair of Gaines' Mill occurred on the 27th June. Several days previous to that date the indications were that a decisive battle would be fought, and the general commanding directed me to take the necessary steps to prevent the immense supplies at our depot at White House from falling into the hands of the enemy, and to have a certain amount of forage and supplies transferred to James River for the use of the army should it be found necessary to move it from the Chickahominy to that river. On the 23d of June I telegraphed to Colonel

Ingalls, the quartermaster in charge of the depot at White House, as follows :

I want you to designate some forage vessels which have on board about 25,000 bushels of oats, and 10,000 bushels of corn, and 400 tons of hay to be sent immediately to James River. Between 500,000 and 600,000 rations now afloat will be designated by Captain Bell to be sent to same place. Towing power should be got ready at once.

At the same time I telegraphed, by direction of the commanding-general, to Commodore Goldsborough to convoy these vessels to the gun-boats then in James River at or near City Point. I also directed Colonel Ingalls to throw to the front by railroad and wagons (the latter to come by the way of Bottom's Bridge) all the supplies he possibly could, so as to have a sufficient amount with the army should our lines of communication be cut.

On the 25th of June I again telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls as follows :

You will have your whole command in readiness to start at any moment. Please consult with Lieutenant Nicholson, of the Navy, to have his vessels placed in such a position that he can protect our depot. There will be no attempt to turn our flank for a day or two, but from all the information we have it is supposed that Jackson will be coming down very soon.

On the 26th of June I telegraphed Colonel Ingalls as follows :

Don't fail to send down into the broad river below West Point all the vessels in the Pamunkey that are not required soon. Three or four days' forage and provisions are all that should be retained afloat at White House. This is a precautionary measure entirely, but must be attended to at once.

It will be seen from this that everything had been carefully considered, and every precaution taken to guard against our supplies falling into the hands of the enemy, should it be found necessary for the army to fall back on the James River. The battle of Gaines' Mill rendered this movement necessary. On the evening of the day on which that affair occurred, in consultation with the general commanding, it was determined to put our transportation in motion for the James River with the view of saving it, and not to destroy it unless it was absolutely necessary to do so to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy. Accordingly the trains were immediately started, and on the afternoon of the 29th were all safely across White Oak Swamp. Final orders were also given to Colonel Ingalls to break up the depot at White House and remove it to James River. This was most satisfactorily accomplished. All our vessels dropped down the river in safety; the rolling stock of the railroad was destroyed, and nothing was left for the enemy except the charred timbers of the White House, to which some incendiary, in positive disobedience of orders, had applied the torch.

Early the next morning the trains were again put in motion, the enemy shelling the rear, but doing little or no damage, and in the evening I had the satisfaction of seeing them parked on the banks of the James River in the vicinity of Malvern Hill. The enemy again shelled the rear of the trains at Malvern, but with little effect. In this most difficult movement every officer of our department, as far as I could ascertain, did his duty well; but I beg to call particular attention to Captain Bliss, assistant quartermaster, who was at that time serving on my staff. He was continually riding along the lines, rendering most valuable assistance in regulating the trains and preventing unnecessary alarm among the employes of the department. Captains Batchelder and Norton, and Lieutenant Tolles, acting assistant quar-

termaster, were also very efficient, and rendered important service. On our arrival at James River I found that Colonel Ingalls had arrived by water with our store vessels, and steps were immediately taken to supply the army from Haxall's Landing. After the battle of Malvern Hill, July 1, it was decided to move down the river to Harrison's Bar, which movement was commenced that night, and the next day found the entire army in camp at that point, with the great bulk of its transportation and material, a few wagons being delayed by the muddy roads until the 3d.

I cannot close this report without calling particular attention to the very valuable assistance which I received on all occasions from Col. Rufus Ingalls, the officer of the Quartermaster's Department next to me in rank with the Army of the Potomac. Of indomitable energy and great resource, he was always ready and prompt in the discharge of his duty. I would beg also to recommend to favorable consideration Captain Sawtelle, assistant quartermaster, and Captain Rankin, acting assistant quartermaster, who rendered most valuable assistance during the campaign of the Peninsula. Always in responsible and important positions, they discharged their duties alike creditably to themselves and advantageously to the service.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

STEWART VAN VLIET,
Brigadier-General and Quartermaster.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

[Inclosure A.]

CAMP WINFIELD SCOTT, VA.,
In front of Yorktown, April 28, 1862.

GENERAL: With regard to the operations of our department as connected with this army I have the honor to report that I believe that everything is working very satisfactorily. We have had great difficulties to encounter, but they have been overcome, and the wants of the army have been and are supplied promptly. The best evidence of this is that there have been no complaints. Our army is stretched across the Peninsula, the right resting near Yorktown and the left near James River. All our supplies are drawn from the depots at Cheeseman's Creek and Ship Point, except for a small portion of the left wing, which are obtained from Fortress Monroe. The only difficulties have arisen from the character of the country, which is nearly level and covered with a dense growth of pines. The surface of the country is sandy, resting on quicksand, and during rainy weather the roads are soon rendered impassable, empty wagons even sinking to their beds. Nearly every foot of the roads has been corduroyed. A great many of these roads have been badly made and are exceedingly rough, and the consequence is that the wear and tear of our transportation has been very great. Large working parties are now on them, and if we should have any more good weather they will soon be much improved.

I find that mules are the only animals fit for this rough service. Our horse teams suffer severely, and I would recommend that hereafter no more horse teams be provided for our armies, no matter in what part of the country they may be serving, as mules are far more serviceable and economical. Our main depots are at Fortress Monroe, Cheeseman's Creek, and Ship Point. I have placed Captain Sawtelle in charge of the depot at the fortress, assisted by Captain Thomas, and Colonel

Ingalls in charge of that at Cheeseman's Creek, assisted by Captain Rankin, acting assistant-quartermaster, Captain Pinner, brigade quartermaster, and Captain Wagner, brigade quartermaster. The latter is in charge of the clothing and camp and garrison equipage. The bulk of the clothing, &c., is kept at Old Point, as I do not desire to accumulate any great amount of stores here, as it would embarrass our movements when we advance. Ship Point is at the mouth of Poquosin River, and is used exclusively as the depot for subsistence stores. Cheeseman's Creek depot is about one mile to the west of Ship Point, at the junction of Cheeseman's and Goose Creeks, and is used for forage, quartermaster's stores, and camp and garrison equipage. This depot is about four miles from headquarters, and the supplies from it have to be transported a distance of $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 7 miles. There is a small depot on Back Creek, from which General F. J. Porter's division is supplied, the distance of land transportation being about the same as from Cheeseman's Creek. There is another small creek (Wormley's), which empties into the York River about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles below Yorktown. This creek has $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet of water, and heavy ordnance is sent into it in barges. It is, however, under the fire of the enemy's guns, and can only be used at night.

Yesterday one of our barges loaded with four hundred 13-inch shells was delayed until daylight, when the enemy opened fire on the boat, and burst a 100-pound shell in it and sunk it. The shells will be saved. I send you a map of the scene of our operations with the roads plainly delineated.

I beg here to state that I have received the most cordial and efficient assistance from the officers of our department in charge of the depots at Fortress Monroe and Cheeseman's Creek, and that Colonel Crosman and Major Belger, as well as Colonel Rucker, have filled all my requisitions with the greatest promptness. I feel under many obligations to them for it. I forward you herewith a copy of a circular which I have issued to the officers of our department on duty with the army.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

STEWART VAN VLIET,
Brigadier-General and Quartermaster.

General M. C. MEIGS,

Quartermaster-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

[Inclosure B.]

WITHIN TWO MILES OF CHICKAHOMINY,
May 23, 1862.

GENERAL: * * * Since my last communication I have established our final depot at White House, the point where the West Point Railroad crosses the Pamunkey River, 23 miles from Richmond. The army now occupies the line of the Chickahominy from 16 to 18 miles in advance. Supplies are now hauled by land from the depot, and owing to the nature of the roads it is about the utmost limit at which an army of this size can be supplied by wagon transportation. I trust, however, that in two days I shall have the railroad in running order, when all anxiety with regard to supplies may be dismissed. I have had all the rolling stock of the railroad ordered to the White House instead of West Point. About twenty-five cars are now landed, and two engines will be put upon the track this evening. The bridge-builders and carpenters only reached the White House last evening. They are now building the two small bridges between White House

and Chickahominy which were burned by the rebels. These will be finished by to-morrow evening, when supplies can be brought on the road to within 7 miles of our extreme right wing. Our left will have to haul only about 2 miles. Only one span of the Chickahominy Bridge has been burned. The bridge across the Pamunkey and one short bridge near West Point will be rebuilt as soon as the road in front is put in running order. When that is done West Point can be made a depot also. It possesses many advantages. There is a good wharf, and 20 feet of water can be carried there, up one of the finest rivers I have ever seen. Two or three days would have been gained in putting the road in order had the proper vessels been forwarded from Baltimore. By some mistake the vessels which should have sailed first sailed last.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

STEWART VAN VLIET,
Brigadier-General and Quartermaster.

General M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

[Inclosure C.]

CAMP NEAR CHICKAHOMINY,
June 5, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 21st ultimo in regard to taking horses from the teams for artillery purposes. This is impracticable at the present time, as our transportation is insufficient, owing to the very bad condition of the roads. I have never seen worse roads in any part of the country. Teams cannot haul over half a load, and often empty wagons are stalled. Our loss of animals is very great. The railroad is of great assistance, but it does not allow us to dispense with our wagons, as with the exception of very few the troops are not on it. The heavy rains of yesterday have injured the railroad very materially, having washed it away in several places. Heavy working parties are on it, and I hope to have it in running order again to-day. The difficulties under which our department has to labor, owing to the frequent and heavy rains and the nature of the country in which we are operating, are very great.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

STEWART VAN VLIET,
Brigadier-General and Quartermaster.

General M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

[Inclosure D.]

CAMP NEAR CHICKAHOMINY,
June 9, 1862.

GENERAL: In view of the re-enforcements ordered to this army (twenty-three regiments), seven of which have already arrived, I have the honor to state that I this day telegraphed you for one hundred and fifty wagons and teams complete. This should be in addition to the transportation with McCall's division, which it is supposed he will bring with him. It now requires every means of transportation we possess, both rail and wagon, to keep the army supplied with forage and subsistence. Had we had such weather as we had reason to expect

at this season of the year we should have had no difficulty whatever in supplying every want, but we have had one continued series of storms ever since we landed on the Peninsula. Notwithstanding this drawback, however, I believe I can assert that no army of this size, under similar circumstances, or any other, has been better or more regularly supplied. The railroad is in good working order from the depot on the Pamunkey to our front, though the recent heavy rains damaged it to a considerable extent. This road of course assists us vastly, though a small portion of our force only is immediately on it. Most of our supplies are obliged to be transported by wagons.

Our transportation as a general thing is still in fair condition, but if the rains continue we will be injured very materially. It is often the case that empty wagons stall, and no teams can ever haul more than 1,000 pounds. Casey's division lost a few wagons in the recent battle, but nothing to embarrass us. It lost, however, all of its shelter-tents, knapsacks, canteens, &c. These articles are being replaced from the White House depot. The railroad bridge across the Pamunkey is being rebuilt, and could be finished in a few days, but I am delaying it, as we want for the present the river above the bridge, as we have a forage station at Garlick's Landing for the right wing of the army. The moment the army crosses the Chickahominy the road can be put in running order to West Point, if we desire to use it. At present the depot at White House answers our wants. When we get possession of Richmond our supplies, a portion at least, can come by Fredericksburg and the James River, though the latter river will be rather unsafe unless we clear the southern bank of guerrillas, which can be easily done.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 STEWART VAN VLIET,
Brigadier-General and Quartermaster.

General M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

No. 8.

Report of Brig. Gen. Rufus Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster, of the operations from August, 1861, to September 2, 1862.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
 OFFICE OF CHIEF QUARTERMASTER,
Camp near Falmouth, Va., February 17, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 20th ultimo, asking for a report of the operations of the quartermaster's department from the time I succeeded General Van Vliet to the date of transfer of the command by General McClellan.*

I desire to state that I have been connected with this army from its first organization; that I was chief quartermaster on the south side of the Potomac while our forces were in front of Washington until March last, when I took charge at Alexandria of the embarkation of the army to the Peninsula; that I followed it there and established successively

* So much of this report as relates to operations subsequent to September 2 will appear in the reports covering operations of the Army of the Potomac from September 2 to November 9, 1862. See Series I, Vol. XIX.

depots of supply, first at Fortress Monroe, afterwards at Cheeseman's Creek, Yorktown, Wormley's, and Queen's Creeks, Franklin's Landing, opposite West Point, Eltham, Cumberland, and White House, on the York and Pamunkey Rivers, and Harrison's Landing, on the James.

It is presumed that my predecessor's report will explain the methods and principles on which the quartermaster's department was organized. Operations so extensive and important as the rapid and successful embarkation of such an army, with all its vast equipments, its transfer to the Peninsula, and its supply while there, under its many vicissitudes, had scarcely any parallel in history, certainly no precedent in our country. Several of our depots had to be established under many embarrassments. At Cheeseman's Creek the harbor was exceedingly small, the channel was narrow, and the water at low tide was very shallow. The roads leading to Yorktown were fearfully muddy and full of quicksand. Still the army was mainly supplied from that point until the evacuation of Yorktown. Wharves were constructed of canal-boats and barges, vessels towed in and out at flood tides, the roads were corduroyed, and the depot was made quite equal to meet all requirements. The depot at White House was made very perfect and efficient. Ten or twelve barge wharves were constructed for use of the various staff departments. The railroad was put in thorough repair, and the army on the Chickahominy was kept well supplied.

On the 28th of June, in execution of orders previously given by General McClellan, instructing me what to do in certain contingencies, I abandoned the White House depot, leaving no public property behind of any value or use. At the moment of departure the rebels had possession of our railroad, had cut our communications with the army, and were in march to the Pamunkey. I succeeded in removing all the transports (over four hundred) from that narrow and tortuous river without accident or delay, and conducted them immediately to Fortress Monroe, thence up James River, to meet the army on its arrival. I reached Haxall's on the evening of the 30th, some two hours before the general commanding, to whom I reported my arrival with the supplies. It was decided to take up a position on the left bank of the James a short distance below the mouth of the Appomattox, consequently on the 1st of July I established the depot at Harrison's Landing. It seems almost a miracle, our successful escape from White House. Had our vessels got entangled on the bar at Cumberland, had the enemy interrupted our passage at some of the narrow bends, the consequences to the army would have been fatal. My safe exit from York and prompt arrival on James River was most singularly opportune and providential, and I count these days of service from the 28th June to the 1st July, 1862, as the most important and valuable of my life.

On the 10th of July following I was announced the chief quartermaster in place of General Van Vliet, who retired at his own request, and who while with this army rendered arduous and responsible service, and from whom I parted with sincere regret. The battles before Richmond during the latter part of June rendered a reorganization of the quartermaster's department necessary. Inspections were immediately made, and reports obtained of all means of transportation, clothing, and forage on hand with the troops, and prompt measures were adopted at once to supply all deficiencies and necessary wants. It appears from my records that on the 20th following there were present with the army about 3,100 wagons for baggage and supplies, 350 ambulances, 7,000 cavalry, 5,000 artillery, and 5,000 team horses and 8,000 mules. Upon the river was a large fleet of transports, having on board an abundance

of supplies of all kinds. The army was then perfectly equipped so far as I observed, and was in condition, except in point of numbers—of which I was not the judge—to move forward.

The withdrawal of the army having been ordered early in August, preparations were perfected to secure our trains from attack by the enemy while evacuating the place and at same time from obstructing the passage of our troops. One corps having been thrown across the Chickahominy near its mouth over a pontoon bridge of some 2,000 feet in length, the supply trains were then driven over without delay, and sent forward rapidly on the roads to Yorktown and Fortress Monroe. After having given all proper orders in regard to the breaking up of the depot I left with the general commanding, and supervised the withdrawal of the trains. The march was conducted with great order and celerity, without the loss or abandonment of any public property of any further use. The fleet of transports was conducted to Fortress Monroe by Lieut. Col. C. G. Sawtelle, assistant quartermaster, in a most skillful and successful manner. This officer broke up the depot at Harrison's Landing on the morning of the 16th of August, the same day the general commanding left by land and moved toward the Chickahominy. Colonel Sawtelle performed this duty with marked ability, and rendered most valuable assistance in the evacuation of White House, and constantly since to the present time.

On arrival at Yorktown and Fortress Monroe the troops were embarked as rapidly as our means of water transportation would allow for Aquia and Alexandria, in order to unite with the forces under General Pope. The cavalry and means of land transportation were the last to be shipped. Much of the cavalry did not arrive until after Pope had fallen back on the defenses and had been relieved in command. Many of the baggage trains were still behind, and did not come up until this army was reorganized by General McClellan after Pope's reverses, and had reached the Antietam. Great exertions were required and made to supply the army on its march in the Maryland campaign.

* * * * *

I am, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

RUFUS INGALLS,

Chief Quartermaster Army of the Potomac.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY,

Chief of Staff Major-General McClellan, New York City.

No. 9.

Report of Col. Henry F. Clarke, U. S. Army, Chief Commissary of Subsistence, of operations from August 1, 1861, to November 9, 1862.

OFFICE CHIEF COMMISSARY SUBSISTENCE, ARMY POTOMAC,
Camp near Falmouth. Va., February 1, 1863.

GENERAL: In compliance with the request communicated to me in your letter of the 20th ultimo I have the honor to furnish the following report of the operations of the subsistence department pertaining to the Army of the Potomac during the period I served on the staff of Major-General McClellan as chief commissary of that army:

I joined the staff of General McClellan August 1, 1861, at Washington, D. C. While the Army of the Potomac was in the vicinity of

that city it was amply supplied with subsistence from the depots established by the department at the city, Alexandria, and Forts Runyon and Coreoran. Commissaries of subsistence of the volunteer service reporting for duty with this army were, with their clerks, first sent to the depot at Alexandria, Va., for instruction, and afterwards assigned to brigades. Much attention was given to them by the officers in charge of the depot, and great good has resulted to the service from this system, which is yet continued in all practicable cases.

To be prepared for the probable future movements of the army, in February of last year more than 600,000 complete rations were loaded on six propellers at New York and sent to Alexandria, Va., to be in readiness to accompany the troop transports when they should sail. These stores were intended for immediate issue to the several commands at their points of landing. In addition to the stores just named 2,500,000 complete rations were loaded on vessels at New York and sent to Fort Monroe, Va., to await further orders.

About the middle of March, so soon as the movement of the army to the Peninsula was determined upon, a large quantity of subsistence stores was dispatched from Washington by steamers and barges in tow of steamers to Fort Monroe, Va. The stores in the steamers were to supply the additional demands that would be made for rations at that post. The barges with their cargoes were to be towed, as the army advanced up the Peninsula, to points of landing on the Chesapeake Bay and the York and Pamunkey Rivers the most convenient for issuing stores, and which might be accessible only by vessels of light draught. During the period of preparation beef cattle were shipped from Baltimore and New York to Fort Monroe, and kept in depot at the latter place for the future use of the Army of the Potomac.

In the desire to be prepared for any emergency Capt. (now Lieut. Col.) George Bell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, was relieved from the charge of the depot at Alexandria, and directed to make arrangements to establish depots on short notice at any points at the terminus of water transportation that might thereafter be designated. How well he complied with those directions will appear in the course of this report.

Orders were issued that each command in embarking should carry with it not less than six days' rations, at least three days of them to be cooked and in the haversacks of the men. On the 18th day of March, 1862, the first troops (a division of Heintzelman's corps) left Alexandria for Fort Monroe, and other portions of the army followed as fast as transports were furnished. March 23 Captain Bell, accompanied by Capt. (now Lieut. Col.) A. P. Porter, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, and a large force of clerks and laborers, left Washington for Fort Monroe, and arrived at the latter place the next day, having under his control the six propellers laden with subsistence stores. While at Fort Monroe—from March 24 to April 5—Captain Bell and party assisted Capt. (now Lieut. Col.) J. McL. Taylor, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, depot commissary, in issuing subsistence to the troops as they arrived and were established in camps in the vicinity of that post at Hampton and Newport News and in discharging vessels laden with subsistence stores.

The army having advanced to the vicinity of Yorktown, Captain Bell was directed to establish a depot at Ship Point, Poquosin River. He arrived with his party and a number of vessels laden with subsistence stores at the place designated on the evening of April 5. On the 6th a wharf was constructed with barges and plank obtained from the

platforms left by the enemy in the small work on that point. At this time and during the stay of his command in the vicinity General O. O. Howard rendered important assistance.

April 7 a large amount of stores was issued, all commands making application for them being supplied. While the army remained in front of Yorktown it was principally supplied with subsistence stores from this depot. On account of the badness of the roads and their location some few of the commands at first sent their wagons to Fort Monroe for rations. The quartermaster's department could give but little assistance in the way of force to lighter and discharge vessels laden with subsistence stores, and our department was obliged to render that and other service, besides performing its own legitimate duties. Fortunately our foresight had caused us to be prepared in a good degree for the emergency. Three days' rations could be issued at one time to each command, which was more than the execrable roads would permit the limited number of wagons to transport. As required, beef cattle were driven from the corral at Fort Monroe to the vicinity of the army, and by Capt. E. M. Buchanan, commissary of subsistence of volunteers, issuing commissary of subsistence at headquarters, distributed to the several commands.

May 5 the depot at Ship Point was broken up, and a few hours afterwards established at Yorktown, where the issuing immediately commenced.

On the 8th 90,000 rations of meat and bread were sent to the army near Williamsburg, to meet any urgent demands after the battle, the quartermaster's department promptly furnishing the transportation. The same day with much difficulty, on account of the shallowness of the water, a depot was opened at Queen's Creek, about 12 miles above Yorktown. It was soon removed to Bigler's Wharf, 5 miles farther up York River.

May 11, Capt. H. K. Thatcher, Fourteenth United States Infantry, acting commissary of subsistence, left Fort Monroe in charge of a large herd of beef cattle to overtake the army, and all vessels coming from Washington with beef cattle were thereafter directed to proceed with their cargoes to the depots to be established on the Pamunkey River.

Following up the advance of the army, on the 10th of May Captain Porter established a depot at Eltham, on the Pamunkey River, 5 miles above its mouth, where a large amount of stores was issued. He was joined the next day by Captain Bell with his force and a number of supply vessels from below.

Capt. E. W. Coffin, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, was left in charge of the permanent depot at Yorktown. Leaving Capt. B. Granger, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, in charge of sufficient stores to supply the rear divisions of the army yet to pass near Eltham, on the 13th of May Captain Bell proceeded to Cumberland Landing. He arrived there with his party and a number of supply vessels, established a depot the same day, and was ready to meet any demands for rations. On the 14th stores were sent to the White House for the advance guard of the army, under General Stoneman, and to establish a depot there. The next day Captain Porter went up with a force and took charge. On the 19th, Captain Bell broke up the depot at Cumberland Landing, and taking with him all the barges and schooners he had the means of towing, proceeded to the White House. By means of trestles, made of lumber obtained at Yorktown, besides lumber that we had on hand, and barges, a good wharf was immediately constructed at this point. Immense quantities of

stores were unloaded here and shipped by wagons and railroad to the front.

As soon as the York River Railroad was put in operation, May 25, Captain Granger was directed to select a suitable point near the Chickahominy River and establish a depot. Dispatch Station, about 1 mile from that river, was selected as being the most convenient for issuing stores, as well as on account of the roads leading to it from the positions occupied by the army.

May 27 Capt. Thomas Wilson, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, who joined at the White House on the 18th of that month and rendered valuable assistance there, established a depot at Savage Station, on the railroad, about 3 miles beyond the Chickahominy River, to supply those portions of the army in that vicinity.

May 30 Captain Wilson left the depot at Savage Station in charge of Capt. R. Holmes, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, and June 3 established a depot at Orchard Station, near Fair Oaks, about 7 miles from Richmond. From this depot the advance troops of the army were supplied.

Owing to the limited railroad transportation and the impracticable condition of the roads, the stores first sent to the depots in front and supplied from them were chiefly the necessary articles of the ration—salt meats, hard bread, coffee, tea, sugar, and salt; but after a supply had accumulated which would admit of the cars bringing the complete ration the other less essential articles were regularly received and issued, as well as anti scorbutics in large quantities.

Capt. J. H. Woodward, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, arrived at Eltham May 11, and superintended the landing of beef cattle from vessels at that point, and with his party took charge of them. On the 14th he marched with the cattle so received for Cumberland Landing, arrived there the next day, and reached the White House on the 16th, where a large corral was established for the receipt and issue of beef cattle.

May 20 Captain Thatcher arrived at the White House with his large herd of beef cattle from Fort Monroe, and turned it over to Captain Woodward. On the march, though encountering many difficulties, Captain Thatcher conducted his herd successfully and in the most satisfactory manner. From the corral from time to time a sufficient number of beef cattle were driven forward to supply the army, and were distributed to the different commands by Captain Buchanan.

June 18, in compliance with instructions given to me by the commanding general, Captain Bell proceeded to Yorktown, selected vessels containing 800,000 rations, and had them forwarded to near City Point, on the James River, where they were placed, under protection of the gunboats, to await further orders.

June 26 Captain Bell was directed to continue sending hard bread and other important articles of the ration to the front during the day and night, and then to reship all he could of the large amount of stores on shore. At the same time he was ordered to be prepared, in the event of the approach of the enemy in considerable force, to destroy all the subsistence stores not reshipped, and then to proceed to Fort Monroe, where he would find further orders. Captain Woodward was directed to proceed at once to the vicinity of Savage Station with all the beef cattle then at the White House. The same day Captain Granger was directed to break up the depot at Dispatch Station, and to send the stores as fast as possible to Savage Station. After supplying the hospitals in that vicinity with rations he succeeded in removing his

stores to the place indicated without any loss whatever. Captain Woodward started early next morning, the 27th, with his herd, keeping well to the left of our lines. By taking the road via Baltimore Cross Roads and Bottom's Bridge at 10 a. m. he reached the place designated.

June 28 instructions were sent to Captain Bell to at once destroy all subsistence stores at the White House not then reshipped, and to proceed with his party and supply vessels via Fort Monroe up the James River to the vicinity of City Point. Owing to telegraphic communication having been cut off by the enemy these instructions did not reach him, but, acting on previous directions, and with his never-failing good judgment and energy, he accomplished the work at the right time.

At 2.30 p. m. on the 28th General Stoneman's command retired to the White House, and General Casey, with the guard, commenced embarking. The property of the quartermaster's department was soon in flames. Further delay being deemed unsafe and unnecessary, at 4.30 p. m. fire was set to the subsistence stores yet on shore, and as previous preparation had been made, their destruction was complete. Owing to the large amount of subsistence stores on shore, the difficulty of getting vessels on short notice for their reshipment, and the necessity of continuing to send certain supplies to the army in front so long as the communication by railroad remained open, it was impossible to have saved the large amount of stores destroyed at the White House.

Captain Bell and party left the White House at 5.30 p. m. on that day for Fort Monroe, having previously sent all the supply vessels in that direction. The same day instructions were given to Captain Wilson to issue rations freely to all the troops calling for them, and not to stand upon the usual forms; to regulate his movements by those of General Sumner's command, and, previous to abandoning the depot at Orchard Station, to destroy all subsistence stores there that would otherwise fall into the hands of the enemy. Similar instructions were given to Captain Holmes relative to the depot at Savage Station. The hospital near by was well supplied with rations. Previous orders had been given that the men's haversacks and all the wagons possible should be filled and laden with the principal articles of the ration.

On the 29th, the army having commenced the movement to change its base to the James River, the subsistence stores then at the two depots last named were effectually destroyed. The parties that had been in charge of them joined the army, and reported for duty on the march and on our arrival at the James River. Captain Granger was placed in charge of a train of wagons, laden with subsistence stores, to relieve as far as possible any troops running short on the march. He conducted the train, overcoming many difficulties, and issued the stores to the troops holding Malvern Hill.

June 29 Captain Woodward, as directed, moved his herd of beef cattle, then numbering 2,518 head, on the road leading to the James River via White Oak Swamp. The next morning early he crossed the swamp and grazed his cattle not far beyond during the day.

At daylight on the 30th he continued the march, and at 10 a. m. took a by-road, which being free from obstructions, he reached the James River at 3 p. m. No beef cattle were lost on this march, which fact, considering the number in the herd, that the roads for much of the distance were narrow and skirted on either side by thick woods, and were crowded with troops and wagons, certainly reflects great credit on Captain Woodward, John O'Neil, the chief herder, and upon the employés in care of the cattle.

During the night of the 30th all the supplies in the train attached to

headquarters were sent from Haxall's Landing to the troops at Malvern Hill. It was now necessary to have stores brought to the nearest accessible points on the James River with the least possible delay.

By arrangement of the commanding general with Capt. John Rodgers, U. S. Navy, commanding the naval force in that vicinity, early on the morning of July 1 I went on board of the gunboat *Maratanza*, commanded by Commander Thomas H. Stevens, U. S. Navy, and was taken to near Harrison's Landing, where the supply vessels previously sent from Yorktown to meet an emergency, the steamer *J. R. Spaulding*, laden with subsistence stores, and some other vessels were at anchor, all under the protection of gunboats.

As directed, the *J. R. Spaulding* at once proceeded to Carter's Landing, where Captain Wilson, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, was in waiting with a party, and immediately commenced discharging her. Two of the schooners were the same morning towed to Haxall's Landing, the *Maratanza* convoying them. Captain Granger was soon ready with a party at that place, and commenced to discharge and issue the stores.

It having been determined that the army should take position during the night of July 1 at Harrison's Landing, on the evening of that day most of the stores discharged at Carter's Landing were reloaded, and the steamer proceeded to that vicinity. Stores were issued at Haxall's until 11 p. m., when most of those remaining on shore were reshipped. At both places a good supply of rations was left for the wounded and sick. Early the next morning the two schooners were towed by the gunboats to Harrison's Landing.

Capt. G. Bell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, arrived with his supply vessels and entire party at Harrison's Landing on the evening of July 1, and on the morning of the 2d commenced discharging and issuing stores to supply all pressing wants. The Long Wharf was then the only place of landing, and only vessels of medium draught could get to the head of it. Under the circumstances it was impossible to fully supply the army from that point.

On the 3d we obtained possession of the wharf at Westover, where we had greater facilities for discharging and issuing stores than at any previous landing. The herd of beef cattle was driven during the afternoon of the 1st and morning of July 2 to the vicinity of Harrison's Landing, where there was plenty of good feed and water. During the stay of the army here, from July 2 to August 15, it was abundantly supplied with subsistence. Our stores were principally received from New York and Washington. All the beef cattle came from the latter place in steamers, and in schooners in tow of steamers, arranged for the purpose. As soon as arrangements could be made fresh vegetables in large quantities were received from New York, Baltimore, and Norfolk, and soft bread from the latter place and Fort Monroe, and issued as equally as possible to the several commands. Dried apples and peaches and desiccated vegetables were issued continuously from the first. Large quantities of fresh vegetables here, as at the White House, were spoiled. Just before leaving Westover two vessels were loaded with dried fruit alone, which we had on shore for issue.

The army commenced the march for Yorktown and Fort Monroe August 14, each command having been directed to carry with it at least eight days' rations. Early on the morning of the 15th the herd of beef cattle, under Captain Woodward, started for Yorktown via the pontoon bridge over the Chickahominy River, and arrived in that vicinity on the 17th.

On the evening of the 15th, under the direction of Captain Bell, the depot at Westover was broken up, and the supply vessels yet there proceeded to Fort Monroe, the propellers taking the sail vessels and barges in tow. Many of our vessels had previously been sent down the river by the quartermaster's department. For some time we had had from fifty to sixty days' rations for the entire army, ashore and afloat, at Westover. Captain Bell arrived at Fort Monroe on the 16th, and assisted Captain Taylor in discharging vessels and arranging for issuing to the troops on their arrival from above.

On the 18th Capt. A. P. Porter proceeded with a party and several vessels laden with subsistence to Yorktown, where he assisted Capt. E. W. Coffin, the depot commissary of subsistence at that place, in landing stores to supply any wants of the troops passing and to embark at that point.

On the 21st Lieut. Col. G. Bell (promoted from captain) left Fort Monroe and arrived at Aquia Creek the next day. Lieut. Col. A. P. Porter (promoted from captain) arrived at same place the next day from Yorktown. At Aquia Creek every possible assistance was given to the officers of the department on duty there in discharging stores and sending them to the front. On the 28th Lieutenant-Colonel Bell, with his party and a number of supply vessels, arrived at Alexandria.

August 30 Capt. B. Granger was placed in charge of a supply train of seventy-five wagons for General Pope's army, with orders to proceed to Manassas. He arrived at Centreville while that army was engaged in the second battle of Bull Run. He turned over most of his stores to Capt. A. S. Austin, commissary of General Hooker's division. The brigades of Generals Newton and Hancock were also supplied at Centreville.

September 1 Captain Wilson was sent to Fairfax Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, to take charge of the depot previously established at that place for the purpose of supplying the troops of General Pope's army. On the afternoon of the 2d he received orders from Col. E. G. Beckwith, chief commissary of subsistence of that army, to "issue stores to all who required them, but load up the cars with the greatest dispatch, and when loaded go to Alexandria." Captain Wilson complied with his instructions to the satisfaction of all concerned.

Entering upon the Maryland campaign September 8, accompanied by Captain Wilson, I joined the commanding general at Rockville, Md. Each command previous to taking up the march had been directed to carry with it as many days' rations as possible in the wagons and men's haversacks.

On the 10th Lieut. Col. A. P. Porter, assisted by Capt. B. Granger, established a depot for the issue of rations at Rockville. A herd of beef cattle, in charge of Capt. W. R. Murphy, commissary of subsistence of volunteers, had been previously sent to that vicinity. Several canal barges laden with subsistence stores arrived at Seneca Creek from Washington in the night of the 10th, and Capt. W. H. Douglass, commissary of subsistence of volunteers, was placed in charge, to issue to all commands that could be best supplied from that point.

To meet the wants of the army as it advanced, on the 12th the Commissary-General was requested to have 600,000 rations of the principal articles forwarded at the earliest moment possible to Frederick City, or as near to that place as they could be transported by railroad. The same day Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, leaving Lieut. William B. Kimball, Thirteenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, in charge of the

stores at Rockville, with Captain Granger and his force of clerks and laborers, returned to Washington, and as soon as the arrangements were perfected there and in Baltimore proceeded, via the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, for the purpose of establishing a depot at the most advanced point practicable in our possession.

On the 14th the stores ordered forward by the Commissary-General commenced arriving at the Monocacy River. The railroad bridge at that place having been destroyed by the enemy the cars could proceed no further, and a depot was established there, from which the army was mostly supplied until after the battle of Antietam. The wagons of the different commands used for the purpose in charge of the commissaries transported the stores to the points in front where required, and when emptied returned to the depot for further supplies. Some wagon trains, laden with the articles of stores most needed, were dispatched directly from Washington, one of which, in charge of Capt. A. C. Voris, commissary of subsistence of volunteers, was well conducted, and arrived opportunely. Captain Wilson was sent to take temporary charge of the depot at the Monocacy River. He succeeded, under many difficulties, during the evening and night of the 14th, in supplying the demands for rations, and was relieved early the next morning by Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, and rejoined me at headquarters.

Leaving the vicinity of Rockville on the 12th, Captain Murphy, with his herd of beef cattle, followed closely the advance of the army during the campaign, and issued to the commissaries of the different commands as required. Capt. J. H. Woodward left Washington the same day with a large herd of beef cattle. After arriving in the vicinity of the army, during the march he kept sufficiently near, and from time to time issued cattle to Captain Murphy, so that the herd of the latter might be kept full enough in numbers to supply the daily wants of the army in that article. Captain Woodward obtained supplies of beef cattle from Washington by sending back on the road to meet and bring forward the different herds started from that place for him.

Soon after the battles of South Mountain and Antietam there were as many as twenty-two hospitals for the wounded and sick at Frederick City. Lieut. G. T. Castle (now captain and commissary of subsistence, volunteer service) was acting commissary for them, and gave entire satisfaction to all concerned.

Subsequently, on September 17, many of the hospitals established in the vicinity for the wounded and sick were supplied by Capt. J. R. Coxe, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, issuing commissary of subsistence at headquarters, and Captain Buchanan was left near Sharpsburg in charge of a depot for their future supply.

September 21 a subsistence depot was established at Hagerstown, Md., by Capt. W. H. Bell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, assisted by Capt. J. A. Doyle, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service. For some time there was much delay in the transportation of stores over the railroad from Washington and Baltimore to this place. The officers in charge of the depot, however, did all in their power to comply with all requisitions for supplies.

On the 24th Captain Wilson was directed to establish a depot at Sandy Hook, Md. The following day his depot was in full working order, and a large amount of supplies was issued to the troops. The railroad bridge over the Potomac River having been rebuilt October 8, Captain Wilson, leaving Capt. J. C. Read, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, in charge at Sandy Hook, established a depot at Harper's Ferry. The different commands of the army of course drew

supplies from the depots most convenient to them. To be fully prepared to supply the army with stores for the Virginia campaign, the depot at Sandy Hook was broken up on the 25th October and re-established the same day, under Capt. J. C. Read, at Berlin. A large portion of the army crossed the Potomac at this point, the remainder crossing at Harper's Ferry.

As soon as the troops commenced crossing the river a depot was established at Lovettsville, Va., and Lieut. G. W. Chandler, Eighth Michigan Volunteers, acting commissary of subsistence, placed in charge. Captain Wilson, having previously been relieved from duty at Harper's Ferry, and directed to proceed to Alexandria for the purpose, left the latter place with his force of clerks and laborers and a train of cars laden with subsistence stores November 3, and the same day established a principal depot at Manassas, from which to establish sub-depots for supplying the army when it should come sufficiently near the lines of railroad on its march from Berlin toward Warrenton, Va.

November 6 Captain Wilson opened a depot at Thoroughfare Gap. He closed it the same day, and the next day established depots at White Plains and Salem. The grade of the railroad being heavy, and the track in bad condition, it was impossible to transport more than a limited amount of stores to the depots just named. That any reached them in season was mainly due to the energy and perseverance of Captain Wilson and his assistants. They were broken up, and the grand depot established at Gainesville on the 8th, from which point and Manassas (the stores being forwarded promptly by railroad from the depot at Alexandria) the army was supplied until depots were established at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, November 10 and 11. Lieutenant-Colonel Porter was left in charge of all the subsistence depots on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. As soon as the troops had advanced into Virginia and ceased to draw stores from Lovettsville and Berlin, in compliance with directions given him he had the stores then remaining at those depots removed to Harper's Ferry, and, in addition, sent from Frederick City sufficient to make an aggregate of 600,000 rations at the former place.

Leaving at Frederick City a month's supply for the troops and hospitals there and in that vicinity, the balance of the stores were reshipped from that depot to Alexandria. Lieutenant-Colonel Porter also prepared with his party to proceed to the same place, to be in readiness for further duty with the army. Captains Woodward and Murphy, with their herds of beef cattle, followed closely the army into Virginia, having the same relation to the troops and to each other that they had in the campaign of Maryland.

November 2 a large herd of beef cattle, held in readiness on the south side of the Potomac, moved forward in charge of Capt. M. R. Caine, commissary of subsistence of volunteers, in the direction of Manassas and Gainesville to meet the army. It arrived in good season, and other herds were subsequently received in a like manner.

During the Maryland campaign and the march of the army into Virginia the department had to depend altogether upon its own resources to unload and reload its stores at the depots and to perform other necessary duties foreign to it.

Major-General McClellan was relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac at Rectortown, Va., November 7, 1862.

Throughout the campaigns of the Peninsula, Maryland, and Virginia, no complaint of moment against the subsistence department reached

my ear, and I believe it gave general satisfaction to the army, the Government, and to the country.

The following are the numbers and classes of vessels laden with subsistence stores discharged by the laborers of the subsistence department while on the Peninsula. More than nine-tenths of them had entire cargoes:

Class.	April.	May.	June.	July.	August, 15 days.	Total.
Ships, barks, brigs, and schooners.....	7	46	54	28	8	143
Steamers	3	2	6	33	19	63
Propellers	13	23	21	22	13	92
Barges and canal-boats	10	23	2	1	41
Total	33	99	83	84	40	339

This includes two large ships, and many barks, brigs, schooners, and propellers of the largest size. Besides, we loaded a number of vessels of different classes with supplies in changing depots from one place to another. In some cases we were compelled to lighter vessels as far distant as 35 miles from the depot. One hundred and twenty-two vessels with subsistence stores intended for this army and sent to the Peninsula were afterward discharged at Alexandria. There was not a vessel consigned for the subsistence department of this army while it was on the Peninsula that has not been satisfactorily traced up and accounted for.

The steam-hoisting arrangement on a barge for discharging vessels, furnished by the Quartermaster's Department on our recommendation, enabled us to gain both in time and labor and successfully meet any urgent demands for stores. It proved invaluable, and was true economy to the Government.

The sheet-iron ovens furnished by the department and used by several of the commands at Harrison's Landing proved a decided success.

But little of the large supply of "extract of coffee" sent to us was issued, the troops as a general thing preferring to do without coffee altogether than to use it. The ration of it was too small by one-half, and it was believed to produce diarrhea.

The following suggestions and remarks may be of value in future operations:

When salt beef or pork is for immediate use a reduction for wagon transportation of 56 pounds per barrel can be made by cutting the heads of the barrels in such a manner as to allow the brine to escape.

If each brigade commissary were provided with a wagon containing a box to fit the entire inside of it, divided off into a sufficient number of compartments for beans, rice, coffee, sugar, salt, and weights and measures, keeping them constantly full, the heavy loss by broken packages would be avoided and the convenience be great. A wagon could be retained for the purpose, or the box be removed when in a permanent camp and again replaced when necessary to move.

When movements are made similar to those of the Peninsular Campaign it would be advantageous to have a boat fitted up with cooking arrangements for supplying small detachments of troops with a meal immediately on their landing.

The reduction of the ration to its old standard for field service, allowing, in addition to it, the present issues of fresh vegetables, would fur-

nish the troops while on that service with quite as much food as they use, and be a source of saving to the Government.

The success of the subsistence department of the Army of the Potomac is attributable to the following circumstances:

The department at Washington made ample previous provision for sending supplies to the Peninsula, and subsequently promptly complied with all the requisitions and requests made of it for this army during that and the Maryland and Virginia campaigns. It moreover gave its advice and countenance to the officers charged with its duties and reputation in the field, and those officers worked together in perfect harmony for the public good. From first to last the commanding general had entire confidence in the disposition and ability of the department to accomplish all that would be required of it.

The number and efficiency of the officers kept on depot duty and of the employés engaged, besides our dependence upon ourselves in all matters whether legitimately belonging to our department or not, materially conduced to our success. During the Peninsular Campaign we assumed control over all vessels laden with subsistence stores, and kept in reserve for emergencies several propellers so laden, using them besides for towing purposes when required. In very many cases the officers of the department superintended in person and gave all necessary orders for making up tows and changing the location of vessels from one depot to another. The valuable services rendered to this army by Col. Amos Beckwith, aide-de-camp and commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, depot commissary at Washington, D. C., from the commencement of the war, cannot be estimated. He gave his advice and assistance in fitting out our expeditions, and subsequently forwarded most promptly beef cattle and other supplies for the army. He has been untiring in the performance of his arduous duties, and never once failed us.

The name of Capt. George Bell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army (now lieutenant-colonel), appears frequently in this report, and always connected with highly important duties. He was charged with establishing depots on the Peninsula and with their administration. Previous to leaving Washington in March of last year he provided a large force of clerks and employés, and otherwise fitted himself out with such admirable foresight that he was prepared for every emergency, and on the first occasion, and ever thereafter, accomplished much more necessary work than properly pertained to the department at the different depots. His duties were constant, of the greatest moment, and laborious; yet he ever performed them at the proper time and in the right way. The services of Capt. A. P. Porter, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army (now lieutenant-colonel), were highly important. For more than two months after the commencement of the Peninsular Campaign he was the only officer immediately assisting Captain Bell in his various duties, and ably did he sustain him. He gave his attention and assistance in constructing temporary wharves at the different points of landing, in establishing depots, discharging vessels, in supplying rations for the troops on the shortest possible notice, and on every occasion on which they were required or could be useful. While acting on his own responsibility during the Maryland campaign, he sustained, if he could not improve, his reputation as one of the best officers of the department.

It has already been noticed that in the establishment and administration of depots at advanced points on the line of railroad and otherwise on the Peninsula, during the Maryland campaign, and again in Virginia, Capt. Thomas Wilson, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army

(not yet promoted), rendered highly valuable services. In the accomplishment of his duties he had many serious obstacles to overcome. His never-flagging energy and perseverance always enabled him to achieve the desired results. Besides the services of Capt. Brownell Granger, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, already referred to, he gave important assistance at the depot. He was always ready and willing, and ever discharged his duties with promptness, intelligence, and entire success.

Capt. W. H. Bell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, successfully managed affairs at the Hagerstown subsistence depot.

The duties of Capt. J. H. Woodward, commissary of subsistence of volunteers, with the beef-cattle herds on the Peninsula, during the Maryland and Virginia campaigns, were laborious and highly important. He performed them to the entire satisfaction of all concerned. And Capt. W. R. Murphy, commissary of subsistence of volunteers, charged with like duties in the last two campaigns mentioned, was likewise successful in their performance.

Besides the officers already mentioned, Capts. R. Holmes, J. C. Read, A. B. Mott, H. M. Swift, R. C. Stickney, J. A. Doyle, D. D. Wiley, G. S. Leland, J. Benedict, G. F. Thompson, commissaries of subsistence, volunteer service, at different times assisted at the depots and acquitted themselves with much credit.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. F. CLARKE,

Colonel, Aide-de-Camp, and Commissary of Subsistence.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General Army of the Potomac.

No. 10.

Report of Surgeon Charles S. Tripler, U. S. Army, Medical Director, Army of the Potomac, of operations from March 17 to July 3.

DETROIT, MICH., February 7, 1863.

GENERAL: In compliance with your instructions I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the medical department of the Army of the Potomac during the time I was connected with it as medical director:

This time naturally divides itself into two periods: The first* embracing the time from the beginning of the organization of that army to that of its taking the field; the second from the latter time to the completion of the change of base to Harrison's Landing, on the James River.

* * * * *

PART II.

The army being about to take the field, certain measures preparatory to the movement suggested themselves.

I may mention here that a great deal of presumptuous intermeddling with the medical department of this army occurred from time to time.

* Part I appears in Series I, Vol. V, pp. 76-113.

Sensation preachers, village doctors, and strong-minded women, suddenly smitten with a more intimate knowledge and thorough perception of the duties and administration of the medical department of an army than I had been able to acquire in more than thirty years' experience and study, obtruded their crude suggestions, and marring when they could not make, and paralyzing when they attempted to quicken, succeeded by their uninformed zeal, innocently enough, perhaps, but not the less unfortunately on that account, in defeating measures I had much at heart, had carefully contemplated, and intended to carry into effect at the proper time.

There were a number of medical officers of the army on duty in the hospitals in Washington who in my opinion ought to have taken the field when the army moved, and it had always been my intention to put them there at that time; but while the hospital system was being organized their services were required in instructing others without military experience in the method of administering those establishments, that they might be made capable of carrying them on when the public service should require the regular medical officers in the field. In the middle of January some members of the Sanitary Commission undertook to regulate this matter for me, by urging that citizens should be employed in the hospitals and the army surgeons sent into the field, at the same time asserting that citizens were as capable of performing the hospital duties as the officers—a matter about which they knew nothing, and as to which they were not called upon to express nor competent to form an opinion. In the end I was defeated in this very matter. I might, perhaps, have accomplished it if I had been let alone.

Early in March the sick were removed from the field to the general hospitals. Convalescents were left in the camps, that they might the more readily be returned to duty when well, and that they might form a part of the garrison of the works when the army was put in motion. Instructions for the government of the medical officers in battle were prepared, in which minute directions were given as to the manner of forming field depots for the wounded, the organization of the parties of medical officers to serve at each, the methods of preparing for the refreshment and professional care of the wounded when brought in, the distribution and employment of the Ambulance Corps, &c. I succeeded in getting a small supply of portable soup from the subsistence department, which was distributed to the regimental surgeons, and its use strictly limited to times of battle.

The different regiments being all supplied with medicines, stores, hospital tents, &c., and a wagon each to transport their supplies, and the sick requiring it having been removed from the camps to the hospitals, the army, so far as my department was concerned, was ready to move. On the 11th day of March it was put in motion for Fairfax Court-House. The enemy having disappeared from our front a return to Alexandria was ordered, and after an interview with yourself, in which I received instructions to govern me for further arrangements, I left Fairfax Court-House for Washington at night-fall of the 14th of March.

In the mean time orders had been issued in Washington limiting your command to the Army of the Potomac in the field and organizing that army into corps. The latter order so changed the organization as to make it necessary and expedient to assign an experienced medical officer to each corps as a medical director, the idea of a *corps d'armée* being that it should be a complete army in itself. Here I intended to bring in the senior medical officers of the army in the hospitals in

Washington as medical directors. I intended so to distribute them; to break up the Washington arrangements; to send purveyor as well as hospital surgeon into the field—in short, to transfer everything in Washington to Fort Monroe, whither you informed me we were to proceed. On my arrival in Washington the Surgeon-General informed me that he had resumed the control of hospitals and purveyor; that I must use my inspectors for medical directors, and appoint another purveyor, as the one in Washington could not be spared. I was further informed that I could not strip Washington of supplies; that I could take part of what was there, and that the remainder of what I wanted would be ordered from New York to meet me at Fort Monroe. I was obliged to acquiesce. I then addressed to the Surgeon-General the letter in the appendix marked M.

A medical purveyor was appointed and ordered to report to me from Baltimore. This officer promptly obeyed, but was in too feeble health to undertake the duty. I then substituted Asst. Surg. R. H. Alexander, of the Army, who entered upon and continued to discharge the duty up to the time I was relieved at Harrison's Bar. The medical directors were assigned to corps as follows: Keeney to Sumner's, Brown to Keyes', Milhau to Heintzelman's, and Magruder to McDowell's. Keeney and Milhau had been my inspectors, and had acquired valuable experience as such during the four months they had been employed on that duty. I had left Keeney in Washington to attend to the business of my office during my absence at Fairfax Court-House. Sumner's corps, to which he was assigned, having been left for a time in the vicinity of Manassas, Keeney remained behind when I joined at Fairfax Seminary. Without consultation with the headquarters of the army to which he belonged, he was relieved and J. F. Hammond substituted. This officer joined General Sumner promptly and conducted the business of his department well, but I cannot help complaining of the act itself as inexpedient and unjust. I remonstrated against it at the time upon principle, but without avail.

The medical directors having been finally arranged to the corps, I prepared for their use the instructions in the appendix marked N.

On the 17th March I saw General Van Vliet in Washington in reference to ambulances. He told me that 36 four-wheeled were then *en route* from Perryville for Fort Monroe; that he would send 86 more from Washington, and 140 two-wheeled in addition to those then in possession of the regiments. This was the best that could be done. Those from Perryville reached Fort Monroe in good season, and were distributed by Captain Sawtelle, and the others did not arrive until from April 9 to May 1.

March 29 the headquarters were transferred to the steamer Commodore, at Alexandria. While still at the wharf, the Sanitary Commission made application for three representatives of that association to be permitted to accompany the army and for facilities for transporting such supplies as they might think proper to send. The matter being referred to me, I agreed to the proposal upon certain conditions, which were accepted, and which I afterwards indorsed upon their official communication as follows: "The proposal of the Sanitary Commission has my concurrence, provided their agents shall consult with me before making issues to the troops, and that their reports shall be submitted to my inspection before they are transmitted for publication." These terms were agreed to, but not observed. It is proper I should now give my reasons for imposing them.

The Sanitary Commission, through the courtesy of Dr. Wood, Acting

Surgeon-General, had been placed in a semi-official position by the Secretary of War, and had been active in soliciting and obtaining many comforts for the inmates of our military hospitals, which they were engaged in distributing very liberally wherever an opportunity offered. While the army was encamped at Washington I had no control over these issues. By urgent appeals to the patriotism of the people their store-houses were kept well filled. So long as we remained at Washington there could be no difficulty about transportation, and there was but little ground for apprehension that the supply would fail. When we moved to the Peninsula the case was altered. Holding the relation that body did to the public and to the army, we had a right to look to them for such supplies as our wounded might need, and which could be obtained from no other source. Moreover, I knew that every pound of transportation was an object in the field. I determined, therefore, to economize their resources, that they should not be unnecessarily squandered in the camps, but should be kept in reserve, when they could be commanded in any emergency, such as a battle or the fitting up a hospital or a hospital ship. I considered further that it was not honest to solicit these contributions from the public upon the plea of urgent necessity, and then wasting where there was no necessity. The rich gave money. It was not proposed to distribute that, and it could not have been used upon the Peninsula if it had been. The poor gave the labor of their hands in making up articles of clothing and the like for the sick and wounded. They had a right to be assured that their contributions should be carefully and judiciously used. I had reason to believe that in many instances they had not been so used, and I desired to arrest this abuse if it really did exist, as well as to prevent it if attempted.

At the earnest solicitation of Mr. Olmstead I was afterwards induced to withdraw this stipulation, he assuring me that the contributions of the public were so large that they could not find store-room for them unless they were allowed to dispense them *ad libitum*, and that he would pledge himself to have at my command 15,000 sets of clothing and dressings at any time a battle should come off. At that time I was expecting about 6,000 casualties at Yorktown.

April 1 the headquarters left Alexandria and arrived at Fort Monroe on the 2d at 6 p. m. The next day I had an interview with Dr. Cuyler, and arranged with him for the reception of 1,000 wounded in the hospitals under his charge. I had been in hopes of getting more room, but was convinced it could not be safely relied upon. On the 4th we marched to Great Bethel, and on the 5th, through a heavy rain, to a cluster of huts some 5 miles from Yorktown. On the 6th I visited Heintzelman's position in front of Yorktown, inspected his hospital department, and found that his medical director, Milhau, had made excellent arrangements for his field hospitals in case of a battle. Some of the depots, however, proved afterwards to be within range of the enemy's guns, and we were obliged to abandon them.

On the 7th I went to Ship Point and inspected the rebel huts there. We had then three large clusters of huts, most of them nearly new and in good condition—one at Ship Point, one about 4 miles from there on the road to Yorktown, and the third at our own camp, near the road to Fort Monroe. These, with a few small dilapidated meeting-houses and private dwellings, scattered from Young's Mill to Cheeseman's Creek, were afterwards used as hospitals. The accommodations afforded by these buildings, it was evident, would not be adequate to our wants, even with the 1,000 provided for at Fort

Monroe, in case of a severe action at Yorktown. The country, also, from Warwick Court-House to York River at our position was but a succession of swamps, that in warm weather would be too prolific of malarial poison to admit of our establishing military hospitals there. I therefore determined to arrange, if possible, with the department at Washington for the reception of all the wounded in excess of the 1,000 at some of the hospitals North. Colonel Ingalls agreed promptly to transport my men from any point on York River to such hospitals as I might indicate. With this understanding I telegraphed and wrote to the Acting Surgeon-General on the 14th of April. (See appendix O.)

April 20 I received a reply from Dr. Wood, acceding to my proposal, and making certain suggestions as to sending certain classes of wounds to particular points. That seemed to me to be difficult of execution, if not impracticable. I had at that time made arrangements to keep a hospital steamer constantly at Cheeseman's Landing for the reception of wounded only. It was necessary that this hospital should receive all the wounded indiscriminately.

On the 13th six eminent surgeons, deputed by the Governor of Massachusetts by authority of the Secretary of War, arrived in camp and offered their services. They were particularly charged to look after the Massachusetts Volunteers, but with a zeal as creditable as it was rare, and a patriotism as conspicuous as it was disinterested, they expressed their readiness and their desire to render their services wherever they could be most useful. The party consisted of Drs. Cabot, Hodges, Gay, Parks, Hartwell, and Homans. A part of these gentlemen were assigned to the Massachusetts troops in Sumner's corps; the others fitted up a portion of the huts on the Ship Point road as a field hospital for the regulars. They had precisely the same means as every other surgeon had. With these means they were soon at the head of a model establishment for the field. After the evacuation of Yorktown and the battle of Williamsburg they repaired promptly to the town, and there rendered most important services to the wounded.

On the 19th Prof. Henry H. Smith, Surgeon-General of Pennsylvania, arrived with the steamer Wm. Whildin, completely fitted up with bedding, stores, instruments, a corps of 18 surgeons and dressers, and a full complement of Sisters of Charity for nurses. He brought with him also the means of embalming the bodies of the dead. This kind office he cheerfully performed for numbers of men from other States. Surgeon-General Smith, upon being informed of my plans, entered into them with hearty good-will, and seconded them with an earnest zeal and a refreshing intelligence that showed he had not acquired his knowledge of hospital administration in Laputa. Soon after his arrival the steamer Commodore was assigned to me by the Quartermaster's Department. Dr. Smith took charge of her equipment, and in a short time had her ready to receive 900 wounded. This vessel and the Wm. Whildin then became our receiving ships, one of which was to be constantly in position to receive the wounded.

Soon after our arrival in front of Yorktown malarial and typhoid fevers again appeared, though not with any alarming rapidity. The greatest proportion occurred in Keyes' corps, on our left. The country occupied by him was the worst on the Peninsula, and, in addition to that, one of his divisions was composed of our newest troops. Desirous of keeping the army as little encumbered as possible with sick, that its movements might not be embarrassed on that account, I took measures to send to the North those too ill to move with us.

On the 17th of April 315 such patients were reported to me—a very small number considering the strength of the army, the wretched weather, the character of the country, &c. The transport Massachusetts was prepared for them, and on the 20th was dispatched for Annapolis. Adhering to the same plan as other men fell sick, I provided the means of transporting them also, and for this purpose I availed myself of the services of the Sanitary Commission. May 1, Mr. Olmstead, the secretary of that association, had one boat, the Daniel Webster No. 1, in his possession, a steamer on which he could carry 250 patients. At his request I procured the Ocean Queen, a steamer of the largest class of sea-going ships, and turned her over to him. He agreed to fit her up in forty-eight hours after getting possession of her. It took rather longer than that, however, and then she carried but about three-fifths of the number she should have carried.

Of course in inaugurating a system of this kind under our circumstances some delays, some awkwardness, and some confusion were to be expected. If I had had at my disposal a few medical officers of experience, these arrangements could have been made with more rapidity and precision. As it was, with the exception of the Surgeon-General of Pennsylvania, I had no one on the water who had the faculty of rapid systemization, but all seemed disposed to do the best they could, and I believe the operations at Yorktown were fully as successful as could have been hoped for. Mr. Knapp, an agent of the Sanitary Commission, was particularly zealous—a little too much so at times. Without my knowledge he took possession of the Commodore, intending to fit her up and officer her with New York surgeons to send to New York with wounded. This did not suit my views at all, and would simply have rendered that steamer less than half as efficient as I intended she should be. Of course I forbade that, but I agreed to give him the Elm City, the next steamer, with perhaps permission to go to New York.

In the mean time a few of our men were being wounded and treated in our hospitals. On the 17th April General Smith had an important affair on our left, in which 32 men were reported to me as killed and 100 wounded. The wounded were sent to the hospital ships. On the 26th 12 men of a Massachusetts regiment were wounded and sent to the ships. In irregular firing during the siege several more of our men were wounded, and disposed of in the same manner.

I have already stated that the army was well supplied with medical stores and the means of transporting them before it was put in motion. What was my surprise, then, so soon as we were in position before Yorktown, to find my office flooded with requisitions for more. Upon inquiry, I found that these things had in many instances been left by the troops in their old camps. Liquors had very generally disappeared. Various excuses were rendered that were not satisfactory. The medical officers seemed to suppose that the medical director was to furnish them with fresh supplies at every change of position, and had taken no pains to transport their stores from Washington to the Peninsula. It was some time before I could remedy this piece of improvidence at all. My store-ship, after having reached Fort Monroe, was detained there by a storm, and when she reached Ship Point it was found very difficult to land her supplies. I succeeded finally in getting her a berth at Cheeseman's Creek, and was then enabled to get on more rapidly. My supplies of stimulants, however, being very limited—those ordered from New York not arriving till very late—I was compelled to refuse to issue to the regiments the little on hand, for the purpose of being sure of having some at least in the event of a battle. I distributed what we

had to the medical directors of corps, with instructions for its prudent use. (See appendix P.)

The first of the large supply from New York reached Fort Monroe April 14; the last did not reach the purveyor until the 1st of May. These supplies were shipped by different vessels, and were mingled with other stores, so that they could not be got at until after tedious and vexatious delays.

On the 9th of May I wrote and telegraphed to the Surgeon-General for bedding, &c., hoping it might be ordered up immediately from Fort Monroe. It was dispatched from Washington the next day, and reached us at White House, but at a much later date than I had hoped for. I telegraphed to the Surgeon-General on the 16th of May and wrote him fully on the 19th. (Appendix R.) On the next day some of them arrived. (Appendix R.) On the 29th nearly all were received. (Appendix S.) On the 2d of June another invoice of 556 packages was received at White House from New York.

To avoid the delay attendant upon sending requisitions to me during the important operations before Richmond on the 27th of May, I authorized the medical directors of corps to approve of them, and directed the purveyor to issue upon their orders. On the 23d of May I directed the purveyor to purchase a large quantity of portable soup and to distribute it to the several corps. On the 11th of June I directed the medical directors of the corps to see to it that their regiments were supplied with everything necessary and to fill up all deficiencies immediately. (Appendix S².) This done, there seemed to be no more that I could do to insure that a sufficiency of all necessary supplies should be on hand in the conflicts soon to occur. If any regiment suffered afterward for want of these things it was due to the negligence or inefficiency of their own officers. There was an abundance of supplies at White House. The way to procure them was not only indicated, but the medical officers were repeatedly enjoined to provide themselves in season, and the chiefs of corps were directed to see that they did so provide.

The works in front of Yorktown being nearly ready for the bombardment and assault, on the 27th of April I proceeded by your order to select positions for the field depots for our wounded on the right. I was accompanied by Captain Abbot, of the Engineers, and was governed by his advice as to protection from the fire of the enemy. While engaged in this duty several shots were thrown by the enemy at our working parties, and from observation of their effect and direction I was satisfied that the positions selected would afford all the protection required for our operations. On the 29th I proceeded to Sumner's position, and with the assistance of General Sedgwick a similar selection of depots was made for the front of that corps.

Immediately afterward the embarkation of the sick was commenced. Sumner's, Heintzelman's, and a part of Keyes' corps were relieved. A letter in the appendix, marked S³, will show what hospital resources we had at that time.

May 2 I telegraphed to the medical director of Keyes' corps to break up his hospital at Young's Mill, and the 4th to concentrate his sick, with a suitable allowance of medical officers, nurses, and subsistence, and to keep his transportation well in hand for any further movement. The same date I inquired for how many men he would want accommodation. The next morning the officer left in charge of the sick at Warwick Court-House reported 232 men; before night they had increased to 800. I then sent an assistant of my own to see to the matter, and before his task was completed more than 1,200 were collected in the

woods and elsewhere from that corps alone. I mention these things to show how little reports of sick, even when they could be had, were to be depended upon in making my estimates for transportation and for hospitals. Not that untrue reports were made by the surgeons, but whenever a march was undertaken straggling was permitted to go on unrestrained, and I fear was sometimes even encouraged by officers whose duty it was to have prevented it. I had frequent occasions to ask attention to this evil during the campaign.

The boats of the Sanitary Commission were employed in transferring some of the sick to the North, and by the 9th of May they had relieved us of 950. We then had 2,000 on hand in Yorktown. I placed Assistant Surgeon Greenleaf, of my staff, at this hospital, who organized and conducted it admirably well. When the pressure was over he was relieved and rejoined me at headquarters.

May 4 the enemy evacuated Yorktown. General Stoneman was sent in pursuit, and on that day he lost 3 killed and 28 wounded. The latter were brought to the rear and placed on the Commodore. The next day the battle of Williamsburg took place. In the night I was directed to send transportation to Queen's Creek for 300 wounded. The Commodore was immediately dispatched in charge of one of my assistants. At noon of the 6th she returned to Yorktown, having been unable to effect a landing, on account of the shoal water. I procured a lighter from Colonel Ingalls, and taking charge of the Commodore myself, proceeded with her to Queen's Creek. Surgeon-General Smith accompanied me. The water was so shallow the steamer could get no nearer than 2 miles to the landing. Lieutenant Remey, of the Navy, boarded us, and courteously offered to land us in his boat. Leaving orders for the lighter to follow up the creek as soon as she came up, Dr. Smith and myself went ashore, set the ambulances in motion, collected from the depots 100 of our wounded, and got them comfortably on the Commodore by 3 a. m. One hundred wounded prisoners were collected in one of the field works near the landing.

The next morning, having organized the ambulance train, I left Dr. Smith to ship the remainder of the wounded, including the prisoners, and boarding a tug, I hastened back to Yorktown to make further arrangements. Here I was met by an order to hurry to Williamsburg to see to the wounded there. Having dispatched the Pennsylvania steamer Whildin to Queen's Creek, accompanied by my senior assistant, Dr. A. K. Smith, of the Army, I hastened to Williamsburg. Here I was joined by a party of able and distinguished surgeons from New York, consisting of Drs. James R. Wood, David L. Rogers, Krackowitzer, Stone, Ayres, and others. Drs. Cabot, Hitchcock, and Bronson, of Massachusetts, were also promptly on the ground. The hospitals were distributed among these gentlemen. I need scarcely say that the wounded received at their hands the most prompt and skillful attention. All the wounded in Williamsburg, comprising about 700 of our own men and 333 of the enemy, had the benefit of their care. The remainder of the wounded were attended to in the field depots near the James and York Rivers.

The whole number of killed in that conflict reported to me was 460, and of wounded 1,474.* Four hundred and thirty-three wounded prisoners were left upon our hands. Many of our men were so slightly wounded it was not necessary to send them to the hospitals. Of the prisoners 60 were too badly wounded to be removed. They were left in Williams-

* But see revised statement, p. 450.

burg, under the care of Dr. D. L. Rogers, of New York. The remainder were ordered to Fort Monroe on the transports. Eight hundred of our men and 100 prisoners were sent to Fort Monroe on the Commodore, and 427 of our men and 273 prisoners on the Wm. Whildin and other transports. The Whildin sailed direct for Philadelphia. On the 11th of May the embarkation of our own wounded was completed. The prisoners from the town of Williamsburg were embarked the next morning.

When the enemy was brought to bay at Williamsburg the corps of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes advanced rapidly upon their position. A drenching rain began in the night of the 5th and continued the next day. I was informed that many of the regiments left their camps with nothing in their haversacks. They had no shelter from the rain, and nothing to eat. The roads were shocking. It seemed almost impossible to get supplies to them. Their privations were consequently extreme. As a natural result, when the columns were again put in motion a large number of men were thrown on my hands—some of them sick, most of them tired and exhausted. They came straggling in from the rear of the army, without reports, nurses, or subsistence. It was impossible to create hospitals for all these men at Williamsburg. I therefore caused a selection to be made for transportation to the rear, and ordered up one of the boats in charge of the Sanitary Commission from Yorktown to receive them. This boat, the Elm City, reached me during the afternoon of the 12th. I directed her, after she was filled up, to proceed to Washington. The remainder of the sick were left in Williamsburg, under the care of Dr. Bronson and the medical officer of General Grover's brigade. I have seen it stated in a New York paper that no provision was made for the shelter or professional care of the wounded at Williamsburg except by the Sanitary Commission. If this statement concerned me alone it would not be worth noticing, but in justice to others I feel called upon to say that no agent or member of the Commission was employed in any capacity at Williamsburg until after all our wounded had been embarked. The medical officers of the army and volunteers, Dr. Cabot's party from Massachusetts, Dr. Wood's from New York, and Dr. Smith's from Pennsylvania, performed the whole work.

About the same time, to afford further relief to our hospitals, a few more of our sick men were sent North. On the 11th May 225 were dispatched from Yorktown, and on the 12th 500 more. On the 13th the steamer Donaldson reported to me at Williamsburg from Franklin's division. She was ordered to take subsistence and hospital stores on board at Yorktown and then to proceed to Alexandria. The number of men she had on board was not reported nor the authority by which she came down.

On the 9th May General Franklin fought at West Point. Dr. Hamilton, his medical director, reported 49 killed and 131 wounded.* He reported also the great efficiency of the Ambulance Corps, organized under your orders October 3, 1861. One of the men of that corps was killed while engaged in removing the wounded.

On the 7th of May we had 9 men of the Sixth Cavalry wounded in a skirmish near New Kent Court-House. They were cared for in the houses in the neighborhood.

Matters being arranged at Williamsburg, I moved on the evening of the 13th to rejoin headquarters. Bivouacking at night on the road, I

* But see revised statement, p. 618.

reached Cumberland at noon on the 14th. Here I found a number of sick, reported as unable to go on. It was raining hard, and the roads were almost impracticable. It was necessary to make some provision for the sick. I took a small tug at night and went down the river until I reached the steamer *Commodore*. The master of the vessel refused to go up the river without a pilot, as it would vitiate his insurance. I applied to the provost-marshal at Eltham for a pilot. He knew of none. Chancing to hear of the mate of a brig about sailing for home who was said to know the river, I sent him an order in your name to repair on board the *Commodore* immediately and take her up. I succeeded in getting her to Cumberland, and thus provided a hospital. Leaving her in position, on the 16th I moved with the headquarters to White House.

This being the new base of operations, it was necessary to establish a general hospital there. There were no buildings at all fit for the purpose, so to meet present necessities I resorted to the use of tents. A detail was ordered to pitch them. It was sluggishly furnished and most inefficient when it reported. Under the superintendence of Brigade-Surgeon Baxter, one of the best officers in the service, with 150 men we succeeded in two days' work in getting but 34 tents pitched. At the end of four days 100 were ready—all we could command. Cooking caldrons were got in readiness, subsistence procured, bed-sacks filled, &c., without delay.

The army being again in motion, more sick and a multitude of stragglers rushed in upon us. Our store-ship and the hospital transports being up, I detailed the *Daniel Webster No. 1* to convey a party of the worst cases to Boston. These men were ordered to be selected with great care from those in the hospital tents. Two hundred and sixty was the number to be received. Before one-half this number was sent from the hospital the ship was reported filled. Stragglers had rushed on board without authority and taken possession. I sent a brigade surgeon to expel them, but without avail. I then determined to send no more men from the Peninsula on account of sickness if there were any means of avoiding it. Orders in relation to the selection of cases were useless. I am sure that hundreds of malingerers succeeded in deserting their colors on the hospital transports in spite of every effort of mine to prevent it. The regimental officers might have prevented it. I could not.

After the 260 had left on the *Daniel Webster* I found 1,020 in the hospital tents, and of these 900 were reported to me by the medical officers in charge as men with such trifling ailments that they should never have been permitted to fall to the rear. A letter to the medical director of Keyes' corps (appendix S⁴) will show how I endeavored to prevent such abuses. Another, marked S⁵, shows the capacity and organization of the general hospitals at White House and Yorktown.

Much censure and abuse having been indulged in toward you as well as myself for not having appropriated the dwelling at White House to the general hospital, I append a copy of a special report made to you on that subject. (See appendix T.) While still at White House, I received a telegram from the front that scurvy had appeared in two brigades of the army, one of these being the regulars. I could scarcely credit the accuracy of the information. I knew that that brigade had obeyed orders issued in relation to the use of vegetables and the manner of cooking their rations. Still I did not think it prudent to disregard the report, and accordingly I telegraphed to Washington for lemons and potash. I procured a few boxes of lemons from the stores

of the Sanitary Commission at once, and carried them with me to the front. Having set the hospital at White House in motion, Brigade Surgeon Baxter in charge, I loaded three wagons with hospital supplies, and on the 21st May started once more in pursuit of the army. I found headquarters at Tunstall's Station. The next day they were advanced to Cold Harbor. Here I investigated the report with regard to scurvy, and found it to be erroneous. I, however, requested the Adjutant-General to compel the men to use desiccated vegetables, and to make and use soup daily unless that were rendered impossible by reason of being actually on the march; the use of fried fresh meat to be absolutely forbidden; boiled or roasted beef to be substituted.

On the 23d I returned to White House, and the next day proceeded to Yorktown to inspect the hospitals there. I found them in want of some articles of clothing and bedding, but generally in good order and well arranged. One of them, in the Nelson House, with Miss Dix for housekeeper, was very neat. On my return I inspected the hospital ships, made arrangements for completing their equipments, and directed the Sanitary Commission to send 1,000 shirts, 300 wrappers, 300 pairs of slippers, and 1,000 sheets to the Yorktown hospital. I then inspected the hospital at White House, made contracts with nineteen physicians from Massachusetts (sent promptly by the Surgeon-General of that State in answer to a telegram from me), placed eight of them on duty at White House, and sent the remainder to Yorktown to relieve as many regimental medical officers, who were forthwith ordered to their regiments. I found stragglers still coming into the hospitals—some really sick, who said they had been sent by their surgeons. On my return to headquarters I met 125 just coming into Dispatch Station to take the train—sent down in ambulances in direct violation of the standing orders of the army. I inspected these men on the spot, and sent a number back to their regiments. When I reached my tent I again brought this matter to the notice of the headquarters, feeling convinced we should soon have no army unless this practice was arrested. (See appendix U.)

May 27 General F. J. Porter fought and defeated the enemy at Hanover Court-House. In this battle there were reported to me 62 killed and 210 wounded.* Of the latter, 138 only went into the hospital. One hundred and twenty-three wounded prisoners fell into our hands. Ambulances were promptly sent for the wounded, and hospitals prepared for them in William Gaines' and Hogan's houses and outhouses. Hogan's house being under fire, I was afterward obliged to remove the inmates (prisoners) to Dr. Gaines' buildings, below. The wounded having been collected and attended to, I requested Colonel Ingalls to order the Knickerbocker to be in readiness to receive them that day (30th). I also directed the Elm City to carry 400 sick from White House to Yorktown. These boats were in possession of the Sanitary Commission. Neither of them were ready. I then directed our own boat, the Commodore, to be placed in position to receive the wounded, and requested Surgeon-General Smith to take the general direction of affairs at that point. (See appendix V.)

I then substituted the Daniel Webster No. 2 for the Elm City to convey the sick. This was met by further objection, and I was obliged to reiterate the order peremptorily, with instructions to the surgeon in charge of the hospital to call upon Colonel Ingalls to order the boat up and send the men off if there were any trouble. One hundred and

* But see revised statement, p. 635.

four wounded were sent down and received by Dr. Smith on the Commodore that day; of these 47 were prisoners. It was intended to remove the remainder of the wounded the next day, but a heavy rain coming on, we were obliged to defer it. That day at 2 p. m. the enemy attacked our left flank at Fair Oaks. The action lasted till night-fall. It was resumed the next morning, and continued till 11 a. m.

Immediately upon the commencement of the battle the boats at White House were ordered to be in readiness to receive the wounded. Surgeons were placed on board those in need of them. Other surgeons, volunteer and contract, of whom I had a supply at White House, were brought up to the field depots. The transportation of the wounded was begun that night and steadily kept up till completed. This was accomplished by the 7th of June. I never received complete returns of the losses in this action. In Keyes' corps 382 were killed and 1,731 wounded. In Sumner's the wounded were about 1,000, and in Heintzelman's 750. The whole number sent from White House by the steamers was 3,580. Of these, 167 were conveyed to Philadelphia by the Wm. Whildin.

June 8 a skirmish took place in front of Sumner's position, in which we had 4 killed and 23 wounded.

During all this time there were of course some men sick in the field hospitals. It was perceived they would be more and more in the way as new conflicts occurred, and it became necessary to devise some means of getting them to the rear. For this purpose I directed the establishment at Yorktown to be enlarged to the capacity of 2,500 or 3,000 beds, so that I might relieve White House hospital and keep it clear for an emergency. The instructions to the officers in charge are in appendix marked W. I was in hopes I should have received before this the 400 hospital tents I had asked for while we were at Yorktown. About one-half of them arrived the middle of June. I requested General Van Vliet to have 100 pitched at White House for an extension of that hospital, and to deposit 75 at Savage and Fair Oaks Stations for use in another battle.

June 4, about 450 sick were sent to Boston by the Sanitary Commission, contrary to my orders. I had received instructions from the Surgeon-General to send no more sick North for a certain time, and had refused permission for this vessel to go to Boston; still she was sent. I do not doubt that the agent thought it made no difference where he went, but he was none the more excusable for that. However, if civilians are allowed to have anything to do with military matters confusion cannot be avoided. They see things only from their own limited standpoint, will form and act upon their own opinions, and in ninety-nine cases in one hundred go wrong.

June 19, I authorized Mr. Olmstead, of the Commission, to fill the steamer Daniel Webster No. 1 and the Spaulding from the White House and Yorktown hospitals, and proceed with them to New York.

A very large number of rebels killed at Fair Oaks were interred by our troops; still many were left unburied. They had fallen or had been carried into the woods, and had thus escaped observation. In the course of time they became so offensive as to seriously incommode our camps. Disinfectants were sent to be strewn over the grounds, and every exertion was made to abate the nuisance. Still, it had not entirely ceased when we left the vicinity.

June 14 scurvy was again reported as having appeared in Sumner's corps. I sent an able medical officer to investigate it, who found six cases in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts Regiments and

several others "acquiring the predisposition to the disease." My reports and action on this will be found in the appendix U² and U³. It will be seen from these reports that the occurrence of scurvy even in this very limited degree was due alone to the neglect of officers to enforce the orders from your headquarters in relation to the use of vegetables by the men. These orders were reiterated, whether with any better success I do not know, but I heard no more of scurvy.

At this time I found it necessary to ask that so much of General Orders, 102, March 19, 1862, as authorized commanders of corps to grant leaves of absence for fifteen days to medical officers should be rescinded. Fifteen days would take them home, but it was a rare thing to find them at their posts at the expiration of it. Notwithstanding we had under contract nearly a hundred citizen physicians, the regiments were scarcely much better provided than when we began to fill vacancies in this way. Several of the contract physicians themselves soon repented of their bargains and begged to be relieved. As their contracts could be determined at their own pleasure, I could only refuse to terminate them myself, but could not prevent their doing so. To obviate this inconvenience for a reasonable time, at least, I wrote to the Surgeon-General, to request him for the future to stipulate with these gentlemen that they should not terminate their contracts in less than three months. My suggestion was adopted, and we were thus enabled to retain several who would otherwise have left us. Desirous of leaving nothing undone to promote and preserve the health of the army at this critical period, I resolved to call upon the whole body of the medical officers for their opinions and advice. For this purpose I addressed to the medical directors a circular, under date of June 18, which will be found in the appendix X. I received before the final conflicts reports from several of these, and all agreed that nothing of any consequence had been left undone that the medical department could do. Better shelter for the men, less work, and in a few instances new clothing, were all that seemed to be wanting.

June 12 the headquarters were removed to the right bank of the Chickahominy, near Dr. Trent's house. Some firing and shelling took place from day to day, but without any damage to us. On the 13th the enemy made a raid to our rear, doing but little harm. Our railway communications were not interrupted. On the 15th, the roads then for the first time admitting of it, I succeeded in transferring the remainder of the Hanover wounded to the floating hospitals at White House.

June 16 I took measures for providing a receiving hospital for the wounded at Savage Station, the headquarters of General Heintzelman. Dr. Swinburne, of Albany, N. Y., a surgeon known to me by reputation, and one who had rendered some service at White House and Fair Oaks, having reported to me under contract, I directed him to prepare this depot under the supervision of Surgeon Milhau, medical director of Heintzelman's corps. Every facility was given Dr. Swinburne for this purpose, large details of men, all the tents we could command, abundance of subsistence, &c. There were several out-houses at the Station that were directed to be vacated; some sick in them belonging to Keyes' corps were transferred to White House. An ice-house near Savage's house was filled with ice. In twelve days, with a detail of 100 men, or as many of them as chose to report to Dr. Swinburne, succeeded in getting the buildings cleaned, 25 tents pitched, two or three caldrons for making soup in position, water-casks pre-

pared and filled with water, hospital stores and dressings, and was prepared to receive the wounded.

June 17, 600 sick were ordered from White House to Yorktown, to make room for wounded I expected soon to be called upon to provide for. The same day the medical officers were ordered again to provide themselves with portable soup. Tents were also ordered to be pitched near the railway terminus at White House, for the reception of wounded upon the arrival of the cars.

On the 20th I visited White House again and inspected the arrangements. I met there Mr. Brunot, of Pittsburgh, Pa., who had come on with a party of well-qualified nurses to offer their services. No more devoted band, none perhaps so much so, had ever presented themselves. I quartered them temporarily upon the hospital steamer Louisiana. At the right time they repaired to Savage Station, performed ever-memorable service, and crowned their self-sacrifice by cheerfully volunteering to remain with the wounded we were obliged to leave in the hands of the enemy when we retired to James River.

Returning to headquarters on the 21st, I sent Dr. D. L. Rogers, of New York (who had rejoined me some days before, the hospital at Williamsburg having been broken up), to the left bank of the Chickahominy, to evacuate upon White House all the field hospitals upon that side. This duty was zealously performed, and all that could be removed were removed.

From this time events hurried on with great rapidity. I sent an order to the purveyor at White House to throw a large quantity of supplies upon Savage Station. By telegraph I received the reply that all was packed up and the boat ordered to fall back to West Point. This was exceedingly vexatious. We were tolerably well supplied, and I had, as before reported, a reserve of three wagon loads in my own camp; nevertheless this *contretemps* was a great disappointment and caused me much anxiety. In a few days the boat returned. As soon as I heard of it I repeated my order (June 27) and telegraphed also to the Sanitary Commission to send up supplies. The effort was made, but too late. On the 28th our communications were cut off. I received nothing from below but some hospital tents, and they came just in time to be burned or to fall into the hands of the enemy.

On the 25th we had a smart skirmish on our left. The wounded, who were very few, were sent to White House. On the 26th General McCall fought at Mechanicsville. This division had joined on the 18th, and I could not succeed in getting a report from it of any sort. The sick were sent into the camp at headquarters without notice, without a report, a nurse, or a crust of bread. I was obliged to send them to Savage Station, to occupy room I wanted for wounded men.

On the 27th General Porter fought at Gaines' Mill. Ambulances were sent to him, and his wounded brought into Savage Station. The cars were kept in motion, and as many as could be sent down were sent to the floating hospitals. A large train was loaded at 10 a. m. on the 28th, when we found that the railway was in possession of the enemy, and I was reluctantly compelled to take the men back to the hospital. All the time the services of every one that could be commanded were employed in attending to the wounded. There were about 1,300 in the tents, buildings, and on the lawn. My assistants, McClellan and Greenleaf, with some of Mr. Brunot's party, were most active and efficient in providing for the refreshment and subsistence of the wounded. Asst. Surg. A. K. Smith, of the army, with Dr. Swinburne and a number of medical officers of volunteers and contract

physicians, were employed in the necessary operations and dressings. No exertion seemed to be too great, no fatigue too exhausting, for the self-sacrificing zeal of every one of those gentlemen.

In the afternoon I received orders to leave all that could not walk, with a supply of surgeons, nurses, subsistence, and hospital stores, to fall into the hands of the enemy. I caused the wounded to be carefully examined, and 650 were reported to me as unable to move. A number of them, however, did contrive to get away and reach the James River in safety. I then called for volunteers to remain with the wounded, and, to the credit of the medical gentlemen be it said, all that I wanted immediately expressed their readiness to undertake the duty. One of them, a friend from my boyhood, Dr. H. J. Milnor, of New York, lost his life from exhaustion in this self-sacrifice. Dr. Swinburne having had the organizing of the hospital, I constituted him chief of the party, and furnished him with a letter to the rebel commander in these words:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 28, 1862.

Dr. Swinburne, a volunteer surgeon, with a number of other surgeons, nurses, and attendants, have been left in charge of the sick and wounded of this army who could not be removed. Their humane occupation commends itself under the law of nations to the kind consideration of the opposing forces. It is requested that they may be free to return as soon as the discharge of their duties with the sick and wounded will permit, and that the same consideration shown to the Confederate sick, wounded, and medical officers that have been captured by our forces may be extended to them. A large amount of clothing, bedding, medical stores, &c., have been left both at Savage Station and Dr. Trent's house.

By command of Major-General McClellan:

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

To the COMMANDING GENERAL CONFEDERATE FORCES,
OF COMMANDING OFFICER.

On the morning of the 29th the headquarters moved in the direction of James River and arrived at Haxall's Landing the next day. The actions at Savage Station, White Oak Swamp, and Malvern Hill occurred in quick succession. So far as circumstances would admit the wounded were conducted or found their way to this point, to Carter's, and to Harrison's Bar. To the latter position the headquarters were transferred on the night of July 1. The next day a heavy rain fell, deluging our wounded, many of whom had no shelter. Some of our hospital ships at that time having reached Harrison's Bar, I procured a lighter from the quartermaster and commenced shipping the wounded, but I was obliged to suspend this operation by orders from yourself, as the wharf was absolutely necessary for landing subsistence. Everything possible, however, was done for the comfort of the wounded. Tea, coffee, soup, and stimulants were being constantly prepared and issued. My train of reserve stores had happily succeeded in reaching the position, and the supplies held out until we were able to get more from the purveyor's store-ship in the stream.

On the 3d my successor, Dr. Letterman, having reported, I turned over the department to him. The reports of killed and wounded in this series of conflicts, I presume, were made to Dr. Letterman. I left the army before there was time to prepare them.

During this campaign the army was favored with excellent health. No epidemic disease appeared. Those scourges of modern armies—dysentery, typhus, cholera—were almost unknown. We had some typhoid fever and more malarial fever, but even these never prevailed to such

an extent as to create any alarm. The sick reports were sometimes larger than we cared to have them, but the great majority of the cases reported were such as did not threaten life or permanent disability. I regret I have not before me the retained copies of the monthly reports, so that I might give accurate statistics. I have endeavored to recover them, but have been unsuccessful. My recollection is that the whole sick report never exceeded 8 per cent. of the force, and this included all sorts of cases, the trivial as well as the severe. The Army of the Potomac must be conceded to have been the most healthy army in the service of the United States.

In reflecting upon the history of the medical administration of the Army of the Potomac many defects are perceived. Some of them may be remedied in future; others, I fear, cannot. For the first time the United States has assembled very large armies. Our staff system has been severely tried. I am not called upon nor am I prepared to say whether the other departments have proved successes or failures. My own department was neither a complete success nor a very decided failure. The most serious impediment in the way of its success was undoubtedly the want of military habits and training in the medical officers. The general impression among the people seems to be that a good citizen physician is fully competent to discharge the duties of a regimental surgeon, and I have no idea that anything I can say will be effective in disabusing the public mind of a notion that I know to be as mischievous as it is erroneous. In my opinion it is impossible to improvise an efficient medical staff. No nation in the world except our own has ever attempted it. So little was known among us about a medical department for an army when the present rebellion grew serious, that in the first project for a grand army one assistant surgeon only was provided for a regiment of 1,200 men, and of so little consequence was the character of even that one considered to be, all sorts of doctors—steam, eclectic, and even advertising quacks—were sometimes commissioned as medical officers; men innocent of any such vulgar acquirements as orthography; men who had never even seen, much less performed, a surgical operation. The great majority of the medical officers were certainly highly respectable members of the profession, but still there were enough of the ignorant and illiterate to prove what I have said, that, so far as the public notion of what was required for a medical officer was concerned, any one called “Doctor” was competent to perform the duties of a military surgeon. I see no remedy for this unless a large standing army is hereafter kept up.

In so vast an establishment as the Army of the Potomac without a rigid adherence to system nothing could have been accomplished. It would have been impossible to supply it; to know whether it was supplied or not; to reduce its supplies to a minimum bulk, so that they could be transported; so to limit the extent of the trains as that the supply wagons should be accessible. Now this system was intelligently termed “red tape,” and medical men fresh from civil life, who ought to have been learners, were encouraged by outside philanthropists to disregard a restraint they found irksome, and to assert a practical independence of it as a mark of a “strong mind.” By firmness and the aid of the more intelligent brigade surgeons a fair progress was made in controlling and correcting this evil, but there were some who were incorrigible.

Transportation for medical supplies was provided, but, as we have seen, they were in many instances left behind, because “there was no

transportation;" the colonels had taken the "doctor's" wagon to carry other baggage—at least that was the excuse offered.

Want of discipline was seriously felt in the difficulty of getting reports from the medical officers. It was inconvenient to make them; inconvenient to send them in; the necessity for them was not apparent. The habit of obedience to orders, whether the reason for them is comprehended or not, is one of slow growth, and particularly among medical men brought up in civil life. I never could get complete reports even while we were in Washington. After we took the field that difficulty was much increased. Still, for the successful administration of the department, these reports were absolutely necessary.

The number of medical officers was too limited. One surgeon and one assistant were allowed to a regiment. No provision was made for a staff, from which details to supply hospitals could be made, or an officer detached to supply a vacancy from illness, death, or resignation. This was a great oversight. The medical director could not remedy it.

There was unquestionably a deficiency of hospital tents upon the Peninsula, but if all that were issued to the regiments at Washington had been carefully transported by them they would have had enough. They, too, were left behind in many instances, both on the Potomac and at Yorktown. Want of transportation was again the excuse.

Some one will ask, Why did you not arrest, try, and dismiss the medical officers who were derelict? How much better off should we have been in that resort? Who were to take their places? When would they reach us? Would the new swarm have been any better than the old, appointed under the same auspices, drawn from the same sources, and with no experience at all?

The fault was not with them; it was the fault of the system. Original vice cannot be atoned for nor its consequences averted by repetition. "The evils which flow from injudicious counsels can seldom be removed by the application of partial severities."

The failure of the medical department of the Army of the Potomac to meet a just public expectation (if it did so fail, which I dispute) was due to a deficiency in the number of officers, to the denial to them of a proper official position, they being considered only as "doctors," to be called upon to prescribe for a man reporting sick, but not authorized to meddle in any way with the police customs of the camp, or to insist on any measures for the preservation of the health of the men, to their not being permitted to control their own transportation when furnished to them, and to the incompetency of a portion of the officers themselves.

The duties of the medical department are administrative and professional. The same officer should not be charged with both; one alone is sufficient to employ the powers of the ablest mind. The administrative duties require experience—a military and professional training—to be acquired only by time and opportunity. We have committed the fault in this war of imposing administrative duties upon officers with neither experience in them nor talent for them. We have charged individuals with the most important of these duties who have never seen a single campaign, have never heard a hostile shot, have never seen a regiment collected together in the field. It is possible it may be judicious to do so, but experience and observation have up to this time taught a different lesson. This war may show that Rehoboam was right after all in dismissing the old counselors because they were

old and taking counsel of the inexperienced for no better reason than because they were young.

The administrative duties of the medical department among the continental nations are chiefly committed to experienced officers of the line. In France these officers are called military intendants. In Russia I believe they have no distinct title. In Great Britain, however, these duties are performed by medical officers who have qualified themselves for them by faithful service in inferior grades. The British is a practical, the French a theoretical, nation. I think the experience of the Crimea has shown the British system to be the best. The military intendant being a non-professional man cannot understand that the laws of nature may require a modification of an army regulation to prevent mischief. The medical administrative officer will probably be better qualified to judge as to this point, and having the advantage of equal military experience with the other will not be likely to embarrass the operations of a campaign by medical follies that are harmless only in the newspapers.

Some capital plans were suggested to me for the comfort of the sick and wounded while on the Peninsula. The difficulty in the way of adopting them was that the Yorktown road was not a Broadway, nor the railway to White House the New York Central. Cars might have been fitted up for the hospital department while we were upon the Chickahominy if we had had the cars; if we had had the time and means to fit them up; if the road had not been required for the transportation of ammunition, subsistence, and forage. The army was, perhaps, unfortunate in having a medical director who supposed it was assembled to make war, and that cartridges were more indispensable than bed-quilts.

For a medical department in the field I would provide, if it were possible, that a surgeon of a regiment should have served not less than five years as an assistant surgeon. This is the law in relation to the Regular Army, but for an irregular and temporary force it is plainly impossible. While we insist upon the principle for efficiency we are compelled to yield it for expediency.

The British army has a surgeon and three assistants to a regiment of infantry of 1,025 men. They have also a staff of thirty-nine administrative and one hundred and forty-nine executive medical officers. The latter are for hospital duties and the like.

In the field one medical officer to 250 men is, in my opinion, a minimum. It is not necessary to keep so many constantly with a regiment, but some are always required for detached service, such, for instance, as our hospitals at White House and Yorktown and the hospital transports. These demands must always occur in a campaign. They should be provided for in time, and not left to chance. Scientific citizen surgeons volunteered their services at the battles on the Peninsula, but how many found their way to Port Royal or to Vicksburg.

At the headquarters of an army there should be a chief surgeon, an aide-de-camp to the commanding general, with the same rank as the chief of the other departments of the staff. This officer, being charged with the administration of the medical department, should be authorized to give orders in the name of the commanding general in relation to all matters connected with the health of the army; the supervision of certificates of disability for discharge, pension certificates, applications for leave of absence for ill-health, sanitary suggestions, and regulating the establishing and furnishing of hospitals, and the like. He should have one aide at least for each *corps d'armée* of which the army is composed. For such an army as the Army of the

Potomac he will require at least three clerks, one of whom should be a competent hospital steward. This assistance is necessary for recording correspondence, making the reports required at headquarters and at Washington, and for dispensing medicines at the headquarters. An assistant quartermaster and an assistant commissary of subsistence are absolutely necessary to the chief surgeon. These officers, holding official relations to their respective departments, can so much more readily command and furnish the supplies in possession of those departments than a medical officer, who has to make requisitions for what he wants upon a quartermaster or commissary already overwhelmed with business. I am surprised it had never been thought of until I brought it to the notice of the present Surgeon-General while we were at Yorktown. If I had had these officers on the Peninsula I could have fitted up and supplied our hospital ships and stationary hospitals with comparatively little trouble or delay. I could have kept the ambulance trains more in hand, could have known more about them, and could have taken much better care of them. The advantages of such an arrangement are too obvious to require to be urged upon a military man.

For each *corps d'armée* of which an army is composed a chief surgeon should be placed upon the staff of the commander of the corps. He should have an assistant and a clerk. If the corps is more than 25,000 strong, he should have two assistants. He should have also an acting assistant quartermaster and commissary. This officer will take charge of the ambulance and supply train, and when temporary hospital arrangements are to be made for the corps he will provide the tents and buildings, and will see to the drawing and placing in position of the necessary subsistence. While we were on the Peninsula I knew in two instances the valuable time of a medical officer wasted in the effort to get from commissaries subsistence for which his patients were suffering, and for which he had an order from headquarters. This officer would take charge of the hospital train upon a march, see that the wagons were not misapplied, distribute them to the brigades and regiments upon their arrival in camp, muster, pay, and subsist the teamsters, forage the horses, &c.

The guard for the hospital train would be the Ambulance Corps if a regular ambulance corps is authorized, or the drilled hospital attendants if we are compelled to use them upon the plan adopted in Washington. In the latter case we might by this means hope to keep these men together. They could not very well be removed and their places supplied by uninstructed men or not at all, at the caprice of colonels.

The chief surgeon of the army should have on his staff one experienced medical officer of the army for each *corps d'armée*, to be kept constantly employed in sanitary inspections. It is in the field we want these officers, and where, in my view, their duties are all-important. No medical man of less than ten years' military training is, in my opinion, competent to perform these duties in the field. Any intelligent physician can inspect the police of a city hospital. One inspector cannot do justice to more than 25,000 men. This I know from experience.

The chief surgeon of the army, the chief surgeon of the corps, and the inspectors should constitute a council of health, and should assemble weekly if practicable, examine the medical reports, the reports of the inspectors, &c., deliberate upon all matters pertaining to the health of the army, and submit through the chief surgeon to the commanding general the result of their deliberations.

Batteries having no regimental organization, or at least not acting

together as regiments, should have an adequate medical force. I should recommend one surgeon as administrative officer for each eight batteries, and one assistant surgeon for each battery. An army in the field must have its general supply train or transports for hospital supplies. A medical purveyor or storekeeper will be in charge of these stores. To get supplies from the purveyor's store to the troops I found very perplexing, both in Washington and on the Peninsula. Now, by having an assistant quartermaster attached to the chief surgeon of each corps, with the hospital train under his charge, this difficulty is at once obviated.

The hospital train for a large army should consist of two four-wheeled ambulances, four *cacolets* (or horse-litters), one ordinary baggage wagon for medicines, stores, tents, and cooking apparatus to each regiment. Instruments, medicines, and dressings for daily use should be transported in panniers or the hospital knapsacks. The reserve supplies in the baggage wagon should be packed in cases of uniform size, exactly fitted to the wagon-box, numbered, and the contents of each marked upon it. The French transport system is admirable, and could be readily adapted to our service.

I cannot close this report without expressing my appreciation of the conspicuous services of Surgs. J. F. Hammond, J. B. Brown, and J. J. Milhau, the medical directors of Sumner's, Keyes', and Heintzelman's corps; Surg. R. H. Alexander, medical purveyor; Surg. A. K. Smith and Assist. Surgs. E. McClellan and C. R. Greenleaf, my own aides. I think I am justified in asserting that there was no duty these officers were called upon to perform that was not well and promptly done; that their zeal never faltered, their ability never failed. If my department was conducted to your satisfaction the efforts of these gentlemen contributed most essentially to that result. Among the volunteer medical officers, in my opinion Brigade Surgeons Lyman, Crosby, Baxter, Bently, and Dougherty deserve special notice for ability and efficiency.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Surgeon, U. S. Army, Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,

U. S. Army, Commanding General Army of the Potomac.

[Appendix M.]

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Medical Director's Office, Washington, March 15, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to request that field supplies for 140,000 men may be put up by the medical purveyor immediately, to be transported with Major-General McClellan's army wherever it may be ordered. I have appointed Assistant Surgeon Bartholow medical purveyor for this army. He has been ordered by telegraph to report to me without delay. General McClellan has directed his chief quartermaster to furnish the transportation for these supplies as soon as they are ready.

The general intends to move in from forty-eight to seventy-two hours.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

Surgeon-General FINLEY, U. S. A.

[Appendix N.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Med. Director's Office, Theological Seminary, Va., Mar. 19, 1862.

SIR: Having been assigned to the staff of General ———, as medical director of his *corps d'armée*, you will please observe the following instructions:

I have reason to believe great improvidence exists in relation to the accumulation, care, and expenditure of medicines and hospital stores. You will require the brigade surgeons or other senior surgeons in your corps to inspect personally the supplies of the several regiments or detachments under their supervision, and to certify to you that they have done so, and find the supplies already furnished to have been faithfully and economically used, and that any new supply required is really necessary before you approve a requisition.

After you have rigorously scrutinized these requisitions you will indorse your action upon them, and then forward them to this office. You will specially forbid any requisition to be sent to this office directly or through any other channel than yourself. None will be noticed or supplied by me coming through any other channel. You will inspect frequently the several commands under your supervision, and see that their hospital departments are kept in order and always ready for any emergency. It will be a never-ending source of mortification if in the approaching conflict anything really necessary for the proper care of the wounded that the medical department has the power to supply should be found wanting. There is a disposition among inexperienced medical officers to accumulate superfluous drugs, and to transport them to the exclusion even of surgical appliances of infinitely more importance. It will be your duty to watch and guard carefully against this error. When your corps is ordered to move there will be, of course, some men unable to march. These must be left in the general hospitals. Upon the late march to Fairfax Court-House a large number of men were sent into the general hospitals. In a great many instances these men were selected without any judgment. Hundreds were received with no disease that should have excused them from duty. Your attention is called to this, that you may take vigorous measures to prevent such an abuse in future. The Surgeon-General of the Army has taken the general hospitals under his immediate care. You will therefore communicate with him in time as to the number in your corps it will be necessary to send to general hospital, and take his orders as to where to send them. You will send a duplicate of this estimate to this office.

Instructions for medical officers in battle have been prepared and issued from headquarters. You will endeavor to carry them into effect, and see that the officers concerned are instructed in the several duties therein assigned to them. The reports required to be made by medical directors of divisions to the medical director of the army will be made to you, and by you transmitted to me with as little delay as practicable. You will make a monthly return of the medical officers of your corps to me. You will see that the monthly reports of sick and wounded are promptly made out at the end of each month and handed to you, to be transmitted to me. You need not consolidate them, but send them all to me without delay. You will see that the weekly reports of the sick of the several regiments are regularly sent in and forwarded to me. The diseases prevailing must be stated in these reports. This information is absolutely necessary at these headquar-

ters. Certificates of disability, approved by the division boards whenever practicable, will also be forwarded to this office through you.

A medical purveyor has been appointed for this army, and will accompany it into the field. He will establish a depot as near the seat of operations as practicable. Sufficient supplies for this army have been ordered to that depot, and it is therefore unnecessary for regimental medical officers to send in daily trifling requisitions, that only encumber the files and embarrass the operations of the purveying department.

Inquiries are constantly made about ambulances. This department has given every attention to that subject, and if a reasonable supply of these carriages is not at the right place at the right time the responsibility for the failure does not rest with the medical director.

The medical officers of your corps you will require to transact their business with you, and through you with this office. When additional medical aid is required anywhere within the limits of your corps you will assign any medical officers, including the brigade surgeons, whose services can be commanded with the least inconvenience to that duty. Frequent communication, both personally and by letter, with this office is invited and enjoined. Your suggestions will always be received with pleasure and carefully considered. Every facility in my power will be afforded you in the performance of your duties and in sustaining your authority. I rely with confidence upon your zealous co-operation in making this the model army of the Republic, so far as depends upon its medical department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

TO MEDICAL DIRECTORS OF ARMY CORPS.

[Appendix O.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Medical Director's Office, Camp Winfield Scott, April 14, 1862.

SIR: I had the honor to send you a telegram this morning in relation to the disposition of the wounded we shall have in the approaching attack upon Yorktown. To guard against failure I address you also by letter. Considering the number of men likely to be engaged and the very limited and uncomfortable accommodations to be had here, it will be absolutely necessary to send the bulk of the wounded to Fort Monroe and to Washington or some other point North. Surgeon Cuyler very promptly offered to put his sick in tents to make room for our wounded; but his hospital, I fear, will not be sufficient for our necessities.

There is a good road from here to Cheeseman's Landing, a distance of 4 miles, where transports can be assembled to receive the men. They can be comfortably sent from there to any point you may indicate. Please let me know your views in relation to this.

Last night six medical gentlemen from Massachusetts reached this camp to serve as volunteers. They were sent by the Governor of Massachusetts by authority of the Secretary of War. Their aid will be very acceptable. I have sent three of them to Sumner's corps and three to Heintzelman's. The Massachusetts regiments are distributed between those corps.

I have to request that the honorable Secretary of War will direct the proper departments to furnish such surgeons as may tender their serv-

ices under his invitation with a horse and tent each, with the necessary servants, and the privilege of purchasing subsistence of the commissaries. They cannot be made comfortable in any other way.

I learn this morning by telegraph that a portion of the supplies ordered from New York a month ago has reached Fort Monroe. Their arrival is most timely, as our field supplies are almost exhausted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

Surg. R. C. WOOD,

Acting Surgeon-General, Washington, D. C.

[Appendix P.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Medical Director's Office, Camp Winfield Scott, April 12, 1862.

SIR: Your letter of April 11 has been received. I find that in very many instances the supplies on hand in regiments in their old camps have been left behind under various pretexts that are not satisfactory to me. Want of transportation is most usually alleged. How this can be when the troops came by water I cannot understand. I have determined, therefore, to issue no more three-months' supplies, but to confine the issues to such articles as are required for immediate use. Liquors will be sent to medical directors of corps, to be issued in their discretion, in hopes that by this means there may be some preserved when we are brought into action. We are now at least four weeks distant from our sources of supplies, and unless some economy is observed in the use of important articles we shall be destitute when most in want. In many instances I observe great waste in the expenditure of bandages. These articles must not be thrown away when once used, but washed out and used again till worn-out. If the medical officers will reflect upon what is before them, and the responsibility to which they will be held, the most indifferent among them will see the necessity for counting every pin before it is used. Their own credit, as well as the comfort and lives of the soldiers under their care, depends upon their vigilance in preserving their supplies.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

MEDICAL DIRECTOR KEYES' CORPS.

[Appendix R.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Medical Director's Office, White House, May 18, 1862.

It is absolutely necessary that not less than thirty contract physicians should be sent to this army at once, to fill the places of medical officers sick and on detached service. The supplies that left Washington on the 11th have not yet reached here. We are nearly exhausted. I suggest that medical supplies be sent in charge of a special agent, to be delivered to the purveyor to whom they are directed. Medical supplies have been found stored under other supplies in the hold of vessels, and detained there for weeks in this river.

We must have four-wheeled ambulances; two-wheeled are good for nothing. I asked for 140 four-wheeled some time ago. A lot of two-wheeled have been received since, but are altogether insufficient.

We want steamer hospitals, properly fitted up for 5,000, provided with physicians, nurses, and stores.

CHS. S. TRIPLER,
Medical Director.

To the SURGEON-GENERAL, *Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Medical Director's Office, White House, May 19, 1862.

SIR: I had the honor to address you on the 9th instant in relation to the necessities of this army. In that letter I stated that unless certain supplies for which I had telegraphed that day reached me in five days this army would be in peril. It is now ten days, and they are not here. I hear there are supplies at Fort Monroe directed to Yorktown, and have telegraphed Dr. Cuyler to send them up here immediately. The army is marching to-day, and a battle may occur at any time. We are not prepared for it.

I telegraphed you yesterday that we wanted steamers properly fitted up for 5,000 men, provided with physicians, nurses, and stores. This is an absolute and instant necessity. The Sanitary Commission is doing what it can to relieve us of our sick, but they cannot do it with sufficient rapidity. We have 2,000 sick at Yorktown and vicinity, 600 at Williamsburg, and I have a prospect of having 1,000 more thrown on my hands from the advancing army to-day. For the accommodation of these men I have 100 hospital tents ordered, but with two days' work I have been able to get but 34 pitched. I have no physicians to detail for the work. The men from the ranks will not do the duty of nurses. My stores are almost exhausted. If a battle take place within a few days I have no place to put the wounded. I must have relief, and that at once. I can no longer stagger under such an accumulation of difficulties.

Seven medical gentlemen from Boston and New York joined me yesterday to offer their services for the expected battle. I have gladly accepted their offer. The first duty I have imposed upon them is to assist in prescribing for the sick now pressing in upon me. One of them I have been obliged to ask to go to the First United States Cavalry to replace Assistant Surgeon Quinan, who reports sick. I have but one assistant surgeon for each regiment of regular cavalry, and less than that for each regiment of regular infantry. When one of them falls sick I have no one to replace him.

The ambulances I asked for are not here. The march from Williamsburg to this point has destroyed a large proportion of those we had. The two-wheeled ambulances forwarded from Washington are insufficient if they were even endurable for the wounded.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,
Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

Brig. Gen. W. A. HAMMOND,
Surgeon-General U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Medical Director's Office, White House, May 20, 1862.

Telegram received. We are this moment receiving the cooking utensils and furniture and the liquors sent by Dr. Laub. On the invoice with the latter are 100 ounces of quinine. I do not know how much of this has been ordered. A requisition for 2,000 ounces was

forwarded last week. I did not see Dr. Asche. He did not report to me. I heard he was at Yorktown some time since with supplies for the Sanitary Commission. Dr. Alexander offered to receipt to him for all he had, and he refused.

The organization of the hospitals at Yorktown is progressing favorably under Assistant Surgeon Greenleaf, but we want one large hospital here. I have 100 hospital tents pitched and occupied. I am sending away 200 of these patients by the Daniel Webster to-day. We ought to have 500 hospital tents here, and I wish the 400 more to be sent. The details for pitching the tents are so slow that it took 150 men two days to pitch the 100.

General McClellan has ordered all the transports at command for carrying the sick and wounded, but many of them were unfit. Only two were fitted up, and I had not the means to fit more. I cannot afford the necessary details of medical officers for sick transports. Nurses, and particularly cooks, are not to be had. The bedding now on hand here is 2,524 blankets, 23 bed-sacks, and 24 pillow-ticks. I have this moment seen a bill of lading of 18 bales of blankets on board a transport in the river.

The Elm City will be stationed here as a receiving ship for surgical cases, and will receive 400. Another that will take 200 will be ready at the end of the week.

The 50 two-wheeled ambulances have arrived, but I am compelled to keep them for the sick, as the four-wheeled ambulances are not sufficient.

It must be borne in mind that this army is in motion, and my province and hospitals extend from Yorktown to Williamsburg, thence to Cumberland and White House, and now our advance is 12 miles from the latter. I have to contrive for all this extent of country, and I have the aid of only one officer of experience on my staff.

CHS. S. TRIPLER,
Medical Director.

Surg. Gen. W. A. HAMMOND, *Washington, D. C.*

[Appendix S.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Med. Director's Office, Camp near New Bridge, Va., May 29, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I have made contracts with nineteen physicians from Massachusetts and one from New Jersey, and that four others have reported, under contract, from Washington and New York. These have enabled me to supply the general hospitals at White House and at Yorktown, and to order to their regiments the medical officers who were left at those places with the sick. Should you be able to send me the others I have asked for I hope to be able to relieve this army from its present embarrassments in this respect. The bedding and hospital furniture ordered to York River have reached the purveyor. A considerable supply of stimulants has also come to hand (some of it, however, in bad order), but no quinine has yet arrived. We are desperately in want of this article. Unless the supplies ordered from Philadelphia were sent by a special agent there is no calculation to be made as to when they will reach the purveyor. They may be afloat somewhere upon the York River for weeks and no intimation of their whereabouts given to the purveyor.

I think that this army is now occupying a better locality, and that we may look for an improvement in the health of the men. Still, rains are very frequent, and some of our camps are in consequence damp and wet. The excitement of being in presence of the enemy, and the daily expectation of a conflict and occasionally the actual occurrence of one, will tend to keep the men in better health and spirits. The rains keep the roads in shocking condition. We have great difficulty in getting up supplies. The railway is in working order to within from 3 to 15 miles of our several camps. This is of much assistance. Still, its capacity in rolling stock is very limited, and there are no suitable cars for carrying sick and wounded. I have used the covered freight cars for transporting sick, but could only take 100 at a time. The great difficulty, however, is in getting the men over the roads to the railroad station.

I had calculated that we should fight our great battle before Richmond, and, if successful, we should have the whole city, if necessary, for a hospital; but this anticipation has not been realized so far. We had a smart affair on our right the day before yesterday, in which we had near 200 wounded. The exact number is not yet reported to me. We are now bringing them here in ambulances, a distance of some 15 miles. I cannot send wounded men over the road to the station in its present condition, and so have to make temporary provisions for them here. This I find very difficult. If the number of wounded increase it will be a very serious matter. I have floating hospitals at White House for 2,000 men, but to get them down there is the great difficulty.

I have authorized and directed Mr. Olmstead, of the Sanitary Commission, to purchase a cargo of ice for distribution to the hospitals ashore and afloat in the York River. This has been done. I have also directed the medical purveyor to purchase one hundred cases of portable soup for distribution to the several regiments and independent commands of the army.

So many frauds have been practiced upon the service by malingerers that I have been reluctant to send any more of our sick to the North. We never get any back that have been sent there, and I know there are hundreds in New York who ought to be in the field. Still, I think I shall be compelled to send off another transport from White House with some 400 men. I infer from your last letter that they can be received in Washington, and will send them there.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

Brig. Gen. W. A. HAMMOND,
Surgeon-General.

[Appendix S².]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Medical Director's Office, June 11, 1862.

Are the regiments of your command prepared with all necessary medicines, instruments, and dressings for the field? If by careful examination you find that deficiencies exist, you will cause the surgeons to make out the necessary requisitions, and you will detail one medical officer to proceed with the whole of them to the medical purveyor at

the White House, in order that the needed supplies may be brought up with as little delay as possible.

CHS. S. TRIPLER,
Medical Director.

Surg. J. F. HAMMOND, *Second Corps.*
Brigade Surgeon HAMILTON, *Fourth Corps.*
Assistant Surgeon MILHAU, *Third Corps.*

Written to—

Dr. LYMAN, *Porter's Corps.*
Dr. BROWN, *Franklin's Corps.*
Dr. HASSON, *Cooke's Cavalry Corps.*

[Appendix S².]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Medical Director's Office, Camp Winfield Scott, May 2, 1862.

COLONEL: In view of present circumstances and the necessity that you should be advised of what will probably be needed for this army, I have to say that, in my opinion, a vigorous resistance will be made at this point. It is the part of prudence at all events to be prepared for it. It is impossible to establish hospitals on this Peninsula for our sick and wounded. The climate, the means of suitable supplies of bedding, stores, and a medical staff, as well as the certainty of an immediate forward movement after the capture of Yorktown, alike forbid the attempt. We must, then, send elsewhere the sick and wounded. I cannot foresee at what time transportation for this purpose will be needed, or in what quantities at a time. We are now endeavoring to send 600 sick to New York. We have, as you know, the Commodore and Wm. Whildin, fitted up and ready for the wounded. They will accommodate about 600. I expect to send the Commodore about four times to Fort Monroe, so that we can assume she will relieve us of about 1,000 to 1,200. We shall there have to send other transports to more distant parts. We have room for the following numbers: Annapolis, 250; Baltimore, 700; Alexandria, 400; Georgetown, 400; Washington, 1,500; Philadelphia, 600; New York, 2,000; Albany, 1,500; Fort Monroe, 1,000. I expect to want transportation to the full extent of this list during the siege and immediately after the capture of Yorktown. We shall need a steamer for a hospital for wounded constantly at your landing. As one is loaded and dispatched another must take her place.

For the sick we can from time to time make an approximate estimate; for the wounded we cannot. If, then, you can have as many boats fitted up with berths as will be necessary to make the trips required to these several points, so as to have one or two constantly at the landing, it will meet the case. We want them well supplied with good water and with facilities for cooking. I will always endeavor to give you as long notice as possible of special wants for the transportation of sick.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,
Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

Lieutenant-Colonel INGALLS,
Aide-de-Camp and Quartermaster, Cheeseman's Landing

[Appendix S⁴.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Medical Director's Office, White House, May 17, 1862.

SIR: Your note of the 14th instant is now before me, being the first moment I have been able to command to attend to such matters for twelve days. It is impossible for me to make provision for relieving the several corps of this army of the men who report sick from day to day. Until this march such a thing was never heard of. I have endeavored to answer and satisfy such calls from the time the army left Yorktown. The consequence has been that as often as I have removed a detachment of sick from a regiment an equal number has demanded the same privilege immediately. This I feel sure is because the men expect by this means to be sent home. Not less than 1,200 men straggled in or were collected by my agents in the woods after Keyes' corps left Warwick Court-House. The report made to me was that about 230 were left. A similar operation was repeated at Williamsburg, and now I find the same thing going on at Cumberland and here. If a camp is changed, a load of sick who ought to be treated by their regimental surgeons is sent to me without authority of any kind. These men ought and must be treated in their regiments. The regulations of the army make it the duty of the quartermasters to transport the sick on a march when called on to do so by the medical officer. (See paragraph 1100.) If the practice that has prevailed for the last three months is permitted to go on it may save trouble to the regimental surgeons and quartermaster's department, but it will destroy this army. If men can be sure of being sent home by being thrown upon the hands of the medical director of this army, the contagion of homesickness will spread till there is not a sound man left here to carry a musket.

The medical directors of the corps must rely upon themselves for providing necessary accommodations for the sick of their corps near their own positions. What means you need I will furnish if it is possible. The purveyor's boat is now at this landing, and if any of your regiments are in need of further supplies I will have them issued. I believe all requisitions that have been sent in from your corps have been filled.

I am endeavoring to establish a general hospital here by pitching tents. In a few days I hope to be able to receive patients, but only such as absolutely require to be thus treated. My hospital tents will furnish no better shelter than those of the regiments. When patients are to be sent to the general hospital application must be made beforehand, stating the number to be sent and the disease of each man. If they can be received, permission will be given to send them in. When sent, the descriptive list must accompany them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

Surg. J. B. BROWN, *Fourth Corps d'Armée.*

[Appendix S⁵.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Medical Director's Office, May 27, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report, in compliance with yours of May 22, that the general hospitals in this department are—

I. At Yorktown, Va., in houses in the town, in frame buildings put

up by the rebels, and in hospital tents. The medical officers attached are Brigade Surg. W. H. White, Volunteers; Drs. F. J. Ainsworth, Joel Seaverns, W. Lamb, Beurine Carpenter, F. A. Howe, Jonathan Brown, Henry H. Fuller, A. J. Cummings, J. H. Morse, G. S. Hitchcock, and J. Q. A. McAllister—all from Massachusetts, on contract. This hospital has been organized by one of my assistants, Dr. C. R. Greenleaf, U. S. Army, and until yesterday was officered by regimental medical officers left behind with their sick. After I had made the contracts with the Massachusetts gentlemen I sent eleven of them to relieve the commissioned officers, and ordered the latter to their regiments.

II. At White House, Va. This hospital consists of 105 hospital tents at present—all I have been able to command. It will probably be extended when more are received. One-half of these tents have been furnished with plank banquettes. The remainder will be similarly furnished when the lumber can be procured. Brigade Surg. J. H. Baxter, Volunteer service, is at present in charge. He is to be relieved by Brigade Surg. A. T. Watson in a few days. Drs. Alexander Bicker, of New York; W. K. Fletcher, L. D. Seymour, Benj. Campbell, of Massachusetts; A. E. Stocker, Asa Millett, Joseph Underwood, Francis C. Greene, and F. LeB. Monroe are the surgeons in attendance. When this hospital was organized, the medical service was performed gratuitously by Drs. Cogswell, Swinburne, Lansing, Willard, and Kneeland, of New York, and Drs. Page and Hall, of Massachusetts. They were relieved on the 26th by the contract physicians above mentioned.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

Brig. Gen. W. A. HAMMOND,

Surgeon-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

[Appendix T.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Medical Director's Office, June 22, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that in obedience to your instructions I proceeded to White House on Friday afternoon (20th), and returned yesterday. I called upon Colonel Ingalls, and in company with him examined the house known as the White House, as well as the outbuildings, grounds, and spring. The house is two stories in height, with two small rooms on each floor, with a very small wing at each end on the lower floor, a cellar under the main building, and with no attic. The four rooms in the main building can each accommodate 5 patients. One of the wings can accommodate 3 or perhaps 4 patients; the other is a sort of pantry, and has on one side the opening for the stairway to descend into the cellar. This room is unfit for any other purpose than a dispensary or kitchen. The cellar is dark, damp, and foul, and, in my opinion, should of itself forbid the occupation of the house as a hospital. The greatest number of sick the house can accommodate is, then, 24, leaving no room for the nurses. The outbuildings are entirely unfit for hospital purposes.

The grounds consist of a lawn, shaded by locust trees, and a kitchen garden. The lawn affords room for about 25 hospital tents. The kitchen garden is of loose soil, parts of it rather low, and in wet weather would be muddy and uncomfortable. By ditching it might be drained. The spring is at the foot of the bank, near the dairy-house.

The water is good, similar to that of the other springs that have been prepared for the use of the men. The supply of water in the spring within the grounds is very scanty. The hospital steward told me he had abandoned it, because he found it required two hours and a half to fill a barrel of water. The spring is inaccessible to wagons. It has always been at the service of the hospital. I inclose the order of Colonel Ingalls to this effect. If this house were used for hospital purposes it could only be made available for the quarters of the surgeons attached and for a dispensary. The sick would require hospital tents upon the lawn. If the grounds were occupied in this way, as they are altogether insufficient for the whole establishment, it would necessitate the organization of a separate administration—surgeons, cooks, stewards, &c.—an expenditure of *personnel* that we cannot very well afford. We have now 170 hospital tents pitched on the plantation, well arranged and well policed; the camp well drained; the administration tents, the cooking apparatus, and the subsistence tents centrally located and convenient for all parties. Thirty-five more tents are on the ground, and are being pitched as the force at our disposal will allow.

Sixty-five of these tents have plank floors. The remaining 35 of the first 100 would have been floored if the lumber had been on hand. The delay in receiving this, however, has developed an interesting and important fact: The mortality in the floored tents has been very sensibly greater than in those without floors. I have directed the surgeon in charge to prepare tables showing the comparative rates of deaths in the two classes of tents for my information. If lumber is received, I will suspend the flooring of the remaining tents until these tables can be examined and the question set at rest. I must remark that although the whole of the tents occupied were in good police, and an air of comfort pervading them, still those without floors were decidedly superior in these respects to the others.

In relation to the relative advantages of hospital tents and buildings for hospital purposes, I think that among those at all familiar with the subject there is but one opinion—that the tents are decidedly the best.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

General R. B. MARCY,

Chief of Staff Army of the Potomac.

[Appendix U¹.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Medical Director's Office, May 29, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that I am convinced a very large proportion of the number lost to our army from our camp at Yorktown to this point is due to the straggling that has been permitted, both in breaking up of encampments and on the line of march. Hundreds were collected in the woods and in houses and huts in our old position at Camp Winfield Scott who were not borne upon the surgeon's reports. I sent out officers to search for these men, and of many who could not be collected in this way we heard by accident, and brought them in after days of privation had brought on actual disease. It would seem there could have been no roll call before the troops took up their line of march, so all along the line of march whoever pleased would drop out, lie by in the woods out of sight, and then for days would be strag-

gling to the rear in search of shelter. I believe they have all been gathered in. Certainly every effort has been made to effect this object. I have been officially informed that Casey's division has lost some 3,500 men within the last two months from sickness and straggling combined.

I am further persuaded that a large number of men have found their way to the hospitals at the North in our transports who were perfectly well, at least when they arrived. Dr. Satterlee wrote me in a letter, received yesterday, that he had seen numbers of such in New York. When orders have been issued to send the sick to the general hospitals in transports, owing to the general neglect to send descriptive lists with the men there have been no means of ascertaining whether those who found their way on board were authorized to do so or not. I would suggest, then, that the most stringent orders should be issued that no man shall be sent to a hospital at the rear, whether on shore or afloat, without his descriptive list and a report from the surgeon of his regiment to accompany him; these reports and descriptive lists to be handed to the medical director of the corps or the senior medical officer of the independent command before the men are permitted to leave their regimental hospitals. When these lists are presented, the medical director of the corps or other senior medical officer to inquire of the medical director of the army by telegraph where these men shall be sent, and shall inform him exactly how many there are. No man to be sent to general hospital who is beyond all hope of recovery. Where the point to which the men are to be sent is indicated, the quartermaster of the corps to make provision for their transportation to the railway and for cars to convey them to the transports or general hospital at White House.

I have also to suggest the propriety of taking some measures to have the well men of this army now in the Northern hospitals sent back to their regiments. I feel confident that more than 1,000 men perfectly fit to join their regiments are now idle in the general hospitals. I have given orders to this effect at Yorktown and White House, and have no doubt they are obeyed in these hospitals.

I would further recommend the prohibition of huckstering at White House and Yorktown, as well as near any of our camps. Much mischief is done by the sale of improper articles of food to the men. Milk, corn bread, fresh vegetables, and eggs are unexceptionable, but all other articles should be forbidden. It would be well to limit the sale of the proper articles to some particular locality at White House and Yorktown, so that it could be readily and frequently inspected by some officer, to insure the exclusion of all forbidden articles.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Appendix U².]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Medical Director's Office, June 14, 1862.

GENERAL: Surg. J. F. Hammond, medical director of Sumner's corps, having telegraphed me this morning that there were some signs of scurvy in that corps, I sent Dr. A. K. Smith over at once to investigate the matter. Dr. Smith reports to me that he found six cases in

the Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts Regiments, Dana's brigade, and several more acquiring the predisposition to scurvy. General Dana informed Dr. Smith that he had been unable to obtain vegetables (such as potatoes) for his men for a long time.

Paragraph 1202, General Regulations, confines the issue of anti-scorbutics to the sick, and then they are to be paid for out of the hospital fund. I think, however, that potatoes have been made part of the ration by act of Congress. It is certain that vegetables are absolutely necessary to prevent scurvy, and if, as in our present circumstances, they cannot be purchased by the men, the Subsistence Department must supply them, or the men will become scorbutic.

I have ordered a supply of lemons and cream of tartar from White House to Sumner's corps. I have also telegraphed to Colonel Clarke to issue, if possible, potatoes, dried apples, pickles, and desiccated vegetables to the men, and have promised to furnish him with any authority he needs that I can procure. I think the issue of these first articles absolutely necessary, and have no doubt it will speedily arrest the disease. The desiccated vegetables are less reliable, as the men dislike to use them. They should, however, be compelled to do so. Potatoes come in this shape, and I believe the commissary has them on hand. I have the honor to recommend that fresh potatoes, fresh onions, dried apples, and desiccated vegetables be immediately ordered to be issued as parts of the daily ration, and that commanding officers be charged with the duty of seeing them daily and properly used.

As I am closing this letter I receive the following dispatch from Colonel Clarke in reply to my telegram.

Potatoes, dried apples, and desiccated vegetables have been sent to the depot near Fair Oaks Station, from which General Sumner's corps draws its supplies. More will be sent. I do not know a single command in which Special Orders, 155, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, have been complied with. Could not the medical directors insist on having it carried out in their respective corps?

The means, then, of preventing scurvy have always been ready for issue in the subsistence department. The responsibility for its occurrence rests with those who have neglected to use these means. I think stringent orders necessary to compel regimental officers to see that their men are provided with and habitually use these necessary articles.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

General R. B. MARCY,

Chief of Staff Army of the Potomac.

[Appendix U³.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Medical Director's Office, June 17, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with instructions in your letter of June 2, in reference to my report of the existence of scurvy in this army, I have the honor to state that I received a telegram from headquarters while I was engaged at White House in organizing a general hospital, informing me of the appearance of scurvy in two brigades, and directing me to send for lime-juice, &c. I telegraphed you on the 21st of May for lemons in obedience to that order, expressing at the time a doubt of the accuracy of the report. This doubt was based on the fact that one of the brigades was that of the regular infantry. I knew that these troops had been furnished with desiccated vegetables, and that some

of them had used them regularly. Orders for this issue had been promulgated long before, as well as instructions as to the method of cooking to be adopted by the troops. I called upon the chief commissary to inquire into the matter, and learned that the men very generally refused to use the desiccated vegetables; that he had abundance of them, and could not get rid of them. Even potatoes had been suffered to rot upon his hands and in the camps.

A general order was again applied for and issued on the 23d of May, requiring the troops to draw and use the desiccated vegetables in soup daily, unless prevented by being actually on the march; prohibiting the frying of meat, and commanding it to be always roasted or boiled.

Upon my arrival at headquarters I inquired into the grounds of the report, and learned that it had been made by the medical director of General F. J. Porter's corps, Dr. George H. Lyman. This gentleman, one of the ablest and most energetic medical officers of the volunteer service, informed me that he had not seen any cases, but had considered it his duty to make it known for prudential reasons as soon as it was mentioned to him by Brigade Surgeon Waters and by some young assistant surgeon of the Regular Army. I sent for Dr. Waters, and found he had seen no cases; that it had been reported to him by some volunteer regimental surgeon. I directed him to have the men brought to me immediately for inspection. He subsequently reported to me that the patients had been sent to the general hospital at White House. A short time afterward I visited this hospital, and there found two cases sent down as cases of scurvy. I examined them. One had no signs of scurvy about him; the other was a rather robust man, with an erythematous patch upon one shin, swelling of the leg and knee, discoloration of the hams, without hardness, and with no swelling or sponginess of the gums. The affection came on, according to the account of the patient, in one night, from sleeping without shelter after a hard day's march through deep mud. I could not consider this case scorbutic under the circumstances, and accordingly, feeling relieved as to the fact, I reported that no scurvy existed in this army.

About this time the lemons arrived and were distributed through the several *corps d'armée*. On the 14th June, Surg. J. F. Hammond, medical director of Sumner's corps, reported to me by telegraph that there were some cases of scurvy in that corps, and requesting a further supply of lemons. I ordered to him immediately all that remained of the consignment, as well as a quantity of cream of tartar. I then sent my senior assistant, Dr. A. K. Smith, to inspect the men said to be affected. His report I inclose.* Upon receipt of this I telegraphed to Colonel Clarke, commissary of subsistence at White House, a request to send potatoes, dried apples, and pickles to Sumner's corps. He replied that these articles were at the depot from which General Sumner drew his supplies and that he would send more. I also addressed a letter on the subject to General Marcy, chief of staff, to endeavor to get some more stringent orders issued on this important matter. I inclose a copy of that letter. I have seen Colonel Clarke since, and he assures me his assistant commissaries have not been able to make the men use the desiccated vegetables; that he had plenty of them, and they were always ready for issue. If the men will not use the means of preventing scurvy, and if their officers will not make them use them, cases of the disease must be expected to occur.

To meet the cases existing I telegraphed you yesterday for a further

* Not found.

supply of lemons, and I am issuing cream of tartar wherever I hear any signs of the disease.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHS. S. TRIPLER,

Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

Brig. Gen. W. A. HAMMOND,

Surgeon-General U. S. Army.

No. 11.

Report of Surg. Jonathan Letterman, U. S. Army, Medical Director Army of the Potomac, of operations from July 4 to September 2.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Med. Director's Office, Camp near Falmouth, Va., Mar. 1, 1863.

GENERAL: In compliance with the directions contained in your communication of January 20, 1863, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the medical department of this army from July 4, 1862, to November 7, 1862, viz:

In obedience to orders from the War Department, dated June 23, 1862, I reported on the 1st day of July following to General McClellan at Haxall's Landing, on the James River, for duty as medical director of the Army of the Potomac, and after the arrival of the army at Harrison's Landing was placed on duty as such on the 4th day of that month.

I attempted on the 28th of the previous month to report to the commanding general from the White House on the Pamunkey River, but was prevented from doing so by the movements of the army, and was compelled to proceed by way of Fortress Monroe and the James River to his headquarters. The change which was taking place in the position of the army when I left the White House rendered it necessary that the medical supplies and the transports for the wounded and sick should also be sent up the James River to meet the wants of the army. Upon inquiry, not ascertaining that any orders had been issued in the case, I assumed the authority, and directed Assistant Surgeon Alexander, U. S. Army, the medical purveyor, and Assistant Surgeon Dunster, U. S. Army, the medical director of transportation, to proceed up that river with their supplies and vessels with all possible dispatch. They reached Harrison's Landing in time to be of the greatest service.

The army when it reached Harrison's Landing was greatly exhausted. The malaria from the borders of the Chickahominy and from the swamps throughout the Peninsula to which it had been so freely exposed now began to manifest its baneful effects upon the health of the men. In addition to this the troops, just previous to their arrival at this point, had been marching and fighting for seven days and nights in a country abounding in pestilential swamps and traversed by streams greatly swollen by the heavy rains, which made that region almost a Sarbonean bog. The labors of the troops had been excessive, the excitement intense. They were called upon to subsist upon a scanty supply of food, and but little time even to prepare the meager allowance. They had little time for sleep, and even when the chance presented itself it was to lie in the rain and mud, with the expectation of being called to arms at any moment. The marching and fighting

in such a country, with such weather, with lack of food, want of rest, great excitement, and the depression necessarily consequent upon it, could not have other than the effect of greatly increasing the numbers of sick in the army after it reached Harrison's Landing.

Scurvy had made its appearance before its arrival there, the seeds of which had doubtless been planted some months previously, and was due not merely to the want of vegetables, but also to exposure to cold and wet, working and sleeping in the mud and rain, and to the inexperience of these troops in taking proper care of themselves under difficult circumstances. This disease is not to be dreaded merely by the numbers it sends upon the reports of sick. It goes much further, and the causes which give rise to it undermine the strength, depress the spirits, take away the energy, courage, and elasticity of those who do not report themselves sick, and who yet are not well. They do not feel sick, and yet their energy, their powers of endurance, and their willingness to undergo hardship are in a great degree gone, and they know not why. In this way it had affected the fighting powers of the army, and much more than was indicated by the numbers it had sent upon the reports of sick.

All these influences were not without their effect upon the medical officers as well as upon the rest of the army. A number of them became sick from the exposure and privations to which they had been subjected, and those who did not succumb entirely to these influences were worn-out by the excessive labor required of them during the campaign upon the Peninsula, and especially by the labor incident to the battles immediately preceding the arrival of the army at Harrison's Landing.

The nature of the military operations unavoidably placed the medical department, when the army reached this point, in a condition far from being satisfactory. The supplies had been exhausted almost entirely or had from necessity been abandoned; the hospital tents had been almost universally abandoned or destroyed; the arrangement of the ambulances was not in such a state as to render very effective service, and the circumstances under which the army was placed required a much larger number of medical officers to perform the duties which were thrown upon that portion of the staff.

It was impossible to obtain proper reports of the number of the sick in the army when it reached Harrison's Landing, nor had the causes just referred to produced their full effects. After about 6,000 had been sent away on the transports 12,795 remained. The data on which to base the precise percentage of sick and wounded could not be obtained at this date, but from the most careful estimate which I could make in the absence of positive data the sickness amounted to at least twenty per cent.

On the 1st of July I directed the Harrison house to be taken and used as a hospital, as it was the only available building for the purpose in that vicinity, although entirely inadequate to meet the wants of the army. Only a few wall tents could be obtained at that time with which to enlarge the capacity of the hospital. No hospital tents could be procured.

The rain began to fall heavily early on the morning of the 2d, and continued with little interruption until the evening of the 3d. A few wounded came to the hospital on the 1st and on the 2d, and thereafter for several days they came in great numbers. Relays of medical officers were required to work day and night, and continued to work faithfully until all the wounded who desired assistance had received it.

The absence of tents prevented shelter being provided, and the vast majority, being slightly wounded, were obliged to find protection from the rain as best they could, the more serious cases being kept in the building. The labors of the medical officers were excessive, but no relaxation was given until all who required treatment had received it. The greatest difficulty experienced at this time was providing proper food, which very many needed much more than any medical or surgical aid. Very soon large caldrons and supplies of beef stock were obtained from the medical purveyor and hard bread from the commissary department, by means of which an excellent soup was prepared and freely issued, relays of cooks being at first employed night and day. This hospital was afterwards sufficiently enlarged by hospital tents to contain 1,200 patients, and when the army left Harrison's Landing the tents were removed to Craney Island, near Fortress Monroe, and a hospital established there by Surgeon Stocker, U. S. Volunteers, who conducted the removal and the re-establishment of the hospital speedily and well.

The transports for the sick and wounded, except those that had been sent North from the Pamunkey River, reached the army on the 2d of July. These vessels were fitted up with beds, bedding, medicines, hospital stores, food, with many delicacies, and with arrangements for their preparation—everything, indeed, that was necessary for the comfort and well-being of the wounded and sick. Surgeons, stewards, and nurses were assigned to their respective boats, and remained with them wherever they went. I doubt if ever vessels have been so completely fitted up for the transportation of sick and wounded of an army as these vessels had been by the orders of the Surgeon-General.

The shipment of the wounded and sick began on the 2d of July in the rain, and was continued day and night until a very large number had been sent away. The want of shelter and proper accommodations at that time at Harrison's Landing rendered it necessary to send away many who under more favorable circumstances would not have been sent out of the army. The weather was so inclement and the mud so excessive that there was an evident disposition on the part of medical officers to look leniently upon any case of sickness or of wounds which presented itself. Had they not been sent on board they must have remained out in the rain and mud, without shelter and without proper food. On the 15th of July about 7,000 had been sent to Fortress Monroe and North. This number having been sent away a large number still remained, and during the first week whilst the shipment was in progress the troops were feeling seriously the effects of the late campaign. The deadly malaria was now producing its full effects, and, together with the want of proper food and the exposure to the rains which had fallen so continuously, and the fatigues endured, was now being fully manifested in the prevalence of malarial fevers of a typhoid type, diarrheas, and scurvy. Whilst the shipment of wounded and sick was going on, and as soon as the pressing necessities of the first few days were provided for, my attention was given to ascertain the most expeditious method of improving the health of the army. The results of the investigations made and the means considered proper for adoption (many of which had been enforced before it was written, the good effects of which were daily apparent) in the case were set forth in a communication I transmitted to you on the 18th of July. An extract from this communication was published to the army in orders, and from this extract I quote the following, in order to recall to your mind the

views which I then had the honor of submitting for the consideration of the commanding general, viz:

The diseases prevailing in our army are generally of a mild type and are not increasing. Their chief causes are, in my opinion, the want of proper food (and that improperly prepared), exposure to the malaria of swamps and the inclemencies of the weather, excessive fatigue, and want of natural rest, combined with great excitement of several days' duration, and the exhaustion consequent thereon. I would recommend, to remedy these evils, that food, with abundance of fresh vegetables, shelter, rest, with a moderate amount of exercise, be given all the troops, and general and personal police be enforced. To accomplish this I would suggest that an abundant supply of fresh onions and potatoes be used by the troops daily for a fortnight and thereafter at least twice a week, cost what they may; that the desiccated vegetables, dried apples or peaches, and pickles be used thrice a week; that a supply of fresh bread, by floating ovens or other methods, be distributed at least three times a week; that the food be prepared by companies and not by squads, and that there be two men detailed from each company as permanent cooks, to be governed in making the soups and cooking by the inclosed directions; that wells be dug as deep as the water will permit; that the troops be provided with tents or other shelter to protect them from the sun and rain, which shall be raised daily and struck once a week and placed upon new ground; the *tentes d'abris* also to be placed over new ground once a week; that the men be required to cut pine tops, spread them thickly in their tents, and not sleep on the ground; that camps be formed not in the woods but at a short distance from them, where a free circulation of pure air can be procured, and where the ground has been exposed to the sun and air to such an extent as to vitiate the noxious exhalations from damp ground saturated with emanations from the human body and from the decaying vegetation. Sleep during the day will not compensate for the loss of it at night, and I suggest that as far as possible the troops be allowed the natural time for rest; that not more than two drills per day be had, one in the morning from 6.15 to 7 and one in the evening from 6.30 to 7.15; that the men be allowed to sleep until sunrise, and that they have their breakfast as soon as they rise. This, with the labor required for policing, will be sufficient during the present season. That when troops march they should have breakfast (if only a cup of coffee) before starting, and after their arrival in camp each man be given a gill of whisky in a canteen three-fourths filled with water. I would also recommend that the strictest attention be paid to policing, general and special; that all the troops be compelled to bathe once a week, a regiment at a time, if possible, being marched to the river, from a brigade, one hour after sunrise or an hour and a half before sunset, to remain in the water fifteen minutes; that sinks be dug and used, 6 inches of earth being thrown into them daily, and when filled to within 2 feet of the surface new sinks to be dug and the old ones filled up; that holes be dug at each company kitchen for the refuse matter and filled in like manner; that the entire grounds of each regiment be thoroughly policed every day, and the refuse matter, including that from stables and wagon-yards, be buried 2 feet below the surface or burned; that dead animals and the blood and offal from slaughtered animals be not merely covered with a layer of earth, but buried at least 4 feet under ground; that the spaces between regiments be kept policed, and no nuisance whatever be allowed anywhere within the limits of this army, and that regimental commanders be held strictly accountable that this most important matter is attended to. I think if these suggestions be carried into effect that we may with reason expect the health of this army to be in as good a state as that of any army in the field.

Every effort is being made by the commissary and quartermaster's departments to provide such articles as I have mentioned belonging to their departments.

This extract will, perhaps, be sufficient to explain the views entertained by me on this subject, so vital to the army and to the country.

After about 7,000 sick and wounded had been sent away there remained 12,975, making a total of nearly 20,000. The greater portion of the army reached Harrison's Landing on the 2d of July. On that day I addressed a letter to the Surgeon-General, asking that 1,000 hospital tents and 200 ambulances might speedily be sent for the use of the army. I felt convinced that great destitution in tents would be found to exist and that many ambulances had been lost, and that it would be necessary to have both of these articles replaced. The tents I considered would be especially needed to shelter the wounded and sick, whom it would be desirable to keep with the army. No one thing so much disheartens troops and causes homesickness among those who

are well as sending sick to hospitals outside of the army to which they belong. Such was the experience of the armies in the Crimea, and such is the experience of all armies.

On the 7th of July the following communication was sent to me from Washington by the Quartermaster General:

You were this day telegraphed as follows, viz: Have ordered tents for 50,000 men sent to Harrison's Landing. Few hospital tents on hand; more making. For the present I advise the use of some of the wall tents lately shipped to Harrison's Landing. But why not send your sick and wounded at once to Fort Monroe, to be transferred to a healthier place? Sick and wounded are not useful at such a place as that at Harrison's Landing.

On the 9th of July General Meigs informed me that he had ordered 200 ambulances from Philadelphia and 250 hospital tents from Washington to Fortress Monroe, saying "the remaining 750 hospital tents will be forwarded as soon as made." Three hundred hospital tents reached Harrison's Landing on the 18th of July. On the 1st of August I was informed that "a large number had arrived, together with a number of ambulances." The tents, as far as they were needed, were used for the accommodation of the sick. The ambulances were distributed before we left.

Before the communication to you of July 18 was written the existence of scurvy attracted my serious consideration, and upon consultation with Colonel Clarke, the chief commissary of the army, large supplies of potatoes, onions, cabbage, tomatoes, squash, and beets and fresh bread were ordered by him. The first arrival of anti-scorbutics was on the 7th of July; potatoes and onions arrived on the 20th, and thereafter the supplies were so abundant that potatoes, onions, and cabbage rotted at the wharf for want of some one to take them away. The fresh bread was eagerly sought for by the men, as they loathed the hard bread, which they had used for so many weeks. This loathing was no affectation, for this bread is difficult to masticate, is dry and insipid, absorbs all the secretions poured into the mouth and stomach, and leaves none for the digestion of other portions of the food. The craving for fresh bread was founded in reason, and was not a mere whim. In addition to these vegetables and fresh bread procured by the commissary department, 1,500 boxes of fresh lemons were issued by the medical purveyor to the various hospitals and to the troops. The beneficial effects of this treatment soon became perceptible on the health of the men, and when we left Harrison's Landing scurvy had disappeared from the Army of the Potomac.

While the army remained at this place supplies of every kind appertaining to the medical department were abundant and large amounts were issued; as it was found necessary to resupply almost the entire army. Ice was freely and almost continuously supplied by the medical purveyor to the general and regimental hospitals and to the transports.

The recommendations contained in the extract taken from my communication to you of July 18, which I have quoted, were ordered to be carried into effect by the commanding general. The subject of police throughout the army, I may here state, was called to your attention in a note addressed to you on the 12th of July. Inspections were made frequently by medical officers in the different corps, by officers sent upon this duty from the medical director's office, and by myself, to see that the instructions just alluded to were enforced. The duty was laborious, and especially so during the excessive heat in July and August. These inspections were purposely made irregularly, both as regards time and

commands. The beneficial effects of the orders and the inspections were very evident in the improvement of the various camps and regimental hospitals. In a few regiments the sickness increased; in some others it remained nearly stationary, and in others it decreased one-half. On the whole, the health of the army was improving. On the 30th of July I informed the Surgeon-General that the number of sick in the army was about 12,000, 2,000 of whom could take the field. The cases became less severe and were manageable, more readily yielded to treatment, and continued so until the army evacuated Harrison's Landing.

It is impossible to convey in writing to any one not mingling with the troops a true idea of the improvement which took place in the health of the troops while we were encamped at that place. The number reported sick on the regimental returns cannot by any means be taken as the true condition of the health of the army upon its arrival there. It does not give the real amount of its effective fighting strength. The want of proper nourishment, the poisonous exhalations from the streams and swamps of the Peninsula, the labor undergone, and the anxiety felt had undermined the strength and withered the spirits of a great many who were apparently well. The effective strength of the army when it reached Harrison's Landing and for some time thereafter was less than the returns would indicate. And then, on the other hand, there are many ways in which improved health manifests itself that cannot be adequately described. There was so much in the appearance, in the life and vivacity exhibited by the men in the slightest actions, even in the tone of the voice, which conveyed to one's mind the impression of health and spirits, of recovered tenacity of mind and body, of the presence of vigorous and manly courage, an impression which to be understood must be felt—it cannot be told. The real strength of the army when it left Harrison's Landing was greater than the large number at that time sent on the transports for the sick would lead you to suppose.

It was agreeable to notice that the measures adopted for the improvement of the health of the troops were so ably and so cordially seconded by the medical directors of corps, that by their exertions and that of the officers under them encouraging results were brought about, and that they were so able and so willing to assist in restoring the health and re-establishing the vigor of the Army of the Potomac. Time showed that those who were not sick were well, that the spirits of the troops had risen, and that the army when it left Harrison's Landing was in a better condition by far than when it reached that place, and that there was every evidence to "expect the health of this army to be in as good a state as that of any army in the field."

From the 15th of July the transports for the sick were chiefly employed in bringing over wounded and sick exchanged prisoners from Richmond and carrying them to the Northern cities, principally to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. They were almost wholly occupied in this duty until the 3d of August, at which time the last were received at City Point. Shortly after communication was opened with the Confederate authorities; large supplies of fresh lemons, brandy, lint, &c., were, by direction of the general commanding, sent to City Point, to be turned over to them for the use of the wounded, but would not be received by them, and were returned. As the general commanding visited the vessels as they returned from that place loaded with our wounded and sick, he will, doubtless, remember the pains taken to have these men in every respect well cared for. I inspected every vessel before it was allowed to leave for the North, that I might

be certain that everything was done, and done properly, that was necessary for the welfare of those on board. Three thousand eight hundred and forty-five sick and wounded were thus transported.

After this time a portion of these transports, which had been while North taken from their legitimate use, were occupied in carrying exchanged Confederate prisoners from the North to City Point. On the return of these boats from this service to Harrison's Landing they were found to be excessively filthy, and required a great deal of labor to render them again suitable for the transportation of the sick. The use of these vessels in this way embarrassed me. On the 6th of August I informed the Surgeon-General by telegraph that—

I sent away yesterday 700 sick from the army. My boats are in use with the Confederate prisoners. If my boats are thus interfered with by the authorities beyond this army, I hope I shall not be held accountable if the sick of this army are not properly sent away.

On the 3d of August the shipment of the sick from the army commenced, and was carried on as rapidly as the transportation could be obtained. It will be perceived from what I have just said that I had at my disposal only a portion of the boats set apart for that purpose, and the hospitals I had drawn plans for, and which the commanding general had directed the chief quartermaster to procure, were not allowed.

These two things alone embarrassed me much.

The following extract from a letter I addressed to the Surgeon-General will show to some extent the difficulties in the way of the rapid shipment of the sick under which I labored on the 13th of August:

I left on the 10th of August 150 hospital tents at Fort Monroe to be pitched near the Mill Creek hospital, and to-day have had 200 more sent from here, and have sent Assistant Surgeon McMillan to superintend putting them in order, and have sent Assistant Surgeon McClellan to superintend the hospital near Camp Hamilton. The tardiness exhibited at Fort Monroe in the erection of that hospital has been a serious annoyance. From the appearance of things at Point Lookout I shall be surprised if the hospital there is finished before the 1st day of November proximo. From this state of things and from the fact of the hospitals which were sent for by Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls, chief quartermaster of this army, some time since, the plans for which were drawn up by me, and which were ordered to be carried into effect by General McClellan, having been refused, as I am informed, by General Halleck, I have been more seriously embarrassed. These buildings were to have been erected about this time at such point as I should have selected, and would have contained about 3,000 sick, and this army would be able to move. Some of the sick transports have been used for other purposes, carrying Confederate prisoners and General Burnside's troops and loaded with supplies. All this has caused serious delay in removing the sick from this point, and have been circumstances over which no one here has any control.

Colonel Ingalls made every effort in his power to aid in removing the sick, and placed at different times boats temporarily at my disposal for this purpose, amounting in all to ten. Some of these could make but one trip; others made more, and carried in all, from the 9th to the night of the 15th of August, 5,945 men; 1,908 were sent away before the 9th on the regular transports. The total number sent away consequent upon the movement of the army was 14,159. The largest number of boats was obtained on the 15th, and on that day and night 5,629 were sent away. This fact will, I think, lead the commanding general to believe that the medical department was not idle. The delay arising from the use of the transports for purposes other than that for which they were designed it was impossible for me to avoid, and at the same time was the cause of another serious evil—the want of time to have the cases to be sent away properly examined. From this cause many were taken on board who should not have been received. Many cases were

sent from regiments which had marched by colonels or captains, without the knowledge of the medical officers, from negligence or favoritism, who were fully able to do the duty required of them, and under the circumstances it became necessary to send them on the boats. This state of things could have been prevented had the medical department full control of its vessels when the preparations were commenced to ship the sick.

The delay occasioned by the causes I have alluded to rendered the case at last an emergency, under the pressure of which it was impossible to have every case thoroughly examined. There are always numbers of skulkers and worthless men in the army who are on the watch for an opportunity to escape duty, and these are always the cases which require the most careful examination; and these are the men who raise the cry of the inhumanity, want of attention, and cruelty of surgeons, which is so frequently taken up and echoed and re-echoed from one end of the country to the other. Out of 3,000 cases examined upon our arrival at Fortress Monroe 600 were fit for duty and ordered to their regiments. When the time and the means are considered it will, I think, be conceded that seldom have so large a number been transported without accident and without suffering. A careful and attentive medical officer was placed on each boat with medical supplies sufficient for use. Credit is very deservedly due to Dr. Dunster and the medical officers of the vessels for the manner in which this large number was transported and provided for. The labor was great.

The supplies appertaining to the medical department were, owing to the excellent manner in which the purveying was performed by Assistant Surgeon Alexander, in every way abundant while at Harrison's Landing, and when the army left that place it was, so far as the medical department was concerned, fully, I might almost say elegantly, equipped with all that was requisite for another campaign.

The subject of the ambulances, after the health of the troops, became a matter of importance. Medical officers and quartermasters had charge of them, and as a natural consequence little care was exercised over them, and they could not be depended upon during an action or on a march. It became necessary to institute some system for their management—such that they should not be under the immediate control of medical officers, whose duties, especially on the day of battle, prevented any supervision when supervision was more than at any other time required. It seemed to me necessary that whilst medical officers should not have the care of the horses, harness, &c., belonging to the ambulances, the system should be such as to enable them at all times to procure them with facility when wanted for the purposes for which they were designed, and to be kept under the general control of the medical department. Neither the kind nor the number of ambulances required were in the army at that time, but it nevertheless was necessary to devise a system that would render as available as possible the material upon the spot, particularly as the army might move at any time, and not wait for the arrival of such as had been asked for, only a portion of which ever came. In order to inaugurate a system which would make the best of the materials on hand and accomplish the objects just referred to, the following order was written and published by direction of the commanding general:

GENERAL ORDERS, {
No. 147. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., August 2, 1862.

The following regulations for the organization of the ambulance corps and the management of ambulance trains are published for the information and government

of all concerned. Commanders of army corps will see that they are carried into effect without delay:

1. The ambulance corps will be organized on the basis of a captain to each army corps as the commandant of the ambulance corps, a first lieutenant for a division, second lieutenant for a brigade, and a sergeant for each regiment.

2. The allowance of ambulances and transport carts will be 1 transport cart, 1 four-horse and 2 two-horse ambulances for a regiment; 1 two-horse ambulance for each battery of artillery, and 2 two-horse ambulances for the headquarters of each army corps. Each ambulance will be provided with two stretchers.

3. The privates of the ambulance corps will consist of two men and a driver to each ambulance and one driver to each transport cart.

4. The captain is the commander of all the ambulances and transport carts in the army corps, under the direction of the medical director. He will pay special attention to the condition of the ambulances, horses, harness, &c., requiring daily inspections to be made by the commanders of division ambulances, and reports thereof to be made to him by these officers. He will make a personal inspection once a week of all the ambulances, transport carts, horses, harness, &c., whether they have been used for any other purpose than the transportation of the sick and wounded and medical supplies; reports of which will be transmitted through the medical director of the army corps to the medical director of the army every Sunday morning. He will institute a drill in his corps, instructing his men in the most easy and expeditious method of putting men in and taking them out of the ambulance, taking men from the ground and placing and carrying them on stretchers, observing that the front man steps off with the left foot and the rear man with the right, &c. He will be especially careful that the ambulance and transport carts are at all times in order, provided with attendants, drivers, horses, &c., and the kegs rinsed and filled daily with fresh water, that he may be able to move at any moment. Previous to and in time of action he will receive from the medical director of the army corps his orders for the distribution of the ambulances and the points to which he will carry the wounded, using the light two-horse ambulances for bringing men from the field and the four-horse ones for carrying those already attended to farther to the rear, if the medical director considers it necessary. He will give his personal attention to the removal of the sick and wounded from the field and to and from the hospitals, going from point to point to ascertain what may be wanted, and to see that his subordinates (for whose conduct he will be responsible) attend to their duties in taking care of the wounded, treating them with gentleness and care, and removing them as quickly as possible to the places pointed out, and that the ambulances reach their destination. He will make a full and detailed report after every action and march of the operations of the ambulance corps.

5. The first lieutenant assigned to the ambulance corps of a division will have complete control, under the commander of the whole corps and the medical director, of all the ambulances, transport carts, ambulance horses, &c., in the division. He will be the acting assistant quartermaster for the division ambulance corps, and will receipt and be responsible for the property belonging to it, and be held responsible for any deficiency in ambulances, transport carts, horses, harness, &c., pertaining to the ambulance corps of the division. He will have a traveling cavalry forge, a blacksmith, and a saddler, who will be under his orders, to enable him to keep his train in order. He will receive a daily inspection report of all the ambulances, horses, &c., under his charge from the officers in charge of brigade ambulance corps, will see that the subordinates attend strictly to their duties at all times, and will inspect the corps under his charge once a week; a report of which inspection he will transmit to the commander of the ambulance corps.

6. The second lieutenant in command of the ambulances of a brigade will be under the immediate orders of the commander of the ambulance corps for the division and have superintendence of the ambulance corps for the brigade.

7. The sergeant in charge of the ambulance corps for a regiment will conduct the drills, inspection, &c., under the orders of the commander of the brigade ambulance corps, and will be particular in enforcing rigidly all orders he may receive from his superior officers. The officers and non-commissioned officers of this corps will be mounted.

8. The detail for this corps will be made with care by commanders of army corps, and no officer or man will be selected for this duty except those known to be active and efficient, and no man will be relieved except by orders from these headquarters. Should any officer or man detailed for this duty be found not fitted for it, representations of the fact will be made by the medical director of the army corps to the medical director of this army.

9. Two medical officers from the reserve corps of surgeons of each division, and a hospital steward, who will be with the medicine wagon, will be detailed by the medical director of the army corps to accompany the ambulance train when on the march,

the train of each division being kept together, and will see that the sick and wounded are properly attended to. A medicine wagon will accompany each train.

10. The officers connected with the corps must be with the trains on a march, observing that no one rides in the ambulances without the authority of the medical officers, except in urgent cases; but men must not be allowed to suffer, and the officers will, when the medical officers cannot be found, use a sound discretion in this matter, and be especially careful that the men and drivers are in their proper places. The place for the ambulances is in front of all wagon trains.

11. When in camp, the ambulances, transport carts, and ambulance corps will be parked with the brigade, under the supervision of the commander of the corps for the brigade. They will be used, on the requisition of the regimental medical officers, transmitted to the commander of the brigade ambulance corps, for transporting the sick to various points and procuring medical supplies, and for nothing else. The non-commissioned officer in charge will always accompany the ambulances or transport carts when on this or any other duty, and he will be held responsible that they are used for none other than their legitimate purposes. Should any officer infringe upon this order regarding the uses of ambulances, &c., he will be reported by the officer in charge to the commander of the train, all the particulars being given.

12. The officer in charge of a train will at once remove anything not legitimate, and if there be not room for it in the baggage wagons of the regiment will leave it on the road. Any attempt by a superior officer to prevent him from doing his duty in this or any other instance he will promptly report to the medical director of the army corps, who will lay the matter before the commander of that corps. The latter will at the earliest possible moment place the officer offending in arrest for trial for disobedience of orders.

13. Good serviceable horses will be used for the ambulances and transport carts, and will not be taken for any other purpose except by orders from these headquarters.

14. The uniform for this corps is: For privates, a green band 2 inches broad around the cap, a green half chevron 2 inches broad on each arm above the elbow, and to be armed with revolvers; non-commissioned officers to wear the same band around the cap as a private, chevrons 2 inches broad and green, with the point toward the shoulder, on each arm above the elbow.

15. No person will be allowed to carry from the field any wounded or sick except this corps.

16. The commanders of the ambulance corps on being detailed will report without delay to the medical director at these headquarters for instructions. All division, brigade, or regimental quartermasters having any ambulances, transport carts, ambulance horses, or harness, &c., in their possession will turn them in at once to the commander of the division ambulance corps.

By command of Major-General McClellan:

S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Owing to the delay in receiving the printed copies the enforcement of the order was prevented until within a few days previous to the evacuation of Harrison's Landing. As soon as they were received steps were at once taken to have the order carried into effect. The system being new and so radically different from any hitherto in vogue no little labor was required to put it in operation. As only a few days elapsed between the distribution of the order and our leaving Harrison's Landing there were many details that could not be attended to. However, imperfectly as the order was carried into effect on the march from that place to Yorktown and Fortress Monroe, during which it was first tried, and from the cordial approval of the medical directors of corps who alluded to the subject after our arrival in Washington in the early part of September, I felt convinced the system would work well. The contrast exhibited during the battles fought by General Pope in Virginia in the latter part of August between the action of the ambulances belonging to the Army of the Potomac, a few of which were able to reach the battle-fields, and those of corps in which the system ordered by General McClellan did not exist, I have been informed was very striking in favor of the former. At the battle of Fredericksburg, which took place on the 13th of December, 1862, this system, I may be allowed to say, was for the first time properly put in

operation, and owing to the nature of that engagement severely tested. It worked very satisfactorily, not only to me, but also in the opinion of the general officers in command; all the wounded being brought from the field the same night, although the battle lasted until after dark, except those between the lines.

While at Harrison's Landing, everything having been done that was considered necessary and that time permitted to place the medical department on a proper footing for active service, little was required of me during our march to Fortress Monroe, nor did anything occur in the medical department worthy of mention. Upon our arrival there steps were immediately taken to have the well men who had unavoidably been allowed to go on the transports to Fortress Monroe separated from those unable to perform their duties, and sent to their regiments.

Whilst the army was at Harrison's Landing the hospitals at Point Lookout, Fortress Monroe, and its immediate vicinity, Portsmouth, and Newport News were within the jurisdiction of the Army of the Potomac, and all of them I visited. On the 1st of August there were in these hospitals 1,820 patients. During that month, including the hospital at Craney Island, to which I have already alluded, they received 5,191; making a total of 7,011. Of these 716 were returned to duty, 101 discharged, 4 sent on furlough, 9 deserted, 218 (paroled prisoners) sent to Annapolis, and 84 died, leaving under treatment 5,879 on the 31st of August. In these hospitals and camps 66 surgeons, 12 medical cadets, 12 hospital stewards, 537 nurses, and 126 cooks were on duty during the month of August.

The army had to be transported by water from this place North. All the vessels that could be obtained (the transports fitted up for the sick, as well as others) were required by the quartermaster's department for this object. It appeared that it was necessary to have the troops transported with rapidity, as they were sent with scarcely any baggage. From this it resulted that the ambulances and all their appurtenances were left behind, to be sent up as vessels could be spared for the purpose. Some of the vessels never arrived. A large portion of the medical supplies were also left behind—in some cases everything but the hospital knapsack—by orders of colonels of regiments, regimental quartermasters, and others; in some cases without the knowledge of the medical officers, in others notwithstanding their protest. For such acts as these medical officers have been severely censured, and they were censured afterward for not having the very supplies which had been left behind in this manner.

From the date of the embarkation of the troops at Fort Monroe up to the time when the general was placed in command of the defenses of Washington I know personally but little of the medical department of the Army of the Potomac. It was not under my control.*

* * * * *

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JONATHAN LETTERMAN,

Surgeon, U. S. Army, and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

* Remainder of report will appear in Series I, Vol. XIX, embracing operations of the Army of the Potomac from September 2 to November 9, 1862.

No. 12.

Reports of Maj. Albert J. Myer, Chief Signal Officer.

CAMP NEAR HARRISON'S LANDING, VA., July 18, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following preliminary report of services rendered by officers and men of the Signal Corps since the date of my communication of June 22.*

The following-named officers have been exposed under fire in the discharge of their duties during the recent movement of this army, and in the engagements of June 25, 26, 27, 29, and 30, and July 1. In each case the officers have well performed the duties on which they were ordered, often under circumstances of dangerous exposure:

In the engagement of June 25, with General F. J. Porter's heavy batteries on our right and with General Hooker's advance near the Williamsburg road: First Lieut. W. S. Stryker, Twelfth West Virginia Volunteers; Second Lieuts. J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey, and N. H. Camp, Fourth New Jersey, at General Porter's batteries. Second Lieuts. W. G. McCreary, One hundred and second Pennsylvania, and E. A. Denicke, Cameron Rifles, New York Volunteers, with General Hooker, near Williamsburg.

At Mechanicsville, June 26: First Lieuts. B. F. Fisher, Third Pennsylvania Reserves, and F. Birney, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers. Second Lieuts. J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey; F. Horner, Sixth New Jersey, and Isaac Beckett, Fifty-sixth New York.

At the battle of Gaines' Mill, June 27: First Lieuts. B. F. Fisher, Third Pennsylvania Reserves, and F. Birney, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers. Second Lieuts. J. Gloskosky, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers; J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey; N. H. Camp, Fourth New Jersey, and F. Horner, Sixth New Jersey.

At the battle of Savage Station, June 29: Second Lieuts. J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey Volunteers; N. H. Camp, Fourth New Jersey Volunteers; F. W. Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers; W. H. R. Neel, Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers; D. S. Tompkins, Fifth Michigan, and E. A. Denicke, Cameron Rifles, New York Volunteers.

At the battle of Malvern Hill, June 30: First Lieuts. L. B. Norton and G. H. McNary, Tenth Pennsylvania Reserves; F. Birney, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Second Lieut. J. F. Robbins, Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

At the battle of Malvern Hill, July 1: First Lieuts. B. F. Fisher, Third Pennsylvania Reserves; F. Ellis, Forty-second New York Volunteers, and Charles Herzog, Forty-first New York Volunteers; Second Lieuts. Joseph Gloskosky, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers, and F. W. Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

These officers have been chiefly under artillery fire, which they have encountered from almost every variety of caliber and in almost every degree of intensity. They have been screened whenever it was practicable from musketry fire. There have been narrow escapes, but no casualties. Two of the officers have been touched, their clothing torn by fragments of shell.

The services of the following-named officers entitle them to especial mention:

At the evacuation of the base of operations at White House Point, Va., and while that point was threatened with attack by the enemy,

* See Part III, p. 243.

communication was for thirty-six hours maintained between the army on shore and the different gunboats of the flotilla in the Pamunkey covering that position. To the co-operation of the land and naval forces thus secured the success of that movement was in part due.

For their services at this place are mentioned: First Lieuts. W. S. Stryker, Twelfth West Virginia Volunteers, and J. H. Hutchinson, Third Vermont, stationed on shore; First Lieut. James S. Hall, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, on flag-ship Chocura.

In the engagement of June 25, at the advance of General Hooker upon the Williamsburg road, the approach of the enemy, hidden by woods from our army, was observed by signal officers stationed in a tree top, and the information was signaled to General S. P. Heintzelman, commanding on the field. On this information some timely movements of our own forces were made.

On this day, also, direction was given to a field battery near General Hooker's position.

For their services at this point are mentioned: First Lieut. C. S. Kendall, First Massachusetts Volunteers; Second Lieuts. W. G. McCreary, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers, and E. A. Denicke, Cameron Rifles, New York Volunteers.

At the same day information was communicated by signal officers across the Chickahominy as to the range and effect of the fire of the heavy batteries stationed on Hogan's and Gaines' Hills, then occupied by General F. J. Porter, and firing upon the position of the enemy at Old Tavern.

The officers who served with these batteries are already mentioned.

At the battle of Mechanicsville signals were not used, the smoke settling so quickly upon the battle-field as to render them invisible. Under the circumstances, the officers were employed as reconnoitering officers, and by their observations gave some information as to the movements and position of the enemy and the direction of our artillery.

At the battle of Gaines' Mill signal communication was established on the field from the right and left flanks of our army, drawn up in line of battle, to the central position, occupied by General F. J. Porter. These stations were established prior to the engagement and maintained under fire until the action became general.

For services rendered preceding and during this action are mentioned: Second Lieut. J. Gloskosky, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers, stationed at the end of Bridge No. 5 and in advance of the left wing; First Lieut. B. F. Fisher, Third Pennsylvania Reserves, and Second Lieut. J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey Volunteers, with the right wing, and Second Lieut. N. H. Camp, Fourth New Jersey Volunteers, stationed with the commanding general.

On Sunday, June 29, at the commencement of the flank movement from the Chickahominy and preceding and at the commencement of the battle of Savage Station, reconnaissances of the position and of the advance of the enemy were made by signal officers, and reported by signals to Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, near Dudley's house, and Brigadier-General Sumner, on the field of battle.

For service on this occasion are mentioned: Second Lieuts. F. W. Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and E. A. Denicke, Cameron Rifles, New York Volunteers, reporting to General Smith the movements of the enemy from observatory station near Dudley's house; Second Lieut. J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey Volunteers, stationed near the railroad, in advance of the center of the line of battle; First Lieut. F. Birney, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, on the Will-

iamsburg road; Second Lieuts. F. W. Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and W. H. R. Neel, Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, at the center. During the action Lieuts. N. H. Camp, E. A. Denicke, and J. C. Wiggins volunteered for a dangerous duty.

Upon the arrival, during the flank movement of this army to its present base, of the advance of the Fourth Army Corps, General E. D. Keyes commanding, upon the banks of the James River, communication was at once established and afterward maintained between our army and the naval forces operating upon the river.

During the battle of Malvern Hill, on the afternoon and night of June 30, communication [was had] between the forces on the field of battle and the general commanding the army on board the United States steamship Galena, while he remained on board that ship, and between the different gunboats taking part in the action, both prior to taking up their positions for action and after they had taken those positions. Communication was also had between the fleet and our forces at other points on the banks of the James River. The firing of the gunboats on this day was in great part directed by signals from the field of battle, and the shells were thus thrown with precision and effect. The officers upon the field were exposed to a serious fire.

For their services on this occasion are mentioned: First Lieut. G. H. McNary, Tenth Pennsylvania Reserves; First Lieut. F. Birney, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Second Lieut. J. F. Robbins, Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, stationed near General Porter's headquarters. First Lieut. Charles Herzog, Forty-first New York Volunteers, on the left and near the advance. Second Lieut. W. G. McCreary, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers, at Haxall's house. First Lieut. C. S. Kendall, First Massachusetts Volunteers, near the river bank. First Lieut. H. R. Clum, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, on board United States steamship Galena. Second Lieut. A. B. Jerome, First New Jersey Volunteers, on board United States steamship Aroostook; and First Lieut. L. B. Norton, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

During the battle of Malvern Hill, July 1, and the operations of that day and the ensuing night, constant communication was kept up between our forces on land and on the fleet, co-operating at various points on the James River. There was communication also between different portions of our army on land and also between different vessels of the fleet. This communication was maintained by officers on the field, some of them exposed to a heavy fire. The positions occupied by officers, wherever stationed, on that day and night were those requiring arduous labor and involving serious responsibility. On this day, as on the preceding, the fire of the Navy was directed and regulated almost entirely by the signal officer from the battle-field and from ship to ship.

For their services during this battle are mentioned: First Lieut. F. Birney, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and First Lieut. F. E. Yates, Fourth Excelsior Regiment, stationed near General F. J. Porter on the battle-field and communicating with the gunboats. First Lieut. F. Ellis, Forty-second New York Volunteers; First Lieut. Charles Herzog, Forty-first New York Volunteers; Second Lieut. J. Gloskosky, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers, and Second Lieut. F. W. Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, stationed near the left advance. First Lieut. G. H. McNary, Tenth Pennsylvania Reserves, and Second Lieut. N. H. Camp, Fourth New Jersey Volunteers, near General Heintzelman, on the right. Second Lieut. J. C. Wiggins, Third New

Jersey Volunteers, and Second Lieut. G. H. McNary, Tenth Pennsylvania Reserves, and Second Lieut. W. G. McCreary, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers, near General Porter. First Lieut. H. R. Clum, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, on board United States steamship Galena. Second Lieut. Isaac Beckett, Fifty-sixth New York Volunteers, on board United States steamship Mahaska. Second Lieut. E. A. Denicke, Cameron Rifles, New York Volunteers, and Second Lieut. A. B. Jerome, First New Jersey Volunteers, on board the United States steamship Aroostook. First Lieut. C. S. Kendall, First Massachusetts Volunteers, on Haxall's house; and First Lieut. B. F. Fisher, Third Pennsylvania Reserves.

In the movements of the night of July 1 and on July 2 from Malvern Hill to the position now occupied by this army; in obtaining and conveying throughout the night of July 1 information to the general commanding the army, then on board the United States steamship Galena, as to those movements of the forces he had remained to superintend; in directing by his order on July 2 the position of the gunboat covering the rear of the wagon train, and which repelled the attack of the enemy on that train; in establishing communication between general headquarters on its arrival at this place and the fleet; in the observation and the announcement of the approach of the enemy to shell this camp on July 3; in designating to the gunboats where they could have the opportunity to be of service to the army on that day, and in reconnoitering and reporting upon the retreat of the enemy, valuable services were rendered.

For these services are mentioned: First Lieut. H. R. Clum, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, on board United States steamship Galena; First Lieut. C. S. Kendall, First Massachusetts Volunteers; Second Lieut. J. Gloskosky, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers; Second Lieut. J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey Volunteers, and Second Lieut. F. W. Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

On June 3, just after the battle of Fair Oaks, while this army lay north of the Chickahominy, the pickets of the left wing, which was then south of the Chickahominy, and the position of which was not before known to be at any point visible from the right wing, were discovered at a distance of 3 miles across the swamp by the signal officer on duty at Hogan's house. Communication was had over the swamp and the fact established that part of our left wing was visible. The swamp was then impassable between the points, and the enemy held the ground between them. This communication was kept up for many days by officers exposed to and often under the artillery fire of the enemy. The records will show the importance of the messages transmitted and the bearing they had upon the movements of this army. The communication was between the general commanding the army, Generals W. B. Franklin, F. J. Porter, and W. F. Smith.

The officers most exposed on these stations have been once mentioned. Others who served faithfully will be mentioned hereafter.

I have the honor further to state, as in place in this report of recent operations with this army, the following will be claimed in a more detailed report as in reference to the value of the services rendered by these officers and men of the Signal Corps of the Army:

1st. That without the co-operation of the Army and Navy the evacuation at this base of operations at White House Point, Va., could or would not have been conducted with the system and success which marked it, and that co-operation could not have been obtained in any

other way than by the presence of the signal officers detailed for that duty.

2d. That while the army occupied both sides of the Chickahominy in the engagement of June 25, in the battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill, at the commencement of the flank movement to the James River, and the battle of Savage Station, information was procured by signal officers and intelligence transmitted under circumstances which without their presence would have rendered its transmission impossible, and that this intelligence was useful.

3d. That in the battle of Malvern Hill intelligence transmitted upon the field of battle was useful, and that the entire naval force was wielded and directed by the general in command in a manner which would have been without the services of the corps impossible.

4th. It will be claimed for the corps that Lieut. W. G. McCreary, acting signal officer, from the observatory station established at Haxall's June 30, on the commencement of the attack on our rear, first discovered later in the afternoon the advance of the column of the enemy moving down the river and upon the left of our position, then at Malvern Hill; that this discovery was made by him while the column was about 5 miles distant; that the column was watched by him until he had formed an estimate of its numbers; that its approach and its distance from our left was then communicated by signals by him to General McClellan, on board the United States steamship Galena; that the immediate movement of the gunboats to attack this column was consequent upon this information; that the movement was by the services of signal officers carried out more rapidly than it could otherwise have been done, and that by the promptness and intelligence with which the gunboats were enabled by signals to go into action and to direct their fire they contributed largely to the repulse of this column of the enemy.

5th. That by the arrival and by the fire at the proper time of the gunboats, directed, at the request of General McClellan on the evening of July 2, to repel the enemy, then attacking the rear of our wagon train, then near Harrison's Landing, the enemy was repulsed, and a serious confusion of the train and consequent loss was prevented. This movement would not have been so rapidly made had it been necessary to convey the orders and information otherwise than by the services of the signal corps.

6th. That within an hour after the arrival of this army at the James River the army was placed in co-operation with the naval forces, assisting it, and that then and in the battle ensuing, and up to the present time, the services of the entire naval forces on this station have been so secured and made available for action as they could in no other manner have been. A similar control of the fleet has been assured to this army throughout the campaign.

I thus early state these facts, and claim such services to have been rendered by the corps, for the reason that the battles are recent and those are now present by whom the propriety of the claims may be verified. It may be important to the officers and men now composing the corps that their services should not be lost sight of, or some of them hereafter claimed to have been rendered by others.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALBERT J. MYER,

Signal Officer, Major, U. S. Army.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
Washington, D. C., October 21, 1862.

GENERAL :

* * * * *

CAMPAIGN OF THE PENINSULA.*

The last days of March were days of labor. The signal camp of instruction was abandoned. The detachments of instructors (of which mention has been made) were formed and ordered to the armies of Generals Halleck and Butler. The office of the signal officer was, at the suggestion of Capt. Samuel T. Cushing, Second Infantry, U. S. Army, and acting signal officer, placed in charge of that officer, who well arranged and superintended its duties while the army went through the campaign of the Peninsula. The Signal Corps of the Army of the Potomac was partially reorganized. A detachment of officers and men was assigned to each army corps. The last equipments for the field and camp were completed, and the corps was then ready to accompany any movement of the Grand Army. Whatever time was else unemployed was given to the vigorous practice in signals of those whose short experience at the camp of instruction had rendered this practice necessary. As the embarkation took place at Alexandria the signal officers of each army corps were distributed among the vessels carrying those corps. The aid they gave in the regulating, by the rapid telegraphing of messages, the embarkation of the forces, the facility with which the movements of the loaded transports were through them directed, and the precision they were able to cause in the arrangements for the debarkation of the great bodies of troops at the end of the voyage were subjects of pleasing surprise and of favorable comments, official and unofficial, among the numerous generals and other officers who were witnesses. Especial mention was made, I am informed, by Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter of the services rendered on this voyage by the signal detachment which, commanded by Lieut. H. L. Johnson, Fifth Connecticut Volunteers, and acting signal officer, accompanied the forces under General Porter.

The detachment serving with General Heintzelman was so well appreciated that a detail from it was sent back by that general from Fortress Monroe to aid in the sailing of the divisions under General Hooker, which, then belonging to Heintzelman's corps, were to sail at a later date. The signal officers accompanying the corps commanded by General Keyes on the voyage down the Potomac were much employed. The signal detachments commanded by Lieuts. N. Daniels, Third Wisconsin Volunteers, and acting signal officer, and F. Wilson, Fifth Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, and acting signal officer, and assigned, respectively, to the corps commanded by Major-General Sumner and Major-General McDowell, did not accompany the movement of the Army of the Potomac at this time.

On March 31 the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, on board the steamer *Commodore*, moved from Alexandria. A reserve party of seven officers, with their flagmen, accompanied them. The enlisted men of this party, the horses, stores, and wagons, with the extra stores for the corps of the Army of the Potomac, were on the same day shipped upon a sailing vessel. On the evening of April 2 the steamer *Commodore* arrived at Fortress Monroe, Va.

* The preceding portion of this report appears in Series I, Vol. V, pp. 69-76.

On April 3 the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were nominally stationed a mile north of Hampton, Va. But very few tents were pitched, however, and this camp could hardly with propriety be styled one.

During the movement down the river it had been made known that a movement of combined land and naval forces against Yorktown was intended. As soon as headquarters had moved from the steamer *Commodore* an interview was had with Commodore Goldsborough, then commanding the fleet near Fortress Monroe, and arrangements were made to send a detachment of signal officers and men on board the *flo-tilla*, then under orders to sail for Yorktown, under the command of Commodore Missroon.

On the next day the army transport with stores, &c., arrived. A night of hard labor sufficed to discharge her, and early on the following morning the reserve signal detachment, fully equipped, with its stores and means of transportation, was ready for the field. A detachment of 3 officers and 6 men, commanded by Lieut. J. W. De Ford, Eleventh Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, and acting signal officer, was ordered to the fleet. A few hours' rest was given to men and horses, yet stiff from the voyage, and at sunset on the 5th of April the party moved toward the front. A rapid night march over roads crowded with immense trains of wagons, and through fields, to avoid obstacles else impassable, and part of a day's toil through deep mud on narrow ways, encumbered with the impediments of a great army, brought the party on the afternoon of April 6 to the camping-ground, near Dr. Powers' house, of the first regular camp of headquarters of the Army of the Potomac made on the Peninsula in time to pitch their tents with the first there pitching.

The general advance of the Army of the Potomac had been made on April 4. On that night headquarters bivouacked at Big Bethel. On the following night they occupied a few uncomfortable sheds of a rebel cantonment near the now-selected encampment. In the general advance of the army the army corps under General Keyes moved upon the James River side of the Peninsula, and after heavy skirmishing touched the enemy's lines at Lee's Mill, near the Warwick River. The country into which this army corps moved was almost unknown to our generals. It was flat and covered with dense forests. The low formation of the ground and heavy rains had made it swampy. Through this the roads, nearly impassable, led. On all the march the detachment of the signal corps serving with these forces, under Lieut. B. F. Fisher, was on duty. There were no elevated points whence general observation could be had, and the character of the country made signaling impossible. The duties of such temporary reconnaissances as are made by scouts in such cases devolved upon the signal officers. They were among the first to follow the devious roads, to recognize the presence of the enemy, to study with their telescopes his strength and movements, and to hasten to report as well as they could such facts as they were able to note to the generals with whom they served. The advance of this column was checked near the line of the Warwick River, and General Keyes established his headquarters at Warwick Court-House.

The column under General Heintzelman, moving on the York side of the Peninsula, passed through a country difficult indeed, but both more open and better drained than that penetrated by the forces under General Keyes. The division of Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter constituted the advance of this column, and after minor encounters with

the enemy, in which they precipitately fled, it came under fire, and was checked by the guns and works at Yorktown. The duties of signal officers accompanying this column were, as with the other wing of the army, those of exploration and reconnaissance.

General Heintzelman established his headquarters at the saw-mill near the head of Wormley's Creek, on the Hampton road.

On the 6th of April a number of vessels of the fleet appeared in the bay off Yorktown. A few exchanges of shots with the enemy's batteries bearing upon the river front convinced the naval commanders that with wooden vessels they could not pass between Yorktown and Gloucester, nor could they encounter without disaster the heavy metal and plunging fire of the enemy's guns. The fleet drew out of range, and anchored in the Roads about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Yorktown.

THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN.

Our forces were in this position when in headquarters camp No. 1, near Yorktown, it was first made known that the corps commanded by Major-General McDowell had been withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac. The hope felt by many that this corps was in some way to turn the enemy's defensive lines at Yorktown fell. At the same time reports were received of reconnaissances made along the lines in front. Earthworks seemed to be found everywhere, and everywhere bodies of the enemy, vigilant and of unknown numbers, resisted any threatened assault. There were heavy rains, and the mud grew deeper. A siege was becoming inevitable.

On the 10th of April headquarters camp moved to Camp Winfield Scott, in front of Yorktown. At about this date the army corps commanded by General Sumner arrived. The signal detachment, commanded by Lieut. N. Daniels, acting signal officer, accompanied this corps. In the bay below Yorktown, at an estimated distance of from 3 to 4 miles from headquarters camp and in sight, lay the co-operating fleet, of which the United States ship *Wachusett* was flag-ship. From the shore of this bay southerly to nearly the bank of the James River the Army of the Potomac was stretched, buried in thick woods, and so hidden that rarely could more than a division be seen together, and often not more than a regiment was visible from any one point of view. The rebel lines reached through a light country from the works of Yorktown proper to nearly the navigable waters of the Warwick River. To pass from the right to the left of our lines, following the narrow and winding earth roads and the miles of corduroyed ways through the woods was a journey of several hours, during which one came by surprise, as it were, upon regiments and brigades of soldiers encamped here and there in the forests, and batteries of heavy field artillery in position among trees and shrubs, and bearing often upon an enemy whose lines and forces, hidden by other trees and shrubs, were invisible. Along all this line there was the picket firing of both musketry and artillery.

On the right, between the works at Yorktown and the fleet below, desultory shots of enormous weight were thrown to and fro from rifled ordnance and 11-inch guns. On land, along the front, if a venturesome picket or curious signal man of either army showed himself within gunshot, or climbed a tree for observation, he was fired at as game. If a group was gathered together anywhere it was customary to disperse it with a shell from a rifled gun. The appearance of an

officer with a telescope, or with any instrument of reconnoissance, rarely failed to elicit this attention.

On the left the rebel gunboat Teazer would now and then creep up the Warwick from the James River and try the ranges of her heavy guns upon the points where her commander supposed our camps might be. With the exception made by the opening of the trenches and the placing of our siege batteries (only one of which ever opened fire), this state of affairs was without change throughout the siege. There were some skirmishes, occasional artillery duels, and the affair of the Burnt Chimneys, or Lee's Mill.

Scattered along this advanced line were the stations of the signal officers, and their duties brought them every day upon and near it. It thus happened to them, serving in their turns in front, that so many of their number came to be at different times during the siege exposed to the enemy's sharpshooters, or, what was by far more common, to the fire of his artillery. Wherever stations were known or supposed to be the enemy day after day directed practice shots, either with guns from their batteries, or, as it once or twice happened, with lighter pieces brought for the purpose.

In the list of officers whose names I had the honor to lay before the general commanding in my report of June 26, 1862, there is, I believe, no one who was not at some time during the siege exposed and near the enemy. The courage and persistence with which some of these officers held the posts to which they were ordered (though in danger day and night for a week together) was worthy of commendation.

With the army thus located the chief signal officer early found cause for regret that official indifference had prevented the construction of the field telegraph trains with which it was at first intended to equip the Signal Corps. With trains of the character of those now in use with the Army of the Potomac it would have been easy to have connected, in one day after their arrival before Yorktown, the principal headquarters of the army. The insulated wire would be even safer running through the wood land than when extended by the side of roads. There were no field telegraphic trains with the army.

On the 7th of April, in obedience to an order of the general commanding, telegraphic communication by signals had been opened with the fleet, the detachment of signal officers ordered at Fortress Monroe having on that day joined it. The shore station, known as the headquarters station (No. 1), was at a barn near Camp Winfield Scott. From this day until the close of the siege there was, by day and night, a transfer of messages to and from the flag-ship of the fleet, and here, as on the fleet, a constant watch observed at once the signals made by either those afloat or on the shore. In dense fogs, in rains, and sometimes when the flag-ship, moving down the river, was shut out from view, this communication failed. To provide for these contingencies another station (No. 7) was opened at a house upon the shore of the bay, at the boat-landing of the fleet. This station was to send messages which could not be sent direct from the headquarters station. It was sometimes used for conferences and conversation by signals between the naval officers on the fleet and the officers of the army on shore. It was likewise in communication when necessary with headquarters station and with the fleet.

A station (No. 6) was, at different times in the progress of the siege, established at the Farinholt house, at the mouth of Wormley's Creek. It was intended to communicate by signals to the fleet in any sudden danger that might arise at the point and to transmit to the headquar-

ters station the knowledge gained from observations made here. This station was little used.

When, on the 30th of April, the siege battery of 100 and 200 pounder Parrott guns, which had been established at this place, opened upon the works at Yorktown and Gloucester, signal officers at this station were communicating with others placed at Moore's house, near Yorktown, who thence reported the effect of the shots in so far as they were able to note them. The signal officers at the battery were of course exposed to the shots with which the enemy replied to the battery near which they were stationed. The signals were not permitted to be interrupted. The signal officers at Moore's house were directly in the line of both fires, the shells from the combatants passing high in the air over their heads. This position, though one of little danger, was not desirable, some of the large shells falling short and exploding near it.

A signal station (No. 5) communicating with the fleet had been opened at Moore's house on the 7th of April. This point was chosen with a view to directing the fire of our naval guns in the attack on Yorktown, then thought to be impending, and also for the purpose of momentarily informing the fleet of the progress of our land forces, whose assault was to be simultaneous.

Moore's house (located on the bank of York River) was directly under the heaviest guns of Yorktown, a mile distant. The beach at the foot of the bank on which the house was placed was commanded by the water battery on the beach at Yorktown. Trees clustering along the top and water edge of the bank, and reaching from near the enemy's works nearly to this house, offered a cover for rebel sharpshooters. This station was first visited and long messages sent from it to the fleet by a party of the corps on the third day after the army arrived before Yorktown, and while the place was yet some distance beyond our pickets. As a station of observation and communication this point was unrivaled. From it one looked down upon the works at Gloucester and their approaches, about 2 miles distant; upon the wharves and water batteries at Yorktown and the whole channel of the river and the bay spread out in view. Inland there could be traced the outline of the works at Yorktown proper, and there was had in view much of the open country between those works and our lines. This place was now permanently occupied as a signal station, communicating with the station at headquarters. When the signal flag was first discovered by the enemy near this house two light field pieces were run up by them in easy range and the officers were driven from their station by their fire, but only to return so soon as the fire ceased.

As the siege advanced the fire on the station became more serious. Lieut. Israel Thickstun, Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and acting signal officer, was stricken senseless by a fragment of a shell while serving on it. The shells were very frequently exploding near it, the station receiving many of the shots aimed at our parallel in front of it. The working station was not reasonably tenable. The officers were instructed to shelter themselves near Moore's house, and to make report by signals only in case of emergency. The station was thus held until the evacuation of Yorktown. Its occupation was of the most use in the early days of the investment, when there were fears of a possible sortie of the enemy in that direction.

A station (No. 4) of observation was established in a point of woods south of Yorktown, at the junction of the Hampton and Warwick roads. This station was a mile from the works at Yorktown, and yet nearer the enemy's work known as the Red Redoubt. Communications hence

by signals were sent to a signal station (No. 2) placed on the saw-mill at General Heintzelman's headquarters, and were thence reported to headquarters station. Another station of observation (No. 3), in like manner repeating its messages through Station No. 2, at General Heintzelman's headquarters, was established on the Warwick road, in a piece of woods north of the cleared land in front of Lee's Mill, and near a small lunette, afterward taken by our forces. The post of observation of the officers here placed extended through a piece of woods southerly to the open ground in front of Wynn's Mill.

The position of these stations was easily discovered by the enemy. They were held through the siege with much risk to the officers ordered upon them. It was necessary to keep the officers there posted on duty for several days in succession, so that they might well know the localities of the enemy. The stations were hidden from the view of the rebel gunners. The danger was of injury from the fragments of the many shells thrown at the position during the thirty days they were occupied.

A signal flag was displayed in a tree, in sight of the enemy, at Station No. 3. The attempt to remove it was made hazardous by the enemy's musketry.

These completed the line of stations on the right. The dense woods covering the center and left of the army rendered signaling there impossible except from artificial stations. Soon after the siege had commenced the chief signal officer was directed by the general commanding to cause signal towers to be erected and to be occupied as stations of observation and communication (if that was possible) along the front. It was hoped, also, that by observing from such points of view, and reporting the ranges of the shot and shell, the fire of guns and mortars soon to open on Yorktown might be accurately directed. These instructions were communicated to Lieut. B. F. Fisher, acting signal officer, commanding the signal detachment on the left of the army, and Lieut. N. Daniels, acting signal officer, commanding that with the center.

The sites for the towers on these portions of the line were at once selected by these officers. Large working parties reported to them, and the work of construction was commenced. On the right of the line, also, the positions for three towers were selected, and the timber for their construction was drawn from the woods and shapened. Of these towers one (H) was to be on the shore of the bay, near Farinholt's house. A second (F) was to be on the high bank near the dam crossing Wormley's Creek. The third (G) on the elevated plain near the Clark house and near Camp Winfield Scott. None of these were, however, completed when the evacuation of Yorktown took place.

A station had been built close to Camp Winfield Scott, in an immense tree. This was sometimes used for purposes of observation. Other stations or perches were now made on trees close to the trenches and batteries of our approaches. From one of these, near Moore's house, and at a height of about 80 feet from the ground, could be had a distinct and close view of the enemy's works at Yorktown.

At the center Lieutenant Daniels, acting signal officer, caused to be raised a lofty structure of logs (E) near our picket line in front of Lee's Mill, and overlooking part of the enemy's works there placed. This tower was constantly occupied by a detail of signal officers as a station of observation, and whatever facts could thence be noted were reported to General Sumner. It was often visited by other officers, whose duties were aided by the observations here made. This structure was in close range of the enemy's guns. Though partially hidden by trees,

it might have been demolished by them. They hesitated, however, to fire upon it, curious (as I have since been informed) to learn for what it was intended. Along the left of the line the parties commanded by Lieut. B. F. Fisher, acting signal officer, erected four tower stations (A, B, C, D). These stations were occupied, and communicated with each other by signals. The positions commanded views of parts of the enemy's lines. The reports thence made were sent to General Keyes' headquarters. The enemy brought a light gun to bear upon one of these towers and sometimes fired upon it, but they were neither able to seriously disturb its occupants nor to interrupt their labors. With this enumeration have been mentioned all the permanent stations established during the siege.

The duties of reconnaissances and communication performed by the officers of the Signal Corps when not occupying these stations have been before referred to. There was no day in the siege but that they could be found in front of the enemy's lines closely watching his works, and there was in consequence no day but on which some of them were exposed to the dangers of this position. Of the character of the reports made and messages sent by these officers the general commanding had knowledge at the time.

On the 16th of April, 1862, occurred the affair of the Burnt Chimneys, or Lee's Mill. Mention has already been made by name of the officers particularly engaged at this place. The messages sent by them were sent at very short distances, and I have no reliable information as to their importance. They were useful, perhaps, in conveying intelligence which might if otherwise sent have necessitated the greater exposure of other officers. The observations reported by some of the officers were made from tops of trees they had climbed for the purpose.

In the last days of April the division commanded by General Franklin arrived on transports at Shipping Point. These troops were kept on shipboard for several days, and it was supposed they were to be moved against the enemy at Gloucester. A detachment of 5 officers and 12 men, commanded by Lieut. D. E. Castle, Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers, and acting signal officer, was assigned to duty with these forces, and reported to General Franklin, whose headquarters were then on shipboard.

EVACUATION OF YORKTOWN.

By the first days of May our approaches were nearly completed, the siege and mortar batteries were in position, and the day was reported fixed on which they were to open fire. Lieutenant Neel states in his report that two days previous to the evacuation of Yorktown and the main line of works—that is, on the morning of May 2, 1862—Lieutenant Herzog, acting signal officer, and himself reported to General Smith, commanding near Lee's Mill, the evacuation of the enemy's main works at that place. I am not informed that this message was sent to general headquarters.

On the night of May 2 the unusual silence of the enemy so attracted the attention of the general commanding that in a message ordered to the fleet that night he mentioned that this silence might indicate an evacuation or a sortie, and asked that a gunboat be sent to draw the enemy's fire. The gunboat Marblehead moved up the river near the batteries, and, firing upon them, drew a number of shots in reply.

On the morning of the 3d of May a signal message was received from Lieut. A. B. Jerome, First New Jersey Volunteers and acting signal

officer on Station No. 3, near Wynn's Mill, that the enemy were destroying their barracks. This was not supposed to have particular bearing upon an evacuation. On the same afternoon the enemy's fire opened as usual about sundown, and increased in rapidity after night-fall, until at midnight the roar of artillery was almost incessant. Shot and shell were thrown in all directions, as though fired at random, and with ranges which had rarely been reached before.

Signals with torches were prohibited at Station No. 2 by the general commanding for fear of drawing the enemy's fire. The signals made from stations at the front (Nos. 3 and 4) were therefore not answered, and no messages were received. About midnight a conflagration was observed in Yorktown. About 2 a. m. on the 4th the firing ceased, and between that hour and daylight our troops entered the works. Soon after daylight a message was received from Moore's house, announcing, "Our flag flies over Yorktown."

The claim is made by the signal officers stationed at the towers (C and E) on the center and left of our lines that the first positive information of the evacuation of the works in front of them was given by them to Generals Sumner and Keyes, with whom they were respectively serving. This report is said to have been made from the tower near Wynn's Mill at 4.30 a. m., and from the tower in front of General Keyes at daylight.

On both the center and the left signal officers went into the works with the first troops that occupied them, and, signaling back reports, gave positive assurance of the absence of the enemy. About 7 a. m. a message from the general commanding announced to the fleet the evacuation of Yorktown.

Lieut. T. R. Clark, acting signal officer with the fleet, on board the Marblehead, had previously, at 5.30 a. m., observed the evacuation from that vessel, and had at that time signaled the report to the flag-ship.

The fleet at once moved from its anchorage, and occupied the channel between Yorktown and Gloucester.

Upon the first announcement of the retreat of the enemy a party under command of Lieut. H. L. Johnson, Fifth Connecticut Volunteers, and acting signal officer, had been sent to Yorktown to establish a signal station in that place, and to send officers to open communication across the river to Gloucester as soon as that place could be safely entered. The officer detailed for this purpose was fairly on his way across the river in a skiff to occupy Gloucester before the enemy had abandoned that position. He was recalled to save him from capture.

As the fleet moved up the enemy hastily abandoned that point, and a signal officer landed with the advance of our troops who occupied it. By 10 a. m. stations had been established (and were working) at Farinholt's house, Yorktown, Gloucester, and on the fleet, the stations at Gloucester and on the fleet communicating to headquarters through the station on Farinholt's house.

Communication with the fleet had not been suspended during the movement of the vessels from the anchorage to Yorktown. The messages transmitted this morning were numerous and important. The general commanding received at Camp Winfield Scott reports from Gloucester and Yorktown and from the senior naval officer (on board the flag-ship, some miles distant and out of sight) frequent statements of the position of the fleet; of reconnaissances made up the river and as far as West Point by steamers ordered on that duty; of captures made,

and of the naval plans and orders. In return, he communicated his own wishes (to which he had immediate response) and his plans for the movement of the combined fleet and army.

Among other messages thus telegraphed was one from the general-in-chief, announcing his intention to move up the river that day the transports with the troops under General Franklin, and asking a convoy of war vessels; one relating to the reported embarkation of the enemy at a wharf beyond Williamsburg (which embarkation it was desired to prevent), and one to save the railroad bridge across the Pamunkey River, which the fleet proposed to destroy.

The reports from the fleet showed that the river was without obstruction as far as the White House, that the white flag was flying at several points on its banks and at West Point, and that no troops were there visible. The wharf beyond Williamsburg was reported as destroyed by fire and as yet burning. One or two large vessels were found on the stocks at West Point.

The signal stations on the right of the army, other than those above mentioned, were this day abandoned, and the parties were concentrated to accompany the advance of the army. Late in the afternoon the sound of cannon announced that the advance guard of the army had overtaken the enemy and commenced the battle of Williamsburg.

BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.

On the 5th of May headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were still at Camp Winfield Scott. The last arrangements were making for the movement of General Franklin's forces, which, sailing up the river and to land at West Point, would turn any position taken by the enemy lower down upon the Peninsula, and would also threaten the flank of their retreating columns.

The signal officers with this command, some time before detailed to it by order of the commanding general, had been distributed among the transports. Other signal officers of the fleet detachment were on the gunboats to accompany them. The services of these officers will have particular mention in relation to the battle at West Point.

The signal detachments of the left and center, in charge of Lieutenants Daniels and Fisher, acting signal officers, had moved forward with the advance of the columns to which they were attached.

The movement to Williamsburg encountered the gravest difficulties in miry roads, puddled by the footsteps and broken into ruts and great holes by the wheel-tracks of the retreating army. These roads led through forests. A heavy rain had been falling all day.

At general headquarters we had heard the sounds of a continued battle since daylight. About 3 p. m. officers of the staff arrived from the front. The chief signal officer was notified that the general commanding was about to go upon the field, and was instructed by him in person that communication was desired between the army at Williamsburg and the gunboats which were to be sent up from the fleet that night to act with it. He was directed to arrange officers for this communication. In obedience to these orders additional officers, carrying with them full written instructions as to the arrangements to be made, were sent to report to Lieut. J. W. De Ford, Eleventh Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, and acting signal officer, on board the flagship.

Two signal officers were to be placed on each gunboat sent to take part in the action. Of these one was to land, if necessary, and join our

troops near Williamsburg wherever they might be visible. The communication of the gunboats to any point on shore visible from their decks and held by our forces was thus made certain. Lieut. H. L. Johnson, acting signal officer, was ordered to the front with a detachment of six officers and their men, which had the day before been concentrated. This party started immediately.

By the time these arrangements were completed it was night. It was very dark, and rain still fell rapidly.

The signal detachments of the forces with Generals Sumner and Keyes, moving with the columns on the march to Williamsburg, acted during the march as scouts to reconnoiter and as aids to carry messages and reports. Their duties in this character were continued on the field of battle. The smoke, the mist, the heavy rain, and the dense woods rendered signaling impossible. Some of the officers were posted by the officers in charge of the detachments where they could use their telescopes, and whence they announced to the commanders near them, either by orderlies or in person, such movements of the enemy as they were able to see. Toward evening General McClellan arrived and went upon the field of battle on the right. Soon after his arrival, in reply to an inquiry made by him whether communication could be had with the gunboats expected to arrive at night, Lieut. B. F. Fisher, acting signal officer, reported to him, and received his orders to establish the communication required. This was successfully accomplished upon the arrival of the vessels, though the night was one very unfavorable for signaling. The shore station was about a mile inland from the river and close to the field of battle. The fact was communicated to the commanding general as soon as accomplished.

Lieutenant Fisher caused another signal station to be erected near one of the works on the battle-field, and made ready to call for and direct the fire of the gunboats, should it be needed, at daylight.

The acting signal officers who assisted Lieutenant Fisher, and those on the gunboats, whose care and watchfulness contributed to the result, are entitled to equal credit. The names of these officers, and of others who deserve mention at this place, are given in my report of June 18, 1862. There is reason to believe that the knowledge of this communication was of some importance to the commanding general. At daylight the enemy had evacuated their works and were in retreat beyond Williamsburg. A signal station had been established at the mouth of Queen's Creek, from which various messages were sent until the store-ships, with supplies, began to arrive.

On the arrival of the chief signal officer on the morning of the 6th communication was opened from the gunboats to other stations well inland, and was kept open at the request of General W. F. Smith, whilst the troops moved forward to occupy Williamsburg and until that village had been occupied in force. The fleet of transports with General Franklin's command was passing up the river to West Point as our troops were marching into the place. The headquarters of the army halted at Williamsburg some days, while the trains of the army were brought up through the almost impassable roads and the wounded of the battle were cared for. Fresh troops were pushed forward in pursuit of the enemy, while those which had suffered most in the engagement followed more slowly. The advance guard, under General Stoneman, pursued closely the retreating army. A party of three signal officers, with their men, accompanied this guard, and was actively employed watching the enemy and reporting their movements.

On the day following our arrival the chief signal officer was ordered

to connect by signal stations, if possible, the village of Williamsburg with West Point. It was the plan that communicating stations should be placed on three schooners, anchored some miles apart in the river, and the messages sent from a station on shore at West Point were to be repeated through the schooner stations to another station on land at the mouth of Wormley's Creek; hence through other stations they would be sent to Williamsburg. The distance was about 20 miles. The schooners were to be brought from Yorktown. With much labor and many tiresome delays the stations were at length established May 9, but only on the day on which headquarters, moving again to the front, left them useless.

At Williamsburg, as at Yorktown, the chief signal officer felt deeply the want of field telegraphic trains, which would have rendered communication, at least over part of this distance, certain and easy.

BATTLE OF WEST POINT.

While general headquarters were at Williamsburg the battle of West Point was fought. The command of General Franklin, arriving at that place under convoy of the fleet on the afternoon of May 6, had by the morning of May 7 been so far disembarked that a large force of infantry was on shore, but not yet in perfect condition for action. It was without cavalry and but poorly supplied with artillery. The disembarkation from numerous transports of various descriptions was yet in progress. The position was almost surrounded by thick woods, which came down near to the river. The country, which was difficult, was not well known by our troops.

Whilst our forces were thus opened the pickets were driven in and heavy volleys of musketry announced the approach of the enemy under General Lee, advancing in great force to the attack, with the hope, doubtless, that our troops, taken unprepared and yet landing, could be routed and driven into the river. At the same time a battery of heavy field guns opened from a height at once upon the army and the transports. It was a moment of serious danger, and the most rapid action was necessary.

Part of the signal officers of the expedition had landed with the troops to which they were assigned. The firing on shore caused those on the war vessels and the transports to be everywhere on the alert. General Franklin, on the *Mystic*, at West Point, was sent for by signals. The order went quickly from the shore to the fleet, and as quickly from ship to ship, to move up and cover the army with their fire. With a promptness impossible without this communication the vessels were brought into position, and threw in the fire of their great guns to aid that of our army.

The contest was not long; the enemy's batteries were silenced, and their troops, repulsed and broken, fell back through the woods, followed for a long distance by the shell of the Navy.

On the 9th of May headquarters moved from Williamsburg, and on the following day they were at Roper's Meeting-house. While here a line of repeating stations was formed, connecting the headquarters of the army with the troops at West Point. It did not work well, however, and was used only for the practice of the officers. At this place the corps was joined by a detachment from the camp at Georgetown, bringing with it the first field telegraph train ever used in the field by an army of the United States. It was that of which mention has been made as partially completed and as used at the camp of instruction.

It was a light structure, on wheels, carrying reels, from which there could be spun out insulated wire. It was fitted with telegraphic instruments of a kind before unused. It had been intended that the reels of this train should carry 10 miles of wire, so prepared that it might be laid on the ground and used anywhere without the escape of the electric current.

Different hinderances had made it impossible to furnish more than 4 miles of a copper wire, coated with gutta-percha, and of a rather inferior quality. The magnetic electric instruments, devised for the train by a mechanic of New York, were of new invention. The working current for these instruments when placed on telegraphic line is generated by a pile of magnets—a part of the instrument itself. The letters of the alphabet are plainly marked on the dial. To cause the letters to be indicated at either end of the line, or to read them, are operations so simple as to be within the power, with little practice, of almost any soldier who can easily read and write. The instrument is used without fluids, without galvanic batteries of any kind, and is compact, strong, and portable. For use with flying telegraph trains on the field of battle, and for military telegraphing in general, I have regarded such instruments as necessary. I am of the opinion that it will be recalled at some time hereafter, with no little pride, that field telegraphic trains of this character and thus equipped were first brought into use by the Signal Corps of the Army, and were first used with the Army of the Potomac. The remains of this train, to which some historic interest already attaches, are now preserved at signal camp of instruction, Georgetown, D. C.

In the first attempts to experiment with and use this train an unexpected difficulty was encountered. The soldiers, unused to the coated wire, and seeing it stretched for miles along fences or lying on the ground near the road, would cut it and break it to examine its character. Some of them thought it an invention of the enemy.

On the 13th of May general headquarters were established at Cumberland. When, soon after our arrival here, the alarm was given that the headquarters train was endangered and that the enemy's forces were advancing, the general commanding, with his staff, started for the field in person. A detachment of five signal officers, equipped, accompanied him. The alarm was groundless.

There was some communication here by signals with the vessels in the river. A line of five signal stations was also established from this place to the advance guard under General Stoneman, then occupying White House. A few messages were sent to and fro over this line, but its principal use was for practice.

On the 16th of May headquarters camp moved to White House, on the Pamunkey River. Among the reconnaissances made by signal officers from this place was one to the Chickahominy, near Bottom's Bridge, at, perhaps, the first time the waters of that stream were seen by any of our army.

On the ensuing day the corps commanded by General Keyes moving up to occupy a position near Bottom's Bridge, Lieut. H. L. Johnson, acting signal officer, with a detachment of signal officers and their men, was ordered to report to and remain with him for duty. From that time until after the passage of the Chickahominy this detachment served under General Keyes, and always with the advance of the corps.

A station of observation was at once established near Bottom's Bridge, whence the movements of the enemy whose pickets were now in sight

across the river, were visible, and thence by a signal line communicated numerous reports to General Keyes' headquarters.

On the day of the passage of the Chickahominy a part of this detachment crossed with the first troops, and opening a station on the bluff near Burnt Chimneys and close to the picket line, placed that point in communication with General Keyes' headquarters, then at Old Tavern. This duty led to a remarkable collision. The advanced signal party was annoyed by the enemy's picket firing from a farm-house near them. The station would soon be untenable. The signal detachment was quietly mounted, and then, on the order of its commander, furiously charged the offending pickets, as the story ran, with telescopes. The panic-flight of the enemy evinced their dread of the novel armament. The party carried, however, revolvers as well as field glasses.

From this date the detachment served with the advance of the forces on the southerly side of the Chickahominy, carrying their stations up to the front at Fair Oaks. The camp was located near the headquarters of Generals Heintzelman and Keyes.

While general headquarters were at White House the wire of the field telegraphic train was extended a distance of 3 miles, lying on the ground and hung on bushes by the sides of the road. Experiments were made in transmitting messages while the wire was in process of reeling out. They were successful, and attracted much attention by their novelty.

A line of four repeating signal stations was established from White House to General Stoneman's advance guard, a few miles distant. This line was well worked, and was used for official messages.

On the 19th of May headquarters were moved to Tunstall's Station, on the West Point and Richmond Railroad. As the army moved from White House the advance guard, under General Stoneman, pushed rapidly forward to Old Cold Harbor, and with its advance encountered a small force of the enemy's cavalry at Gaines' Mill, near New Bridge.

A detachment of signal officers accompanied this advance, joining the small party which had served with General Stoneman previously. With the column moving in the field these officers were found everywhere in the advance and perched upon the roofs of the prominent dwellings. They sometimes anticipated the march of the advance guard. The distances over which they could work, however, were, from the formation of the country, generally short, and a single message could go by courier almost as rapidly as by signals. The labor of so large a party seemed unnecessary, and the greater number was ordered by General Stoneman to discontinue, that officer retaining with his advance the three who had accompanied him from Williamsburg.

On the next day the advance guard reached the banks of the Chickahominy at New Bridge. Some scattered forces of the enemy and a few guns, very plainly exposed, were visible on the crest of the hill on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy. On the northerly side, on the first elevated ground of the river bank, were the Hogan and the Gaines mansions. These houses were about three-quarters of a mile distant from each other. From a point near the Hogan house could be had an extensive view of the bottom lands bordering the river and of the country upon the opposite bank. A station of observation was established here under the direction of Lieut. N. Daniels, acting signal officer, and was held for some days while outside of our pickets. This station afterward became one of much importance.

On May 22 headquarters were established near Cold Harbor. From general headquarters to the station in front near Hogan's house a line

of six repeating stations was made. The officers were kept constantly on these stations. Messages were transmitted to and from the front over this line with reasonable rapidity and accuracy. There were no great movements of the enemy visible from the station of observation, and there was little to report. The chief value of this line, as of the other repeating lines established at Williamsburg and White House during the march of the army, was in the practice and consequent skill which work upon them gave the officers on stations.

From headquarters camp at Cold Harbor parties were sent out to reconnoiter the course of the Chickahominy from Bottom's Bridge to New Bridge, and to select those prominent points which might serve in case of need as communicating stations. These parties were instructed to also note prominent points in view on the southerly side of the Chickahominy. The knowledge of the country gained by them showed it practicable to communicate by signals between the portions of the army occupying the northern and those at this time on the southern side of the Chickahominy. The stations would be, however, some distance to the rear of the advance on both sides of the river, and that on the south side of the Chickahominy near to the railroad, on which a line of electric telegraph was then building. It was not thought worth the while to occupy them.

From Cold Harbor the insulated wire of the field telegraph was run out a distance of two miles for one day to a point near the headquarters of the advance guard. These headquarters moving, it was reeled up on the same day.

THE SKIRMISH AT MECHANICSVILLE.

Early in the afternoon on the 24th of May our artillery opened upon the enemy for the first time on this part of our lines at New Bridge. The fire, sustained for some time, elicited no response. During its progress the advance guard, under General Stoneman, with a brigade under General Davidson, moved toward the village of Mechanicsville, then known to be held by a force of the enemy. The artillery joined the column on the march.

A detachment of seven signal officers, hastily collected from stations in the vicinity, moved with our forces. From the upper story of Austin's house, a dwelling located on a high bank on the east side of Beaver Dam, a first view was caught of the enemy on the other side of the Chickahominy, near Mechanicsville Bridge, and of the spires of Richmond.

Before the fact that the enemy was visible could be announced to the commanding general the head of the column, ascending on the Mechanicsville road to the crest on the west side of Beaver Dam, was received by a discharge of the enemy's artillery, and the engagement was commenced. At the same time a battery of two guns, stationed on the south side of the Chickahominy near a foot bridge, opened in a vain attempt to reach the left of our line near Austin's house, on the east side of Beaver Dam. It was not known what force of the enemy might be near this battery. A signal officer was stationed on the left of our lines to watch it and report by signals any movement of the enemy in that direction to another officer stationed near the battery engaging the enemy on the west side of Beaver Dam, and also to another officer stationed with the battery firing from near Austin's house. The skirmish was of short duration. Our troops were hardly deployed in line of battle when the enemy's fire ceased, and they retreated to Mechanicsville.

A signal officer stationed on Austin's house reported six guns as moving near that village. It was dark by this time, and the troops bivouacked for the night.

By order of General Stoneman two signal officers were sent to report to General Davidson, and a code of rocket signals was arranged by which to indicate certain movements if made by his forces during the night.

At daylight the troops advanced upon the village, and after some artillery firing occupied it. As the line moved up General Stoneman, at his headquarters near Austin's house, was kept informed of its progress, and of the moment of the occupation of the village, by signals from the officers who accompanied the troops. As soon as the village was occupied a courier was dispatched ordering the wire of the field telegraph to be run out from a dwelling near the Hogan house, by this time occupied by General W. F. Smith as his headquarters, to a point near Mechanicsville. This was done, with a few hours' labor, in a heavy rain, and soon after noon the telegraphic communication was established from the headquarters of General Davidson, near Mechanicsville, to the division headquarters of General Smith. The ease with which this was done illustrated the rapidity with which under more favorable circumstances such communication might be made available.

On the day following the occupation of Mechanicsville a station of observation was established near that village, which was held almost constantly while our troops occupied the place. On the next day an expedition was made by a force of two companies of cavalry, with a detachment of mounted artillery and a field piece, under the command of Maj. A. S. Webb, of the Rhode Island Artillery, to examine the country in the vicinity of the Richmond and Virginia Central Railroad.

Two signal officers joined the expedition for the purpose of reconnaissance. This expedition penetrated the enemy's lines for some miles, driving in their pickets and scattering their supports, and finally reaching the railroad at a station near Greenshaw's, 12 miles from Richmond. The track was destroyed and set on fire in two places. In this work of destruction the turpentine from the canteens which signal soldiers carry was found to be a useful auxiliary. By the time the party reached the railroad it had been reduced by pickets left on different roads and guards at houses to about 25 men. The drums of the rebel force camped in the vicinity could be distinctly heard beating the alarm. The party returned to our lines unmolested.

On May 26 headquarters camp was established near New Bridge.

BATTLE OF HANOVER COURT-HOUSE.

On the evening of May 26 the chief signal officer was informed that a force under General Fitz John Porter would move at daylight to attack the enemy at Hanover Court-House. He was directed to provide a signal party to accompany it. A signal party of 7 officers, with their men, fully equipped and with three days' rations, were ordered to move with the troops at daylight. The chief signal officer accompanied this party. It had rained during the night and part of the previous day. On the morning of the 27th it was still raining. The columns moved with difficulty and slowly.

At about 11 a. m. the outposts of the enemy were encountered. About noon the head of our column near Hanover Court-House came suddenly upon a force of the enemy apparently advancing to meet it.

The lines of both armies were formed at once and the battle commenced with artillery.

At nearly the right of our line our principal battery was posted, and was instantly engaged. A few hundred yards to the right of this battery, and in front of our line, was a clump of woods, from which was had a good view of the enemy and also of the fields they occupied. Lieutenants Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and acting signal officer, and Gloskosky, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers, and acting signal officer, were ordered to establish a station here to observe the enemy and to report by signals to Lieutenant Horner, Sixth New Jersey Volunteers, and acting signal officer, who was placed at the battery, and to headquarters station, near the general commanding.

Lieut. G. H. McNary, Tenth Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, and acting signal officer, was posted on a house some distance in the rear of the battery and commanding a view of the fields in front. He was directed to report at headquarters station. (It was intended to use this station to communicate with the front in case our line advanced fighting.)

Lieutenant Thickstun, Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and acting signal officer, was placed upon a house on the left, where he could see the open country, in order to report any movements of the enemy from that direction. Lieutenants Norton, Tenth Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, and acting signal officer, and Wiggins, Third New Jersey Volunteers, and acting signal officer, were held in reserve. All the officers mentioned were in the range of artillery fire.

The fire upon the stations occupied by Lieutenants Marston and Gloskosky, Horner, and McNary was particularly severe. The flag had no sooner been raised on the advanced station than it was greeted by a volley of musketry. Though immediately screened behind trees, its position was much exposed throughout the action. Lieutenant Horner, stationed with the battery, received, of course, his share of the shots directed at the guns, whilst Lieutenant McNary, posted in the rear of the battery, was in line of shots, which went over it, and seemed by his elevated position to attract not a few intended for himself.

Messages were received from the advanced station by the station at the battery, directing the aim of the guns, announcing the retreat of the enemy, and replying to a question as to the nationality of a body of troops which appeared on the field; this latter, fortunately, just in time to prevent our own forces, which, advancing, had that moment come in view, from receiving the fire of our guns.

The enemy were driven from their first position after a contest of an hour's duration. Our line advanced toward Hanover Court-House in pursuit. The stations at first established were abandoned by order of General Porter. The signal officers were sent forward with the first skirmishers, reconnoitering and reporting from elevated points in the field and on the right and left of the line as it advanced. A station was erected on the top of a large house overlooking the field of battle near which it was and the valley in which the village of Hanover is located. From this station a report was made that some regiments of the enemy with artillery were visible in the valley near Hanover. Our advance soon after moved rapidly to that village. The signal party was hurried to the front to seek the position of the enemy, and kept on the road going west of Hanover until a camp of the enemy was visible. It was here learned from the returning troops that the general advance of the army was not in this direction, whilst the sounds of

artillery announced that a conflict had recommenced near the first scene of battle. Hastily turning back, the party again arrived on the field just as the last shots were fired.

On the following day the army occupied the same position. The dead were buried; the wounded were cared for. The condition of the enemy's camp showed with what haste they had retreated.

A station of observation was opened on a prominent house near the field of battle, whence frequent reports were made to headquarters. Other minor stations were also established. The officers were called in from these stations at sunset. It was thought there might be a battle on the following day, and an order was sent back to camp directing more officers to report the next morning. The party bivouacked on the field.

At daylight the next morning the chief signal officer was ordered by General Porter to send a party to General Emory, under whose command expeditions had been sent out during the night. The headquarters of General Emory were found at a church or school-house beyond Hanover. They were connected by a line of repeating stations with those of General Porter yet upon the battle-field.

The chief signal officer was also directed to extend a line as far toward the left on the Ashland road as was practicable. The headquarters of General Morell, commanding on the left, were connected by repeating stations with general headquarters, and when, a few hours after, the signal detachment ordered in the night arrived, this line was extended a mile and a half toward Ashland. A signal station was erected upon the roof of the mansion before mentioned.

About 9 a. m. a dense cloud of smoke was reported as visible from this station. It was some miles distant and in the direction taken by one of our expeditions. Not long after a signal dispatch from General Emory announced that our troops had reached Ashland and the destruction of the railroad bridge. This was followed by other brief messages and reports. Orders went soon after to General Emory to call in his forces.

The object of the advance on Hanover (the destruction of the enemy's communications by railroad north) had been accomplished, and the army corps was about to rejoin the Army of the Potomac. The signal lines were ordered to be broken up. The last message—one of "All quiet"—came from the left. The party was concentrated and moved for their camp on the Chickahominy. At 1 o'clock all our troops were in motion on their return, and the headquarters of General Porter had left the field of battle.

THE SIEGE OF RICHMOND.

The siege of Richmond may very properly date from the time at which headquarters camp was established at New Bridge. By the closing days of May the left wing of the Army of the Potomac had advanced along the railroad toward Richmond to beyond Fair Oaks. It was concealed in the dense woods, and held the swampy and uncomfortable ground on the south side of the Chickahominy. Its advanced pickets were just in view of great cleared fields and high grounds, which, if attained, would bring them almost within range of Richmond and in healthy encampments. The right of the army was stretched along the northern banks of the Chickahominy from Bottom's Bridge to beyond Mechanicsville. There were bridges at Bottom's Bridge, at the railroad crossing, at a point above the railroad—a corduroy structure, known as Sumner's

Bridge—and three bridges nearly completed; one at, one above, and one below the location of New Bridge. The open country mentioned as in front of the left wing reached to the bridges at New Bridge, and here were large fields on both the north and south sides of the Chickahominy.

The corps of Generals Heintzelman and Keyes occupied the southern side of the river. The northern side was held by the corps of Generals Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin.

The signal party serving on the south side of the river, under Lieut. H. L. Johnson, Fifth Connecticut Volunteers, and acting signal officer, had been working faithfully under most disadvantageous circumstances. They were shut in everywhere by swamps and thick woods; there were no points from which they could communicate to advantage; the army was new; the generals did not know how to employ signal officers, and the officers had yet to gain by service experience as to the best modes in which to employ themselves. There were, however, signal stations along the railroad, connecting General Heintzelman's headquarters at Savage Station with the front beyond Fair Oaks, and the officers had reconnoitered faithfully, but with little success, along the picket line for points of observation.

On the northern side of the Chickahominy the field telegraph line was extended along fences and in trees from general headquarters to near Mechanicsville. The soldiers had ceased to cut the wires, patrols had been established, and the line was working successfully and with little interruption.

There was a station of observation near Mechanicsville, and the station near Hogan's house, above New Bridge, which had been occupied from the time the advance of the army reached it. From this station could be seen the line of thick woods in which we knew the left of the army lay covered; but though it was scanned carefully every day, and often with glasses, no friendly soldier was visible.

BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES.

On the 30th day of May was fought the battle of Seven Pines. This battle was fought in the rain and in a thick woods, and without any prearranged plans on the part of our forces. The left of the army resisted the furious attack of the enemy wherever and however they were able, fighting in the dark as it were, sometimes first knowing the presence of the foe by receiving his fire. With such circumstances and on such ground it was impossible for the signal officers to use signals, nor does it seem from their reports that they acted as reconnoitering officers, reporting by courier. Some of them joined the staffs of different generals and served gallantly enough as aides. The temptation for a signal officer to convert himself into an aide is always serious, the duties of the latter, as rendered in our service, requiring less care and much less trouble; for this reason, and to discourage the practice, no mention was made in my preliminary report of any services of signal officers at Seven Pines.

The fight raged furiously from about noon. From a signal station near Hogan's house the shells could be seen bursting in the air and the smoke rising above the tree-tops, while the sounds of the battle were distinctly audible. About 3 p. m. a brigade, forming, as it seemed, a part of the enemy's left, moved in line of battle, with skirmishers in front, across the open fields south of New Bridge, to join the action. A few guns were at the same time fired by a battery near them. The

movement of these troops was visible by many of our officers at Hogan's house and excited comment by its steadiness. The fire continued heavily long after night-fall, and when it ceased both armies only rested for the struggle of the following day.

THE BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS.

On the evening of the 31st of May the chief signal officer was informed at headquarters of the result of that day's battle. It was known in the night that General Sumner had succeeded in crossing the Chickahominy with his corps, that the progress of the enemy was checked, and that there would be a battle in the morning. It was announced in the evening as the plan that the corps of Franklin and Porter would cross in three columns the three bridges near New Bridge at daylight, the crossing to be covered by the fire of numerous batteries posted on the first rising grounds north of the river. This would bring a force on the flank of the enemy, engaging with his front our troops near Fair Oaks. It was reported, also, that there was trouble at the crossing of Bottom's Bridge, the bridges being crowded with wagons and troops. A signal party was ordered down in the night to render assistance, if it should be required, by transmitting orders from one side of the river to the other. There was no occasion for the services of this party. All officers and men of the signal party fit for duty were ordered to be ready to move from camp before daylight.

At daylight the next morning the whole army was under arms. The signal party was moved to near New Bridge, and parties were arranged to accompany the columns to cross as follows, viz: Four officers with their men reported to the commander of each column; two were to cross at each bridge with the troops and two to remain with the batteries detailed to cover that column. Of the officers crossing at each bridge with the first troops one was to carry the white the other the red signal flag. The white flag was to transmit messages relating to the general service; the red was to be used to direct the fire of the artillery. The communicating officers stationed at the battery were similarly equipped as to their flags and had similar instructions.

Orders were sent to the station near Mechanicsville to carefully watch every movement of the enemy in that direction, and to report by the line of field telegraph to general headquarters each half hour. There were two balloons fastened and floating in the air some hundred feet from the ground. One of these was near Mechanicsville, the other close to Gaines' house. An officer was sent to each of these, with directions to ascend; the one near Mechanicsville to report by signals from the car of the balloon to a point near headquarters any information he might gain; the other, at Gaines' house, to attempt to open communication from the car with any signal officer serving with the left whose attention he could call or with any signal officer after our troops should advance and have crossed the river. These ascensions were made as ordered, but without results. Very little could be seen from the balloon near Mechanicsville; there was no reply from the left to the signals made from the car of that near Gaines' house.

The scene near New Bridge after daylight was one of interest. The morning was clear and still; the sun shone brightly after the rain which had fallen in the night; there were everywhere bodies of troops ready to cross, and batteries of cannon from their chosen position covered almost every point of the opposite slope. At the bridges working parties were working busily. Now and then shots were exchanged across

the river. It seemed as though the moment of battle had come, but the bridges were not ready. It was whispered soon that they could not be finished in some hours; then not completely on that day, and later it was known that the crossing was impracticable. The heavy rains had had their effect. The stream had risen and was still rising. It had overspread its banks, the treacherous soil was saturated, and the bottom of the valley had become a morass.

While the troops of the right thus waited, we heard the roar of the battle raging at Fair Oaks, and soon after came tidings of the defeat of the enemy.

The services of the signal party with the left in this battle were in character similar to those of the day before. They were aides, and carried many important messages.

The signal party at New Bridge were kept in the field all day, and bivouacked there at night on this and the following day, to be ready for their part in any movement that might be ordered.

On the 2d of June the enemy had retreated to Richmond.

On the 3d of June a party of signal officers, with their men, under Lieut. Franklin Ellis, of Tammany Regiment, New York Volunteers, and acting signal officer, was ordered to pass our line and make a reconnaissance as far as James River, to ascertain the practicability of communication by signals between our army and the naval vessels then lying in the river. This party reached the river at Westover and there boarded a flag-of-truce boat. It then returned by way of Charles City Court-House. Communication by signal was found to be impracticable. It was thought by the officers that messages might be sent by rockets or from the car of a balloon.

COMMUNICATION OPENED BETWEEN THE RIGHT AND LEFT.

Up to the date of the battles of the Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, as has been mentioned, no portion of the left of the army had been visible from ground held by the right. The enemy had some guns on the heights near New Bridge and troops in the woods near Price's house. From the station near Hogan's house we could discern with glasses two guns and numbers of troops near James Garnett's House.

The result of the battles of May 31 and June 1 had not enabled the left to reach the open country in their front; they were yet hidden by the woods. From the time the construction of the bridges near New Bridge had commenced there had been, now and then, artillery firing between our batteries posted to cover them and the enemy's guns near Price's house.

After the battle of the Seven Pines the enemy seemed to increase their force at this point, earthworks began to be visible, and their artillery had better ranges. From this time for as long as the army remained before Richmond the defenses on the southern side of the Chickahominy grew more formidable. It was customary to fire on either side at any object that attracted attention, and sometimes it seemed only for practice. The signal station near Hogan's house was close to a battery of 20-pounders, and thus received its share of projectiles.

On the second of June an officer at this station observed with his telescope a number of men moving in a spot of cleared ground among the woods on the other side of the swamps of the Chickahominy, and beyond the enemy. They seemed to have just reached the place. They were about 3 miles distant, and wore our uniform. This, how-

ever, had ceased to be distinctive, the enemy wearing it, and with impunity, whenever they could obtain it. Two signal officers, with their men, were ordered to cross the river at Sumner's Bridge, and to reach this spot if found to be held by our army. It was dark when they reached this bridge, and it was found impassable. Early the next morning they crossed at the railroad, and after a journey of about 10 miles from their point of departure reached the clearing on Golding's farm, which was found to be occupied by the advanced pickets of General Burns' brigade. Their signals were seen at once and answered from the station at Hogan's, and it was then first known that our forces on the opposite sides of the Chickahominy were in view of each other. These stations were worked from this day until the morning of the battle of Gaines' Mill, and for the first days with some danger, the enemy knowing the positions of both and trying often to reach them with artillery. They were then, and for some time after, of importance; to communicate by courier between the points requiring a difficult ride of some 7 miles. On the day following the occupation of this station the division commanded by General Smith crossed the Chickahominy and encamped on Golding's farm. This signal line then became his mode of communication with general headquarters, and so remained while headquarters were on the northern side of the Chickahominy.

When it was proposed that General Smith's command should move on Old Tavern officers were designated to accompany it. The make of the country was such that they could while moving have kept constant communication with the forces north of the Chickahominy. During these days stations were established at different times at Austin's house, at the bridges, and at the batteries near New Bridge whenever movements were heard of as contemplated, or when unusual firing on our part or on that of the enemy offered a chance for the service. With the left of the army the officers had by this time established perches in tree-tops, and had gained a knowledge of localities which rendered their reports of some service to the generals receiving them.

About this time information was received at headquarters of the cavalry raid led by the rebel General Stuart, who, with two regiments and some horse artillery, passed the rear of our army, attacking the railroad train, and taking a number of prisoners near Tunstall's Station. The news of this near approach of the enemy's forces created much alarm at the depot at White House, at which there were then but few of our forces. At the request of Colonel Ingalls, who commanded the depot, a signal officer, Lieut. F. W. Owen, Thirty-eighth New York Volunteers, and acting signal officer, came ashore from one of the gunboats, and established a station that night on one of the chimneys of the White House. The war vessels took positions in which they could cover the depot with their fire. The enemy did not attack it.

On the 13th of June general headquarters moved to Camp Lincoln, on the south side of the Chickahominy. The field telegraph wire, which had been so long stretched to Mechanicsville, was on this day ordered to be reeled up, and the train to follow headquarters to the other side of the Chickahominy. On the next day this wire was stretched through the woods to General Smith's headquarters at Golding's, and the line was working. From this station at Golding's communication was kept by signals with the station at Hogan's, and with another station now permanently established on Austin's house, near Beaver Dam. There was a station of observation at Mechanicsville. The messages received from these stations at Golding's were transmitted by the field telegraph line to general headquarters near Trent's house.

Reports were required to be made three times each day and at midnight. The mist and smoke of the camps which overhung the valley often interfered with the regularity of the reports. There was, however, each day a general information as to the condition and movements of the enemy visible from the stations.

The signal party which had been serving with the left of the army here joined the main party. The different detachments serving with the Army of the Potomac were from this time concentrated in one party, from which details were made for duty at different points as they were required. Experience had shown that a signal party serving with so large an army was most usefully managed when kept together, to be distributed at the order of the chief signal officer to those points where on any day their services might be required, the chief signal officer in his turn obtaining at headquarters such knowledge of the plans of our own army and the position of the enemy as would enable him to direct the details at the proper time to positions in which to take part in contemplated movements. Lieutenant Fisher, as senior officer, was placed in immediate charge of the party thus concentrated.

It was the prevailing opinion now that the battle of Richmond would be fought on the open grounds before mentioned, and which were now in our front, as we approached Old Tavern. Every preparation was made for the duties of the signal officers when the army should advance. It would be their place on the day of the attack to keep in communication the forces which would be co-operating on both sides of the river. The country in front was favorable. The sickness resulting from some months' exposure and hardship began to tell seriously on the strength of the signal party; but those who remained were well drilled, and waited with eager expectation.

Each day evidences of the enemy in our front grew stronger. On the south side of the Chickahominy picket firing was almost constant. It was stopped sometimes by agreement. On the extreme left there were numerous skirmishes, some of them of such magnitude as to be almost battles. Shells were very often thrown into our lines and were replied to by our artillery. In front of our right, stretching up the left bank of the Chickahominy, the enemy's earthworks grew more numerous and their artillery was heavier. One day they brought a 64-pounder rifled gun, of which they had placed one or two in battery, to bear upon the station at Hogan's, and fired deliberately at the officers, who steadily continued their signaling until ordered to cease. This station was made so frequently a target that it was ordered to be moved to the edge of the woods, where it was hidden from the view of the enemy, though in the range of their guns. With the same gun some shots were thrown at the station at Austin's, but failed to reach it. The shells from these guns were thrown far over our camps opposite to them on the north side of the Chickahominy. There were on our side no pieces of sufficient caliber to reply to them. A few days after some 4½-inch rifled guns were received, and a day was set aside (the 25th of June) to try their range upon the batteries and the camps of the enemy.

ENGAGEMENT OF JUNE 25.

On the 24th of June orders were received to so arrange for the next day signal parties as to be able to direct from the south side of the river the fire of heavy guns to open on the following day from positions near Hogan's house and also near Gaines' house. It was intended to silence the 64s before mentioned, and also to direct the fire upon an

earthwork in the vicinity of Old Tavern and upon some positions of the enemy near Garnett's house. Lieutenants Camp and Wiggins, acting signal officers, who had been serving for some time at the Hogan-house station, petitioned that, as this was to be active service, they might remain during the cannonade. Three additional officers were ordered to join them, and Lieut. W. S. Stryker, Ninth New York State Militia, and acting signal officer, was sent to arrange the communications on the north side of the river. Lieut. B. F. Fisher, acting signal officer, was sent with a party of four officers to report to General Smith, and was instructed to arrange the communications on the south side of the river.

On the following morning the officers were posted, and were in communication at the following points in view of each other, viz: At the battery at Hogan's house, at New Bridge, at the battery near Gaines' house, on Smith's redoubt, and in the edge of the woods near James Garnett's. The fire commenced at daylight, and was for a time met with a spirited reply by the enemy's guns. During this cannonade a screen which had been erected to hide Lieutenant Wiggins (station near New Bridge) from the view of the enemy was penetrated, at a moment his duties called him outside of it, by a cannon shot from their guns. The fire for a time was quite severe. Later in the day the enemy's guns ceased to reply.

In front of our left our picket line extended through the open fields near Garnett's, the enemy's line of pickets being in the same field, in view and quite near them. As the shot from our long-range guns on the north side of the river fell their range and effect were noticed by an officer on our picket line. Messages were sent from time to time by him to an officer stationed behind the first fringe of woods, whence the report went by signals to the batteries on the other side of the river. In the afternoon the shots ranged near the earthworks at Old Tavern, and as they fell in the woods close to them shouts, as of masses of men, could now and then be heard. Our guns were evidently so placed that they could seriously annoy the enemy and aid us in our advance. The firing ceased at sunset. It was to be resumed on the following morning. Lieut. B. F. Fisher, acting signal officer, was ordered to take charge of all the details for this duty and to report to General Porter at daylight. The signal telegraph line was ordered this night to be reeled up and to report to General Porter in the morning. It was anticipated there might be an engagement on the north side of the river.

ACTION IN FRONT OF FAIR OAKS ORCHARD.

On the day that this cannonade was taking place on our right the action in front of Fair Oaks Orchard was fought upon our left. At this engagement there were present at different times Generals Hooker, Heintzelman, and McClellan. A detachment of four signal officers, with their men, Lieut. W. G. McCreary, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers, and acting signal officer, commanding, had been sent at daylight to report to General Hooker. In the action which ensued Lieutenants McCreary and Denicke, acting signal officers, were posted in a tree-top in front of Casey's redoubt, from which they overlooked the positions of the enemy not visible from the ground. Hence messages were sent in reference to the direction and range of our artillery when engaged to Lieut. C. S. Kendall, First Massachusetts Volunteers, and acting signal officer, stationed with the batteries on the Williams-

burg road. The movements of the enemy's troops visible from this position, and some of them important, were reported to Lieutenant Beckett, acting signal officer with General Heintzelman. The station on the tree-top was rendered unpleasant by now and then musketry fire and occasional shots from the enemy's sharpshooters. In addition to the services rendered by reporting the location and movements of the enemy, the reports from this station caused to be stopped during the action the fire of one of our batteries which was persistently throwing its shells among our own men. The station was held until after the action had ceased. General Hooker had requested that this detachment should be returned to him each day while he held this position.

EVACUATION OF WHITE HOUSE.

Early on the morning of June 26 a report received at headquarters from Lieutenant Fisher, then at General Porter's headquarters, indicated that our heavy batteries near there would not open on that day. At noon on this day it was first intimated to the signal officer that an attack by the enemy in force upon our right, on the north side of the Chickahominy and upon our depot at White House, was anticipated, and that a change of base to James River might be necessary. A telegram was instantly sent to General Casey, then commanding at White House, requesting that a staging for a signal station be raised at once upon the roof of the White House. Lieut. W. S. Stryker, acting signal officer, was ordered to proceed from general headquarters to White House, and, assuming charge of the communications there, to arrange with the signal officers upon the gunboats for their prompt co-operation. Lieutenant Stryker left immediately for his station, some 20 miles distant.

By noon of the following day the communications had been arranged. From this moment until the last of the evacuation the signal officers here (on shore and on shipboard) were actively on duty. To the perfect understanding thus had between our land and naval forces may be attributed in some degree the success of the complete evacuation of that depot in the face of an advancing enemy. Brigadier-General Stoneman, falling back past White House with his light brigade on his way to Yorktown, here arranged by signal messages to place his wearied infantry on the vessels, and requested that a signal officer accompany him on his march down the Peninsula. Lieut. F. W. Owen, Thirty-eighth New York Volunteers, acting signal officer, was detailed for that purpose. The last message sent announced the close approach of the enemy. A few moments later the fleet of transports got under way. The White House was set on fire by some unknown person after the last officer and man connected with the Signal Corps had left it.

BATTLE OF MECHANICSVILLE.

About 4 p. m. on the 26th of June a message from Lieutenant Fisher, acting signal officer, then at Hogan's house, north of the Chickahominy, announced that the enemy was moving down the north side of the Chickahominy; that there would be a battle at Mechanicsville, and that all the troops then on the north side had been ordered to be ready to cross to the south of the Chickahominy. Lieutenant Fisher was about to leave, with the officers collected from the different signal stations near him, for the point at which the battle was expected. Very soon after a message from General Reynolds announced that with the troops under

his command he had fallen back to a predetermined position near Beaver Dam. At almost the same time at which this message was received the roar of the battle at Mechanicsville made it evident it had commenced.

At the commencement of this battle Lieutenant Fisher distributed his officers as follows, viz: Lieutenant Beckett, acting signal officer, with a battery on the right of our line, about 100 yards from a prominent house on the field: Lieutenant Horner, acting signal officer, with the extreme right; Lieutenant Wiggins, acting signal officer, with the reserve. Lieutenant Fisher, with Lieutenant Birney, took post on the roof of the house mentioned, and at which a battery was stationed. From these positions, which were occupied as points of observation, the officers were able, by the aid of their glasses, to obtain information which could not otherwise have readily been given. Their reports were made to the different commanders near whom they were serving. Signals were not used upon the field of battle. The fire upon the stations occupied by the officers upon this field was quite severe. The fire of artillery continued until about 9 o'clock at night, and when it closed our troops everywhere had held their positions. During this action one officer had been left at the Hogan station, communicating with the station on Golding's farm. It was presumed that this station was constantly watched by the enemy.

There is always a possibility that the key to signal communication may be by accident or betrayal in the possession of the enemy. It is customary for this reason to disguise true messages, and to send with an especial signal messages intended to deceive. On this night, as soon as the firing had ceased, the chief signal officer instructed the Hogan station to send, in plain view of the enemy, the message, "The five divisions have arrived." As our forces intended to leave the position, this message, if it could by any accident be interpreted by the enemy, would lead them to believe that we proposed to hold it. No other messages were sent this night.

The field telegraph train, which had arrived from the south side of the Chickahominy on the morning of this day, had been ordered to be extended from General Porter's headquarters, which later in the day during the battle was the position of General McClellan, to a point near Old Cold Harbor. The wire had been reeled out accordingly. It had fallen again among new troops, who investigated its composition by cutting it, and the officer going to Cold Harbor had been warned that the enemy were approaching that position and that it would not be held by our troops. The line was not working. Under these circumstances the wire was now ordered to be reeled up and the train to recross the river. At about 10 o'clock the officers and men collected from the field of battle were gathered at Hogan's station, and arrangements were made for them to take part in the battle of the following day. It was the impression at this time that a great battle would be fought the next day on the south side of the Chickahominy. Lieutenant Fisher was ordered to return to the signal camp near general headquarters, and to rejoin at daylight, with additional officers, the party on the northside of the Chickahominy, to serve with General Porter. The remainder of the party (with the exception of four officers detached to General Hooker) fit for duty was ordered to be at the station at Golding's farm, equipped, and there to await orders to move with the forces on the south side of the river. The officer in charge of the wagons of the signal detachment was ordered to be ready to strike camp at any time and to accompany the movement of general headquarters.

BATTLE OF GAINES' MILL.

Before daylight on the 27th of June the sound of cannon announced that the battle had recommenced. Word was sent to Lieutenant Fisher to carry out the instructions given him the night before. The signal detachment serving at Gaines' Mill numbered eight officers, with their flagmen. As our troops fell back from Mechanicsville the station at Hogan's house was abandoned, the enemy's skirmishers being then in the same piece of woods and not far distant.

When our forces took up their position near Gaines' Mill Lieutenant Fisher disposed of the officers of his command as follows, viz: Lieutenant Gloskosky, acting signal officer, was stationed near the north end of Duane's Bridge, whence he observed and reported the movements of the enemy in the valley of the Chickahominy at points where they crossed the river from the south to the north side to take part in the action, and upon the heights on the north side, adjacent to the stream. These reports were signaled to Lieutenant Camp, acting signal officer stationed near General Porter's headquarters. Lieutenants Wiggins and Fisher were upon the right of the army, and reported the appearance and advance of the enemy coming in the direction of Gaines' Mill and Cold Harbor. These reports were sent to Lieutenant Horner, near General Porter's headquarters.

Lieutenants Tompkins and Beckett were ordered to open communication across the Chickahominy from a point near General Porter's headquarters to a point near General Smith's headquarters. These officers failed to make this communication. The persistence with which some of the officers held their stations in the ensuing battle of that day attracted attention. Lieutenant Gloskosky, reporting from the left, early drew upon himself the fire of the enemy's guns, to which he paid but little attention, and held his station until the destruction of the bridge behind him, rendering it necessary that he should change his station.

The station on the right was held by the officers upon it until they were notified that to hold it longer, while it involved very great risk, would be useless. From all the stations reports were sent to General Porter, near the Adams house, as the enemy drew near, and until, in the smoke and confusion of the general engagement, messages could no longer be sent.

About 2 p. m. the chief signal officer received instructions from the general commanding to open communication from the position then occupied by the general near Trent's house to General Porter's headquarters on the field of battle on the north side of the river. It would have been easy to carry out this order had it been earlier given, and it would have been possible to do so had our troops on the north side been able to hold their position. As the action resulted, the stations—one at Trent's house, the other in a tree near General Porter's headquarters—were no sooner determined upon than it became necessary to abandon them. With the retreat of our forces at sunset efforts to establish this communication ceased. During the progress of this engagement Lieutenant Denicke, Cameron Rifles, and acting signal officer, stationed at Smith's redoubt, was able to render some service by reporting the effects noticed with his telescope of the shots directed from the battery of 20-pounder guns there stationed upon the enemy appearing near Gaines' house.

The detachment held in reserve on the south side of the river rendered on this day no material assistance. There was no advance of our forces

in which they could take part. Late in the afternoon some of them were placed upon stations near Smith's redoubt, at Trent's house, and at two farm-houses at different points lower down on the Chickahominy, one of these being the Dudley house, to endeavor to communicate with the stations on the field on the north side of the river. It was impossible to effect this, and when our forces, after the battle, retired across the Chickahominy the officers of both parties rejoined their camp near general headquarters. Headquarters camp had moved on the afternoon of this day, and was established this night at Savage Station.

ENCAMPMENT AT SAVAGE STATION.

On the next day (Saturday) there was no general engagement. The greater portion of the signal party, wearied by the duties of the two preceding days and nights, were kept in camp to rest and to be at hand if they were needed. A detachment of 4 officers, with their men, Lieut. W. G. McCreary, acting signal officer, commanding, was sent to report to General Hooker in front.

About noon this day it was known that the enemy, victorious at Gaines' Mill, had reached the line of the railroad to White House, and their cavalry was seen near Bottom's Bridge. Telegraphic communication with the depot at White House was broken. At very nearly the same time Lieutenant Hastings, acting signal officer, who had started from White House on the morning of this day with a wagon load of signal stores and without escort, and who had crossed his wagon at the ford at Bottom's Bridge (the bridge being destroyed) in the presence of the enemy's cavalry, reported to the chief signal officer at general headquarters camp his safe arrival with his charge on the south side of the Chickahominy. This was the last arrival of wagons from the depot on the Pamunkey. Lieutenant Hastings was ordered to join with his train the great trains by this time moving on all main roads toward the new base upon the James River.

Early this morning the chief signal officer had been notified that General Keyes' corps had crossed the White Oak Swamp and was near Charles City Cross-Roads. He was instructed to send two signal officers, with their men, to report to him. In obedience to this order Lieuts. Charles Herzog, acting signal officer, and Franklin Ellis, acting signal officer, were ordered to join General Keyes. They were supplied with rockets, and a code of rocket signals was arranged, by which, if rockets could be seen, communication could be had from the position held by General Keyes to general headquarters. They were further ordered that, having first obtained the permission of General Keyes, they would push on to the James River, and put themselves in communication, if possible, with the naval forces there lying.

The dense woods of White Oak Swamp, beyond which General Keyes' forces were, precluded the possibility of signaling by flags by day. An attempt was made to run out the telegraph wire to reach his headquarters. It was laid for a short distance. The thronging of the immense trains upon the road leading from Savage Station to White Oak Bridge, and the imperfect character of the apparatus, rendered its farther extension impossible, and the effort was after some hours abandoned. The wire was ordered to be reeled up, and the officers in charge of the train were instructed to move it, as soon as there was opportunity, toward James River. At sunset officers were stationed to watch for the rockets, should any be thrown up from General Keyes' corps. During this day large forces of the enemy could be seen from near

Dudley's house moving on the north side of the Chickahominy in the direction of the railroad and on the roads leading to White House.

Our forces in front and on the south side of the Chickahominy occupied their usual lines. Large numbers of wounded from the fields of Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill were gathered at the Savage house and in the grounds surrounding it, at the railroad station. The wagons of the signal party were kept packed, and the party was held in readiness to move. By evening it had become generally understood that headquarters were to move that night, and the order had been circulated that all were to be in preparation to march at the shortest notice. The tents were finally struck at about 2 a. m.

MOVEMENT FROM SAVAGE STATION.

It had been raining during the night, and at daylight a thick fog was hiding the movements of both armies. Instructions were given before dawn to Lieutenant Fisher to report at daylight with a party of five officers and their flagmen at General Smith's headquarters, still near Golding's farm, and afterwards to accompany any movement of the troops of that portion of the army, now our right, during the ensuing day. A station of observation was ordered to be established at Dudley's house. Four officers, with their men, were to report as usual at daylight to General Hooker. The remainder of the party was to be in reserve near Savage Station, and there to wait for further orders. All trains were to move at once for the depot on James River. Soon after daylight it was evident that the general movement of the army which had been taking place drew near its completion. The rear of the last train moving from the front was in the open fields surrounding Savage Station. Headquarters moved across White Oak Swamp.

About 7 a. m. the fog, which had shut out everything, lifted, and from the station at Dudley's house long lines of the enemy's troops could then be seen moving on the north side of the river, as if toward White House, and halted at the different roads leading from the bridges. The movement was evidently in force. A report of these facts was sent by courier to General McClellan. An hour later the forces under General Franklin, moving back from our lines in front by way of Trent's house, began to occupy positions at Dudley's house and near Savage Station. The signal officers serving with this portion of the army, stationing themselves on trees and on house-tops as the troops moved back, reported to General Franklin and his division commanders such movements of the enemy as they could see, until the enemy's pickets had crossed the river from the northern side, and until in the afternoon the last troops moved from Dudley's house to go upon the battle-field at Savage Station, the officer upon Dudley's station leaving it with the rear guard. At noon the troops under Generals Hooker and Heintzelman were occupying the second line of defenses in front of Savage Station and on both sides of the Williamsburg roads. There were occasional skirmishes and exchange of cannon-shots near this place, but the enemy had not shown themselves in force. The sounds of a slight engagement near Sumner's position was audible for a time, but soon ceased. The troops were everywhere on the alert and in good spirits, and the retreat seemed making with precision.

Squads of men at this time were destroying at Savage Station property it had been found necessary to leave behind. Close to the Williamsburg road at Savage Station a siege howitzer, a piece of the siege train, had become disabled by some breakage of its carriage.

The officer in charge had piled wood under and on top of it, and setting fire to the mass, which blazed up fiercely, was quietly waiting some time after the gun had been rendered useless for its entire destruction. A train of cars laden with ammunition and provisions stood on the railroad track close to the station. This was being dismantled. A great pile of boxes of hard bread stood by the road near the hospital. This was to be left, it was said, for the sick and wounded. The wagon trains had passed out of view from Savage Station. There remained only the troops designated to hold for a time this position.

The signal officers who had reported to General Hooker in the morning, though reconnoitering, had not been called upon for any active service. The reserve party yet remained at Savage Station.

THE BATTLE OF SAVAGE STATION.

Early in the afternoon the troops of Generals Sumner and Franklin, falling back from the positions they had held in the morning, began to form their line upon what was to be the battle-field. About 4 p. m. the laden train of cars standing upon the track was fired. Another train attached to a locomotive was started at speed and without guidance toward the broken railroad bridge crossing the Chickahominy. Soon after a terrific explosion in that direction announced the destruction of large supplies of ammunition.

Our lines were formed upon the east side of the open grounds at Savage Station, the left of the line extending in the woods upon the south side of the Williamsburg road. As the line was forming the signal officers, who had been held ready during the day, together with those coming in with the different bodies of troops, were assigned to stations.

Lieutenants Birney and Yates, acting signal officers, were posted on the Williamsburg road as far toward the front as they could be visible, with instructions that one of the party should proceed yet farther toward the enemy, supposed to be approaching in that direction, to reconnoiter; and, returning, his reports should be sent by signals to the central station, placed near the point at which the Williamsburg road leaves (going toward White Oak Swamp) at Savage Station.

Lieutenant Wiggins was placed at a point where the railroad track first enters the cleared ground from the direction of Richmond. Hence the railroad is a long way visible. Lieutenant Wiggins was to report any advance of the enemy upon the railroad or from that direction.

Lieutenant Tompkins, acting signal officer, was placed where the right of our line rested on the deep cut of the railroad east of Savage's house. He was to report any force appearing on our right by the road from Trent's house or over the bridges of the Chickahominy.

At the central station were posted Lieutenants Neel, Marston, and Denicke, acting signal officers. The arrangements were hardly completed when a message from the station on the Williamsburg road and a verbal report made by an officer from that station announced the enemy as not far distant, and moving on the railroad slowly, and with artillery. This report was sent to General Sumner. Other reports soon indicated the presence of the enemy at other points in our front. The shells from their guns began to strike in the edge of the woods near the signal officers there stationed. A final report from Lieutenant Wiggins estimated the distance of the enemy from his station in yards. These reports were forwarded to General Sumner, who, in reply to the last, said he was coming upon the field in person. The officers were

ordered in from the advanced stations. General Sumner came upon the field.

At the commencement of the action, which now opened, some shells were thrown from a howitzer on the enemy's right, near Williamsburg road, directly among the tents crowded with the wounded surrounding Savage Station. A white flag sent from the hospital was met by the enemy, and thereafter the range of this gun was carefully altered. No other shells fell among the sufferers.

A few moments later the enemy showed themselves on the line of the railway, and opened upon the troops near the central signal station with a gun of the heaviest caliber. The piece is reported to have been either an 8-inch columbiad or a 64-pounder rifle, mounted upon a railway car, and moved upon the railway. The range and service of the piece were splendid, and its fire was most annoying until silenced by a battery of Parrott guns near our center. The signal flag offered too perfect a mark to be used among troops in its presence, and the station here, with the one established before the action, on the right of our line, and now practically useless, ceased working.

Much of the battle of Savage Station was fought on open ground, our lines advancing across the plain to close with the enemy, who held the edge of the woods on the west side of the cleared ground from the railroad to beyond the Williamsburg road. The musketry firing, as the lines closed with each other, was very severe. As our different lines moved up it was thought at one time it would be necessary to establish a signal station far to the front and at a point much exposed to the enemy. Lieutenants Camp, Wiggins, and Denicke, acting signal officers, volunteered to work this station, and took their places with the line, ready to move up when it should be ordered. By the time the line had advanced the enemy had been driven back, and the station was unnecessary. It was dark when the conflict ended. It was fully 9 o'clock before the reports were received from the battle-field. The place of combat, on which they sought the dead and wounded with torches, the trains of cars yet burning on the railway track, a hospital and large grounds crowded with the suffering of other battles, and long lines of troops, lit up now and then with a lurid light by the explosions of ammunition among the burning stores, were some of the incidents of the scene.

Some time after dark the chief signal officer was requested by General Sumner to carry to General McClellan, then on the other side of White Oak Swamp, the message that he had repulsed the enemy after a severe action and with severe loss on both sides; that he was confident that he could repulse their whole force again in the morning, and that he was most anxious to hold his then position at Savage Station. The message caused some excitement upon its delivery at general headquarters. The signal party at Savage Station bivouacked near the battle-field.

The troops under General Heintzelman moved from the works which they had been holding during the day at about the same time that the line of battle was formed at Savage Station. These troops crossed the White Oak Swamp on roads higher up than those leading over the principal crossing. The signal officers accompanied the columns. There was no occasion for their active service.

General headquarters camp was established this night on the south side of White Oak Swamp. Our troops were all night moving over from Savage Station. The enemy, quieted by the sharp check they had received in their defeat of the afternoon, showed no signs of imme-

diately pressing the pursuit. On this night, as on the days and nights before, the great trains were to be found stretched out upon the road or moving slowly to their destination.

The signal party, which had bivouacked near Savage Station after the battle, crossed the swamp at about 4 a. m. They rested near the crossing.

The morning of June 30 was clear and pleasant. On this day was to be made the last march necessary to place the troops in the new position on James River. The troops everywhere were in motion, seemingly in good spirits. The trains moved steadily upon the roads without confusion, halting at times to allow the cavalry and artillery to pass to the front, to take up their assigned positions.

The corps commanded by General Keyes was well in advance and known to be near the river. General headquarters were at a house upon the road near where the camp had been, about 3 miles from White Oak Swamp. Soon after they were established here the signal detachment assigned to General Hooker, of General Heintzelman's corps, the preceding day reported for duty. They were instructed to hasten forward with General Keyes' advance, and on his arrival near the James to put that officer in communication with the gunboats.

Lieutenant Herzog, acting signal officer, also reported here in person the fact that Lieutenant Ellis, acting signal officer, and himself had, in obedience to orders given on Sunday at Savage Station, accompanied a small party of cavalry sent forward by General Keyes, had reached James River on the night before, and had there boarded one of our war vessels; that he had again visited the James River on the night of the 29th, whence he had now just returned. The position of the fleet had been ascertained. No enemy in force had been seen in going or returning. The report was read to General McClellan. The officer was ordered to rejoin General Keyes. Headquarters soon after moved upon the road toward Haxall's Landing.

The signal detachment which had bivouacked near White Oak Crossing was, with the exception of two officers, retained with himself by Lieutenant Fisher, acting signal officer, this morning ordered forward by that officer to report to the chief signal officer at general headquarters. This party reported just in time to be present at the first engagement on Malvern Hill. Before noon General Keyes, with the advance, had reached the James River without encountering the enemy, and all the roads of communication were opened. The corps commanded by General Fitz John Porter was at and on the roads near Malvern Hill.

The signal officers who had accompanied the fleet from James River were in communication with those who had been sent forward with General Keyes, and a perfect understanding of their relative movements and positions had been thus given by the land and naval forces. Communication had been opened from a point just below Haxall's to the flag-ship Galena, lying off City Point. The rear of the army was yet at White Oak Swamp. The change of base (to James River) seemed to be a thing accomplished, and that without molestation. A very short time afterward the tumult of the cannonade at White Oak Swamp announced the enemy's attack in that direction.

The position of Malvern Hill, nearly 2 miles from the James River, and yet commanding a view of that stream, is perhaps as perfect as could be chosen for combining by the use of signals the operations and the fire of land and naval forces. From the summit of the hill the roads leading to Richmond by the river and passing Turkey Bridge

are overlooked, and even where the roads approaching pass through dense timber the dust raised by moving columns, showing through the tree-tops, indicate to an observer here placed their position. A signal station was now ordered to be established on the roof of a small house at this point.

A station of observation was ordered to be placed on Haxall's house, whence a long view is had of the river and the roads near it.

Two officers were placed on board the gunboat *Aroostook*, which lay in sight of the station at Malvern Hill and also of the Haxall's station. There was one officer (Lieutenant Clum, acting signal officer) on board of the flag-ship *Galena*, which had now moved up to near Haxall's from lower down the river. All this time sounds of a general conflict in our rear were increasing. The battles of White Oak Swamp, New Market, and Glendale had opened and were progressing. The commanding general, who, leaving Haxall's, had ridden toward the front at the first sounds of the cannonade, returned, and went on board the flag-ship to confer with the naval commander. A signal message was sent to him from Malvern Hill, reporting the lines of communication open. Orders were sent to the signal officers on board the gunboats to watch the station on Malvern Hill in case they went into action. Soon after this Lieut. W. G. McCreary, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers, acting signal officer, stationed on a house at Haxall's, noticed, about 5 miles up the river and approaching, clouds of dust, which, as he thought, indicated the movement of a column of the enemy. The fact, mentioned by him to two officers of the general's staff, attracted no attention.

Watching this movement for some time, during which he was able to form an estimate of the strength of the supposed column and the distance it had advanced, Lieutenant McCreary, acting signal officer, reported the fact by signals to General McClellan, still on board the *Galena*. An instant reply inquired how far the enemy was distant, and the answer was met by the announcement that the gunboats would move up and shell them.

The Haxall station was ordered to immediately report by signals to the general any further facts of interest that might occur. The gunboats were got under way at once, and signals passed from one to another to "Come on and shell the enemy." At this time we had strong batteries on Malvern Hill and a considerable force in that vicinity. The plain on top of the hill was crowded with wagons, and the stragglers from the remainder of the army were being here gathered and formed together. There were preparations to meet an attack, but it was not expected immediately.

The enemy's column moving down the River road came rapidly through the woods to a point within close range and opened on the heights with field artillery. The long lines of dust in the woods and beyond them marked the positions of their infantry. The contest was rapid and decisive. With the first of the enemy's shell the hill was cleared as if by magic of wagons and of stragglers, which went down the hill together, and rapidly on to Haxall's by hundreds. Our batteries on the hill came promptly into position and opened in reply, while the great guns of the fleet threw in their shells fairly among the enemy. Almost as soon as the gunboats had left Haxall's Station the signal station on Malvern Hill had come in view to the signal officers stationed on the mast-tops, and the signal messages from the field, "Fire one mile to the right," "Good shot," "Fire low and into the

woods near the shore," &c., were reported to the gunners in a few minutes after their broadsides were opened. The gunboats continued their fire for some time after the land batteries had ceased, and until the enemy's columns, repulsed and scattered, were out of range and hidden from view.

With the first lull of the firing came inquiries by signals from General McClellan as to the progress of the battle still raging with other parts of the army. The reply from General Porter brought the commanding general quickly on shore and on the field, which he reached after night-fall. Messages went to and fro between the field and the gunboats until after dark, when the vessels moved down the river. At the beginning of the action the signal flag stationed and working on a house on Malvern Hill, directly in front of the enemy's batteries, seemed to attract their attention, and several shots, some of them passing very close, were thrown at it. No injury was done, however, and the working was not suspended. The number of messages crowded on this station from all parts of the army was too great to admit that all of them should be sent.

During this action other stations were established communicating from the position of General Porter, after he came upon the field, to where our advanced batteries (under General Griffin, stationed a mile distant, on the Quaker road) were firing on the enemy. Some messages in reference to this firing were thence communicated to General Porter. These field stations were withdrawn at dark. A detail of officers and men was posted at the Malvern Hill station, to be on the alert throughout the night in the case of an emergency, and an officer was sent to one of the gunboats, by the order of General McClellan, to open communication thence that night if it was practicable. The vessel had moved so far down the river that the signals were not visible. The stations at Haxall's, communicating with the fleet near there, were retained. Mention has been made of the names of officers in my preliminary report. The headquarters camp was this night at Haxall's Station. The next day was fought the principal battle of Malvern Hill.

THE BATTLE AT MALVERN HILL.

The preparations for this battle commenced at daylight. The officers who had been placed on board the fleet the preceding day had remained throughout the night. Other officers were now sent to the vessels which it was expected would take part in the action. The stations on Malvern Hill and at Haxall's remained as they had before been posted. Orders were sent to Lieutenant Fisher, acting signal officer (who, arriving from White Oak Swamp, reported for duty this morning), to establish stations on the right and left of our lines (which the whole army had formed in the night), near Malvern Hill, and as far in front as was practicable. The central station was to be near the station communicating with the Navy, which was also near the position occupied by General Porter on the crest of Malvern Hill. In obedience to this order Lieutenant Camp, acting signal officer, was posted on the house at General Heintzelman's headquarters, communicating with Lieutenant McCreary, acting signal officer, stationed near General Porter; Lieutenants Gloskosky and Ellis, acting signal officers near the headquarters of General Couch, on the left, communicating with Lieutenant Wiggins, acting signal officer at the central station; Lieutenants Birney and Yates, acting signal officers on station to communicate with the

fleet. The station at Haxall's was occupied by Lieutenant Kendall, acting signal officer. All these lines were working fairly before the enemy had made any attack in force. The naval forces held the same positions as on yesterday, and awaited the word of the general commanding on the field how and where to throw their fire. Signal officers were in the tops of each, by whom the signal messages were read as sent.

About noon the enemy advanced on our left. Our batteries on land opened, and a signal order brought to their assistance the fire of the fleet, the shells of the great guns passing high over portions of our army and plunging into the woods through which the enemy were moving. The conflict at this point terminated, after a severe struggle, with the repulse of the enemy. One of the first messages sent from the signal station on the left was a call for more men. At that time our lines seemed hard pressed. A message from this station announced to General McClellan, upon his arrival on the field about 2 p. m., the repulse of the enemy, then just effected by General Couch's division.

During this contest this signal station was found to be under so severe a fire that it was necessary to order it to be moved to where it could be better covered from view. It was then posted behind a fringe of trees, and there worked under fire throughout the day. In the lull of the engagement after the first attack, and when the firing recommenced in the afternoon, it was engaged with frequent messages relating to our own troops and to the enemy. Reports of various character and importance passed over this line until night, when with the final repulse of the opposing army the officers were put upon night stations where our lines of battle had been, and there remained working until the order came late at night to evacuate the position.

The forces on the right were not extensively engaged this day, and few communications passed over the line extending to General Heintzelman. The communication with the naval vessels through all of this day was complete. The fire of their guns was controlled by the general on the field as readily as was that of his own batteries.

The messages to open fire, to cease firing, to fire rapidly, to fire slowly, to fire to the right or left, to alter the elevation of the guns, the ranges, the length of fuses, &c., passed continuously. At one time the order went to fire only single guns, and to wait after each the signal report of the shot. About 6 p. m., while the last attack was raging, it was signaled, "Fire rapidly; this is the crisis of the day."

The fire of the Navy covered the left of our army. It was turned upon our enemy, more than 2 miles distant from the ships in the woods and invisible from the vessel, with precision. It was not the fault of naval officers or men that one or two of the shells struck in our own ranks. The guns had been trained in obedience to signal messages closer and closer to our lines, until the variations usual in such long flights of the shell caused the accident.

It must be borne in mind that from early in the day until dark they threw an almost continuous fire, and sometimes by broadsides, along the flank of our army, and over a part of it up to its front. The attention of the general commanding the army was called to the names of some of the officers present in my report of July 18, 1862.

The battle of Malvern Hill closed after dark with a terrific cannonade and the absolute repulse of the enemy. The plain was held by our troops, and the foe, beaten everywhere, were flying. The signal officers were ordered to bivouac at their stations, to be ready to join the expected movement of the troops at daylight.

MOVEMENT FROM MALVERN HILL.

About an hour later the chief signal officer, then at the deserted camping ground at Haxall's, whence headquarters had that evening moved to Harrison's Landing, was informed that the whole army would move that night for Harrison's Landing, and he was ordered to arrange such communication that General McClellan, who would remain on board the Galena off Haxall's, might be in communication with General Keyes, whose corps was the rear guard, and be also informed of the manner in which the march was made and of any occurrences in relation to it.

An order was sent to the signal party upon the battle-field notifying the officers of the order, and directing them to accompany the movement of the troops.

Lieutenant Kendall, acting signal officer, established a station on the bank of the river, and through the night reported from time to time to General McClellan, through Lieutenant Clum, acting signal officer upon the flag-ship, the names of the different corps and divisions and the times as they passed on the road on their march down the river. A message was also sent at dawn reporting the condition of the troops and the character and conduct of the march. The general commanding the army communicated with General Keyes in reference to it.

Soon after daylight the movement was so far completed that the last troops and trains were passing. The corps of General Keyes was in position to cover the roads on which our forces were moving. It was raining heavily. A message was received from General McClellan a little later, about 9 a. m., announcing his departure to superintend the landing of fresh troops at Harrison's Landing, and the flag-ship moved down the river.

The signal station held up to this time by Lieutenant Kendall was now abandoned. At about this hour the last wagons of the trains were entering the clearing at Haxall's. The rear guard of the army was crossing the bridge over Turkey Creek, already swollen by the torrents of rain which had fallen. The timbers of the bridge had been partially cut, and trees on the sides of the road were weakened, to obstruct it as soon as the rear guard had passed. The trains, though retarded by swelling streams and the mud, were moving in good order upon the road, and General Keyes, whose corps covered the rear, had every confidence that the movement would be completed with success.

In this movement from Haxall's to Harrison's Landing the roads were at one time so encumbered that trains were not permitted to move upon them. It was thought some of the wagons would be lost. In these circumstances the instruments taken from the field telegraph train were sent forward upon horseback. The reels of wire were to follow as occasion offered. Of these one reached Harrison's Landing in safety. The other, broken upon the road, was destroyed by the officer in charge.

The last detachment of two signal officers and their men, who had been kept back to enable the rear to be covered by the naval guns if necessary, now rejoined general headquarters, established at Harrison's Landing, 6 miles below Haxall's. A report of the state of the march was made to the general commanding.

The road from Haxall's to Harrison's Landing is at many points, if not throughout its whole course, within the range of cannon-shot from the river. It was recommended that should the enemy attempt to follow our trains in force, two signal officers be placed upon a gunboat to be sent up the river to attack them. Of these officers, one, landing and

taking a position whence the enemy could be seen, could direct upon them the guns of the vessel, although the troops upon whom the fire was turned might be invisible to the gunners. The flag-ship of the fleet now lay off Harrison's Landing. Communication was opened between that vessel and general headquarters. Officers were stationed to make it permanent. The roof of the Harrison mansion offered the most elevated position on which to establish a station of observation. A detail of men was set to place thereon a temporary staging and to clear away the tree-tops which interfered with the view.

It was now late in the afternoon of what had been a dark, rainy, and uncomfortable day. The rear of our trains had arrived within 2 miles of their destination. A force of the enemy following, and getting in range, opened upon them with two pieces of artillery. The teamsters were becoming anxious and alarmed, the roads were full, and there was danger of a confusion which might cost us the loss of a large number of wagons, with their stores. A message was sent by order of General McClellan to the flag officer of the fleet to notify him that the enemy were annoying the rear of the trains, and to ask that a vessel move up to repel them. The distance and position were given. The *Maratanza* was signaled from the flag-ship of the duty required, and steamed off immediately. The second shot from her 11-inch gun fell close to the enemy's battery. It was hastily withdrawn. The staging on the mansion was so far completed on this night as to be fit for use. The detachments of the signal party, with the exception of those officers and men on the gunboats, had rejoined, and the party was this night encamped near general headquarters.

The morning of the 3d of July was dark and cloudy. The camping ground at Harrison's Landing is surrounded by creeks and swamps, and the heavy rains, with the tramlings of thousands, had converted the plowed fields into morasses of mud. It was difficult to move between camps on foot or from one part of the army to another. Everything was wet, cold, and uncomfortable. The greater mass of the army lay in the open grounds which surround Harrison's mansion. Some of them were weary with the ceaseless marching and fighting of the past week, and were confused and depressed by movements they did not understand. There was that disorder and unsettled condition of affairs which must always attend the movements of so great an army made under the circumstances in which ours had moved from the Chickahominy and marched and fought its way to the James.

About 8 o'clock the report of a gun and a shell whistling into camp indicated the presence of the enemy and excited attention everywhere. From the station on top of the mansion the smoke of the gun could be seen rising above the trees in the direction of and beyond Westover Church. Other shots followed, the shells falling nearer, and the enemy seemed to be advancing slowly. Some time elapsed; the fire continued; forces supposed to be the enemy could be seen showing themselves in the open ground near the church. Our men began to grow restless.

Exaggerated rumors came in from the front that the enemy in three strong columns were advancing upon our position. The commanding general had gone on board of one of the transports and had not yet returned. The flag officer commanding the fleet signaled to know what was the firing, and whether the Navy could render any assistance. A reply was sent at first that it was the enemy, and that the commanding general was on board the *Ariel*, and then a message that if a gunboat was sent a mile down the river the smoke of the enemy's guns could be seen from her decks.

At this time the commanding general reached the flag-ship with the Ariel; was informed of the facts, and came at once on shore, having signaled from the vessel the fact of his coming and a reply to a question about preparation. The whole army was under arms to meet the enemy, the men moving out cheerfully for the anticipated battle. Two signal officers had been sent to the front, with instructions to proceed as far as possible to reconnoiter, and to report to the station on the mansion.

The chief signal officer was now ordered to see that communication was kept with the vessels of the fleet, and to establish a station connecting this communication with a point near the position which the general commanding took on the field. A few moments later the guns of the war vessel down the river were heard as her fire opened upon the woods where the enemy had been seen, and presently a couple of rounds from a field battery in front silenced the enemy's guns. A signal message sent from the front to the mansion station asked that the gunboat down the river might cease until our forces could reconnoiter the positions lately held by the enemy. This message was sent to the flag-ship. It could not be signaled from the shore or the flag-ship instantly to the vessel engaged, and her fire was kept on the woods.

A squadron of our cavalry sent on a reconnaissance came in sight of her officers, and the guns were at once turned upon them as enemies. Fortunately one of the signal officers detailed for the station at the front had accompanied the reconnaissance. His signals were recognized on the vessel, communication was opened, and the gunboat's fire ceased. The reconnaissance showed no enemy in our front in force. A dispatch reporting the result was signaled from the officer who had accompanied the reconnoitering party to the general commanding. An hour or two later the camp had resumed its quiet.

On this day the detachment of four officers and their men who had been at White House during the evacuation of that place reported for duty.

On the night of the 4th of July the commanding general had received information which induced the belief that an attack would be made upon our position by the whole force of the rebels on the following day. The chief signal officer was instructed to so arrange communication that the gunboats stationed to cover the right and left flanks of the army at points respectively about 2 miles above and 2 miles below the mansion station should be in communication with that station; that from this station communication should also be had to the flag-ship and as far toward the front as was practicable. Stations were also to be arranged on each flank of the army on shore, communicating thence to the flanking gunboats. Lieutenant Fisher was instructed to arrange the shore stations. Lieutenant Stryker was sent to post the officers on the fleet.

On the morning of the 5th all the preparations had been made. The enemy, however, did not advance the attack. There was no engagement. These stations were afterward adopted as the permanent stations, and were held thereafter for the forty-one days our army lay at Harrison's Landing. The accompanying map and report will illustrate the positions.

A week later the positions at Harrison's Landing had become so strong that anticipations of an attack by the enemy had ceased. The army awaited re-enforcements to resume the offensive. The officers of the Signal Corps, wearied and exhausted by three months of constant movement and labor (many of them sick from diseases incident to the

climate and brought on by exposure), were, with the exception of those on the permanent stations, gathered into one camp, that they might be rested. The party was re-equipped and reorganized. Its members had profited by the experience they had gained in the field, and after a few days of repose were ready again for service.

At midnight on the 30th of July the enemy, who had crept down after dark with two batteries, opened fire from the right bank of the James River at two points—one opposite the mansion station, the other opposite Westover—upon the encampment of our army and the transports in the river. A report of the position of their batteries was made by the officer on the mansion station, and was sent to the general commanding just at the close of the bombardment. During this cannonade the officers on the stations on our right flank were on the alert. The gunboat Maratanza, lying on our right, engaged the battery at Westover, and drew its fire. The foretop, in which Lieut. Paul Babcock, jr., Seventh New Jersey Volunteers, and acting signal officer, had posted himself, was struck by a cannon-shot while that officer was calling the flank station on shore with his lights. The stores camp of the signal party was for a time endangered this night by the shells which fell in it. A corporal of the party was killed and one man wounded.

On the following day our forces occupied both banks of the James River. As soon as they had permanently established themselves on the right bank signal stations were posted, which placed them in communication with the signal lines before mentioned, and at the same time enabled the fire of the fleet to be called at any moment, and to be directed to cover them.

On the 5th of August, and in the temporary absence of the chief signal officer, Lieutenant Fisher was in command of the signal party of the Army of the Potomac. On this day General Hooker, with two divisions, moved to reoccupy Malvern Hill. In the brief combat that followed Lieutenant Camp, acting signal officer, posted on the field at the Mellert house and over 2 miles inland, directed the fire of the steamer Port Royal on the position of the enemy at Malvern, and by his messages notified its commander of the progress of this action. He also first reported the retreat of the enemy.

On the following day a line of stations connected General Hooker's headquarters on Malvern Hill with general headquarters at Harrison's Landing, 8 miles distant. Re-enforcements were sent for by this line, and over it were passed the messages which directed some of the movements, and finally the withdrawal of the expedition. The reports of Lieutenants Fisher and Camp, herewith, have reference to this operation.

From the date of this expedition until the 15th of August (the time of the evacuation of Harrison's Landing) there were no operations of magnitude. There was the usual routine of messages between the permanent stations and across the river.

On the day of the evacuation of Harrison's Landing the station on the Harrison mansion was one of the last points abandoned, and a party of two signal officers with their men served with the rear cavalry of the rear guard, under General Pleasanton, as the columns moved down the Peninsula.

When the troops were gathered near Fortress Monroe stations were posted at Newport News and on that fortress, and these were worked until the army embarked for Alexandria to take part in the campaigns then making in Northern Virginia.

The maps herewith exhibit, as nearly as practicable, the location of those signal stations established during the campaign of which it has been possible to obtain record. The sub-reports of the acting signal officers are also submitted for the information to be gained from them.

This main report has been drawn in the form of a narrative, in order that the general commanding may have laid before him the circumstances under which the duties of the corps were attempted and the labor which attended them. This has been necessary in a first report of this character.

The Signal Corps of the Army of the Potomac was not during the Peninsula Campaign so circumstanced as to be most effective. There was reason to regret in almost every battle and position the want of the field telegraph trains, so essential to the greatest usefulness of organizations of this kind. Appropriations for the other proper stores were first made by Congress at the end of February. The sums were not subject to the draft of the signal officer until May. The army was new. The duties of the corps were novel, and were understood by but few generals in the service. The acting signal officers were all of volunteers, without any experience in military usage. They had been hastily instructed and equipped, and were thrown upon their first campaign in a country very difficult for their duties and into battles and operations of unusual magnitude.

There were few at first who aided them, even when it was in their power. It was often difficult to obtain official information of contemplated movements. It was due to the good material selected from the State regiments for the corps that, so situated, the officers and men achieved on the Peninsula the success they did, and toiled willingly through unusual labor with a zeal and effort which attracted there the attention of the general commanding the army.

Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

ALBERT J. MYER,

Signal Officer, Major, U. S. A., and C. S. O. Army Potomac.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Army of the Potomac.

No. 13.

Reports of E. J. Allen [Allen Pinkerton], Chief of Secret Service Division.

HDQRS. PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Washington, D. C., March 29, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following information relative to the forces and defenses at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, as extracted from a report of one of my operatives, made to you on November 15, 1861; the date of his visit to the above-named places being October 26, 1861:

That, as my operative was informed, General Magruder (whose headquarters were at Yorktown) commanded all the forces on the Peninsula bounded by James and York Rivers, and also those on Gloucester Point, his command at that time including twenty-seven regiments of infantry, 1,200 cavalry, and four field batteries, containing each from four to six guns, iron and brass, rifled and smooth bore. That Colonel Crump was in command of the forces at Gloucester Point, where were

then encamped two regiments of infantry, two companies of cavalry, and one field battery, consisting of four brass and two iron guns, ranging from 6 to 12-pounders. That on the beach at Gloucester Point was a heavy earthwork, with twelve mounted guns, ranging from 32 to 64 pounders. That the intrenchments surrounding all the guns and forces (with the exception of one regiment of infantry) above specified commence about one-fourth of a mile above the aforesaid earthwork on the point and run, in a somewhat circular form, until they again strike the York River about half a mile below the said earthwork. That these intrenchments are composed of split pine logs, set up endwise inside, with an earth bank outside about 12 feet at the base, the earth being taken from the outside front, thus making a ditch of some 5 or 6 feet in depth and the same in width at the top. That at about the center of this breastwork is a 64-pounder mounted on a high carriage, which traverses on a circle calculated for a sweep of the whole land side of the intrenchments, which is a clear field of about 700 acres, bounded by timber on the north and York River on the south. That between October 26 and November 11, 1861, the rebels commenced a heavy earthwork on an elevation 50 yards back from the water, 30 to 35 feet above the water level, and 200 yards lower down the river than the earthwork at the point first mentioned. That said earthwork had an intrenchment in front partly finished, 8 to 10 feet wide at the top, 5 to 6 feet in depth, the front of the embankment perpendicular, and the back of the ordinary slope. That on this work were employed more than 100 soldiers. That in order to draw out the real purpose of this fortification my operative asked Colonel Crump if it was an infantry breastwork; that the colonel replied: "O, no, sir; it's a battery, and we intend to mount six heavy guns thereon—four 32-pounders and two 64-pounders." (For masked batteries below Gloucester Point, see report of this date extracted from statement of Ringgold.) That the landing at Yorktown is in front of a hill which rises with a slope some 25 feet above the beach, on the top of which hill, and in front of the town, is an earthwork mounting six or eight guns, 32 to 64 pounders, of which guns my operative saw six, but was informed by the sentinel that there were eight. That this last-named battery is about three-quarters of a mile from that on Gloucester Point, to which it is nearly opposite, but a short distance lower down. (For further particulars concerning Yorktown batteries, see report of this date on statements of Maurice and Ringgold.) That, as my operative was informed by a lieutenant in the rebel army, from Yorktown down the Peninsula toward Fort Monroe are small creeks and inlets running into both the York and James Rivers. That many of these creeks or inlets head near each other and run in opposite directions into the different rivers. That for nearly 15 miles down from Yorktown breastworks were thrown up on the several points of land between the headings of these various creeks or inlets, said breastworks facing toward Fort Monroe, and mounted with 18 to 64-pounders.

All of which is respectfully submitted by your obedient servant,
E. J. ALLEN [ALLEN PINKERTON].

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Commanding U. S. Army.

HDQRS. PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Washington, D. C., March 29, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following information relative to the forces and defenses at Yorktown, Williamsburg, Bethel, &c., as extracted from various reports previously addressed to you from these headquarters:

That from the statement made by James H. Maurice, deserter from the Second Florida Regiment, reported on to you on February 1, I am enabled to select the following concerning defenses on the Yorktown Peninsula, to wit:

FORTS, DEFENSES, ETC., NEAR YORKTOWN, VA.

Fort Grafton is 4 miles southeast by south from Yorktown and one-quarter of a mile back of an inlet from York River; contains four 32-pounders; that in the northeast corner being rifled and protecting a powder magazine. Artillery fort, adapted for field pieces, three-quarters of a mile southeast from Fort Grafton, $4\frac{3}{4}$ miles southeast from Yorktown, on an old road leading from this fort to Back Creek. Breastwork for cannon on the north side of Poquosin Creek, by an old mill. Yorktown is surrounded by a breastwork, on which 32-pounders are mounted, the number of which was not known by informant. That the magazine is in Cornwallis Cave, at the foot of the bluff on which the town is built. That in immediate proximity to this magazine is a fort containing six guns, not rifled; is covered with sods for concealment, and cannot be seen until close at hand. Fort half a mile south-southwest from Yorktown, mounting three 32-pounders, one rifled; fort three-quarters of a mile south-southwest from Yorktown, mounting two 32-pounders. Rifle pit from the bridge on Back Creek northwest to the shore and along the shore westerly; that it is concealed, the earth dug from it being thrown into the water. Fort at Gloucester, opposite Yorktown, contains two 10-inch columbiads, one rifled cannon of European manufacture, and two or three 32-pounders—in all five or six guns. Informant was sufficiently near to perceive that these guns were genuine. Informant was told, and understood from general report, that Williamsburg was well fortified, but cannot speak on that point from personal observation.

That from the statement made by William H. Ringgold, who left Gloucester November 6, 1861, reported on to you on December 2, 1861, I am enabled to present the following concerning the defenses on the Yorktown Peninsula, to wit:

That at Gloucester Point proper, York River, is a battery of nine 32-pounder columbiads, pointing up, down, and across the river; that on the bluff encircling Gloucester Point is a continuous embankment about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles in length from the river above to the river below; that this embankment was used as a sentinel-walk, and that on the inside thereof was a single gun, commanding the country road coming from the north. That on Bryant's plantation, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles below Gloucester Point, are two masked batteries, commanding the river, each containing one gun, one battery being situated on each end of the plantation. That around Yorktown on the land side is a continuous embankment, about 3 miles in length, and mounted with heavy columbiads, commanding all approaches to the town; that within the embankment or breastwork are

minor intrenchments. That at Yorktown there was a battery, consisting of five heavy columbiads, mounted on the heights of the town, directly opposite the Gloucester batteries, and commanding the river. That what has been called Cornwallis Cave was used as a magazine for ammunition; that the principal magazine was then (November 5) on the bluff, about 75 yards back of Cornwallis Cave, in an embankment on the upper side of the old road leading up into the town; that under the bluff just below Cornwallis Cave, concealed from upward-bound vessels behind a point on the river, is a battery of four or five short guns of large caliber, supposed to be shell guns; that this battery cannot be seen by vessels ascending the river until they have passed the point of land concealing it and are directly opposite the said battery. That there are iron gun-carriages at Ship Point, 8 miles below Toos Point; that up to November 5 there were no batteries on the York River Railroad between West Point and Richmond. That there were no fortifications or batteries on York River above Yorktown and Gloucester Point, or between the York and Rappahannock Rivers, except at Gloucester Point. That on December 9, 1861, my operative conversed with a lieutenant in General Magruder's command, said lieutenant being then on furlough at Richmond; that my operative asked the lieutenant if any further defenses had been made at West Point or on the York River within a month, and that the lieutenant replied, "No;" adding that the defenses at Gloucester Point and Yorktown were considered sufficient to protect the river.

That the statement of James H. Maurice, under date of February 1, concerning the forces on the James and York River Peninsula, is substantially as follows, to wit:

Encamped 3 miles southwest of Yorktown—Second Florida, Colonel Ward, 700 to 800 men; Sixteenth Georgia, Colonel Cobb; Thirteenth Louisiana, Colonel Sulakowski. Cobb's Legion, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Yorktown and 2 miles southeast from the Second Florida. Fifty-fifth Virginia, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles south-southeast of Yorktown and half a mile back from the head of the creek. Fifth Virginia Artillery, Fort Grafton, 4 miles south-southeast of Yorktown. Two regiments, names not known, on the Cornwallis battle-ground. Three regiments immediately south of Yorktown. Several regiments at Williamsburg.

That William H. Ringgold, an intelligent colored man, in report addressed to you December 2, 1861, specifies the following regiments as being on the Yorktown Peninsula and at Gloucester Point:

Sixth Georgia Infantry, Colonel Colquitt, numbering 1,000 men, within the intrenchments at Yorktown above described. Louisiana Zouaves, numbering about 950, encamped a short distance below Yorktown. Second Alabama Infantry, 1,050 men, 3 miles from Yorktown, on the road to Hampton. Fifth North Carolina Infantry, 800 men, 8 miles from Yorktown, on the road to Big Bethel. Eighth Alabama Infantry, Colonel Winston, 1,000 men, near Big Bethel Church. Cobb's Legion, 5 or 6 miles from Big Bethel Church, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of the road to Hampton and opposite Little Bethel. This Legion consists of about 400 cavalry, armed with Maynard's rifles, and 600 infantry, all from Georgia, commanded by Thomas C. Cobb. Several Louisiana regiments at Williamsburg. At Gloucester Point, 5,000 infantry, 160 cavalry, and two companies of artillery. That the total rebel force on the York and James River Peninsula was estimated by the rebels at 25,000 men. That there is a telegraph from Richmond to West Point, also from Yorktown and Great Bethel to Richmond via James River and

Grove Wharf. That there is much Union feeling among the poorer classes on the York and Rappahannock Rivers, especially among the oystermen and fishermen.

All of which is respectfully submitted by your obedient servant,
E. J. ALLEN [ALLEN PINKERTON].

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Commanding U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp at Yorktown, May 3, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following information relative to the forces and defenses of the rebel Army of the Potomac and also of the rebel Army of the Peninsula, obtained to date, which has been extracted from current statements made at these headquarters by spies, contrabands, deserters, refugees, and prisoners of war, in the order of time as hereinafter indicated, and which at the time of reception were made the subject of special reports to you; that portion of this report having reference to the rebel Army of the Potomac as included in the summaries relative thereto being also derived in part from previous reports made to you in reference to the rebel Army of the Potomac. I have also appended to this report a varied summary of those forces and defenses, showing by different combinations about the probable number of these forces and the locality and strength of their defenses.

The summary of general estimates of the rebel army at Yorktown shows their forces to date of latest information to be 100,000 to 120,000, such being the medium estimates, and taken from statements deemed most reliable, the information upon which they are based having been derived from officers of their army and from persons connected with their commissary department at Yorktown, the latter of whom stated the daily rations issued there to be 119,000. The summary also shows that specific information has been received of twenty-two different known brigades, forty-five regiments, and three battalions infantry, two regiments cavalry, one legion of 2,500 men, and ten companies artillery, which specific information, though forming but a small portion of the rebel army, is all that it has been possible to obtain, owing to want of time and the very rapid and continued accumulation of troops at this point re-enforcing their army. It may, however, safely be assumed that the medium estimates stated (100,000 to 120,000) are under rather than over the mark of the real strength of rebel forces at Yorktown.

It is also shown by statements in the report that rebel re-enforcements at Yorktown commenced to arrive on the 25th March in considerable numbers, and have continued arriving ever since to date of latest information, one brigade having landed at King's Mill, James River, on the 1st instant.

All of which, general, is respectfully submitted, by your obedient servant,

E. J. ALLEN.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Lincoln, near Richmond, June 26, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following information relative to the forces and defenses of the rebel army of the Peninsula, including the forces and defenses of Yorktown up to the time of the evacuation and of Richmond and vicinity up to date of this report; this information having been obtained and extracted from statements made at these headquarters by spies, contrabands, deserters, refugees, and prisoners of war, in the order of time as hereinafter indicated, and which at the time of reception were made the subject of special reports to you. I have also appended to this report a varied summary of those forces and defenses, showing by different combinations about the probable number of these forces and the locality and strength of their defenses.

The summary of the general estimates of the rebel army at Yorktown up to about the time of the evacuation shows their forces to be 100,000 to 120,000. The specific information regarding the rebel army at Yorktown, obtained to date, shows the following-named organizations: Twenty-two brigades, ninety-one regiments, three legions, two battalions infantry, five battalions artillery, sixteen companies artillery, and two companies infantry.

This information is necessarily limited, because the rapid accumulation of rebel troops at Yorktown and their subsequent changes of organization rendered it impossible to obtain but a partial specific knowledge of their forces.

The summary of general estimates of the rebel army shows their forces to be at this time over 180,000 men, and the specific information already obtained warrants the belief that this number is probably considerably short of the real strength of their army, which is as follows: Two hundred regiments infantry and cavalry, including the re-enforce ments just arrived of Jackson's and Ewell's forces (eight battalions), five battalions artillery, twelve companies infantry and independent cavalry, and forty-six companies of artillery—in all about forty or fifty brigades. The forces under General Jackson just arrived have been ascertained by general estimate and by partial specific information, and the number is probably about 30,000, which includes about 10,000 sent from Richmond to re-enforce him lately, and which only reached him and formed a junction at a very recent date.

The summary shows the number of earthworks completed by the rebels in the vicinity of and for the defense of Richmond to be fifty-two, and the specific number of guns shown to be mounted on thirty-six of the same is about 205, leaving sixteen fortifications without specific information as to the number of guns.

All of which, general, is respectfully submitted, by your obedient servant,

E. J. ALLEN.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp at Harrison's Landing, Va., August 14, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following information of the forces and defenses and the movement of the forces of the rebel army of Richmond and vicinity from the time of commencing the

Seven-days' Battles at Mechanicsville to date of this report, including the movement from Richmond to the valley of Jackson and his forces and the re-enforcements sent to him from the army at Richmond, which information has been derived from statements made at these headquarters by spies, contrabands, deserters, refugees, and prisoners of war, in order of time as hereinafter indicated, and which at the time indicated were made the subject of special reports to you. I have also appended to and made it part of this report a varied summary of these forces and their movements, together with summary of the defenses in the vicinities of Richmond and Petersburg, showing the probable number of these forces and the position and strength of their defenses.

The summary of general estimates shows 200,000 men to have composed the rebel army of Richmond about the time of the Seven-days' Battle, which estimates are abundantly confirmed by the specific information obtained up to date of this report, as will be seen by reference to the table showing organization of the rebel army accompanying and part of this report.

It is also shown that the rebel losses in the seven battles before Richmond in killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners was at least 40,000 men. It is also shown that General Jackson left for Gordonsville early in July with 40,000 men, and that at least as many more were sent to re-enforce him before the 10th of August, thus leaving the entire rebel force in the vicinity of Richmond and Petersburg, according to information received up to date of this report, 80,000 men.

The table of specific organizations of the rebel army shows that they had forty-six brigades, two hundred and fifteen regiments, nineteen battalions, and one company infantry, one legion, eleven regiments cavalry, two battalions, and six companies ditto, three battalions artillery, and seventy-six batteries of artillery; in all equaling two hundred and fifty-two regiments. Of course, in the nature of the case, this specific information does not cover their entire army, and must, therefore, be taken as below even a minimum estimate.

All of which, general, is respectfully submitted, by your obedient servant,

E. J. ALLEN.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

[Inclosure.]

DEFENSES OF RICHMOND.

The statements in this and previous reports show the number of fortifications for the defense of Richmond to be fifty-two, and that the number of guns mounted upon thirty-six of them is 201 to 205, while the number upon the remaining sixteen is not given. These fortifications are shown to be located about as follows: one fort on the plank road northwest of Richmond; one fort on Deep Run turnpike, near the fair grounds; one on Bacon Quarter Branch Creek, north of Richmond; four on Brook turnpike; one on road between Brook turnpike and Meadow Bridge road; three on Meadow Bridge road and Central Railroad; six on and near Mechanicsville turnpike; one on Union Hill; one on Race Course; one on Church Hill; three at and below Rocketts; one 3 miles below Rocketts, between River and Old River turnpike; two on Marion Hill; one on Fulton Hill; one at junction of Darbytown and Charles City roads; four on old stage road to Williams-

burg; four on and near New Bridge road, 5 miles from Richmond; two near Mrs. Price's and Dr. Garnett's, on Chickahominy Bluff; one on Charles City road; one at Ball's Bluff, and one at Fort Darling; one on Nine-mile road, and other similar breastworks and rifle pits in the vicinity of the front line of the rebel army on the Chickahominy.

GENERAL ESTIMATES OF THE REBEL FORCES IN VIRGINIA.

Jackson's army of the valley was 15,000 prior to recent re-enforcements from Richmond.

Rebels had opposed to us at the Seven-days' Battles 100,000 men, and estimated our force at 70,000.

One hundred and twenty-five thousand men said to have followed our army on its retreat.

Jackson's valley force was 8,000 to 10,000 men; was re-enforced by Ewell with 10,000 from the Rappahannock, making it 18,000 to 20,000.

Twelve thousand to 15,000 men were sent from Richmond to re-enforce Jackson, but did not reach him until he was on his way to Richmond from the Shenandoah Valley.

Jackson's force now consists of Ewell's division, about 12,000 men; G. W. Smith's division, about 12,000 to 15,000 men; Jackson's own division, about 8,000 to 10,000 men.

The whole Richmond army now (July 10) numbers probably 200,000 men, and has been estimated at 250,000.

Georgia regiments recently filled by recruiting to 1,100 or 1,200.

Said to be 20,000 to 25,000 troops at Petersburg. Troops from Beauregard's army are daily arriving.

Heard a rebel lieutenant say that the rebel army numbered 190,000; our army generally estimated by the rebels at 130,000.

Surgeon Powell, returned Union prisoner, states that the admitted rebel loss in the Seven-days' Battles was 19,000.

A British subject who arrived per flag of truce, and is a compositor by trade, states that he set up for the Richmond Examiner an item stating that of 14,000 men led into the second day's fight by General A. P. Hill he only brought out 6,000.

Rebel troops in the Seven-days' Battles, including Jackson's whole force, estimated at 220,000 to 260,000.

Jackson's forces going north are usually estimated at 50,000, but the estimates range from 30,000 to 80,000.

It is customary at the South, in speaking of regiments, to call them thousands, but the regiments will not average over 700.

Jackson was said to have taken with him into the valley one hundred regiments.

Rebel army previous to the late battles was estimated at 250,000; killed and wounded, 45,000 to 50,000.

About 20,000 troops are in the vicinity of Petersburg. About July 5 50,000 were encamped between Petersburg and Richmond.

That about two weeks ago 25,000 troops were received from the South per Petersburg Railroad, said to have come from Charleston, S. C.

Jackson said to have taken 40,000 troops with him to the valley.

Rebel killed and wounded in the late battles estimated at 25,000 to 75,000.

Jackson said to have with him in the valley 60,000 men.

Rebel army of Richmond estimated at 130,000, exclusive of Jackson's forces and the troops south of James River.

Jackson's estimated at 110,000, of which number 30,000 were re-

cently sent him from Richmond and 60,000 from the south via Lynchburg.

One hundred pieces and three or four car loads of artillery from the South went to Fredericksburg depot on July 29, 1862, said to be for Jackson.

Beauregard's forces are believed to be mostly in Richmond.

Thirty thousand to 40,000 disciplined troops supposed to have been received in Richmond shortly before the commencement of the Seven-days' Battles.

About 50,000 troops were encamped around General Lee's headquarters on July 28, 1862.

One hundred and eighty thousand at Richmond prior to re-enforcements from Charleston; 40,000 taken by Jackson to the valley. He was afterwards re-enforced by 60,000 from the cotton States.

Rebel army estimated at 250,000 by the people of Richmond.

(The above statement was made by officers of the Federal Army who escaped from Richmond.)

Two trains daily of ten to fifteen cars each, loaded with troops, entered Richmond from Petersburg for four or five weeks prior to August 8, 1862.

Fifty thousand troops reported in Richmond to have been sent to Jackson within four weeks prior to above date.

Jackson said to have taken 75,000 troops from Richmond.

Nearly the whole rebel force said to have been employed against McClellan at the battle of Mechanicsville.

No. 14.

Report of Colonel Robert O. Tyler, First Connecticut Heavy Artillery, commanding siege train.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CONNECTICUT ARTILLERY,

July 15, 1862.

GENERAL: From the disembarkation of my regiment at Cheeseman's Landing, on the 12th of April, 1862, until this date, most of the services of the regiment have been performed, directly or indirectly, under your orders. At Yorktown, as director of the siege, and at Gaines' Mill, Chickahominy, and Malvern Hill, the portions of the regiment engaged have been under your immediate orders. Under these circumstances I would respectfully request permission to submit a report of the services of my regiment upon the Peninsula.

Siege of Yorktown.—At Yorktown, under all the difficulties of transportation, my regiment kept pace with the engineers in laying platforms and placing guns and material in position. Six batteries, mounting forty-eight guns and mortars, were fully armed and equipped; twenty-three additional guns and mortars disembarked. It is unnecessary to call attention to the amount of labor required in such batteries as No. 1, mounting 100-pounder and 200-pounder Parrotts, and No. 4, mounting 13-inch sea-coast mortars, all of which exceed in weight any guns previously placed in siege batteries, or to say how much the heavy firing from No. 1 for four consecutive days may have had to do with the evacuation of that place. On the day of the evacuation the six batteries equipped were prepared to throw 175 tons of metal daily into Yorktown. My regiment subsequently removed all this material from the batteries and re-embarked it.

Hanover Court-House.—The greater portion of this work having been completed, I reported with ten companies of my regiment to you at White House on the 28th of May. Upon the services performed by the regiment in reconnaissances near Old Church, in destroying all the means of crossing the Pamunkey below Hanover Court-House, and in the action near that place, a report has already been forwarded to your office. My regiment formed the advance of the infantry under General Cooke which followed the rebels on Stuart's raid, when they marched 42 miles in thirty-seven hours, as has been reported by Colonel Warren, Fifth New York Volunteers, commanding the Volunteer Reserve Brigade.

Upon the 20th of June I was ordered to bring up a battery of five 4½-inch Rodman guns and one of five 30-pounder Parrotts, and to place them in position near New Bridge. The disembarkation of the guns and material at White House commenced on the 21st of June, and upon the 24th these guns were in position, with ammunition and material complete, in Batteries Sykes and Porter, under the command of Major Kellogg, and in charge of Company F, Captain Dow, Company D, Captain Cook, and Company B, Captain Brooker.

Gaines' Mill.—Upon June 25, under your direction, these batteries opened upon the rebel batteries on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, doing, as reported by the signal officer, much damage, dismounting the enemy's largest gun and compelling him to remove his camps.

Chickahominy.—Upon the 26th his batteries again opened, and at 6 p. m. of that day we moved across the Chickahominy, where they reported to General Smith. Here they were joined by two 10-pounder Whitworths, under Lieutenant Sedgwick, which had been brought round with their material by way of Baltimore Store and Bottom's Bridge. Upon the following day (June 27) these batteries were placed in position on Golding's Hill, commanding both banks of the Chickahominy, where they were fought during the day under a severe fire, and when the services of the guns could no longer be useful they were retired, and the companies formed by Major Kellogg and led into the line of infantry defending that position—a fact specially noticed by General Smith in his report. The casualties of this day were two men killed and wounded. I wish especially to call your attention to Lieutenant Sedgwick, in command of the two Whitworths, which with only 20 men he removed by hand a distance of 2½ miles, the second gun being brought away when our pickets were retiring past the guns.

Upon the 20th of June the regiment was ordered to report to General Barry for duty as heavy artillery. The companies not in battery or in depot at White House were marched to Orchard Station by Lieutenant-Colonel White. The rapid advance of the enemy prevented the removal of my hospital from near Cold Harbor, where many of my sick, including two officers (Lieutenants Faxon and Harwood) and my hospital attendants, were taken prisoners. On the night of the 28th and the morning of the 29th the guns under Major Kellogg were successfully retired behind White Oak Swamp, where they joined the remainder of the siege train, which had been in position and in depot at Fair Oaks Station, in front of Sumner's corps, and commanded by Major Hemingway, under whose orders were Company E, Captain Rockwood; Company H, Captain Hubbard; Company K, Captain Ager. The successful removal of these guns and stores from Orchard Station

is greatly due to the exertions of these officers; more especially of Captain Hubbard, who was left in charge of the rearmost train.

On the night of the 29th the train was retired from White Oak Swamp to Turkey Bend. On the 30th of June I received an order to report to you with such guns as there was still ammunition remaining for.

Malvern Hill.—During the night of June 30 five 4½-inch Rodmans, five 30-pounder Parrotts, two 8-inch howitzers, and two 10-pounder Whitworths, manned by Companies F, D, B, K, and I, and commanded by Captains Dow, Cook, Brooker, and Ager, and Lieutenant Hatfield, under Majors Hemingway and Kellogg, were transported from the camp at Turkey Bend, and under difficulties which you will well understand were taken chiefly by hand up the steep ascent of Malvern Hill, with their ammunition and material, the companies working all night after their previous tedious marches. The guns occupied the heights of Malvern Hill, were served under your personal orders, and were said to have caused much destruction to the head of the enemy's approaching column.

The casualties of this day were one killed and three wounded. The companies, after working all the night of the 30th to place these guns in position and fighting them during the whole of the day of the 1st of July, spent that night in retiring the guns to the present depot, near Westover Landing. The remaining guns, the ammunition of which had been exhausted, were also safely and expeditiously retired to Harrison's Landing by the other companies under Lieutenant-Colonel White.

At Westover Landing we formed a junction with that portion of the regiment and of the siege train under the command of Major Doull which had been cut off at White House.

I would respectfully call your attention to the fact that all the ammunition used at Malvern Hill had been transported by way of Gaines' Mill, Savage Station, and White Oak Swamp to that place, and that the officers and men with the guns had been almost constantly laboring day and night from the 21st of June, and to the fact that out of twenty-six heavy guns twenty-five arrived safely at this place. This was accomplished under almost unheard-of difficulties, with mule trains, constantly breaking down, driven by frightened citizen teamsters, who deserted whenever the fire became heavy. Frequently teams had to be pressed into the service to replace those which had been exhausted by the labor of drawing the guns, and sometimes for miles the guns were drawn by hand by the different companies of the regiment. One howitzer was abandoned near Savage Station, the carriage having become so disabled it was impossible to remove it. Under the direction of Lieutenant Jackson the carriage was burned and the howitzer rendered perfectly unserviceable.

To the field officers, company commanders, and men already mentioned I feel that a debt of gratitude is due for the immense labor they performed and the difficulties they cheerfully overcame. I wish, in addition, to mention the services of Lieutenant and Quartermaster Robins, Lieutenants Whittelsey and Jackson, acting ordnance officers, to whose energy the safe bringing through of the ammunition trains is mostly due, and also to bear testimony to the great assistance rendered me on all occasions by my adjutant, Lieutenant Pratt.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. O. TYLER,

Colonel First Connecticut Artillery.

Major-General PORTER,

Commanding Fifth Provisional Army Corps.

No. 15.

Report of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Department of Northern Virginia, of operations from April 15 to May 19.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
May 19, 1862.

SIR: Before taking command on the Peninsula I had the honor to express to the President my opinion of the defects of the position then occupied by our troops there. After taking command I reported that the opinion previously expressed was fully confirmed. Some of my objections to the position were that its length was too great for our force; that it prevented offensive movements except at great disadvantage, and that it was untenable after the guns of Yorktown were silenced—a result admitted by all our officers to be inevitable from the enemy's great superiority in artillery. York River being thus opened, a large fleet of transports and 500 or 600 bateaux would enable him to turn us in a few hours. It seemed to me that there were but two objects in remaining on the Peninsula: The possibility of an advance upon us by the enemy, and gaining time in which arms might be received and troops organized. I determined, therefore, to hold the position as long as it could be done without exposing our troops to the fire of the powerful artillery, which I doubted not would be brought to bear upon them. I believed that after silencing our batteries on York River the enemy would attempt to turn us by moving up to West Point by water. The great fatigue and exposure incident to their service told very severely upon the health of our troops. In three days, ending May 3, about —— sick were sent to Richmond.

Circumstances indicating that the enemy's batteries were nearly ready, I directed the troops to move toward Williamsburg on the night of the 3d by the roads from Yorktown and Warwick Court-House.

They were assembled about Williamsburg by noon of the 4th, and were ordered to march, by the road, to Richmond, Major-General Magruder leading. Early in the afternoon the cavalry rear guard on the Yorktown road was driven in and rapidly followed by the enemy. Brigadier-General McLaws was sent with the brigades of Kershaw and Semmes to support the cavalry. He met the enemy near the line of little works constructed by Major-General Magruder's forethought; made his dispositions with prompt courage and skill, and quickly drove the Federal troops from the field, in spite of disparity of numbers. I regret that no report of this handsome affair has been made by General McLaws.

Major-General Magruder's march was too late to permit that of Major-General Smith the same afternoon. His division moved at day-break on the 5th, in heavy rain and deep mud. About sunrise the rear guard was again attacked. The action gradually increased in magnitude until about 3 o'clock, when General Longstreet, commanding the rear, requested that a part of Major-General Hill's troops might be sent to his aid. Upon this I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be a mere spectator, for General Longstreet's clear head and brave heart left me no apology for interference. For details of the action see accompanying reports.

Our wounded and many of those of the enemy were placed in hospitals and residences in Williamsburg.

Major-General Smith's division reached Barhamsville (18 miles), and Major-General Magruder's, commanded by Brig. Gen. D. R. Jones, the Diascund Bridge, on the Chickahominy road, on that day. Those of Major-Generals Longstreet and Hill marched from Williamsburg (12 miles) on the 6th. On that evening Major-General Smith reported that the enemy's troops were landing in force on the south side of York River, near West Point.

On the following morning the army was concentrated near Barhamsville. In the mean time it had been ascertained that the enemy occupied a thick and extensive woods between Barhamsville and their landing place. Brigadier-General Whiting was directed by General G. W. Smith to dislodge him, which was handsomely done. The brigade of General Hood and part of that of Colonel Hampton performed the service. You are respectfully referred for details to the accompanying reports.

Want of means of subsistence compelled the army to move toward Richmond, the divisions of Smith and Magruder taking the road by New Kent Court-House and those of Longstreet and Hill that along the Chickahominy.

On the evening of the 9th the army halted its left near the cross roads on the New Kent Court-House road and its right near the long bridges. In this position the York River Railroad supplied us from Richmond.

On the 15th the attack upon the battery at Drewry's Bluff by the enemy's gunboats suggested to me the necessity of so placing the army as to be prepared for the enemy's advance up the river or on the south side, as well as from the direction of West Point. We therefore crossed the Chickahominy to take a position 6 or 7 miles from Richmond.

That ground being unfavorable, the present position was taken upon the 17th.

Had the enemy beaten us on the 5th, as he claims to have done, the army would have lost most of its baggage and artillery. We should have been pursued from Williamsburg and intercepted from West Point. Our troops engaged, leaving Williamsburg on the following morning, marched but 12 miles that day, and the army in its march to the cross-roads averaged less than 10 miles a day. Had not the action of the 5th been at the least discouraging to the enemy, we would have been pursued on the road and turned by way of West Point.

About 400 of our wounded were left in Williamsburg because they were not in condition to be moved. Nothing else was left which we had horses to draw away. Five field pieces, found by the chief quartermaster at the Williamsburg wharf, were abandoned for want of horses and harness.

In the three actions above mentioned our troops displayed high courage, and on the march endured privation and hardship with admirable cheerfulness.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON,
General.

General COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.

APRIL 5-MAY 4, 1862.—Siege of Yorktown, Va.

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.

- April 4, 1862.—Advance of the Army of the Potomac from vicinity of Fort Monroe.
5, 1862.—Skirmish near junction of the Warwick and Yorktown Roads.
Skirmish near Lee's Mill.
9-11, 1862.—Reconnaissances in front of Yorktown.
16, 1862.—Engagement at Lee's Mill, Burnt Chimneys, or Dam No. 1.
22, 1862.—Franklin's division arrives in York River.
- May 4, 1862.—Yorktown occupied by the Union forces.

REPORTS, ETC.

- No. 1.—Organization of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, during the siege of Yorktown.
- No. 2.—Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Second Division (Richardson's), Second Corps, of operations April 4-7.
- No. 3.—Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, U. S. Army, commanding division, of operations April 4-6.
- No. 4.—Brig. Gen. John H. Martindale, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations April 4-7.
- No. 5.—Col. Charles W. Roberts, Second Maine Infantry, of operations April 4-13.
- No. 6.—Col. James Barnes, Eighteenth Massachusetts Infantry, of operations April 4-14.
- No. 7.—Col. Jesse A. Gove, Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry, of operations April 4-12.
- No. 8.—Col. Charles A. Johnson, Twenty-fifth New York Infantry, of operations April 4-13.
- No. 9.—Brig. Gen. George W. Morell, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of operations April 4-9.
- No. 10.—Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, of operations April 4-12.
- No. 11.—Col. Hiram Berdan, First U. S. Sharpshooters, of operations April 4-21.
- No. 12.—Lieut. Henry W. Kingsbury, commanding Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, of operations April 5.
- No. 13.—Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett, Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, of operations April 5.
- No. 14.—Capt. Augustus P. Martin, Battery C, Massachusetts Light Artillery, of operations April 5.
- No. 15.—Capt. William B. Weeden, Battery C, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, of operations April 5.
- No. 16.—Brig. Gen. John W. Davidson, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, Second Division, Fourth Corps, of operations April 5-12.
- No. 17.—Brig. Gen. John J. Peck, U. S. Army, of operations April 5-30.
- No. 18.—Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, of reconnaissance toward Yorktown, April 6, with indorsements.
- No. 19.—Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, U. S. Army, as Director of the Siege of Yorktown from April 7-May 5.
- No. 20.—Brig. Gen. John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer Army of the Potomac, of operations during the siege.
- No. 21.—Lieut. Cyrus B. Comstock, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, of Confederate works at Gloucester Point, Va.

- No. 22.—Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army, Chief of Artillery Army of the Potomac, of the siege.
- No. 23.—Col. Henry J. Hunt, commanding Artillery Reserve, of operations April 18–June 25.
- No. 24.—Maj. Alexander Doull, Second New York Artillery, Ordnance Officer of Siege Train, of the siege.
- No. 25.—Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Corps, of operations April 4–15.
- No. 26.—Brig. Gen. Charles S. Hamilton, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, Third Corps, of operations April 11–12.
- No. 27.—Col. Charles T. Campbell, Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry, of skirmish near Yorktown April 11.
- No. 28.—Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, of the engagement of Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.
- No. 29.—Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.
- No. 30.—Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery Smith's division, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.
- No. 31.—Capt. Terence J. Kennedy, First New York Battery, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.
- No. 32.—Capt. Thaddeus P. Mott, Third New York Battery, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.
- No. 33.—Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Smith's division, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.
- No. 34.—Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, Smith's division, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys, with congratulatory order.
- No. 35.—Col. Breed N. Hyde, Third Vermont Infantry, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.
- No. 36.—Capt. Fernando C. Harrington, Third Vermont Infantry, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.
- No. 37.—Col. Edwin H. Stoughton, Fourth Vermont Infantry, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.
- No. 38.—Col. Henry A. Smalley, Fifth Vermont Infantry, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.
- No. 39.—Col. Nathan Lord, jr., Sixth Vermont Infantry, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.
- No. 40.—Brig. Gen. Charles S. Hamilton, U. S. Army, commanding division, of engagement near Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.
- No. 41.—Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, U. S. Army, of skirmish near Yorktown April 22.
- No. 42.—Brig. Gen. John W. Davidson, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, Smith's division, of operations April 19–22.
- No. 43.—Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, of an affair near Yorktown, April 26, with congratulatory letter from Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.
- No. 44.—Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Hooker's division, Third Corps, of an affair near Yorktown April 26.
- No. 45.—Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, U. S. Army, as General of the Trenches, April 27.
- No. 46.—Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, U. S. Army, as General of the Trenches, April 28.
- No. 47.—Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Corps, of operations on the left, April 27–29, with indorsement.

- No. 48.—Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Smith's division, of reconnaissance toward Lee's Mill April 28.
- No. 49.—Col. Hiram Burnham, Sixth Maine Infantry, of reconnaissance toward Lee's Mill April 28.
- No. 50.—Col. Francis L. Vinton, Forty-third New York Infantry, of reconnaissance toward Lee's Mill April 28.
- No. 51.—Brig. Gen. Henry M. Naglee, U. S. Army, of reconnaissance toward Lee's Mill April 29.
- No. 52.—Brig. Gen. Innis N. Palmer, U. S. Army, of reconnaissance toward Lee's Mill April 29.
- No. 53.—Brig. Gen. Charles D. Jameson, U. S. Army, as General of the Trenches, May 3-4, with indorsement.
- No. 54.—Col. Jesse A. Gove, Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry, of occupation of Yorktown May 4.
- No. 55.—Col. James McQuade, Fourteenth New York Infantry, as General of the (left wing) Trenches, May 3-4.
- No. 56.—Col. Samuel W. Black, Sixty-second Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations May 3-4.
- No. 57.—Col. Amor A. McKnight, One hundred and Fifth Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations May 4.
- No. 58.—Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, C. S. Army, commanding at Yorktown, &c.
- No. 59.—Col. H. C. Cabell, First Virginia Artillery, Chief of Artillery, of actions April 5-16.
- No. 60.—Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, C. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill).
- No. 61.—Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, C. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, Second Division, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill).
- No. 62.—Capt. M. Stanley, commanding Troup Artillery, Cobb's (Georgia) Legion, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill).
- No. 63.—Col. Goode Bryan, Sixteenth Georgia Infantry, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill).
- No. 64.—Col. William M. Levy, Second Louisiana Infantry, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill).
- No. 65.—Lieut. Col. Ross R. Ihrie, Fifteenth North Carolina Infantry, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill).

No. 1.

Organization of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, during the siege of Yorktown, Va., April 5 to May 4, 1862.

[Compiled from the records of the Adjutant-General's Office.]

AT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

Provost Guard.

2d U. S. Cavalry.
Battalion 8th U. S. Infantry.
Battalion 17th U. S. Infantry.

Guards and Orderlies.

A and E 4th U. S. Cavalry.
Independent company Oneida Cavalry.
Sturges' Rifles.

SECOND ARMY CORPS.—Brig. Gen. EDWIN V. SUMNER.

SEDGWICK'S DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. JOHN SEDGWICK.

Provost Guard.

K, 6th New York Cavalry.

Gorman's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WILLIS A. GORMAN.

1st Minnesota.
 15th Massachusetts.
 34th New York.
 82d New York.
 1st Company Mass. Sharpshooters.

Dana's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. N. J. T. DANA.

7th Michigan.
 19th Massachusetts.
 20th Massachusetts.
 42d New York.

Burns' Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM W. BURNS.

69th Pennsylvania.
 71st Pennsylvania.
 72d Pennsylvania.
 106th Pennsylvania.

Artillery.

Col. CHARLES H. TOMPKINS.

A, 1st Rhode Island.
 B, 1st Rhode Island.
 G, 1st Rhode Island.
 I, 1st United States.

RICHARDSON'S DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. ISRAEL B. RICHARDSON.

Provost Guard.

D, 6th New York Cavalry.

Howard's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. OLIVER O. HOWARD.

5th New Hampshire.
 61st New York.
 64th New York.
 81st Pennsylvania.

Meagher's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. THOMAS F. MEAGHER.

63d New York.
 69th New York.
 88th New York.

French's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM H. FRENCH.

52d New York.
 57th New York.
 66th New York.
 53d Pennsylvania.

Artillery.

Capt. GEORGE W. HAZZARD.

B, 1st New York.
 G, 1st New York.
 A, 2d Battalion New York.
 A, 4th United States.
 C, 4th United States.

CAVALRY.

Col. JOHN F. FARNSWORTH.

8th Illinois.

THIRD ARMY CORPS.—Brig. Gen. S. P. HEINTZELMAN.

PORTER'S DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. FITZ JOHN PORTER.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. JOHN H. MARTINDALE.

2d Maine.
 18th Massachusetts.
 22d Massachusetts.
 13th New York.
 25th New York.
 2d Company Mass. Sharpshooters.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE W. MORELL.

4th Michigan.
 9th Massachusetts.
 14th New York.
 62d Pennsylvania.

Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. DANIEL BUTTERFIELD.

16th Michigan.
 83d Pennsylvania.
 12th New York.
 17th New York.
 44th New York.

Artillery.

Capt. CHARLES GRIFFIN.

C, Massachusetts.
 E, Massachusetts.
 C, 1st Rhode Island.
 D, 5th United States.

Unattached.

1st U. S. Sharpshooters.
 A, 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry.

HOOKER'S DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. CUVIER GROVER.

2d New Hampshire.
 1st Massachusetts.
 11th Massachusetts.
 26th Pennsylvania.

Second Brigade.

Col. NELSON TAYLOR.

70th New York.
 71st New York.
 72d New York.
 73d New York.
 74th New York.

Third Brigade.

Col. SAMUEL H. STARR.

5th New Jersey.
 6th New Jersey.
 7th New Jersey.
 8th New Jersey.

Artillery.

Maj. C. S. WAINWRIGHT.

D, 1st New York.
 4th New York Battery.
 6th New York Battery.
 H, 1st United States.

HAMILTON'S DIVISION.

- (1.) Brig. Gen. CHARLES S. HAMILTON.
 (2.) Brig. Gen. PHILIP KEARNY.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. C. D. JAMESON.

57th Pennsylvania.
 63d Pennsylvania.
 105th Pennsylvania.
 87th New York.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. DAVID B. BIRNEY.

3d Maine.
 4th Maine.
 38th New York.
 40th New York.

Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. HIRAM G. BERRY.

2d Michigan.
 3d Michigan.
 5th Michigan.
 37th New York.

Artillery.

Capt. JAMES THOMPSON.

B, 1st New Jersey.
 E, 1st Rhode Island.
 G, 2d United States.

CAVALRY.

Col. WILLIAM W. AVERELL.

3d Pennsylvania.

FOURTH ARMY CORPS.—Brig. Gen. ERASMUS D. KEYES.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. DARIUS N. COUCH.

Briggs' Brigade.

Col. HENRY S. BRIGGS.

2d Rhode Island.
 7th Massachusetts.
 10th Massachusetts.
 36th New York.

Peck's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. JOHN J. PECK.

55th New York.
 62d New York.
 93d Pennsylvania.
 98th Pennsylvania.
 102d Pennsylvania.

Graham's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. L. P. GRAHAM.

23d Pennsylvania.
 31st Pennsylvania.
 61st Pennsylvania.
 65th New York.
 67th New York.

Artillery.

Maj. R. M. WEST.

C, 1st Pennsylvania.
 D, 1st Pennsylvania.
 E, 1st Pennsylvania.
 H, 1st Pennsylvania.

SMITH'S DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WINFIELD S. HANCOCK.

5th Wisconsin.
 6th Maine.
 43d New York.
 49th Pennsylvania.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. W. T. H. BROOKS.

2d Vermont.
 3d Vermont.
 4th Vermont.
 5th Vermont.
 6th Vermont.

SMITH'S DIVISION—CONTINUED.

Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. JOHN W. DAVIDSON.

7th Maine.
33d New York.
49th New York.
77th New York.

Artillery.

Capt. R. B. AYRES.

1st New York Battery.
3d New York Battery.
E, 1st New York.
F, 5th United States.

CASEY'S DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. SILAS CASEY.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. HENRY M. NAGLEB.

52d Pennsylvania.
104th Pennsylvania.
56th New York.
100th New York.
11th Maine.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM H. KEIM.

85th Pennsylvania.
101st Pennsylvania.
103d Pennsylvania.
96th New York.

Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. I. N. PALMER.

81st New York.
85th New York.
92d New York.
93d New York.
98th New York.

Artillery.

Col. G. D. BAILEY.

A, 1st New York.
H, 1st New York.
7th New York Battery.
8th New York Battery.

BRIGADE REGULAR INFANTRY.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE SYKES.

2d United States.
3d United States.
4th United States.
6th United States.
10th United States.

11th United States.
12th United States.
14th United States.
17th United States.
5th New York.

CAVALRY RESERVE.

Brig. Gen. P. ST. GEORGE COOKE.

Emory's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM H. EMORY.

5th United States.
6th United States.
6th Pennsylvania.

Blake's Brigade.

Col. GEORGE A. H. BLAKE.

1st United States.
8th Pennsylvania.
McClellan Dragoons.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Col. HENRY J. HUNT.

E, 1st United States.
G, 1st United States.
K, 1st United States.
A, 2d United States.
B, 2d United States.
E, 2d United States.
M, 2d United States.
C, 3d United States.
F, 3d United States.
G, 3d United States.
K, 3d United States.
L, 3d United States.

M, 3d United States.
G, 4th United States.
K, 4th United States.
A, 5th United States.
I, 5th United States.
K, 5th United States.
A, 1st Battalion New York.
B, 1st Battalion New York.
C, 1st Battalion New York.
D, 1st Battalion New York.
5th New York Battery.

CAVALRY.

9th New York.

SIEGE TRAIN.

Col. R. O. TYLER.

1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery.

VOLUNTEER ENGINEER BRIGADE.

Brig. Gen. D. P. WOODBURY.

15th New York.

50th New York.

BATTALION UNITED STATES ENGINEERS.

Capt. J. C. DUANE.

 No. 2.

Report of Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Second Division (Richardson's), Second Corps, of operations April 4-7.

HDQRS. HOWARD'S BRIGADE, RICHARDSON'S DIVISION,
Ship Point, Va., April 7, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report, in accordance with general orders from division headquarters, dated April 4, 1862, I embarked my brigade at Alexandria, as follows: The Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers and Sixty-first New York Volunteers on the Spaulding; six companies of the Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers in the Donaldson, under Colonel Cross; four companies of same, in command of Lieutenant-Colonel Langley, on the Croton. The Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers, detached by orders from headquarters army corps, had not arrived from Manassas. I took my headquarters on board the Spaulding, and sailed at 1.10 p. m. the 4th instant.

We arrived at Fort Monroe at 7.30 next morning, and were ordered by General McClellan, through General Van Vliet, to proceed without delay to Ship Point. Some delay was occasioned in procuring a pilot.

We left Old Point at 1 p. m. and reached this place at 3.15. I immediately apprised General McClellan of my arrival with the regiment, and received orders from him to remain in command at this post until relieved by a superior officer; to assist all in my power in improving the facilities for the transportation of supplies; to repair the road from this point to the Hampton and Yorktown road, and to ascertain the most feasible place of landing army supplies. I detailed Major Conner, with a force, to proceed and repair the road mentioned. I made a personal reconnaissance of the Poquosin River and became satisfied that this was the most practicable place for receiving supplies from water transportation. On the arrival of General Van Vliet I communicated with him, and ordered all the assistance I could in preparing a place for unloading the vessels.

In the mean time I received dispatches from General McClellan, urg-

ing the facilitating of the means of transportation. I have detailed all the pioneers in General French's brigade and my own, who, under Major Parisen, of the Fifty-seventh New York, are now at work, in conjunction with Major Conner, on the road.

The larger part of Colonel Miller's regiment are and have been detailed to assist the landing of commissary stores, and Colonel Cone has assisted in the quartermaster's department.

General French, with three regiments and two companies of his fourth, arrived yesterday, the 6th, at 2 p. m., and disembarked as speedily as possible.

Six companies of the Fifth New Hampshire arrived this morning at 10 a. m., all of which are encamped in this immediate vicinity.

I have detailed Captain Sherlock as harbor-master of the port for the present and given him instructions.

I transmit a copy of the orders of General McClellan to me; also copy of instructions to the harbor-master.*

I have the honor, general, to turn over to you the command of the post.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. O. HOWARD,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

No. 3.

Report of Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, U. S. Army, commanding division, of operations April 4-6.

HDQRS. PORTER'S DIVISION, THIRD ARMY CORPS,
Camp Winfield Scott, near Yorktown, Va., April 23, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the commanding general, the operations of this division during the march to this camp on the 4th and 5th instant. My report has been delayed for those of subordinate commanders.

In compliance with instructions from the commanding general this division, with Averell's Third Pennsylvania Cavalry temporarily attached, moved at 6 o'clock a. m., on the 4th instant to Big Bethel, Howard's [Harwood's] Bridge, and Cockletown, repairing at Bethel the bridge destroyed by the rebels and removing from the road near the first two places fallen timber. The obstacles caused a delay of nearly four hours. At Howard's Bridge the enemy had two pieces of artillery in position, sustained by a small force of cavalry and 400 Mississippi infantry. After firing a few shots and receiving some from our artillery, these retired as our infantry advanced. Morell's brigade and Griffin's battery and a squadron of cavalry were sent forward to Cockletown to occupy the junction of the Yorktown and Ship Point roads, thus cutting off the garrison, if any, of Ship Point. This brigade also controlled the avenue of communication between Warwick Court-House and Yorktown. The remainder of the division camped at Howard's Bridge. Colonel Averell, with a portion of his cavalry, was dispatched to Ship Point to ascertain the character of the defenses and their garrison. He returned early in the evening and reported the place abandoned, the barracks, &c., for 3,000 men being in excellent condition.

* Not found.

On the 5th instant, in compliance with instructions, the division was united at Cockletown, and moved toward Yorktown over a marshy road, rendered that day almost impassable by heavy rain. At the junction of the Yorktown and Warwick Court-House roads our skirmishers became engaged with those of the enemy. Cavalry and artillery were moving in advance, and apparently close at hand and looming up in the mist and rain were extensive defenses of the enemy, from which we were immediately saluted with the fire of artillery. The skirmishers at once advanced to drive back the enemy's light troops, find out what was in front, and to cover the deployment of Morell's brigade, which soon formed on both sides of the road to resist attack or to advance should a favorable occasion offer. Weeden's battery was posted by Captain Griffin to shell the enemy, who as the mist rose were seen crowding the ramparts. Griffin's battery was joined to Weeden's. Shots from both were directed with judgment and skill, and the enemy's infantry were driven rapidly from their huts, tents, and ramparts to seek shelter in the timber in rear of their works. Our fire was warmly returned by the artillery of the enemy. This, though of far superior caliber, produced no effect upon our well served field pieces, which soon drove the artillerists to cover. The Sharpshooters, under Colonel Berdan, were busily engaged as skirmishers, and did good service in picking off the enemy's skirmishers and artillerists whenever they should show themselves.

Martindale, on coming up, was instructed to relieve Morell on the left and to ascertain what was on our left, and if artillery was required to notify me. The swampy character of the whole country rendered it almost impossible to move artillery, and until the ground was examined and cleared of the enemy by skirmishers I did not like to risk it unnecessarily off the road. The appearance of a large force on the left and the fire of artillery on Martindale's lines, together with his call, caused me to send him portions of Griffin's and Martin's batteries, leaving a portion of each with Weeden. These Captain Griffin posted so advantageously that their fire soon drove the enemy's infantry from their works and checked the fire of their artillery.

Butterfield and the cavalry were held in reserve to support either brigade.

A slight examination of the country from a house on the field and the growth of timber and brush convinced me that a marsh intervened between the works of the enemy on our left and Martindale's brigade, upon which a heavy fire of artillery and musketry had been directed, and that he dare not cross it to attack our accumulating force. The division camped on the ground which it had been directed in orders the previous day to occupy.

I respectfully refer to the reports of the brigade, regimental, and battery commanders, herewith submitted, for information of their special movements during the day. I am pleased to bear testimony to the admirable manner in which all commands were handled and posted till the inaccessible position of the enemy was discovered. All were exposed to fire from the enemy's artillery, and all bore themselves with a degree of indifference to be expected only of veterans. I beg especially to call attention to General Martindale's reference to the reconnaissance of the Twenty-second Massachusetts, under Colonel Gove; also to Martin's Massachusetts battery. Like credit is due to Weeden's battery and the sections of Griffin's under Lieutenants Kingsbury and Hazlett. All were properly posted by Captain Griffin, admirably served, and with the infantry gave assurance that any duty hereafter required of them will be performed with satisfaction, and all which may be expected

of them will be realized. I wish here to express my thanks to Colonel Averell for services rendered by him in posting portions of the command and in conveying orders. His command was, from the character of the ground, necessarily inactive, and at an early hour in the day, after seeing to the proper disposition of his regiment, he joined me at the head of the column, where his services were the most available.

I wish here also to express my gratification at the admirable arrangements of the acting medical director, Surgeon Lyman, for the care of the wounded. Anticipating casualties, he prepared for the wounded, who were immediately properly provided for in comfortable quarters and with proper medical attendance. I cannot speak too highly of his forethought and attention to the wounded and sick.

All other members of my staff, the assistant adjutant-general, and aides, were engaged in conveying orders under exposure at times to great danger.

I regret to say that a few men were killed and wounded, but considering the fire of artillery and infantry to which the division was subjected the casualties were very few.*

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,

A. A. G., Hdqrs. Third Army Corps, Camp Winfield Scott.

[Indorsements.]

HDQRS. THIRD CORPS, CAMP WINFIELD SCOTT,

Near Yorktown, Va., April 24, 1862.

The advance from Hampton to the front of the rebel batteries at Yorktown was conducted with rapidity and skill. We were embarrassed by the want of guides and misled by unreliable maps. The conduct of the troops in front of Yorktown was all that could be desired. They were within easy range of the rebel guns for several days.

Respectfully forwarded.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Camp Winfield Scott, near Yorktown, May 2, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army. The alacrity and steadiness of the troops and the good conduct of the officers during the operations referred to have been such as to merit the approbation of the War Department.

By command of Major-General McClellan:

S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 4.

Reports of Brig. Gen. John H. Martindale, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations April 4-7.

HDQRS. MARTINDALE'S BRIGADE, PORTER'S DIVISION,

April 15, 1862.

Agreeably to the Regulations of the Army and in compliance with the notice sent from division headquarters, I have respectfully to report

* Nominal list omitted reports 4 killed and 31 wounded.

that my brigade broke camp at Howard's Mill at about 7 o'clock a. m. on the 5th of April, 1862, and marched toward Yorktown in the following order: 1st, Twenty-second Massachusetts; 2d, Captain Allen's Fifth Massachusetts Battery; 3d, Second Maine; 4th, Eighteenth Massachusetts; 5th, Twenty-fifth New York; 6th, Thirteenth New York. The head of my column was brought to a halt at Cockletown in consequence of the occupation of the road by Morell's brigade and a train of transportation wagons and ambulances, and remained thus obstructed and wholly unable to proceed until after 10 o'clock a. m. The accompanying reports of regimental commanders disclose the true state of the narrow and swampy road or defile through which we marched.

On the road the sound of artillery was heard in advance, and I hastened to close up and form my column as soon as I reached an open space of ground, where it could be done without delaying the march along the road. When the leading regiment (the Twenty-second Massachusetts) was formed, it was advanced in close column of companies to the position occupied by the commanding general of division, to whom I reported for instructions. At that time he was on the right of the Yorktown road, not far from its junction with the Warwick road. The four regiments of Morell's brigade were extended—two on the right of the Yorktown road and two to the left on the Warwick road. These two last regiments I was ordered by the commanding general of division to relieve, to throw forward skirmishers to discover whether the enemy was in force on the left, and to prevent the left from being turned. At a subsequent hour I was directed by a written order to extend protection to Professor Lowe, with his balloon and wagons, still farther to my left and rear, and was apprised again that it was necessary to prevent my left from being turned. I was further requested by the commanding general to dispense with artillery if possible.

Agreeably to these instructions the Twenty-second Massachusetts and the Second Maine Regiments were immediately marched to the left of the Warwick road, and at a distance of about 800 yards crossed the road, relieved the two regiments of Morell's brigade, and were brought in view of the enemy's line of intrenched works, which extended in a curved line toward Warwick. This occurred as early as a quarter past 12 o'clock m. The intervening river was concealed from us by the depression of the ground and a low marsh. Skirmishers from the Twenty-second Massachusetts were sent forward to reconnoiter, and at once a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries was opened on us at a range of about 1,600 yards.

The Twenty-second Massachusetts and Second Maine, which were closed in column and in the line of fire, were ordered to move by the flank to the Warwick road, where they would be partially sheltered by the woods. While in this position Major Tilton, of the Twenty-second Massachusetts, informed me that a battery outside of the intrenchments had opened on his skirmishers within half a mile of their position. Shortly before I had seen two regiments marching out of the intrenchments and passing behind woods which were interposed between them and my right, and concealed them from view. Under these circumstances I communicated the facts to the commanding general of division, and requested the support of artillery.

In the mean time my remaining regiments had arrived. The artillery (Martin's battery and three pieces, I think, of Griffin's) reached the ground. Two sections of Martin's were planted on the ground where I had just reconnoitered the enemy's works and where the firing had opened on us; the remaining pieces were sent along the Warwick road

through the woods still farther to the left until an opening was reached from which the enemy was visible and assailable. The Second Maine, under Colonel Roberts, advanced to protect the left of the artillery thus sent forward, and the Twenty-second Massachusetts was placed so as effectually to cover the space intervening between the two positions occupied by our batteries; the Eighteenth Massachusetts and Twenty-fifth New York were deployed in line of battle parallel to the Warwick road, and skirmishers sent forward to penetrate the woods and reconnoiter the ground in our front. By this arrangement a line was covered by the skirmishers of my brigade extending from the peach orchard on the left of the Yorktown road and skirting the Warwick River to the vacant redoubt and from thence covering the front of the Twenty-second Massachusetts and Second Maine to the left of our batteries.

At about this time the Thirteenth New York advanced a reconnoitering party still farther to the left, and reported to me the condition of the ground in that direction. I was called upon by Professor Lowe for a force to cover his balloon and transports, and dispatched the Thirteenth New York for that purpose, which advanced, and likewise threw out skirmishers.

While in this position I was visited by the commanding general of the corps and of this division, to the latter of whom I explained the arrangements above described, which received his approval.

At this time Colonel Gove, commanding Twenty-second Massachusetts, sent a request to advance his reconnaissance still farther, which was acceded to with the sanction of the commanding general of division then on the ground. This reconnaissance, more than any other event of the afternoon, developed the intrepidity and discipline of my brigade. It was executed in a manner at once cool, discreet, and fearless; and although nine men were wounded, one wound being fatal, it is due to the care and control wielded by the commander that the loss of the regiment was not serious. In this movement Captain Wardwell, of the Twenty-second Massachusetts, deserves particular mention. The result of that reconnaissance in affording accurate knowledge of the line of the enemy's intrenchments appears in the report of Colonel Gove, to whom I think the commendation of the commanding general is due.

All of my regiments behaved well. The discipline to which they have been subjected and its high utility were obvious at all times. Most of them had never before been under fire. If in the future they shall fulfill the expectations created by their steadiness on the 5th instant the commanding general may rest on them in any emergency.

The post of danger and caution combined was taken by the Twenty-fifth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson commanding. His report discloses that it was maintained with a cautious daring which gives assurance that his care for that regiment has not been misapplied. I believe that every man in my brigade on that day performed the duty and filled the place assigned to him.

Very respectfully, &c.,

JOHN H. MARTINDALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

P. S.—Although not attached to my brigade, Martin's battery (Third Massachusetts) co-operated with it. After being posted by Captain Griffin, the steady courage of that battery and the quiet but determined

and unflinching intrepidity of Captain Martin attracted general attention and admiration from my command.

Respectfully, &c.,

JOHN H. MARTINDALE,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, PORTER'S DIVISION,
Near Yorktown, April 11, 1862.

I have to call the attention of the commanding general of division, and through him of the commanding general of the *corps d'armée* and of this army, to the unfair accounts which some of the reporters on the march with us have been permitted to communicate to the public press of the transactions of Saturday last (the 5th instant). The correspondent of the Philadelphia Inquirer appears to have communicated the information of which I complain. This would be a matter of less moment if it was not understood that the communications sent North are subjected to a censorship to secure accuracy, and become therefore in a certain sense official.

The communication states that at 12.30 o'clock the heaviest firing commenced, and that Morell's brigade, on the left, advanced within three-fourths of a mile of the intrenched enemy; that "Butterfield's and Martindale's brigades were reclining on their arms throughout the day." It is not necessary to detract anything from the gallantry of General Morell's brigade in doing justice to the gentlemen and regiments comprising my own. Now, it is known to the commanding general of this division that previous to the hour of 12 m., after following the baggage train of General Morell's brigade, which necessarily occupied the muddy road through which we marched, I reached his position in front of Yorktown followed by the Twenty-second Massachusetts and Second Maine Regiments in my command. Two regiments of Morell's brigade had been ordered to the left of the front by the commanding general of division, which I was directed at once to relieve. Before 12.30 o'clock the Twenty-second Massachusetts and Second Maine had relieved these regiments and occupied the left of the division line during all of the remaining time on that day and afterwards until yesterday, when by order of the general commanding we removed from the position then assigned to us. Not a shot was thrown from the intrenched batteries on the left; that General Morell's regiment had been relieved and took their position in front of Yorktown previous to the time, and then a heavy and rapid fire was opened on us. The Twenty-second Massachusetts and Second Maine were immediately thrown forward, and the skirmishers of the first-named regiment advanced toward the fortifications. Instead of reclining on their arms, every regiment of my brigade, namely, the Eighteenth and Twenty-second Massachusetts, the Thirteenth and Twenty-fifth New York, and the Second Maine, had their skirmishers far in advance, and at the moment I am now writing the skirmishers of the Twenty-fifth New York still remain on the line then taken, and within 100 yards of the concealed road connecting the works on the left of Yorktown with the works near the town. Colonel Gove, commanding the Twenty-second Massachusetts, advanced within 800 yards of the enemy's works and supported Martin's and Griffin's batteries on the right and in advance

of their positions, while Colonel Roberts, commanding the Second Maine, deployed and supported those batteries on the extreme left. These regiments both bivouacked that night in the positions assigned to them, and were not withdrawn from there until the following day. It is an unkind and unfair presentation of the gallantry, coolness, and daring of these regiments and their commanders, and especially of Colonel Gove and the Twenty-second Massachusetts, as reclining on their arms, when the report of the medical director shows 9 wounded men in the Twenty-second Massachusetts alone (one of whom has since died)—more than all the other casualties in your three brigades that day put together.

I know that the commanding general of this division will appreciate the feelings with which the gentlemen commanding my regiments and other officers and men are likely to regard this first semi-official account of their first trial under fire. For myself I would be the last to detract from the heroism of the other brigades of this division and their able commanders, but it is not conceivable that either of them would approve of the narrative to which attention is now called.

Opportunity was afforded on that day to test the qualities of all my regiments, and in a very high degree of the Twenty-second Massachusetts. The last-named regiment was under severe fire, and but for the cool, discreet, and fearless conduct of its commander would have suffered still more from their exposure.

Very respectfully, &c.,

JOHN H. MARTINDALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, PORTER'S DIVISION,
Near Yorktown, Va., April 7, 1862.

I have to report for the information of the commanding general that Lieutenant-Colonel Ingraham, brigade field officer of the day, has just returned from the reconnaissance made by him in company with Lieutenant McAlester. Lieutenant-Colonel Ingraham reports that there is considerable activity along the line of the road leading toward Yorktown from the forts and batteries on my left, from which the firing was opened on us day before yesterday. It is his conjecture that a battery is being constructed a little back of the fort, which is vacant, a little to our left. There are also sounds of activity at the point indicated by me to the commanding general yesterday, where Captain McMahon, of the Twenty-fifth New York Volunteers, supposed two guns were being placed. Last night a considerable body of men approached to within a few paces of the pickets of the Twenty-fifth, but drew up in line of battle after the men went down and opened fire by file on the position occupied by the pickets of the Twenty-second Massachusetts in the peach orchard. Lieutenant-Colonel Ingraham reports that in his opinion the two positions where he thinks batteries are being placed will command our camps within easy range, and that the enemy has ascertained the fact by the view of pickets from the tops of trees. He saw one instance of observation of that character.

Respectfully, &c.,

JOHN H. MARTINDALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE, A. A. G.

No. 5.

Report of Col. Charles W. Roberts, Second Maine Infantry, of operations April 4-13.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND REGIMENT MAINE VOLUNTEERS,
Camp before Yorktown, Va., Sunday, April 13, 1862.

GENERAL: In compliance with circular received this morning I submit the following report:

Agreeably to orders, early on Friday morning, April 4, I left New Market Bridge, Va., preceded by the Twenty-second Massachusetts Regiment, Colonel Gove, *en route* for Yorktown. After a pleasant and easy march, lunching at Big Bethel, where we were joined by General Morell's brigade, we arrived about 5 o'clock p. m. at or near Cockletown, so called. Here we bivouacked for the night. At an early hour the following morning we were again on the move. The day being unpropitious, and the roads extremely muddy, the advance was very fatiguing to the men. However, the command being "Forward, march," we arrived about noon before Yorktown, when by the order of General Martindale, together with the Twenty-second Massachusetts, I moved my command to the extreme left, taking a position in close column of companies in rear of the Twenty-second Massachusetts in a corn field directly in front of a rebel intrenchment, the remaining regiments composing the brigade keeping in the rear as a reserve, Generals Morell's and Butterfield's brigades being on the extreme right of the division. Several winged messages of death, however, whizzing about and around us, soon notified the wary general in command that our position was not an enviable one for infantry alone. He immediately deployed us to the left, under cover of the woods, and from thence by the right of companies I moved my command through the woods located on the left of a road running in a westerly direction toward the rebel batteries. I advanced in this position, my skirmishers in front, until I reached the Third Massachusetts Battery, commanded by Captain Martin, which battery I was ordered to support on the left, Colonel Gove, of the Twenty-second Massachusetts, occupying a similar position on the right. Between the hours of 1 and 3.30 p. m. the artillery practice was exceedingly severe on both sides, the rebels making excellent range shots, and at times very much disturbing my skirmishers, a few shots occasionally depositing themselves near my main force.

No casualties occurred in my command, but the battery bravely commanded by Captain Martin lost two men and two or three horses, while several of the skirmishers from Colonel Gove's regiment were seriously wounded. About 4 o'clock the firing on both sides, with now and then an occasional shot, ceased. I remained in this position, my picket in front, until the morning following, when I was relieved.

Monday evening, the 7th instant, just at dark, my command was ordered to perform picket duty in front, the outpost being located in a peach orchard nearly a mile from the line of our encampment in a northerly direction and facing the enemy. The weather being exceedingly cold and rainy, and my command remaining over thirty hours on this duty, they suffered extremely; but no casualties occurred excepting that George C. Martin, a private of Company H, was wounded through the leg by a rifle-ball from the enemy's outpost. The wound, however, proved not dangerous.

Just before being relieved on Tuesday night Captain Foss, in command of the picket, notified me that the enemy were advancing in force

on our lines, which intelligence was the means of quickly bringing into line under arms an entire brigade. The above rumor, however, proved false.

On Wednesday morning we arrived at our present safe and pleasant camping ground, where the command have been busy in various ways, among which are bridge building, running saw-mills, doing picket and provost-guard duty, &c.

Very respectfully, I remain, yours,

CHAS. W. ROBERTS,

Colonel, Commanding Second Regiment Maine Volunteers.

General J. H. MARTINDAL,

Comdg. First Brigade, Porter's Division, Heintzelman's Corps.

No. 6.

Report of Col. James Barnes, Eighteenth Massachusetts Infantry, of operations April 14-14.

HDQRS. EIGHTEENTH REGT. MASSACHUSETTS INFANTRY,
Camp Winfield Scott, before Yorktown, Va., April 14, 1862.

SIR: I herewith submit a record of events occurring to the Eighteenth Regiment Massachusetts Infantry since leaving Camp Ingraham, near New Market Bridge, Va.:

In obedience to orders from brigade headquarters the regiment was formed in column at 5.30 o'clock on the morning of the 4th of April, and soon after it took up the line of march toward Great Bethel at the head of the brigade, and in advance of any other column on the middle road. Three companies, D, H, and G, were detached from the column and placed under charge of Major Hayes, who had orders to form an advance guard and deploy skirmishers in front. The regiment at mid-day reached Great Bethel without having met any of the enemy, and there halted two hours while a bridge was being repaired. After resting, it took the place in column to which it was assigned by the commanding general and continued the march. At night it encamped within the abandoned earthworks of the enemy at Howard's Creek. On the next morning at 6.30 o'clock the march was resumed toward Yorktown. The weather was rainy and the roads very muddy. The regiment, however, came up at about 2 o'clock p. m. within sight and range of the enemy's Yorktown batteries in a fresh condition. After unslinging knapsacks the battalion was marched up and deployed in line of battle parallel with the Warwick road, where it remained while Martin's Third Massachusetts Battery and Griffin's were playing upon the batteries on the enemy's right. The right company of the battalion was sent forward soon after the line of battle was formed, by the orders of the general commanding, to deploy as skirmishers, under charge of Captain Thomas, and subsequently two other companies, I and B, were added to the skirmishers, and the whole placed under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ingraham. Five shells and a large number of musket and rifle balls were fired from the enemy's intrenchments at the skirmishers, but none of them caused any injury. At sunset the battalion was closed in mass by divisions on first division, and the men pitched their shelter-tents and remained on the ground during the night. The skirmishers were relieved at 9 o'clock in the evening by a

picket of 70 men, under command of Captain Weston. No casualty occurred during the day or night.

Sunday, April 6.—Early in the morning Captain Weston's picket was relieved by Company B, under command of Captain Ruby. At 11 o'clock a. m. the battalion was moved a few hundred yards to the right, where it pitched its camp in full view of the enemy's batteries. During the day one shell passed over the camp, and a number fell short of it, but in exact line.

Monday, April 7.—The weather was stormy. A picket of 20 men sent out.

Tuesday, April 8.—The cold easterly storm still continues. The same number sent out on picket as yesterday.

Wednesday, April 9.—The regiment was marched toward the river about a mile, and an encampment formed in a peach orchard. The same picket detail sent out as heretofore.

Thursday, April 10.—Seventy men were detailed to build a bridge, under charge of Major Hayes, over Wormley's Creek. The regiment was relieved from detailing the small picket.

Friday, April 11.—The same detail was made for bridge building. One hundred and fifty men were detailed, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ingraham, to repair the New Landing road.

Saturday, April 12.—The same detail for building road and bridge was made as yesterday.

Sunday, April 13.—An outpost guard of 250 men were detailed and sent to the front, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ingraham.

The bearing of the officers and men throughout all these occurrences has been such as to give me entire satisfaction.

Very respectfully,

JAMES BARNES,
Colonel, Commanding.

Capt. CHARLES J. POWERS,
*Asst. Adjt. Gen., General Martindale's Brigade,
Porter's Division, Third Army Corps.*

No. 7.

Report of Col. Jesse A. Gove, Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry, of operations April 4-12.

HDQRS. TWENTY-SECOND MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT,
Camp before Yorktown, Va., April 12, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In compliance with circular from brigade headquarters of this date, requiring commanders of regiments to send in written reports of the events embraced within the time from Camp New Market to the present, &c., I have the honor to make the following statement:

Pursuant to instructions received in the evening of April 3, on the morning of the 4th instant I struck camp and formed my regiment in column at 6 a. m., ready to move at the appointed hour. The brigade of which my regiment formed a part was delayed at the bridge across the southeast branch of Back River from that hour until 8.25 o'clock, partly in consequence of the passing column of General Morell's brigade, which in the general order was to march at 5 a. m., and partly by the baggage train of General Morell's and division headquarters. At

length we crossed the bridge, and reaching Big Bethel, formed in column of divisions and closed in mass, and halted about an hour to await the repairing of the bridge. Resuming our march on the Yorktown road we proceeded about $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles to Howard's Creek, which we crossed at 5.30 p. m., and bivouacked for the night. Our baggage trains did not arrive until 2 o'clock the next morning.

At 7 a. m. on Saturday, the 5th instant, took up our line of march in the direction of Yorktown through thick woods for some distance, and over a bad road, rendered almost impassable by a heavy rain, which continued to fall until about 11 a. m. After marching some 6 miles heard firing just in front, both from the enemy's and our own batteries. My regiment being in the advance in the brigade, followed by the Second Maine, Colonel Roberts, I was directed by the general commanding to form in close column of companies right in front, and move forward to the right of the road just in rear of our batteries. Here we halted for a considerable time, our batteries exchanging shots occasionally with the enemy.

It was now about 12.30 o'clock. After remaining here for a short time I received orders from General Martindale to move across and to the left of the road, and, following him to a point near a house and barn, halted, and directed the men to take off their knapsacks, but to retain their haversacks and canteens, filling the latter with water from a stream near by. Forming again my regiment in close column of companies I moved to the left, leaving the house to the right and rear, to the Warwick road, where I found the Sixty-second Pennsylvania, Colonel Black, deployed and concealed from the view of the enemy by timber to the left. Passing his left I crossed the road and moved some 200 yards to the front, and changing by direction to the left moved directly toward the enemy's works, and halted when within about 1,500 yards. The Second Maine, in column of companies, was directly in my rear. I was directed by the general commanding to throw out a company of skirmishers to the right and feel the enemy in that direction. I ordered Captain Sampson, Company A, to deploy his company, and Captain Thompson, Company F, to support him, sending Lieutenant-Colonel Griswold with the latter to dispose of the line as he should find necessary after an examination of the ground.

Pending this movement the enemy's batteries threw two shells over us, while two struck directly in front in an abatis made of felled timber. I was directed to move my regiment under cover of the woods to the left across the Warwick road, throw out skirmishers into the woods, and occupy a line directly in front of the enemy. I immediately deployed Company B, Captain Wardwell, and advanced some 600 yards through the woods, with my right in the edge of the timber and my left resting on the Warwick road, which runs to the left and diagonally to the front of the woods.

From the edge of the woods where the center lay is an unobstructed field, and within 1,100 yards were the enemy's fortifications, which consisted of four works, mounting at this time nine field artillery guns, but capable of mounting many more. I was immediately followed by the remainder of my regiment, which I advanced through a dense wood and swampy bottom to within 100 yards of the front of the woods, and so disposed as to support the batteries that went down the Warwick road and out into the opening of the timber and those to my right near our first position. As soon as the artillery was in position to my left and rear the enemy opened upon it with a heavy fire, which was vigorously replied to by our own batteries. Cannonading was kept up be-

tween the batteries during the afternoon, and up to 5.30 p. m. no casualties occurred in my regiment, although my left was exposed to the fire of the enemy's batteries. Between my line and the enemy's, and about half way, was a ridge of land running parallel with the works, which obstructed a view of what was immediately in their front.

As I had already received orders to bivouac for the night in my present position, and having applied for and obtained permission to reconnoiter their works, I advanced with Company B, Captain Wardwell, deployed as skirmishers, under a heavy fire, some 500 yards, to near the crest of the ridge. I ordered the skirmishers to lie down, while I advanced, under cover of a clump of trees and boughs, along a road leading to the left of their work, to a position within 600 yards, where with my glass I thoroughly examined their whole line of works. Having completed my observations, I directed the line to return. As soon as we came in sight, they opened a most terrific fire of shot and shell, having the range completely. By careful observations we were enabled to avoid a great deal, by ordering the men to lie down just before their shells exploded and then rise up and move rapidly forward. But for such precautions our casualties would have been much greater. The officers and men behaved under these trying circumstances with great coolness, preserving their intervals and bringing off the field their wounded companions. Many shells were thrown into the woods in the midst of the remainder of the regiment, mortally wounding one man and some others slightly. The whole command behaved with commendable bravery under this their first exposure to the enemy's fire. Assistant Surgeon Prince was at his post with stretchers, and carried the men to the rear, where Surgeon Warren took them in charge and promptly sent them to the division hospital. Annexed is a list of the wounded.*

The result of my observations while to the front were immediately but informally reported to the general commanding brigade. I now reiterate in substance the facts embraced therein:

From the point of observation to the front of their works was not more than 600 yards. The road leads directly to the left of their works, and above and to the right of the road the stream is dammed, so to flow all the timber land to their left and our right, where Lieutenant-Colonel Griswold, with Companies A and F, were deployed, so as to render it impassable in that immediate vicinity. To my right, under the skirt of the woods, was an earthwork, seen earlier in the day, apparently deserted. In front of their entire line was the Warwick River, of considerable width, with steep banks, forming an admirable ditch to their entire line. A considerable stockade work connects the left and middle works, while to their left and rear is a square work of considerable strength, and apparently well constructed for defense. This commands the road to the right and left, but only one gun was fired from here during the day.

It appeared as though the works were constructed with a view to great strength and powers of resistance, following to that end, in the erection of their works, the meanderings of the stream.

Near the dam and in front of their main work a gun is mounted, which commands the dam, road, and entire front. From this we received the shots earlier in the day, upon our first arrival.

An earthwork could be thrown up in the edge of the woods under cover of night within 1,100 or 1,200 yards, and the same could be ad-

* Nominal list omitted reports 1 officer and 8 men wounded.

vanced to within 600 yards, to the crest reached by the skirmishers, and with a suitable earthwork silence their guns.

A large body of infantry was observed in their works, apparently at evening parade, their band playing "Dixie." The sound of musket balls was distinctly discernible amid the crash of shot and shell, quite reaching us in our retirement. As soon as we got under cover they ceased firing. I remained in the woods until Sunday morning, about 10 o'clock, when, pursuant to orders, I withdrew my regiment and encamped near the house. At night I furnished a picket of 500 men, under the command of Major Tilton, who were stationed to the front and on the left of the Yorktown road, relieving the Forty-fourth New York, under command of Major Chapin.

On Thursday, the 10th instant, moved with the brigade to the right of the road and in rear of Wormley's Creek.

On Friday morning furnished 300 men for picket, under Lieutenant-Colonel Griswold, and stationed to the front and right of the Yorktown road.

Respectfully submitted.

JESSE A. GOVE,
Colonel, Commanding.

Capt. CHARLES J. POWERS, A. A. G.,
Hdqrs. 1st Brig., Porter's Div., in Camp before Yorktown, Va.

No. 8.

Report of Col. Charles A. Johnson, Twenty-fifth New York Infantry, of operations April 4-13.

HDQRS. TWENTY-FIFTH REGT. NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
April 13, 1862.

GENERAL: I herewith transmit a summary of events since leaving encampment near Hampton, Va.:

Early on the morning of Friday, April 4, together with the other regiments composing the First Brigade, we started on the main road leading to Yorktown. The road being in excellent condition, very little delay was occasioned on the march, and at noon we halted at Big Bethel for rest and partook of our rations. In the course of an hour our march was resumed, and we proceeded on unmolested, arriving at Howard's [Harwood's] Creek at about 5 p. m., and there bivouacked that night.

The following morning the regiment continued its march, but, owing to the bad condition of the road and a heavy rain-storm, made slower progress than on the preceding day, arriving at noon, however, in front of Yorktown.

The regiment was then drawn up in line of battle on the left of the road, while on the left of this line and perpendicular to it a part of Captain Martin's battery was drawn up, having a good range of the works of the enemy on the left. This battery opened fire upon them, to which they quickly responded, some of their shots passing over and some in front of my regiment, a piece of one falling at the feet of Lieutenant Bates, of Company I. At this time I ordered Captain Gleason, with Companies A and H, to move forward into the woods in front to ascertain if the enemy were in force near us. They encountered a deep morass and belt of fallen timber, through which they proceeded, and

driving the pickets of the enemy before them through a thick undergrowth of timber, came within full view of their long line of batteries and heavy breastworks.

Here, this side of a morass, beyond which they retreated, and within 50 yards of the enemy's pickets, was established my line, which was maintained by this regiment until April 10, at which time we were relieved from the division of General Hamilton, whose pickets at this point were driven in on the same day.

The firing on both sides was heavy during most of the afternoon, and the loss of Martin's battery was several killed and wounded. At about 5 p. m. it ceased, and the Twenty fifth Regiment was withdrawn a short distance to the rear, and there bivouacked for the night, still in range of the enemy's guns, a line of pickets having been established, those from this regiment holding their original position and having the Eighteenth Massachusetts on their right, and those of the Twenty-second Massachusetts on their left.

The next day several shells passed over my encampment, and struck in the immediate vicinity. To get out of the range of their fire, by order of the general commanding the brigade I moved over to the right of the field and encamped in a small hollow. Nothing of particular interest occurred while there. My pickets, being in such close proximity to the rebels, discovered many things concerning their position, &c., and exercised themselves diligently night and day in finding out their probable number and what they were doing, many narrowly escaping being killed by the shots of the enemy.

On the 10th instant I moved to the right of our position some distance, where we now are encamped, anxiously awaiting the signal for an attack.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. A. JOHNSON,
Colonel, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. J. H. MARTINDALE.

No. 9.

Report of Brig. Gen. George W. Morell, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of operations April 4-9.

HDQRS. 2D BRIG., F. J. PORTER'S DIV., 3D ARMY CORPS,
Camp Winfield Scott, before Yorktown, Va., April 21, 1862.

GENERAL: Pursuant to orders for the advance of the Army of the Potomac, my brigade, composed of the Fourteenth Regiment New York Volunteers, Colonel McQuade; Fourth Michigan, Colonel Woodbury; Ninth Massachusetts, Colonel Cass, and Sixty-second Pennsylvania, Colonel Black, moved from Camp No. 2, near Hampton, at 5 o'clock a. m. on the 4th current, preceded by Colonel Averell's cavalry and Colonel Berdan's Sharpshooters, and escorting Griffin's and Weed's batteries of artillery. I marched to Big Bethel over the same route as in the reconnaissance of the 27th ultimo. Beyond Big Bethel the cavalry fell to the rear, the Sharpshooters, as skirmishers, continuing in front of my brigade, which had the honor of leading the column. A small body of the enemy's cavalry retired as we advanced, and though frequently in sight, kept out of reach.

As we approached Howard's Bridge over the Poquosin River I

threw forward part of the Fourteenth New York Volunteers, Colonel McQuade, also as skirmishers, and advanced with them and the Sharpshooters, to ascertain if the works which I had reconnoitered on the 27th ultimo were still occupied. When within a few hundred yards of them the enemy opened fire upon us. Meanwhile the balance of the Fourteenth had deployed to the right. The Fourth Michigan, Colonel Woodbury, by your order, extended on their right to the river and the artillery had come to the front. The whole steadily pressed forward, and after a slight resistance the enemy retreated, carrying off two light pieces of artillery, which could not be prevented, owing to the difficulty of crossing the river and the marsh in their front. The Fourteenth New York first entered their works. With the Ninth Massachusetts and Sixty-second Pennsylvania Regiments I commenced the removal of obstructions from the main road, but was recalled before completing it. The column halted for the night, with the exception of my command, which pushed on 2 miles farther and bivouacked at Cockle-town.

At 7 o'clock on the morning of the 5th we were again in motion, the cavalry still in the rear. The rain commenced falling at the same time, which made the road exceedingly heavy and delayed our progress. You joined me at the saw-mill, your staff and mine forming a conspicuous group, and at 10 a. m., as we arrived at the junction of the Warwick with the Yorktown road, we received the first shot from the enemy. It came from their works on our right near the town, and was well aimed, though a little too high. The Sharpshooters under Colonel Berdan were alone in front of us.

By your orders Weeden's and Griffin's batteries, which were in the center of my brigade, were moved to the front and in the open field to the right, about midway between the White House or Observatory and the town, and immediately opened fire, supported by the Fourth Michigan, Colonel Woodbury, and Fourteenth New York Volunteers, Colonel McQuade, the first with its left near them and its right toward the town, the last with its right near them and its left toward the White House, both partially covered by woods.

The Ninth Massachusetts, Colonel Cass, was posted in the woods on the left of the Yorktown and in front of the Warwick road, with its skirmishers thrown forward through the woods, and on its left in the open fields the Sixty-second Pennsylvania, Colonel Black, with its left in a corn field, and so retired as to observe the works of the enemy and the Warwick road.

Until 1 o'clock p. m. mine was the only brigade on the ground, and the regiments remained in the above position up to that time, when the two on the left being relieved by the arrival of General Martindale's brigade, I united mine by moving them to the right of the Yorktown road in the woods, in the rear of the White House and on the left of the Fourteenth New York. During this movement a 42-pounder shell passed over the Ninth Massachusetts Regiment, and in its first ricochet fell without exploding into the Sixty-second Pennsylvania, wounding Privates Musser, Rumbaugh, Reddy, and Bell, one of whom (Musser) died the next morning.

Sunday night (6th) I threw up embankments to cover the field batteries in front of the New York and Michigan regiments, employing for that purpose a detachment of the Ninth Massachusetts Regiment as a working and the Sixty-second Pennsylvania as a covering party, each under the command of its colonel.

To insure an efficient support to the field batteries my whole brigade

as posted on Saturday (5th) bivouacked in the woods, extending from the White House toward Yorktown till Wednesday afternoon (9th), when they were ordered to the present encampment. During these four days they were without fire, except what was necessary to warm their rations, and although within close range of the enemy's guns escaped with 1 man, Private Tompkins, of the Fourth Michigan, severely wounded by the fragment of a shell. They were all raw troops, for the first time under fire, and yet I doubt if their patience and coolness could have been surpassed by veterans.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. MORELL,
Brigadier-General.

Brig. Gen. FITZ JOHN PORTER,
Commanding Division.

No. 10.

Report of Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, of operations April 4-12.

HEADQUARTERS SMITH'S DIVISION,
Camp No. 4, Wener's, April 12, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with General Orders, No. 14, of the 10th instant, I have the honor to report for the information of the brigadier-general commanding the Fourth Army Corps that, in pursuance of instructions, the division under my command marched at 6 a. m. the 4th instant toward Young's Mill. After crossing Watts' Creek the skirmishers frequently encountered the rebel pickets. Having proceeded about 2 miles, the country opened and Young's Mill appeared visible about 1,000 yards in advance of the woods. Having reconnoitered, and feeling satisfied that there were no heavy guns in position, I immediately deployed three regiments of the Second Brigade, and keeping two in reserve advanced on the works, the enemy retiring out of them. Shots were exchanged, and one private of the Fifth Vermont was shot through the shoulder.

On entering the works, which appeared well constructed, I found them deserted, apparently; fires were, however, burning, with rations half cooked, &c. I then disposed of the command, sending pickets forward from the Second Brigade to guard the front toward Warwick Court-House, to the right from the First Brigade toward Big Bethel, and to the left from the Third Brigade to Deep Creek.

On the morning of the 5th the division proceeded in the direction of Williamsburg, the Second Brigade watching the road to Deep Creek, the Third Brigade in the center, with a regiment (the Seventh Maine) deployed as skirmishers to protect the front, and the First Brigade watching the right, and the rain began about 7 o'clock and continued pouring in torrents, rendering the roads well-nigh impassable. On arriving at Warwick Court-House I pushed the Third Brigade across the stream with a battery (Captain Wheeler's), while I collected the remainder of the division in the open fields on the opposite side of the creek. After halting three-quarters of an hour I again put the division in motion (the roads were awful) and slowly proceeded on the march. After having advanced about 2 miles the fortifications around and about Lee's Mill came in sight. While flames appeared on all sides, and until

two fires were brought to bear on the works, I was unable to decide whether the rebels were not evacuating the position. I immediately directed Brigadier-General Davidson to deploy his brigade out of sight along the edge of the woods, with orders to hold the front. The rebel fort on their right began to reply to our guns, on which I brought Captain Wheeler's battery out of action and then placed two guns to command the road out of sight. I then gave directions to Brigadier-General Hancock to cover our right flank, and in pursuance of such instructions the brigadier-general posted the Fifth Wisconsin on another road to the right leading to Lee's Mill. I brought the Second Brigade, under Brigadier-General Brooks, up in reserve about half way through the woods, and then waited for instructions. These relative positions were held until the 7th instant.

On the evening of the 7th instant I moved the First and Second Brigades, together with the batteries, to the right, and occupied a position in the vicinity of their present encampments.

On the morning of the 11th the Third Brigade moved to its present position.

On the 7th [6th] instant a reconnaissance was made by my direction by Brigadier-General Hancock with two regiments (the Fifth Wisconsin and Sixth Maine), a report of which I inclose, marked A.*

On the 8th instant a reconnaissance was made under the direction of Lieutenant Comstock by the Sixth Maine, a report of which I inclose, marked B.

I would beg respectfully to call your attention to a report made by Brigadier-General Davidson, commanding Third Brigade, marked C, and a very careful report, marked D, of the operations of the artillery of the division made by Captain Ayres. The operations of both, as, indeed, of all the commanders, and the behavior of the division, commands my unqualified approbation.

The casualties up to this date are as follows: One officer (lieutenant, Thirty-third New York) and — privates wounded. Lieutenant Swan, of Company A, and Bugler Brown, of Company D, of the Seventh Maine, taken prisoners.

WM. F. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

No. 11.

Report of Col. Hiram Berdan, First United States Sharpshooters, of operations April 4-21.

HDQRS. FIRST REGT. BERDAN'S U. S. SHARPSHOOTERS,
Camp Winfield Scott, April 21, 1862.

GENERAL: In compliance with General Orders, 115, I have the honor to submit the following report of the conduct of my regiment of Sharpshooters during the march from Camp No. 2, near Hampton, and the engagement on the 5th instant:

Our duties on the march were confined to skirmishing and clearing the woods along the road. But few rebels were seen, and those invariably mounted and keeping at a respectful distance. My whole command, both officers and men, behaved extremely well, and I could not have asked more cheerful compliance with or prompt execution of orders.

* Reports of Davidson (No. 16) and Hancock (No. 18) the only inclosures found.

Our proceedings on the 5th, I trust, are not entirely unknown to you. The men displayed the greatest coolness and bravery during the entire action and manifested their power to use their skill to good advantage under a galling fire, which, in my judgment, considering that they were in their first engagement, deserves special notice. There were some instances of personal daring, but as they were owing more to opportunity than anything else, I think the whole command should share any compliment they may receive. I first reconnoitered the ground, and then divided the regiment into companies and detachments, with proper supports and reserves, according to the cover and duties to be performed, which were principally to guard the roads against cavalry, the right and left wings against flankers, and to watch the movements of the enemy, and also groups of from one to one hundred, to pick off gunners and protect batteries. As for myself, I feel amply repaid for the danger I ran in reconnoitering the ground under fire, posting the men, encouraging and directing them through the day, by the confident feeling that we must have killed and wounded several hundred rebels and that I lost only 2 men killed and 4 wounded, notwithstanding that a fire was kept up upon us from the enemy's rifle pits and by shell when they were able to work their guns.

Since the 5th we have sent a detail of 20 to each of three brigades, and sometimes to Hamilton's division. On the 19th instant I sent two companies, A and C, under the charge of Major Trepp, to General Smith's division. They have thus far done good service, getting very near the enemy, digging rifle pits, and yesterday killed 9 certain, and probably more, besides wounding many.

My command are in admirable spirits and to a man are confident of the ultimate success of our arms, and are all anxious to be detailed on picket or other duty where a chance is afforded them to avenge themselves on the rebels, who are attempting to destroy their country.

I have the honor, general, to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. BERDAN,

Colonel, Commanding U. S. Sharpshooters.

Brig. Gen. FITZ JOHN PORTER,
Commanding Division.

No. 12.

Report of Lieut. Henry W. Kingsbury, commanding Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, of operations April 5.

CAMP NEAR YORKTOWN, April 6, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows concerning the firing of Battery D, Fifth Artillery, while under my command on the 5th instant:

About 11 a. m. the battery was placed by your direction on the right of the Rhode Island Battery, which had already engaged the enemy. The Fourth Michigan Regiment, Colonel Woodbury, acted as our support during the day. Our guns opened with percussion shell, the second shot giving the range, about 2,100 yards. We then fired fuse shell and spherical case at the camps within the enemy's intrenchments and at large groups of men who appeared around their guns. The fire was briskly returned by five of their guns (barbette). In ten minutes their fire slackened.

Orders were received from General Porter and yourself that our fire was too rapid—to continue at intervals of ten or fifteen minutes, merely to draw the fire of the enemy. This was done for about two hours, when the firing ceased on both sides.

About 2 p. m., in obedience to your orders, I sent Lieutenant Hazlett, with his section, to report to you. The enemy at this time reopened fire. We returned it from time to time until 4 p. m., when their fire ceased and our battery was withdrawn for the night. Once during the afternoon we fired briskly at a body of cavalry (from 50 to 70) which passed rapidly before their intrenchments.

Our ammunition, Parrott's (the percussion shell with Schenkl plungers), was all that could be desired. Of an average of 30 rounds to a gun I remember but two that did not explode.

The effect of our shots upon men could not be seen. Upon tents, &c., it was very evident and satisfactory.

The conduct of the officers (Lieutenants Hazlett, Harrison, and Reed) and of the men was all that could be desired.

The firing of the enemy was good, but though the firing lasted several hours, neither our men nor our horses were touched; this being due in a great measure to the extreme softness of the ground, many of the shells being deeply buried before exploding.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY W. KINGSBURY,
First Lieutenant, Fifth Artillery.

Capt. CHARLES GRIFFIN,
Fifth Artillery, Chief of Division Artillery.

No. 13.

Report of Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett, Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, of operations April 5.

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY D, FIFTH ARTILLERY,
Camp near Yorktown, April 6, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the following facts with reference to the action of my section yesterday:

After having been detached at about 2 o'clock p. m. I proceeded some distance on the Warwick road to our left, where there was a strong force of the enemy intrenched. They had guns mounted in three earthworks, which were connected by infantry parapets. In the center fort I could count four field pieces; in the other, although they appeared to have several guns, I could not see any of them. Just as I left the road to enter the field in front and opposite the works they opened a very heavy fire. They apparently had previously ascertained the range of the road, as the shot plunged into the road, passing over our heads.

I had with me my own section of two 10-pounder Parrotts, and also three light 12-pounder guns belonging to Captain Martin's battery. I opened fire at once, and for a short time the firing was on both sides very severe. The enemy had some light guns outside of their intrenchments in the ditch.

During the early part of the engagement there were 2 men killed and 3 wounded, belonging to Captain Martin's battery.

I could not ascertain certainly what execution our firing did. Most of our shot burst directly over their intrenchments, and I think they must have done injury to the enemy. After a short time the enemy slackened their fire. I then ceased firing, except a shot about once in ten or fifteen minutes. There was a large white frame house on my left and front. The enemy fired several shells inside of this house, evidently desirous of setting fire to it.

Some time after the fire slackened two or three regiments of infantry and some horsemen, with two or three wagons, were seen to leave the fort from their left. I fired a percussion shell at them, which burst directly in the column. I then threw three or four shrapnel, which burst over them. The column then took the double-quick and left.

Soon after this a portion of Captain Randolph's battery came to relieve me, but just as I was getting ready to move another column of infantry appeared on the left leaving the fort. I then threw one shrapnel, which burst in the column. I then rejoined my battery, the only casualties being 2 men killed and 3 wounded of Captain Martin's battery.

The conduct of my men during the action was all that could be desired.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. E. HAZLETT,

First Lieutenant, Fifth Artillery.

Capt. CHARLES GRIFFIN,

Chief of Artillery.

No. 14.

Report of Capt. Augustus P. Martin, Battery C, Massachusetts Light Artillery, of operations April 5.

APRIL 6, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement of the battery under my command on the afternoon of the 5th instant:

About 2.30 o'clock p. m. the right half battery took a position on the Warwick road, within about 1,600 yards of the enemy's works and barracks, and immediately opened fire upon them, which was briskly returned for an hour, when the enemy and ourselves ceased firing, but the pieces remained in position until about 5 o'clock, when they were relieved by another battery. No injury or loss was sustained by the portion of the battery in this position. The left half battery, under command of First Lieutenant Dunn, was ordered to a position on the Warwick road about three-quarters of a mile south of the position of the right half battery—on a field, with one section of Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery—where they engaged the enemy for two or three hours at a distance of about 1,600 yards. The firing was very rapid on both sides. The enemy was very strongly fortified and well covered, while we were in an open space and exposed to view, without any covering whatever.

Two privates, named Charles L. Lord and Edwin N. Lewis, were killed; one corporal and two privates, named Corp. Charles H. Tucker and Privates Freeman Carey and Timothy Donahoe, were wounded, but their wounds were not of a serious character.

Four horses belonging to the battery were killed during the engagement.

The officers and men of the battery behaved well, every man performing his part with coolness and promptness, much more so than could reasonably be expected, considering it was their first experience under fire.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. P. MARTIN,

Captain Battery C, Massachusetts Artillery.

Capt. CHARLES GRIFFIN,

Chief of Artillery, Porter's Division.

No. 15.

Report of Capt. William B. Weeden, Battery C, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, of operations April 5.

HDQRS. BATTERY C, FIRST R. I. LIGHT ARTILLERY,
April 5, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report:

On the reconnaissance this morning by your order I moved to the front, and went into battery in an open field to the right of the road. Commenced firing at about 10.30 a. m., throwing the first shots fired on the defenses of Yorktown. Our first fire was directed at bodies of men drawn up before intrenchments, and about 1,500 or 1,600 yards distant. The infantry scattered at once. After firing several rounds moved forward 150 yards and fired on the intrenchments, distant 1,800 to 1,900 yards. Also fired at enemy's camps, and several times during the day at bodies of cavalry. Captain Griffin's battery took position on our right, and the batteries were supported by Fourth Michigan Volunteers.

The enemy opened fire from his intrenchments, while I was coming into battery, with 32-pounder shells and 12-pounder shrapnel and solid shot. His fire was at first well directed and heavy, but slackened when at your command we fired slowly. In the afternoon few shots were exchanged.

Private John E. Reynolds, serving at his piece as No. 1, was struck by a fragment of shell in the thigh. The limb was amputated, and he died shortly after.

At 5.30 p. m. I was relieved by Allen's battery and moved to rear.

The battery, consisting of six pieces, 3-inch rifled guns, expended 216 rounds of ammunition—Hotchkiss case-shot and ordnance percussion shell and case-shot.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. B. WEEDEN,

Captain, Commanding.

Capt. CHARLES GRIFFIN,

Chief of Artillery, Porter's Division.

No. 16.

Reports of Brig. Gen. John W. Davidson, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, Second Division, Fourth Corps, of operations April 5-12.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SMITH'S DIVISION,
Camp near Lee's Mill, Warwick River, Va., April 12, 1862.

SIR: Having been directed by the general commanding the division to furnish a report of the operations of my brigade from the 5th instant to the present time, I respectfully state as follows:

The advance of the division from Young's Mill was formed by my brigade, the Seventh Maine, Colonel Mason commanding, being deployed as a line of skirmishers in front, with a section of Kennedy's battery, Lieutenant Cowan, following the road; the Thirty-third New York Volunteers, Colonel Taylor, Seventy-seventh New York, Colonel McKean, and Forty-ninth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Alberger, in the order named, moving in rear of this advance in column.

About 4 miles from Young's Mill, at 11 a. m., the enemy's pickets were driven in, exchanging occasional shots with our skirmishers, and a mile and a half farther on through a dense woods we came in sight over an open space of the position of the enemy's line of earthworks in our front. The Seventh Maine, as skirmishers, were halted in the edge of the woods, about 950 yards from these works, the section of artillery placed in battery, and the Thirty-third, Seventy-seventh, and Forty-ninth New York formed rapidly in line under the fire of the enemy's shell and canister. The left of the Seventh Maine was in an exposed position, being about 500 yards from the smaller work, but partially concealed by the woods. Wheeler's battery, which followed my brigade, came into position on the right and left of our road and opened on the enemy. My aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Long, of the Thirty-third New York, who had climbed a tree for observation upon our left, reporting to me that two regiments were moving down upon our left flank, Lieutenant-Colonel Alberger (Forty-ninth New York) was thrown back at an obtuse angle with the rest of my line to meet their intentions. With these dispositions we awaited the arrival and reconnaissance of General Smith.

The troops of my brigade maintained their position as above stated until 7 p. m. of the evening of the 7th, when they were withdrawn about one mile farther to the rear.

My casualties were:

	Killed.	Wounded.
Officers.....	..	2
Corporals.....	1	..
Privates.....	2	10
Total	3	12

The Forty-ninth Regiment and a company of the Thirty-third New York—the latter under Lieutenant-Colonel Corning—were much exposed to the fire of the enemy's rifle pits while we lay in position.

I regret to state that Lieutenant Swan, Company A, and Bugler Brown, Company D, Seventh Maine, were captured by the enemy on the 5th instant, being separated from their comrades by a swamp while skirmishing.

I desire to bring specially to the notice of the general the cheerful obedience and fortitude of the regiments of my brigade, lying, as they

did, for fifty-four hours under the close artillery fire of the enemy, two nights of it exposed to a violent storm, without an opportunity of exchanging a shot, except from light field pieces, and bearing, some regiments of it, thirty-six hours' duty to the front as skirmishers, and willing for more. I think the general commanding this division may well be proud of them, as I am, and trust to the successful exhibition of their other soldierly qualities when we meet the enemy closer.

My staff, Adjutant-General Griffing, Captain Martindale, Surgeon Herrick, Captain Russell, and Lieutenants Long and Cameron, were actively engaged during the whole time in conveying necessary orders and posting regiments when required.

I have no distinction to make among the regiments of my brigade. The duties of some were necessarily more arduous than those of others, and led them into more exposed positions, but when all behaved alike with the greatest coolness, gallantry, obedience, and fortitude they are all equally deserving of my warmest gratitude and confidence, and I desire so to present them to the commanding general.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

J. W. DAVIDSON,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

P. S.—Copy respectfully inclosed for the information of Colonel Taylor, Thirty-third New York; Lieutenant-Colonel Alberger, Forty-ninth New York; Colonel Mason, Seventh Maine, and Col. J. B. McKean, Seventy-seventh New York, who are requested to have above report read to their regiments as a mark of my sense of their soldiership.

No. 17.

Report of Brig. Gen. John J. Peck, U. S. Army, of operations April 5–30.

HDQRS. PECK'S BRIGADE, CAMP WINFIELD SCOTT, VA.,
Near Warwick River, April 30, 1862.

My brigade took position near the Warwick River after dark on the 5th instant.

On the 7th I made a reconnaissance of this river down to the James. From its depth and breadth I found the enemy's vessels could control the navigation and reach our lines with heavy guns. To secure our left flank from a gunboat attack I constructed batteries Ira Harris and Couch near the junction of Mill Creek with the Warwick. Since their completion rebel craft have not ventured nearer than the James River. These, with four additional works near the edge of the river, have also forced the enemy's camps and picket line a long distance back from the Warwick and materially interrupted his communications. This view is strengthened by the fact that within eight or ten days the enemy's heavier vessels have been seeking positions higher up on the river side of Mulberry Island, from which to reach my lines; 6-inch elongated shells have been thrown from them over the advance batteries.

My armament consists of eight 10-pounders, altogether too light for the proper service of the several batteries. With a small number (say two) of 8-inch howitzers and two 8-inch mortars I could command

most of Mulberry Island and reach their landings on the James River side.

James River from Newport News to a point about 4 miles above the mouth of the Warwick has an average breadth of nearly 5 miles, enabling the smaller vessels to keep out of the range of batteries on the Peninsula. At that point it is reduced to about $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles, and continues of this width some 2 miles. Above the light-house on Mulberry Point it widens out again. Would not possession of the island enable the commanding general to control in a considerable degree the James River in case the Navy fails to do the work?

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN J. PECK,
Brigadier-General.

General R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.

[Indorsement.]

MAY 1, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded. I think more heavy artillery necessary to make much impression on Mulberry Island than General Peck specifies.

E. D. KEYES,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

No. 18.

Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, of reconnaissance toward Yorktown, April 6, with indorsements.

CAMP IN FRONT OF WARWICK COURT-HOUSE,
April 7, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that in obedience to instructions from division headquarters I yesterday morning proceeded with the Fifth Wisconsin and Sixth Maine Regiments of Volunteers to make a reconnaissance from this point of the creek, forming the line of the enemy's defenses, until I met our own troops coming from the direction of Yorktown. Lieutenant Merrill, of the Engineers, and Lieutenant Bowen, Topographical Engineer, were ordered to report to me.

We found the enemy in possession of the whole length of the stream, our skirmishers meeting the enemy's pickets at every point on this side of the river and driving them to it, and in several places across it. In each case field works of the enemy were developed, all, with one exception, having artillery in them. The stream is a succession of pools, formed by damming the river at different points, rendering it, it is understood, unfordable, the enemy's pickets retiring by small bridges. The banks of the stream on the other side appear generally to be higher than on this side. In one case, however, at some chimneys in an open field, at about 400 yards distance, the ground is higher than their battery opposite, mounting one gun, but there are evidences of another work behind this, sheltered by the woods, and there are appearances of ranges being cut in the woods and two guns there. This is the point where Lieutenant Comstock met my column and made a reconnaissance, covered by one of my regiments, the Sixth Maine, under Colonel Burnham.

This creek here is about 1,200 yards distant from the Yorktown road. The Fourteenth Alabama was stationed there, and according to the statement of four soldiers of that regiment, taken by the Sixth Maine Volunteers, it numbered 1,070 men when it left Richmond, a few days ago. During the afternoon other movements of troops were observed marching down the stream behind the works, while this regiment was holding the crest of the creek. The dam there, by the statement of the colonel, is from 15 to 20 rods in length and about 12 feet broad. It is believed that yesterday that point could have been easily taken. The colonel of the regiment sent me a message by his major, asking permission to take it, which, however, I did not receive, being at the time with the other regiment, overlooking the two lower works. I merely mention this to show his idea of the practicability of it at that time, for I imagine the difficulty would have been in crossing the creek and in maintaining possession after we had taken it, for we had no artillery or intrenching tools with us. Major Harris, who took the message, with an escort of two men, meeting a scouting party of seven of the enemy, was prevented from communicating. He, however, by a ruse (commanding a deployment of men) and the fire of the two men, killing one of the enemy, causing them to fall back, escaped.

The circumstances were entirely changed afterwards, for the movement of several regiments of troops beyond the forts was observed by our line of skirmishers, who, notwithstanding, held the crest for about three hours, and until withdrawn to return. The next work below that appeared to be a rifle pit, and showed no guns. Our skirmishers, of the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, Captain Bean, drove the enemy from this crest down the bank, across the bridge there, and into their works. This appears to be flanked by the work in rear of the one-gun battery. Below this three other works were seen, each mounting artillery, each containing several guns. We drove the enemy to the crest of the high ground overlooking the flat in front of these forts. From the one (of those two) highest up the stream the enemy threw a number of shells at our skirmishers. It appears to have a direct control of the next one or two lower down the stream. We had a fair view of the lower work from this crest at about not more than 1,000 paces, and probably not so far. This crest commands it, and looks down upon the mill and road directly under it.

Troops are stationed at the mill, for at each time of driving their skirmishers in bugle-calls sounded the alarm, and the movement of a piece of light artillery was heard. It appeared to us to be moved toward us, in order to prevent our skirmishers from descending the crest or debouching on the road. At another point lower down, at 1,100 yards' distance, we had a fair, unobstructed view of the fourth work in the order mentioned, from ground that commanded it, and with a level plain between us and the stream. Our skirmishers, who had lain there twenty-four hours, reported that the parapets of that work had been raised about 3 feet. There is an encampment of troops in the woods on one flank and one in the rear of it. Several colors could be seen in the woods. For a detailed explanation as to the armament, position of the forts, and their relative positions, I beg leave to refer you to the reports of the engineers, who made their reports direct to the headquarters of the army corps. I herewith inclose a return of the casualties.*

Our soldiers behaved with spirit. I may mention here the names of

* Not found.

several persons whose conduct was marked: Captain Ross, Captain Bean, Lieutenant Oliver, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers; Colonel Burnham, Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler, Major Harris, and First Lieut. J. D. McFarland, adjutant, Sixth Maine Volunteers. The latter, on horseback, took a prisoner within 150 paces of the enemy's battery, chasing him on horseback to that point in a direct range of the enemy's infantry and artillery, and in unobstructed view of the fort mounting one gun, which was afterward discharged at our troops. The parapet was lined with infantry and the gunners were at their posts. The officer was not fired at probably because he kept the prisoner between the fort and himself. This officer reports that the water is 5 or 6 rods in breadth. He had a perfectly unobstructed view of it. In approaching this work he leaped his horse over a rifle pit, not of recent construction, which was on this side of the river. It was a little above the fort and nearly at right angles with the stream. Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler and this adjutant captured three other prisoners. The first prisoner taken was a signal man, placed behind some chimneys at 400 yards distance from the battery; the other three were of a party of five scouts of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler commanded the skirmishers at this point. A number of the enemy were killed at different points where our skirmishers came in contact with them.

It is but just to speak of the handsome manner in which Lieutenant Merrill and Lieutenant Bowen, the engineers, made their observations under the enemy's fire and in short range of their guns.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

[Indorsements.]

HEADQUARTERS NEAR FOUR CORNERS,
April 10, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded. The attention of the brigadier-general commanding the Fourth Army Corps is called to the handsome and thorough manner in which Brigadier-General Hancock, commanding the reconnaissance, conducted it.

WM. F. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

DEAR GENERAL: I send you, entirely unofficially, a copy of General Hancock's report, thinking the information may be immediately useful, and not knowing when you may get it regularly. I think the road from Yorktown to Lee's Mill should be guarded at the point where it leaves the road to Warwick. The road also leading to your camp from here should be guarded, and I would respectfully suggest that if the brigade of Sedgwick, now in front, is not sufficient for both, another one be ordered up. I have ordered my artillery horses to begin to pack forage remaining at Ship Point for a feed. We cannot use them to any extent here, and I have ordered the caisson horses for that purpose.

Yours, as ever,

WM. F. SMITH.

General McCLELLAN.

No. 19.

Report of Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, U. S. Army, as Director of the Siege of Yorktown, from April 7-May 5.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, OPPOSITE WEST POINT, VA.,
May 8, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to present the following narrative of events in front of Yorktown, connected with the operations of my division and my duties as director of the siege since my last report of the 7th of April:

To the 10th ultimo my division occupied the position in front of Yorktown taken on arrival, viz: One brigade in the timber skirting the upper branches of Wormley's Creek, one brigade in rear on the plateau immediately west of the mill-dam on that creek, the third brigade in the angle between the roads to Yorktown from Warwick Court-House and Fortress Monroe. Batteries were attached to each brigade, and posted to sweep all approaches and the front of each command. My command thus posted guarded the whole front of Yorktown from York River to the Warwick. Two brigades were shielded by timber from the view of the enemy and protected against sorties, and could give to or receive quickly aid from the other brigades if attacked. Sentinels were pushed as far to the front as the irregularities of the ground or other cover would permit, and, with the artillery behind a parapet erected for the purpose near the White House, inflicted much injury upon the skirmishers and gunners and the enemy encamped within the works. The Fourth Michigan Volunteers in open day drove from under the guns of the enemy from 20 to 30 beef cattle and cows, and so quickly that the enemy could not fire upon them until they had secured their booty and were under shelter.

Our camps were within range of the enemy's guns, and consequently without fires, during the exceedingly wet weather of that period. I was therefore instructed by my corps commander to move on the 10th of April my division to the plateau south of Wormley's Creek, and to picket from York River to the Yorktown road, where they would be joined by the pickets of Hamilton's division, which at this time had arrived, and had been directed to relieve my brigade on the west of the Yorktown road. My division occupied this position till the close of the siege, the duties in front being diminished by Hooker's division, which arrived soon afterwards and encamped immediately on my left, thus closing the interval between Hamilton and myself, and completing the line from York River to the Warwick. While under the fire of the enemy's guns, so carefully and well posted were the men that from the 6th to the 10th of April the division lost only some 15 men, including casualties from several sorties from the enemy on the left; yet I have reason to believe more serious loss was inflicted upon the enemy.

Personal reconnaissances, confirmed by the reports of engineer officers and the troops, showed the Yorktown defenses to be strong and well armed, and connected with those on the Warwick by field works for artillery and infantry; that the Warwick was not fordable; that the bridges were destroyed, and the approaches to the several dams, which had backed up the water to overflow the banks, were obstructed by abatis and defended on the right bank by strong forts, which were well armed and manned, and connected by infantry parapets.

Officers on picket reported the enemy apparently in great numbers

and very active, while deserters stated that the troops at Yorktown, originally about 15,000, had been vastly increased by arrivals from Richmond, and were confident of successfully defending the place. On this end of the line it was at this time well established that the works could not be carried before the enemy's artillery was silenced without fearful sacrifice of life, while I understood that in the opinion of the general commanding the left, as well as of the engineer officers, the line of the Warwick below Wynn's Mill could not be carried by assault.

Heavy rains having rendered impassable the roads to the depots for subsistence, I caused to be examined and staked out the channel of Wormley's Creek, with the view of getting provisions and grain landed in my camp. Up this creek was eventually brought the pontoons and also the heaviest portions of the siege artillery. For ease of communication, and to enable support to be thrown, if necessary, quickly to the front, I caused bridges to be thrown over this creek and roads to be opened, and for annoyance to the enemy and the security of the picket line along the whole front of the corps I caused to be detailed daily portions of the regiment of Sharpshooters under Colonel Berdan, who, aided by Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley and other officers of the regiment, pushed the rifle pits as close as possible to the enemy's works. The Berdan Sharpshooters throughout the siege also furnished companies and rendered valuable aid to the corps of Sumner and Keyes.

The troops were employed to the 17th, in connection with those of other divisions of the corps, in opening roads, building bridges, guarding the front, and in occasional reconnaissances. On the 11th the enemy, after driving in the pickets of Hamilton's division and destroying the house in the peach orchard to the left of the Yorktown road, attacked my picket line, but was repulsed by a section of Weedon's Rhode Island Battery and the Twenty-second Massachusetts Volunteers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Griswold. My picket line was immediately re-established, but Hamilton's did not connect till the 17th, under Colonel Lansing. On the 13th an attack on the right of my line was handsomely met and repulsed by the Twelfth New York Volunteers, under Major Barnum. A close and thorough reconnaissance on the 25th, made by that excellent officer of the army, Col. Jesse A. Gove, with his regiment, the Twenty-second Massachusetts Volunteers, confirmed his former reports of the 5th and 16th that the Warwick was not fordable, the banks swampy, and the dams near its headwaters, on account of artificial obstructions, unapproachable in face of the enemy on the opposite banks. The reports of casualties in these affairs have been forwarded, as well as the result of the reconnaissance.

Reconnaissances in the balloon had materially aided me, as well as other officers, in obtaining information of the strength of the enemy's position, which was to a great degree confirmed on the 11th by an elevated and extensive view of the defenses of Yorktown, the whole line of the Warwick, and of the enemy's bivouacs, obtained while accidentally breaking loose while ascending. I desire here to remark that the balloon can be made a most useful accessory to reconnaissances, and especially valuable in an extensive battle, if the observer be intelligent and educated for the military profession. Without that professional education the relations of works or bodies of troops to each other, and the movements of troops or trains of artillery or wagons, and many other facts of the greatest moment, may and often will be unnoticed. A signal officer, or, better still, the magnetic telegraph, should accompany the aeronaut.

On the 18th of April, the necessary approaches to the first parallel

and the bridges being nearly completed, the first parallel and some of the batteries were commenced, and their completion pushed as rapidly as the supply of tools, &c., would permit. From that time to the 27th the loss in my division from the fire of the enemy was very small, and was generally caused by the Sharpshooters.

On the 27th, for reasons known only to the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac, I was appointed director of the siege, and had assigned to me for temporary duty two of his aides, Captains Kirkland and Mason. On that day I visited the whole work and made myself acquainted with everything relating to it, the working parties, the guards, &c., which I had not personally known, and arranged for united action under all circumstances on the whole front and for expediting the completion of the works. For these purposes I issued on that day in manuscript my printed instructions of May 1. To the faithful execution of them by all officers in command, and to the energetic, laborious, and faithful action of the officers in charge of working parties and their assistants, is due in a great measure the punctual arrival of details properly supplied with tools and provisions, and the rapid completion of the labor assigned them.

On the 28th a two-gun battery was silenced by a battery of First New York Artillery, attached to the artillery reserve. This battery was erected by the enemy opposite Battery A, on our left, to annoy our workmen and to aid in the protection of one of the dams of the Warwick, a small work in the front of which had been carried by General Grover on the 26th.

On May 1 the enemy placed two rifled guns in Hamilton's front, near the burned house, and indications of a sortie were reported by the general of the trenches, Colonel Lansing. The necessary dispositions were made to resist any attack of the enemy, but none was made except on a party making rifle pits in advance of the works on the extreme right. It was repulsed with slight loss by a small force of the Second Maine and Thirteenth New York Volunteers.

From the 1st instant the firing of the enemy had been quite brisk, causing some losses, but on the 3d the firing increased in rapidity and many of the shots fell in our camps. Suspicions of intended evacuation of Yorktown were roused that night, but all efforts to ascertain the fact were defeated, and it was with great difficulty that the rifle pits on the right were completed.

About 3.30 on the morning of the 4th, upon explosions and fires in the enemy's works being reported to me, I directed the generals of the trenches, General Jameson and Colonel McQuade, Fourteenth New York, at once to push forward a force into the works. Before the order was carried into effect General Jameson informed me that deserters reported the place abandoned. The commands designated to enter the town pushed forward rapidly. The one on the left was fired upon from the Red Fort. Those on the right experienced some losses from shell planted in the ground, which exploded when trod upon. Many of these shell were concealed in the streets and houses of the town, and arranged to explode by treading on the caps or pulling a wire attached to the doors. These attempts to destroy life were discovered in time to prevent many injuries.

As the sun rose the national flag was unfurled to the breeze, conveying to the Army and Navy the glad tidings that the authority of the United States had been extended without a desperate struggle over these formidable defenses and this stronghold of the enemy. Colonel Gove, Twenty-second Massachusetts, and Colonel Black, Sixty-second

Pennsylvania Volunteers, simultaneously displayed their flags. The greater number of the batteries were ready for service, when in great haste the enemy, on the night of the 3d instant, abandoned Yorktown and the line of works on the Warwick. On the 5th all batteries would have been completed in time to open fire that night. Battery No. 1, on the 1st instant, opened fire upon the town and wharf, and succeeded in driving from the latter vessels which appeared to be landing troops and ammunition. The destructive effects of this battery, and the presumed knowledge of the enemy of the probable time the other batteries would open, must have been the main cause of the sudden evacuation of Yorktown and abandonment of the line of the Warwick, as it cannot be doubted that the fire of these batteries would in a few hours have been most destructive upon the enemy and rendered untenable the works of Yorktown, without which the defenses of the Warwick were useless.

I desire to call the attention to the reports heretofore forwarded of General Jameson, Colonel McQuade, and Colonel Lansing, generals of the trenches, which exhibit the state of affairs at the last moment of the siege and the occupation of Yorktown.* Eager for the success of our cause; intelligent, earnest, and laborious in the performance of duty; energetic in requiring the same of all under them; guarding against unnecessary exposure of their men, yet regardless of danger to themselves, they represent the spirit of all officers, from other divisions as well as my own, with whom my duties have thrown me in contact. In this connection I desire also especially to mention Brigadier-Generals Morell, Martindale, Birney, Butterfield, and Grover, and Col. J. H. Hobart Ward, all generals of the trenches. Lient. Col. Strong Vincent, Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers; Lient. Col. Howard [Thos. W.] Egan, Fortieth New York, and Major Holt, whose intelligence, energy, good judgment, and system in the control of the working parties cannot be too highly commended.

In addition to my own division were employed in the labors of the siege the divisions of Hooker and Hamilton and the regular troops under Brigadier-General Sykes. As far as came under my observation all performed their laborious and oftentimes dangerous duty cheerfully and effectively. A few complaints were made by the engineers and officers in charge of working parties of negligence on the part of some troops, but the complaints were very rare.

I must leave to the brigade and regimental commanders to give the names and labors of junior officers, whose services are especially deserving of commendation for their cheerful, energetic labors and frequent gallant acts during the siege, and I refer to their reports for the extensive list. In my own command I desire to present the names of the following regiments, which, under their respective commanders, were continually in the trenches, and most faithfully and cheerfully, under all circumstances, frequently most trying, performed their laborious and dangerous duties during the thirty days of the siege: Second Maine, Col. C. W. Roberts, and Lieutenant-Colonel Varney; Fourth Michigan, Colonel Woodbury; Sixteenth Michigan, Colonel Stockton and Major Welch; Ninth Massachusetts, Colonel Cass; Eighteenth Massachusetts, Col. J. Barnes, Lieutenant-Colonel Ingraham, and Major Hayes; Twenty-second Massachusetts, Col. J. A. Gove, Lieutenant-Colonel Griswold, and Major Tilton; Sixty-second Pennsylvania, Col. S. W. Black and Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzer; Eighty-third Pennsylv-

* See Jameson's, No. 53, and McQuade's, No. 55; Lansing's, not found.

nia, Colonel McLane and Lieutenant-Colonel Vincent; Twelfth New York, Colonel Weeks, Lieutenant-Colonel Richardson, and Major Barnum; Thirteenth New York, Col. E. G. Marshall; Seventeenth New York, Col. H. S. Lansing; Fourteenth New York, Colonel McQuade; Forty-fourth New York, Colonel Stryker and Lieutenant-Colonel Rice; Twenty-fifth New York, Colonel Johnson; Berdan Sharpshooters, Colonel Berdan and Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley. The last two deserve great credit throughout the siege for pushing forward the rifle pits close to the enemy's works and keeping down the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters.

I desire also to express my gratification at the gallant and efficient service of the division artillery, under the immediate direction of Capt. Charles Griffin, Fifth Artillery, whose reports of service rendered and losses in respective batteries were forwarded in proper time. Often exposed to a hot fire from the enemy, and meeting with some losses, these batteries were examples of superior discipline and instruction, and the conspicuous coolness, gallantry, bravery, and skill of the officers and men merited the highest commendation. These batteries were: D, Fifth Artillery, Capt. Charles Griffin; C, Rhode Island Artillery, Captain Weeden; C and E, Massachusetts Artillery, commanded, respectively, by Capt. A. P. Martin and Allen.

Many officers of the regular artillery were employed, and rendered most efficient service in superintending the erection of batteries and magazines, laying platforms, mounting guns, &c. In many instances they were specially under the direction of General Barnard, who, cognizant of their labors, I presume will give those officers due credit for their services. Those who came specially under my notice after I was appointed director of the siege were Lieutenants Kingsbury, Hazlett, Randol, Benjamin, Elder, Barlow, Dresser, Pennington, and Carroll. My aides-de-camp, Lieutenants McQuade, Fourteenth New York; George Monteith, Fourth Michigan; S. M. Weld, Eighteenth Massachusetts, were engaged night and day in carrying my orders, often under fire.

I desire to express my thanks to the major-general commanding for the loan of his aides, Captains Mason and Kirkland, who, with my aides, promptly carried and saw to the execution of my orders. During a few days near the close of the siege, while confined to my tent by illness, I had necessarily to rely upon these officers for information of the progress of the works, posting troops, the position, movements, and apparent intentions of the enemy, which, with the best of judgment, was obtained often by great exposure to the fire of the enemy.

Surgeon Lyman, medical director of the division, and his assistants, Brigade Surgeons Waters and Bentley, deserve the warmest commendation for their zeal, activity, and forethought in establishing hospitals and their prompt and excellent care of the sick and wounded.

Capt. C. B. Norton, division quartermaster, aided by Brigade Quartermasters Smith, McHarg, and Caslow, as also Brigade Commissaries McKelvy, Spear, and Walker, and Lieutenant Batchelder, ordnance officer, deserve high praise for their energy and judgment in procuring and keeping up under great difficulties the supplies of their respective departments, which were rarely deficient, and from which they were often able to supply the wants of adjacent commands.

Immediately after the occupation of Yorktown by my command I assigned, in compliance with orders, the Forty-fourth New York Volunteers to duty there, it being an excellent and reliable regiment, and, with another regiment designated by the major-general commanding, strong enough to hold Yorktown and Gloucester Point. That day

General Van Alen was assigned to the command of Yorktown and vicinity, and having assumed control and made all necessary arrangements for the defense of the posts, the care of property, cleanliness, &c., I withdrew my command.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,

Major-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Headquarters Army of the Potomac.

No. 20.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer
Army of the Potomac, of operations during the siege.*

CAMP NEAR YORKTOWN, VA., May 6, 1862.

SIR: The accompanying drawing (map No. 2)* gives with accuracy the outline and armament of the fortifications of Yorktown proper, with the detached works immediately connected therewith (map No. 3). The general outline is almost the same as that of the British works in the Revolution; the trace is somewhat different. The profile is everywhere respectable. The three bastioned forts looking toward our approaches appear to have been earliest built, and have about 15 feet thickness of parapet and 8 to 10 depth of ditch, the width varying much, but never being less at tops of counterscarp than 15 feet, and I should think generally much more. The works extending around the town from the western salient of fronts just mentioned appear to have been finished during the past winter and spring. They have formidable profiles, 18 feet thickness of parapet, and generally 10 feet depth of ditch.

The water batteries had generally 18 feet parapet, the guns *en barbette*. They were (as well as all the works mentioned) carefully constructed, with well-made sod revetments. There were numerous traverses between the guns and ample magazines, how sufficient in bomb-proof qualities I am unable to say. The water batteries were as follows: No. 1, five 8-inch columbiads; No. 2, four 8-inch columbiads; No. 3, three 32s and one 32 navy; No. 4, three 32s (1827); No. 5, two 32s; No. 6, three 9-inch Dahlgrens and one 10-inch Dahlgren; No. 7, on beach, three 8-inch columbiads and one 64-pounder, besides a 42-pounder carronade, intended to sweep the shore.

The first two guns of the works on the heights bore upon the water as well as the land, and were of heavy caliber. The guns in position on the fronts of attack (the first two of which bore on the water) were as follows, commencing on the left. (See the list herewith, which gives all the guns in position or for which there were emplacements.) The emplacements were all occupied before the evacuation by siege guns, rifled, 4½-inch 24-pounders and 18-pounders.

In Fort Magruder (the first exterior work) there were found one 8-inch columbiad, one 42-pounder, and one 8-inch siege howitzer, the two former *en barbette*. The sketch will show the emplacements for guns on field or siege carriages, making, I think, with the foregoing,

* All maps referred to in this report will appear in Atlas.

twenty-two. Two of these were placed behind traverses, with embrasures covered by blindages. The two external redoubts with the connecting parapets formed a re-entrant with the fronts of attack, and all the guns bore on our approaches. It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches were swept by the fire of at least forty-nine guns, nearly all of which were heavy, and many of them the most formidable guns known; besides that, two-thirds of the guns of the water batteries and all the guns of Gloucester bore on our right batteries, though under disadvantageous circumstances. Besides the above there were emplacements for four or five guns in the entrenchments running from Yorktown toward Fort Magruder. The guns on barbette carriages had not any protection, except in a few cases sand bags had been piled up. It is supposed that they awaited further indications as to the localities of our batteries before constructing merlons. For the guns on ship or siege carriages some arrangements had been made for protection by building up sodded merlons, or by sand bags and cotton bales, but as they were they would have been very inefficient against our fire.

The ravine behind which the left of the Yorktown fronts of attack was placed was not very difficult, and its head formed depressions in front of their left imperfectly seen by their fires, and from which access could be had to the ditches, but we could not be sure of this fact before the evacuation. The enemy held, by means of a slight breastwork and rifle trenches, a position in advance of the heads of these ravines as far forward as the burned house. Our own rifle trenches were advanced to within 60 yards of the burned house—a point from which the day before the evacuation I made my last reconnaissance. Owing, however, to the fact that the enemy's riflemen were better concealed by shrubbery, &c., than our own, our men, who had just constructed their trench the night before, did not dare to show their heads or use their rifles, and I was unable to examine the grounds in front.

The ravines which head between the Yorktown fortifications and exterior works are deep and intricate. They were tolerably well seen, however, by the works which run westwardly from the Yorktown works, and which were too numerous and complicated to be traced on paper.

Fort Magruder, the first lunette on our left, appears to have been built at an early period, probably before the rear of Yorktown was inclosed, and to prevent the approach of an enemy who should attempt to pass the ravines. It had a moderately strong profile, but its gorge, a mere stockade, was taken in reverse by our Battery No. 13.

The Red Redoubt (square) farther to the left answered very well as a means of continuing the line and securing against assault by ordinary means, but its front was almost wholly occupied by barbettes for field or siege guns, and its interior was seen from our Battery No. 13. The exterior connection between this work was first a rifle trench, probably afterwards enlarged into a parapet, with external ditch and an emplacement for four guns in or near the small redan in the center.

Behind this they had constructed numerous epaulements, with connecting boyaux, not fully arranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended, probably, to protect their camps and reserves against the destructive effects of our artillery. From the Red Redoubt these trenches and epaulements ran to the woods and rivulet which forms a head with the Warwick, and continue almost without break to connect with the works at Wynn's Mill. This stream mentioned (whatever be its name, the term "Warwick," according to some, applying only to the tidal channel from the James River up as high as Lee's Mill) is

inundated by a number of dams from near where its head is crossed by the epaulements mentioned down to Lee's Mill. Below Lee's Mill the Warwick follows a tortuous course through salt marshes of 200 to 300 yards in width, from which the land rises up boldly to a height of 30 or 40 feet. The first group of works is at Wynn's Mill, where there is a dam and bridge. The next is to guard another dam between Wynn's and Lee's Mills. (This is the point attacked by General Smith on the 16th ultimo. His object was merely to prevent the further construction of works and to feel the strength of the position.)

A work, of what extent is not now known, was at the sharp angle of the stream just above Lee's Mill, and a group of works was at Lee's Mill, where there was also a dam and bridge. From Lee's Mill a line of works extends across Mulberry Island, or is supposed to do so. At Southall's Landing is another formidable group of works, and from here, too, they extend apparently across to the James. These groups of field works were connected by rifle pits, trenches, or parapets for nearly the whole distance. They are far more extensive than may be supposed from the mention of them I make, and every kind of obstruction which the country offered, such as abatis, marsh, inundation, &c., was skillfully used. The line is certainly one of the most extensive known in modern times. The country on both sides of the Warwick from near Yorktown down is a dense forest, with few clearings. It was swampy and the roads impassable during the heavy rains we have continually had, except where our own labors had corduroyed them. If we could have broken the enemy's line across the isthmus we could have invested Yorktown, and it must with its garrison have soon fallen into our hands. It was not deemed practicable, considering the strength of that line and the difficulty of handling our forces, owing to the impracticable character of the country, to do so.

If we could take Yorktown or drive the enemy out of Yorktown the enemy's line was no longer tenable. This we could do by siege operations, and the result was in my mind a certainty. It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault. The operations of the siege required extensive preparations, and the landing and bringing up of siege artillery by roads which we had to corduroy throughout their whole extent were in themselves heavy operations. The position of Wormley's Creek, with its numerous wooded ravines, which head near Yorktown, 1,500 yards (at that distance there was everywhere good cover in them), offered great facilities for siege operations, while it at the same time demanded great preliminary labor. Numerous bridges had to be built and roads prepared along the margin of the creek and up the ravines. Nearly 5,000 yards of road, mostly side cutting, with numerous crib-work bridges over intersecting ravines, were constructed. The mill-dam was widened for vehicles, and a crib-work bridge built at the "old dam." Three pontoon bridges, two long crib-work bridges, one floating-raft bridge, were constructed lower down (though not all maintained), and other bridges were in construction toward the mouth and over the South Branch.

This preliminary work was so far complete on the 17th of April that it was deemed practicable to commence the construction of batteries, and the following decided on:

Battery No. 1, five 100-pounder Parrotts and one 200-pounder Parrott at Farinholt's house. Battery No. 2, fifteen guns, $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch 30 and 20 pounders, 1,500 yards from Redoubt, and 2,000 yards from big gun. Battery No. 3, six guns, 20-pounder Parrotts, 1,900 yards from

Red Redoubt. Battery No. 4, ten 13-inch mortars, Moore's plateau. Battery No. 5, four 20-pounder Parrotts, near Warwick road.

N. B.—Six 20-pounders were put in this battery.

Batteries Nos. 1 and 2 were immediately commenced and finished (essentially finished) in three days. No. 3 was commenced, but its construction was retarded by circumstances unnecessary to explain. The sites of Nos. 4 and 5 were not definitely fixed until two or three days later, and another, Battery No. 6, for six 4½-inch ordnance rifled guns, was determined upon. Portions of parallel connecting Nos. 2 and 3, and from the left of Yorktown road to No. 5, were commenced in the edge of the woods by daylight on the 25th. The same night a parallel was run through the open ground from No. 3 to connect with those portions just mentioned, and carried to a depth of 4 feet and a width of 6 feet, affording good cover. The same night a portion of parallel was commenced from near the point marked on the map as Redoubt C to near the head of the ravine toward the York River, and carried to dimensions to afford cover.

On the night of the 27th a parallel was run across from the head of ravine in one night to the York River (or rather to the edge of the bluff), and on the night of the 29th a branch or boyau was run from this to a point 200 yards more advanced on the bluff, from which the whole area between us and the fortress was seen, the gorge of the first redoubt taken in reverse, and the Red Redoubt plunged into.

I have not time to enter into the details of works and batteries, but will simply state that Battery No. 6 was changed into a battery for five sea-coast mortars, Battery No. 5 enlarged to contain eight 20-pounders, and Battery No. 3 enlarged to contain seven 20-pounder Parrotts. Batteries 7 and 8, for six 20-pounder Parrotts each, were built to operate on the work at Wynn's Mill; Battery No. 9, for ten 10-inch siege mortars; battery No. 10, for three 100-pounder Parrotts and seven 4½-inch ordnance; Battery No. 11, for five 10-inch sea-coast mortars; Battery No. 12, for five 10-inch and five 8-inch siege mortars; Battery No. 13, for three 30-pounder Parrotts and four 30-pounder Parrotts, directed at the redoubt at Yorktown works and on to batteries capable of being used on Gloucester; Battery No. 14 for three 100-pounder Parrotts and one 100-pounder James, to operate on Yorktown water batteries and Gloucester. Another 200-pounder Parrott was ordered to Battery No. 1.

Redoubts A and B, for strengthening our line, were finished, Redoubt C well advanced, and Redoubt D just commenced on the night of May 3. A parallel had been run from Redoubt A to Battery No. 5, obstructions and portions of parallel from Redoubt A to Batteries 7 and 8. The foregoing applies to the state of the works on May 3; not to the particular time at which they were finished. A battery for two 8-inch siege howitzers was being commenced in a clearing south of the Wynn's Mill works, to enfilade that position, and two 8-inch mortars were to be put in position to operate on the works in front of General Smith's position.

On the night of May 3 all the batteries were armed (*i. e.*, contained their armament) except three 100-pounders in No. 10, seven Parrott guns in No. 13, four 100-pounders in No. 14, and part of the sea-coast and siege 10 and 8 inch mortars were yet to be placed in battery.

All would have been ready on the night of the 5th, and the fire would have been opened on Tuesday morning. The water batteries would have been enfiladed by Batteries Nos. 1, 13, and 14, while they were in the direct line to receive all the shots of No. 10, which passed over the front of the work, and indeed No. 2 as well. The gunboats would have

engaged and run past the water batteries, and opened a fire upon the rear of the town and enfiladed the ravine over the outlet of which the road from Yorktown to Williamsburg passes.

When the number of our mortars and guns are considered, the great security with which they would have been worked (owing to their careful construction and the manetlets provided for the embrasures), the positions which Batteries Nos. 1, 10, 13, and 14 occupied, the co-operation of the Navy, &c., it will be admitted, I think, that the enemy's position had become untenable; that he could not have endured our fire for six hours.

It should be mentioned that Battery No. 1 was opened on the 1st, and with great effect on the wharf (where the enemy appeared to be receiving artillery and stores) and the town.

During the first opening of our parallels little effort was made by the enemy to interfere with our work by his fire, but after opening the parallel between the ravine and York River an incessant fire was kept up during the day with rifled projectiles, 8-inch shell, and solid shot, and 32 and 34 pounder shot, without retarding the work in the least or causing material loss of life. It is also a matter of surprise that, since our first appearance before Yorktown (April 5, and particularly since the 15th) the ravines and woods have been filled with men, night and day, making roads, building batteries, parallels, and guarding the works, the loss of life has been most trifling. I know not the exact number, but I have reason to believe that it does not amount to a dozen. I can hardly conceive that the enemy should not have known how to use his curved fires with more effect upon those ravines. There was probably no very great supply of ammunition, and that was reserved for warmer work. His fire for the last two or three days was pretty brisk, however. During the siege operations General Woodbury, with his brigade, has been mainly engaged on the construction of roads and bridges, making gabions and fascines, and constructing Battery No. 4 (13-inch mortar).

Captain Duane, with his command, and Lieutenants Comstock and McAlester, have superintended the siege works. All these officers have exhibited great energy, industry, and courage, and will be favorably mentioned by the commanding general, as also my aide-de-camp, Lieut. H. L. Abbot, Topographical Engineers, who has done most valuable service in the reconnaissances and determination of the positions of the enemy and our own works.

Although it is next to impossible to fix by reconnaissance the exact trace of field works, our plans prove to be quite accurate, and the position of every one of the enemy's guns bearing on our own was marked.

Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Farquhar have been at General Sumner's headquarters engaged in examining the enemy's positions along the Warwick and in strengthening our own and in constructing Batteries Nos. 7 and 8. Had the siege continued further they would have been brought to the front. I should mention that besides the siege work mentioned extensive boyaux of communication were made down the Peninsula between the York River and Wormley's Creek, as shown on the siege plan.

I should remark that the bateaux-bridge equipage constructed during the last winter has proved of infinite service, and I believe it is the only reliable military bridge. Such equipages as the India-rubber, or even the Russian canvas-boat bridge, are of very limited applicability.

I send herewith four maps, viz: Map 1, siege plan; map 2, plan of Yorktown and Gloucester works, taken after our occupation (it must

be borne in mind that there is a difference in the scale); map 3, plan of external works immediately connected with Yorktown; map 4, general topography and delineation of the enemy's line across the Peninsula. I regret that there is not time and means to prepare a complete plan of this enormous system of defenses. They should form part of the record of the operations of the Army of the Potomac.

The forcing of such a line with so little loss in itself is an exploit less brilliant, perhaps, but more worthy of study, than would have been a murderous assault, even if it had proved successful.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient,

J. G. BARNARD,

Brig. Gen., and Chief Engineer Army of the Potomac.

General JOSEPH G. TOTTEN,

Chief Engineer, &c., Washington, D. C.

Journal of the siege.

Saturday, April 5.—The headquarters of the army reached Church about 1 o'clock. General Heintzelman joined us; the chief engineer accompanied him to the front and examined the enemy's lines.

Sunday, April 6.—The chief engineer went up to the front with Lieutenant McAlester, and reconnoitered ravines in front of Yorktown and gave general instructions to Lieutenant Merrill to reconnoiter Warwick River to connect with Lieutenant Comstock; to Lieutenant Comstock to reconnoiter from Wynn's Mill down to connect with Lieutenant Merrill; to Lieutenant McAlester to reconnoiter works in front; also to Lieutenant Abbot to survey ravines.

Monday, April 7.—The chief engineer accompanied the commanding general to examine the enemy's position along Warwick River from Southall's Landing down; instructed Lieutenant Comstock to repair to General Keyes' headquarters and continue the various reconnaissances up to Wynn's Mill. Lieutenant Abbot reconnoitered front of Yorktown fort.

Tuesday, April 8.—Engineers employed in the reconnaissances mentioned.

Wednesday, April 9.—Lieutenant Comstock temporarily with General Keyes reconnoitering from Wynn's Mill down to connect with Merrill's reconnaissance; Lieutenant Abbot with Keyes reconnoitering Warwick River from Lee's Mill down; Lieutenant McAlester reconnoitering from left of Yorktown road to Wynn's Mill; Captain Duane and command at Ship Point.

Thursday, April 10.—Engineers employed as before; Captain Duane came in with his command, leaving 10 at Ship Point to look out for engineer property. Lieutenant Abbot obtained very satisfactory reconnaissance of Yorktown lines. The chief engineer selected an engineer and artillery depot in company with the chief of artillery, and examined the road between Cheeseman's and Back Creeks. Examined the Yorktown and Gloucester shore and works from Farinholt's house.

Friday, April 11.—Captain Duane and command to move down to the engineer depot and make arrangements for getting up bridge equipage and engineer materials and tools. Lieutenant McAlester was

directed last night to push reconnaissance; two points especially mentioned: First, as to the practicability of attack, attacking the position of Wynn's Mill by enfilading batteries near forks of roads, and by direct batteries in front and cutting the dams; second, as to batteries on the knoll and parallel thereto on the left.

Saturday, April 12.—Lieutenant Comstock finished his reconnaissance and report of the reconnaissance of Warwick River. Lieutenant McAlester was engaged in examining for batteries and observing enemy's works. Lieutenant Merrill, with General Keyes' corps, in conjunction with Lieutenant Bowen, Topographical Engineers, reconnoitering the Warwick River. Captain Duane, with the regular engineer companies, examining the branches of Wormley's Creek for roads and bridges, his troops making gabions, &c.

Sunday, April 13.—Lieutenant Comstock surveying ravines in front of Yorktown; McAlester reconnoitering as before; Merrill remapping his reconnaissance; Captain Duane and command as before; Lieutenant Babcock, working under directions of Lieutenant McAlester, made an examination of Wynn's Mill position. General Woodbury reported with his command, and was directed to move near engineer depot.

Monday, April 14.—Lieutenant Comstock surveying ravines; Lieutenant McAlester examining for roads. Lieutenant Merrill came in with Lieutenant Bowen with the maps of their reconnaissance. He was instructed to lay before General Smith the views of the commanding general in reference to certain points and make such future examinations as he might think necessary. By Special Orders, No. 108, headquarters Army of the Potomac, Colonel Alexander, assisted by Lieutenant McAlester, was charged with direction of road-making in ravines at the mouth of Wormley's Creek, General Hamilton's division furnishing the working parties. General Woodbury was charged with roads and bridges between the two arms of the creek and south of the southern one.

Tuesday, April 15.—General Woodbury and his command supposed to be opening roads and establishing bridges and making gabions; Captain Duane, with regular engineer companies, on same duties; Colonel Alexander charged, by Special Orders, No. —, with laying and superintending roads south of Wormley's Creek; Colonel Alexander was engaged in assigning and making arrangements for beginning his portion of the roads; Lieutenant Comstock engaged in surveying ravines in front of Yorktown; Lieutenant McAlester assisting Colonel Alexander in discharge of duties assigned him in Special Orders, No. —. Lieutenant Merrill came in from General Smith with information and message, which was laid verbally before the commanding general. Lieut. N. J. Hall, assigned duty under my orders by Special Orders, No. —, was directed to examine the works of Yorktown to see how far they can be identified with old works. Lieutenant Abbot engaged in making up his reconnaissance of preceding days.

Wednesday, April 16.—General Woodbury is supposed to have been engaged yesterday in opening the roads between the two arms of Wormley's Creek and in building bridges. Part of his command are understood to be making gabions and fascines and part at work at the bridges and roads. Colonel Alexander, assisted by Lieutenant McAlester, commenced roads on the north bank of Wormley's; no report received of the exact progress; great delay was incurred from want of tools. Lieutenant Comstock was engaged exploring the ravines for batteries. Lieutenant Merrill accompanied General Smith's command in its

operations against the one-gun battery, and is understood to have been severely wounded in the arm. Lieutenant Abbot was engaged part of the day in making up his maps, and was ordered in the afternoon to proceed to Gorman's position, where the cannonading against Wynn's Mill batteries took place, to throw up epaulements for field artillery. Finding no tools in the division he returned to the depot, where he succeeded in getting enough for 400 or 500 men. On arriving no troops were found at the locality, and the locality of General Gorman's headquarters was not known. Lieutenant Abbot then proceeded to General Hamilton's division, and succeeded in obtaining working parties for two batteries, which were laid out; enough work was done to afford a thin cover. Lieutenant Abbot being ill, Lieutenant Babcock relieved him at 10 a. m. There is great difficulty about tools, which I know not how to remedy. Tools are issued by the quartermaster to troops, but there are no statements of how many are in any division or brigade. The demand for them for roads has prevented the selection of any depot. The quartermaster of each division or brigade should report how many there are in the command, and the chief quartermaster should establish a central depot near General Heintzelman's headquarters and place an officer in charge of it, and see to the return of tools not intended to be permanently issued.

Thursday, April 17.—The reconnaissances show that the different batteries of the works of Yorktown contain about as follows, empty embrasures being counted as guns :

Guns visible on enemy's lines.

	Guns.
Bluff battery No. 1 (nearest wharf)	5
Bluff battery No. 2	3
Bluff battery No. 3	3
Bluff battery No. 4	4
Bluff battery No. 5	4
Embrasure battery No. 6	4
In lower water battery Commander Missroon says he saw (I saw two and sand-bag embrasures for four more)	8
On main lines the big gun and its companion bear on the water	2
Total	33

Of these guns there can be directed at the proposed battery at Moore's house :

Guns of No. 1 (certain)	5
Guns of No. 3 (certain)	3
Guns of water battery No. 2 (certain)	2
Guns of No. 2 (probable)	4
Guns of No. 4 (probable)	3
Guns of No. 5 (probable)	4
Guns on main lines (probable)	2
Total	23

NOTE.—The Gloucester batteries, several of the water batteries, say four, and the water-bearing guns of the upper work, would bear on the extremity of this battery at 2 and $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Commander Missroon says he saw fifteen of the latter. I saw the same day his four or five from Moore's. A traverse would protect the extremity. There is 200 feet of space, and allowing 25 feet on the edge of bluff for howitzers would leave 175 feet, which space at $17\frac{1}{2}$ feet would give 10 guns; at 15 feet, 12 guns.

Guns on land fronts I have seen.

Land fronts.	Embrasure.	Heavy barbette.	Field barbette.	Total.	Remarks.
Front No. 1:					The big gun is on the west salient of this front.
East flank.....	1		2	1	
Curtain.....	1			1	
West face.....					Very doubtful about division of these faces or whether there are two.
Front No. 2:					
East face.....		1		1	
Curtain.....	1		1	2	
West salient.....		1		1	
Front No. 3:					
Curtain.....	1		3	4	
East shoulder angle.....		1		1	
East face.....	1			1	
Salient.....		1		1	
Total of land fronts.....	5	4	6	15	
Add the two rifled guns (counted as water bearing).....				2	
Total.....				17	

The big rifled gun and its companion already counted in water-bearing guns.

Total guns bearing on approaches so far as yet seen :

Guns of detached works.

	Field.	Heavy.
In first barbette.....	4	* 1
In salient in center.....	4
In redoubt on left.....	4	* 1
Total.....	12	2
Grand total.....		14

LOCATIONS OF BATTERIES.

At a conference, consisting of the commanding general, Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, Brig. Gen. W. F. Barry, chief of artillery, and the chief engineer, it was decided to locate immediately batteries as follows :

Battery No. 1 (five 100-pounder and one 200-pounder Parrotts) at Farinholt's house.

Battery No. 2 (fifteen guns, 4½, 30, and 20 pounders) 1,500 yards from red redoubt; 2,000 yards from big gun.

Battery No. 3 (six guns, 20-pounder Parrotts) 1,900 yards from Red Redoubt.

Battery No. 4 (ten 13-inch mortars) on Moore's plateau.

Battery No. 5 (four 20-pounder Parrotts) near Warwick road.

N. B.—Six 20-pounder Parrotts were put in this battery.

The operations of the day have been the same as the preceding one.

Friday, April 18.—During the day the batteries above mentioned were marked Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, by Captain Duane, assisted by Lieutenants Comstock and Babcock. No. 4, the location was selected by

* 32-pounder howitzer.

General Woodbury. Battery No. 1 was completed so as to afford shelter for the men. Battery No. 2 had not much progress made during the night, owing to the obstructions of roots and reluctance of men to work. Battery No. 3 was carried up sufficiently to afford shelter to the men. It is not known whether Battery No. 5 was commenced. It was laid out by Lieutenant Comstock, and an effort made by him to obtain a working party. General Woodbury reports three bridges over Wormley's Creek finished and roads leading to them nearly finished; 651 gabions made yesterday, making a total of 1,495. Colonel Alexander reports the roads over left branch of Wormley's Creek so far forwarded that they will be open throughout in another day. He was working 2,185 men.

Saturday, April 19.—General Woodbury reports 922 gabions made, making a total of 2,102, but as the general himself was called away, no particular report of bridges and roads was made. Same remarks as to Colonel Alexander. Bridges and roads are believed to be so far advanced as to render all siege operations practicable. Captain Duane reports as follows: (Report dated April 19.)

The state of the batteries now in construction under my charge: Battery No. 1.—This battery was begun last night at 8 p. m., and the parapet is now essentially completed. The magazine framing is in position and ready to be covered with earth. Platforms are in readiness to be put down, and this work will be begun at once. Battery No. 2.—This was begun at 9 p. m. of the 18th, but owing to the detail of working parties not being continuous and the men idle, the progress has been unsatisfactory. No fascines or gabions have been supplied, thus causing further delay. Battery No. 3 begun at 9 p. m. of the 18th; lower tier of gabions placed and earth raised somewhat higher than their tops before daylight; some gabions of second tier placed. No fascines were furnished, and the supply of gabions was insufficient; men did not work well; no working party to-day. Battery No. 6 (corner of Warwick and Yorktown roads) begun at 12 p. m. of the 18th, and the men worked well; parapet about at height of sole of embrasure; no gabions or fascines furnished and no working party to-day.

Sunday, April 20.—Battery No. 1 reported essentially finished; magazine made; some finishing-off work to be done; the artillery laying platforms and mounting guns. Battery No. 2 well advanced; both tiers of gabions up; excavation of magazine commenced; in readiness for commencing gun-platforms. Battery No. 3, epaulements, with one tier of gabions and revetments, thrown up during the night. Work prevented during the day by its occupation by an artillery company. Battery No. 4, position selected in ravine leading from Wormley's Creek to Moore's house; to be commenced on the morning of the 21st. Battery No. 5, site selected; to be commenced on the morning of the 21st. Battery No. 6, an epaulement thrown up, but the work did not progress satisfactorily during the night, nor did the working parties during the day get on until a late hour. Batteries Nos. 7 and 8, no report as to their condition. The report of General Woodbury is received. He has 396 men employed in making gabions and fascines; 1,962 of the former have been made; 1,180 have been delivered and 782 remain on hand. Four officers of the Fiftieth New York Volunteers are employed in superintending road-making on the north side of Wormley's Creek, above the upper pontoon bridge. General Woodbury reports three pontoon bridges, one crib bridge, and one floating bridge over the west branch of Wormley's Creek, besides the mill-dam and any bridge above. The abutments of one other bridge are complete; the roads well advanced; trestle bridge on south branch of Wormley's, near its mouth, under way, but will not be completed for some days. Any cannon required for the next few days must be taken around the old road. Colonel Alexander's reports for the 19th and 20th refer to the work upon the roads in the vicinity of the mill-dam leading from the bridges below to the

mill, and from the mill up the two branches of the creek to the batteries. On the 19th very good progress was made on these roads. Colonel Alexander states that the men worked well, but their officers do not attach sufficient importance to the work to be performed, many of them lying under the shade in place of superintending the working parties. He suggests that an order from general headquarters addressed to officers with working parties might do some good. The number of men on these works is 2,817 and 122 officers on the 19th; on the 20th, 2,188 men and 95 officers. Fair progress was made yesterday, notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather. The roads from the mill to the batteries, or as far as they are laid out, may be completed to-morrow (21st), with the exception of covering the bridges. The work below the mill is much heavier than was anticipated, and will take more time. General Woodbury says he is sadly in want of wheelbarrows. Lieutenant McAlester was in charge of the works from 12 m. on the 19th until the date of this report, and Lieutenant McAlester reports more details of the work, and also states that the work is delayed for the lack of wheelbarrows. Lieut. Col. B. S. Alexander relieved from construction of roads and assigned to duty at headquarters of General W. B. Franklin.

Monday and Tuesday, April 21 and 22.—Captain Duane's report is for the twenty-four hours ending at 6 a. m. to-day. He reports the condition of the batteries under his charge as follows:

Battery No. 1, finished, with the exception of traverses. Battery No. 2: parapet finished and magazine constructed and partly covered. Battery No. 3: very little was accomplished in this battery, the working party having been withdrawn early in the day. Battery No. 4, commenced and pretty well advanced. Battery No. 5 was commenced and carried up to the height of soles of embrasures. Battery No. 6 finished, except requiring some more earth on magazine.

Captain Duane says all the working parties were withdrawn before dark, and did not return; also, that no artillery officers reported at any of the batteries except No. 6. The report of General Woodbury states that 394 men and 13 officers are making gabions and 160 men and 5 officers are making fascines; 890 of the former and 887 of the latter are on hand and at the engineer depot, at the saw-mill, or in the vicinity; also a portion near the mortar battery. The report is signed by H. W. Bowers, assistant adjutant-general. Lieutenant McAlester reports, of the 3,000 men asked for, 2,326 reported this morning for duty on military road, with 79 commissioned officers. Four hundred and sixty axmen were all employed in completing bridges, 25 men to work the wheelbarrows in covering the bridges, and the remainder of the forces were employed with picks and shovels in trimming and draining road in east-branch ravine, excavating and embanking throughout the entire extent of west-branch ravine and main ravine below the dam, and covering bridges as far as could be done without wheelbarrows. Lieutenant McAlester repeats his remark of yesterday, that the lack of a proper number of wheelbarrows essentially retards the completion of the roads. Captain Stewart reports that he, with Lieutenant Farquhar, reported for duty to General Sumner. He and Lieutenant Farquhar went to the battery near Wynn's Mill constructed by Captain Clark. The parapet is roughly constructed, and six platforms for guns in embrasures are done; on the right over 150 running feet of rifle pit has been finished and another commenced on its left. About 400 men were, he believes, at work at this during the day (April 21). The battery farther to the right is still more incomplete; the parapet is not quite finished. Three rough platforms are down and three embrasures without any. It was occupied by Ames' field battery of six guns.

Wednesday, April 23.—Battery No. 1 finished; a second magazine for shell commenced. Battery No. 2: the magazine finished, the terreplein graded, and trees in parapet cut down. Battery No. 3: the revetment of this battery was taken down and rebuilt during the night. Battery No. 5, revetment finished and magazine commenced. Battery No. 6 finished. One embrasure in No. 3 was injured by the explosion of a shell, but has been repaired. One thousand seven hundred and eighty men, with 63 commissioned officers, were employed on that portion of military roads which is under the charge of Lieutenant McAlester, Engineers; for the last twenty-four hours 145 axmen employed on bridges, and the remainder, with picks, shovels, and wheelbarrows were excavating, embanking, and finishing. Considerable progress was made in covering bridges, but eight of the nine are yet incomplete. The earthwork is now in progress throughout the whole extent; about one third remains to be finished, trimmed, and drained. Those side issues leading from left branch through secondary ravines up to the plateau (two to the front and one to the rear) were commenced yesterday and proceeded with to-day. General Woodbury reports 510 officers and men making gabions, &c., and two companies employed on Mortar Battery No. 4; two companies employed on crib bridge west branch of Wormley's Creek, and about 160 men at work on bridge of the south branch. Four hundred and sixty-four gabions were made yesterday and 203 issued; remaining on hand, 1,151. Three hundred and forty-eight fascines are on hand yet; 45 issued yesterday. I transmit a copy of a letter received last evening from General Woodbury:

GENERAL: In reply to yours of date, relative to sand bags, gabions, &c., I have the honor to state that two engineer depots have thus far been established, one at the brigade headquarters and one at the steam saw-mill, and officers appointed to take charge of them. With reference to the sand bags, there are at Captain Duane's camp 12,500; at Ship Point, 90,000; brought by steamer Thorn, ———; brought by steamer Thomas Swann, 11,000; total, 113,500.

A portion of these are on the way to the engineer depot at this camp; the rest will be brought up to-morrow. The schooner *Huntress* has also arrived with a cargo of intrenching tools, which will be brought to the engineer depot as soon as transportation can be obtained.

Respectfully,

D. P. WOODBURY,
Brigadier-General.

Col. J. McLeod Murphy, of the Fifteenth Regiment New York Volunteer Engineers, reports that he, with 300 men, go this morning to join General Franklin, in accordance with letter of Assistant Adjutant-General's Office of yesterday. He desired the services of Lieutenant Farrell, Fifteenth Regiment, which was granted. The report of Captain Brainerd, Fiftieth Regiment New York Volunteers, states that about 200 men of the Seventy-fourth New York Volunteers positively refused to work night before last, and returned to their camp about 9 p. m. The report is forwarded through the Adjutant-General's Office.

Thursday, April 24.—General Woodbury's command has 300 men employed making gabions, fascines, &c.; 133 men on Mortar Battery No. 4, and about 200 men on bridges. Colonel Murphy, with 300 men, on detached service. Ten hundred and ninety-eight gabions and 243 fascines remain on hand. The northern approach to the upper pontoon bridge, 1,200 feet in length, is nearly finished, and will be completed probably to-morrow. Crib bridge, floating bridge, and middle pontoon bridge are all in working order. The crib below the middle pontoon bridge will be built as soon as possible. The materials have been cut and floated to the site. Mortar Battery No. 4 is prepared for the plat-

forms. By to-night all will be done that can be accomplished on the battery before the platforms arrive. Lieutenant McAlester reports 1,668 officers and men employed on military roads. The road below the dam is now completed to within about 300 yards of lower terminus, the point limiting the portion under his supervision. One branch is made, leading from the main road below the dam up to the plateau in front. The road in right-branch ravine is completed, except the covering of the two bridges. These, together with those on four side issues upon the plateau in front, which were commenced yesterday, will be finished to-day. The covering of three bridges in left-branch ravine and the earthwork of the branch road leading up to the plateau in rear are yet incomplete. This work, together with some trimming and draining on this part of the road, will be finished to-day. The roads in the two branch ravines above dam, with the secondary roads leading up to the plateau, will therefore be completed to-day. Lieutenant McAlester doubts whether the bridges at the dam will be finished to-night. Lieutenant Abbot, topographical engineer, aide-de-camp, was yesterday directed to inspect the road and bridges. He reports that the road from the upper pontoon bridge to the mill and thence up the right-hand ravine is passable to a point where the plateau can be reached, except at three culverts, which will doubtless be done to-day. From the mill the road up the left-hand ravine via the old dam, up the long ravine, is completed, except a space of a couple of hundred yards at the crossing of the stream just before reaching the terminus of the old Secession road to the springs. This place ought to be completed to-day. All three roads should be rounded up in the middle and ditched on the bluff side. I have ordered this to be done as directed.

Bridges.—The old dam bridge is well advanced, but will require another day's labor. The crib work is put up and covered with brush, but the want of wheelbarrows delays the covering with earth; approaches good. The mill-dam bridge is unfinished. A frame-work of logs and some brush covering to widen it is completed, but much dirt must be thrown on it before it is ready for any but infantry use. One or two days at least, without carts, will be required; approaches good. Upper pontoon bridge in proper order, except a dirt covering, very necessary to prevent the noise of crossing artillery being made. Frame bridge completed, except a *débouché* to the road to the mill on the north side of the creek. This is absolutely essential. Raft bridge worthless except for infantry, for want of buoyancy. A regiment has crossed in open order; approaches bad; 180 pontoons below raft in fine order; excellent approaches; to be covered with dirt. Pontoon bridge below raft. Abutments laid and approaches dug, but no bridge. Pontoon bridge near Harris' house completed, but requires some little filling to connect the abutments with the approaches for wagons; to be covered with dirt. Frame bridge across east branch of Wormley's Creek not more than half done. Approaches good on south end, but incomplete on north end. I think several days will be required to finish this bridge. Captain Stewart reports that 300 men were working on the rifle pits and 200 men were employed in thickening the parapet and placing rough corduroy platforms in Battery No. 7, which is still incomplete and will require much labor. Six guns are now on the rough platforms. The embrasures of No. 8 are not wholly revetted. At General Smith's position (by Garrow's) a rifle pit has been uncovered and carried on near the water to the right and front of the batteries, and he intends forming obstructions of abatis to the right of them in the woods. Captain Smith reports that the enemy appear to be busy

in the works opposite Batteries Nos. 7 and 8, preparing embrasures of sand bags, &c., some eight or nine apparently in different stages of construction, and they have perhaps covered their line between Garrow's and Wynn's Mill with defenses. General Franklin required 100 pontoons, with oars and anchors, for landing troops, and balks and chessex enough for 20. Orders have been sent from the Adjutant-General's Office directing Colonel Ingalls to tow down such pontoons as could be spared. Captain Stewart has been charged with the construction of Batteries Nos. 7 and 8.

Friday, April 25.—About 350 men of the Engineer Brigade are employed in getting out timber for bridges on west branch of Wormley's Creek; 140 men on bridge south of Wormley's, and 112 men are employed on Battery No. 4; 180 men making gabions, and 24 collecting and guarding pontoon property; Colonel Murphy, with 300 men, on detached service; 132 gabions made yesterday and 235 issued; 995 remaining on hand; 223 fascines on hand. The floating bridge on west branch of Wormley's Creek was taken up yesterday and transferred to the crib bridge a few hundred yards below. This crib bridge is progressing rapidly. Some pontoons were taken from the lower pontoon bridge to allow barges to go through. Lieutenant McAlester reports that 1,240 men and 39 officers were engaged on military road for twenty-four hours ending 6 a. m., and that the road is now ready for use. The widening of the mill-dam to a double track is not quite finished. It will be done to-day. Ample width for a single track is all done and ready for use. A small detail (500 to 600 men) has been applied for to work upon the dam and three additional branch roads leading from main to road up to plateau. Captain Stewart reports having examined the positions of divisions and batteries of the left of the line under orders from General Sumner. There are three batteries at the Burnt Chimneys, one of six guns in embrasure just to the left and front of chimneys, connected by a covered way, with one for four guns on the right and front. In the latter are four 10-pounder Parrott guns. Neither were quite finished. A covered way leads from this second battery to the hollow and woods on its right. Another battery for four guns—two 10-pounder Parrotts and two light 12-pounders—is also constructed. Four batteries have been constructed by General Peck nearly in the position shown in the small tracing, which is on the scale of the map photographed by Major Humphreys. The left—Battery Couch, four guns barbette, close to the creek, on a spur to sweep the channel as you approach and pass the battery. Battery Harris, for four guns; in it are two 10-pounder Parrotts, but not on the platforms; connected with Battery Couch by a narrow covered way. Battery Keyes still masked by woods, as is Battery Couch; no guns mounted. Next Battery Peck, for seven guns, at point; it has two 10-pounders. Battery West is under construction for seven or eight guns. The batteries seemed well placed for the object in view. Yesterday Lieutenant Farquhar, with 300 men, was engaged on No. 8; 100 men were making gabions for Captain Stewart's battery. No. 7 was occupied by a battery during the day. Batteries Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 completed. A portion of first parallel was commenced yesterday, connecting Batteries Nos. 2 and 5, the portion in the woods being commenced about 1 p. m. and the open part after dark. The portions in the woods are well advanced. On the open portions the number of men called for by Captain Duane were not furnished. The men succeeded in getting cover and the parallels are progressing to-day.

Saturday, April 26.—No doubt No. 1, parapet carried to the height of

banquette and the revetment commenced. Redoubt No. 2 same as No. 1; very little work was done last night; it was impossible to get the working parties to do anything; it was very dark and rainy. The parallel from Battery No. 5 to York road has been carried to the depth of 4 feet and to a width of 6 feet, affording a good cover through from York road to Battery No. 2. The trench has been carried to the depth of 4 feet, and is from 10 to 12 feet wide. Lieutenant McAlester reported yesterday that he would be ready to commence mortar batteries at 10 a. m. to-day with 200 men. He had located 10-inch siege mortar batteries for fifteen guns. He has asked for 400 men on branch roads to-day. One hundred and seven men of General Woodbury's command were making gabions and 594 on bridges and dock for Mortar Battery No. 4; 78 gabions and 7 fascines were made yesterday, and 860 of the former and 180 of the latter remain on hand. The connection between the upper crib bridge and the upper pontoon bridge (west branch of Wormley's Creek) is not complete. The lower crib bridge on west branch of Wormley's Creek will probably be finished to-day. General Woodbury states that he had supposed that the platform timbers of the 13-inch mortars would come with the mortars; if not, he will begin immediately to hew timber for that object. I understand that platforms have come with the mortars, but that they are entirely too light for use alone, and may require a grillage or strong frame-work of some kind to support them. The trestle bridge on the south branch of Wormley's is progressing slowly in consequence of the absence of 300 men of the Fifteenth Regiment with Colonel Murphy. This detachment includes many carpenters. Two regiments have been detailed for instruction in making gabions, &c., to report to General Woodbury at the meeting-house near here. One has reported this morning. Captain Stewart reports 200 men thickening the parapet and revetting No. 8 with gabions; a party of 100 men making corduroy road to Battery No. 7 from Yorktown and Warwick roads, under direction of Lieutenant Farquhar, Engineers. Captain Stewart visited Batteries Nos. 7 and 8, and examined the rifle pits and batteries at Garrow's Chimneys and the line of General Smith between the Lee's Mill roads. He consulted with General Smith respecting the defense of his line.

Sunday, April 27.—Eight hundred and sixty men of the Engineer Brigade have been employed on bridges, Battery No. 4, and unloading shells, and instructing troops in making gabions and fascines. One company and 300 men on detached service at Cheeseman's Landing. Number of gabions on hand 860, of fascines 180. One barge with mortars has been brought within 15 feet of the wharf of Battery No. 4; several cribs of crib bridge have given way; tools for nearly 10,000 men are reported in the engineer depots, mostly at depot in camp of Engineer Brigade. A great deal of difficulty and delay is still experienced in regulating the working parties. Details, after waiting at the place they have been directed to go, return to camp and report no engineer officer to be found, while the engineer officer reports waiting several hours for a detail without seeing them. All this I think could be remedied by conforming to the requirements of Order, No. 119, headquarters Army of the Potomac. The order requires that the division officer of details shall consult the engineer or artillery officer in construction daily, and shall also be responsible for tools, &c., and that the party is provided with them in proportion as desired by the constructing officer. This, too, would prevent all such occurrences as has happened this morning, viz: A detachment reporting without tools of any kind, because the officer in charge of detail had none. The same order

requires that this officer, when he has not sufficient tools, shall immediately make requisition upon General Woodbury, in charge of depots. These delays are generally, I am forced to believe, the result of culpable neglect, and ought to be remedied. Captain Stewart reports that a party of 200 men was employed on Battery No. 8 revetting the interior slope with gabions, and that two-thirds of the battery is revetted; the weather interfered with the work; 100 men were also making gabions and fascines; neither party worked after 3 p. m. Work at abatis, &c., was probably continued near Garrow's Chimneys by General Smith's command. No reports have been received from Captain Duane or Lieutenant McAlester this morning.

Monday, April 28.—The upper pontoon bridge over west branch of Wormley's Creek has been relaid with increased balks and with a second layer of covering with chess. The troops of General Woodbury's command are variously employed on batteries, bridges, with pontoon property, instructing men in gabion and fascine making, and 320 men on detached service. No report of gabions and fascines made was received this morning, as the regiments at that work are supposed to have reported to the assistant adjutant-general at headquarters. General Woodbury has been directed to require the reports to pass through his office, as the regiments were ordered to report to him, and this department must be informed of the material on hand, &c. Three hundred and twenty-four gabions and 180 fascines, reported as made several days ago, are being collected at the depot this morning. I have asked Captain Stewart about the work done in the woods, &c., from Battery No. 7 to Redoubt A; also between Nos. 7 and 8. I have suggested rifle pits, with entanglements, on open field between Nos. 7 and 8. I have directed Captain Stewart to protect this flank by every means possible, and consult with General Sumner upon the defenses. General Woodbury has been directed to furnish such assistance to General Barry with the 13-inch mortars as in his power. To-day only 1,000 men reported, in place of 1,500, to Lieutenant McAlester. He reports everything under way; Redoubt C, extension of parallel on the 10-inch sea-coast mortar batteries.

MEMORANDUM OF BATTERIES.

Battery No. 9 on left of old dam, about 1,900 yards from fortress, for ten 10-inch siege mortars.

Battery No. 10 in middle of parallel between right branch and York River, 1,500 feet from big gun, built for seven siege guns and three 100-pounder Parrotts. The six 4½-inch guns from No. 6 will be placed in it; also one from No. 2. This last will be replaced by a 30-pounder Parrott.

Battery No. 11 in head of ravine E, 2,600 yards from fortress, 4,000 from Gloucester Point, for four 10-inch sea-coast mortars.

Battery No. 12 behind secession huts, 1,700 yards from fortress, 2,000 from exterior work, for ten 10-inch siege mortars.

Battery No. 13 on right of boyau to be made to-night and near bluff, 1,250 yards from fortress and 2,400 yards from exterior work and 2,500 yards from Gloucester, for three 100-pounder and three 30-pounder Parrotts, leaving four 30-pounder Parrotts to be otherwise employed.

Battery No. 6 to be converted into a mortar battery for six 10-inch sea-coast mortars. An epaulement to be built to protect against Wynn's Mill and a couple of platforms behind it to direct mortars that way.

Battery No. 1 to be extended to receive another 200-pounder Parrott.

Tuesday, April 29.—Redoubt C: 200 men are employed night and day. The ditch is now 6 feet deep and about 7 wide. It is proposed to continue the width to 12 feet, which will require twenty-four hours more time at least. The closing of the redoubt to the rear can be commenced to-morrow morning. Parallel: in consequence of the detail being short 500 men, little progress was made in the day-time; also, the detail for the night was not filled out, and Battery No. 12 was opened in consequence. The branch parallel leading from main parallel to rear to Plum Tree Ravine, L, was not opened last night. It will be opened to-night. Battery No. 9: the detail worked very sluggishly and the platforms cannot be put in this morning, as was anticipated. It will be ready to-morrow. Battery No. 11 has progressed rapidly and is now ready for its platforms. Battery No. 12 will be ready for its platforms to-morrow morning. The magazine timbers ought to be delivered at all the above batteries to-day, and to-morrow the carpenters, with tools, nails, and spikes, ought to be on hand. Parallel between ravine and York River requires steps and *banquette* tread. Parallel between Battery No. 2 and Yorktown road requires widening, a berme, and steps. Parallel behind Battery No. 10 requires a little more excavation. Branch parallel traced and nearly excavated. Redoubt A will be completed to-day. Redoubt B: revetment done; parapet nearly completed; will probably be done to-day. Battery No. 10 ready for gun-platforms; one magazine completed, except floor; the other under way. Number of gabions ready, 176; on hand, 950; at depot at saw-mill, 276; about 400 at the Methodist Church, and about 250 distributed near batteries. The artillery has charge of laying the platforms and mounting the mortars in Battery No. 4. The beds for the platforms are prepared by the engineer. General Woodbury suggests that as the mechanics employed on these beds have no experience in that line, they can be usefully employed on other mortar beds. General Woodbury desires that the Fifth New Hampshire and Sixty-ninth New York Volunteer Regiments be ordered to continue on the service for which they have been detailed for four more days. I respectfully request that this may be granted. Captain Stewart reports progress on Nos. 7 and 8 and corduroy road to No. 7, and also having examined the ground along left of line. Nothing of moment to report. Inclosed is a memorandum for reference. The following memorandum, changing the armament of Battery No. 13 and establishing Battery No. 14, is approved by the commanding general:

Battery No. 13 to consist of six 30-pounder Parrott guns, two on the left to be directed at the gorge of right redoubt, the other four to be directed 5° north of hospital. A change of 15° in the direction of embrasure will bring these last four to bear on Gloucester, if necessary. Battery No. 14 to consist of three 100-pounder Parrotts and one 100-pounder James gun, to be placed at extremity of old parallel; right cheek of embrasures to embrace the extreme right-hand effective gun of Gloucester fort. Shifting embrasures 5° or 10° will bring the big gun and water batteries of Yorktown into the field.

Wednesday, April 30.—Parallel from Battery No. 2 to Battery No. 5 completed, except leveling top of parapet. Parallel leading from Battery No. 5 to Redoubt A will be completed to-day. Parallel on right completed, save a few steps and a small portion of *banquette*. Redoubt B is essentially completed. Battery No. 10 finished, except placing dirt upon magazine. Battery No. 6: changed for mortars; will be completed to-day. Battery No. 1: extension for 200-pounders commenced, and will be completed to-day. Four hundred and three men of General Woodbury's brigade are engaged on bridges on south and west branch of Wormley's Creek, 415 on detached service, the re-

mainder on Battery No. 4, guards, making gabions, &c. Three hundred and eighty-four gabions were made yesterday, and 1,370 on hand; 700 or 800 of these are at Methodist Church. I have directed that they be collected at the saw-mill depot immediately; 119 fascines are on hand. The bridge over the south branch of Wormley's requires four more framed trestles; they will be in place to-night. The roadway covering has been delayed for want of teams, but will probably be done before the end of the week. The lower (formerly the middle) pontoon bridge over west branch will be relaid to-day with four additional balks throughout and an additional covering of boards. The upper pontoon bridge over the same stream is ready for the passage of siege artillery. Crib bridge may also bear heavy artillery. The communication between this bridge and the lower road along the north bank of west branch is completed, but the turn is rather abrupt for teams. Nearly five of the foundations for platforms for Battery No. 4 are laid. One magazine is completed, except the door; another is well advanced. The work progresses well. General Woodbury can spare twenty more pontoons for General Franklin, who has eighty already. Lieutenant McAlester reports as follows:

Parallel: 400 men were at work completing it during the day, and at night I opened with 500 men the branch parallel designed to communicate with Duane parallel at Battery No. 2. Redoubt: 200 men during the day-time were widening ditch and parapet. Battery No. 9: 250 men were completing excavation and grading road leading up to it by daylight. It will be ready for platforms and traverses at noon to-day. Battery No. 11: 150 men completed excavation for battery and magazine by daylight. May complete the magazine to-day. Battery No. 12: 200 men completed excavation ready for platforms, and opened road leading up to it by daylight. Magazines will be excavated to-day.

Thursday, May 1.—The parallel under direction of Captain Duane on left of Wormley's Creek nearly finished; on right branch of Wormley's Creek completed. Redoubt B completed. Battery No. 1: extension nearly completed; enough to receive armament. Batteries Nos. 13 and 14 laid out and worked one day and night. General Woodbury reports 416 men on detached service, and the remainder employed on bridges, batteries, making gabions, &c. Two hundred and twenty-six gabions made yesterday and 1,241 on hand; 79 fascines on hand. Bridge over south branch of Wormley's: frame completed. If the weather will permit it will be ready for use in two or three days. Two double-covered pontoon bridges and one good crib bridge now span the west branch of Wormley's Creek. Seven foundations for mortar platforms in Battery No. 4 were ready last night. Captain Stewart reports that 195 axmen were employed in cutting trees on the 29th ultimo from Redoubt A to Battery No. 7 and from No. 7 to the clearing between Nos. 7 and 8. To form an obstruction trees were also cleared away from front of Battery No. 8. A party was also employed at night, under Lieutenant Farquhar, in throwing up a covered way along the road from No. 7 to No. 8. On the 30th ultimo a party of 800 men worked upon the pit across the clearing between Nos. 7 and 8; 200 men also employed on No. 7. Others were making fascines, making abatis, and preparing timber for magazines. Lieutenant McAlester reports his operations for the last twenty-four hours as follows:

Redoubt C: the width of ditch was increased from 7 to 8 feet, the ramp of approach commenced, and last night the excavation for closing gorge was opened. To-morrow I hope to commence emplacements for guns. Parallel: the parallel has now its width of 12 feet. With some slight exceptions earthen *banquettes* are in for about one-quarter the length, and a few log ones were arranged yesterday. I think it can all be completed to-morrow night. Road leading from mill road to Battery No. 2. The bridge across ravine half done; can be completed to-night, I think. Battery No. 9:

excavation ready for platforms to be completed at 11 a. m. to-day; those for magazines probably to-night; magazines to be put in to-morrow. Battery No. 12: all excavations to be completed to-night; magazines to be put in to-morrow. Battery No. 11 to be finished, magazines and all, to-night.

MEMORANDUM OF BATTERIES—NO. 2.

The commanding general directs the following changes for batteries:

Battery No. 5 to be enlarged to receive two more 20-pounder Parrotts, making 8 in battery.

Battery No. 3 to receive one additional 20-pounder Parrott, for which there is space already.

Battery No. 10 to receive additional siege guns, making eight siege guns and three 100-pounder Parrotts.

Battery No. 1 to receive the additional 200-pounder Parrott.

These changes, with those fixed by memoranda of April 28 and 29, will constitute the batteries as follows: Two 200-pounder and five 100-pounder Parrotts (one 200-pounder Parrott not arrived, the other in battery).

Battery No. 1, distance to Gloucester fort 5,025 yards; distance to Yorktown wharf 4,820 yards, and distance to big gun 3,810 yards.

Battery No. 2 (right wing nine siege guns, three 4½ Ordnance, six 30-pounder Parrotts, and left wing six 20-pounder Parrotts), distance to Yorktown front 1,850 yards, and distance to exterior redoubts 1,800 yards.

Battery No. 3 (seven 20-pounder Parrotts), distance to exterior redoubts 2,000 yards, and distance to Yorktown front 2,300 yards.

Battery No. 4 (ten 13-inch mortars), distance to Gloucester fort 4,100 yards, bearing N. 28° W.; distance to Yorktown wharf 3,400 yards, bearing N. 43° W.; distance to big gun 2,400 yards, bearing N. 49° W.; distance to right redoubt 3,100 yards, bearing N. 77° W.; distance to Red Redoubt 3,360 yards, bearing N. 86° W., and distance to work at Wynn's Mill 4,900 yards, bearing S. 52° W.

Battery No. 5 (eight 20-pounder Parrotts), distance to Red Redoubt 1,575 yards; distance to right redoubt 2,000 yards, and distance to Yorktown front 2,800 yards.

Battery No. 6 (five sea-coast 10-inch mortars), distance to Gloucester fort 5,100 yards, bearing N. 3° E.; distance to Yorktown wharf 3,900 yards, bearing N. 5° W.; distance to Yorktown front 2,775 yards, bearing N.; distance to exterior redoubts 2,050 yards, bearing N. 32° W., and distance to Wynn's Mill works 2,500 yards, bearing S. 45° W.

Battery No. 7 (six 20-pounder Parrotts, if it be had), distance to Wynn's Mill works 1,100 yards.

Battery No. 8 (six 20 pounder Parrotts), distance to Wynn's Mill works 1,125 yards.

Battery No. 9 (ten 10-inch siege mortars), distance to Yorktown front 1,910 yards, bearing N. 20° W., and distance to exterior redoubts 2,000 yards, bearing N. 70° W.

Battery No. 10 (seven siege guns and three 100-pounder Parrotts), distance to Gloucester fort 3,400 yards; distance to Yorktown wharf 2,550 yards; distance to Yorktown front 1,500 yards, and distance to right redoubt 2,150 yards.

Battery No. 11 (four or five sea-coast 10-inch mortars), distance to Gloucester fort 4,700 yards, bearing N. 9° W.; distance to Yorktown wharf 3,650 yards, bearing N. 17° W.; distance to Yorktown front 2,500 yards, bearing N. 18° W.; distance to exterior redoubt 2,400 yards, bearing N. 52° W., and distance to Wynn's Mill 3,300 yards, bearing S. 52° W.

Battery No. 12 (ten mortars; at present it is proposed to put in five 10-inch and five 8-inch mortars), distance to Yorktown front 1,580 yards, bearing N. 20° W.; distance to exterior redoubt 1,900 yards, bearing N. 78° W., and distance to Burnt House 925 yards, bearing N. 9° E.

Battery No. 13 (left wing, three siege guns, 30-pounder Parrotts, directed at gorge of right redoubt; distance to Red Redoubt 2,590 yards, and distance to right redoubt 2,100 yards; right wing four siege guns, directed 5° N. of hospital; this wing will embrace the whole Yorktown front, and a change of embrasures of 15° will bring it to bear on Gloucester fort, in all, seven 30-pounder Parrotts), distance to big gun 1,250 yards; distance to left salient of Yorktown front 1,625 yards; distance to Yorktown wharf 2,300 yards, and distance to Gloucester fort 3,100 yards.

Battery No. 14 (three 100 pounder Parrotts and one 100-pounder James, embrasures to be arranged to sweep from big gun to Gloucester fort), distance to big gun 1,400 yards; distance to Yorktown wharf 2,450 yards, and distance to Gloucester 3,150 yards.

Friday, May 2.—The parallel between right and left branches of Wormley's complete, except about 100 feet of *banquette* and some trimming of excavation; the whole to be finished to-night or to-morrow. Battery No. 11 finished, except traverse; to be put in after mounting mortars. Batteries Nos. 9 and 12 complete, except magazine and traverse. Every effort will be made to finish these by to-morrow night. Redoubt C: ditch from 9 to 12 feet wide and gorge and ramp excavation nearly completed. They can doubtless, with emplacements for guns, be finished by Sunday night. Road connecting parallel across left-branch ravine to be completed to-night. The one along the shore of right-branch ravine commenced to-day. Parallel between Battery No. 2 and Redoubt A needs slight changes. Battery No. 3: change complete, except traverse. Battery No. 13: parapet three-fourths completed; magazine commenced; magazine for reserve is commenced and excavation completed. Captain Stewart reports parties still at work on Battery No. 7 and constructing magazine for Battery No. 8. Three hundred and forty-eight gabions were made yesterday and 215 issued, leaving 1,374 on hand. The south-branch bridge progressing well. Sand-spit bridge will be commenced to-day. Work on lower crib bridge to be resumed to-day. But one platform foundation remained to be laid last night in Battery No. 4. The magazine will probably be finished to-day. The commanding general authorized two 8-inch siege mortars to be sent to General Smith, to be located near Garrow's Burnt Chimneys, for shelling the works in front of General Smith's position. Captain Stewart was directed to establish a battery for two 8-inch siege howitzers in the small clearing west of General Sumner's headquarters, to be fired at 12° 30' elevation. To clear trees 60 feet high when firing at this elevation the howitzers must be placed 270 feet back from the woods; if 100 feet high, 440 feet back. If fired at 5°, they must be 686 feet in rear of trees 60 feet high and 1,143 feet in rear of trees 100 feet high. The position, according to our own maps, will enfilade the Wynn's Mill works, from the farther extremity of which it is but about 1,800 yards, and it is but 2,000 yards from the enemy's works at the one-gun battery.

Saturday, May 3.—Battery No. 3: extension completed. Battery No. 5: extension for two guns ready for platforms. Battery No. 13: parapet done, extension for one gun commenced, and magazine ready for earth cover. Battery No. 14: revetment completed, magazine ready for

cover, and parapet to be thickened. Battery for Whitworth gun, near No. 14, commenced; boyaux, 2,500 yards, 6 feet wide and four feet deep, completed. Battery for Whitworth gun, near No. 5, has one row of gabions up. Lieutenant McAlester reports that his portion of the parallel will be finished to-night, including the additional *banquette* decided upon last night. He reports also that no interest whatever in the work could be excited in the officers, and that the men were therefore generally idle. The detail from the Mozart Regiment accomplished very little. Battery No. 11 is complete. Batteries Nos. 9 and 12 progressed very slowly from a failure of carpenters and teams to report as expected. Lieutenant McAlester thinks they may possibly be completed to-night. Two-gun (Whitworth) battery located and commenced yesterday; will be ready to-morrow evening. Infantry road up right branch ravine commenced yesterday; will be finished and ready to-day. Redoubt C: the enemy concentrated so heavy a fire upon it that the working party was withdrawn at about 10 a. m. At night work was resumed upon it, but the officers and men from Hooker's division worked badly. Lieutenant McAlester thinks he will be able to finish it to-night. Captain Stewart reports that during a part of the day a party of 100 men was employed in revetting, building traverse, and repairing Battery No. 7; 200 men were engaged in making obstructions in its vicinity, and 200 men were at work on No. 8. A party of 200 men was engaged yesterday afternoon in forming the parapet of a barbette battery for two 8-inch siege howitzers in peach-orchard clearing; also 100 men cutting timber in its vicinity. General Woodbury reports 255 of his command at work on bridges over Wormley's Creek; 100 on Battery No. 4; over 300 men on detached service, and the remainder variously employed. Two hundred and forty-two gabions were made yesterday and 485 issued, leaving 1,131 on hand. A large force will be employed in making fascines to-morrow. The road covering of bridges over south branch of Wormley's Creek is complete. The earth-covering will probably be done by Sunday night. The sand-spit pontoon bridge will, I hope, be done by Sunday night.

Sunday, May 4.—Battery No. 8 is reported as completed; some trees were to be felled to unmask it. A mortar battery near Garrow's Chimneys was being constructed; this would have been completed to-morrow. The parallel between Batteries Nos. 3 and 5 is completed. Battery No. 10: one traverse and magazine to finish and embrasures to open. Battery No. 13: three traverses to build. Battery No. 14: traverse to build and parapet to thicken. Battery for Whitworth guns: interior slope to be revetted. Battery for Whitworth guns, near Battery No. 3: parapet three-fourths done. Battery No. 5: change completed. Redoubt D commenced last night. Five hundred and seventy gabions and 83 fascines were on hand at engineer depot. No report has been received from Lieutenant McAlester of the work under his charge. Redoubt C was completed, and only a little finishing was required to be done upon the parallel and batteries between the branches of Wormley's Creek. The works upon the batteries, trenches, &c., were suspended on the morning of the 4th, the fortress of Yorktown and the whole line of rebel works, including the fort and batteries at Gloucester, having been evacuated during the preceding night by the enemy.

J. G. BARNARD,

Brigadier-General and Chief Engineer Army of the Potomac.

General R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

Positions of guns and emplacements for guns in the fortress of Yorktown, beginning with water battery and going around the entire main works of Yorktown from east to west.

Water battery of one 8-inch columbiad; one 64-pounder gun; two 8-inch columbiads, and one 42-pounder carronade. (Lower or beach battery; two or three of its guns would see our battery—No. 14, perhaps No. 13 also.)

Three 9-inch Dahlgren guns and one 10-inch columbiad. (Water battery is on left flank of front of attack, drawn on siege sketch, with embrasures, but the embrasures had been filled with guns mounted *en barbette*. The 10-inch columbiad would probably have borne on our Battery No. 14.)

Front of attack.—One 6½-inch rifled gun (burst); one 9-inch Dahlgren occupying place of next, *i. e.*, one 6½-inch rifled (burst); one 8-inch columbiad; two barbettes for field guns (guns gone); one 32-pounder; two barbettes for field guns (guns gone); one 32-pounder, navy (burst); one 8-inch columbiad; one 8-inch siege mortar; one 24-pounder gun; one barbette for field gun (gun gone); one 8-inch columbiad; one 32-pounder, navy; one 24-pounder gun; one 32-pounder, navy; one barbette for field gun (gun gone); one 4½-inch rifle; one barbette for field gun (gun gone); one 32-pounder, navy; one 24-pounder gun; one 7¾-inch carronade; one 24-pounder; one 8-inch columbiad, and one 12-pounder gun.

On parts of works not seen by our approaches.—One barbette for field gun (gun gone); one 24-pounder gun; one 12-pounder gun; one 6-pounder gun; one barbette for field gun (gun gone); one breech-loading rifle, 2 $\frac{8}{16}$ -inch caliber; six barbettes for field guns (no guns); one 42-pounder carronade; three barbettes for field guns (no guns); one 42-pounder carronade; four barbettes for field guns (no guns); one 42-pounder carronade; four barbettes for field guns (no guns); one 42-pounder carronade, and three barbettes for field guns (no guns).

Redoubt of five 8-inch columbiads; battery of four 8-inch columbiads; battery of four 32-pounders; battery of three 32-pounders; (two-thirds at least of these guns would have borne upon our battery No. 14, some on battery 13); battery of two 32-pounders (gone, probably removed since siege began and mounted elsewhere); flanking battery to ravine of one 42-pounder carronade (to sweep the beach).

Battery for two guns (no guns in place) and battery for five guns (no guns in place) on beach (upper battery.)

Total arrangement for guns 94, of which we captured 53 guns in good order; 3 guns burst. Total number of guns, 56. Barbettes for field guns 31, and 7 embrasures for navy guns.

J. G. BARNARD,
Brigadier-General and Chief Engineer.

No. 21.

Report of Lieut. Cyrus B. Comstock, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, of Confederate works at Gloucester Point, Va.

CAMP WINFIELD SCOTT, NEAR YORKTOWN, VA.,
May 5, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with your instructions I have to-day visited

Gloucester Point, and submit the sketch* on the next leaf of the rebel works there. These works are two in number, namely, a water battery on the extreme point, with its terre-plein only a foot or two above high tide, and a large field work on the bluff above. The water battery is U-shaped and has its rear closed. The guns and carriages were evidently navy ones; the parapet about 20 feet thick, and interior crest about $7\frac{1}{2}$ feet high, revetted, and covered with turf embrasures, also revetted with sods. The main magazine, large and well covered with bomb-proof shelter, adjoining small magazines marked *c* and *d* and *f* on the sketch,* shot furnaces *a* and *b*, and between each pair of embrasures an inclined bomb-proof blind, giving cover for the gunners. These blinds are made by leaning heavy timbers against the interior slope, where they rest on a frame also resting against the interior slope. These timbers are together about 3 feet thick, and are covered with sods. In the rear of the battery in a well by itself there is a barbette gun, *c*, the only gun now in the work. The whole work is carefully and neatly finished. There are embrasures for twelve guns.

The field work on the bluff is 30 or 40 feet above the water; is a bastioned work of strong but variable profile, the parapet varying from 15 to 20 feet in thickness, 7 to 10 feet in height, and a ditch from 7 to 15 feet in depth, the depth of ditch and height of interior crest varying with the inequalities of the level of the ground. Several of the magazines serve as traverses. A long line of bomb-proof shelter, giving a long traverse in the center of the work, had been begun. A well was in progress. In one place the parapet was not quite finished, and in another the revetment was incomplete. The masks to cover the outlet had not been finished up. The revetment, like that of the water battery, was of sods. The finished portion of the work was well and carefully done, with these exceptions. Guns and carriages were navy—these three were *en barbette*. There were no embrasures. The strength of the work is nearly the same as that of the work inclosing Yorktown.

Very respectfully,

C. B. COMSTOCK,
Lieutenant of Engineers

General J. G. BARNARD,
Chief Engineer, Army Potomac Headquarters.

[Indorsement.]

The caliber of several of the guns bearing on the river and on our positions is not given by Lieutenant Comstock. There were eight in all. Those not mentioned are believed to be as heavy as 32-pounders.
J. G. B.

No. 22.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army, Chief of Artillery
Army of the Potomac, of the siege.*

HDQRS. CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 5, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following general report of the operations of the artillery at the siege at Yorktown:

The army having arrived in front of the enemy's works April 5 went

* To appear in Atlas.

into camp, and preparations were at once commenced for the siege. From this date until April 10 active reconnaissances of the enemy's line and works were pushed by the commanding general. By his orders I examined the various inlets and creeks for the purpose of selecting a suitable place for landing the siege train. Cheeseman's Creek, an affluent of the Poquosin River, about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the proposed location of our works, was selected as possessing the greatest advantages of deep water, a good landing, and facility of approach. The siege train depot was established in a large open field about one and a half miles from the landing and at the junction of the roads forming the approaches to the various batteries. The siege train consisted of 101 pieces, as follows, viz: Two 200-pounder Parrott rifled guns, eleven 100-pounder Parrott rifled guns, thirteen 30-pounder Parrott rifled guns, twenty-two 20-pounder Parrott rifled guns, ten $4\frac{1}{4}$ -inch rifled siege guns, ten 13-inch sea-coast mortars, ten 10-inch sea-coast mortars, fifteen 10-inch siege mortars, five 8-inch siege mortars, and three 8-inch siege howitzers. Three field batteries of 12-pounders were likewise made use of as guns of position.

To serve this siege train the First Connecticut Artillery, Col. R. O. Tyler (1,400 men), and the Fifth New York Volunteers, Colonel Warren (800 men), were placed under my orders. Upon consultation with the commanding general and the chief engineer (General Barnard) the following location of batteries and distribution of guns was decided upon:

BATTERY No. 1.

In front of Farinholt's house, on the right bank of Wormley's Creek, and at its junction with York River, to command the water front of Yorktown and Gloucester and the extreme left of the enemy's land-side works.

Distance.—Five thousand yards to work on Gloucester Point; 4,800 yards to Yorktown wharf; 4,000 yards to center of Yorktown; 3,800 yards to enemy's long-range rifled guns on the high bastion.

Armament.—Two 200-pounder Parrott rifled guns; five 100-pounder Parrott rifled guns.

Garrison.—One battery, First Connecticut Artillery (Captain Burke), Major Kellogg commanding.

BATTERY No. 2.

In front of the enemy's line bearing on Yorktown and Hampton stage road in first parallel.

Distance.—One thousand eight hundred yards to Red Redoubt (left); 1,900 yards to enemy's long-range rifled guns on high bastion (right).

Armament.—Three $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch rifled siege guns; six 30-pounder Parrotts; six 20-pounder Parrotts.

Garrison.—Two batteries First Connecticut Artillery; one battery First Battalion New York Artillery; Major Hemingway, First Connecticut Artillery, commanding.

BATTERY No. 3.

In first parallel 200 yards to the left of Battery No. 2.

Distance.—One thousand nine hundred yards to Red Redoubt; 2,300 yards to enemy's long-range rifled guns in high bastion.

Armament.—Seven 20-pounder Parrott guns.

Garrison.—Two batteries First Battalion New York Artillery, Captain Voegelée.

BATTERY NO. 4.

In ravine under plateau of Moore's house.

Distance and compass-bearings.—To Gloucester Point, N. 28° W., 4,100 yards; to Yorktown wharf, N. 43° W., 3,500 yards; to Yorktown, N. 49° W., 2,400 yards.

Armament.—Ten 13-inch sea-coast mortars.

Garrison.—Two batteries First Connecticut Artillery (Captains Dow and Harmon), Major Alex. Doull, Second New York Artillery, commanding.

BATTERY NO. 5.

Beyond Warwick Court-House stage road, in front of the Red Redoubt.

Distance.—To Yorktown, 2,800 yards; to high bastion, 2,000 yards; to Red Redoubt, 1,600 yards.

Armament.—Eight 20-pounder Parrotts.

Garrison.—Battery E, Second U. S. Artillery, Captain Carlisle, and one-half Battery C, First Battalion New York Artillery.

BATTERY NO. 6.

Junction of Warwick and Hampton Roads.

Distance and compass-bearings.—To Gloucester Point, N. 3° E., 5,100 yards; to Yorktown wharf, N. 5° W., 3,900 yards; to Yorktown, N., 2,775 yards; to Wynn's Mill, S. 45° W., 2,500 yards; to Red Redoubt, N. 32° W., 2,000 yards.

Armament.—Sixteen 10-inch sea-coast mortars.

Garrison.—One company (Captain Burbank's) First Connecticut Artillery.

BATTERY NO. 7.

In front of Wynn's Mill.

Distance.—To Wynn's Mill works, 1,100 yards.

Armament.—Six field 12-pounders.

BATTERY NO. 8.

In front of works south of Wynn's Mill.

Distance.—1,125 yards.

Armament.—Two batteries (twelve guns) of field 12-pounders.

BATTERY NO. 9.

To left of old mill-dam.

Distance and compass bearings.—To fort, N. 20° W., 1,900 yards; to exterior works, N. 70° W., 2,000 yards.

Armament.—Ten 10-inch siege mortars.

Garrison.—Two batteries (Captains Cook and Rockwood) First Connecticut Artillery, Major Trumbull commanding.

BATTERY No. 10.

In the middle of first parallel, between right branch and York River.

Distance.—To fort, 2,550 yards; to right redoubt, 2,150 yards; to high redoubt, 1,500 yards.

Armament.—Three 100-pounder Parrotts; one 30-pounder Parrott; seven 4½-inch rifled siege guns.

Garrison.—Two companies Fifth New York Volunteers, Captain Winslow.

BATTERY No. 11.

At the head of ravine E.

Distance and compass-bearings.—To Gloucester Point, N. 9° W., 4,700 yards; to Yorktown wharf, N. 7° W., 3,650 yards; to fort, N. 18° W., 2,600 yards; to exterior works, N. 32° W., 2,400 yards; to Wynn's Mill. S. 52° W., 3,300 yards.

Armament.—Four 10-inch sea-coast mortars.

Garrison.—One company Fifth New York Volunteers.

BATTERY No. 12.

On Peninsula plateau, behind secession huts.

Distance and compass-bearings.—To exterior works, N. 78° W., 2,000 yards; to fort, N. 20° W., 1,600 yards; to burnt house, N. 9° E., 925 yards.

Armament.—Five 10-inch siege mortars.

Garrison.—One company Fifth New York Volunteers.

BATTERY No. 13.

To the right of ———, in front of Moore's house.

Distance.—To Gloucester Point, 3,000 yards; to exterior works, 2,400 yards; to fort, 1,300 yards.

Armament.—Six 30-pounder Parrotts.

Garrison.—Two companies Fifth New York Volunteers, Captain Cambreleng commanding.

BATTERY No. 14.

Extremity (right) of first parallel.

Distance.—To Gloucester Point, 3,100 yards; to exterior works, 2,500 yards; to fort, 1,400 yards.

Armament.—Three 100-pounder Parrotts.

Garrison.—One battery (Captain Perkins) First Connecticut Artillery.

Thursday, April 17.—By pushing close reconnaissances the engineer officers have seen at least fifty guns in the enemy's works. Of these thirty-three are on water front and looking down York River, of which twenty-three will bear on our battery No. 1. The remainder, seventeen guns, are on land front. There are probably more, which are masked by sand bags.

Friday, April 18.—Batteries 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 laid out, and ground broken in Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 6. At daylight working party in No. 1 well

covered in. No. 2 less advanced. No. 3 progressed far enough to shelter men. No. 6 raised to height of sole of embrasures.

Saturday, April 19.—Colonel Hunt, commanding artillery reserve, ordered to detail a 20-pounder Parrott battery for Battery No. 3, to occupy it after dark to-night. Also ordered to detail fifty-four harnessed horses to haul the 100-pounders into No. 1, the work to be continued all night. Platforms laid and magazine completed in No. 1, and all preparations made for mounting guns. Rain for the past twenty-four hours, and ground soft and slippery and altogether unfavorable for heavy work.

Monday, April 21.—Batteries 4 and 5 commenced. The officers and cannoneers of Randol's and De Russy's batteries making gabions and fascines, under Brigadier-General Woodbury. Cannoneers of Lieutenant-Colonel Brickel's brigade, under Major Arndt, revetted the embrasures of Battery No. 7 with gabions and finished the battery generally. Ames' battery (A, Fifth Artillery) in position in Battery No. 7, relieving Diederichs' battery, First Battalion New York Artillery. One hundred horses hauling siege guns to Batteries 3 and 6.

Battery No. 1. Received from depot four 100-pounder Parrotts, 250 shell, 50 shot, and implements. Five 100-pounders are now mounted, and this battery fully ready for service.

Battery No. 3. Received from depot four 4½-inch siege guns and platforms. Two platforms laid.

Battery No. 6. Received from depot six 4½-inch siege guns and platforms. The artillerymen excavated the terre-plein to the depth of 14 inches and commenced to lay platforms.

A vessel has arrived at Cheeseman's Landing with 13-inch mortars. Number not known. Arrangements are made to receive these mortars when hoisted out of the vessel, and when the present heavy weather abates to tow them around to the immediate vicinity of the battery in which they are to be placed. It will be necessary to ask the assistance of the Navy to hoist them out of the transport. I would respectfully ask that such assistance be requested.

Tuesday, April 22—a. m.—Batteries 1, 2, 3, and 6 are now ready for service and are fully supplied with implements and ammunition to the full capacity of the magazines.

The vessel with five 30-pounder guns has arrived and a detachment is now discharging her. They will be disembarked by 3 or 4 o'clock, and if the road is repaired by that time they will be at once hauled to Battery No. 2.

Another detachment is at work on the 13-inch mortars. Blocks and tackle for hauling them have arrived.

Tuesday, April 22—p. m.—The usual daily detail of the cannoneers of two field batteries for the manufacture of gabions, fascines, &c. Harnessed horses furnished for transportation of siege guns. Ninety barrels of powder transported from landing to depot.

Battery No. 1. Two hundred and fifty cartridges supplied for 100-pounder gun. Magazine arranged and drains constructed.

Battery No. 2. Five platforms for siege guns laid; 50 rounds of canister and 500 cartridges supplied; also implements and equipments complete for five 4½-inch guns. This battery is now ready for service.

Battery No. 6. Platforms for five 4½-inch guns laid and the guns put in position. The following ammunition was placed in the magazine of this battery: 600 cartridges, 300 shot, 300 shell, 100 case-shot, and 50 canister. Implements and equipments also supplied. Battery now ready for service.

I would respectfully recommend that strong infantry supports be now placed in position in the immediate vicinity of Batteries 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. Batteries 3 and 6, being particularly exposed to sorties of the enemy, should be more than usually well supported, and I would therefore recommend for each of them a section of light artillery in connection with the infantry supports.

Wednesday, April 23.—Battery No. 1. No change except oiling guns and carriages and finishing drains in and about the battery.

Battery No. 2. Five platforms laid and the battery supplied with the following ammunition: Two hundred and fifty $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch solid shot, two hundred and fifty $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch shell, one hundred case-shot.

Battery No. 6. Same as in battery No. 1.

The following material was landed from transports and hauled to depot: Forty-two 10-inch carcasses, sixteen hand-barrows, three platforms. One 13-inch mortar was transferred from transport to canal-boat, which is to transport it up Wormley's Creek. A detachment is ordered to work all night to complete the transfer of the remaining four mortars. The whole number will be ready to be towed into position to-morrow night. Another detachment is ordered to work all night disembarking five 30-pounders.

Thursday, April 24.—One hundred and seventy 30-pounder shell, ten 30-pounder shot, thirty-three 30-pounder shell with Greek fire; forty-eight 8-inch carcasses, twenty-six 10-inch carcasses transported from landing to depot; five 30-pounder Parrott guns transported from landing to Battery No. 2.

Battery No. 2. Five 30-pounder Parrott guns placed in position, six platforms laid, and five hundred rounds of 30-pounder ammunition placed in magazine. This battery is now ready for service. Eight 13-inch sea-coast mortars were transferred from the transport to canal-boats, and will to-night at high tide be towed into Wormley's Creek. Two 13-inch mortars and one 200-pounder Parrott gun will be transferred to-morrow, and, weather permitting, will also be towed into the creek. A quantity of 10-inch shell and 100-pounder Parrott projectiles are being landed from transports.

Battery No. 5. Six platforms laid. The guns will be in position to-night and by daybreak ready for service.

Friday, April 25—a. m.—The five 30-pounder Parrotts were placed in position in Battery No. 2 last night. Ammunition supplied for the fifteen guns of that battery, and the guns transferred to their proper platforms—*i. e.*, five 20-pounders in left branch, next in order five 30-pounders, and next five $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch guns. Finishing work is now being done, but the battery is ready for immediate service. Eight 13-inch sea-coast mortars, with a quantity of shell, were towed out of Cheeseman's Creek last night *en route* for Wormley's Creek. Upon arriving at the fleet it was ascertained that the tide was beginning to ebb, and the officer detailed by me to superintend the work (Major Webb) was dissuaded by the pilot and Captain Missroon, U. S. Navy, from attempting the passage. The canal-boats were therefore anchored beyond range of the enemy's guns and view, and they will be run in at 8 o'clock to-night, together with the remaining mortars and 200-pounder.

Friday, April 25—p. m.—In consequence of the breaking of the blocks and falls procured from the Navy, the transfer of mortars was necessarily delayed. Two 13-inch mortars and one 200-pounder gun yet remained to be transhipped. Measures have been taken to procure from Fort Monroe lifting material of adequate strength. Six hundred 30-pounder shells and four hundred 30-pounder shot were trans-

ferred from landing to depot. One large sling-cart, lifting-jack, and ropes were taken to battery No. 4, in readiness for 13 inch mortars. Eight 13-inch mortars are to be brought into Wormley's Creek to-night at high tide (8 p. m.) and will be moved up to Battery No. 4 early to-morrow morning.

Saturday, April 26—a. m.—Two of the barges, containing eight 13-inch mortars, were successfully gotten into Wormley's Creek this morning. The remaining barge, loaded with 13-inch mortar shell, is hopelessly aground, and will have to be discharged. It can easily be unloaded, and I have to request that the engineer department be ordered to furnish Colonel Tyler with pontoons for this purpose. No change reported in any of the batteries.

Saturday, April 26—p. m.—Two canal-boats, containing eight 13-inch mortars and nine beds, were brought into Wormley's Creek, in readiness to be taken up to their position at high tide (8.30 o'clock) to-night. Major Webb left Cheeseman's Creek at 5 o'clock this afternoon, in charge of two canal-boats, containing two 13-inch mortars, one bed, and one 100-pounder gun, with its chassis, carriage, and platform. They will be brought into Wormley's Creek at high tide to-night.

The following were landed from transports at Cheeseman's Landing and transported thence to depot, viz: One hundred and thirty 10-inch shell, twenty-three 10-inch carcasses, seven 8-inch carcasses, one hundred and seventy 30-pounder shot, four hundred 30-pounder shell.

Battery No. 1. Ten shell from the large gun at Yorktown and two from Gloucester Point were fired this morning at a canal-boat ashore about 350 feet in front of the battery. Fragments of these shell struck the battery in several places. The projectile appears of about 7 inches caliber and about $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches in thickness.

Battery No. 2. The working party asked for this morning, to complete the road in rear of the battery, did not report. The application is renewed for to-morrow, as the work is deemed to be of importance.

Batteries Nos. 3, 5, and 6. No change.

Battery No. 4. Preparations made for landing and mounting 13-inch mortars. The roads to and from Cheeseman's Creek are again getting bad, and require immediate attention.

Sunday, April 27, 1862—a. m.—The 200-pounder Parrott and the remaining two 13-inch mortars were successfully brought into Wormley's Creek just at daybreak this morning. Great credit is due my assistant, Major Webb, for this work. It was by his energy, perseverance, and coolness during the larger portion of forty-eight hours' almost continuous labor, for nearly two hours of which he was under the enemy's fire of shot and shell, that the great difficulties attending the movement of this exceedingly heavy material were overcome. I have given orders to Colonel Tyler (who has already entered upon the execution of them) to mount and place in position the mortars and 200-pounder. I have no change to report in any of the batteries.

Sunday, April 27—p. m.—One hundred and twenty-five barrels of powder were to day hauled from Cheeseman's Landing to depot. The roads to and from the landing are now so bad that it is utterly impossible to bring more than light loads over them. I earnestly request that a strong working party be detailed at once for its repairs. The road in rear of Battery No. 2 is still unfinished. I beg to repeat my application of yesterday and of the day before that a party be detailed to complete it.

Monday, April 28.—Battery No. 1. Platform for 200-pounder laid; chassis, upper carriage, and gun mounted.

Battery No. 2. Gabion revetment of embrasures faced with green hides, approaches to magazine improved, and splinter-proofs constructed over entrance to same. This battery was much fired at by the enemy to-day. One shell struck in the battery and burst. No casualties.

Battery No. 3. Platforms completed, guns placed in position, and magazines filled. Several shots were fired at this battery by the enemy. One shell struck full in the exterior slope of the parapet, and knocked out two or three feet of earth.

Battery No. 4. Four platforms for 13-inch mortars laid and two mortars transferred from barge to battery.

Battery No. 5. No change. This battery was to-day much fired at by the enemy. The firing was, however, extremely wild, the enemy being apparently uncertain of the true position of the battery.

Battery No. 6. No changes.

Battery No. 9. This battery is not yet ready for its platforms. Six 10-inch mortars and beds, fifteen platforms, and 708 shell were hauled to it from depot.

Cheeseman's Landing. Four companies of First Connecticut Artillery relieved by two companies Fifth New York Regiment. The discharging of the vessel loaded with 10-inch shell was completed. The vessel on which are the 10-inch sea-coast mortars drawing so much water as to be unable to get to the wharf until high water, no mortars were discharged.

Tuesday, April 29.—Battery No. 1. Mounting of the 200-pounder completed.

Battery No. 2. Supplied with mantelets for fifteen embrasures. Work on road continued.

Battery No. 3. Mantelets supplied for three embrasures.

Battery No. 4. Four 13-inch mortars and three beds landed and two platforms laid.

Battery No. 5. No change.

Battery No. 6. Six platforms for siege guns taken up and removed to battery No. 10.

Battery No. 9. Garrisoned by two companies First Connecticut Artillery and four 10-inch mortars. Three hundred and eighty-four 10-inch shell and material for ten platforms hauled in.

Battery No. 10. Garrisoned by one company of Fifth New York. Material hauled in for four platforms, one platform laid, and two do. partly finished.

Battery No. 11. Garrisoned by one company of Fifth New York. Getting out timber, and hewing the same for sea-coast mortar platforms.

Cheeseman's Landing. Platform material, 20-pounder Parrott guns, and large quantity of shell landed.

Wednesday, April 30.—Battery No. 1. Opened fire at 2 o'clock p. m. with the five 100-pounders and one 200-pounder. The fire was first directed at the wharf at Yorktown, where the enemy were busily engaged discharging six or seven schooners. These vessels were soon driven off. The enemy's large barbette gun was directed upon us at intervals of fifteen or twenty minutes. Two of the 100-pounders were turned in that direction with apparent good effect. The fire of the 200-pounder was directed upon the vessels, which after leaving Yorktown wharf took refuge behind Gloucester Point. This fire was very effective. The enemy's fire was well directed, but the protection afforded by the battery effective, and their fire caused us no casualties. Battery No. 1 gives us complete control of the enemy's water batteries,

wharves, and Gloucester. The expenditure was as follows, viz: Solid shot, five from 200-pounder, one from 100-pounder; shell (percussion), sixteen, all from 100-pounder; shell (time fuse), thirteen, all from 100-pounder; shell (filled with Greek fire), four, all from 100-pounder. The performance of the guns was excellent, as was also that of the iron carriages and chassis. Most of the percussion shell failed to explode, and no observable effect was produced by the Greek fire.

Batteries Nos. 2, 3, and 5. No change.

Battery No. 4. One mortar transferred from barge, and two mortars mounted and now ready for service. A third mortar was being mounted when the blocks broke, and further work was delayed for repairs. Three hundred and fifteen shell placed in the battery.

Battery No. 6. Six 4½-inch guns removed to Battery No. 10.

Battery No. 10. Six platforms laid for 4½-inch guns and six guns placed in position. One platform for 100-pounder hauled to the battery.

Battery No. 11. Materials for platforms supplied.

Cheeseman's Landing. The following material was landed, viz: Three 10-inch sea-coast mortars, ten do. beds, four 20-pounder Parrott guns and carriages, four Whitworth guns, fifteen 13-inch shell with Greek fire, a quantity of platforms, implements, &c. I beg to urge the necessity of immediate further repairs upon the road near Cheeseman's Landing and in front of General Hooker's division (Yorktown road). It is impossible to haul heavy guns over that portion of the road.

Thursday, May 1.—Battery No. 1. A few shots were fired this p. m. at Yorktown wharf, with what effect is not known, as the fog was thick. Fire at the rate of one shot per hour was maintained at this battery all night, to prevent the enemy's transports, which were driven away yesterday afternoon, from returning to discharge their freight under cover of darkness. Some of the pintle-blocks have started; repairs will be made at once.

Battery No. 2. No change. A working party of 80 or 100 men is needed to complete the road.

Batteries Nos. 3 and 5. No changes.

Battery No. 4. Two more mortars mounted, three more mortars discharged, five beds discharged, and five platforms laid.

Battery No. 6. Six 4½-inch guns and ammunition sent to Battery No. 10.

Battery No. 9. Not yet ready for platforms and the magazine not yet completed.

Battery No. 10. Garrisoned by two companies of Fifth New York Volunteers. Six platforms laid for 4½-inch guns, and the six guns placed in position ready for service. Magazine supplied with one hundred rounds per gun for six guns. One 100-pounder platform laid and materials hauled in for two more.

Battery No. 11. Material got out of hewn timber for foundations for four 10-inch sea-coast mortar platforms. Magazine nearly completed.

Battery No. 13. Not yet ready for its garrison.

Battery No. 14. Reported ready for its garrison to-night. One company First Connecticut Artillery detailed, and platforms will be laid to-morrow.

Cheeseman's Landing. Four 20-pounders, four Whitworth guns, and five platforms for 100-pounders landed and sent up to depot. Four 10-inch sea-coast mortars landed, and a large quantity of shot, shell, and implements sent from landing to depot.

Friday, May 2, 1862.—Battery No. 1. Repairs made to the platforms. Sixty shot and shell fired at the enemy's wharf and water battery with apparent good effect. The long-range gun in the enemy's high bastion is believed to have burst.

Battery No. 2. Mantelets put up in embrasures. One 4½-inch gun transferred to Battery No. 10.

Batteries Nos. 3, 5, and 6. No change.

Battery No. 4. Three 13-inch mortars and three beds disembarked, four platforms laid, and three mortars mounted.

Battery No. 9. Six platforms laid. Six 10-inch siege mortars mounted.

Battery No. 10. Three platforms for 100-pounders laid. Three chassis for 100-pounders in position.

Battery No. 11. Four platforms for 10-inch sea-coast mortars laid; ninety shell received.

Battery No. 12. Five platforms for siege mortars laid and two 10-inch mortars placed in position.

Battery No. 13. Not yet ready.

Battery No. 14. Platforms for two 100-pounders carried into battery; three chassis and three upper carriages for do. received. Two 8-inch mortars, 100 shell, 8 barrels of gunpowder, and implements and equipments for same, sent to headquarters of General Smith.

Cheeseman's Landing. Six chassis for 100-pounders; six carriages for do. landed and sent to depot. Large quantity of implements, ammunition, and ordnance stores landed and sent to depot. I have again most urgently to request that a strong working party be sent to complete the road in rear of Battery No. 2.

Saturday, May 3.—Battery No. 1. Thirty-four shot and shell fired at big gun bastion and water battery, with very good effect at the latter.

Battery No. 2. Completed the setting up of the mantelets. A working party on the road from 12 m. until 5 p. m.

Battery No. 3. Completed setting up of mantelets. One 20-pounder platform laid and one additional 20-pounder gun placed in position.

Battery No. 4. This battery was entirely completed, platforms all laid, and mortars all mounted at 9 o'clock a. m. One hundred barrels of powder placed in magazine; implements and equipments supplied. The battery is now ready for service.

Battery No. 5. Two additional 20-pounder guns placed in position.

Battery No. 6. Supplied with platforms and with 634 10-inch shells.

Battery No. 10. Laying platforms for 100-pounder and placing chassis and carriages for ditto in position. Two badly-directed shots from No. 1 dropped shells into this battery to-day, of which one exploded, fortunately without injury to any one.

Battery No. 11. Remaining platforms laid and ready for mortars. Magazine completed. Two beds and one 10-inch sea-coast mortar hauled in and placed in position. One hundred more shell received. Twenty-five barrels powder placed in magazine, with implements, equipments, &c. This battery will be fully ready for service in twelve hours more.

Battery No. 12. Remaining platforms laid and the mortars all mounted and placed in position. Magazine completed and supplied with powder, fuses, implements, and equipments. This battery is now fully ready for service.

Battery No. 13. Engineer work not yet completed. Armament, garrison, and all artillery equipment and supply in waiting. The battery can be made ready for service in six hours after the engineers turn it over to the artillery.

Battery No. 14. Platforms laid for three 100-pounder Parrotts, and

the chassis and upper carriages placed in position and mounted. The guns and ammunition will be hauled in to-day and the guns mounted to night. The battery will be ready for service at daylight to-morrow morning.

Sunday, May 4.—The enemy evacuated the place during the night, and the United States troops took possession at daylight.

The difficulties attending the placing in position the unusually heavy material used in this siege were very much increased by the peculiarities of the soil and by the continuance of heavy rains during the greater portion of the operations. Oftentimes the heavier guns in their transportation of three miles from the landing to the batteries would sink in the quicksands to the axle-trees of their traveling carriages. The efforts of the best trained and heaviest of the horses of the artillery reserve were of no avail in their attempts to extricate them, and it became necessary to haul this heavy metal by hand, the cannoneers working knee-deep in mud and water. In these labors the officers and men of the First Connecticut Artillery and of the Fifth New York Volunteers exhibited extraordinary perseverance, alacrity, and cheerfulness. It finally became necessary to construct a heavy corduroy road, wide enough for two teams to pass each other, the whole distance from the landing to the depot. Whenever it was practicable to use horses, they were promptly supplied by Colonel Hunt from the batteries of the artillery reserve under his command.

At the suggestion of Major-General McClellan a number of rope mantelets, on the plan of those used by the Russians at Sebastopol, were constructed in New York, under the supervision of Colonel Delafield, Corps of United States Engineers, and were forwarded to me with great dispatch. They were placed in the embrasures of batteries 2 and 3, and would doubtless have fully answered the same good purpose which those of similar construction did at Sebastopol.

Although all of the batteries but two (and they required but six hours more to be completed) were fully ready for service when the enemy evacuated his works, circumstances only permitted fire to be opened from Battery No. 1. The ease with which the 100 and 200-pounders of this battery were worked, the extraordinary accuracy of their fire, and the since-ascertained effects produced upon the enemy by it force upon me the conviction that the fire of guns of similar caliber and power in the other batteries at much shorter ranges, combined with the cross vertical fire of the 13 and 10-inch sea-coast mortars, would have compelled the enemy to surrender or abandon his works in less than twelve hours.

It will always be a source of great professional disappointment to me that the enemy, by his premature and hasty abandonment of his defensive line, deprived the artillery of the Army of the Potomac of the opportunity of exhibiting the superior power and efficiency of the unusually heavy metal used in this siege, and of reaping the honor and just reward of their unceasing labors day and night for nearly one month.

In conclusion, I beg to present the names of Colonel Tyler, Majors Kellogg, Hemingway, and Trumbull, Captains Perkins and Burke, First Connecticut Artillery; Maj. Alex. Doull, Second New York Artillery; Colonel Warren, Lieutenant-Colonel Duryea, Major Hull, and Captain Winslow, Fifth New York Volunteers, as conspicuous for intelligence, energy, and good conduct under fire.

My assistant, Major Webb, captain Eleventh U. S. Infantry, and my aides-de-camp, First-Lieutenant Marshall, Second New York Artil-

lery, and First-Lieutenant Verplank, Sixty-fifth Regiment New York Volunteers, carried my orders day and night, frequently under fire, with promptness and good judgment. The conduct of Major Webb in running the 13-inch sea-coast mortars, with their material and ammunition, into the mouth of Wormley's Creek, under the fire of the enemy, was particularly conspicuous for perseverance and great coolness and gallantry.

The services of several artillery officers were valuably employed in superintending the construction of gun and mortar batteries, magazines, splinter-proofs, traverses, fascines, and gabions. As they were under the orders of General Barnard, chief engineer, I leave it for him to bring their names and services to the notice of the major-general commanding.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WILLIAM F. BARRY,
Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. INSPECTOR OF ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, August 25, 1863.

GENERAL: In reply to your note* of to-day's date I have to state for the information of Dr. Lieber as follows:

When it was believed at daybreak May 4, 1862, that the enemy had evacuated Yorktown and its defenses, our pickets and skirmishers and subsequently larger bodies of our troops immediately advanced to occupy the abandoned lines. Before reaching the glacis of the main work, and at the distance of more than 100 yards from it, several of our men were injured by the explosion of what was ascertained to be loaded shells buried in the ground. These shells were the ordinary 8 or 10 inch mortar or columbiad shells, filled with powder, buried a few inches below the surface of the ground, and so arranged with some fulminate, or with the ordinary artillery friction primer, that they exploded by being trod upon or otherwise disturbed. In some cases articles of common use, and which would be most likely to be picked up, such as engineers' wheelbarrows, or pickaxes, or shovels, were laid upon the spot with apparent carelessness. Concealed strings or wires leading from the friction primer of the shell to the superincumbent articles were so arranged that the slightest disturbance would occasion the explosion. These shells were not thus placed on the glacis at the bottom of the ditch, &c., which, in view of an anticipated assault, might possibly be considered a legitimate use of them, but they were basely planted by an enemy who was secretly abandoning his post on common roads, at springs of water, in the shade of trees, at the foot of telegraph poles, and, lastly, quite within the defenses of the place—in the very streets of the town. A number of our men were killed by them before the disgraceful trick was discovered and information of the fact could be given to the troops. Careful examinations were at once made, and sentinels were posted wherever the existence of these infernal machines was ascertained or suspected. Major-General McClellan ordered that the Confederate prisoners taken by us at Yorktown should be made to search for these buried shells and to disinter

* Not found.

and destroy them when found. I was myself a witness of the horrible mangling by one of these shells of a cavalryman and his horse outside of the main work upon the Williamsburg road, and also of the cruel murder in the very streets of Yorktown of an intelligent young telegraph operator, who, while in the act of approaching a telegraph pole to reconnect a broken wire, trod upon one of these shells villainously concealed at its foot. It is generally understood that these shells were prepared by General George W. Rains, of the Confederate Army, for his brother, Brig. Gen. Gabriel Rains, the commander of the post of Yorktown, at whose instigation they were prepared and planted. The belief of the complicity of General Gabriel Rains in this dastardly business is confirmed by the knowledge possessed by many officers of our Army of a similar mode of warfare inaugurated by him while disgracing the uniform of the American Army during the Seminole war in Florida.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM F. BARRY,

Brigadier-General and Inspector of Artillery, U. S. Army.

Brig. Gen. G. W. CULLUM,

Chief of Staff, Headquarters of the Army.

No. 23.

*Reports of Col. Henry J. Hunt, commanding Artillery Reserve, of operations
April 18-June 25.*

HDQRS. ARTILLERY RESERVE, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Winfield Scott, near Yorktown, April 27, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit a report of the services of the artillery reserve for the past week:

On the 18th instant Carlisle's battery (six 20-pounder Parrotts) was ordered to Battery No. 7, in front of Wynn's Mill. The position was occupied at daybreak on the 19th, and the men set to work laying platforms and clearing away the wood in front of the embrasures. At 7 o'clock firing was commenced and continued at intervals, setting fire to the enemy's barracks, disabling two of their guns, and silencing their fire.

Lieut. Durando Russell, of Taft's battery, Fifth New York Artillery, temporarily attached to the battery, was severely wounded by a fragment of shell; the only casualty from the enemy's fire.

Carlisle's battery was relieved on the 20th by Diederichs' (four 20-pounder Parrotts), which kept up a fire at intervals all day, expending sixty-seven rounds. Captain Diederichs reports that he distinctly saw a conflict going on between two bodies of the enemy's infantry in the edge of the wood behind their batteries. The same fact was reported to me by some of the pickets in advance of the battery. On the same day (20th) Voegelée's battery (six 20-pounder Parrotts) occupied No. 3, in front of the White House. He threw a few shells, when the firing was stopped. Captain Voegelée reports that his fire caused 300 or 400 of the enemy, probably a working party, to leave the work. The guns were withdrawn at sunset, the battery being unfinished. Ames' battery of light 12-pounders replaced Diederichs'. His firing was rather to test his guns than for any other object. The distance (about 1,000 yards) was too great for effective shell-firing.

On the 24th Captain Smead, with one section of his own battery (light 12-pounders), one section of Voegelée's, and one of Knieriem's (20-pounder Parrotts) occupied the earthworks (No. 7) to cover a reconnaissance made by Colonel Gove, Twenty-second Massachusetts Volunteers. After the reconnaissance was successfully accomplished the guns were withdrawn under the enemy's fire. No casualties.

On the 25th Diederichs' battery, re-enforced by a section of Knieriem's (six 20-pounder Parrotts), was placed in position in Battery No. 2, and Carlisle's battery occupied Battery No. 5, which position they still hold. Voegelée, having laid the necessary platforms and the works being completed, occupies No. 3. I inclose herewith the reports of the officers commanding the batteries above referred to.*

Early in the week the cannoneers of two batteries at a time were detailed daily for making gabions and fascines, under direction of General Woodbury.

On Friday this detail was discontinued and the work was commenced in the batteries.

On Friday and Saturday 158 gabions and 11 fascines were prepared. As soon as the necessary preparation can be made and the material procured a regular supply of these articles can be furnished by the batteries not otherwise employed. A number of officers have been daily detailed as assistants in the construction of works, and two officers (Lieutenants Dresser, Fourth U. S. Artillery, and Sinclair, Third U. S. Artillery), are now regularly detailed for engineer duty and employed in the construction of redoubts. The reserve has furnished day and night the teams and drivers necessary for hauling the siege guns, mortars, and material from the landings to the depot and from the depot to the different batteries.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY J. HUNT,
Colonel, Commanding.

General W. F. BARRY.

HDQRS. ARTILLERY RESERVE, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Winfield Scott, near Yorktown, Va., May 4, 1862.

Since my report of April 27 Diederichs' battery, with one section of Knieriem's, has continued to occupy Earthwork No. 2. During this time, down to the morning of the 4th instant, when the enemy evacuated his positions, firing between this battery and the enemy has taken place at intervals night and day.

On the 1st instant the cheek of one of his pieces was somewhat damaged by a shot. No other injury done the battery.

On the 28th, the work being finished and the platforms laid by his cannoneers, Voegelée's battery reoccupied Earthwork No. 3. Firing between the work and the enemy's batteries took place daily, but nothing of moment occurred. The work was frequently damaged by the enemy's shot and shell and repaired by the labor of the cannoneers.

On the 1st and 2d the enemy's fire was very heavy.

On the 3d mantelets were placed in the embrasures and two more platforms laid for additional guns.

On April 28, on the application of Brig. Gen. F. J. Porter, director of the siege, two sections of Grimm's battery, First Battalion New York

* Not found.

Artillery (Brickel's), re-enforced by a section of Knieriem's (20-pounder Parrotts), took position, the first in the open in front of Redoubt A, the section of 20-pounders behind the section of the parallel running from the same redoubt, and engaged the enemy's battery near Wynn's Mill. After a brisk firing the enemy's guns were silenced and Grimm's guns withdrawn.

General Porter speaks in terms of praise as to the conduct of the officers and men.

The 20-pounders remained in position until Redoubt A was occupied by three light 12-pounders of Howe's battery, under Lieutenant Morgan, Fourth U. S. Artillery, of Howe's battery.

On April 29, about 8 p. m., three light 12-pounders of Howe's battery were placed in position in Redoubt A by Lieutenant Morgan, who had been engaged during the day with his cannoneers in making a ramp, laying a platform, &c. As soon as they were in position the 20-pounders of Knieriem's battery were withdrawn from the parallel in front.

From this date until yesterday firing took place between this redoubt and the enemy's works. No damage was done to the work or the guns. The fire of Morgan's guns dispersed parties of workmen and twice drove off a gun placed so as to command his position. During the period merlons were constructed of sand bags, so as to protect the guns without interfering with the field of fire.

Carlisle's battery has occupied earthwork No. 5 from the time of its completion to the date of the withdrawal of the enemy's force.

During the week Brevet Captain Pennington, Lieutenants Wilson, Barlow, and Hains, Second U. S. Artillery; Sinclair, Third U. S. Artillery; Dresser, Fourth U. S. Artillery, and Ames and Watson, of the Fifth U. S. Artillery, have been detailed for engineer duty, and engaged in the construction of works, magazines, &c. Other officers were detailed as assistants to these. The officers and men not detailed from the reserve on battery or other duty have been engaged in the fabrication of gabions, fascines, &c., under direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Getty, U. S. Army.

The teams have been used daily for hauling siege guns, mortars, material, and munitions, as during last week.

The services required of the reserve were well performed, and it is now ready for any armed service required of it.

The subjoined reports of the officers commanding batteries are transmitted with this.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

[HENRY J. HUNT,
Colonel, Commanding Artillery Reserve.]

Brig. Gen. W. F. BARRY.

—
HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY RESERVE,
Camp Lincoln, Va., June 25, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to state the service of the artillery reserve since my last report, dated May 4. At that time Robertson's battery was still detached with General Stoneman and remained absent until the 31st. He was engaged with the enemy on the 9th near Slatersville, and again at Hogan's, near New Bridge, on the 23d, with

* Not found.

marked success, and on the 23d, together with Tidball's battery, he was engaged at Ellison's Mill. On the 15th of May Tidball's battery was detached to Stoneman's advance, and engaged the enemy at New Bridge on the 23d, drove him from his position, and again engaged him near the bridge on Bell's Creek with success. On the 24th one of his sections, under Brevet Captain Pennington, Second Artillery, was detached for service with General Davidson at Mechanicsville. Benson's battery was detached on the 27th of May for service with General Porter, and took an active part in the battle of Hanover Court-House and the operations connected with it, during which he engaged and silenced a battery and drove it off, and so crippled one of its pieces, a howitzer, that it fell into our hands.

For the particulars of those affairs and the losses I respectfully refer you to the reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, commanding the horse artillery; Captains Robertson, Benson, and Tidball, commanding batteries; First Lieutenant and Brevet Captain Pennington, Second Artillery, commanding a section whilst detached, which reports are inclosed herewith.*

The reports as to the conduct of officers and men are uniformly good. From the period at which the army occupied the position at New Bridge the artillery reserve furnished batteries for the protection of the bridges and working parties, occupied the positions commanding the approaches of the enemy, and kept his troops in check. On many occasions this led to cannonades and artillery combats, but seldom to loss of life on our part.

On the 5th the enemy opened a heavy fire from several distinct points on our positions, principally upon that near the New Bridge occupied by Snow's battery, Maryland Artillery, attached to the reserve since June 2. The fire was answered with spirit by that battery, which, aided by the fire of the German 20-pounder Parrotts and Carlisle's guns, soon silenced their fire and drove them off. For the particulars of the action I refer to Captain Snow's report, transmitted herewith.†

On the 20th the firing from the enemy on Voegelee's battery of 20-pounders was especially active and destructive, killing 1 man and several horses. He also brought a large rifled gun or guns into play, making it necessary to throw up earthworks as cover. In all the operations of the batteries officers and men have behaved well, and cheerfully rendered the service required of them. For the names of those who distinguished themselves I respectfully refer to the reports transmitted herewith, and beg to call attention to the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, aide-de-camp, whilst detached in command of the horse artillery.

On the 19th of May Weed's and Edwards' batteries were detached to join Sykes' brigade, with which they are still serving.

On the 2d of June De Russey's battery of Napoleon guns was detached to Heintzelman's corps, and Petherbridge's brigade, consisting of Snow's and Wolcott's batteries of Maryland Artillery, joined.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY J. HUNT,

Colonel and Aide-de-Camp, Commanding Artillery Reserve.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps.

* For reports of Benson, see pp. 694, 695; Tidball, p. 656; Pennington, p. 657, Volume XI, Part I. For reports of Hays, see p. 242; Robertson, p. 246, Volume XI, Part II.

† See pp. 1000, 1001.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH PROVISIONAL CORPS,
Harrison's Landing, July 9, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded for the information of the major-general commanding. I was present at the skirmish of the First Maryland Battery with the enemy, and have to commend the admirable manner in which it was maneuvered and served, subjected as it was to a hot fire from various directions, and from some guns at pretty close range. I was struck with the coolness of the men and officers, who I believe were for the first time under fire.

I also saw Captain Benson at Hanover Court-House, where his services were invaluable, not more in the action than in the after operations of destroying the bridges over the South Anna. I commend Captain Benson to favorable consideration of the commanding general.

F. J. PORTER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

No. 24.*Report of Maj. Alexander Doull, Second New York Artillery, Ordnance Officer of Siege Train, of the siege.*

COLONEL: The siege of Yorktown being terminated by the evacuation of that place by the rebel forces just when nearly the whole of the siege batteries were ready to open fire, I have the honor to submit for your consideration the following report of the work which has been performed by the officers and men of your regiment in arming the siege batteries at that place:

During the seven days that elapsed from the 26th of April to the evacuation of Yorktown all the batteries have been fired at more or less continuously, and though the regiment has never before been under fire, and is, like the rest of this army, composed of troops who have not been twelve months in the service, and who would, therefore, be considered in any regular artillery in the world merely as recruits, and the officers have not had the advantage of that scientific military training which is usually considered necessary for this branch of military service, and although a large portion of the material employed has been of a weight hitherto completely unknown in sieges, and has, therefore, necessitated the employment of carriages and platforms usually confined to permanent works, on account of the labor, care, and accuracy required for their construction, yet the condition of the batteries and the accuracy with which all the platforms have been laid and the magazines arranged give no indication whatever of these disadvantages.

The siege train at present in battery and under my charge consists of two 200-pounder and five 100-pounder Parrotts at Battery No. 1, manned by Battery B, commanded by Major Kellogg; five 4½-inch guns and five 30-pounder Parrotts at Battery No. 2, manned by Batteries A and H, commanded by Major Hemingway; ten 13-inch sea-service mortars, 1861, at Battery No. 4, manned by Batteries F and G, commanded by Major Doull; six 10-inch sea-service mortars, 1861, at Battery No. 6, manned by Battery C, commanded by Captain Burbank; ten 10-inch siege mortars at Battery No. 9, manned by Batteries D and E, commanded by Major Trumbull; five 4½-inch rifles at Battery No. 10,

manned by Battery I, commanded by Captain Perkins. In addition there were in depot at Fort Grafton four 20-pounder Parrotts, four 10-pounder Whitworths, three 8-inch howitzers, and two 8-inch mortars (siege); and there have been transported to the depot and afterward given over to Colonel Warren, Fifth New York Volunteers, five 10-inch siege mortars and five 8-inch siege mortars; making a total of thirty rifled guns, three howitzers, and thirty-eight mortars, or seventy-one pieces of artillery, of which sixty-five were disembarked by the First Connecticut Artillery and the six 10-inch sea-service mortars by the Fifth New York Volunteers.

For the maneuvering and transportation of this material there has been provided one gin, complete; three mortar wagons; two large sling-carts, and three hand-carts. In addition one treble, two double, and one single block were obtained from Lieutenant Baylor, Fortress Monroe. With these and with temporary derricks, constructed from such timber as could be procured, the disembarking, the loading of the mortar wagons, and the mounting of the 4½-inch and 30-pounder Parrotts at Cheeseman's Landing has been performed.

The mounting of the 200-pounder and 100-pounder Parrotts and the 13-inch sea-service mortars (1861) was done with the gin. In mounting the latter the treble block broke. This and the slipping of the block of a gun-tackle while moving one of the 13-inch mortars on rollers, were the only accidents that happened during the whole of the embarking, disembarking, and mounting of this armament, although a very large amount of the duty was performed at night. The guns and mortars were hauled from the landing by the horses of the reserve artillery.

To the zeal and energy displayed by the lieutenants who have been detailed for that service, in the performance of a duty in which as light artillery officers they cannot be expected to take much interest and which was especially severe upon horses and harness, the service is much indebted.

The 100-pounder Parrotts were transported upon the large sling-carts. This was attended with some difficulty even when the roads were moderately good, and I beg to suggest that an advantage would be found in widening the tires of these sling-carts, so as to give a larger bearing surface.

The hand sling-carts were found very useful in disembarking the mortars and mortar beds. The pole of one of them broke at the junction of the braces and the pole. It has been repaired by the regimental artificers in a manner which appears to be an improvement. The front bolts for connecting the upper and lower strap and the bolt for connecting the braces cross through the pole about 2 inches apart. These are dispensed with, and the braces and straps shrunk on the pole by an iron ring.

The 200-pounder Parrotts were transported to the battery by water at night, and landed by being rolled on skidding. The 13-inch mortars and the mortar shell were run into Wormley's Creek at night in barges, taken up to the battery, and landed at a wharf constructed for that purpose at one end of the battery. This was done by raising the mortars by the gin, placing rollers under them, rolling them to a port cut in the side of the barge, raising them by successive lifts with sling-cart screw worked by dog-ropes until they hung as high as possible, and then running them nearly onto the platform, where they were again placed upon rollers, rolled into position, lifted by the gin, and the carriage placed underneath.

The heaviest pieces placed in position in the trenches before Sebastopol were, by the English, the 68-pounder gun of 10,640 pounds, and the 13-inch sea-service mortar of 11,300 pounds, and, by the French, the *canon de 50* of 10,190 pounds, and the *mortier de 32e* of 9,615 pounds. The 200-pounder Parrott weighs 16,570 pounds, and the 13-inch sea-service mortar (1861) 17,120 pounds. The guns placed in position before Yorktown exceed, therefore, in weight by 50 per cent. any guns that have ever before been placed in siege batteries. I have, therefore, been thus particular in detailing the manner in which they have been placed in position. I do not believe that any very great difficulty would be found in moving the 200-pounder by the sling-cart over very good roads, but the dimensions of the 13-inch sea-service mortars (43 inches diameter) would render it impossible to transport them without a special carriage, as the mortar when slung on the sling-cart hangs 20 inches below the tires of the wheels. In the battery, ways of logs, with flanks spiked on top, were constructed, and the ground excavated between to permit the passage of the mortar, but this could only be done upon hard ground.

In the arranging of the stores and maneuvering of the guns the following points in which improvements might be made suggested themselves, and are respectfully submitted for consideration:

1. That the construction of the pole of the hand sling-cart be altered as above mentioned.

2. That the simplicity of the siege platform be still further increased by making no distinction between mortars, sleepers, and front and rear pieces and deck plank—*i. e.*, by boring dowel-holes in all the pieces, sending the dowels in bundles, to be placed in where necessary, and leaving the bolt-holes to be bored in the battery.

3. That a certain supply of tools, most of them now found in battery wagon D, be supplied with the gun and mortar implements at the rate of one for each five pieces, viz: 2-foot rule, an auger, a mortar level, (the gunners' level not being convenient for laying platforms), a hand-saw, a cold-chisel, and a battery lantern; that a magazine be allowed for every five guns, and a complete set of magazine implements (Ordnance Manual, p. 367), including copper adzes and dark-lanterns, be supplied for each magazine. Battery wagon D is admirably suited for depot purposes, but if each battery and battery magazine is supplied with them the battery wagons are soon exhausted of these stores, without the other stores which they contain being called for at all.

4. That a full complement of the machines and ropes specified in Ordnance Manual, page 367, be sent with each train, and that in addition 3-inch planking, skidding, blocking, spare tackle-blocks, and a number of small tackles, consisting of wooden double and single blocks, with 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch falls, be provided.

5. In maneuvering the 13-inch mortars it became evident that the iron-shod handspikes provided were not sufficiently strong.

6. The steps of the wrought-iron mortar-carriage require an upright brace, or the upper one becomes crooked in mounting the mortar.

Only one battery (No. 1) of five 100-pounders and one 200-pounder Parrott opened fire during the siege. This battery opened fire on the 1st of May, and at once drove all the rebel shipping from the wharves at Yorktown. In all, 137 rounds from the 100-pounders and 4 rounds from the 200-pounder were fired. An inspection of the batteries on the river front of the Yorktown fortifications will afford the best indication of the very accurate practice made from this battery; but the impossibility of observing with equal accuracy the results of

firing at such long ranges (3,800 to 4,700 yards) renders it extremely questionable whether any useful result follows a large expenditure of ammunition at distance over 2,500 yards.

The following points of importance appear to have been established by this practice:

1. That the wrought-iron carriages are too rigid to resist long-continued firing at high angles, the rivets cutting off completely. It is very much to be regretted that a few rounds were not fired from the 13-inch mortars, to test their carriages, as it appears probable that they would fail more completely in this respect.

2. That the mode of supporting the pintle and traverse circle used in this battery is not sufficiently strong. The object of the platform is to so connect these two parts that no relative motion can take place. The intermediate pieces should therefore act more directly than in these platforms. The pintle-plates should have a larger bearing surface upon the pintle, and should be strengthened by ribs. Probably the best plan of all would be to adopt a low carriage, similar to that sent by Captain Parrott for the last 200-pounder, with four trucks, the rise of the platform being given by the position of the trucks. To dispense with the pintle altogether, using rails and hollow trucks (report of Major Mordecai on recent English constructions), the wooden platform would then consist of two traverse circles, with wooden braces and iron tie-bolts.

For the service of these guns it was necessary to convey 17,047 projectiles and of the powder and small stores into depot at Fort Mifflin, commenced on the 12th of April and continued until the evacuation of Yorktown, on the morning of the 4th of May [*sic*]. During that time 726 wagon loads were conveyed from Cheeseman's Landing to the depot, of which 527 loads were projectiles, 70 powder, 88 platforms, and 41 small stores. This does not include the projectiles for the 13-inch mortar, which were conveyed to the battery by water.

The weather during the siege was very varied, and the roads, consequently, sometimes in such good order that the wagons made two and even three trips a day; sometimes so bad that they were a day and a half on the road. On Wednesday, the 16th, 62 wagons brought up 1,882 10-inch mortar shell, 40 wagons carrying 30, and 22 carrying 31 shell, weighing 2,700 pounds. This is the maximum. On the 27th of April 17 wagons brought only 125 barrels of powder, being only 700 and 600 pounds a wagon. This was the minimum. The average, taken from the projectiles, was 1,456 pounds a wagon. This estimate of transportation is exclusive of that between the depot and the batteries, for which purpose 25 wagons were kept constantly employed from the 21st of April. In all, 613 wagon loads were conveyed.

In the three weeks during which these siege operations have been conducted your regiment has worked, with very little relief, night and day. As soon as any battery has been completed the companies to whom it has been assigned have moved into camp near it, constructing such shelter from the enemy's fire as they could, and remaining with their guns; differing in this respect from all other troops employed in the trenches, who returned to camp out of fire as soon as their duties were finished.

When it is considered that the first siege train placed in battery by the English before Sebastopol consisted of seventy-two pieces; that they marched into Balaklava on the 25th of September, and opened fire upon the 17th of October, twenty-three days afterwards, and that they employed to accomplish this end all the resources of a powerful

navy, and of a large regular artillery, skilled by constant practice in the large maritime fortresses of Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu in all the maneuvers of heavy artillery, and that only the same time (twenty-three days) was occupied (the 12th of April to the 3d of May) in placing seventy-one guns in battery, many of them much exceeding in weight any that have before been used in a siege, it is evident that the labors of the First Connecticut Artillery will compare favorably with anything of the kind that has been done before.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALEXANDER DOULL,

Maj. 2d N. Y. Arty., Ord. Officer to Siege Train, 1st Conn. Arty.

Col. R. O. TYLER,

Commanding First Connecticut Artillery.

No. 25.

Report of Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Corps, of operations April 4-15.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS,
Warwick Court-House, Va., April 16, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the operations of this army corps from the 4th to the 15th instant, inclusive.

Two divisions (Smith's and Couch's) marched from their camps near Newport News at 6 a. m. the 4th. Smith, being in advance, encountered the enemy's pickets at Watts' Creek. While halting at this point to close the column it was reported that the enemy had strong works and a force at Young's Mill. I caused the column to be closed up, but the two regiments of the enemy retreated in great haste at our approach, firing only a few shots, and wounding one of our men. The enemy's works at Young's Mill are so strong that with 5,000 men he might have stopped my two divisions there a week.

At 6 o'clock the head of Smith's column left Young's Mill, and at about 11 a. m. came in sight of the enemy's works on Warwick Creek, near Lee's Mill, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from here. The rain had been falling in torrents all the morning, and it was with the utmost difficulty that a few guns could be got forward to the edge of the woods fronting a wide open space, from which the enemy had burned the buildings and cut the timber to give a field of fire for his two forts in advance, which we could see. A brisk fire was opened on both sides between guns and skirmishers; Brigadier-General Davidson's brigade being posted and partly deployed on the left, and Brigadier-General Hancock's brigade on the right, while Brigadier-General Brooks' brigade was held in reserve about half way through the strip of woods of a mile wide, which we occupied, Couch's division being in rear.

Between 2 and 3 o'clock p. m. it was reported to me that a body of 2,000 or 3,000 of the enemy was filing out from the rear of the works about Lee's Mill, and moving to our left. Immediately I directed Graham's brigade to move to the left, and send scouts far enough through the dense forest to discover, if possible, the enemy's intention. Word was soon brought to me that another of the enemy's forts was found, and that the course of Warwick River seemed to be nearly parallel to our line of advance from Young's Mill. Accordingly, leaving

the front in charge of Brigadier-Generals Smith and Graham, I returned in this direction, sending in scouts from point to point to the left, but without a satisfactory result.

Later in the day Brigadier-General Peck, of Couch's division, was ordered far down to the left from Warwick Court-House with Brady's and McCarthy's batteries and three regiments, and discovered two other forts and a considerable body of rebels not far from the mouth of Warwick River. I was thus enabled in the first day to comprehend with tolerable clearness the position of the enemy from a short distance above Lee's Mill down to James River. He is in a strongly-fortified position behind Warwick River, the fords in which have been destroyed by dams, and the approaches to which are through dense forests, swamps, and marshes. No part of his line as far as discovered can be taken by assault without an enormous waste of life.

On the 6th I thoroughly reconnoitered my whole front, and in the evening directed Brigadier-General Smith to withdraw his brigades to the rear and right, and shortly after a similar order was received from Major-General McClellan. Smith's division is now, since the 7th, on and near the Yorktown road from near this place to the Four Corners. Graham's line of battle is in the edge of the woods, a mile from here, and their pickets connect.

Brigadier-General Peck's brigade and two of West's batteries are now stationed on the irregular peninsula running down to Warwick River, and bounded on the right and left by Stony and Lucas Creeks. General Peck has been extremely active in that quarter, and has thoroughly studied his ground, and has thrown up some earthworks, which will be indicated on the map. The two division commanders, Couch and W. F. Smith, have exhibited continued zeal and intelligence.

Brigadier-General Graham's brigade has remained near its position of the first day, where General Graham has made good dispositions.

Colonel Briggs' brigade has been held mostly in reserve near these headquarters. A reconnaissance with one regiment (Colonel Wheaton's) was made on the left, and the other regiments have been active by detachments.

The morning of the 6th, Brigadier-General Hancock, with the Fifth Wisconsin, Colonel Cobb, and Sixth Maine, Colonel Burnham, Lieutenants Comstock, Bowen, and Merrill, engineers, made a reconnaissance of the enemy's lines above Lee's Mill. The reconnaissance was conducted with great skill and daring, and in the report of General Hancock, inclosed herewith, several officers are commended by name, among them Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler and Lieut. and Adj. J. D. McFarland, of the Sixth Maine, who took four prisoners. One of the prisoners was pursued 150 yards by Lieutenant McFarland on horseback directly toward the enemy's fort and in easy range of his guns, captured, and brought off. This act of gallantry deserves special notice.

On the 9th instant Colonel Burnham and the Sixth Maine assisted Lieutenant Comstock in a reconnaissance of the one-gun battery. A brisk skirmish occurred, resulting in the loss of 1 man mortally wounded on our side and the killing and wounding of 10 or 12 of the enemy. General Davidson's brigade, consisting of the Seventh Maine, Thirty-third, Seventy-seventh, and Forty-ninth New York, of Smith's division, which was deployed on its left, occupied a very exposed position until the evening of the 7th instant, at which time the brigade was withdrawn out of range. The guns of Wheeler's battery, placed in the edge of the woods and supported by Davidson's brigade, played upon the enemy's works at intervals until they were withdrawn by General Davidson's

assistance on the night of the 7th without attracting the attention of the enemy. The guns being too small to affect the enemy's forts, it was thought best to waste no more ammunition. As will be seen by the list of casualties, Davidson's brigade suffered far more than any other in this corps. The conduct of that brigade and of Wheeler's battery was excellent. They captured 3 prisoners and killed many of the enemy. Lieutenant Swan and Bugler Brown, of the Seventh Maine, were captured by the rebels.

I am happy to be able to report acts of extraordinary coolness which were performed in Captain Wheeler's battery, Smith's division, on the 6th instant. The enemy opened with a 10-pounder Parrott. One of its projectiles, a percussion shell, passed through the corner of a limber ammunition-chest, exploded 29 cartridges and 2 case-shot in one compartment, and set fire to the packing tow in the other compartment of the chest. Sergt. David L. Smith and Artificer James H. Hickox promptly passed water upon the burning tow, which Private William H. Kershner pulled out with his hands, and thus prevented the explosion of all the remaining ammunition. With such artillerists we have everything to expect.

The artillery of the Second (Smith's) Division was under the chief direction of Capt. R. B. Ayres, whose dispositions were excellent.

The artillery of the First Division (Couch's) was under the chief direction of Major West, First Pennsylvania Artillery, whose zeal and activity have been constant.

Yesterday afternoon I reconnoitered closely the one-gun battery opposite Smith's right. I observed the enemy digging to extend his defenses about it. This morning at 3 o'clock a. m. (at which hour this report of operations concludes) I received the order of Major-General McClellan to stop the enemy's working.

Owing to the unusual coldness of the weather and the rains our men have suffered considerably. The badness of the roads has made it next to impossible to get forward supplies. No complaints, however, have been heard, and every officer and man of this corps seems devoted to the great task before us.

The engineers, Comstock, Merrill, and Bowen, have been actively engaged in reconnoitering the enemy's position and the country occupied by this corps. No country I have been in seems more difficult to learn, and in finding out my exact situation the troops have been severely taxed. I have been cordially seconded by all the superior officers, and they and the men have shown an extraordinary activity and cheerfulness under the trying circumstances of cold, wet weather, bad roads, and short rations.

With every means to make reconnaissances it has required many days to discover the position and apparent strength of the enemy's lines in front of the army corps. Our knowledge is yet far from perfect. Enough has been ascertained to be certain they are exceedingly strong, and I have learned that thousands of slaves have been long occupied in their construction.

Inclosed is a list of the casualties, stating the divisions and regiments to which the killed and wounded belonged and the dates of their injuries. It will be seen that up to this time we have lost 2 killed and 19 wounded.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G., *Army of the Potomac.*

HDQRS. FOURTH CORPS, WARWICK COURT-HOUSE, VA.,

April 16, 1862—7 a. m.

SIR: I had the honor to receive at 3 o'clock this morning the copy of Major-General McClellan's order to Brigadier-General Smith to stop the enemy's work at the one-gun battery, opposite his right flank. I reconnoitered that work closely myself yesterday, but could not satisfactorily discover its strength. Many indications convince me that the enemy is working in rear and out of sight of the forts we see. I have had ten [?] regiments of Couch's division notified to be ready to move in a moment, should their services be needed, to support Smith, from whom I have not yet heard.

Yesterday the enemy threw ten or twelve shot and shells from a battery opposite the mouth of Stony Creek upon the ground occupied by the left flank of Graham's brigade. No damage was done, although some of the projectiles flew over one regiment. It seems the enemy has a field gun, with which he visits that fort occasionally. Graham's pickets will watch, and he is instructed to make a new disposition of his camps if necessary.

8.10 a. m.—The first guns are now heard. I shall go in that direction myself.

I remain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Army Corps.

Brigadier-General WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 26.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Charles S. Hamilton, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, Third Corps, of operations April 11-12.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, April 12, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that the alarm of yesterday was caused by the enemy making a dash at some wood buildings lying between the left wing of my pickets and the rebel intrenchments. The buildings were burned and no doubt destroyed, that they might not be used as a cover for sharpshooters.

Later in the day another dash was made from the intrenchments in front of my extreme right on the rifle pits occupied by the Berdan Sharpshooters, but under pressure of larger numbers. The troops under General Jameson, dispatched to the support of the pickets, quickly repulsed the rebels, driving them back under cover of their earthworks. A gun which the rebels had been compelled to withdraw within their works by the fire of the Sharpshooters was again put in position during the night while the rifle pits were vacant.

The troops on picket duty, in the main, behaved well in the presence of the enemy. A few exceptions, however, were noticed in the Sixty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers and in the regiment of Sharpshooters.

I transmit herewith a report of Colonel Hays, Sixty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, with a list of casualties; also a note from Colonel Berdan in relation to his men leaving their post.

It is proper to remark that Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, Sixty-third

Pennsylvania Volunteers, referred to as having given the Sharpshooters instructions to return to camp, utterly denies having given any such instructions or any permission whatever.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. S. HAMILTON,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Fifth Corps.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, April 13, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, instructing me "to report more promptly when anything occurs in your front," and that "in case the enemy make a demonstration similar to the one of yesterday you will open immediately a fire of artillery upon him;" and, further, "should he attempt to construct additional rifle pits you will open fire upon him with spherical case-shot;" and, further, "you will protect your artillery by throwing up breastworks, which may be used either for artillery or infantry."

In reply, I respectfully say that in a former communication I have notified the commander of the corps that he would be promptly furnished with information of everything worthy of notice that takes place in my front. The information called for this morning was furnished as soon as received in detail from the commander in the front, Colonel Poe, and that all the information was furnished to the general commanding the corps that was in my possession verbally yesterday evening at his quarters.

The further particulars furnished this morning concerning the demonstration made late yesterday evening were sent forward in response to your note of this morning, which note was received before the desired information was in my possession.

It is proper to say here that the demonstration by the enemy on our right was of such a nature and occurring at such an hour as to lead Colonel Poe to the reasonable belief that it was only an expectation of an attack from us, and he did not communicate the information until this morning.

In regard to throwing up breastworks for the protection of artillery and infantry, I may be permitted to reply that orders from headquarters Third Army Corps require a detail daily of all the axes, picks, shovels, and spades in this division to be sent to work on the road to Ship Point. Whenever the labor of these men and the implements can be dispensed with they will be employed in erecting the breastworks, as suggested by me to the general commanding the corps yesterday evening, and the artillery of the division will be freely used whenever it will prevent the construction of earthworks, additional rifle pits, or the labor of the rebels on their intrenchments.

The camp of my artillery will be changed forthwith.

I regret to see that the tone of your letter conveys censure.

I am, captain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. S. HAMILTON,

Brigadier-General.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Corps.

No. 27.

*Report of Col. Charles T. Campbell, Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry,
of skirmish near Yorktown, April 11.*

CAMP FIFTY-SEVENTH REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
Near Yorktown, Va., April 12, 1862.

SIR: I most respectfully report the result of the skirmish of yesterday (11th) afternoon, in which my regiment was engaged.

The enemy were concealed in a peach orchard near the road leading to Yorktown and along a cross fence from a road toward the woods on the left—I should suppose about 600 or 700 strong. Their fire on our approach was very heavy from their cover and from their fort on the right, but they were soon compelled to cease and quit their cover by the well-directed fire of the Fifty-seventh. They returned towards the fort in very good order, though I am convinced their loss was heavy. The loss of the Fifty-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers is 4 wounded.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. T. CAMPBELL,
Colonel Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers.

General C. D. JAMESON,
Commanding First Brigade, Hamilton's Division.

No. 28.

*Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, of the engagement
at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Winfield Scott, near Yorktown, April 19, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to transmit reports explanatory of the operations of General W. F. Smith's division in the affair of the Burnt Chimneys, on the 16th instant. The report will explain the transaction with sufficient clearness. There are a few points to which I would call the attention of the Secretary. The object of the movement was to force the enemy to discontinue his work in strengthening his batteries, to silence his fire, and gain control of the dam existing at that point. All these purposes were fully and handsomely accomplished. Between the time when Lieutenant Noyes crossed and that when the skirmishers of the Third Vermont crossed the stream, the enemy had by some means considerably increased the depth of water. It should be understood that a dense forest comes up to the very edge of the stream on the enemy's side, effectually concealing everything from view, and completely covering the rebel infantry.

The purposes of crossing the skirmishers was to ascertain the real state of the case on the enemy's side. There was no other way of obtaining the information. The loss sustained in accomplishing this is to be regretted, but was small in comparison with the importance of the object in view. The accompanying map will show the great importance of the position held by General Smith. The conduct of the officers and men on the 16th was admirable and deserves the highest commendation. It was the fortune of Mott's battery (Third New York

Artillery) and the Vermont regiments (Brooks' brigade), particularly the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth, to be especially exposed. Their conduct was admirable and worthy of veterans.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General U. S. Army.

No. 29.

Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.

HEADQUARTERS SMITH'S DIVISION,
Camp before One-gun Battery, April 17, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in pursuance of instructions I yesterday proceeded to reconnoiter the fort known as "the one-gun battery" and the works in its vicinity. I posted one battery (Captain Mott's) on the right of the road leading from Yorktown to Lee's Mill, sending a regiment to the right through some pines, with instructions to open fire if they saw working parties, and another regiment to the left with the same instructions, holding the remaining three regiments of the Second Brigade (Brigadier-General Brooks) in reserve, the First Brigade (Brigadier-General Hancock) holding the road to Lee's Mill from the Four Corners with two batteries in the vicinity of Mrs. Curtis' house, the Third Brigade (Brigadier-General Davidson) with one battery at the Four Corners.

On the infantry opening fire the enemy replied with shell, on which I directed Captain Mott to open fire with his battery, which he at once did, getting the range (about 1,100 yards) with great accuracy. The enemy replied with shrapnel and shell, which burst all around, one shell against the wheel of one of the guns, killing 3 men and wounding more. After about an hour's brisk firing their works were silenced, one gun in the embrasure of the upper work having been replaced by a wooden gun.

About 3 o'clock I got eighteen guns in position about 500 yards from the works, and, having given Brigadier-General Brooks instructions to support the artillery on either flank with his brigade, I moved the First Brigade, under Brigadier-General Hancock, up in support, ordering the Third Brigade (Brigadier-General Davidson) to occupy the position vacated by Brigadier-General Hancock at Mrs. Curtis' house. I opened fire, and for some time the enemy replied with rapidity. At length their fire slackened. I ordered four companies of the Third Vermont to cross the creek and feel the enemy. On arriving at the crest of the parapet of the outer work they were met by the enemy in force, who had lain secreted, and were forced to retire, having had, however, possession of the work for a few minutes.

Later in the day, under fire of the artillery, I made another reconnaissance with the Fourth Vermont on the right, the Fifth and Sixth on the left, but found it impracticable to push farther than up to the dam, a position I now hold. During the night we had thrown up strong breastworks—one on the right for four guns, within 300 yards,

and one on the left, with eight embrasures, and one in the center, for four guns, each within 500 yards' range.

I regret that these operations could not be carried on without loss. I have not as yet been able to ascertain the exact amount, but believe that from 100 to 150 will cover the whole loss in killed, missing, and wounded.* Among the latter, I regret to say, is Lieutenant Merrill, of the Engineers, an officer who throughout the operation rendered me the most valuable assistance, and whose services I have to request may be replaced.

I have to thank every officer and soldier under my command. Their gallantry under fire was only equaled by their steadiness and ready obedience of orders.

When the detailed reports from the brigadier-generals and officers commanding independent corps come in I doubtless shall have several instances of services performed by individuals to bring to your notice.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

WM. F. SMITH,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Fourth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS SMITH'S DIVISION,

April 18, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, and in reply have to state that in pursuance of instructions conveyed by yourself I proceeded on the morning of the 16th instant to reconnoiter and interrupt the progress of the enemy's works in front of their battery known as the "one-gun battery" and its vicinity. With that view I advanced at 6 a. m. with the Second Brigade, under Brigadier-General Brooks, and one battery (Captain Mott's, Third New York Artillery), having the First Brigade, under Brigadier-General Hancock, in support, guarding the road from Four Corners to Lee's Mill, with two batteries (Captain Ayres', Fifth Artillery, and Captain Wheeler's, First New York Artillery), and the Third Brigade, under Brigadier-General Davidson, at the Four Corners, with one battery (Captain Kennedy's) in reserve.

On arrival at the opening of the woods on the road leading to the fort in question I directed Brigadier-General Brooks to send one regiment into some pines to the right and another to the left of the dam, with instructions to open fire if they found the enemy engaged on their works, and brought Captain Mott's battery into position in the woods on the right of the road, retaining the other three regiments in support. On the infantry opening fire the enemy replied with shrapnel and shell, upon which I directed Captain Mott to open fire, which he did with great effect, getting the range with wonderful accuracy. The enemy shelled the battery, one shell killing 3 men and wounding others. After about an hour the enemy were silenced, and I ordered the firing to cease. I then proceeded, having done all that my instructions directed, to reconnoiter, and I ascertained from personal observation that the gun in the angle of the upper work had been replaced by a wooden gun, and that scarcely anybody showed above the parapet, the skirmishers from the Fourth Vermont doing good execution.

About noon the general commanding in chief arrived on the field, and

* But see return of casualties, p. 367.

he, deeming the position an important one to hold, ordered me to make preparations to put the whole division into position; whereupon I directed Brigadier-General Hancock to bring his brigade up in support, replacing his vacated position by Brigadier-General Davidson, throwing the Second Brigade into the woods on the flanks.

A staff officer of Brigadier-General Brooks having in my presence reported to General McClellan that he had forded the brook below the dam and proceeded within 25 yards of the work, I asked and obtained permission to place as many guns as I could on the crest of the opening, about 500 paces from their advanced works, and under the cover of their fire to throw some skirmishers across the creek below the dam at the point forded, while two companies of the Fourth Vermont were to attempt a crossing at the dam, with a view of pushing a reconnaissance to ascertain if the works had been sufficiently denuded to enable a column to effect a lodgment. On carrying this into execution it was found that the enemy had been largely re-enforced subsequent to the time they had been driven out of their batteries and rifle pits, at this time reoccupying their tiers of rifle pits and works, and pouring in from behind them the most destructive and sustained fire. Means had been taken by the rebels to increase the depth of the water below the dam, so that the ammunition of the skirmishers of the Third Vermont was mostly destroyed. They passed through the first rifle pits and gained the crest of the second, holding themselves there against great odds, when from want of ammunition they were forced to retire, which they did in a steady and gallant manner.

Brigadier-General Brooks' report, which I inclose, details so minutely the further operations of his brigade that I will only add that on seeing the three companies of the Fourth Vermont, which were ordered to attempt the passage of the dam, subjected to such a heavy fire of musketry, I immediately sent an officer down, under the fire of our artillery and the enemy's musketry, with orders direct to Colonel Stoughton to return to his former position in the woods.

Brigadier-General Hancock's inclosed report will detail the orders given to him and the movements of his brigade during this day.

It will be apparent from this report that no attempt to mass the troops of the division was made for an assault upon the works, but only such troops as were absolutely necessary to cover the movements of the companies of the Third and Fourth Vermont, and to be at hand to secure to us the enemy's works if we found them abandoned. The moment I found resistance serious and the numbers opposed great I acted in obedience to the warning instructions of the general-in-chief, and withdrew the small number of troops exposed from under fire. The night was spent in the construction of works for the protection of the batteries still nearer the enemy's works than the artillery had been during the day. The positions strengthened we now hold, holding also with strong pickets the two points of woods on this side the creek near the dam.

Soon I hope to have the honor of inclosing a report from Captain Ayres, commanding the artillery, and will then be able to enter still further into particulars.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. F. SMITH,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY,

Chief of Staff, &c.

HEADQUARTERS SMITH'S DIVISION,
April 24, 1862.

GENERAL: In continuance of my report of the 18th instant I have the honor now to inclose another letter from Brigadier-General Brooks, inclosing a list of the casualties of his brigade, as also a letter from Capt. R. B. Ayres, Fifth Artillery, commanding the artillery of my division, both of which are deserving of the careful perusal of the major-general commanding.

I cannot conclude without bringing to the notice of the general-in-chief the professional ability and experience displayed by Capt. R. B. Ayres, Fifth Artillery, in all the arrangements made and carried into effect by him in relation to the artillery, the practice of which was excellent—a result I entirely attribute to his zealous exertions during the past six months.

I would also desire to mention Lieutenant Bowen, Topographical Engineers, who throughout the affair rendered me most efficient aid, and on one occasion was the means of conveying an order from me to the Fourth Vermont under a heavy fire, which order, I believe, was instrumental in saving many brave lives. Lieutenant Merrill I have before mentioned, who was wounded while with the line of skirmishers reconnoitering.

To all others, officers and men, my thanks are due for the zealous manner in which their duties were performed. I will only add that among the four companies of skirmishers of the Third Vermont Volunteers who crossed the creek there were more individual acts of heroism performed than I ever before read of in a great battle.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,
WM. F. SMITH,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Brigadier-General MARCY,
Chief of Staff, &c.

[Inclosure.]

Return of casualties in Smith's division.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
1st Brigade.....	2	2
2d Brigade:				
2d Vermont.....	1	1
3d Vermont.....	23	51	9	83
4th Vermont.....	2	10	12
5th Vermont.....	2	6	8
6th Vermont.....	4	44	48
3d Brigade.....
Batteries:				
Ayres'.....	1	1
Mott's.....	3	7	10
Total.....	35	121	9	165

No. 30.

Report of Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery Smith's division, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.

HDQRS. LIGHT ARTILLERY, SMITH'S DIVISION,
Camp near Lee's Mill, April 18, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that pursuant to orders the artillery of this division moved with it—Mott's battery with the leading brigade—and was brought into action at different times during the day as follows: Mott's battery, on arriving in a position about 1,250 yards in front of the rebel works on Warwick Creek, occupied that position till about 2 o'clock p. m., when all the artillery (save one section of Kennedy's) was pushed forward into the field in front of the rebel works to within 900 yards. Firing was kept up from this position sufficient to prevent the enemy from working his guns to any extent. Later, some infantry being pushed forward on our left, I ordered the whole twenty pieces to open for their support. Still later, infantry being pushed forward on our right (Colonel Stoughton's regiment), the enemy lined the parapet with musketry and opened a terrific fire upon our troops. I immediately ordered all the guns to open with case-shot upon the enemy, firing over our troops. The result fully met my expectations, the rebels scarcely being able to get any shots to advantage, but firing over our troops, which were withdrawn with but slight damage.

It is believed that the enemy suffered severely. At one time we fired upon a regiment marching by flank, carrying away their colors and scattering them quickly. The position last taken up by the artillery is now occupied by ten pieces (four of them still more advanced) behind works thrown up night before last and last night. From those positions occasional shots are thrown during the day and night. It will be seen from Captain Mott's report that his battery suffered severely, especially in their first position. The captain and all his officers and men bore themselves with gallantry. All the command conducted themselves with perfect coolness. The firing was admirable. First Lieut. Charles Kusserow, adjutant and inspector, is again entitled to mention for his coolness and skill as an artillery officer.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. B. AYRES,
Captain Fifth Artillery, Commanding.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

 No. 31.

Report of Capt. Terence J. Kennedy, First New York Battery, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.

IN BATTERY NEAR LEE'S MILL, VA.,
April 17, 1862.

SIR: I have to report that pursuant to your orders yesterday afternoon about 3 o'clock four guns of my battery (First New York Artillery) were placed in position on the right of our line of guns in front of

forts and at once opened fire, as directed by your order. Our shots fell inside the fort, most of them doing good execution, bursting among the troops coming to the front of the fort. The rebels opened fire upon us with two guns—large ones, I think—when we first came into position, but by our own and the other guns were soon silenced. Captain Ayres during the action rode to our front, and observing infantry, directed me to throw shells at them. We did so with great effect, our shells falling in the midst of those who came down to repel the assault by our infantry. I am told by two lieutenants of the Fourth Vermont, who claim to have made a part of those who marched to the assault, that our guns twice shot the rebel flag-staff off, and that it was not afterward raised. Two of the guns of our battery were left on the field during the night, the others being ordered back. We fired occasional shots during the night—say about thirty minutes apart—our shells striking and bursting, with only two exceptions, inside the earthworks. During the night lights were observed in several places beyond the line of forts in the woods. We directed our shots at the lights, and they disappeared. We thought them signal lights, but from works appearing this morning believe they were used by workmen on forts. I cannot forbear the remark that my men behaved admirably.

Supposing you wanted an immediate report, I have used the best means at hand to report to you. If any other more formal report be required I will make it.

Respectfully, yours,

T. J. KENNEDY,

Captain First Battery New York Volunteers.

Capt. R. B. AYRES,

Commanding Artillery, Smith's Division.

No. 32.

Report of Capt. Thaddeus P. Mott, Third New York Battery, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.

BEFORE THE ENEMY, April 17, 1862.

CAPTAIN: According to order I yesterday followed General Brooks' brigade at 6.30 a. m. At 8.30 a. m. my first section, by orders of General Smith, was brought into position by Lieutenant Flynn at the edge of the woods, about 1,100 yards from the enemy's works. We opened upon the enemy's works with shrapnel, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ seconds time and $23\frac{3}{4}^{\circ}$ elevation, with very good effect. The enemy's firing was excellent, they without doubt having the different ranges along the woods. I brought the balance of the battery into position on the left of my first section, using for my Napoleons shrapnel at $3\frac{1}{2}$ time and $33\frac{1}{4}^{\circ}$ elevation, giving them solid shot at 21° to 30° elevation. From the reports of my officers the following was the ammunition used at our first position: The right section used 58 rounds of shell and shrapnel; the center section (Napoleons) used 32 rounds spherical case, 8 shells, and 24 solid shot; the left used 45 rounds shell and shrapnel. The battery remained engaged in hot position from 7.45 until 10 o'clock a. m.

The casualties in our first position were 3 killed and 4 wounded on the first section; 1 horse killed of the first section; 1 horse wounded on the center section and 1 on the left section.

At about 2 p. m. the battery was ordered into the field closer to their batteries. The right section, by the report of its officer, expended in its second position 211 rounds shell and shrapnel, using $1\frac{3}{4}^{\circ}$ elevation and $1\frac{1}{2}$ second time, with good effect. The center section expended 42 spherical case (elevation and time 2 and $2\frac{1}{2}$), 20 shells, and 60 round solid shot, elevation $1\frac{3}{4}^{\circ}$ and $1\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$. The left section expended 247 rounds shell and shrapnel; time $1\frac{1}{2}$, elevation $1\frac{3}{4}^{\circ}$.

The casualties of second position: 1 man and 1 horse wounded of right section; the center section, 5 men wounded, 2 horses killed, 1 horse wounded, 1 trail broken, 1 limber chest knocked through by 6-pounder shot, solid, of enemy; the left section, no one killed, the guidon mortally wounded.

The following is the ammunition left in the battery: For the Parrott guns, 133 rounds shell and shrapnel and 24 solid shot; 4 shell, 12 spherical case for the Napoleons.

In closing my report I cannot but compliment the coolness of the men, and speak with thanks of the help rendered by Mr. O'Donnell, volunteer lieutenant, he commanding my left section. Of the balance of the officers, they belong to the battery, but did their duty, and proved themselves worthy of their position.

I remain, sir, yours, respectfully,

T. P. MOTT,

Commanding Third Battery, New York Artillery.

Captain AYRES,

Commanding Artillery, Smith's Division.

No. 33.

Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Smith's division, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, SMITH'S DIVISION,
Camp near Lee's Mill, Va., April 18, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to instructions, I have the honor herewith to submit a report of the operations of my brigade at this place on the 16th instant.

At 6 o'clock on the morning of that day, the commander of the division, leaving our last camp with General Brooks' brigade for this place, gave me verbal instructions to hold my command in readiness to proceed with my brigade and two batteries of artillery (Ayes' and Wheeler's) to join him in case I should receive orders to that effect from him, or in case I heard a strongly-sustained fire of artillery in his direction, and in that event to order up General Davidson's brigade to a point near the Widow Curtis' house, to cover the left of the division from any assault that the enemy might make from Lee's Mill, and to notify General Keyes, commanding the *corps d'armée* if these dispositions became necessary, and to request him to send a brigade to occupy the Four Corners, on our left.

At nearly 9 o'clock, hearing a considerable fire of artillery, I gave the orders in question, and sent the notification before referred to to General Keyes. Shortly after this, as I was about advancing, I received an order from the commander of the division to take post at the

position designated before to be assigned to General Davidson. When General Davidson reported to me that he had arrived, I directed him to assume a position at the Four Corners. Forming in line of battle and reporting my action to the division commander, I was directed to retain that position until further orders, but to be ready to move to the right or left, as circumstances might make it necessary. I held that position until the afternoon, possibly 3 o'clock, when I received orders to move to the front in the woods nearer the enemy's batteries, as a reserve, General Davidson being ordered to take my place, and my advance to take effect on his arrival. Some time afterward I was ordered to advance with two of my regiments (the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers and the Sixth Maine Volunteers) to a point close to the position occupied by Captain Mott's battery in the morning, but sheltered from the enemy's view by a strip or screen of timber.

Some time afterwards I was ordered to the front, in the open space to the left and somewhat in rear of the artillery, as a support to the Third Vermont Volunteers, of General Brooks' brigade, which was to the left and front of the artillery, and engaged with the enemy. I advanced rapidly, and upon arriving at the proper place formed my two regiments in line of battle with the object in view. I found, however, that the Second Vermont and one or more regiments of General Brooks' brigade were already advancing to its support between me and the enemy, and on my inquiry of General Brooks where he wished my assistance, he replied that he did not then require any. My regiments remained in this position until near sundown, when I met the commander of the division in the batteries of artillery, when he informed me that he accomplished everything that he desired to accomplish during that day; that I should leave one regiment (Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers) in its then position, and place the other (the Sixth Maine Volunteers) in a position perpendicular to it across the road leading to Lee's Mill, where I had just before placed four companies, and some short distance in advance on that road, in order to protect our left from any threatened assault of the enemy from that direction during the night. I then threw out a line of pickets in its front.

In the mean time the commander of the division had ordered my remaining regiments (the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers and Forty-third New York Volunteers) to occupy the position which I had left near the position of Mott's battery in the morning. About 7.30 o'clock p. m. I reported to the general in person and received an order to throw one wing of the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers to the front and immediately on the left of our battery in position, and also to detail a working party of 750 men to throw up the redoubts during the night. This working party was taken from the two regiments in reserve.

The casualties in my brigade were but few, herewith submitted,* as nearly all of the enemy's artillery was silent and my troops were placed beyond the effective range of musketry.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,

Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,

Assistant Adjutant General, Smith's Division.

* Embodied in statement on p. 367.

No. 34.

Reports of Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, Smith's division, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys, with congratulatory order.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
April 18, 1862.

SIR: The regiments of this brigade left their camps on the morning of the 16th instant in this order: Fourth Vermont (Stoughton) at 6 o'clock, Third Vermont (Hyde), Second Vermont (Whiting), Fifth Vermont (Smalley), and the Sixth Vermont (Lord), at 6.30 o'clock. The Fourth (Stoughton) was advanced through the timber east of the field of Garrow's farm, in which are the standing chimneys, until the skirmishers reached the water in the dam to the front and left of the enemy's works. The Third (Hyde) was sent through the timber on the west side of the same farm, their skirmishers advancing to the stream below the dam. They also had to observe the approaches from the left. The Fifth Vermont (Smalley) was posted to support the Third. The Second (Whiting) and Sixth (Lord) were held in reserve in a field southeast of the one with chimneys. In concert with these dispositions part of Mott's battery was placed at the southeast corner of the field containing the standing chimneys, within easy range of the enemy's works. As soon as they were in position Stoughton's skirmishers opened on the enemy a brisk fire, as did the section of Mott's battery. The enemy returned the fire with artillery and small-arms. The skirmishers of the Third Vermont also opened on the enemy. Our fire had the effect of diminishing that of the enemy until it almost ceased. A company of picked men from the Fifth Vermont was deployed in front of the chimneys, and advanced, under a heavy fire of shell and canister, down the slope to the water's edge below the dam, where they remained sheltered during the day, and were in position to greatly harass the enemy in working his guns.

About 10.30 o'clock Lieut. E. M. Noyes, of my staff, made a bold and daring reconnaissance by crossing the stream below the dam and getting up within 50 yards of the enemy's works undiscovered. He found the stream to be about waist-deep. Wagons were also seen about this time in the rear of the works, as if removing stores. In order to try and determine the true state of affairs, two companies of the Third Vermont were directed to cross the stream and feel their way toward the works, and if they got into them they were to make a given signal. To cover this movement batteries were placed in the open field near the chimneys, and as the companies advanced they opened a heavy fire on the works. These companies crossed the creek, supported by two other companies of the same regiment, and gained possession, with slight opposition, of the rifle pits in front of the enemy's right, and it is reported that about half a dozen of the men actually penetrated the work itself, driving out quite a number of the enemy by means of lusty yells alone. In crossing the stream the ammunition of most of these men got wet, and therefore useless, and instead of giving the signal agreed upon, unfortunately a messenger was sent back who failed to reach me. The ammunition failing, and no re-enforcements reaching them, these companies were ordered back to this side of the stream.

As soon as the practicability of crossing the stream was demonstrated, a section of artillery was ordered to our right to enfilade the rifle pits covering the enemy's right. Three companies of the Fourth Vermont were ordered to move along the abatis in front of the water toward the

end of the dam, with the view of crossing on the dam. Colonel Lord was ordered to act in concert with this movement by throwing four companies of his regiment across the stream below the dam. As the artillery opened the three companies of the Fourth, led by Colonel Stoughton in person, advanced toward the end of the dam. The four companies of the Sixth, led by Colonel Lord, dashed into and across the stream. These movements caused the enemy to make a display of his strength and re-enforcements by opening a terrific fire of musketry from his rifle pits. On seeing this, orders were given by General Smith to suspend the movements of the Fourth just as they reached the end of the dam, and Colonel Lord, seeing this, ordered his companies back.

In consequence of a want of time, I beg leave to defer giving a more detailed report until a subsequent period, when I will forward an appendix, containing a list of casualties,* accompanied by the reports of the regimental commanders, mentioning the names of officers, &c.

Very respectfully,

W. T. H. BROOKS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE,

April 20, 1862.

SIR: I herewith transmit the reports of the different regimental commanders of the parts taken by their respective regiments in the action of the 16th. I can heartily indorse the commendations of the different officers and men mentioned by them. The Second Vermont was held in reserve and was not engaged during the day; hence no report is made from that regiment. In passing, however, through the field, from our right to the left, in which the batteries were placed, that regiment was fired upon and had 1 man killed.

It is with great satisfaction and pride that I feel able to bear testimony to the coolness and daring and general bearing of the officers and soldiers of the brigade throughout the day. The bravery and determination exhibited by those companies that crossed the stream under a most galling fire of the enemy, concealed in rifle pits, are only to be equaled by disciplined veterans or by American citizens who only assume the uniform of soldiers when their country is in danger. In my report of the 18th I made mention of the names of Colonels Stoughton and Lord, as being at the head of their companies in the movement that took place late in the evening; the first a soldier by education, the last a soldier by nature. They fully realized the high anticipations formed of them. Colonels Hyde and Smalley are also deserving of notice for their activity and the dispositions made of their regiments during the day. I beg leave to call attention to Captain Harrington, Third Vermont, who commanded the four companies of that regiment, in conjunction with Captain Bennett, Third Vermont, that first crossed the stream and took possession of the enemy's works. His report is transmitted herewith.

Although not of my command or under my direction, yet as acting in concert with the brigade, I feel that it is not out of place to express my admiration of the skill and efficiency of the different batteries of

* Nominal list omitted reports 1 officer and 43 men killed, 6 officers and 128 men wounded, and 4 men missing.

artillery under Captain Ayres' command, and especially of the services rendered by Mott's battery, the first to take part in the engagement. So also of Lieutenants Merrill, Engineers, and Bowen, Topographical Engineers, who were both exceedingly active and bold in their reconnaissances, and, in addition to his proper duties, Lieutenant Bowen found time to aid the wounded of the Fourth Vermont off the field. In this connection I beg to refer you to Colonel Stoughton's report.

Most efficient aid was rendered on the field by Surgeons Janes, Third Vermont, Chandler, Sixth Vermont, as also by Assistant Surgeons Goodwin, Third, and Tuttle, Sixth Vermont. The wounded were promptly brought into places of safety, and although the darkness of the night was great, and the ambulance stations remote from each other, the wounded were sheltered and their wounds dressed by 1 o'clock a. m. Assistant Surgeons Shaw and Carpenter, and the former State assistant, Phillips, were unwearied in their attention to them through the night.

In conclusion, I beg to mention the names of the officers of my staff: Brigade Surg. E. E. Phelps, Capt. Theodore Read, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. E. M. Noyes, Third Vermont, aide-de-camp.

Dr. Phelps' services with this brigade may most properly be considered a "labor of love." At first he was delegated by his State to look after the well-being of her children sent to defend the Government, and in furtherance of this object he sought the position he now most faithfully and ably fills. During the action and ever since he has been unremitting in his attentions to the wounded. The labors of Captain Read and Lieutenant Noyes throughout the day were incessant and most useful. The reconnaissance of the enemy's works by Lieutenant Noyes was mentioned in my first report. Both of these officers were during the day much exposed to the enemy's fire while in the execution of their duty, transmitting orders, &c. They were distinguished for their coolness under all circumstances. I beg leave to transmit a copy of an order issued by me the day after the action.

Very respectfully,

W. T. H. BROOKS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Smith's Division, Fourth Army Corps, Army of the Potomac.

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GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SMITH'S DIVISION,
No. 36. } *April 17, 1862.*

The brigadier-general commanding congratulates the troops of this brigade for the conduct exhibited by them yesterday while under fire. The invincibility of spirit shown by those companies, exposed to a terrific fire from the enemy sheltered in rifle pits, is worthy of the highest admiration.

The conduct of First Sergeant Holton, Company I, Sixth Vermont Volunteers, in securing and bringing back the colors of the regiment after the bearer was shot down, is deserving of especial notice as a praiseworthy and daring act.

Let your future conduct rival that of yesterday, and your friends and State may well be proud of you.

By order of Brig. Gen. W. T. H. Brooks:

THEODORE READ,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 35.

Report of Col. Breed N. Hyde, Third Vermont Infantry, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.

HDQRS. THIRD REGIMENT VERMONT VOLUNTEERS,
Camp near Warwick Creek, April 17, 1862.

Having been ordered to take position yesterday under direction of Captain West, of General Smith's staff, I placed my regiment in the woods to the left of a position taken by Capt. T. P. Mott's battery. Six of my companies were deployed as skirmishers, or as supports, the left of the line on the road leading from Lee's Mill to Yorktown, the right resting in the edge of the woods near Captain Mott's battery. The line of skirmishers was nearly a mile in length. The left of my line in the morning connected with a line of pickets or skirmishers of the Fifth Vermont. The line of the Fifth Vermont was withdrawn during the day without notice to me or Major Seaver, commanding my line of skirmishers, thus leaving the extreme left exposed to a flank movement of the enemy. The four remaining companies were placed near the right of the line of skirmishers.

Between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon I received verbal orders to send two of my companies across the creek, and if possible gain possession of the enemy's works on our right, with orders to make a signal with a white flag to signify that we were in possession of the works, thus warning our artillery to cease firing. Two companies, D and F, were ordered immediately to carry out this order. Companies E and K were ordered to support this movement, with instructions that re-enforcements would follow immediately, which information was given under instructions received.

At a little before 3 o'clock I ordered the advance of Companies D and F, Captain Harrington, Company D, commanding, with the support of Companies E and K, Captain Bennett, senior officer, the whole under the command of Captain Harrington. The whole advanced steadily without firing, Companies D and F somewhat deployed, Companies E and K in close order until nearly across the creek (the enemy having from the first moment of advance opened a severe enfilading fire from our left,) when our men opened a telling fire, which drove the enemy from the rifle pits in front. The enemy retired before our steady advance, leaving us in complete possession of the rifle pits in our front, and of an earthwork, say, 300 yards in the rear of them. The ammunition having become useless, our men were soon unable to reply to the enemy advancing with two regiments on our left and one in our front. The enemy's fire telling on our men fearfully, and no supports or signs of re-enforcements making their appearance, though a full statement was sent in due season to headquarters of the brigade, which, unfortunately, did not reach the general commanding the brigade, I reluctantly ordered a retreat, which was very reluctantly obeyed. We held the enemy's rifle pits about forty minutes. The whole time from the order of advance to the order for retreat was nearly one hour. The loss to the four companies engaged, in killed, wounded, and missing, including commissioned officers, is about 75, of which 22 were killed outright. I had 7 men of the other companies wounded during the day's operations.*

Very respectfully submitted.

B. N. HYDE.

Capt. THEODORE READ, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

* See p. 367.

No. 36.

Report of Capt. Fernando C. Harrington, Third Vermont Infantry, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.

I have the honor to report that about 3 o'clock p. m. of April 16, by order of Col. B. N. Hyde, commanding Third Vermont Volunteers, Companies D and F of said regiment advanced through the creek upon the enemy's works, which were directly behind it about 20 yards, supported by Companies E and K; that the two leading companies, D and F, were deployed slightly as skirmishers, and charging upon the works drove the enemy from them, when they opened a destructive fire upon us, which was immediately returned with much spirit by the four companies. I soon saw three regiments of the enemy, the one on our right outflanking us about half its length, one on our immediate front outflanking slightly our left, and one advancing by the flank at right angles with the enemy's line and directly across our left flank. The last regiment was not firing. About one division reached across the right flank, and a company enfiladed us on the left. They had taken position about 35 yards in our front, and were firing from behind trees and a rudely-constructed log breastwork at that distance. After about forty-five minutes from our first advance I received the order from Colonel Hyde to fall back, which I gave, and ordered it passed along the line. A portion of the men heard the order, and I supposed the whole did so, and fell slowly back. Soon discovering that all the men had not heard or refused to obey the order, I again passed the order to fall back, which was promptly and orderly done, bringing almost all the wounded. But few were lost in retiring, although the regiment on our left opened fire from their entire line. None, I think, would have been lost in the retreat had it not been that the water had been raised about 2 feet since our advance. There were about 192 men in the four companies, and the total loss in killed, wounded, and missing, as far as I can learn, was 82.* But few, if any, prisoners were taken by the enemy.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. C. HARRINGTON,

Captain Company D, Commanding Companies.

Adj't. W. F. COREY, *Third Vermont Volunteers.*

No. 37.

Report of Col. Edwin H. Stoughton, Fourth Vermont Infantry, of engagement of Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH VERMONT VOLUNTEERS,

April 17, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report' of the part of yesterday's operations enacted by my regiment:

Pursuant to your orders we formed ourselves within 200 yards of one of the enemy's forts, mounting two guns, about half past 7 o'clock a. m., separated from them by a brook dammed up, settling the water back so as to form an impassable pond. My skirmishers opened fire

* See p. 367.

upon them with such effect as to prevent their cannoneers working their guns to much advantage. I remained in this position, making a diversion about 5 o'clock p. m. with four companies, pursuant to your order, until dark, losing in killed 2 and in wounded 10, including Captain Atherton, of Company C, who behaved remarkably well, which I am happy to say the officers and men of my command all did without an exception.

The conduct of Lieutenant (Acting Adjutant) French in crossing the field twice in the hottest of the fire, in pursuance of orders given him, and in assisting in getting off the wounded, is particularly deserving of praise. I cannot speak too highly of Lieutenant Bowen, of the Engineers, who came to us and assisted in getting the killed and wounded from the field, being the last to leave himself. This gratuitous act of kindness is most highly appreciated by the regiment, and I should feel thankful if in your report you should see fit to mention him.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. H. STOUGHTON,
Colonel Fourth Vermont Regiment.

No. 38.

Report of Col. Henry A. Smalley, Fifth Vermont Infantry, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH VERMONT VOLUNTEERS,
Camp near Lee's Mill, Va., April 17, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor, pursuant to instructions, to make the following report of the operations of my regiment in the action of yesterday:

Obedient to orders, I marched my regiment in rear of and as a support to the Third Regiment, holding, as directed by my general, my regiment in reserve, covering the road to the left of the open space in which our brigade hospital is established. We held this position until ordered to occupy a position in which our wings would cover both sides of this road. A picket was established in our front. Though many wounded men of the Third Regiment were taken to the rear no call was made upon my regiment to support them, and, indeed, none was asked. Sixty-five non-commissioned officers and privates and three officers, all under command of Captain Dudley, Company E, were detached as sharpshooters, and, I have reason to believe, did excellent service in picking off men at the enemy's guns and their officers. Two guns were completely silenced, I have been informed, by the shots of these men. This company was relieved by another about 4 p. m., they having fired away nearly all their ammunition. Four companies of my regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, were unemployed during the day, they having been upon picket until nearly dark. These, with the company of Sharpshooters, reduced the force with me to only five companies.

Orders were issued about 5 p. m. for my regiment to advance across the field in rear of the Sixth, which was to attack the enemy's position. This order was executed until the Sixth fell in my rear, leaving me in front. A picket guard was established in my front, which was afterwards relieved by one from the Sixth, and at about 10 o'clock p. m. I withdrew my regiment to the camp assigned it by the general, having held without attack the place in front of the enemy which I occupied when the Sixth retired.

About dusk I was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Grant and the four companies under his command which had been relieved from picket.

My men, though not greatly exposed, with the exception of 130, who were acting as sharpshooters, behaved with coolness, daring, and in an entirely subordinate manner.

I regret I have to report a few casualties, viz, 2 men killed, 7 wounded (of which 2 are dangerously wounded), and none missing.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. A. SMALLEY,

Colonel Fifth Vermont Volunteers.

Capt. THEODORE READ,

Asst. Adj. Gen., Second Brigade, Smith's Division.

No. 39.

Report of Col. Nathan Lord, jr., Sixth Vermont Infantry, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.

HDQRS. SIXTH REGIMENT VERMONT VOLUNTEERS,

Camp Winfield Scott, Va., April 17, 1862.

SIR: I herewith beg leave to report in regard to the engagement of yesterday.

At 5 o'clock p. m., in compliance with orders received, the order was given by me to advance for the purpose of carrying the enemy's fortifications by storm. The companies, led off by Companies A and F, advanced fearlessly and in perfect order. The creek, which at the point selected to cross is about 20 rods in width, varying in depth from 2 to 4 feet, was crossed by Companies A and F without firing a shot. In the mean time the succeeding companies of the regiment successively entered the water, gradually forming in line of battle, with a view of taking the rifle pits of the enemy at the point of the bayonet. Before this could be accomplished, and at a distance not to exceed 30 yards from the rifle pits of the enemy, a most rapid, galling, and destructive fire was opened, telling with fearful effect upon the men who were advancing to make the assault.

At this time, seeing that the concerted attack previously arranged to be made by a portion of the Fourth Vermont Regiment and the Sixth Vermont Regiment under cover of the artillery, must inevitably fail on account of an unexpected fire from the fortifications of the enemy and directed toward the Fourth Vermont Regiment, and seeing, also, that the men of my own command were falling under the cross-fire from the enemy's rifle pits at such a rate as would have left only a remnant to charge upon a greatly-superior force and at the greatest disadvantages in relative position, I gave the order to withdraw. The order was reluctantly obeyed, the men displaying throughout a determination to succeed in their undertaking, without regard to loss or disadvantages. The wounded were all recovered, many of them, however, receiving fatal wounds while they were being taken from the water by their comrades.

I report with deep regret the loss of Capt. Edwin F. Reynolds, of Company F, than whom there was no braver or better man.

When all do nobly it were unjust to particularize, but I cannot forbear to mention the heroic conduct of Second-Lieutenant Bailey, of Company D, and Second-Lieutenant Kinney, of Company I, both of

whom were wounded. Sergeant Holton, of Company I, rescued the colors, which had fallen in the water—the color-bearer having been shot down. Captain Davenport, of Company H, was seriously wounded in the thigh while bravely leading his men to the attack. Corporal Cox, of Company A, was taken prisoner, but by his adroitness succeeded in effecting his escape. Corporal Duggan and Sergeant Daushee, of Company A, and Sergt. Porter Crane, of Company H, merit all praise for their bravery. With such officers and men the enemy's fortifications can be taken. The colors of the regiment were pierced by eleven bullets.

Accompanying this you will find a statement of killed, wounded, and missing.*

Very respectfully,

N. LORD, JR.,

Colonel Sixth Regiment Vermont Volunteers.

Capt. THEODORE READ,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 40.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Charles S. Hamilton, U. S. Army, commanding division, of engagement near Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, April 16, 1862.

CAPTAIN: The cannonade of this morning has resulted in giving us the exact range of the enemy's works on our left. The rebels were driven from their work and compelled to take shelter behind their intrenchments. The fire from our side developed ten guns in position in the rebel earthworks, two of which are 24-pounders.

One private killed in a Michigan regiment by a cannon-shot. No other casualties.

I think we can now effectually stop further strengthening of the rebel works on my left, and we have the range so perfectly that their works can only be occupied by taking close shelter under the parapet.

Very respectfully,

C. S. HAMILTON,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, April 16, 1862.

GENERAL: I have to report that the batteries of my division opened a brisk fire on the enemy's works in front of my left at 11 a. m. to-day. The fire resulted, first, in driving the enemy from his rifle pits into his works; second, in driving everything from their barracks and camp; and third, in driving all the infantry from the works into the woods in the rear, leaving only a few men in the works to man the guns; one of the enemy's guns entirely disabled.

I have further to report that the line of rebel works for three-quarters of a mile could have been carried by a single brigade with very little

* See p. 367.

loss. I further report that I believe I can carry these works and hold them without much loss.

Our casualties to-day are 1 man killed and 1 wounded. The conduct of Lieutenant Butler, of Thompson's battery, is spoken of by Brigadier-General Berry as gallant in the extreme.

Very respectfully,

C. S. HAMILTON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Third Corps.*

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS,
April 16, 1862—6.30 p. m.

CAPTAIN: One of the shots of Captain Beam's battery dismounted one of the rebel guns at 3 p. m. A gun was directed over it, which was immediately knocked over by a well-directed shot, and a third shot scattered the rebels, who have not approached their guns since. No further casualties reported, but the work of intrenching by the rebels on my left is stopped. One or two guns will be in position during the night. The rapid cannonading this afternoon has been in the direction of Smith's position.

Very respectfully,

C. S. HAMILTON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 41.

Report of Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, U. S. Army, of skirmish near Yorktown, April 22.

HDQRS. LEFT OF THE LINE, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Winfield Scott, Va., April 23, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to state that since my last report nothing of importance has occurred in my command, nor has any change in the location or employment of the troops taken place.

Yesterday a slight skirmish occurred in front of Davidson's brigade, Smith's division. The enemy pushed our pickets with his skirmishers, but was driven back, it is reported, with loss.

Our loss was 2 men killed, 2 mortally and 1 slightly wounded, and 1 taken prisoner. We captured 1 prisoner from the enemy.

Measures have been taken to provide cordage to mantelets for the guns now in battery on Smith's front.

One man in Sedgwick's division last evening was severely wounded on picket and 1 killed the night before.

Very respectfully,

E. V. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.

No. 42.

Reports of Brig. Gen. John W. Davidson, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, Smith's division, of operations April 19-22.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SMITH'S DIVISION,
April 20, 1862.

SIR: I respectfully report to the general of division that I made a reconnaissance by his direction yesterday evening, the object of which was to ascertain if the enemy had any force or rifle pits on this side of the creek; if so, to drive what they had over and to find if they were engaged in the construction of any works. I had with me in advance Mason's regiment and supported it with Taylor's. I could discover no force or pits on what appeared to be ground on this side of the creek, except some few advanced pickets, who fell back as our skirmishers reached the edge of the woods, about 400 yards from the creek, across the opening. A few shots exchanged by us called what appeared to be about three regiments to arms, and caused them to advance (from the bugle-calls and the sounds of wheels in the dense forest beyond) a piece or two of artillery. I could not ascertain that any work was going on, the dense woods beyond not permitting a glimpse to us of their operations. We could hear distinctly the sound of felling trees and driving piles and the hammering of nails. As to have crossed the open space to the creek from my position would have brought my infantry under fire from their artillery, and in view of the big fort supposed to be by estimation 800 yards distant, I did not show any force beyond the few skirmishers unavoidably seen by the enemy.

Below will give some idea of the ground this side the creek, for which I am mainly indebted to Captain Cook, of Mason's regiment:*

I am informed that Signal-Officer Fisher, who was in a tree giving a view of the big fort, saw troops falling in rapidly at the few shots fired by us and the enemy's pickets showing watchfulness.

It may be proper to state here that Colonel Mason informs me that in the conversations which used to occur between our pickets at night and those of the enemy across the creek at our camp of the 5th, 6th, and 7th instant, some of the other side stated that their picketing was done by picked men; that the run of the regiments was not taken, which may account for their marked superiority in this duty.

I had one corporal, of the Seventh Maine, severely wounded, who incautiously exposed himself in the open road while the line of skirmishers was creeping through the woods.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

J. W. DAVIDSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SMITH'S DIVISION,
April 22, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I respectfully report to the general of division that about 12 m. a party of the enemy, in my judgment about 150 to 200 strong, attacked the pickets in front of my brigade, the pickets concentrating

* Diagram omitted.

on the supports, and the supports and reserves were at once advanced under my orders and the enemy driven back. I cannot tell whether the movement was supported by other troops of the enemy. The dense woods hide everything in this line they do.

I desire (more particularly it is the object of this report) to mention the soldierly conduct of Captain Morse, of the Seventh Maine Regiment. Finding the pickets present in his front, he concentrated all the men he could raise, and with a rapid advance and shout drove them through the woods across the opening this side the creek to their dens again.

I had 2 men of the Seventh Maine killed and 3 wounded, 2 mortally.

The Tenth Massachusetts was advanced along the road leading to Lee's Mill, but discovered no movement of the enemy from that direction.

Captain Morse reports quite a number of negroes among the enemy in their advance.

Respectfully submitted.

J. W. DAVIDSON,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

P. S.—One of the men killed was killed by a volley. At least twenty balls are in his body. One of those mortally wounded is named George O. McLellan, Company D, Seventh Maine. He loaded his gun and fired it after he was down and then made a tourniquet with his handkerchief. One prisoner was taken by the Seventh Maine Volunteers and one was lost by them.

No. 43.

Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, of an affair near Yorktown, April 26, with congratulatory letter from Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Winfield Scott, April 26—11 a. m.,
(Via Baltimore, April 27, 1862.)

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:

Early this morning an advanced lunette of the rebels on this side of the Warwick, near its head, was carried by assault by Company H, First Massachusetts Regiment. The work had a ditch 6 feet deep, with a strong parapet, and was manned by two companies of infantry; no artillery. Our men moved over open, soft ground some 600 yards; received the fire of the rebels at 50 yards; did not return it, but rushed over the ditch and parapet in the most gallant manner. The rebels broke and ran as soon as they saw that our men intended to cross the parapet. Our loss, 3 killed and 1 mortally and 12 otherwise wounded. Took 14 prisoners, destroyed the work sufficiently to render it useless, and retired. The operation was conducted by General C. Grover,* who managed the affair most handsomely. Nothing could have been better than the conduct of all the men under fire. The supports, who were also

* See Grover's report, No. 44.

under artillery fire of other works, were companies of the First and Eleventh Massachusetts. The object of the movement was to ascertain the nature of the ground in rear of the work, render the work untenable, teach the rebels a lesson, and catch some prisoners. In spite of the rain our work progresses well.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Congratulatory letter from Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON CITY, April 27, 1862.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, *Yorktown*:

I am rejoiced to learn that your operations are progressing so rapidly and with so much spirit and success, and congratulate you and the officers and soldiers engaged upon the brilliant affair mentioned in your telegrams.

Repeating the assurance that everything in the power of this Department is at your service, I hope soon to congratulate you upon a splendid victory, that shall be the finishing stroke of the war. In every quarter the work seems to go bravely on.

Yours, truly,

EDWIN M. STANTON.

No. 44.

Report of Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Hooker's division, Third Corps, of an affair near Yorktown, April 26.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, GENERAL HOOKER'S DIVISION,
Near Yorktown, Va., April 26, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, pursuant to instructions received from the headquarters Army of the Potomac, I moved to the front upon the Yorktown road at an early hour this morning, in command of five companies of infantry (A, H, and I, First Massachusetts, and A and G, Eleventh Massachusetts), and a section of Captain Thompson's battery of the Second Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Butler, for the purpose of assaulting and carrying a field work occupied by the enemy, and learning as far as practicable the nature of the ground and his supports, if any, in the rear. With this view I made the following disposition of the force at my command, viz: The three companies of the Massachusetts First, under Lieut. Col. G. D. Wells, were thrown forward upon a road which *débouchés* from thick woods some 800 yards directly in front of the point of assault. Lieutenant-Colonel Wells was charged with the immediate command of this force, and was instructed to throw out at the break of day one company of skirmishers to the left of the work, for the double object of preventing the escape of the enemy in that direction should the nature of the ground prove such as to render escape to the rear impracticable, and to prevent re-enforcements from the enemy's heavy supports at a distance of about 1,500 yards to the left; to hold another in reserve for contingencies and emergencies, while with the third to assault the work in front, and carry it at the point of the bayonet if necessary. At the same time Lieutenant But-

ler's pieces, supported by a company of the Eleventh Massachusetts, were placed in a masked position on the right, to serve as a rallying point and to cover a retreat if necessary, while Company A, Eleventh Massachusetts, was held in front of the battery, in readiness to deploy and support or re-enforce the assaulting party.

When the flanking skirmishers of Lieutenant-Colonel Wells' command had extended about half way across the open field they were to occupy, and had drawn the attention of the enemy to the extent of partially drawing their fire, Lieutenant-Colonel Wells, with Captain Caruth's company, H, dashed across the broken field for a distance of about 800 yards, covered by the enemy's fire, and in most gallant style carried the work at the point of the bayonet; a work with a deep ditch and strong profile, and which our prisoners, I am informed, admit to have been occupied by two companies of rebel infantry. The support from the Massachusetts Eleventh, though a little late, owing to the natural difficulties of the ground, arrived in time to make any interference with our working party, which partially reduced the parapet, too hazardous to be attempted, while our skirmishers on our left flank very handsomely and effectually held in check re-enforcements which the enemy attempted to throw forward.

We were subjected during the whole time to heavy firing from the enemy on our left, and for about twenty minutes to the fire of a battery of, I think, two guns, in the edge of the timber on or near our own ground. It is also reported to me that the latter battery, after shelling us, turned its guns upon the main work of the enemy. If so, this would indicate a probability that they were our own guns firing upon us at first by mistake.

The officers and men concerned in this affair, however small it may be, deserve great credit for the prompt, efficient, and daring manner in which they carried out my orders.

After having partially worked down the parapet, and having ascertained that this work was supported by one or more works screened by the woods in its rear and having captured 15 of the enemy prisoners, I withdrew my force to camp.

I regret to have to state that in this affair we lost 3 killed and 1 mortally wounded of Company H, First Massachusetts, and had 12 men of Company H, and 1 man of Company A, First Massachusetts, wounded. A list of the killed and wounded is herewith inclosed.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. GROVER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

TO ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

No. 45.

Report of Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, U. S. Army, as General of the Trenches, April 27.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIGADE, PORTER'S DIVISION, A. P.,
Camp Winfield Scott, Va., April 28, 1862.

GENERAL: As general of the trenches for the twenty-four hours ending April 28, 8 a. m., I would respectfully report that I relieved General Jameson at 7 a. m. 27th. I received from him no instructions. General Marcy had directed me to see him, also to see General Barnard,

chief of engineers. From General Barnard's adjutant, Lieutenant Hall, of the artillery, I received an idea of the location of the works in progress, but no instructions from any source. I directed the field officers commanding the outposts from Battery 7 to the York River to report to me. I caused to be read to them all the portions of the confidential circular of April 23 relating to their duties.

I issued the following orders to the field officers of divisions in charge of working details in the trenches :

You will please keep a record of the work under your charge, as follows :

1st. The detail at work ; number of men ; regimental officers in charge ; work upon which they are engaged, and manner of performing their duty.

2d. Engineer officer detailed ; his name ; hour of arrival and departure ; directions received from him.

3d. Hours at which details commence work and cease ; hour of their arrival at the ground and departure.

4th. Condition of the work when each detail commenced work ; progress and amount completed each four hours afterward.

5th. Any general remarks as to the progress and condition of the work necessary, or of interest to the general commanding the army or the general of the trenches.

The reports under the 4th heading will be in the shape of a memorandum, and will be sent to me at headquarters at the mill-dam every four hours—8, 12, and 4 a. m. and p. m. The engineer officer in charge will certify to the amount of work completed, as mentioned on the memorandum.

The information required under article 5 will be sent as often as may be deemed necessary or important by you. The failure of any detail to report for duty at the hour ordered or the absence of any officer, delaying the work, will be immediately reported.

In no case were any reports received or the order in any way complied with, except by Lieutenant-Colonel Vincent, commanding details working in trenches from your division.

The officers who failed entirely to comply with these orders were Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, One hundred and fifth [sixty-third] Pennsylvania Volunteers, from Hamilton's division ; Major Holt, Seventieth New York Volunteers, from Hooker's division.

The officers in command of the details for outpost duty, with the details, are as follows : From Porter's division, Colonel McQuade, Fourteenth New York Volunteers ; detail 600 men from Fourth Michigan Regiment and 400 men from the Sixty-second Pennsylvania Regiment. From General Hamilton's division, Col. O. M. Poe, Second Michigan Volunteers ; detail two regiments, unknown. From General Hooker's division, Colonel Cowdin, First Massachusetts Regiment ; detail First Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers. I inclose the report of each of these officers.*

Your attention is directed to the report of Colonel Poe, concerning working parties having been sent to the trenches not in charge of field officers, in direct violation of General McClellan's orders.

At noon I discovered 500 men from Hooker's division (250 from Sixth New Jersey and 250 from Seventh New Jersey) were at work at the redoubt near Battery No. 5 without a field officer in charge, also in violation of the orders. I reported the same to Captain McKeever, and asked him to direct that a field officer be placed in charge of the work. Upon my arrival on the ground at 8 o'clock I found Major Holt, who stated that he was ordered to report with 1,000 men ; that he had no tools, and that he had made ineffectual attempts at the headquarters of General Heintzelman and General Porter and other places to secure tools. In reply to an inquiry at General Hooker's concerning instructions given for the detail, it was stated that no other instructions were

* Not found.

given than that Major Holt was to report to the assistant adjutant-general of the Third Corps, and there would be an engineer officer, under whose directions he was to proceed and act. I immediately advised General Williams, and the tools were finally procured at the engineer depot, General Woodbury's camp. I think this delay must have delayed their work at least four hours.

The detail ordered from Stockton's Michigan regiment to report to Captain Duane at 8 a. m. reported at that hour, and were ordered by Captain Duane to remain at the head of the ravine on the left of the parallel across the Peninsula and await his orders. They did not commence work until an hour and a half after their arrival. Five hundred men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Tileston, of the Eleventh Massachusetts Volunteers, did not get to work until two hours after their proper time, owing, I think, to the lack of thorough understanding of the hour at which they were to report and the exact location of the work upon which they were to be engaged. Two hundred men of the Fourteenth New York, under Lieutenant-Colonel Skillen, ordered to work on the mortar battery (which was commenced yesterday), got to work upon the location originally selected for this battery, which was afterward changed to a location to the left and to the rear of the deserted huts.

Lieutenant-Colonel Skillen reported to me shortly after 8 o'clock as follows: That he had been at work since 6.30 o'clock; that there was no one there to direct him what to do, and that he was fearful of doing his work improperly. I immediately advised General Williams of the fact, asking him for the name of the engineer in charge. He replied, Lieutenant McAlester. Shortly afterward I saw Lieutenant McAlester, and learned from him that the location of the mortar battery had been changed by order of General Barnard, and that Lieutenant-Colonel Skillen's detail had been at work at the wrong place. They worked about three hours to no purpose.

The details at work upon the new battery commenced upon the Peninsula half way between Moore's house and the Dam were unable to push on the work during the night, owing to the want of fascines and wire, which had not been sent.

At 11.30 o'clock a. m. I received a full report from Lieutenant Perkins, whom I dispatched at the left of the line to supervise the posting of the guards and to look after the work in the trenches. He reported that there were 500 of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania and 500 of the Fifth Michigan there doing nothing. They had been trying all the morning to find where they were to work. There was no engineer there, and no one knew what work was to be done. Lieutenant Comstock was supposed to be the engineer in charge. Lieutenant Perkins directed them to remain there until they should receive orders from myself or the engineer in charge. The detail of 500 men from my brigade ordered to report at 6.30 p. m. were delayed a considerable length of time in getting their tools, by a journey first to the six-gun, then to the seventeen-gun battery. They did not finally get to work until between 10 and 11 o'clock. The cause is said to be the absence of Lieutenant McAlester, the engineer in charge. I am not informed sufficiently to state this as the positive cause.

The officers report the men as going out full of energy and spirit, determined to show what work they could accomplish, but before they got to work chilled, cold, muddy, and not much in the humor for it.

These comprise, with those in the report of Colonel Poe, the principal portion of the delays in the work upon the trenches during my tour of duty.

Considerable complaint was made from time to time against the engineer officers in charge of the work, that they were not to be found, and the absence of definite instructions as to where the parties were to report and what they were to do. While there may have been some ground for a portion of this complaint it seemed to me that the engineer officers accomplished all that the same number of officers could accomplish. The necessity of a more thorough and systematic division of labor, and of more assistance to the engineer officers in directing the work of details, was very evident. The inclosure, marked A,* I would respectfully submit as a system which seemed to me would be of more benefit in securing a greater amount of work and leaving the engineer officers a better opportunity of more advantageously carrying on the work.

After reading the orders, as previously stated, to the officer in charge of the outposts I dispatched Captain Hoyt to supervise the posting of the guards, examine and report upon the work in the trenches on that portion of the line from the secession huts to the Yorktown road, Lieutenant Perkins to the same duties from the Yorktown road to Battery No. 7, and gave my personal attention to the balance of the line on the right not included in the above.

At about 9.20 a. m. the enemy opened fire upon nearly the whole of our front from the ravine to the left of the Peninsula over to Battery No. 6. Several shells burst in the immediate vicinity of the mill-dam in the ravine in front. One burst in the seventeen-gun battery and some near the secession huts. No one was hurt.

There was no other firing of any consequence until the afternoon, when some shells exploded near yourself and General McClellan and others who were passing along the trenches.

Toward evening, after leaving General McClellan and yourself, I found the detail of 1,000 men of the Eleventh Massachusetts, under charge of Colonel Tileston, who had been at work, waiting to be relieved. They waited something like one and a half hours, when word was received that no detail was to relieve them, and they were sent home. An accurate estimate of the number of hours of labor lost through the various causes mentioned shows the necessity of a more thorough system of organization of work in the trenches.

During the day Captain Wheeler and Lieut. R. J. Parker, of the First New York Artillery, from Smith's division, came to the front not on duty and without a pass. They were ordered to report themselves under arrest to General Andrew Porter, provost-marshal, in accordance with instructions in confidential circular dated April 23.

At night, finding the number of men detailed for outpost duty in my judgment insufficient to properly guard the works, I requested Captain McKeever to send another regiment to report to Colonel Poe, in order to complete the connection between the six-gun battery and the battery at the left of the Yorktown road. This regiment was sent, and the details were posted in accordance with the verbal instructions received from you. The rifle pits ordered to be made by you during the night were all made. Some shells were fired by the gunboats during the night, the first six of which, using twenty-second fuses, as timed by us at the mill, burst in and near the enemy's works; the remainder fell short, some of them exploding over the right of the parallel across the Peninsula and on the ground between the parallel and Moore's house.

At 8 a. m. this morning the first tier of gabions had been laid on the

* Not found.

battery on the Peninsula, the excavations completed for the magazine, a ditch dug to drain the battery and the magazine, and the men were working leisurely in the absence of the fascines and wire to carry on the battery. The work had progressed well on the mortar battery near the ravine in the left and rear of the secession huts. At 8 a. m. General Birney, general of the trenches of the day, had not arrived. Presuming that he had selected some other portion of the line for his headquarters, I returned to camp. Two regiments of the enemy were seen about dusk to break camp, pack knapsacks, and move to their left from near the front of Battery No. 7 toward Yorktown.

This report has been delayed by the non-arrival of the reports of the field officers in charge of details and the late arrival of the reports of commandants of outposts. I must apologize for the incoherent manner in which the report is made up. I have sent it in as it is, feeling it to be my positive duty to make a full report of everything as speedily as possible, without regard to the manner so long as the matter was all in.

I hope you will return it to me if in your judgment anything in it is ill-advised or improper.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

DANL. BUTTERFIELD,

Brigadier-General, General of the Trenches, April 27, 1862.

Brig. Gen. FITZ JOHN PORTER,

Directing Siege.

No. 46.

Report of Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, U. S. Army, as General of the Trenches, April 28.

HEADQUARTERS BIRNEY'S BRIGADE,

Hamilton's Division, Camp Winfield Scott, April 29, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that I entered on my tour of duty as general of the trenches at 8 o'clock a. m. April 28, 1862. The field officers, excepting Porter's division, were ignorant of the order requiring them to report to the general of the trenches, and much of the day was expended in getting into communication with them. The work on the parallels progressed fairly, although there is great slackness on the part of officers in keeping the men at work. One-half of the detail well officered and men urged to labor would accomplish double the present progress. The new oblique parallel was pushed through vigorously by the detail from General Sykes' brigade. A great deal of work was accomplished. The second relief of working party from Porter's division on the parallel on right did not report, and work ceased with first relief. Rifle pits to control the chimney were sunk as instructed, as well as the darkness and fog would enable us to judge of the ground. I would recommend the sinking of small rifle pits with sand-bag protection in front of several points on our line.

The enemy fired some 30 rifle shots at our advanced sentinels, to which my pickets, according to my instructions, did not reply. The cannonading on their part directed to our right was incessant—chiefly small shell, with an occasional solid shot and several mortar discharges. The only injury to our guard or working parties was a severe flesh-wound in the thigh from a shell received by a sergeant in the fatigue detail from General Sykes' brigade.

The constant musketry on our left between 7 and 8 o'clock this a. m. was from the guard in Sedgwick's division, who upon being relieved claim to have proper authority to discharge their pieces. If it is not stopped it will be impossible for us to distinguish real alarms from false ones.

I was relieved by Brigadier-General Berry, of Hamilton's division. Most of the details were deficient in numbers, and many of the regiments had a very small force. I would recommend that the field officers in charge of working parties and guards, as well as all engineer and artillery officers, be required to report and confer with the general of the trenches by 9 o'clock a. m., and be ordered to make to him a written report of operations during the day and night, so far as necessary to his proper direction of working parties and guards, by 7 o'clock a. m., otherwise upon such a long line it would be impossible for the general to get into communication with these officers and ascertain their requirements and give necessary orders to the guards.

I am, general, your obedient servant,

D. B. BIRNEY,

Brigadier-General, General of the Trenches.

General PORTER, *Director.*

No. 47.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Corps, of operations on the left, April 27-29, with indorsement.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS,
Warwick Court-House, April 27, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report operations on the left during the last twenty-four hours.

Four of the enemy's gunboats were reported in James River yesterday. I saw three. They threw, say, twenty shells, the most of them at Peck's works, but without any damage to the troops. Peck had one man wounded yesterday by the enemy's pickets and another the day before. Brigadier-General Hancock, with a strong force, was out most of the day yesterday. He succeeded in cutting and clearing in front of Smith's left a space of 40 or 50 yards, and by erecting breastworks of logs for his pickets secured them from constant murderous attacks heretofore made on them in that quarter. I have not yet received General Hancock's report, but I derived from a personal interview with him an exact understanding of the enemy's works at a point about 750 yards below the one-gun battery. At that point they are very strong, and can only be reached by vertical fires from our side. The enemy have two dams there, and are busy at something which I do not understand, unless they are preparing for a sortie or for a cross-fire on Smith's batteries. The benefits which we should derive there from 8-inch siege mortars in that quarter would be so great as to justify strong exertions to obtain them. Couch's division have done much in erecting fortifications of different kinds, Smith's have done next in amount, and Casey's have done nothing.

As Lee's Mill is no doubt an extremely strong portion of the enemy's lines, where he could cross and form 15,000 men in a short time, a system of defense to secure Casey from a *coup de main* is required. I

propose to commence as soon as the Yorktown road is finished, unless otherwise ordered. I am not certain that I know where Adams' house is, but it will require all our tools two days to render this end of the road passable. I have ordered an additional regiment to the neighborhood of Young's house. That leaves me with a very small reserve with which to support Peck or Graham.

Smith's division has had such hard work and exposure that sickness is beginning to show itself. Brigadier-General Davidson having been disabled by a strain, I allowed him to be classed with the wounded and gave him leave of absence for fifteen days. General Sumner disapproved of my action in this case. Brigadier-General Graham is in hospital, and Couch was sick yesterday. My chief surgeon is quite indisposed also.

This morning between 12 and 1 o'clock a telegram from General Smith announced that the water below the dam was falling rapidly, and that he anticipated an attack at dawn. I had all my corps ready, but moved nobody.

I remain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

Capt. J. H. TAYLOR,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS,

Warwick Court-House, May 1, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a report made by Brigadier-General Hancock to Brigadier-General Smith, commanding division, and accompanying reports of a reconnaissance on the 29th instant, and of the work done to clear and protect the picket line below Smith's batteries, opposite the enemy's one-gun battery. The reconnaissance gives me a good understanding of the enemy's works opposite Smith's left, and the work done will secure his pickets from constant annoyance and loss. The affair was well managed, but our loss was 2 killed and 6 wounded. One of the wounded was a commissioned officer. The enemy's loss was greater than ours.

Some appearances on the 29th indicated that the enemy had withdrawn from Smith's front. In the afternoon of that day General Smith sent out a scouting party, and discovered their pickets in the same position as that occupied the day before. One officer and 3 privates of the scouting party were wounded. I directed a searching examination of my whole front to be made on the 29th. Accordingly Brigadier-General Casey, commanding division, sent out Brigadier-Generals Palmer and Naglee, each with a majority of his brigade, to make a reconnaissance toward the works at and near Lee's Mill. The reconnaissance was thorough, and resulted in confirming the opinion so often heretofore stated by me, that the portion of the enemy's lines near Lee's Mill is exceedingly strong. General Naglee lost one man—mortally wounded and since dead—of the Eleventh Maine. I inclose his and General Palmer's reports. I shall direct Brigadier-General Casey, commanding division, to strengthen his front greatly by artificial means.

Last night at dusk it was reported to me that the enemy had shown two regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one battery of artillery to the full view from the point on our left occupied by Colonel De Trobriand, Fifty-fifth New York Volunteers, Peck's brigade. I

caused proper dispositions to be made, to prevent a crossing, and in the night some shots from Major West's batteries were thrown over. The enemy only replied with musketry, wounding one of our men only.

The Yorktown road along the whole of my front is now in a condition to be used by teams. It has been completed at a vast expense of labor.

I have the honor respectfully to submit this report through Brigadier-General Sumner, commanding the left wing.

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Army Corps.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS LEFT WING, *May 1, 1862.*

GENERAL: I have given orders that no reconnaissance will be made in force requiring the enemy's pickets to be driven in without orders from these headquarters or the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac.

I deem it indispensably necessary that the authority which controls the reserves should know of these movements before they are made.

Respectfully,

E. V. SUMNER,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

General S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 48.

Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Smith's division, of reconnaissance toward Lee's Mill, April 28.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, SMITH'S DIVISION,
Camp near Lee's Mill, April 29, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the following as the result of the operations of the troops under my command for special service yesterday:

In obedience to instructions from division headquarters, about 6 a. m. I left camp with the Fifth Wisconsin, Sixth Maine, and Forty-third New York Volunteers. The object of my operations was to cover a strong working party in felling timber in front of our picket line, covering our whole front, in the direction of Lee's Mill; in leveling the limbs of said trees; in clearing out the undergrowth on the enemy's side of the picket line for a considerable distance back, and in making defenses of logs for our pickets—this being necessary from the proximity of the enemy and his taking the advantage of the undergrowth and the approaches by a ravine which headed near the picket line and led to the creek, filled with tangled briars, giving the enemy's sharpshooters an opportunity to approach within 30 or 40 paces of our pickets unobserved, and causing them to be shot down every day at their posts with scarcely an opportunity of retaliation. Incidentally it was also intended to give the engineer officers, Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Bowen, an oppor-

tunity to make a re-examination of the next work below the one in front of our batteries (about 750 yards) if opportunity presented.

To carry out these orders the Forty-third New York Volunteers was sent to the extreme right of our picket line along the creek especially to do the labor and guard that point during its continuance. I took the Fifth Wisconsin and Sixth Maine Volunteers beyond the picket line toward Lee's Mill, on the main road, with a view of approaching the enemy's works in question from the front and covering the workmen on the other part of the line. I deployed a portion of the Maine regiment as skirmishers, the remainder as reserves and flankers. The Fifth Wisconsin, in line of battle and in support, then advanced toward the creek, with our right brushing the picket line.

The Thirty-third New York Volunteers, of General Davidson's brigade, which had been ordered to report to me, in order to cover like operations in front of the picket line of that brigade, I found on the ground, and posted them on the road leading to Lee's Mill and perpendicular to it and about 200 yards in front of the picket line, with skirmishers thrown out 400 yards in advance, said skirmishers connecting with the flankers of the Sixth Maine.

A section of artillery was ordered to report to me, but finding no opportunity to use it—it being entirely a heavily-wooded country—I directed it to remain in the camp of the Forty-ninth New York Volunteers.

Advancing the skirmishers of the Sixth Maine, the enemy's pickets and scouts were soon driven before them, and the line advanced until the right rested on the creek near the Forty-third New York, the front and left within about 100 yards of the stream. It was then found that on a prominent knoll on this side of the creek, and directly overlooking their works at a distance of about 75 paces from them, the enemy had thrown up a breastwork of logs in the form of a rifle pit. This is the only point from which their works could be overlooked. The commander applied to me for orders to take this rifle pit. At this time the reserves and supports were brought up closer to the line. I found, however, that on the right and left of this prominence the moment our men descended the little crest behind which they were lying a column of assault would be exposed to a flank fire of their ranges of rifle pits along the creek on the other side and at short range. I therefore concluded, having had an examination of their works from this prominence a day or two before—having had temporary possession of it, and knowing what the general nature of those works were, and the fact from experience then derived—that the moment of ascending that knoll we were under their immediate fire at very short range; that the advantage to be gained in taking it would not counterbalance the losses we would sustain, unless it was intended that the works on the other side should be assaulted also. I concluded, as it had no reference to our main operations, that as long as we could keep the enemy confined to that point it would be good military judgment not to make the assault, but to hold the position.

In order to ascertain the views of the general commanding the division on the subject I sent an officer of engineers to him to represent the state of the case. He decided that the assault should not be made. After holding this position about an hour, our skirmishers within 40 or 50 paces of it in front, the enemy became very defiant, and the officer in command ordered a charge on our skirmishers. Their men rose up behind their rifle pits apparently with the view of crossing their breastwork in obedience to the order, but a deadly and well-

directed volley from our skirmishers poured in at this moment at their very short range caused them to subside promptly with evident considerable loss. They never fired a shot afterward. At the command "Charge" the colonel of the Sixth Maine brought up his reserve close to the skirmishers, sheltering them in a little ravine. Their assistance, however, was unnecessary. It is believed that the enemy were there in considerable force, for long rolls had been beaten in their works in different directions from the time we arrived there. On the last day of examination of these works several regiments took their places in the rifle pits while our men held the knoll.

On the right of the line toward the river, Colonel Vinton, in command, advanced the Forty-third New York down the ravine close to the creek and held his position there for more than an hour, and until the ravine was entirely cleared out from the underbrush, and nearly all this time under a teasing fire from the other side of the creek, generally from unseen enemies, who appeared to occupy rifle pits or were sheltered behind palisades in the woods. At the mouth of the ravine, on the opposite side of the creek, appeared a little work, explained in accompanying sketch. At 2 o'clock p. m., the work having been substantially completed along the whole front of General Davidson's and my brigades, I ordered the troops to be slowly withdrawn, the skirmishers of the Sixth Maine bringing up the rear. The enemy had been so well punished at different places that they made no attempt to follow our skirmishers home. We met with some losses, but I have no doubt far less than we would have subsequently encountered on the picket line had the work not been performed. Besides, our men had felt on picket a sense of the greatest insecurity. From the causes before mentioned it was necessary to remedy this, for from our proximity to the enemy, and owing to the comparatively short distance from them to our batteries, it is always necessary to throw the supports and reserves on the picket line and making the contest there immediately, instead of allowing our pickets to fall back upon the supports. The men behaved with spirit. First Lieut. W. G. Mitchell, my aide, had charge of the working party, and performed his duties well and faithfully.

I herewith submit reports of Col. H. Burnham and Col. F. L. Vinton, commanding the Sixth Maine and Forty-third New York Volunteers, respectively, with sketches of the prominent positions held by them, referred to herein.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

No. 49.

Report of Col. Hiram Burnham, Sixth Maine Infantry, of reconnaissance toward Lee's Mill, April 28.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH MAINE REGIMENT,
Camp No. 9, in the Field, April 28, 1862.

The following report of a reconnaissance made to-day by the Sixth Maine Regiment of a portion of the shore of the Warwick River to the left of our batteries is respectfully submitted:

The regiment moved from the camp at the hour named in the order

and proceeded down the road leading to Lee's Mill. On arriving at a point in the road opposite the locality intended to be examined the regiment was halted, two companies deployed as skirmishers, and two more as flankers, to protect the left flank. The skirmishers then advanced and the regiment followed in line of battle.

Not more than a hundred yards had been passed over after leaving the picket line before our skirmishers began to exchange shots with the enemy's outposts. In one or two instances they had the audacity to call out to our men not to fire, that they were friends; but the ruse was unsuccessful, and they were driven back to the main body. This was quite large and protected by a breastwork of logs, and in some places earth had been thrown up as if for a rifle pit. This breastwork is erected on the crest of a swell of land about 75 yards from and overlooking the stream.

Our skirmishers approached within a short distance of the enemy, and covering themselves kept up a continual fire upon them. This fire they returned. The enemy apparently found our fire very annoying, and after the lapse of perhaps an hour passed in this manner an attempt was made to frighten off, for it is thought no more was intended. An officer was distinctly heard to order the enemy to charge. As if in obedience to this order they rose up in sight over their breastwork. Our men took advantage of the exposure and poured in a simultaneous and it is believed deadly volley. The rebels instantly fell back under cover again. The line remained in this position until ordered to retire.

Charles L. Clark, of Company F, was wounded in the thigh. This was all the casualty which occurred. A sketch of the locality accompanies this report.*

HIRAM BURNHAM,

Colonel, Commanding Sixth Maine Regiment.

JOHN HANCOCK, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 50.

Report of Col. Francis L. Vinton, Forty-third New York Infantry, of reconnaissance toward Lee's Mill, April 28.

HDQRS. FORTY-THIRD NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,

April 28, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with the order of General Hancock I have the honor of forwarding to him the following statement concerning the clearing and re-establishing of our picket line so far as it was under my direction and protection. I also add what few observations I could make of the enemy's works and the nature of the ground in front. The sketch I forward I have drawn from memory entirely, not having been prepared to take bearings or measure distances:*

The pioneers of the brigade having reported to me, I put them in charge of Lieutenant Bogart, my adjutant, who employed them according to the directions transmitted from General Hancock through Lieutenant Mitchell. I crossed the picket line with my regiment, followed by the pioneers, near the left support. The skirmishers of the Sixth Maine covered me partially from the left toward the right after entering the wood. While the pioneers were opening the wood around the

* Omitted as unimportant.

angle of the picket line to the south of the little creek I kept my regiment 30 or 40 paces in front of them, with skirmishers about the same distance in front of me.

As the work progressed from left to right—that is, from south to north—I moved along to keep pace, throwing out more skirmishers until the whole belt of woods and abatis were rendered clear. This was accomplished by 9.30 o'clock. The pioneers worked very industriously. I was then ordered to place the center of my right on the little creek, and to move forward with caution, while the pioneers cleared the ravine through which the creek runs. This I did. The little creek is deep. A man goes in it to his middle; its sides are steep; it is 6 feet wide. I moved forward in the manner indicated about 40 paces. The pioneers did their work behind me. The regiment was pretty close on the skirmishers, because at this point all the ground was covered with water and the skirmishers went slowly. Here we commenced to see through the thin forest the earthwork of the enemy, which I have drawn, facing the ravine. In front of the parapet are protections of some sort for riflemen—I think logs. The sharpshooters of the enemy at this point fired at the regiment, which I am afraid they saw too plainly. They killed a man. He was shot in the forehead with a small bullet. I did not return the fire. At their next discharge they wounded 2 men. I then allowed the regiment to break into groups and take cover on its line of battle. I also gave permission to fire. We could not see the enemy's riflemen, although we could easily distinguish their men on their parapet. Wherever there was a report I allowed four or five shots to be sent in; no more. The water at this point is of variable depth, increasing toward the large creek. I think it is the backwater of the creek dammed below.

The enemy was not skirmishing. All his shots were from unseen points—loop-holes through logs, perhaps. He fired with some persistence, and finally wounded another man and a lieutenant. I aimed low. The water splashed as far as I could see.

At about 11 o'clock I was ordered to retire my line within the picket line. The pioneers had already finished what they had to do along the ravine. In falling back, those companies which had been most under fire fell back the best, but they all did pretty well. I formed all but the three left companies, resting their right on the right support. The others were taken to the neighborhood of the left of our picket line, and from them skirmishers were thrown out, who connected on their left with the Sixth Maine skirmishers and on their right with our pickets, thus protecting the pioneers still working on the extreme left. Between 1 and 2 o'clock, all the work being concluded, I came into camp.

The sketch I add will explain my idea of the position of the enemy at the point where I was fired on. Through the ravine in which runs the little creek there is a sweep for rifle shot and grape. The water dammed back covers the usual obstructions to be found in a forest—logs, roots, deep holes. My skirmishers went to this side of the big creek, but I attempted nothing more.

With regard to the conduct of the officers and men I have no fault to find.*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANCIS L. VINTON,

Colonel Forty-third New York Volunteers.

Capt. JOHN HANCOCK, A. A. G., *First Brigade, Smith's Division.*

* Nominal list of casualties shows 1 man killed and 1 officer and 3 men wounded.

No. 51.

Report of Brig. Gen. Henry M. Naglee, U. S. Army, of reconnaissance toward Lee's Mill, April 29.

CAMP WINFIELD SCOTT, VA., NEAR LEE'S MILL,
First Brigade, Casey's Division, April 30, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I was directed yesterday at 3 p. m. by General Silas Casey to carry out certain instructions of General Keyes and make an immediate close examination of the works in front of Lee's Mill, adding that I should move my entire brigade for the purpose. The Fifty-second Pennsylvania were, with the exception of one company, on fatigue duty. The One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania and Fifty-sixth New York by the Yorktown and Lee's Mill road, and the Eleventh Maine and One hundredth New York by the central road, were marched from their several encampments, and arrived in the position assigned to them in rear of the point of woods about the same time. The right and left companies of the Eleventh Maine were deployed and advanced as skirmishers, supported by the right and left companies of the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania; the right and left companies of the Fifty-sixth and One hundredth New York in rear and supporting them. The balance of the Eleventh Maine Regiment, Colonel Caldwell, advanced some 200 yards after all of the former had moved forward 600 yards into the woods, leaving the balance of the Fifty-sixth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Jourdan; One hundredth New York, Colonel Brown, and the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, Col. W. W. H. Davis, deployed in echelon as reserves.

The skirmishers had no sooner entered the wood than they met the pickets of the enemy, but without hesitation drove them at an even pace before them, and so continued receiving the discharge of their reserves, who also retired, and were driven rapidly beyond the woods and into their works. The pursuit was continued to the edge of the woods, but 150 yards in front of the batteries, where all remained until the reconnaissance was made, and which developed the following information: That the batteries were not abandoned, as had been reported, but that active preparations were going on to strengthen the different works; that there is a creek immediately in front of them; that the batteries are erected on abrupt, prominent, rugged points 40 feet above the creek, the ground rising rapidly from it; that the large timber has been cut between the batteries and the creek and lies in the most irregular confusion, making, immediately under the guns of the batteries and the rifle pits of the enemy, a very formidable obstacle. The late hour the order was received made it 5.30 p. m. before the proper preparations could be completed, and it was within a quarter of an hour of sunset before the woods were cleared and an approach could be made to a point where any observation could be properly taken, and which was within 200 yards of the guns of the enemy.

Attached you will find a rough topographical sketch.*

I am most happy to refer to the gallant conduct of all the troops employed, who, although inexperienced, marched boldly to their task without the least hesitation.

* Omitted as unimportant.

The casualties were few, and will be reported as soon as accurately ascertained.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

Your obedient servant,

HENRY M. NAGLEE,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. HENRY W. SMITH,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Casey's Division.

No. 52.

Report of Brig. Gen. Innis N. Palmer, U. S. Army, of reconnaissance toward Lee's Mill, April 29.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, CASEY'S DIVISION,
April 30, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to the instructions received from headquarters of the division I have the honor to report that on consulting with General Smith, who was sending out a reconnoitering party on my right, I advanced five companies of the Ninety-third Regiment to move to the front, keeping up the connection with the Seventy-seventh Regiment, Davidson's brigade, which was acting as escort to the officer sent by General Smith to make the reconnaissance to his front. The officer commanding these companies had orders to return with the Seventy-seventh whenever the reconnaissance was made. Two regiments and the battery were paraded, but held in reserve in the field near the telegraph tower, and two regiments were deployed in front of my line of pickets, with orders to move to the front, drive in the enemy's pickets, if any were out, and ascertain, if possible, the condition of the works in front of my line toward Lee's Mill.

The order for the reconnaissance was not received until 4 p. m., and I had but a very short time in which to work, as I thought it necessary to order the party to return to the reserve by dark. Colonel Belknap, of the Eighty-fifth, who had the right of the line, moved directly forward to the creek, but found it impassable. The enemy's pickets commenced firing upon this regiment only from the other side of the creek, where they were posted in front of a few rifle pits. The fire was not returned until the men reached the creek. As soon as the fire was returned all of the pickets disappeared. By this time it was nearly dark, and this regiment returned as directed. The Ninety-eighth, under Major Mann, deployed on the left of the Eighty-fifth and moved forward, feeling the men of General Naglee's brigade on the left. This regiment had no pickets at all, but they were under the fire of the forts in front, which had opened on General Naglee. Major Mann did all that could be expected, and returned a little after dark.

The only information gained by this short reconnaissance is that the enemy's pickets appear to be posted as usual in front of my line, but only on the other side of the creek.

The sharp firing from the front, which I presume has been reported by General Naglee, convinces me that up to last night the works in front toward Lee's Mill had not been evacuated.

There were no casualties among the men of my command. Colonel Belknap reports one of the enemy's pickets killed.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. N. PALMER,

Brig. Gen., Commanding Third Brigade, Casey's Division.

Capt. HENRY W. SMITH, A. A. G., *Casey's Division.*

No. 53.

Report of Brig. Gen. Charles D. Jameson, U. S. Army, as General of the Trenches, May 3-4, with indorsement.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, KEARNY'S DIVISION,
May 4, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that I relieved Brigadier-General Martindale as general of the trenches at 8 a. m. the 3d instant. Nothing of particular interest occurred during the day. The enemy kept up an irregular fire from their works most of the day and part of the night, but with no effect upon our working parties or guards. The rebel fire continued at intervals until about 11.30 o'clock p. m., when it ceased entirely.

At about 3 o'clock this morning quite heavy explosions were heard in the vicinity of Yorktown and a very bright fire was observed there, which facts were immediately telegraphed to you.

About 3.30 a. m. there were strong indications that the rebels had evacuated their works. Very soon after three rebel soldiers approached our lines under a flag of truce. They stated that Yorktown was evacuated. In accordance with instructions from you, I deployed two companies of the Sixty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, together with a portion of the Berdan Sharpshooters, as skirmishers, with a portion of the Twenty-second Massachusetts, Colonel Gove, as support, and advanced cautiously towards the rebel works in front of Yorktown. No signs of the rebels were visible as I approached, and I had the honor of entering the town at about 5.30 o'clock this a. m. The works were entirely deserted, the rear guard of the enemy having left about 3.30 o'clock a. m. Most of their guns were left in their works loaded and spiked. A very large number of tents were left, a large portion of which were in a damaged condition, although there are a great many very little injured. I caused the American flag to be raised immediately upon entering, and placed a guard on all the buildings and other property.

I remained in command until about 9 o'clock a. m., when I was relieved by Brigadier-General Butterfield.

I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. D. JAMESON,

General of the Trenches.

Brig. Gen. FITZ JOHN PORTER, *Director of Siege.*

[Indorsement.]

MAY 5, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded to headquarters Army of the Potomac. The first indication of the evacuation of Yorktown was given me thus, and the attending circumstances are as follows:

About 4 o'clock I was aroused by the corporal of my guard, who

informed me that quite heavy musketry firing was in front and a house on fire in Yorktown. On ascending immediately the lookout at my tent I discovered that some building was on fire, and that sounds arose from the apparent bursting of shells. I immediately telegraphed General Jameson the fact, and to know what was the firing in front. He said he knew of no firing, but would ascertain. Before receiving a reply I was convinced from the flashing in the flame that the enemy's magazine or a building containing powder was burning, and I directed General Jameson to send forward a force to ascertain if the enemy had not abandoned the town, and as soon as the notice of deserters came I directed him and Colonel McQuade (general of the trenches on the left) to send forward a regiment and occupy the town. The reports of Colonel Gove, Twenty-second Massachusetts, and Colonel McQuade are inclosed. The inclosed telegram will show that no suspicion of his evacuation existed up to 3.15 a. m. on the 4th instant.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Brigadier-General, Director, &c.

[Inclosure.]

MAY 4, 1862—3.15 a. m.

I have completed both rifle pits on the left. They are well supplied with sand bags and screened with bushes. Have enlarged the advanced rifle pit on the right near the old chimney; put on sand bags and masked it with trees. No signs of any movement of the enemy.

C. D. JAMESON.

General FITZ JOHN PORTER.

No. 54.

Report of Col. Jesse A. Gove, Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry, of occupation of Yorktown, May 4.

HDQRS. TWENTY-SECOND MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT,
Camp Winfield Scott, Va., May 4, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with the request of the general commanding division that I make an immediate report of the occupation of Yorktown by our forces this morning, I address you directly, without passing through the general of trenches, whom I left at Yorktown, to avoid delay:

I proceeded this morning with my regiment and 150 men, Captain Boughton, of the New York Thirteenth, to the trenches, arriving at the mill-dam at 5 a. m. precisely, where I reported to General Jameson. Detailing 250 of my command to relieve the same number of the old guard to the left of the road, I proceeded with 750 to relieve the guard to the right and the two companies in the rifle pits in front near the chimneys, all under the command of Colonel Black, of the Sixty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers. Colonel Black's command, as soon as relieved, marched out of the trenches, and by direction of General Jameson I advanced two companies, and relieved those in the rifle pits. I deployed Company B, Captain Wardwell, supported by Company D, Cap-

tain Dunning, as a reserve, and we approached their work, accompanied by General Jameson and Colonel Black and his two companies. My command followed the line of skirmishers in supporting distance. On our arrival we found no obstruction to our occupation, their works being entirely evacuated.

I placed the first national flag upon the ramparts, the men giving three hearty cheers as it unfolded to the breeze. Passing their works, I continued the line of skirmishers through the town without opposition. Several deserters from the enemy and some 30 negroes appeared, all of whom were reported to General Butterfield, who had just arrived. I immediately posted sentinels on the ramparts and at all the houses, to prevent stragglers entering to commit depredations.

In this connection I regret to state that some of the most flagrant cases of violation of orders in that respect were committed by officers whose overweening curiosity seemed to entirely absorb all sense of propriety or official dignity.

It is my painful duty to report the wounding of 6 of Company G, Captain Whorf, from the explosion of a torpedo imbedded in the surface of the ground. These inhuman missiles of war were placed in the field in front, in the several houses, and in the roads and thoroughfares in the town. An explosion took place in a column of cavalry outside of the works, with what result I am unable to state. In the town one of the telegraph corps stepped on one of them, which exploded with deadly effect. It was a 10-inch shell, concealed by the sand, and in the middle of the road.

The works completely surround the town, and are of a formidable character, and capable of maintaining a determined resistance. Being relieved at 2 p. m. by Colonel Stryker, of the Forty-fourth New York, I returned to camp.

Respectfully submitted.

JESSE A. GOVE,

Colonel Twenty-second Mass. Regt., Commanding Outposts, &c.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Porter's Div., Camp Winfield Scott, Va.

No. 55.

Report of Col. James McQuade, Fourteenth New York Infantry, as General of the (left wing) Trenches, May 3-4.

CAMP WINFIELD SCOTT,

Near Yorktown, Va., May 4, 1862.

GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following report as general of the trenches, in charge of the left wing, for the twenty-four hours ending at 8 a. m. to-day:

The outpost guard consisted of 1,000 men, under command of Colonel Dodge, of the Eighty-seventh New York Volunteers. The guard was stationed between Battery No. 7 and Battery No. 3. The ground between Battery No. 7 and Redoubt A should have been guarded by General Sumner's corps, but no party having been sent from that corps, I was compelled to locate a portion of my command there. During the day a number of the rebels were seen in the small sand-bag redoubt in front

of Redoubt A, and were dispersed by a few shell thrown from that redoubt. During the night every precaution was taken to guard against an attack, and your orders in regard to Battery No. 3 were complied with. The parapets were manned, and skirmishers thrown forward to give notice of an attack.

A heavy fire was kept up by the rebels until about 1 o'clock this morning. After that hour they fired at intervals. At 4 o'clock a fire was seen in the enemy's works, which was evidently the conflagration of a building containing ammunition, the explosions resembling volleys of musketry and the bursting of shell.

About sunrise I received a telegram from you ordering me to send forward a party of men to occupy the enemy's works if abandoned. Two hundred men were at once detailed for that purpose. At this time the enemy fired three shot, which fell in the wood immediately to the left of Battery 6. A few minutes afterward the officer in command at Redoubt A opened fire upon the rebel sand-bag redoubt, where he reported the rebels to be collected in considerable numbers, apparently at work. After communicating this intelligence to you I made a personal examination of the enemy's works, and without awaiting the receipt of an answer from my last dispatch I advanced with the outpost guard—consisting of detachments from the Thirty-eighth and Fortieth New York Regiments, under command of Colonel Riley, which had just relieved the old guard—and entered the rebel works at the redoubt near the Yorktown road about 6 o'clock a. m. While in the redoubt an infernal machine of the enemy exploded, killing 2 and wounding 3 men of the Fortieth New York Regiment. The men were immediately withdrawn from the redoubt, and a guard posted, so as to prevent unauthorized persons from entering it. I left the outpost guard in command of Colonel Riley, and instructed him to send a party into the wood in rear of the enemy's works to reconnoiter, and to bring in any stragglers or deserters from the enemy who might be secreted there.

I am compelled to report that the outpost duty was not performed entirely to my satisfaction, owing to the inexperience of the officers and the bad state of discipline among the men. I was unable to procure reliable information of the movements of the enemy, except by personal observation. The men came on duty without rations, and the attempts to obtain permission to leave the guard to procure them caused much confusion. The commanding officer reported that the detail for the guard was not received by him until 11 o'clock the night before, and the prohibition against fires in camp during the night and the obligation to mount guard at daybreak prevented the men from preparing rations. No field officer accompanied the detail of 500 men from the One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Regiment. There was no surgeon detailed for the guard. The surgeon who accompanied the guard of the day before remained until this morning.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. McQUADE,
Colonel and General of Trenches.

Brig. Gen. FITZ JOHN PORTER,
Director of Siege.

No. 56.

Report of Col. Samuel W. Black, Sixty-second Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations May 3-4.

HDQRS. SIXTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS,
Camp Winfield Scott, May 4, 1862.

I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 3d instant I reported to Brigadier-General Martindale, general of trenches, at a few minutes before 4.30 o'clock; the picket detail being 600 officers and men of the Sixty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzer, and 400 officers and men of the Fourteenth New York Volunteers, under Major Davies, all from the Second (Morell's) Brigade. The old pickets were relieved on time, Major Davies, with 225 men of the Fourteenth New York Volunteers, occupying for the day the trenches on the left of the Mill road, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzer with the rest of the entire detail, occupying the trenches on the right. At 8 a. m. I reported to Brigadier-General Jameson, who relieved General Martindale. Throughout the day and most of the night the firing from the enemy's works was heavy, continuous, and frequent. At night the pickets were posted well to the front, forming a continuous and connected line. Two companies of the Sixty-second occupied the rifle trenches with a detail of sharpshooters.

About 3 o'clock this morning a large fire was discovered inside of the Yorktown works and frequent explosions of shell and cartridges were heard. At daylight 3 prisoners were taken at the rifle trenches. I immediately had them carried to the general of the trenches at the mill. They stated that the enemy had withdrawn from Yorktown and that little or no force was now inside.

In company with General Jameson, and under his orders, four companies of the Sixty-second and two companies of the Twenty-second Massachusetts Volunteers (Colonel Gove) moved forward to the left of the rebel works. General Jameson and the undersigned ascended the front and entered almost together, when I raised and waved a small American flag. The Sixty-second and a small detail of sharpshooters, followed by the Twenty-second Massachusetts Volunteers, ascended the works in good order, and took possession of the fortifications of Yorktown.

In a very few minutes after the first flag was raised Colonel Gove planted a large American flag prominently on the front. I think it right to say that the third person in the works was the sergeant-major of the Sharpshooters.

The last shot fired from the rebel fortifications was a shell from Gloucester Point, thrown about twenty minutes before the occupation of Yorktown. It burst at the main parallel, and within a very few feet from two companies of the Sixty-second, happily, and as it would seem providentially, doing no harm.

The conduct of the officers and men on picket both day and night was every way satisfactory, Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzer and Major Davies being particularly vigilant and attentive.

Very respectfully,

SAML. W. BLACK,

Colonel Sixty-second Pa. Vols., Commanding Pickets.

Brigadier-General MORELL,

Commanding Second Brigade.

No. 57.

Report of Col. Amor A. McKnight, One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations May 4.

HDQRS. ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTH PA. VOLS.,
Camp Winfield Scott, near Yorktown, Va., May 4, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that Company E, Captain Greenawalt, of this regiment, was the first of this division to enter the enemy's works in front of Yorktown, which they did at 7.30 this morning. Sergeant Patterson was the first in. Captain Greenawalt says the enemy commenced taking in their pickets at 1 o'clock this morning; could hear artillery and troops moving all night.

I am, very respectfully, &c.,

A. A. MCKNIGHT,

Colonel, Comdg. One hundred and fifth Pa. Vols.

Capt. JAMES M. WILSON, A. A. G., *Kearny's Division.*

No. 58.

Reports of Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, C. S. Army, commanding at Yorktown, &c.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE PENINSULA,
Lee's Farm, April 5, 1862.

SIR: I have just left my saddle, and hasten to make a rough sketch of to-day's action.

As I reported last evening, the enemy were camped last night about 5 miles in advance of our lines. They advanced very leisurely this morning, evidently taking precautions for the safe advance of a large army. Their road leading to Yorktown was good, and they reached the front of Redoubts No. 4 and 5 about 10 a. m., and commenced firing on our works with cannon a few minutes later.

Col. Geo. T. Ward's brigade defended these redoubts with coolness and gallantry, opening the action with slight skirmishing, then returning to the curtain wall which connects them.

The enemy moved their batteries to about 1 mile from our lines and opened briskly, but soon fired slowly, and had continued to do so, ceasing at intervals until 4.30 p. m., when my last informant left. Their sharpshooters found a protected position, which they have constantly occupied, in a peach orchard about 600 yards in front of Redoubt No. 5, and having ascertained the range, they made it dangerous for our men to expose their persons. Three men (none mortally) and 5 horses were wounded at this position.

Learning from my advance guard the approach of the enemy on both roads, I had ridden to Lee's Mill before learning of the attack on Yorktown, and saw that Brigadier-General McLaws had placed his troops for the defense of that position. Four companies of the Tenth Georgia, under Lieutenant-Colonel Weems, skirmished in the front across the creek, taking 2 prisoners, Lieutenant Swan and a private of the Tenth [Seventh] Maine, General Smith's division.

Leaving General McLaws to defend this flank with August's brigade in the front, Colonel Hunt's command covering Mulberry Island, and General Wilcox's brigade in reserve, I started for the center (where I

expected the enemy to concentrate) about half past twelve, and had progressed a short distance through the miry road when the booming of cannon announced the opening of the action at Lee's Mill. I found afterward that this proceeded mostly from Cosnahan's battery of two pieces on the extreme right, replying to five or six pieces of the enemy on the opposite hill.

Hearing that a brisk engagement was going on at Yorktown, and fearing that Colonel Ward's position would be stormed by overpowering numbers, I ordered up General Wilcox with two regiments to his support, and he came up with admirable promptness. Passing the dams between Lee's and Wynn's mill-ponds, which were guarded by three companies of Nineteenth Mississippi and Fourteenth Alabama Regiments, I found Colonel Winston commanding at Wynn's Mill, with three regiments, a small battalion, and two batteries well posted, and the men in fine spirits. As I was leaving, the enemy's artillery opened (mostly with rifled pieces) from a high ground some 1,200 to 1,300 yards to the front and left, and continued their practice until 5 p. m., when my last informant left.

Proceeding to the redoubts to the left of Yorktown, I found Colonel Ward's arrangements satisfactory. The enemy's firing was slow and they were not pressing forward. I therefore ordered one of Wilcox's Alabama regiments, which had advanced to near Wynn's Mill, back to the head of Lee's mill-pond, as cannonading continued in that direction.

In approaching Yorktown the enemy directed their fire against my staff, and the horse of the lieutenant-colonel commanding, was badly wounded by a Minie ball. I found General Rains, commanding the garrison, prepared to defend it with determination. He complains of the want of powder.

Returning by the main road to Lee's Mill about 5 p. m., I found the action was over, and that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth North Carolina had arrived from General Colston's brigade.

The enemy had time to turn our right by finding a crossing to Warwick River, but being hotly fired into by the First Louisiana Battalion and by Col. A. Cumming, Tenth Georgia, which skirmished far down the river, following them, their effort was foiled. They appeared in force across Warwick River, opposite our works on Minor's farm, which cover the approaches up Mulberry Island.

Casualties at Redoubt No. 5, 3 men and 5 horses wounded; Wynn's Mill, 3 men slightly wounded, 2 horses killed; Lee's Mill, 1 man killed, 4 men wounded, 1 man missing, 2 men deserted.

[J. BANKHEAD MAGRUDER,
Brigadier-General, &c.]

General R. E. LEE, *Richmond, Va.*

—
RICHMOND, VA., *September 5, 1862.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to request that you will cause the defective copy of my report and all additions since furnished by me, now in your office, to be withdrawn and to be substituted therefor the accompanying correct and complete copy of the same.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. BANKHEAD MAGRUDER,
Major-General, &c.

General S. COOPER, *Adjt. and Insp. Gen., Richmond Va.*

P. S.—Information received subsequent to the sending in of my report has enabled me to do more ample justice to others and to correct some statements as to the order of events for which the sub-reports did not furnish conclusive data. The corrections here made will prevent, it is believed, the necessity of explanations in the future.

I am, sir, &c.,

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PENINSULA,
Lee's Farm, Va., May 3, 1862.

GENERAL: Deeming it of vital importance to hold Yorktown, on York River, and Mulberry Island, on James River, and to keep the enemy in check by an intervening line until the authorities might take such steps as should be deemed necessary to meet a serious advance of the enemy on the Peninsula, I felt compelled to dispose my forces in such a manner as to accomplish these objects with the least risk possible under the circumstances of great hazard which surrounded the little army I commanded.

I had prepared as my real line of defense positions in advance at Harwood's [Howard's] and Young's Mills. Both flanks of this line were defended by boggy and difficult streams and swamps. In addition, the left flank was defended by elaborate fortifications at Ship Point, connected by a broken line of redoubts crossing the heads of the various ravines emptying into York River and Wormley's Creek, and terminating at Fort Grafton, nearly in front of Yorktown. The right flank was defended by the fortifications at the mouth of Warwick River and at Mulberry Island Point, and the redoubts extending from the Warwick to James River. Intervening between the two mills was a wooded country about 2 miles in extent. This wooded line, forming the center, needed the defense of infantry in a sufficient force to prevent any attempt on the part of the enemy to break through it. In my opinion, this advanced line, with its flank defenses, might have been held by 20,000 troops. With 25,000 I do not believe it could have been broken by any force the enemy could have brought against it. Its two flanks were protected by the Virginia and the works on one side and the fortifications at Yorktown and Gloucester Point on the other.

Finding my forces too weak to attempt the defense of this line, I was compelled to prepare to receive the enemy on a second line, on Warwick River. This line was incomplete in its preparations, owing to the fact that 1,000 negro laborers, whom I had engaged in fortifying, were taken from me and discharged by superior orders in December last, and a delay of nine weeks consequently occurred before I could reorganize the laborers for the engineers. Keeping, then, only small bodies of troops at Harwood's and Young's Mills and at Ship Point, I distributed my remaining forces along the Warwick line, embracing a front from Yorktown to Minor's farm of 12 miles, and from the latter place to Mulberry Island Point of 1½ miles. I was compelled to place at Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and Mulberry Island fixed garrisons, amounting to 6,000 men, my whole force being 11,000; so that it will be seen that the balance of the line, embracing a length of 13 miles, was defended by about 5,000 men.

After two reconnaissances in great force from Fort Monroe and Newport News, the enemy, on April 3, advanced and took possession of Harwood's Mill. He advanced in two heavy columns—one along the old York road and the other along the Warwick road, and on April

5 appeared simultaneously along the whole front of our line from Minor's farm to Yorktown. I have no accurate data upon which to base an exact statement of his force, but from various sources of information I was satisfied that I had before me the enemy's Army of the Potomac, under the command of General McClellan, with the exception of the two *corps d'armée* of Banks and McDowell, respectively, forming an aggregate number of certainly not less than 100,000, since ascertained to have been 120,000. On every portion of my lines he attacked us with a furious cannonading and musketry, which was responded to with effect by our batteries and troops of the line. His skirmishers were also well thrown forward on this and the succeeding day and energetically felt our whole line, but were everywhere repulsed by the steadiness of our troops. Thus, with 5,000 men, exclusive of the garrisons, we stopped and held in check over 100,000 of the enemy. Every preparation was made in anticipation of another attack by the enemy; the men slept in the trenches and under arms, but to my utter surprise he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault. In a few days the object of his delay was apparent. In every direction; in front of our lines; through the intervening woods, and along the open fields, earthworks began to appear.

Through the energetic action of the Government re-enforcements began to pour in, and each hour the Army of the Peninsula grew stronger and stronger, until all anxiety passed from my mind as to the result of an attack upon us.

The enemy's skirmishers closely pressing us in front of Yorktown, Brigadier-General Early ordered a sortie to be made from the redoubts, for the purpose of dislodging him from Palmentary's peach orchard. This was effected in the most gallant manner by the Second Florida (Col. Geo. T. Ward) and Second Mississippi Battalion (Lieut. Col. John G. Taylor), all under the command of Colonel Ward. The quick and reckless charge of our men, by throwing the enemy into a hasty flight, enabled us to effect, with little loss, an enterprise of great hazard against a superior force, supported by artillery, when the least wavering or hesitation on our part would have been attended with great loss. The Warwick line, upon which we rested, may be briefly described as follows:

Warwick River rises very near York River and about a mile and a half to the right of Yorktown. Yorktown and Redoubts Nos. 4 and 5, united by long curtains and flanked by rifle pits form the left of the line until, at the commencement of the military road, it reaches Warwick River, here a sluggish and boggy stream, 20 or 30 yards wide, and running through a dense wood fringed by swamps. Along this river are five dams—one at Wynn's Mill, one at Lee's Mill, and three constructed by myself. The effect of these dams is to back up the water along the course of the river, so that for nearly three-fourths of its distance its passage is impracticable for either artillery or infantry. Each of these dams is protected by artillery and extensive earthworks for infantry.

After eleven days of examination the enemy seems very properly to have arrived at the conclusion that Dam No. 1, the center of our line, was the weakest point in it, and hence, on April 16, he made what seems to have been a serious effort to break through at that point.

Early on that morning he opened at that dam a most furious attack of artillery, filling the woods with shells, while his sharpshooters pressed forward close to our lines. From 9 a. m. to 12 m. six pieces were kept in constant fire against us, and by 3 p. m. nearly three bat-

teries were directing a perfect storm of shot and shell on our exposed position. We had only three pieces in position at that point, but two of them could not be used with effect and were rarely fired, so that we were constrained to reply with only one 6-pounder of the Troup Artillery, Cobb's (Georgia) Legion, Capt. M. Stanley, under the particular charge of Lieutenant Pope. This piece was served with the greatest accuracy and effect, and by the coolness and skill with which it was handled the great odds against us were almost counterbalanced.

By 3.30 p. m., the intensity of the cannonading increasing, heavy masses of infantry commenced to deploy in our front and a heavy musketry fire was opened upon us. Under the cover of this continuous stream of fire an effort was made by the enemy to throw forces over the stream and storm our 6-pounder battery, which was inflicting such damage upon them. This charge was very rapid and vigorous, and before our men were prepared to receive it several companies of a Vermont regiment succeeded in getting across and occupying the rifle pits of the Fifteenth North Carolina Volunteers, who were some hundred yards to the rear, throwing up a work for the protection of their camp. This regiment immediately sprang to arms and engaged the enemy with spirit, under the lead of their brave but unfortunate commander, [Robert M.] McKinney, and, aided by the Sixteenth Georgia Regiment, repulsed the enemy, but when the gallant McKinney fell a temporary confusion ensued, which was increased by an unauthorized order to fall back. The enemy renewed the attack with great force. At this moment the Seventh and Eighth Georgia, under command of Colonels Wilson and Lamar, respectively, the left of the Sixteenth Georgia, under command of Col. Goode Bryan, and the two companies of Captains Martin and Burke, of the Second Louisiana, under Colonel [J. T.] Norwood, accompanied by the Fifteenth North Carolina, with fixed bayonets and the steadiness of veterans, charged the rifle pits and drove the enemy from them with great slaughter.

Colonel Anderson, commanding his brigade, and the commanding officers of the troops above mentioned, deserve great praise for the promptness with which they rushed to the conflict and repelled this serious attempt of the enemy.

Subsequently the enemy massed heavier bodies of troops and again approached the stream. It was evident that a most serious and energetic attack in large force was being made to break our center, under, it is believed, the immediate eye of McClellan himself, but Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, who was in command at that point, forming the Second Louisiana, Seventh and Eighth Georgia, of Colonel [George T.] Anderson's brigade; the Fifteenth North Carolina, Twenty-fourth Georgia, and Cobb's Legion, in line of battle on our front, received the attack with great firmness, and the enemy recoiled with loss from the steady fire of our troops before reaching the middle of the water.

Brigadier-General McLaws, commanding the Second Division (of which Cobb's command formed a part), hearing the serious firing, hastened to the scene of action, and exhibited great coolness and judgment in his arrangements. The Tenth Louisiana, Fifteenth Virginia, a part of the Seventeenth Mississippi, and the Eleventh Alabama were ordered up as reserves, and were placed in position, the Tenth Louisiana marching to its place with the accuracy of a parade drill. The other regiments were assigned positions out of the range of fire. In addition, General McLaws placed the whole of his division under arms, ready to move as circumstances might require. Colonel Anderson had led two of his regiments, the Seventh and Eighth Georgia, into action and held

two others in reserve, while Brigadier-General Toombs advanced with his own brigade, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General Semmes, close to the scene of action, and by my order (having just arrived) placed two regiments of this brigade into action, retaining the rest as reserves. These dispositions and the enemy's suffering from his two repulses rendered our position perfectly secure. Darkness put an end to the contest.

The dispositions of General McLaws were skillfully made; his whole bearing and conduct is deserving of the highest commendation.

I cannot designate all the many gallant officers and privates who distinguished themselves, and respectfully call the attention of the commanding general to the accompanying reports; but I would fail to do my duty if I did not specially mention some particular instances.

Brigadier-General Cobb, commanding at this point, exhibited throughout the day the greatest courage and skill, and when, once at a critical moment, some troops in his line of battle wavered, he in person rallied the troops under a terrible fire, and by his voice and example entirely re-established their steadiness.

Brigadier-General Toombs had in the morning, by my order, detached from his division Colonel Anderson's brigade to support Brigadier-General Cobb, and late in the evening, when ordered forward by me, promptly and energetically led the remainder of his command, under fire, arriving just before the enemy ceased the vigor of his attack and in time to share its dangers.

Brig. Gen. P. J. Semmes commanded Toombs' brigade, the latter being in command of the division, and showed his usual promptness and courage.

Col. William M. Levy, of the Second Louisiana Regiment, was the colonel commanding at Dam No. 1, and evinced judgment, courage, and high soldierly qualities in his conduct and arrangements, which I desire specially to commend.

Captain Stanley was in command of two pieces of artillery, including the 6-pounder so effectively served. Both he and Lieutenant Pope conducted themselves with skill and courage.

Captain Jordan's piece was in a very exposed place, and was soon disabled, after a few rounds, and was properly withdrawn. Both he and his men exhibited great steadiness under the terrible fire which swept over them.

The enemy's loss of course cannot be accurately estimated, as the greater part of it occurred over on their side of the stream, but I think it could have scarcely been less than 600 killed and wounded.

Our own loss was comparatively trivial, owing to the earthworks, which covered our men, and did not exceed 75 killed and wounded.

All the re-enforcements which were on the way to me had not yet joined me, so that I was unable to follow up the action of April 16 by any decisive step. The re-enforcements were accompanied by officers who ranked me, and I ceased to command.

I cannot too highly commend the conduct of the officers and men of my whole command, who cheerfully submitted to the greatest hardships and deprivations.

From April 4 to May 3 this army served almost without relief in the trenches. Many companies of artillery were never relieved during this long period. It rained almost incessantly; the trenches were filled with water; the weather was exceedingly cold; no fires could be allowed; the artillery and infantry of the enemy played upon our men almost continuously day and night; the army had neither coffee, sugar, nor

hard bread, but subsisted on flour and salt meat, and that in reduced quantities,* and yet no murmurs were heard. Their gallant comrades of the Army of the Potomac and the Department of Norfolk, though not so long a time exposed to these sufferings, shared their hardships and dangers with equal firmness and cheerfulness. I have never seen, and I do not believe that there ever has existed, an army (the combined armies of the Potomac, Peninsula, and Norfolk) which has shown itself for so long a time so superior to all hardships and dangers. The best drilled regulars the world has ever seen would have mutinied under a continuous service in the trenches for twenty-nine days, exposed every moment to musketry and shells, in water to their knees, without fire, sugar, or coffee, without stimulants, and with an inadequate supply of uncooked flour and salt meat. I speak of this in honor of these brave men, whose patriotism made them indifferent to suffering, disease, danger, and death. Indeed, the conduct of the officers and men was such as to deserve throughout the highest commendation.

I beg leave to invite the attention of the Department to the reports which accompany this, and to commend the officers and men there named to the most favorable consideration of the Government. I cannot close this report without publicly bearing testimony to the great and devoted services of the cavalry of the Peninsula so long under my command. Always in the presence of superior forces of the enemy, I owe much of the success which attended my efforts to keep them within the walls of their fortresses to the alacrity, daring, vigilance, and constancy of the Third Virginia Cavalry and the independent companies from James City, Matthews, Gloucester, and King and Queen Counties.

The services rendered by the officers of my staff have been invaluable. To these I owe my acknowledgments. Captains Bryan and Dickinson, of the Adjutant-General's Department; Majors Magruder and Brent, of the Commissary and Ordnance Departments, respectively; Captain White, acting chief quartermaster; Colonel Cabell, chief of artillery; Lieutenant-Colonel Cary, acting inspector-general; Lieutenant Douglas, of the engineers; Lieutenants Eustis and Alston, aides-de-camp; Dr. George W. Millen, acting staff officer, and Messrs. J. R. Bryan, H. M. Stanard, D. T. Brashear, and Henry A. Boyce, who as volunteer aides have rendered most important services, and to Private E. P. Turner, of the New Kent Cavalry, on duty sometimes in the field, at others in the assistant adjutant-general's office.

My thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel Ball, of the Virginia Cavalry, who for several weeks during the siege acted as a volunteer aide. His conduct on the 5th in my immediate presence, and under a severe fire of the enemy, was very gallant, and worthy of the high reputation which he won at Manassas.

I am also greatly indebted to Maj. George Wray, of the One hundred and fifteenth Virginia Militia, who has aided me in the administration (civil as well as military) of the affairs of the Peninsula, and to Lieuts. Joseph Phillips and Causey, of the Confederate Army. The local knowledge of these officers has been of great advantage to the service, while their intrepidity and enterprise have been in the highest degree conspicuous on every occasion.

I cannot express too strongly my estimate of the services rendered by my chief quartermaster, Major Bloomfield. Soon after he took charge he introduced order, promptness, and economy in the management of his department. The scarcity of supplies and materials was so great

* See report following.

as to make it almost impossible to procure them. The genius, energy, and extraordinary industry of Major Bloomfield, however, overcame all obstacles, and enabled the Army of the Peninsula to move, to march, and to fight with the regularity of a machine. This statement is made in justice to Major Bloomfield, who is absent on account of sickness at the time that I write.

I ask the attention, also, of the Government to the valuable services rendered by Mr. William Norris, of Baltimore, the signal officer in charge of the signal service of the Peninsula, and to those of his efficient assistant, Lieutenant Lindsay, of the Fifteenth Virginia Regiment.

It is but just to Col. Charles A. Crump that I should bear testimony to the zeal, gallantry, and decided ability with which he performed the various duties of commander of the post at Gloucester Point during the year in which he was under my command. He was worthily supported on all occasions by Lieut. Col. P. R. Page and the other officers and men constituting his force.

That accomplished officer Capt. Thomas Jefferson Page, of the Navy, successfully applied the resources of his genius and ripe experience to the defense of Gloucester Point, while the important work opposite was commanded with devoted zeal and gallantry by Brigadier-General Rains.

My thanks are due to Capt. Frederick Chatard, of the Navy, for valuable services as inspector of batteries, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Noland, late of the Navy, the efficient commander of the batteries at Mulberry Island Point.

That patriotic and scientific soldier Col. B. S. Ewell rendered important services to the country during my occupation of the Peninsula, as did Col. Hill Carter, the commander at Jamestown, and his successor, Maj. J. R. C. Lewis.

I should fail in my duty to the country, and especially to the State of Virginia, if I neglected to record the self-sacrificing conduct of Capt. William Allen, of the artillery. At the very commencement of the war this gentleman erected at his own expense on Jamestown Island extensive fortifications for the defense of the river, and from that time until he was driven from his home he continued to apply the resources of his large estate to the benefit of the country, and so great and disinterested were his zeal and devotion as an officer, that he lost almost the whole of his immense possessions in endeavoring to remove the public property committed to his charge and that of the commanding officers. I cannot commend his conduct as an officer too highly to the Government nor his patriotism as a citizen too warmly to the love and respect of his countrymen.

To Captains Rives, St. John, Clarke, and Dimmock, of the engineers, and their able assistants, the country is greatly indebted for the formidable works which enabled me to meet and repulse with a very small force the attack of an army of over 100,000 well-drilled men, commanded by the best officers in the service of the enemy. The steadiness and heroism of the officers and men of the artillery of the Peninsula, both heavy and light, were very conspicuous during the attack on April 5 and throughout the siege which followed.

The high state of efficiency of this arm of the service was mainly due to Col. George W. Randolph, chief of artillery, on my staff, who applied to its organization, discipline, and preparation for the field the resources of his great genius and experience. To this intrepid officer and distinguished citizen the country is indebted for the most valuable

services from the battle of Bethel, where his artillery principally contributed to the success of the day, to the period when he was removed from my command by promotion. He was ably assisted by Lieutenant-Colonels Cabell and Brown, of the same corps.

The medical officers deserve the highest commendation for the skill and devotion with which they performed their duty in this sickly country.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. BANKHEAD MAGRUDER,
Major-General.

General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General C. S. Army.

RICHMOND, VA., *September 2, 1862.*

SIR: It having been this moment suggested to me that the paragraphs in my report of the operations in the Peninsula in relation to the sufferings of our troops might be construed into a charge of neglect on the part of the Commissary Department, I think it proper to state that my only object was to do justice to the heroic fortitude under great and, I think, unavoidable privations.

To avoid all misunderstanding I will add that my statements on this subject apply particularly to the troops on the line of trenches across the Peninsula between Yorktown and Mulberry Island, on James River.

Previous to the arrival of General Johnston I had given orders that these two points should be amply provisioned, with a view to a siege of these places, and hence they were intended to be supplied for a longer period than the depots on which the intermediate troops depended.

It is proper to state, also, that the means of transportation on York and James Rivers, known to me to be scanty, were mainly employed in sending down re-enforcements, ordnance, and ordnance stores, which were absolutely necessary, and as these re-enforcements came without wagons and without cooking utensils, the burden of furnishing transportation to this large force was thrown on the limited means of my own command, and of necessity restricted the troops to the supply of meat and breadstuffs alone.

I deem it just to these departments to make this statement as an addendum to my report.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. BANKHEAD MAGRUDER,
Major-General, Commanding, &c.

General S. COOPER, *Adjutant and Inspector General.*

No. 59.

Report of Col. H. C. Cabell, First Virginia Artillery, Chief of Artillery.

MAY 10, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the artillery under my command from April 5 until the evacuation of the Peninsula:

Our line of defense consisted of the fortifications at Yorktown; the

redoubts (Nos. 4 and 5) near Yorktown; the line of the headwaters of Warwick River, and the Warwick River itself. The narrow peninsula formed by the junction of the Warwick and James Rivers was abandoned up to a point about 5 miles from the mouth of the Warwick River, and at this point (called Minor's farm) a series of redoubts, extending from the right bank of this river nearly to Mulberry Island Fort, were constructed to check any assault of the enemy upon our right flank coming up by the way of Land's End. The Warwick River had also obstructions placed in it to prevent the approach of the enemy's gunboats up this river, and we were further protected by our gunboat Teazer, which was placed near the mouth of the Warwick. From the topography of the ground it was absolutely necessary to occupy the whole of this line in the then condition of our forces. Our forces were so few in numbers that it was essential to the safety of the command that the whole should be defended, as the breaking of our lines at any point would necessarily have been attended by the most disastrous results; the center broken or our flanks turned, compelling a precipitate retreat to Yorktown or Mulberry Island, to stand a siege of the enemy's land force, assisted by the whole naval force, with but little prospect of relief or re-enforcements when the enemy occupied the intermediate country. The left bank of the York River was protected by the fortifications at Gloucester Point. The force of infantry was very small; the cavalry consisted of one and a half regiments; the artillery force was very large. Heavy guns were mounted at Gloucester Point, at Yorktown, at Redoubt No. 4, and at Mulberry Island.

From deserters, prisoners, and other sources we were convinced that the enemy was advancing in very large force. He had been collecting his troops and munitions of war for several weeks, and it was certain that he would commence his march with a vastly superior force. Our advanced regiments retired before the enemy, according to orders, and took their positions upon and in rear of the Warwick River line, in perfect order. Re-enforcements had been promised us from Richmond, and the determination of the commanding general to defend the position against assault met the cordial approval and co-operation of the Army of the Peninsula. Three roads led up from the Peninsula and crossed the line of our defenses. The first on our right was the Warwick road, that crossed at Lee's Mill; the second crossed at Wynn's Mill, and the third was commanded by the redoubts (Nos. 4 and 5) near Yorktown. The crossing at Lee's Mill was naturally strong, and fortifications had been erected there and at Wynn's Mill. Below Lee's Mill the Warwick River, affected by the tides and invested by swamps on each side, formed a tolerable protection; but the marshes could easily be made passable and the river bridged. Between Lee's and Wynn's Mills an unbroken forest extended on the right bank of the stream to a distance of about 3 miles. Two additional dams were constructed—the one (Dam No. 1) nearest to Wynn's Mill and the other Dam No. 2. A dam, called the "upper dam," was constructed in the stream above Wynn's Mill. This detailed description of the line of defense seems necessary to explain the positions of the artillery of the Peninsula. The whole force of artillery was placed in position. Captain Young's battery and a portion of Major Roemer's battery occupied Minor's farm. A 12-pounder, of Captain Cosnahan's, and a Parrott piece of Captain Sands', under the command of Lieutenant Ritter, were placed in the extreme right redoubt at Lee's Mill, the battery under the charge of Captain Cosnahan. Captain Sands' three pieces, and Captains Garrett's and Read's batteries, each consisting of three pieces,

occupied the remaining positions at Lee's Mill. One gun of Captain Nelson's battery, under the command of Lieutenant Nelson, was placed at Dam No. 1. Captain Macon's battery (the Fayette Artillery), six pieces; the Donaldsonville Battery, six pieces, Captain Maurin; three pieces of the howitzers (Captain Hudnall), and a portion of Captain Southall's battery were stationed at Wynn's Mill. A piece of Captain Hudnall's and a piece of Captain Southall's artillery were placed at the "upper dam." Captains Smith's, Armistead's, Richardson's, and Page's, and the remaining pieces of Captains Nelson's and Southall's batteries, occupied positions at Redoubts Nos. 4 and 5, the curtain connecting these redoubts, Yorktown, and the intermediate positions.

The enemy came up and opened fire on the morning of April 5. From that time until our evacuation of the Peninsula the firing was continued with slight intermissions.

I have been thus particular in noticing the batteries in position on April 5, because I think it due that all who first stood the advance of the enemy, in force at least seven times greater than ours and confident in superior numbers, should have a place in this report. It is a tribute due to their courage, firmness, and patriotic purpose to defend our position to the last, no matter in what superior numbers he should come. The defense was gallantly and most successfully made, and our pieces, all along the line from Minor's farm to Yorktown, were fired at the enemy. My duties called me along the whole line, and I can bear willing testimony to the bravery of the infantry and cavalry, all of whom were acting as skirmishers along the line. Wherever the enemy appeared—and they appeared all along the line—our muskets and artillery opened upon them. The enemy, after a few days, seemed to change their purpose of breaking our lines by assault, and commenced to erect batteries in front of our lines. They seemed determined to forego the gallant charge, and went to the spade and their rifled guns, under the cover of intrenchments, to dislodge us from our position. No other course could have afforded a more ennobling tribute to our small force or a more damaging slur upon the boastful arrogance of the enemy.

On April 16 General McClellan laid aside "his ill-timed prudence" and ventured an assault at Dam No. 1, one of the weakest positions on our line. It was of great danger and of commensurate importance to us. A small clearing in the woods had been made on our side, opening upon a large field upon the other. The cleared space permitted us to employ but few guns at this point. The enemy had erected three batteries, and opened upon us with a converging fire of sixteen guns. A 24-pounder howitzer, of Captain Nelson's battery, occupied the front and most exposed position immediately at Dam No. 1. Two pieces of the Troup Artillery (Captain Stanley) occupied positions at the right and left redoubts, about 200 yards to the rear, upon rising ground. The enemy made an assault in force upon this position and attempted to cross.

I refer to the reports of Captain Stanley and Jordan for a detailed account of their conduct in the fight. The charge was signally repulsed by our infantry. Our artillery did all that could be done in sustaining our infantry force and dispersing the enemy.

It gives me great pleasure to bear tribute to the alacrity with which Captains Page and Palmer hurried up to this position when sent for by me. It was a critical point in the engagement, but by the daring assaults of our infantry the enemy were quickly dispersed before their guns could be brought up. After this signal repulse no further assault

was made on our lines, but the fire of the enemy was incessant from artillery and musketry.

During this time our artillery had to be changed frequently at Dam No. 1. This position was occupied by four pieces of Captain Rosser's battery, Captain Richardson's battery, a section of Captain Palmer's howitzers, and a section of Captain Page's battery at the redoubt to the right of Dam No. 1. The positions of the artillery had also to be shifted at other points. All these movements were made at night necessarily.

I am much indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Brown for his disposition of the batteries of the left flank. His report will give a more detailed account of these batteries, as my supervision over them ceased upon the arrival of General Pendleton, chief of artillery on General Johnston's staff, and was confined necessarily to the command of Major-General Magruder. Up to that time I witnessed the courage and skill they displayed.

Captain Stanard's battery arrived and was placed in position below Lee's Mill on April 6. Captain Kemper's battery arrived a few days after and was also put in position.

From April 5 to — many of our batteries were not once relieved. Until reserves came relief was impossible; yet officers and men exhibited as much perseverance and ability to bear exposure and labor without murmur as they did courage in resisting the enemy. Our defenses, which were as strong as could be made by the limited force at your command, were necessarily extremely imperfect, and much work had to be done after the enemy was upon us; but our men held their positions while our works were being perfected and until a sufficient force arrived to make us secure.

The God of Battles, that ever sides with a just cause, and a wise disposition of forces and courage, and discipline of an army, has insured us one of the most gallant defenses, against apparently overwhelming numbers, that history gives any record of.

The fidelity and promptness with which my orderlies, William O. Duke, of the Richmond Fayette Artillery, and ———, of the Charles City Troop, conveyed my orders deserve attention.

I cannot close this report without calling attention to the batteries of light and heavy artillery in the several garrisons of Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and Mulberry Island.

The very small force constituting the Army of the Peninsula on April 5 required the withdrawal of the whole infantry and cavalry force from Gloucester Point to near the line of defense between the York and James Rivers. The heavy artillery was thus left without any support for several days, and most nobly and efficiently did they maintain their position.

When the line of defense was constructed Mulberry Island was thrown out of the line of defense several miles to stand, if necessary, a siege. Captains Garrett's and Young's batteries were withdrawn to this fort thus isolated.

The efficiency and skill of the cannoners at Yorktown were attested during the whole defense. The firing was continued until 2 o'clock at night the night of the evacuation, by which time many of our troops had arrived at Williamsburg. The skill and efficiency of our cannoners were not only attested by my own observation, but by the accounts that have been published in the Northern papers. I ascribe their superior efficiency to the entire calmness and cool courage of our cannoners and their superior intelligence. They have had but little

opportunity for practicing, though they have been taught the principles and science of firing. Their entire self-possession, united with courage, intelligence, and patriotic zeal, enabled them to practice the best rule for firing, "Fire with deliberate promptitude," and insured their success.

I beg particularly to call attention to the efficiency of Lieut. William B. Jones, who acted most efficiently as my adjutant during the greater portion of the defense, and of my adjutant, Richard M. Venable, who relieved him from duty to enable Lieutenant Jones to return to his company, all the other officers having become incapacitated from service by arduous and constant exposure at the batteries.

I deeply regret to have to state that one of these officers, Lieutenant Shield, a gallant and chivalrous spirit, who had distinguished himself in action, has since died.

Very respectfully,

H. C. CABELL,

Colonel First Regiment Artillery and Chief of Artillery.

Maj. Gen. J. B. MAGRUDER.

No. 60.

Report of Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, C. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill).

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, RIGHT FLANK,

Lee's Farm, Va., April 30, 1862.

On the 16th instant, between 2 and 3 p. m., my attention was attracted by an increase in the intensity of fire which had been heard during the morning from the direction of Dam No. 1. Thinking that perhaps a real attack was intended at that point, I ordered forward the Tenth Louisiana, Fifteenth Virginia, and four companies of the Seventeenth Mississippi, and rode toward the dam, ordering up, on my way, the Fifteenth Alabama also to act as reserves to Dam No. 2, and directed my whole command, artillery, infantry, and dragoons, to be under arms and ready to obey any order at once. I then joined General Cobb.

The firing at this time, from both cannon and small-arms, was very heavy and constant, convincing me that the attack was intended as a real one, and I became exceedingly anxious for the reserves to come forward, for General Kershaw's brigade, of the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth South Carolina, was in position some $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles on my right down the Peninsula, and should the line be broken at this point of attack by a large body of the enemy that position would be a critical one, and Lee's Mill would have to be abandoned unless a considerable force of our troops was on hand to oppose them.

I heard from General Cobb that General G. T. Anderson's brigade had been ordered to his support by General Magruder, and sent off by Lieutenant Stanard, who offered his services to bring it forward, and sent others to hasten those regiments I had previously ordered up.

A body of the enemy succeeded in crossing the pond below the dam and were in our lower rifle pits.

Colonel McKinney, of the Fifteenth North Carolina, was killed while gallantly leading his regiment to repulse them. His death and the sudden dash of the enemy created some confusion, which was, however,

promptly corrected by General Cobb, who, riding in among the men, they recognized his voice and his person, and promptly retook their positions. Colonel Anderson's brigade at this time came forward most opportunely, and the Seventh Georgia, Col. W. T. Wilson, followed by the Eighth, Colonel Lamar, charging the enemy with the bayonet, and assisted by the Fifth Louisiana and others, drove them back across the pond, killing a large number.

A few minutes after this one of the artillery pieces was reported as disabled, and I ordered up a section of Captain Palmer's battery, which was in reserve on Lee's farm, and Capt. Thomas Jefferson Page, of the Magruder Light Artillery, being near me, offered his battery, and I directed him to bring it.

Soon after this the regiments I had ordered forward came rapidly up. The Tenth Louisiana, Colonel [Mandeville de] Marigny, was ordered to the main point of attack, and the others halted within a few hundred yards. Captains Page's and Palmer's batteries came dashing forward in full speed, and I felt my position secure. The firing ceased as night came on, and the assault was not renewed.

I refer you to the reports of General Cobb, and of Colonels Levy, Bryan, T. R. R. Cobb, Lamar, and Wilson, and of Captain Stanley, of the Troup Artillery (Cobb's Legion), accompanying this, for further particulars and for their notice of individual merit.

In the death of Colonel McKinney the service has lost one who was pure in all his thoughts and just in all his acts; a brave and skillful officer, who, in his death, as in his life, reflected honor upon both his native and his adopted State, and illustrated the Christian gentleman.

Majs. James M. Goggin, adjutant and inspector general; A. H. McLaws, quartermaster; Captain McIntosh, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Tucker, aide-de-camp, were with me and were of signal service.

Very respectfully,

L. McLAWS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. A. G. DICKINSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 61.

Report of Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, C. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, Second Division, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill).

HDQRS. 2D BRIG., 2D DIV., ARMY OF THE PENINSULA,
April 22, 1862.

GENERAL: I submit the following report of the engagement of the 16th instant between the troops under my command and a portion of the enemy's forces:

The enemy commenced a cannonade upon our position at Dam No. 1, occupied by the Second Louisiana Regiment, about 8 o'clock in the morning, which was continued during the morning and until 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Up to the last-named hour they displayed only two pieces of artillery, and at that hour the number increased to six.

Under a heavy fire from their artillery the enemy made a bold movement to cross the stream at 3.30 o'clock at a point just below Dam No.

1, at the position occupied by the Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment. This movement was undertaken by a brigade of the enemy, though only three of their companies succeeded in crossing the stream. My troops were soon thrown into line of battle in the following order, commencing with the Second Louisiana Regiment, on the extreme left, at Dam No. 1, the Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment, Sixteenth and Eleventh Georgia Regiments, and Cobb's Legion, on my extreme right, who were posted as they arrived, and arrived in the order of their distance from the scene of action. The Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment occupied the position of the main attack, and was promptly led by its lamented colonel to the charge against the enemy.

Colonel McKinney was in the front and center of his regiment, bravely leading it, when he fell mortally wounded and instantly died. The service could not have lost a truer man or braver soldier. The fall of Colonel McKinney and an unauthorized order, from some source unknown to me, caused the regiment to fall back, and for a moment the entire line on the right up to the position occupied by the Georgia Legion was thrown into confusion. It was, however, momentary. The men were soon rallied, and in less than five minutes the entire line was restored, and through the remainder of the engagement officers and men acted with coolness and courage.

At this time, by order of General G. T. Anderson, of Georgia, the Seventh and Eighth Georgia Regiments, being a portion of the brigade under his command, were brought into the action, and rendered efficient service. The gallant charge of the Seventh Georgia Regiment deserves the special notice given in the accompanying report of Colonel Levy, who was in immediate command at Dam No. 1, and to whose coolness and courage we are indebted in no small measure for the successful movements of the extreme left of my command.

You had at an early hour of the engagement ordered up four companies of the Seventeenth Mississippi Regiment and the Tenth Louisiana Regiment as a re-enforcement. By your direction I caused the Tenth Louisiana Regiment, under the fire of the enemy, to take position in the rear and in supporting distance of the Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment. The movement was made by Colonel Marigny with great coolness, who put his men in position at double-quick.

During the engagement, which lasted about three hours, the enemy were twice successfully repulsed, and finally driven across the stream and beyond the range of our fire in great confusion and with severe loss.

Our casualties I have already reported to you. From the best information I can obtain the loss of the enemy could not have been less than 200 killed, besides the wounded and prisoners.

It is proper to remark that we had but three guns in position at Dam No. 1, viz: One 12-pounder howitzer, Captain Jordan's battery, at the work near the dam, and one 12-pounder howitzer and one 6-pounder of the Troup Artillery (Captain Stanley), of Cobb's Legion. The howitzer of Captain Jordan's battery was disabled during the action, and the howitzer of the Troup Artillery could not be used without danger to our infantry at the lower works; consequently the 6-pounder piece of the Troup Artillery, was compelled to maintain almost alone the unequal contest with the enemy's artillery during the hottest portion of the engagement. This was done with a spirit and courage creditable to the officers and men.

Your presence on the field will enable you to bear evidence to the

gallantry and courage both of our officers and men during the engagement.

For details I refer you to the accompanying reports of the officers in command of the different regiments engaged. At my request the report of Colonel Levy is not limited to his own regiment, as he was charged with the general defense of Dam No. 1.

Among the casualties I must mention the fact that Capt. James Barrow, of my staff, was severely wounded while delivering one of my orders.

It is due to Captain Barrow, as well as the other members of my staff, Maj. Robert Thomas, Capts. John A. Cobb and William Gwin, to say that they were prompt, cool, and efficient in the discharge of their duties during the engagement.

HOWELL COBB,
Brigadier-General.

General LAFAYETTE McLAWS,
Commanding Division.

No. 62.

Report of Capt. M. Stanley, commanding Troup Artillery, Cobb's (Georgia) Legion, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill).

—, —, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report as follows in reference to the part taken by the battery under my command (Troup Artillery) in the engagement of the 16th instant at Dam No. 1:

I had but two of my pieces in position at that point—a 6-pounder bronze field piece, under Lieutenant Pope, and a 12-pounder army howitzer, under Lieutenant Lumpkin. The former was on the right, in an earthwork of but little strength, and the latter in an earthwork somewhat stronger, on the left. Both works are unfortunately placed, being in too low a position to command the field on the opposite side of the dam. Besides my own pieces one other was there, a 24-pounder iron howitzer, belonging to Captain Jordan's battery, placed behind a work just at the dam and in a position to command scarcely more than the dam itself. Our horses, in charge of their drivers, were placed in a bottom to the right and rear of our position. One 12-pounder howitzer took no part in the engagement, because the direction of the enemy was such that it could not be fired without endangering the lives of our own men in the intrenchments at the dam. In front of the dam on the opposite side from us is a broad field, in which the ground rises gradually from the water's edge to the crest of a hill 600 or 700 yards distant, and then slopes less gradually to the woods beyond. This conformation gave the enemy an admirable position in which to place his artillery, and it indicates how unfortunate for us is the position of our works and of the dam itself.

At about 9 a. m. on the 16th instant the enemy brought up under cover of the hill a battery of six pieces, and placed them just beyond the crest, so as to fire and yet to be to a large extent protected. Judging from the balls thrown, of which a large number have been gathered up, the most of their guns were rifled. There were, however, some 12-pounder round shell and shot, indicating a smooth bore. Against this formidable array the only piece which could be used with any

effect, or without endangering the lives of our men near the dam, was the smooth-bore 6-pounder, under Lieutenant Pope. For several hours did this piece maintain the unequal conflict. Captain Jordan's piece fired a few rounds, but from its disadvantageous position could not command the enemy's position, and therefore exhibited sound judgment in not prolonging its fire.

A little before noon there was a mutual cessation of the fire. Soon after dinner the conflict was renewed. An attempt was made by the enemy's infantry to carry our rifle pits, by fording the stream in the woods some distance below the dam, and during this assault the fire of their artillery upon our works was terrific. The whole atmosphere was filled with the exploding shell and shrapnel. As before, the piece under Lieutenant Pope replied steadily and effectively, and not until the cannoners were exhausted did the firing on our side cease. It was near night when the conflict closed.

Though several of my men were struck with fragments of shells and spent Minie balls, and though our works were repeatedly penetrated by the enemy's shot, not one behind the works was seriously injured. One of our drivers, W. P. Meeler, a brave and faithful young man, who was with the horses, had his right leg shot off below the knee by a cannon-ball. Seven of our horses were killed in the fight, five of them by Minie balls in the engagement of the infantry.

That the casualties among my men were so few I ascribe to the merciful providence of Almighty God. The men, with hardly an exception, exhibited great coolness and courage.

Although the howitzer detachment took no active part in the conflict their position was exposed to a very fierce fire.

I mention with special commendation Lieut. A. F. Pope, Gunner J. F. Dillard, and Private J. C. Strickland.

The following also are worthy of particular notice: Sergt. R. K. Pridgeon and Privates A. C. Sorrell and George B. Atkinson.

In conclusion I would suggest that our position at Dam No. 1 is very inferior to that of the enemy, and that in view of his powerful and numerous artillery special attention be given to that point.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. STANLEY,

Captain, Commanding Troup Artillery, Georgia Legion.

Col. T. R. R. COBB, *Commanding Georgia Legion.*

No. 63.

Report of Col. Goode Bryan, Sixteenth Georgia Infantry, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill).

BIVOUAC, SALLIE TWIGGS' SIXTEENTH GEORGIA REGT.,

April 19, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 16th, under orders from headquarters Second Brigade, Company D, Captain Montgomery, of this regiment, was sent to the rifle pits of the Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment, to act as sharpshooters and protect a working party of that regiment.

About 3.30 o'clock, heavy firing being heard in that direction, the Sixteenth Georgia Regiment advanced and took position in the trenches

on the right of the battery opposite Dam No. 1, at which point a considerable force of the enemy had crossed and occupied our rifle pits. They were soon driven back across the ——— by the Fifteenth North Carolina, Seventh Georgia, and a portion of the Sixteenth Georgia Regiments, stationed near the dam. A heavy fire was kept up by the Seventh North Carolina and Sixteenth Georgia Regiments until dark, at which time the enemy retired.

I cannot close this report without an expression of great gratification at the coolness and gallantry displayed by both officers and men of my command during the engagement, and particular mention should be made of Captain Montgomery, of Company D. Being driven from the rifle pits, with only three of his men (the others being deployed as skirmishers), he gave warning to the Fifteenth North Carolina of the advance of the enemy, and, joining that regiment with the few men of his company that could be collected, charged with command and drove the enemy from the pits.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

GOODE BRYAN,
Colonel Sixteenth Georgia Regiment.

Capt. JOHN A. COBB,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 64.

Report of Col. William M. Levy, Second Louisiana Infantry, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill).

CAMP OF SECOND LOUISIANA VOLUNTEER REGIMENT,
Dam No. 1, Va., April 18, 1862.

SIR: On the 16th instant, at about 8 a. m., the enemy appeared in considerable force in the woods and rear portion of Garrow's field, opposite the position occupied by the Second Louisiana Regiment. In a few minutes two pieces of artillery were put in position and opened a fire of shell upon us. This was briskly replied to by the 6-pounder field piece of the Troup Artillery, belonging to Colonel Cobb's (Georgia) Legion, and by a few shots from the 12-pounder howitzer, Captain Jordan's battery.

During the morning and up to about 3 o'clock sharp artillery firing was kept up on both sides, and the infantry was engaged in skirmishing at pretty long range. A little after 3 o'clock the enemy brought up more artillery and displayed six pieces (two rifled Parrott's) and opened a furious cannonade, which they kept up, with scarcely the slightest intermission, for three hours. While throwing their shells upon us a bold rush was made across the river or creek by a considerable body of the enemy's infantry, who suddenly dashed through the water and, under cover of the woods, reached the rifle pits in front of the position of the Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment. This regiment, with the exception of its picket, was at work intrenching its camp, and while leading his men to charge the enemy Colonel McKinney fell and died instantly, gallantly pressing forward at the head of his command. This unfortunate death of Colonel McKinney threw the Fifteenth into momentary confusion, and the enemy was then at the rifle pits and about to cross them.

At this time Companies B (Capt. A. H. Martin) and D (Capt. R. E. Burke), of the Second Louisiana Regiment, under the direction of Major Norwood, of that regiment, threw themselves from their position at the redoubt and curtain on the crest of the hill and attacked the enemy along the left of the rifle pits, while the Seventh Georgia vigorously attacked them along the rest of the line, and the Eighth Georgia came up on the right of the Seventh Georgia. Companies I (Captain Flournoy) and K (Captain Kelso), Second Louisiana Regiment, stationed at the lower redoubt, near Dam No. 1, opened fire upon the enemy from their position at the redoubt. The rapid and vigorous attack of our troops at once checked the enemy, and in a few minutes they precipitately retreated, recrossed the creek, and sought shelter, from the havoc which pursued them, under cover of their field pieces. Shortly afterward the movements of the enemy showed that with a large force they intended to renew their effort to break our lines, and with a largely-increased force they again attempted to cross, but were speedily repulsed, retreating in disorder.

I have no means of ascertaining the number of killed and wounded on the part of the enemy; but from the bodies left on this side and the removal from the field on the other side of bodies I am satisfied that it must have amounted to at least 200.

I cannot refrain from mentioning that, as falling under my immediate observation, while the conduct of all our troops was most satisfactory, the Seventh Georgia Regiment, the section of the Tronp Artillery (Captain Stanley), and the companies of the Second Louisiana Regiment which I have enumerated, manifested the most praiseworthy alacrity and intrepidity.

After this second decisive repulse the enemy retired their infantry from the field, and, night coming on, the combat ceased, leaving us in full possession of our position, from which we had not moved, except to drive back and pursue the enemy, and in the enjoyment of the pleasing knowledge that we had repulsed a foe largely exceeding us in numbers.

I have the honor to remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. M. LEVY,

Colonel, Comdg. Second Louisiana Regiment and Dam No. 1.

Capt. JAMES BAUM, *Assistant Adjutant-General of Brigade.*

No. 65.

Report of Lieut. Col. Ross R. Thrie, Fifteenth North Carolina Infantry, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill).

HDQRS. FIFTEENTH REGIMENT NORTH CAROLINA VOLS.,

Near Lee's Farm, Va., April 19, 1862.

I hereby transmit a report of the action of the Fifteenth North Carolina Volunteers in the engagement of the 16th instant near Dam No. 1, on Warwick Creek:

On the morning of the 16th cannonading along the line toward Wynn's Mill, and also some of the enemy's guns being brought to bear upon our batteries at Dam No. 1, and as the day progressed other indications of an attack by the enemy upon our line induced Colonel [Robert

M.] McKinney to call the regiment into line on the Military road running in front of where the regiment was lying.

About 10 a. m., calling in a working party of 100 men, and keeping the regiment in this state of readiness for two hours or more, he ordered the arms stacked, and had the whole regiment detailed for work upon a heavy intrenchment which he had been ordered to have erected in front of the encampment, and about 200 yards in the rear of the rifle pits skirting the water thrown back by Dam No. 2, making arrangements for carrying on the work the whole of the ensuing night. Our pickets were in front of the rifle pits, close along the water's edge. From the best information I have at the point the enemy charged the depth of the water was about 4 feet and its width from 150 to 200 yards, and covered with heavy timber and thick undergrowth.

About 3 p. m., the regiment being engaged upon the works alluded to, the pickets gave the alarm that the enemy were charging rapidly across the water and making to our rifle pits. The regiment was immediately thrown in line of battle, and, being ordered by Colonel McKinney, advanced at a double-quick and with a yell upon the enemy, who had taken partial shelter behind the earth thrown from our pits before the regiment could reach them, and opened a terrible fire upon us as we advanced. Their fire was returned with promptness and with deadly effect upon the enemy. Volley after volley in rapid succession immediately followed from both sides, amid which Colonel McKinney gallantly fell in the early part of the engagement, shot through the forehead. He fell near the center of the line, and his death was not known to either officers or men for some time after it occurred, and a deadly fire was kept up by both sides until about 5 p. m.

Not knowing the strength of the enemy at the commencement of the engagement, Colonel McKinney dispatched an orderly to Brigadier-General Cobb for re-enforcements, and after having been engaged about two hours in close conflict, the enemy having given away on our right, the Seventh Georgia Regiment, under Colonel Wilson, came to our assistance, and at this moment the enemy gave way in precipitate retreat, and did not again rally at any point on our line. The regiment had about 500 men engaged.

I have no means of definitely ascertaining the force of the enemy, but it must have been superior to ours. Prisoners report that they belonged to the Third Vermont Regiment, commanded by Colonel Hyde. We captured 8 of them. The number of killed of the enemy in front of where the regiment was engaged has been ascertained to be 30; how many fell in the water is not known.

I regret that I cannot under present circumstances make a more detailed report of the engagement and its incidents.

Too much cannot be said in commendation of the gallant bearing of both officers and men under a terrific fire of musketry for the space of two hours, and the fate of the gallant dead calls the living to other deeds of daring for their country's cause.

It is with peculiarly deep feelings of regret that I report the death of Col. Robert M. McKinney, a conscientious, brave, just, and skillful officer, and a Christian gentleman.*

Your obedient servant,

R. R. IHRIE,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. HOWELL COBB,
Commanding Second Brigade, Second Division.

* Nominal list of casualties shows 12 killed and 31 wounded.

APRIL 11, 1862.—Confederate Naval Operations in Hampton Roads, Va.*Report of Capt. James F. Milligan, C. S. Army.*

NORFOLK, VA., April 11, 1862.

Our fleet captured the following prizes to-day between Newport News and Old Point, viz: Brig Marcus, of Stockton, no cargo; brig Salboa, of Providence, deck loaded with hay, balance of cargo not known; the schooner Catherine T. Dix, of Accomac, no cargo; 11 prisoners taken on board said vessels. The Monitor, if at Old Point at all, did not make her appearance. At 5 p. m. the fleet returned to the anchorage above Craney Island. The enemy's fleet, over 100 sail, are all below the Rip Raps.

JAMES F. MILLIGAN,
Captain and Signal Officer.

General S. COOPER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

MAY 4, 1862.—Skirmishes near Williamsburg, Va.

REPORTS.

- No. 1.—Brig. Gen. George Stoneman, U. S. Army, Chief of Cavalry.
- No. 2.—Maj. William R. Palmer, U. S. Topographical Engineers.
- No. 3.—Brig. Gen. Philip St. George Cooke, U. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Division.
- No. 4.—Lieut. Col. William N. Grier, First U. S. Cavalry.
- No. 5.—Col. Henry J. Hunt, U. S. Army, commanding Artillery Reserve.
- No. 6.—Capt. Horatio G. Gibson, Third U. S. Artillery.
- No. 7.—Brig. Gen. William H. Emory, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Cavalry Reserve.
- No. 8.—Col. William W. Averell, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, of operations around Williamsburg May 4-6.
- No. 9.—Maj. Lawrence Williams, Sixth U. S. Cavalry.
- No. 10.—Capt. William P. Sanders, Sixth U. S. Cavalry.
- No. 11.—Capt. J. Irvin Gregg, Sixth U. S. Cavalry.
- No. 12.—Capt. William P. Chambliss, Fifth U. S. Cavalry.
- No. 13.—Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, C. S. Army, commanding division.
- No. 14.—Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Brigade.
- No. 15.—Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.

No. 1.

Reports of Brig. Gen. George Stoneman, U. S. Army, Chief of Cavalry.

HDQRS. ADVANCE GUARD ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 18, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit, in accordance with instructions, a report of what was done on the 4th and 5th of May, 1862, by the forces under my command, consisting of Hays' brigade, four batteries of flying artillery, the First and Sixth Regulars, Third Pennsyl-

vania and Eighth Illinois Regiments, and Barker's squadron of cavalry, the whole composing the advance guard of the Army of the Potomac. My instructions were to pursue and harass the rear of the retreating enemy, and if possible to cut off his rear guard, or that portion of it which had taken the Lee's Mill and Yorktown road. In harassing the enemy I was to be supported by Hooker's division, which was to follow us by a forced march along the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, and in cutting off the rear guard I was to co-operate with the division of General Smith, which was to march on the other, or Lee's Mill, road. Six miles from Yorktown we came upon the enemy's pickets. Two miles farther we came up with the rear of his rear guard, consisting of a regiment of cavalry, with a deep ravine and bad crossing between us and him. From this position he was driven by Gibson's battery. Here I sent General Emory, with Benson's battery and the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry and Barker's squadron, across to the Lee's Mill road to cut off any force on that road and between Emory's and Smith's column, advancing as was supposed along that road, and with the remainder I pushed on as fast as safety would permit to occupy the junction of the road from Yorktown with that of Lee's Mill, 2 miles from Williamsburg.

Here I will state that previous to sending Emory across I had communicated with the advance guard of Smith's column, and had heard, through one of my aides, that Hooker was close behind us with supporting divisions. General Cooke, commanding the advance, consisting of a section of Gibson's battery and a portion of the First Cavalry, upon debouching from the woods found himself at the junction of the two roads and in front of a strong earthwork flanked by redoubts, and in the presence of a strong rear guard of the enemy, consisting of a regiment of cavalry, a battery of artillery, and three regiments of infantry. General Cooke immediately made dispositions to attack the enemy with the small force at his disposal, and I hurried up the remainder of the First Cavalry and Gibson's battery. Owing to the limited space of cleared ground in which we could possibly operate with cavalry or artillery, I was unable to bring into action more than one battery and about 300 cavalry. The remainder of the force I directed formed in a clearing half a mile to our rear to cover our retreat, which I saw must necessarily soon be made unless the infantry support, 2 miles behind at last accounts, should come to our assistance.

After great exertion, rendered necessary by deep mud and thick abatis, Captain Gibson got his battery to play upon the enemy, and Colonel Grier put his regiment in position to support it. In the meantime the enemy, strongly re-enforced from his main body, had thrown himself behind the abandoned earthwork, and several regiments of infantry were seen marching in a direction indicating their intention to turn our right and cut us off. I directed Major Williams, with a portion of the Sixth Cavalry, to make a demonstration through the woods on our right, with the view of holding the enemy in check until the arrival of our infantry support, which I had sent Governor Sprague back to hurry up. The firing from Fort Magruder in front of the First Cavalry and Gibson's battery was producing great effect upon both men and horses; the Sixth Cavalry had come upon a strong force of infantry and cavalry, and was secured from disaster by a gallant charge made by the rear squadron, commanded by Captain Sanders, during the withdrawal of the regiment. The First Cavalry had made two brilliant charges, and horses and men were falling at their guns. The enemy was receiving re-enforcements every minute. After holding our

position for near three-quarters of an hour Governor Sprague came up and reported that Hooker's division was in the road behind Smith's division and could not get past, but had been stopped by order of General Smith. Under all these circumstances I deemed it worse than useless to try to hold our position at the junction of the roads in front of a strong earthwork and overwhelming force, and therefore gave directions to withdraw and take up a defensive position, which we had determined to try and hold at all hazards. General Hooker and staff soon after arrived, but his division was 2 miles behind, and the road before him crowded with troops.

I now return to General Emory. He, in accordance with my instructions, had crossed over from the Yorktown to the Lee's Mill road, and had cut off a battery supported by a regiment of Stuart's cavalry, encountered and drove them off toward the James River, where they were fired upon by their own gunboats, mistaking them for our troops. Smith's division not arriving, as was expected, having crossed over onto the Yorktown road, General Emory sent to ask for an infantry support, which I requested General Hooker to send him, and which he endeavored to do, but was unable to accomplish until early the next morning.

It will be seen that Hooker's and Smith's divisions changed places and how it came that the fighting was not ended the first day, for had Hooker not been delayed we could have taken possession of the empty earthworks before the enemy could have reoccupied them, and Stuart's cavalry have been cut off and captured by Emory and Smith.

After having made the best disposition of which the nature of the ground and the character of the force under my command would allow we awaited the arrival of re-enforcements, expecting every minute an attack from the enemy in front and on our right (and which, had he known our weakness, he would most certainly have made), until the arrival of the three army corps commanders, to the senior of whom I reported the condition of affairs and awaited further action.

The conduct of all during the affair was such as almost to forbid individualizing, but I feel it a duty to mention in particular the conduct of Captain Gibson and the officers and men of his battery, Lieutenant-Colonel Grier, Captain Davis and his company, Captain Sanders and his squadron, Generals Cooke and Emory, and Major Williams.

Colonel Burges was severely wounded while receiving a message which he was upon the point of carrying to the rear.

During the 5th my command was split up into fragments by the commanders, and I remained an idle spectator until the arrival of the general commanding.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE STONEMAN,

Brigadier-General, Chief of Cavalry.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ADVANCE GUARD ARMY POTOMAC,

June 4, 1862.

SIR: In my report of the engagement with the enemy had by my command on the 4th of May I neglected to mention the important services which were performed by Col. W. R. Palmer, of the Corps of Topographical Engineers. I regret the omission the more, inasmuch

as he was assigned to duty with my command by my very particular request. During the day Colonel Palmer led the reconnoitering party with great skill and vigor, and during the engagement was with the foremost and regardless of danger. I ask that this letter may go and be considered as part of my official report of the affair of the 4th of May before Williamsburg, Va., and am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE STONEMAN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Advance Guard.

General S. WILLIAMS, *Adjutant-General.*

No. 2.

Report of Maj. William R. Palmer, U. S. Topographical Engineers.

WILLIAMSBURG, VA., May 7, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that in obedience to your instructions I reported on Sunday morning at 9 a. m. to General Stoneman, who commanded our advance of cavalry in pursuit of the retreating rebels. General Stoneman directed me to take Captain Magruder's squadron, First U. S. Cavalry, as an advance guard. I pushed ahead with this squadron, being usually half a mile in advance of the command. When some 7 or 8 miles on our way we encountered the rebel pickets, who fired upon us. Their fire was instantly returned by Magruder's squadron, Captain Savage's squadron, Sixth U. S. Cavalry, acting as flankers. General Cooke soon arrived, and ordering up three light pieces, a few shells were thrown among them, upon which they quickly retreated. Advancing about 2 miles farther, we were retarded about fifteen minutes in a similar manner. We continued to advance, moving on cautiously through the woods, and on reaching the open plain at once discovered several rebel batteries some 800 to 900 yards in front of us. I was able without the aid of my glass to observe one brigade of infantry, at least one regiment of cavalry, and some 300 artillery. The infantry fired volleys at us. The batteries opened instantly from six to eight guns with shell. General Cooke quickly came to the front and ordered up a section (three guns) of Captain Gibson's battery, Third U. S. Artillery, under Lieutenant Fuller, who handled his guns admirably. Very soon after the remaining three pieces, Captain Gibson commanding, commenced their fire. We had but these six light pieces to use against the great odds the rebels had opposed to us. Portions of the First and Sixth U. S. Cavalry gallantly charged close up to the rebel works, and again to save our pieces from being taken. Fortunately the rebels at first fired too high, but very soon they got our range, and threw their shells directly in our midst. General Stoneman, accompanied by his staff, also the Count de Paris, Duc de Chartres, who volunteered to accompany the advance, came very soon to the front, where they found General Cooke and aides, and the artillery officers, Captains Magruder and Savage, and myself. An order was given that we should withdraw from this exposed position for a time. We retired some 200 yards (no infantry being at hand to support us) under cover of the woods.

During thirty or forty minutes we were exposed to the shells and musketry of some 4,500 rebels, we lost, as nearly as I can ascertain, 12

men killed, 32 wounded, including three officers, Colonel Burges, of General Sprague's staff, being one of them; also 42 horses killed.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. R. PALMER,

Maj., Top. Engrs., Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. Army.

Brig. Gen. A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Chief Top. Engr., Army of the Potomac, Williamsburg, Va.

No. 3.

Report of Brig. Gen. Philip St. George Cooke, U. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Williamsburg, Va., May 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make for the general commanding-in-chief a report of the action of the advance guard of the army, or that portion of it under my immediate command, at the forts in front of Williamsburg, on the 4th May instant:

The regiments of the division present were but two—Sixth Cavalry, First Brigade, and First Cavalry, Second Brigade. Of Lieutenant-Colonel Hays' four batteries of horse artillery, but one, Captain Gibson's, was placed under my command. Having passed Yorktown about 2 miles, you, who I understood were combining the advance on two roads, gave me a general instruction to push on to the junction of these roads near Williamsburg, attacking the enemy at discretion. About 2 miles below Williamsburg my advance guard and flankers encountered a rear guard of the enemy, about two companies, at a defile of a mill and dam and a breastwork across the road. I ordered up a section of artillery, with which Lieutenant Fuller handsomely opened fire at less than 300 yards under a fire of musketry. After a few rounds I ordered the advance guard, Captain Savage's squadron, Sixth Cavalry, to advance and charge, but the enemy had retreated, leaving two military wagons in flames and also a spiked howitzer. During the affair General Emory, who joined me in front, had been ordered by you, as I afterwards learned, with Major Barker's squadron, of my command, to the other road.

On reaching with the head of my column the strip of swampy woods, the central battle-field of the next day, I received a report from Savage's right flank platoon that beyond and to the right there were field works. Halting the column, I sent Lieutenant Martin, acting assistant adjutant-general, to penetrate the woods and assure himself if they were abandoned. Soon after Colonel Palmer, Topographical Engineers, who was with the support of the advance guard, Captain Magruder's squadron First Cavalry, reported that there was an occupied work in front, which he thought the enemy could be driven from by a section of the battery. I moved on. On arriving at the farther edge of the woods, by the narrow muddy road, the enemy and his extensive works were in view. Lieutenant Martin had, however, just returned, and reported the works to the right to be unoccupied, and although there was a considerable force of the three arms in front, I assumed that it was only a rear guard of a few regiments or a legion; that I might by boldness push on, especially as I received a report that there was another forest road which

turned their left flank, and sent an order to Major Williams, commanding Sixth Cavalry (four large squadrons with him), to take that road and attack the enemy's left flank.

Fuller's section of Gibson's battery was now ordered to open fire at the outlet of the road. The enemy warmly returned the fire from a battery in a redoubt perhaps a thousand yards to the left front. It becoming serious and the enemy showing more forces, I had to advance to ground where both cavalry and artillery could act freely, and ordered the whole battery to be formed in the open space in front, and placed Lieutenant-Colonel Grier, First Cavalry, with three small squadrons in close column in a slight hollow which I observed near its right flank. The enemy, now constantly reoccupying the works more to our right front, opened a new battery from a fort about 400 yards distant. Their cross-fire of shell and shrapnel became destructive, killing and wounding many horses and a number of officers and men, he having the advantage of a well-ascertained range. Having been in his presence thus about three-quarters of an hour, and not perceiving any effect from Williams' column, I sent Captain Merritt, aide-de-camp, to report the state of affairs, and to ask if you had orders to give. He returned with an order to retire. You undertook, at his request, to send an order to Williams to withdraw. The battery then retired by piece, and Colonel Grier was ordered to cover it. From the loss of horses and the boggy ground four caissons had to be left. To one piece Captain Gibson attached ten horses, but so impracticable was the ground that they were unable to move it, and it became imperatively necessary, under the advance of a very superior force of the enemy and information that a force was sent to cut off our retreat, to abandon it.

Colonel Grier then retired with his last squadron at a walk, which also assisted off the wounded, and so it was charged in the narrow road by a superior force of the enemy's cavalry. Captain Davis, its commander, wheeling about by fours, met and with the greatest gallantry repulsed them. The charge was repeated, and this brave squadron, Baker its second captain, again drove them, capturing a regimental standard and taking a captain prisoner. Colonel Grier highly praises these brave men, but omits to report that he was with them in personal combat with two enemies, one of whom he wounded; that he lost his horse, and was slightly wounded himself.

Major Williams' column of four squadrons Sixth Cavalry, taking the road designated, passed the forest and a bad ravine and reached the enemy's works, but by that time he found himself in front of superior forces of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, and very properly ordered platoons about and retreated. In passing the ravine the rear squadron suffered severely from the fire of the enemy's cavalry. It followed them over and was handsomely charged and driven back by this squadron, under their gallant commanders, Captain Sanders and Captain Hays, and their brave subalterns, Lieutenants McLellan and Madden, and suffered severely in its turn in passing the ravine. Sergeant [John F.] Durboran, of Company M, is reported by Captain Sanders as having killed two rebels, captured and brought in their horses and arms.

My command having regained the open ground, dispositions were made by you, in connection with Hays' batteries, to receive the further attacks of the enemy, who were reported to you as marching to surround us.

Lieutenant Kerin, of Savage's flankers, also himself took a rebel captain prisoner. Five privates were made prisoners during the advance previous to the action.

Lieutenant-Colonel Grier's and Captain Gibson's reports are herewith inclosed. Major Williams' (now absent with his regiment) will be forwarded as soon as it can be obtained.

The total loss inflicted on the enemy, known to be considerable, under the circumstances could not be ascertained with any precision.

I have to report the loss of 35 killed and wounded and missing, including Lieutenants McLellan, D'Wolf, and Benton, all severely wounded. Names and other details given in reports of commanders. About the same number of horses were killed and wounded, of which 22 were in the battery. Captain Gibson praises highly all his officers. The captain and the whole company, which was under my eye, appeared cool, brave, and devoted.

It is with the greatest pleasure that I can report that my command generally gave me high satisfaction.

Of my staff Lieut. James P. Martin, acting assistant adjutant-general, Capt. W. Merritt and Lieut. Frank Beach, aides-de-camp, I must say that they did all and more than their duty with such calm bravery and judgment that I feel much pride in their association.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE STONEMAN,
Chief of Cavalry, Headquarters Army of the Potomac.

No. 4.

Report of Lieut. Col. William N. Grier, First U. S. Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST REGIMENT CAVALRY,
Camp at Williamsburg, Va., May 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part borne by the First Regiment U. S. Cavalry during the action between the advance guard of the army and the enemy near Williamsburg, Va., on the 4th instant:

Agreeably to orders received from Brig. Gen. P. St. G. Cooke I formed my regiment in close column in a small ravine to the right and a little in advance of the artillery, and about 430 yards in front of the enemy's fortifications. The nature of the ground was such as to enable it to charge at any moment in line or in column upon any cavalry or infantry the enemy might send against the battery. While holding this position the regiment was constantly subjected to a fire of shells and spherical case, which was kept up during the withdrawal of the force, which was ordered to retire, the cavalry in rear to cover the artillery. When the last squadron, composed of Companies I and K, Captains Davis and Baker, was at the entrance of the woods, the whole battery had retired, with the exception of one piece and four caissons, which were disabled by the loss of their horses. After waiting till ten horses had been hitched to the piece without being able to drag it out of the mud the horses were unhitched and the squadron retired at a walk. The squadron was again delayed in the woods, assisting our wounded to the rear, and finally was charged by a large body of the enemy's cavalry. Captain Davis, commanding the squadron, composed of 60 men, wheeled it about by fours, there being room for no larger

front, and charged the enemy, repulsing them handsomely and driving them back in confusion, protecting the battery and the wounded. In this charge a regimental standard, with the coat of arms of Virginia, was captured and a captain taken prisoner. The squadron was again charged by the enemy, who were again repulsed, and retired to the other side of the woods, where they remained. While waiting at the entrance of the woods the enemy's fire was particularly severe. Several of the enemy were killed and wounded—number not known.

Very respectfully,

WM. N. GRIER,

Lieutenant-Colonel, First Cavalry, Commanding Regiment.

Lieut. J. P. MARTIN,

Acting Asst. Adj. Gen., Hdqrs. Cavalry Reserve.

No. 5.

Report of Col. Henry J. Hunt, U. S. Army, commanding Artillery Reserve

HDQRS. ARTILLERY RESERVE, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Roper's Meeting-House, Va., May 11, 1862.

Immediately after sending my last report, dated the 4th instant, I received orders to send Hays' brigade of horse artillery, consisting of Gibson's, Benson's, Robertson's, and Tidball's batteries, to report to General Stoneman and accompany the cavalry in pursuit of the enemy in his retreat from Yorktown. The brigade moved accordingly, and was engaged, portions of it, at various points on the road and at the battles fought on the 4th and 5th instant near Williamsburg. The reports* of Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, commanding the brigade, and of Captains Gibson and Benson, commanding batteries, are inclosed herewith. From these it appears that Lieutenant D'Wolf, Third U. S. Artillery, and 4 men of Gibson's battery and 1 of Tidball's men were wounded severely and Captain Gibson lost 17 horses killed and 5 wounded.

Captain Gibson was engaged under the concentrated fire of eight pieces of artillery and a cross-fire at short distance of large bodies of infantry. He maintained his position without any infantry support for an hour and was then ordered by General Cooke to withdraw. Such was the nature of the ground that one piece and four caissons sunk in the mud. Twenty minutes were spent in unavailing efforts to move them; but the loss of horses and the manner in which the carriages were bogged rendered all his efforts unavailing, and he was reluctantly compelled to abandon them. Three of the caissons were afterwards recovered. The loss was due to the mud; the piece was abandoned, not captured. The conduct of officers and men is represented as admirable.

Captain Gibson speaks in high terms of Lieutenants Fuller, Pendleton, Meinell, and D'Wolf, Third U. S. Artillery; the latter had his horse killed under him and is very dangerously wounded. He also specially notices the gallant conduct of Sergt. G. A. Niforth, of his battery (C, Third U. S. Artillery), and of Private John Thompson, who captured a guidon from the enemy, and was sabered by some of our own men in the *mêlée*, receiving four wounds.

* Reports of Hays and Benson not found.

Captain Benson had his horse killed under him. He mentions in terms of commendation Lieutenant Barlow, Second U. S. Artillery.

Asst. Surg. J. S. Smith, U. S. Army, was very active in the discharge of his duties and under the hottest fire.

The reserve left Yorktown on the 9th and reached camp at Roper's Church to-day, where it was rejoined by Gibson's, Tidball's, and Benson's batteries. Robertson's is still with the advanced corps of observation under General Stoneman.

The siege guns and material were hauled by the teams of the reserve batteries from the trenches to the landing at Yorktown.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY J. HUNT,
Colonel, Commanding Artillery Reserve.

Brig. Gen. W. F. BARRY.

No. 6.

Report of Capt. Horatio G. Gibson, Third U. S. Artillery.

LIGHT COMPANY C, THIRD ARTILLERY,
Camp at Williamsburg, Va., May 6, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the operations of my battery in the engagement with the enemy near this place on the 4th instant:

Soon after passing Yorktown I received orders to detach a section under Lieut. W. D. Fuller to the front. A few miles in advance some of the enemy fired upon the head of our column, and Lieutenant Fuller at once came into action, and drove them from their cover just as I arrived with the rest of the battery on the ground with orders from General Stoneman to report to General Cooke and remain with him. The march was resumed, and on entering the woods near our last camp the whole battery was again ordered forward.

On arriving at the head of our column I found Lieutenant Fuller already engaged with the enemy, firing from the road on the skirt of the timber. By direction of General Cooke I ordered the section to be moved forward on the right of the road, and also brought the other sections into battery in the field on the left. I discovered a large body of the enemy (artillery, cavalry, and infantry) moving from the enemy's work in front to another on our right. I at once opened a rapid and steady fire upon them, and continued it so long as they were in sight and with considerable effect, and then directed the fire of the guns on both works. The enemy returned it rapidly and with serious effect, disabling the battery at nearly every shot. The line of the woods around us formed a crescent, partially inclosing the field in which the battery was posted. The ground was very miry and boggy, particularly on the edge of the timber, where my caissons were placed, in charge of Lieutenant D'Wolf, and the wheels sunk into the mud nearly to their axles. In this hazardous position, with a cross-fire of the enemy upon me, with no infantry support, I kept my guns in play for nearly an hour, and until I had expended about 250 rounds of ammunition.

Orders were then given by General Cooke to withdraw the battery, which was commenced by Lieutenant Fuller on the right, and followed by me with the other sections on the left. I succeeded in getting them all into the timber, except the last, which, having lost two of the horses, sunk in a boggy hole near the road. I sent Lieutenant Meinell to over-

take the battery and bring teams to haul it out, and also the caissons mired down and disabled in horses; but this officer, being dismounted (his horse wounded), was unable to do so as quickly as it was necessary to save them. After occupying nearly twenty minutes in fruitless efforts, with ten horses attached, to extricate the piece, by the repeated advice of Lieutenant Colonel Grier and Captain Davis (as the rebel cavalry was close upon us) and the fire of all the enemy's guns concentrated upon us), I abandoned it with reluctance and retired with Captain Davis' squadron. At the same time Lieutenant Pendleton, seeing the helpless condition of the caissons, and that they could not be saved until the piece which obstructed the road was removed, ordered the drivers to retire with their teams.

I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of my officers and men. Under a hot and incessant fire from the enemy, shot and shell flying thick and fast around them, they stood gallantly to their posts without flinching. Lieutenant Fuller served his pieces bravely and handsomely, and Lieut. E. Pendleton and H. Meinell, chiefs of sections, and Lieut. William D'Wolf, chief of the line of caissons, more immediately under my eye, were cool, gallant and efficient in the discharge of their important duties. The latter, while remaining manfully at his exposed and inactive post under a severe fire, was dangerously wounded in two places, and as he was leaving the field had his horse killed under him.

Though almost all of my men behaved more than creditably, especially the non-commissioned officers, yet I am unable to speak of any one in particular except Sergt. G. A. Niforth, whose gallant exertions to bring off his piece at no ordinary risk I deem worthy of especial notice.

After I left the First Cavalry in the woods I learn that they were charged by a regiment of the enemy's cavalry, whom they repulsed and charged upon in handsome style. Private John Thompson, Company G, Third Artillery, of my battery, reports that in the *mêlée* he took a standard from one of the enemy, but was sabered by one of our own men and compelled to give it up.

My loss in the action was 1 officer and 4 men wounded, 1 slightly. I also lost 17 horses killed, 6 at one fire in a caisson, and 5 wounded. I abandoned one piece, three caissons, and one caisson body, of which I have since recovered all except the piece and caisson.

The enemy, I am informed, lost from the effects of my fire 6 killed and 7 wounded and quite a number of horses. I should judge that the fire of at least eight guns was concentrated upon my battery—two large ship carronades and two rifled guns.

I am deeply sensible of the misfortune that I met with in the loss of my piece and caisson, but all those on the spot will bear witness that I made every effort to prevent it, and that I remained by them until I was obliged to give up all hope of saving them. I am much indebted to Capt. B. F. Davis and his squadron of the First Cavalry for their support and assistance under a severe fire concentrated upon them, and only regret that it was unavailing.

I forgot to mention that Lieut. J. W. Upham, Ninth New York Cavalry, attached to the battery, was left in rear in charge of the battery wagon and forge.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. G. GIBSON,

Captain Third Artillery, Commanding Battery.

First Lieut. J. P. MARTIN, *Seventh U. S. Infantry, A. A. A. G.*

No. 7.

Report of Brig. Gen. William H. Emory, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Cavalry Reserve.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, CAVALRY RESERVE,
Williamsburg, Va., May 6, 1862.

SIR : At the moment of arriving under fire with my own brigade on the 4th instant I received orders from General Stoneman directing me to take Benson's battery, Averell's cavalry, and Barker's Illinois cavalry (one squadron) and occupy the road to the left and communicate with General Smith's pickets. Following a wood road, and when we were about striking the great highway leading from Yorktown to Williamsburg on a narrow road skirted on both sides by dense thicket and ponds, the enemy's cavalry in column of fours charged on the advance guard, which was for a moment thrown into confusion. The promptness of Captain Benson, who immediately unlimbered and fired, put the enemy to the right-about. Colonel Averell's cavalry was then brought to the front, a squadron dismounted as skirmishers on each flank, who routed the enemy's dismounted skirmishers, and the advance was impeded but for a few moments. The enemy was driven so closely that he was compelled to retire toward Lee's Mill, near Yorktown. He formed in line of battle in an open field where the roads fork, leading by the banks of the James River. The artillery being then opened on him his ranks were broken. After one or two ineffectual attempts to reform he fled toward James River. I sent repeated requests for a regiment of infantry to guard the battery while I pursued across the country, where artillery could not follow, but none reached me until next morning.

The capture of two infantry prisoners and the information communicated by General Stoneman led me to believe an infantry force was intercepted and still between us and the Yorktown lines. My orders being to communicate to the rear with the pickets of General Smith's column I remained in that position all night and sent to the rear, but found no pickets to communicate with, General Smith's column having taken another road—that on the York River side.

At 10 o'clock at night General Hooker, with one brigade, passed to my rear on the main road to Williamsburg. As I was about marching at 5 o'clock next morning I received an express from General Hooker saying the enemy was in force 2 miles in front, and asking for my battery. I immediately marched with my whole force to his support, leaving Major Barker, with his squadron, to guard the rear and left, having previously ascertained very nearly to my satisfaction that the enemy's force (like my own, composed entirely of cavalry and artillery) had retreated by a road leading along the beach of the James River under cover of a gunboat, and it afterward was reported to me that this gunboat, mistaking their own cavalry for ours, shelled it. Unless their artillery was put on board the steamer it must have been abandoned, and will be found in our rear, as we had certain information that the cavalry passed by the road to our left and that the artillery did not. I remained supporting General Hooker, sending out parties to reconnoiter the enemy's right and to occupy the ground between our left and the James River, until 1 o'clock, when General Heintzelman came up, who sent me with my command, cavalry and artillery, to guard an attack on the left and rear from the direction of the Williamsburg road

leading through Allen's plantation. We held this road, without infantry to support us and nothing between us and the enemy's works in front. During the day two squadrons of Colonel Averell's cavalry were sent to the rear to repress disorders of a serious character. This was done thoroughly and with good effect. Subsequently General Heintzelman sent me four regiments of infantry to turn the enemy's right, but that was found impracticable from the nature of the locality, the lateness of the evening, and the want of a guide.

On our side in the skirmish of the 4th instant there were 2 killed and 4 wounded of the Illinois Cavalry. On the enemy's side the loss in killed and wounded is not known, the fight having taken place in a dense woods. We found, however, one of their men killed in the action and saw on the road evidences of many wounded. During the 4th and 5th instant the command captured 70 prisoners, including 2 captains and 1 lieutenant.

I have to notice with satisfaction my aides, Lieutenants Audenried and Wade, for their untiring activity and gallantry, the nature of their duties taking them from the right to the left of the entire line. I also think it due to Captain Benson to state that in carrying an order for General Hooker he had a horse shot under him.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. EMORY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Lieutenant MARTIN,

Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Division Cavalry Reserve.

No. 8.

Report of Col. William W. Averell, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, of operations around Williamsburg May 4-6.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, VOLUNTEER CAVALRY,
Camp Williamsburg, Va., May 8, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command and my observations during the 4th, 5th, and 6th instant:

At 8 o'clock a. m. on the morning of the 4th I received a note from you, informing me that the enemy had evacuated Yorktown and was in full retreat, and directing me to get my command in readiness to move at a moment's warning. Half an hour after I received an order from General Stoneman, chief of cavalry, to report to him, which I did, after ascertaining that the order had been given by the general commanding the army. My regiment passed through Yorktown about 12 m., finding the First and Sixth U. S. Cavalry, with three or four batteries, in front of it. As no order of march had been received by me, I fell into the column the first opportunity.

Upon arriving at a point on the road somewhat in advance of the church, 4 or 5 miles from Yorktown, Brigadier-General Emory came to me with an order from General Stoneman to report to him (General Emory) for the purpose of making a reconnaissance toward the James River on our left. Being joined by Benson's battery, the command of General Emory, composed of my regiment and Benson's battery, was put in motion on a cross road to the left, by the church above men-

tioned. After proceeding half a mile Major Barker, of the McClellan Dragoons, was met with a squadron and some prisoners which he had taken. He informed us that the enemy were forming in front cavalry, infantry, and artillery. He was put in front of the column by General Emory's order, then followed a squadron of my regiment, a section of Benson's battery, then four squadrons cavalry, then the rest of the battery and the remainder of the cavalry. After proceeding a few yards, and before the column was entirely in motion, the head of the column was attacked impetuously by the enemy. Major Barker's squadron was thrown in disorder to the rear past my squadron, which drew out to the right of road in order to form, and upon the section of Benson's battery in front. Captain Benson opened with canister when the enemy had arrived within 30 yards. My leading squadron formed and dismounted to fight on the right, and another squadron of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry moved rapidly through the thicket to the left, and threw its skirmishers forward. The enemy disappeared with a loss of 4 men and 2 horses killed. He was subsequently driven from another position which he assumed, a mile in rear of the first, and we bivouacked for the night in the rain, which began to fall about 8 p. m.

General Hooker, with a brigade, passed us early in the morning, and soon after General Emory's command, increased by General Patterson's brigade, was *en route*. The sound of heavy firing was shortly after heard in front, and a message was received from General Hooker stating that he desired us to hurry forward and re-enforce him. The roads were almost impassable, but the command found itself in range of the enemy's guns about 9 a. m. Leaving my regiment under cover, I proceeded to the front, where I discovered General Hooker in position, with one battery in front of the enemy's works, one brigade of infantry being scattered about in the fallen timber to the right, left, and rear of the battery. General Grover's brigade had just arrived on the field, followed by Patterson's. General Hooker a few minutes after my arrival discovered a brigade of the enemy advancing beyond his extreme left, and did me the honor to intrust me with placing Grover's brigade in position to meet their attack. Upon my suggestion General Grover, with the greatest promptitude, moved his brigade by the left flank until he had cleared the fallen timber and then toward the front, his right resting upon the great abatis. A few moments more and the steadiness of his fire, which begot a reluctance on the part of the enemy to advance any farther, showed that the right man was in the right place.

General Hooker's immediate left was secure, but what with the enemy and the elements, the want of rest and food, his division had yet a terrible task to perform, but alone, unaided, for several hours he maintained a vigorous attack. Though his weakened lines sometimes wavered, still through the mud and rain his shivering troops faced the desperate foe. During the day my regiment was engaged in pushing close reconnaissances up to the enemy's right, in order to give timely warning of any attempt of his to turn our extreme left. In these operations some 40 or 50 prisoners were taken. From these we learned that General Longstreet commanded the Confederate forces opposed to us, from 30,000 to 50,000 strong; that among his subordinate generals were Magruder, Wilcox, McLaws, Hill, Stuart, and Pickett; that they intended to beat us before our re-enforcements could come up, and that re-enforcements arrived to them as late as 5 p. m. They had not the slightest intention, so far as any prisoner knew, of retreating from their position. One company of Third Pennsylvania Cavalry penetrated as

far as the right redoubt of the enemy's lines, past which a road from our extreme left ran to his rear.

At about 2 p. m., by direction of the general commanding, my regiment was placed in position on our extreme left with Benson's battery. Four regiments of infantry passed our position toward the enemy's right about 4 p. m., but owing to the lateness of the hour, want of knowledge of the road, or some other cause, turned too far to the right and lost the way, or at least did not get upon the enemy's flank.

On the morning of the 7th [6th] my regiment was early *en route* in pursuit of the retreating rebels. With two squadrons of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry and two of the Eighth Illinois I proceeded on the road to New Kent some 4 miles, recovering five pieces of artillery that the enemy abandoned in his hasty flight, and capturing 21 prisoners.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. W. AVERELL,

Colonel Third Pennsylvania Cavalry.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 9.

Report of Maj. Lawrence Williams, Sixth U. S. Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CAVALRY,
Camp in the Field, May 31, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report regarding the operations of the Sixth Cavalry at the battle of Williamsburg:

The Sixth Cavalry was a portion of the cavalry reserve, and formed a part of the advance guard under General Stoneman. We met the enemy on the 4th instant about 3 o'clock p. m. before his fortifications just in front of Williamsburg. Our pickets had been engaged for some time, and some pretty brisk firing on the part of the forts and Gibson's battery, when I was ordered to make a detour through the woods and take a battery on the enemy's extreme left flank. I accordingly proceeded with the Sixth Cavalry through the wood indicated, and after going about half a mile at a trot debouched upon an open but undulating ground in front of the enemy's line of fortifications. The ground was very heavy, and between the woods and the field works (pointed out by the sergeant who acted as my guide) there was a deep ravine, only passable by file. This ravine was about equidistant from the woods and the work. It was passed, and the regiment formed about 100 yards from the fortification. Lieutenant Madden, with a platoon, was sent to reconnoiter its gorge. This was during the time its occupants were engaged with Gibson's battery in front. Lieutenant Madden reported that the ditch and rampart would have to be surmounted before we could effect an entrance, and also that infantry was approaching on the rear side of a woods which skirted the back of the fort.

I saw three regiments advancing in line. Our position was very critical, equally exposed to the guns from the fort and the advancing infantry. I determined to retire. Four of the squadrons and a portion of the Fifth had already passed the ravine mentioned above when two squadrons of rebel cavalry rushed from the barracks in rear of the fort

and endeavored to cut off Captain Sanders' company, then in the ravine. Captain Sanders wheeled his company about, charged and repelled the enemy with great gallantry. I cannot speak too highly of both officers and men on this occasion. Though every one felt that few would survive if the guns of the fort were turned upon us while advancing to its rear, not one showed the slightest concern. Captain Sanders showed great prudence and bravery in the timely manner in which he met the enemy, though taken at a disadvantage and by superior numbers. I regret exceedingly to report that Lieutenant McLellan was wounded by a shell in the leg while engaged with the enemy. His gallant bearing was observed by all, and he is a great loss to the regiment. I inclose Captain Sanders' report and that of Captain Hays, which will give an account of the casualties.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LAWRENCE WILLIAMS,
Major Sixth Cavalry, Commanding.

Lieut. JAMES P. MARTIN,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Cavalry Division.

[Indorsement No. 1.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
June 2, 1862.

The brigadier-general commanding directs me to return this report with the following indorsement:

1. The report is addressed to no one. Major Williams will supply the omission and give his reason for this neglect.

2. If the Sixth Cavalry was a part of an "advance guard," which is very inaccurate, it is unnecessary and very unusual to inform his commander, to whom alone he was responsible, who this commander was; and its leaves obscure what is usually expressed—from whom he received the order for the flank movement.

3. It is not a fact that he received an order to "take a battery on the enemy's right flank" or left flank either. He was ordered to attack the enemy's left flank. When the order was given "Gibson's battery" had not opened fire; a section only was up, and the enemy had shown but small force, and only two guns, and at long range, on their extreme "right."

By command of Brigadier-General Cooke:

JAS. P. MARTIN,
Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Indorsement No. 2.]

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CAVALRY,
Camp in the Field, June 3, 1862.

The mistake regarding the non-address of the communication is a clerical error. The improprieties referred to, if they are such, are the result of inexperience, and from the fact that on the day of the battle I was somewhat confused as to who was my immediate commander. Both Generals Cooke and Stoneman gave me orders. The statement regarding Gibson's battery, if incorrect, is a misapprehension on my part. It was what I was told. That regarding the order to take the battery on the enemy's extreme left may be or may not be correct in the opinion of the general commanding. I don't know from whom the order came. I only know that it was Lieutenant Beach, aide-de-camp

to General Cooke, that brought the order, and that his words were, as nearly as I can recollect, "The general wishes you to go through the woods and attack a battery on the enemy's extreme left." The battery to which we went was the only force the enemy had on his extreme left when we arrived. If I am wrong in this statement, it is very strange that my adjutant, who heard the order Lieutenant Beach communicated, should have received the same impression that I did, and also the sergeant that guided me to the battery. The report should read, "Battery on the enemy's extreme left" instead of "right flank."

LAWRENCE WILLIAMS,
Major Sixth Cavalry, Commanding.

[Indorsement No. 3.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
In the Field, June 4, 1862.

SIR: The brigadier-general commanding directs me to state that very little experience should have taught that your immediate commander was either General Stoneman or General Cooke, but he requests you to specify what order in the engagement of the 4th of May you received from General Stoneman. General S. undertook, at the request of Captain Merritt, to send you an order to retire, but your report shows you did not wait for it. The expression that your report, "regarding the order to take the battery on the enemy's extreme left may or may not be correct in the opinion of the commanding general" cannot be understood. Do you mean the alternative, that in his opinion it may be correct?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. P. MARTIN,
Lieutenant, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Maj. L. WILLIAMS,
Commanding Sixth Cavalry (through General Emory).

[Indorsement No. 4.]

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CAVALRY,
Camp in the Field, June 4, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date. When I made out my report of the operations of the Sixth Cavalry at the battle of Williamsburg I stated simply what occurred as far as was in my knowledge to state. It was simply what I believed to be a truthful statement of what occurred. I had no idea that it involved anything that would give rise to so much dissatisfaction. General Cooke pleased to contradict one of my statements. I simply say that the statement regarding the attack of the battery may or may not be correct; that is, I either got the order or I did not get the order. If I did not get the order, it is very strange that both my adjutant, the sergeant who guided me, and myself should have all received the same impression from its communication. The order received from General Stoneman was to retire with my regiment and form it on the field in front of the White House, afterward General Sumner's headquarters. I was performing this when Lieutenant Beach brought me the order to attack the battery on the enemy's extreme left, which I

suppose came from General Cooke, as it was communicated by his aide-de-camp.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
LAWRENCE WILLIAMS,
Major, Sixth Cavalry, Commanding.

Lieut. JAS. P. MARTIN,
Lieut. and Actg. Asst. Gen., Cavalry Division.

[Indorsement No. 5.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY RESERVE,
In the Field, June 6, 1862.

On the 4th day of May, 1862, in accordance with instructions from General Cooke, I directed Major Williams to "attack the enemy's left flank."

FRANK BEACH,
Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.

No. 10.

Report of Capt. William P. Sanders, Sixth U. S. Cavalry.

SIXTH CAVALRY CAMP, May 26, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the transactions of my squadron on the 4th of May, 1862, near Williamsburg, Va.:

When it became necessary for the regiment to retire from its position near Fort Magruder my squadron, Companies A and M, was in the rear. In order to get back we had to cross a long and narrow ravine, where we could only march by twos and by file, and afterward through a narrow wood road. Just before reaching the ravine the enemy's artillery commenced a fire of shell from the fort with a very accurate range. As my rear files got into the ravine I found that the rebel cavalry was following us, and immediately sent Lieutenant Madden to report this fact to the commanding officer. While in the worst part of the ravine the cavalry appeared on the edge and opened a destructive fire from carbines and pistols. I hurried across as fast as possible and formed platoons. The enemy followed across the ravine and up the hill. I wheeled about by platoons and charged, driving the enemy back into and across the ravine with considerable loss, equal to if not greater than ours. Not a man of the rebels was in sight mounted, or apparently alive, when I returned. I saw some 15 lying on the ground in the ravine.

Captain Hays, commanding Company M, was with me during the charge, and displayed coolness and great bravery. Lieutenant McLellan, Company A, though severely wounded by a shell while crossing the ravine, remained until after the charge. The men all acted bravely and turned at the command, after having been subjected to a very severe fire while retiring across the ravine, and charged gallantly. Sergeant Durboran, of Company M, First Sergeants [Joseph] Bould and [Michael] Cooney, of Companies A and M, and all the men, I think, deserving of praise.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. P. SANDERS,
Captain, Sixth Cavalry, Commanding Fifth Squadron.

No. 11.

Report of Capt. J. Irvin Gregg, Sixth U. S. Cavalry.

WILLIAMSBURG, May 5, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that when it became necessary to retire from the position in rear of Fort Magruder, when one-half the squadron under my command had crossed the swamp word was passed along the line that our rear was attacked. A portion of my squadron, under Lieutenants Paulding and Ward, seeing Captain Sanders' squadron engaged, wheeled about and joined in the *mêlée*. Sergeant [Andrew F.] Swan, of G company, and Sergeant [Emil] Swartz, of F company, are especially deserving of praise for their gallant bearing. Sergeant Swan and Private [Parker] Flansburg, of G company, were wounded and three horses missing.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. IRVIN GREGG,

Captain, Sixth U. S. Cavalry.

Maj. L. WILLIAMS,

Commanding Sixth Cavalry.

No. 12.

Report of Capt. William P. Chambliss, Fifth U. S. Cavalry.

HDQRS. 4TH SQUADRON, 5TH CAVALRY, SMITH'S DIVISION,
May 8, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to state that at an early hour on the morning of the 4th instant I received an order from the general commanding the division to move forward with my squadron across the dam at Garrow's Ford, to take the road to Williamsburg, continue on it as far as I could with safety, and to gain what information I could as to the movements of the enemy and the condition of his rear. In obedience to this order I crossed the dam as soon as it was repaired, having been delayed some time for this work to be done, and took the road branching to the left, in the rear of the enemy's abandoned works, and which the guide whom the general had sent me said was the road taken by the enemy. About a mile in advance I passed the infantry pickets of the division. Continuing on what I was informed was the direct road to Williamsburg, I found a great number of the enemy's tents still standing and other evidences of a hasty retreat.

About this time the guide said he wished to put me in possession of all the information he had as to the intentions of the retreating army. He stated that some heavy guns had been placed in position so as to command the road 2 or 3 miles ahead of where we then were, and that a strong force would be left in the vicinity of Williamsburg to dispute our passage at that point. Subsequent events have shown this information to have been well founded. It determined me at the time to be very cautious in my movements. On reaching a large, open field I discovered on the opposite side of it, with heavy timber in the rear, a picket of rebel cavalry. I halted for the purpose of sending a party to reconnoiter, when I saw what appeared to be a column of infantry posted in the woods; and information at the same time having been

conveyed to me that the cavalry was moving to the right, as if for the purpose of gaining my rear, I determined to fall back about a hundred yards, in order to gain a position to meet this movement of the enemy. I directed Lieutenant Elbert, with the second division of the squadron, to face the woods to the right, and repel any attack made from that direction.

The first division, under Lieutenant McLean, I had drawn up across the road, facing to the front. I then sent out a party of skirmishers to scour the woods on our right. Information of what had been seen was conveyed to the general commanding by Captain Currie, his assistant adjutant-general, who had been with me up to this point. After waiting a short time, and seeing no evidence of an attack, I again ordered the squadron forward. At the recent headquarters of General Magruder, situated on a commanding eminence, with an earthwork in front, I again discovered the pickets of the enemy, strongly posted in the work and in rear of the building. I halted the squadron and moved my skirmishers forward, but on their being fired upon with carbines or muskets, and not being able to return the fire with pistols, our only fire-arms, I recalled them. I then sent Lieutenant Elbert with a detachment to the left and one with a non-commissioned officer to the right, under cover of the woods, to gain, if possible, their rear without being seen, with directions to charge if they found the picket unsupported by a strong force; but the enemy discovered this movement and retreated. From this point I continued to move slowly but steadily forward, supported by the brigade of Brigadier-General Hancock, which had in the mean time come up, occasionally seeing a few of the enemy's cavalry, who invariably fled at our approach.

By direction of Brigadier-General Hancock, I sent a detachment, under Lieutenant McLean, to prevent, if possible, the destruction of a bridge over a stream to our left, but the bridge had been destroyed before he reached the place. He was fired upon by the enemy's pickets from the opposite side of the stream. I continued on this road to its intersection with the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, at which point I met the advance from the right wing of the army, and where I received an order from the general commanding the division to halt. The officers and men of my command executed with promptness and to my entire satisfaction all that I required of them during the day.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. P. CHAMBLISS,

Captain, Fifth Cavalry, Commanding Fourth Squadron.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,

Adj. Gen. Smith's Div., Hdqrs. Smith's Div., Camp Hancock, Va.

No. 13.

Report of Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, C. S. Army, commanding division.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION,

May 16, 1862.

SIR: About 3 p. m. on the 4th instant I received notice from the commanding general, General Johnston, that he led one of the brigades of my command (General Semmes) into the redoubts in front of Williamsburg, as the enemy were reported as advancing and in close proximity.

Before I had arrived on the ground the enemy had opened a rapid fire from a battery placed to the left of the York road several hundred yards before it joins the Warwick road from Grove Wharf.

Meeting the commander-in-chief, he directed me to turn back another brigade to the support of the First, and accordingly General Kershaw was directed to return with his command, the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eighth South Carolina. I also turned back Captain Manly's battery and sent for another.

Arriving on the ground, I ordered the occupation of the redoubts to the right, and placed a gun in each. This was done because I was unaware how far the enemy had succeeded in taking positions in front, and because, from my previous knowledge of the ground, I was aware that the right-hand redoubts commanded those below, including the main work, known as Fort Magruder. The redoubt commanding the road from King's Mill Wharf and other right-hand roads from Grove Wharf, placed near a point called Tutton's Neck, was also occupied.

The right flank and the non-commanding positions being occupied, I directed General Kershaw, with a portion of his command, to take position in the woods to the left of Fort Magruder with one regiment and five companies, and then ordered forward Captain Manly, with two pieces, to occupy Fort Magruder. Supporting his advance with the Fifth Louisiana (Colonel Hunt, of Semmes' brigade), the artillery went forward at full speed, led by Captain Read, my chief of artillery, followed by its support, and gained the works without opposition. I then galloped forward to the main work, our artillery responding rapidly and effectually to that of the enemy.

On arriving I saw a considerable body of cavalry immediately on our left and front of a redoubt, placed to command a road leading across the head of Saunders' Pond. At first they were supposed to be our own men, so close were they and so confident in their advance; but the mistake was soon discovered and our guns opened on them with shell. Our cavalry coming up, I directed Colonel Davis, commanding, to charge that of the enemy, which he did in gallant style, driving them back with but little loss to us. General Kershaw was then directed to advance from the line of woods and occupy the work in his front, which was promptly done. I then withdrew the Tenth Louisiana (Colonel Marigny) and sent it to occupy the extreme left redoubt, commanding the dam over Saunders' Pond.

My whole front, right, and left being now secured, I withdrew the Tenth Georgia from the main work and the Fifteenth Virginia from the next redoubt on the right, and directed them to deploy, the Tenth Georgia (Col. A. Cumming) leading along the York road, and ordered the cavalry to charge the enemy in that direction. For special reasons the charge was not made, and, the infantry going forward, the enemy retired down the York road, leaving one 6-pounder rifle gun and three caissons on the ground occupied by their battery.

Captain McCarthy, whose battery arrived a few minutes previous to this, sent forward horses from his pieces, and the gun and caissons of the enemy were brought to the main work.

To Captain Manly's battery, however, is due the credit of killing three horses attached to the caissons and pieces, and by the rapidity of his fire preventing the enemy from carrying them off.

The enemy made no further demonstrations against us, and by direction of the commanding general my command was relieved during the night by General Anderson's, and at once took up their line of march to the rear.

The enthusiasm of the troops was most gratifying, as it evidenced how anxious they were to meet the enemy, not to retire from him.

I beg leave to call attention to the promptness with which General Kershaw placed his men into the various positions he was directed to occupy and the readiness with which he seized on the advantages offered by the ground as he advanced to the front over, to him, an entirely new country. His command obeyed his orders with an alacrity and skill highly creditable to the gallant and obedient soldiers composing it.

Much credit is also due to General Semmes for the disposition of his troops made before my arrival, whereby the main work was saved to us without struggle.

To the cavalry, under Colonels Davis and Wickham and Major Butler, of Hampton's Legion, much praise must be given for their inspiring hand-to-hand encounter with the cavalry of the enemy. Their gallantry was rewarded at the time by the enthusiastic cheers of those who saw their charge.

Colonel Wickham, although wounded in the side with a sword thrust, continued on the field and in the saddle until it was evident no more duty was required of him against the enemy.

Owing to the march being resumed on the same night the troops were relieved from the works, and the cavalry being since absent from my vicinity, I have been unable to get a return of our losses or to form an estimate of those of the enemy. I believe, however, that our loss will not exceed 10 in killed, wounded, and missing. The cavalry took 6 or more prisoners, and one wounded man was found on a box of one of the caissons. The number of the enemy killed is not known, but is believed to be considerable.

Major Edwards, commissary of my command, was particularly active and exposed in carrying out my orders, and Major Goggin, inspecting officer; Major McLaws, quartermaster; Captain Read, chief of artillery; Captain McIntosh, assistant adjutant-general; Captains Atkinson and Henley, volunteer aides, and Lieut. H. L. P. King, aide-de-camp, were active and useful in placing troops in position and bringing them forward from the rear.

The commanding general was, however, upon the ground himself, and I acted under his guidance. The knowledge of his presence inspired of itself a feeling of confidence, and I believe gave an impulse to all our actions.

Very respectfully,

L. McLAWS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

To the ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Right Wing.*

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,

May 23, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded.

I rode upon the field merely to ascertain if any additional force would be required, and, although present, interfered in no manner with Brigadier-General McLaws' command. The whole action was directed by him.

J. E. JOHNSTON,

General.

No. 14.

Report of Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY BRIGADE,
Talleysville, Va., May 13, 1862.

MAJOR: On the 3d instant my command was intrusted with the duties of rear guard upon the withdrawal of our forces from the Peninsula, to take place that night.

Owing to the peculiar difficulties of the ground I established my line across the Peninsula along Skiff Creek, allowing our forces to pass through. It was after daylight before the rear of the infantry passed me. Lieutenant-Colonel Wickham, Fourth Virginia Cavalry, occupied the left, on the Telegraph road, from Yorktown to Williamsburg, with Colonel Goode, Third Virginia Cavalry, and a section of mountain howitzers. I held the center just at Blow's Mill, and posted Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, of the Jeff. Davis Legion, at Lee's Bridge, over Skiff Creek, which he effectually destroyed before the enemy reached it. (I had already disposed the First Virginia Cavalry, Col. Fitz. Lee, along the York River above.)

About noon the enemy advanced rapidly with a strong force of cavalry, artillery, and infantry along the Telegraph road. Their cavalry advance was checked by Lieutenant-Colonel Wickham, but they soon opened upon him a fire of artillery, which obliged him to retire. I received notice of this move of the enemy, but as there was evidence of advance in my immediate front, I was deterred from my first intention of crossing quickly to the enemy's rear with my right wing of cavalry. The country along that road was exceedingly unfavorable for cavalry operations. I had just sent a dispatch to the general, informing him of my position and the enemy's movement, when the courier returned to me with the information that the enemy was just above us on the road and came near capturing him. Convinced that it was a small scouting party, from the rapidity of its movement, I detached Colonel Goode, with 100 men, and started them in pursuit.

Colonel Goode came upon the enemy's cavalry in the woods at the intersection of a by-road leading from the Telegraph road into my road. A spirited conflict ensued, in which the enemy's cavalry, after repeated charges, were entirely routed, and betook themselves to the shelter of artillery and infantry, posted farther on, leaving 8 dead in the road, besides the many wounded and riderless horses following in their wake. Colonel Goode's gallant conduct and the bravery of his men deserve the highest praise. He captured the enemy's flag and withdrew, bringing every wounded man (four) in in a very orderly manner. I came up with the remainder of my force just at this juncture, and finding that the enemy had pushed forward their infantry to the road in my immediate front, and had a piece of artillery bearing upon my right flank from a concealed position in the woods, I sent the mountain howitzers across to take position, and turned across the field with my column, so as to return by the James River beach, the only route open. The mountain howitzers performed well, but the effect upon the enemy concealed in the woods could not be seen. The enemy's artillery had a fine target and kept up incessant firing, but without any damage whatever.

I arrived at Williamsburg, by the Beach road, too late for that portion of my brigade with me to share the honors of the signal success

of their comrades of the Fourth Virginia Cavalry (Lieutenant-Colonel Wickham) and the Wise Legion Cavalry of my command (Col. J. Lucius Davis), gallantly emulated by the cavalry of the Hampton Legion, under Major Butler.

I regret that, owing to the severe wound of Lieutenant-Colonel Wickham, and the absence of Colonel Davis on important detached service, I am unable to furnish details from their own reports, but it will suffice for the general's information that our cavalry drove the enemy from the open space near Fort Magruder, killing and capturing a number, obliging them, with the aid of the artillery, to abandon their artillery and take to the woods, our own loss being slight, except that in the wound inflicted upon Lieutenant-Colonel Wickham the country will be for a time deprived of the services of a brave and zealous soldier and a most gallant and meritorious officer. The command of this regiment devolved upon Maj. W. H. Payne (Colonel Robertson being detained by sickness in Richmond).

My volunteer aide, Capt. S. G. Staples, who joined me but a day or two before, participated in the charge with the Hampton Legion Cavalry.

Disinterested officers, spectators, speak in the most glowing terms of the conduct of that portion of my brigade, and all join in praise of the brilliant dash of the Hampton Legion Cavalry upon the enemy's cavalry in front of Fort Magruder.

During the day several couriers and vedettes were interrupted, and two of my best officers were captured, Capt. W. B. Newton (Fourth Virginia Cavalry), by mistaking the enemy for our own, and Conner (Jeff. Davis Legion), while detached from his company on picket.

I herewith inclose Colonel Goode's report, marked A.*

I take occasion to express my thanks to my staff for their efficient performance of all the duties devolving upon them, and the intelligent and prompt transmission of orders by my personal escort—to be more particularized in my report of the battle of the 5th, to follow. I will, however, mention the fearless daring and cool and determined courage always so conspicuous in Capt. W. D. Farley, attached as volunteer aide. He manages to get into every fight, and is always conspicuously gallant. He is a young man of rare modesty, merit, and worth, who can scarcely be replaced.

I have the honor to be, major, your most obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Cavalry.

Maj. THOMAS G. RHETT,

A. A. G., Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia.

No. 15.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., SECOND DIV., R. W. D. P.,

Camp near Chickahominy River, Va., May 17, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the part borne by Capt. B. C. Manly's battery, attached to my brigade, against the enemy on Sunday, the 4th instant, in front of Williamsburg.

* Not found.

When about entering Williamsburg at the head of my brigade at 1 p. m., an order was received from General Johnston to occupy Fort Magruder and the adjacent redoubts with my command, which was promptly done, Captain Clemons, assistant adjutant-general, conducting the troops to their respective positions, and I in the mean time reporting to General Johnston in the town, and rejoining the command before all the troops were in position.

The infantry and artillery being at a greater distance from the line of redoubts than the enemy, and having a plain of some hundreds of yards to traverse before reaching them, were much exposed to a rapid fire from his guns in position, not exceeding 600 yards in advance of Fort Magruder; nevertheless our loss was slight then or during the remainder of the afternoon.

One of Manly's guns ordered to the second redoubt on the right of Fort Magruder being unsupported, I requested Brigadier-General Kershaw, whose command was in my rear, to occupy that work with a portion of his infantry, which was immediately done.

Manly's guns were promptly got in position, and worked with spirit, intelligence, and effect, entirely silencing the enemy's fire in less than one hour.

One of the enemy's guns, three caissons, and parts of two others, well filled with ammunition, were by my direction brought in by Captain Clemons, assistant adjutant-general, using for the purpose the teams of the Richmond Howitzers.

At night my command was relieved by that of Brigadier-General Anderson, and in pursuance of orders retired through Williamsburg at 12 p. m.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

PAUL J. SEMMES,
Brigadier-General.

T. S. McINTOSH,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, R. W. D. P.,
Vaughan's, July 12, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to the circular order of the 10th instant, from the headquarters of the army, calling for reports of guns captured from the enemy in the recent battles before Richmond, I have the honor to state that no guns were captured by this brigade.

At Williamsburg, on the 4th day of May last, the troops of this brigade captured one 3-inch wrought-iron gun, three caissons and parts of two others, well filled with ammunition, no report of which has been heretofore made.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

PAUL J. SEMMES,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. T. S. McINTOSH,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

MAY 5, 1862.—Battle of Williamsburg, Va.**REPORTS, ETC.**

- No. 1.—Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac.
- No. 2.—Return of Casualties in the Union forces.
- No. 3.—Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, U. S. Army.
- No. 4.—Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, U. S. Army, commanding Third Corps.
- No. 5.—Lieut. Miles D. McAlester, U. S. Engineer Corps.
- No. 6.—Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division.
- No. 7.—Maj. Charles S. Wainwright, Chief of Artillery.
- No. 8.—Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.
- No. 9.—Col. Robert Cowdin, First Massachusetts Infantry.
- No. 10.—Col. William Blaisdell, Eleventh Massachusetts Infantry.
- No. 11.—Col. Gilman Marston, Second New Hampshire Infantry.
- No. 12.—Col. William F. Small, Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry.
- No. 13.—Maj. Casper M. Berry, Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry.
- No. 14.—Col. Nelson Taylor, Seventy-second New York Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.
- No. 15.—Col. William Dwight, jr., Seventieth New York Infantry.
- No. 16.—Maj. Thomas Holt, Seventieth New York Infantry.
- No. 17.—Lieut. Col. Israel Moses, Seventy-second New York Infantry.
- No. 18.—Col. William R. Brewster, Seventy-third New York Infantry.
- No. 19.—Lieut. Col. Charles H. Burtis, Seventy-fourth New York Infantry.
- No. 20.—Brig. Gen. Francis E. Patterson, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.
- No. 21.—Col. Samuel H. Starr, Fifth New Jersey Infantry.
- No. 22.—Maj. Francis Price, jr., Seventh New Jersey Infantry.
- No. 23.—Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division.
- No. 24.—Capt. James Thompson, Second U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery.
- No. 25.—Brig. Gen. Charles D. Jameson, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.
- No. 26.—Col. Stephen A. Dodge, Eighty-seventh New York Infantry.
- No. 27.—Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
- No. 28.—Col. Henry G. Staples, Third Maine Infantry.
- No. 29.—Col. Elijah Walker, Fourth Maine Infantry.
- No. 30.—Col. J. H. Hobart Ward, Thirty-eighth New York Infantry.
- No. 31.—Col. Edward J. Riley, Fortieth New York Infantry.
- No. 32.—Brig. Gen. Hiram G. Berry, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.
- No. 33.—Col. Orlando M. Poe, Second Michigan Infantry.
- No. 34.—Col. Henry D. Terry, Fifth Michigan Infantry.
- No. 35.—Col. Samuel B. Hayman, Thirty-seventh New York Infantry.
- No. 36.—Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Corps.
- No. 37.—Maj. Joseph H. Whittlesey, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 4-7.
- No. 38.—Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.
- No. 39.—Maj. Robert M. West, Chief of Artillery.
- No. 40.—Col. Julius W. Adams, Sixty-seventh New York Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of operations May 4-7.
- No. 41.—Brig. Gen. John J. Peck, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
- No. 42.—Col. Thomas A. Rowley, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Infantry.
- No. 43.—Brig. Gen. Charles Devens, jr., U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.
- No. 44.—Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division.
- No. 45.—Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery.
- No. 46.—Lieut. Charles Kusserow, Adjutant of Artillery.
- No. 47.—Capt. Charles C. Wheeler, Battery E, First New York Light Artillery.
- No. 48.—Lieut. Andrew Cowan, First New York Battery.

- No. 49.—Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.
 No. 50.—Col. Hiram Burnham, Sixth Maine Infantry.
 No. 51.—Col. Edwin C. Mason, Seventh Maine Infantry.
 No. 52.—Col. Robert F. Taylor, Thirty-third New York Infantry.
 No. 53.—Col. William H. Irwin, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Infantry.
 No. 54.—Col. Amasa Cobb, Fifth Wisconsin Infantry.
 No. 55.—Brig. Gen. W. T. H. Brooks, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
 No. 56.—Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division.
 No. 57.—Brig. Gen. Henry M. Naglee, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.
 No. 58.—Brig. Gen. William H. Keim, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
 No. 59.—Brig. Gen. Innis N. Palmer, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.
 No. 60.—Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Second Corps, with
 congratulatory order from General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army.
 No. 61.—Return of Casualties in the Confederate forces.
 No. 62.—Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Brigade.
 No. 63.—Capt. John Pelham, commanding Stuart Horse Artillery.
 No. 64.—Brig. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Second
 Division.
 No. 65.—Col. M. D. Corse, Seventeenth Virginia Infantry.
 No. 66.—Brig. Gen. R. H. Anderson, C. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
 No. 67.—Col. M. Jenkins, Palmetto Sharpshooters, commanding Second Brigade.
 No. 68.—Brig. Gen. George E. Pickett, C. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.
 No. 69.—Brig. Gen. Roger A. Pryor, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.
 No. 70.—Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.
 No. 71.—Col. Samuel Henry, Ninth Alabama Infantry.
 No. 72.—Col. J. J. Woodward, Tenth Alabama Infantry, of operations May 4-5.
 No. 73.—Lieut. Col. L. Q. C. Lamar, Nineteenth Mississippi Infantry.
 No. 74.—Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding division, of operations
 April 6-May 9.
 No. 75.—Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.
 No. 76.—Col. D. K. McRae, Fifth North Carolina Infantry, commanding brigade.
 No. 77.—Maj. Daniel H. Christie, Twenty-third North Carolina Infantry.
 No. 78.—Lieut. Col. Powhatan B. Whittle, Thirty-eighth Virginia Infantry.

No. 1.

*Reports of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding
 Army of the Potomac.**

BIVOUAC FRONT OF WILLIAMSBURG,

May 5, 1862—10 p. m.

After arranging for movement up York River I was urgently sent for here. I find Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force, probably greater a good deal than my own, and very strongly intrenched. Hancock has taken two redoubts and repulsed Early's brigade by a real charge with the bayonet, taking 1 colonel and 150 prisoners, killing at least 2 colonels and as many lieutenant colonels and many privates. His conduct was brilliant in the extreme. I do not know our exact loss, but fear Hooker has lost considerably on our left.

I learn from prisoners that they intend disputing every step to Richmond. I shall run the risk of at least holding them in check here while I resume the original plan. My entire force is undoubtedly con-

* See also his general report, pp. 19-23.

siderably inferior to that of the rebels, who still fight well, but I will do all I can with the force at my disposal.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Williamsburg, Va., May 6, 1862.

I have the pleasure to announce the occupation of this place as the result of the hard-fought action of yesterday. The effect of Hancock's brilliant engagement yesterday afternoon was to turn the left of their line of works. He was strongly re-enforced, and the enemy abandoned the entire position during the night, leaving all his sick and wounded in our hands. His loss yesterday was very severe. We have some 300 uninjured prisoners and more than 1,000 wounded. Their loss in killed is heavy. The victory is complete. I have sent cavalry in pursuit, but the roads are in such condition that I cannot move artillery nor supplies. I shall therefore push the other movement most energetically. The conduct of our men has been excellent, with scarcely an exception. The enemy's works are very extensive and exceedingly strong, both in respect to their position and the works themselves. Our loss was heavy in Hooker's division, but very little on other parts of the field. Hancock's success was gained with a loss of not over 20 killed and wounded. Weather good to-day, but great difficulty in getting up food on account of the roads. Very few wagons have yet come up.

Am I authorized to follow the example of other generals, and direct names of battle to be placed on the colors of regiments? We have other battles to fight before reaching Richmond.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

WILLIAMSBURG, *May 6, 1862.*

Every hour proves our victory more complete. Enemy's loss great; especially in officers. Have just heard of five more of their guns captured. Prisoners constantly arriving.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON.

No. 2.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces at the Battle of Williamsburg.

[Compiled from nominal lists of casualties, returns, &c.]

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
General staff officers.....	2		1				3
4th Maine Infantry.....				1			1
6th Maine Infantry.....				4			4
2d New Hampshire Infantry.....	1	15	3	65		19	103
2d Vermont Infantry.....				1			1
5th Vermont Infantry.....				1			1
1st Massachusetts Infantry.....		7	3	34		9	53
7th Massachusetts Infantry.....		1		2			3
11th Massachusetts Infantry.....		7	2	57		1	67
1st New York Light Artillery, Battery D.....	1	1		7			8
1st New York Light Artillery, Battery E.....	1	1		1			2
1st New York Battery.....	1	1		2			3
4th New York Battery.....		1		5			6
33d New York Infantry.....			1	9			10
37th New York Infantry.....	2	21	5	65		2	95
38th New York Infantry.....	2	9	6	61		10	88
40th New York Infantry.....		5	1	23			29
55th New York Infantry.....		2		15			17
62d New York Infantry.....		3		5			8
70th New York Infantry.....	7	72	13	125		113	330
72d New York Infantry.....	2	57	6	84		46	195
73d New York Infantry.....	2	15	2	65		20	104
74th New York Infantry.....		36	3	51	1	52	143
5th New Jersey Infantry.....	2	7	9	58		27	103
6th New Jersey Infantry.....	2	37	5	69	1	25	139
7th New Jersey Infantry.....	1	25	9	81		7	123
8th New Jersey Infantry.....	2	33	11	111		4	161
3d Pennsylvania Cavalry.....		1					1
1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Battery D.....				1			1
26th Pennsylvania Infantry.....		3	1	21		5	30
49th Pennsylvania Infantry.....				2			2
85th Pennsylvania Infantry.....			1	1			2
93d Pennsylvania Infantry.....	1	5		19		1	26
98th Pennsylvania Infantry.....		4		4		23	31
101st Pennsylvania Infantry.....				5			5
102d Pennsylvania Infantry.....		3	2	37			42
103d Pennsylvania Infantry.....				2			2
2d Michigan Infantry.....		17	3	35		5	60
5th Michigan Infantry.....	1	28	5	110			144
8th Illinois Cavalry.....						1	1
McClellan Dragoons.....		2		1			3
5th Wisconsin Infantry.....		8	4	66		1	79
1st U. S. Artillery, Battery H.....		2	2	6			10
Total.....	27	429	98	1,312	2	371	2,399

No. 3.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, U. S. Army.*HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS D'ARMÉE,
Steamer Ariel, May 12, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on Sunday, the 4th instant, at 12 m., I received an order from General McClellan to take command of the troops ordered in pursuit of the enemy. General Stoneman had been previously ordered to march with two regiments of cavalry and

four batteries of horse artillery. I came up with him at 4 o'clock p. m., and found he had been engaged with the enemy. General Stoneman stated to me that the enemy had in front of him four regiments of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and several pieces of artillery, with a rifle pit a half a mile long, but he believed they had evacuated their works. He, moreover, said that the wood between us and the enemy was practicable for infantry; that the cavalry had been riding through it. I then had Smith's division in hand, and feeling the importance of pressing the pursuit as fast as possible I determined to advance at once. I formed the division in two lines and advanced. After entering the woods I found the underbrush much thicker than I expected and the lines became entangled, and shortly afterward it became so dark it was impossible to advance, and I ordered the troops to halt and lie on their arms.

During the night it recurred to me that it was possible that General Stoneman might have been misinformed as to the force of the enemy, and also as to the strength of their works, which proved to be the case.

Another difficulty which could not be set aside was this: A part of General Smith's division had marched without rations. All these considerations determined me to pause a little and change my plan of attack. I had a careful reconnoissance made on the left of the enemy's works on the morning of the 5th, and found two of their forts unoccupied. I immediately ordered General Hancock to advance with a brigade and ten pieces of artillery and hold those works, it being my intention to force their left. This led to an attack upon him by a superior force of the enemy, which he splendidly repulsed. I sent three regiments to re-enforce him, but they did not reach him until after he had repulsed the enemy.

General Hooker became engaged with the right of the enemy early in the day and had very severe fighting. On its being reported to me that he was hard pressed, I immediately ordered General Kearny, who was coming up with his division, to support him, which he did as soon as possible, and participated in the fight. About 11 o'clock a. m. I sent General Heintzelman to the left to take command of the troops in that quarter.

At 3 o'clock p. m. the enemy made a furious attack upon my center, which was directly in front of their principal work and at a half a mile distance. When it commenced I had not many troops to meet it, and for a little time I was exceedingly anxious, for I well knew the fearful consequences that would ensue if they pierced our center. I sent several officers to the rear to hurry up the troops, and they struggled on through the mud and rain as fast as possible. The leading brigade of Couch's division came up first under General Peck, and walked into the fight in the most gallant manner. Great praise is due General Peck for his high conduct. The action at this point continued so long and with such determination on the part of the enemy to force our center that several of our regiments expended all their ammunition, and I was obliged to interpose fresh regiments between them and the enemy.

About 5 o'clock p. m. I received a message from the commanding general that he was at a house near by and wished to see me. I was then expecting another burst of the enemy to force the center, and I felt it to be unsafe to leave my position at that moment. I therefore sent a staff officer to the general to ask whether I should come to him at once or if he would allow me to delay a little. I had not the slightest intention of showing any disrespect by this message. About twenty minutes after this the general came down to me, and after conversing

a short time he remarked, "There seems to be nothing more doing here," and he would move toward the right. I have received no reports from the subordinate commanders. The enemy evacuated all his works in front of Williamsburg that night.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. V. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,
Near Cumberland, Va., May 16, 1862.

GENERAL: I would beg leave to attach the following note to my report of the battle of Williamsburg. I have glanced over the reports of this battle. As to General Keyes' report, so far as it regards myself I consider it unworthy of notice. In reply to General Heintzelman's report and that of others, indirectly charging me with not having supported Hooker, I would refer to General Kearny's report, in which he states that he received an order from me before 11 o'clock a. m. on the 5th instant to advance with his division and support Hooker. Some others have endeavored to make it appear that I failed to send reinforcements to Hancock when it ought to have been done. It could not have been done when these troops were first asked for without endangering the center. The maintenance of that point seemed to me of the utmost importance, for if they had pierced the center it would have been impossible to have prevented a serious disaster, and their attacks on this point were made in the most determined manner, and were several times renewed. The moment I felt certain that I could hold the center I sent three regiments to re-enforce General Hancock, but they did not reach him until after he had repulsed the enemy.

I do not know what General Heintzelman means by asserting that three divisions were idle on the right during Hooker's engagement. There was but one division (Smith's) on Hooker's right, and from this Hancock was detached with his brigade, leaving but two brigades at the center until the arrival of General Peck at the head of Couch's division about 2 o'clock p. m., and shortly afterward the attack commenced on the center. Casey's division did not arrive on the ground till late in the afternoon.

I beg leave to report that during the march and operations of the 4th instant and the action of the 5th all my staff officers showed great zeal and ability in the performance of their several duties.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. V. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,
Near Cumberland, May 17, 1862.

GENERAL: In the rapidly passing events of the 5th instant I cannot recollect with certainty what occurred at the council consisting of myself, Generals Heintzelman and Keyes. It was a very brief and informal affair, and I am quite sure there was no disagreement. I think

I proposed to turn the left of the enemy, and it was understood by all if Captain Stewart, who had been sent out on a reconnaissance, should report that the forts on the enemy's left were evacuated that we would occupy them at once.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. V. SUMNER,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

NOTE.—I inclose the copy of a note to General Heintzelman showing that I intended to attack their left.

E. V. SUMNER.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS LEFT WING, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Adams' House, May 5, 1862.

GENERAL: The general commanding directs me to say to you that the report from our right is on the whole favorable, but that there will be undoubtedly some batteries to carry. The divisions are not yet up with which the movement is to be made. The enemy's abandoned works on his left will be occupied at once and held. The movement will be made to-morrow morning, and the general directs that you govern yourself accordingly.

Very respectfully, general, your most obedient servant,

J. H. TAYLOR,

Chief of Staff and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Brigadier-General HEINTZELMAN,
Commanding on the Left.

No. 4.

Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, U. S. Army, commanding Third Corps.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS, ALLEN'S FARM,
May 5, 1862—9 p. m.

GENERAL: This morning about 9 a. m. the enemy attacked General Hooker, with the evident intention of overwhelming him before he could be re-enforced. He gallantly sustained himself. I was with General Sumner farther to the right. He sent out and made some reconnaissances to the right, with the object of turning the left flank of the enemy. About 11 a. m. he learned that it was practicable, but still was waiting for provisions for some of the troops. I left at about 11 a. m. and reached General Hooker's division about 1.30 p. m. I found him hard pressed, but had already sent several messengers to hurry up General Kearny's division. The rebels in the morning got re-enforcements, and the battle raged with various advances and retreats. It was after 2 p. m. when the first re-enforcements reached us. But a few moments before our troops were driven back, some in a panic.

After great exertions this was partially checked, and the opportune arrival of General Berry's brigade saved our artillery and drove the enemy back. Gradually the other brigades arrived, and the enemy

were driven back to their original position. Every effort they made was repulsed, and at dark we still held our original position. The enemy occupy a strongly intrenched position with some field guns. It is so situated that we have to bring forward our field guns within short range to oppose their guns within their intrenchments. Thus situated we have been able to make but little use of our artillery.

I am unable to give even an approximate estimate of our loss, but it is quite large. It cannot, I think, be less than 500 killed and wounded. General Hooker's division has suffered so severely that it will not be very reliable for to-morrow. I will try and hold the position, but it is necessary that I be strongly re-enforced.* I have applied to General Sumner for aid, which I hope to get before day to-morrow.

We have various reports as to the force of the enemy. I inclose a note I received from Colonel Averell, and also a statement he has made from statements received from prisoners. I think, however, that they intend here to make a determined stand. General Jos. E. Johnston the prisoners report in command of the troops in our front. I think it of the utmost importance that I should be strongly re-enforced at the earliest moment. General Emory, with his cavalry, a battery of horse artillery, and three regiments of infantry in the afternoon made an effort to turn the enemy's right flank, but the ground was found impracticable. We have taken 30 or more prisoners. I hope General Porter's division will be pressed forward immediately to re-enforce me.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Third Corps.

Col. R. B. MARCY,

Chief of Staff, Camp Winfield Scott.

Our men are out of provisions to-night, and the roads are almost impracticable.

S. P. H.

[Inclosure No. 1.]

SIR: I have taken several prisoners in feeling about the enemy's right. Have ascertained by careful examination the following facts, viz: Longstreet commands on the enemy's right, with Hill, Withers, Wilcox, and Hunton. He left Williamsburg with his division, consisting of three brigades, this morning at 9 o'clock. They were stampered there last night and spiked some of their guns. Joe Johnston is commanding. They do not think of retreating from this position, so they say. They left Yorktown because they thought a good run was better than a bad stand. They have all the latest newspaper news, and confirm the taking of New Orleans, &c. They say Burnside has left North Carolina.

WM. W. AVERELL,
Colonel Cavalry.

Captain MCKEEVER.

They report a strong force at Williamsburg.

WM. W. A.

* See Addenda, p. 455.

[Inclosure No. 2.]

AT ALLEN'S FARM, *May 5—8 p. m.*

GENERAL: Some 30 prisoners have fallen into the hands of my cavalry to-day while it was engaged in feeling about the enemy's right; among them a very intelligent gentleman (Mr. Allen), adjutant of the Twenty-eighth Virginia, who conversed with me freely. From all the information I can gather I think I can state the following as very nearly the truth: Johnston is commanding the enemy's forces. He left Williamsburg at 8 o'clock this morning, intending to attack us before our re-enforcements could come up. Longstreet's division is opposite our left. He is jolly to-day—in good spirits. J. E. B. Stuart commanded the cavalry which General Cooke attacked yesterday, and leaving his brigade this morning he stood on the road and cheered the rebel regiments on. Three more regiments left Williamsburg at 5 p. m. to-day at a double-quick to re-enforce their line here, which shows that there was a pressure somewhere. The most intelligent of them say that they have over 50,000 men here, and they express the belief that they cannot be whipped. They know nothing of any other movements of ours. They think our force in front is 120,000. They have suffered considerably to-day.

From the fact that most of these prisoners have strayed from their regiments with the intention of reaching Williamsburg, and have fallen inadvertently into my hands, I believe that there is a communication from our left directly to rear of the enemy's right which could be made by, say, five of our most reliable regiments, followed by two or three batteries with axmen and two regiments of cavalry. I don't think the party that undertook to turn their right took the right direction or started early enough. I was not with it, but believe they struck into the woods too soon.

We must be ready to-morrow morning early, I think.

Respectfully, yours,

WM. W. AVERELL.

General HEINTZELMAN.

[Addenda.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS, ALLEN'S FARM,

May 5, 1862—9.30 p. m.

GENERAL: We have been hard pressed by the enemy all day, and nothing but the opportune arrival of General Kearny's division saved us from the loss of some of our artillery and defeat. Cannot you cut a road in front of the enemy's intrenchments by which I can be re-enforced before daylight in the morning, as I fear they will make another effort to drive us back? It will require at least a division for me to hold the position against the force the enemy has to bring against me. General Hooker's division suffered so severely that I do not expect to receive much aid from it. By cutting this road the troops can readily join me without having to make the large circuit by Cheesecake Church. Cannot you also attack him at daylight on his left and in your front? I fear greatly that unless he is strongly pressed I will not be able to maintain my position. May I rely upon your aid to sustain me? Our loss has been heavy, some 500 killed and wounded.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Third Corps.

General E. V. SUMNER, *Commanding, &c., Allen's House.*

P. S.—General Jos. E. Johnston is in command in my front, and has been re-enforced this morning and again late in the afternoon. They evidently felt hard pressed when our re-enforcements arrived. They attacked General Hooker at about 8 a. m., intending to overwhelm him before he could receive re-enforcements. The rebel force is variously estimated by the prisoners we have taken as high as 50,000 men. They have intrenchments, and they are so situated we cannot make much use of our artillery. May I beg you to send me at least a division before daylight?

—
HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS,
Williamsburg, Va., May 7, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement of Generals Hooker's and Kearny's divisions of my corps with the enemy at their intrenchments in front of Williamsburg on the 5th of May, with so much of what previously occurred as is necessary for the understanding of the operations:

On Saturday evening, May 3, the enemy in Yorktown kept up a fire of shot and shell on our lines till after midnight. At the first appearance of daylight Sunday morning I heard what I took to be a heavy skirmish in the direction of Yorktown and saw a bright light. I ordered an ascension with the balloon, and Professor Lowe reported to me that the light was a burning building or a vessel near the wharf off Yorktown. Subsequently I learned that the firing was caused by the explosion of small-arm cartridges and shells from a rebel magazine in the direction of Yorktown. I then got a telegram from General F. J. Porter that it was believed the enemy were abandoning Yorktown. I immediately went up in the balloon with Professor Lowe. We could not distinguish any guns or men in or around the fortifications of Yorktown and the smoke of their camps was very much diminished. In a few minutes we saw to our right a line of skirmishers advance steadily, supported by a regiment of infantry, toward the rebel works and enter them. I immediately descended, and gave orders to the divisions of Generals Kearny and Hooker to prepare to march; also to Colonel Averell's Third Pennsylvania Cavalry.

At 10 a. m. I went to general headquarters, and received orders for General F. J. Porter's division to occupy Yorktown; that the reserve cavalry and four batteries of horse artillery, under General Stoneman, would advance toward Williamsburg, and for me to support it with Hooker's division. Soon after I received orders for General Kearny's division to prepare to march.

One thousand men of General Hooker's division were on duty in the trenches, and were detained for some time by the general on duty there. Another regiment, the Seventy-first New York, was still at Cheeseman's Landing. This delayed the march of the division till near 1 p. m. My headquarters accompanied this division.

Before I reached the Half-way House, where I was directed to leave a force to watch the road from Lee's Mill, I heard firing in front, and received a note from General Stoneman that he had met the enemy intrenched about 2½ miles from Williamsburg, and wanted infantry to aid in carrying their works. At the Half-way House, 7 miles from Yorktown, I found the head of General Hooker's column detained by General Smith's division, which had reached that point before him,

and was advancing to the support of General Stoneman. I pushed forward, and a mile from the front met General Hooker returning. He stated that General Sumner was in advance, and that the road was filled with troops. He suggested to march his division to the left from Cheesecake Church, about a half a mile in rear of us, into the road leading from Lee's Mill to Williamsburg, and attack the enemy farther to the left.

As I could not now follow my instructions literally I approved of this suggestion, and directed him to push forward. I continued on to Adams' house, about 3 miles from Williamsburg, where I arrived about 5 p. m., and found there Generals Sumner, Smith, Stoneman, Hancock, and soon after Generals Keyes and Brooks arrived. General Cooke was on the left of the road with the cavalry. Here were parts of two corps and a part of the reserve all mixed up. How General Sumner got here and the other generals I do not know, as my instructions directed me to "take control of the entire movement." General Hancock's brigade had just arrived; had stacked arms for a few moments to refresh themselves with rest and food. General Sumner determined to attack the works in front and carry them with the bayonet.

Before the arrangements were completed it became so dark that the troops got lost in the woods, and had to wait there until daylight. During the night it commenced raining. Not long before daylight a messenger from headquarters arrived with orders to General Sumner, but as the latter was not to be found they were delivered to me. Soon after General Sumner arrived, having been compelled to spend the night in the woods.

About 7 a. m. General Casey arrived, and reported his division halted in the road a short distance back. Generals Sumner, Keyes, and myself then held a consultation, and it was determined to make a reconnaissance from our extreme right. We were told by a countryman that he had passed that way the Friday before, when the direct road to Williamsburg was filled with the retreating rebel troops. The reconnaissance disclosed the fact that two earthworks in that direction, one of them unfinished, were abandoned, and that the left flank of the enemy could be turned.

It was now near 11 a. m., and it was still raining steadily. I left as soon as I was relieved from a conference of generals and took the road by Cheesecake Church into the road leading from Lee's Mill to Williamsburg. The distance was 6 miles, and the road so bad that I did not reach General Hooker before 1 p. m. I passed several deserted earthworks. This was evidently the main line of the retreat of the rebel forces. It was strewn with broken wagons and abandoned tools. Before I left General Sumner's headquarters a firing of artillery and musketry had been heard by me, and so continuous as to occasion me great anxiety. When I came up with General Hooker he informed me that he had attacked the enemy in front that morning at 7.30 o'clock, and that he was hard pressed, and in want of immediate re-enforcements; that he had written me a note and forwarded it by an orderly through the woods in close proximity to the rebel works, and that the distance across was not much over a mile, if so far. This note was dated 11.20 a. m., and was received by General Sumner after I left. The orderly was not gone over twenty minutes. Colonel Blaisdell, Eleventh Massachusetts, sent by General Hooker to open communication with our troops on his right, also reported to General Hancock that the road was open and the communication clear from General Hooker's right to the left of General Sumner. I immediately sent another note to Gen-

eral Sumner, stating to him the situation, and asking him for a re-enforcement, and to aid us also by a demonstration on the enemy's front and left flank. This note I sent by two orderlies through the woods by the short route. To this note I received no answer. No re-enforcements and no demonstrations were made.

I had the evening before sent an order to General Kearny to advance to Cheesecake Church and there await orders. General Sumner the next morning sent him an order to advance and support Hooker. I now sent him another, informing him of our pressing need and urging him to hurry up.

The enemy had in front of General Hooker's attack six earthworks, the largest of them (Fort Magruder) with a bastioned front. A portion of the ground in General Hooker's front was clear. The trees in front of this clear space were felled, to give cover to their sharpshooters and more range to their guns. They had rifle pits between their works and the felled trees. They also had field artillery in the rear of their rifle pits. The only space where we could plant a battery was exposed to a cross fire from the artillery in their works. The ground in advance of their works was a level, unobstructed plain for 600 yards, and then dense forest and thick undergrowth, through which you could scarcely see a man at the distance of 60 yards. The most of the battle was fought in this forest. The space in which our batteries could be used was so contracted that they were comparatively of little use.

The infantry supports being driven out of a point of woods to the left of the road the enemy possessed himself of it, and drove the men from the guns of Captain Webber's battery, and carried off three Parrott guns, one 12-pounder howitzer, and one caisson. Captain Bramhall's battery on the right of these was also abandoned, but the guns were so badly mired they could not be carried off by the enemy. General Emory, with Colonel Averell's Third Pennsylvania Cavalry and Captain Benson's horse artillery, was a mile and a half in the rear, watching a road through a cleared space on our left, through which a road ran into Williamsburg. He and Colonel Averell were of the opinion that by this road we might make an attack and turn the enemy's right flank. As soon as our re-enforcements came up I sent Captain McKeever, my assistant adjutant-general, to conduct to him four regiments of infantry, two batteries of artillery belonging to General Kearny's division, with which and the cavalry and horse artillery I wished him to make the attack. General Hooker and his division gallantly sustained themselves against a much superior force from early in the morning until near 3 o'clock p. m., when the Third Brigade began to give way, having expended nearly all their ammunition. General Patterson, who was in command of this brigade, had joined but a few days before. By great exertions on his part and that of the officers most of the brigade was again rallied. The troops maintained their ground for some time with empty guns and not a cartridge in their boxes, relying upon their bayonets. I had sent messenger after messenger to General Kearny to hurry up his division. The road had now become a sea of mud from the passage of the troops of the enemy, then of our troops, and the ammunition wagons and artillery.

Our soldiers, weary and exhausted by the labors of the siege of Yorktown, had left Sunday morning as soon as those in the trenches the night before joined us. The long march through the rain and mud gave but little time for rest. Many straggled or came back with the constant stream of the wounded, who had to be helped to the rear. They were not always prompt to rejoin their regiments. The rain, the

sight of the wounded, the re-enforcements still behind, all conspired to depress everybody. No efforts I could make would move them. I ordered the drums to beat, but the drums were wet, and did not give forth cheerful sounds. I saw some brass instruments. I ordered the musicians to play, but it was only part of a band. Lieutenant Johnson, of my staff, looked around and found some more. Putting them together, the band struck up a patriotic air. This inspired new life into all. The men collected and began to cheer. The strains were wafted through the old forest, and made themselves heard by our weary troops above the roar of the battle, and inspired them with fresh vigor to perform new deeds of valor.

At 2.30 p. m. by the most strenuous exertions (the men laying aside their knapsacks) General Kearny and General Berry with his brigade pushed through the obstructions on their way and arrived on the ground just as the enemy got to a battery of our artillery in the road, and repulsed him immediately. The officer in charge of the guns fired three shots, which aided in checking the enemy. The Fifth Michigan, Colonel Terry, charged upon the enemy with the bayonet, and drove them upon the rifle pits, killing 143 of them, 63 of whom were shot through the head. General Berry is entitled to great credit for the energy he displayed in passing the obstructions on the road and for the gallant manner in which he brought his brigade into action at the turning point of the battle.

An hour after General Berry arrived General Birney with his brigade came up, followed immediately by General Jameson with his. From a prisoner we learned that during the afternoon four rebel regiments arrived from Williamsburg at a double-quick, and at this time the most determined efforts were made to turn our left flank. Re-enforcements for the enemy, however, were arriving all day till 5 p. m. General Kearny had but five regiments engaged. Of the remainder four regiments were on the left flank, under General Emory, and three in reserve, under General Jameson. General Hooker had about 9,000 men, including the artillery, in the action. The Seventy-first New York Volunteers were left at Cheeseman's Landing, but have joined since the battle.

I cannot find words to do justice to the gallantry of General Hooker's division. The smoke and rain were driven by the wind into the faces of our men. Even the elements were combined against us. Notwithstanding the disheartening circumstance that our troops knew we had three divisions idle on their right, within hearing of their musketry, they held the ground as long as they had any ammunition with a fearful loss of life against great odds, in a fortified position, until General Kearny's division made a march of 9 miles through rain and mud over a road obstructed by troops that were going to the right, where they were not wanted. I cannot find words to express my admiration of their gallantry.

About 2.30 p. m. General Peck's brigade, sent by General Keyes, took up a position somewhere on General Hooker's right, and engaged the enemy. As his report was not made to me, I cannot say with what result. It no doubt helped to keep the enemy in check on that part of this line.

In General Grover's brigade most of the regiments did very well—the Second New Hampshire particularly so, and it suffered greatly. Colonel Marston, of the Second New Hampshire, states in his report that—

The rebel barbarian in command extended a white flag, and cried out to him (Cap-

tain Drown), "Don't fire, don't fire; we are friends!" at the same time directing his men to trail their arms. Captain Drown, believing they were about to surrender, directed his men not to fire, whereupon the whole body of the enemy suddenly fired upon him, killing him instantly and also several of his men.

Another instance of cowardice and treachery is related in Colonel Blaisdell's report of the Eleventh Massachusetts as having occurred in front of his regiment:

While the regiment was engaged on the left of the road, at not more than 50 yards, a rebel officer displayed a white flag, crying out, "Don't fire on your friends." When I ordered, "Cease firing, and Private Michael Doherty, of Company A, stepped forward to get the flag, and when near it the officer said to his men, "Now, give it to them." The men obeyed, firing and severely wounding Private Doherty, who immediately returned the fire, shooting the officer through the heart, thus rewarding him for his mean treachery.

Some of our wounded men were bayoneted by the rebels, and a New Jersey captain was found bayoneted and his ears cut off. There are other cases.

In Colonel Taylor's brigade all the regiments behaved very well and suffered the heaviest loss; nearly as much as both the others together. Colonel Dwight, Seventieth New York Volunteers, is particularly commended. He was badly wounded and taken prisoner, but left in the hospital in Williamsburg on parole. The Third Brigade, Brigadier General Patterson, suffered very severely; the Seventh and Eighth New Jersey Volunteers, however, had quite a number of stragglers, as well as the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania, in the First Brigade.

I beg leave to refer the commanding general to the regimental reports for the names of officers and men who particularly distinguished themselves. The artillery was not as much used as was desirable on account of the difficulties of the ground, but the batteries brought in position made good use of their opportunities. Three of our batteries were not engaged, as they could not be used. When the artillery of General Kearny's division arrived I sent Capt. J. Thompson, its chief, to examine the ground, and he reported that it could not be used to advantage, with the exception of two pieces, to hold the road in our front, and he placed them there. The effort to turn the enemy's right flank would have been made at an earlier hour of the day, but I had not the troops to spare until after General Kearny's division arrived on the field. It did not then succeed, as I was without guides or maps, although Colonel Averell had possession of the right work, No. 1, of the enemy, and occupied it with a company of cavalry from an early hour of the day.

Early in the night the enemy commenced his retreat. This intelligence unfortunately was not communicated to me until after sunrise. As soon as I learned it I ordered forward the cavalry and horse artillery in pursuit. Between 6 and 7 a. m. we took possession of Fort Magruder and the dependent works. The enemy then had two regiments of infantry and some cavalry in sight in front of Williamsburg. I sent forward a brigade of infantry and some artillery under General Jameson, but the enemy hastily retreated through the town. We found two field pieces this side and five siege pieces beyond, 2 miles out, the bad roads and pursuit compelled him to abandon. There were also abandoned wagons and a great number of small-arms. In Fort Magruder there was some ammunition left, and we got a silk flag, inscribed "Pickens Guard," and "Presented by the Ladies." In the town the enemy abandoned all their severely wounded without attendance or the least provision for their sustenance. Counting them, the prisoners captured during the battle and the first day of their retreat,

we got about 1,000 men; among them one colonel and several other officers. Up to Saturday 800 rebels were buried by our troops.

The reconnaissance map made by Lieutenant McAlester, inclosed, shows the strength of the enemy's position, as well as the gallantry and good conduct of the troops that could force him to abandon such works.

General Jameson and Captain McKeever, of my staff, were the first officers in Williamsburg. The retreating enemy fired their magazine, filled with shells and other ammunition. General Hooker's division, when assigned to my corps, was stationed near Budd's Ferry, on the Potomac; did not join until after we sat down before Yorktown. The duties of the siege were so laborious I never had an opportunity to see a single regiment in line of battle. All the troops were entire strangers to me, except their gallant commander.

I also beg leave to call the attention of the commanding general particularly to General Hooker's report.

I cannot close my report without commending anew Generals Kearny and Hooker and the members of their staffs for their unwearied exertions and conspicuous gallantry. The former lost two members of his staff killed. To the members of my staff, the chief of it, Capt. Chauncey McKeever, and Lieut. M. D. McAlester, of the Engineers, I am particularly indebted for their conspicuous good conduct and gallantry. Captain McKeever rendered good service on my staff at Bull Run. Lieutenant McAlester established a reputation in the preliminary operations for the siege of Yorktown. May I commend them both to your favorable consideration?

To the other officers of my staff, Capt. Isaac Moses, assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. L. Hunt, Thirty-eighth New York Volunteers; Lieut. G. E. Johnson, Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Lieut. Henry Norton, Sixty-third New York Volunteers, I am indebted for valuable service in communicating orders and in clearing the road for the advance of General Kearny's division. They were so actively employed that they were seldom at my side. Assist. Surg. John J. Milhau, medical department, the medical director of the corps, was most indefatigable in his attention to the wounded during the action and the following night. He performed many operations himself. He was very active in procuring and arranging transportation for them to Queen's Landing, at which point they were embarked for Fort Monroe. Captain McKelvy, the chief commissary of the corps, was also quite active, and has kept the troops well supplied with provisions.

I knew nothing of the handsome affair of General Hancock's until near midnight, when, as I was returning to my bivouac from writing a note to General McClellan, I met an officer of his staff, who informed me of the affair, and that the general had arrived at General Sumner's headquarters at 5 p. m. that day. After midnight I received directions not to renew the attack without further orders; that the general would send me re-enforcements, and was making arrangements for the operations of the next day.

General Peck informs me that he found a regiment of General Grover's brigade coming back along the Williamsburg road, the officers of which reported the enemy driving in our front; that their ammunition was getting expended. This regiment remained inactive all the afternoon. This was the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania. Captain McKeever stopped a lieutenant and several men of this regiment who were retreating on the left-hand road.

Generals Jameson and Berry both sent scouts forward during the

night to the immediate vicinity of the works in their front, and reported the enemy abandoning them. As soon as I knew this I pushed forward our skirmishers and occupied them. Soon after the commanding general arrived from beyond my right, and we rode forward into Williamsburg.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,
Brigadier-General.

General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Commanding Army of the Potomac, Williamsburg, Va.

No. 5.

Report of Lieut. Miles D. McAlester, U. S. Engineer Corps.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Williamsburg, Va., May 8, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report and accompanying sketch of the positions occupied by the enemy (and those upon which were made our main or central attack and left demonstration in the battle of Williamsburg), being results of my reconnaissance of the 5th instant during the battle and the 6th instant after the evacuation by the enemy of his positions. The sketch is not laid down instrumentally, but can be relied on as sufficiently accurate for forming any conclusions regarding the dispositions of the battle:

At 7 a. m. on the 5th you communicated to me at Adams', on the Yorktown road, the general's order to report to General Hooker, who was then engaging the enemy on the Hampton road. I did so at 9 a. m., and he immediately sent me to reconnoiter the ground and enemy's redoubts to our left, these redoubts sending in upon him a hot artillery fire, while Fort Magruder, on the road immediately in front, had ceased artillery fire altogether. I proceeded as rapidly as the almost impassable abatis would permit to the ravine and salient of woods at A, passing several regiments of our troops struggling slowly through toward the front. The abatis or entanglement here was a most formidable obstacle to the passage of troops. Arrived at A, I saw Patterson's brigade disappearing through the woods as they deployed to the left. Presently a detachment of eight men of the Seventy-second New York Volunteers, under a sergeant, came up through the entanglement, and I immediately directed them to deploy forward to the advanced crest of the ravine, which crest was in the open space. I followed up, and there obtained a very good view of Redoubts 2, 3, and 4 (see sketch) and Fort Magruder. In the latter work I saw several regiments drawn up, apparently inactive, designed doubtless to prevent the carrying that fort (the enemy's central work) by storm and to furnish supports to right and left. Redoubts 2, 3, and 4 were full of men, and 3 was firing rapidly upon our battery at B from two pieces, and it seemed to me the enemy had a field battery moving from point to point in the open space between his works and delivering a fire upon various points of our advance, but I was unable to see it.

Up to this time scattering musketry fire only was heard in the woods to the left. After observing at A for half an hour I saw the enemy's

troops commence filing rapidly in the formation of skirmishers (not to attract our fire) from Redoubts 2, 3, and 4 directly to the woods to their front and our left. This was the movement upon our flank which annoyed us so much, came near several times in the afternoon attaining our rear, and resulted in the desperate fighting which raged so continuously all the afternoon up the wooded ravine from C to D and generally through the woods thereabouts. I then returned to General Hooker and reported the results of my reconnaissance, which amounted to the following conclusions:

1st. That the ravine at C was impracticable for artillery designed to be put into position on the enemy's plateau at this point, and that it would be difficult to get a battery into position on our side of the ravine in consequence of the large number of trees we would be obliged to fell to unmask it; besides, I had serious doubts whether the battery so placed would prove sufficient, in consequence of the crest of the ravine toward the enemy being higher than the one on our side.

2d. That our troops had better be passed to the front either up the road or around through the woods, instead of through the entanglement.

3d. That the open space constituting the enemy's position extended apparently (from my point of view) considerably beyond his right redoubt, thus affording a probable chance of getting at his right or rear. (Redoubt No. 1 I could not see.)

The last conclusion or supposition I communicated to the brigadier-general commanding on his arrival. At about 2 p. m. he directed me to pass around to the enemy's right and see what chances existed of turning his position. I retraced the Hampton road to E, passed Averell's cavalry at F (his pickets were some distance in advance), and went far enough up the road on Allen's estate to derive the conclusion that the opening where the enemy's works were and that on Allen's estate were either continuous or very near together, and that a movement around them might be decisive. This conclusion proves to have been partly erroneous (see sketch), the two openings being separated by woods more than a mile across, and two small streams, branches of the Achershope, and connected by a good straight road, G H (see sketch), unobstructed, passing through the woods and crossing the two streams upon mill-dams in perfect order. This conclusion I immediately reported to the general.

At about 4.30 p. m., by the general's order, I returned to Allen's estate to hasten General Emory's proposed movement upon the enemy's right and rear, and overtook him moving forward toward G with three regiments of infantry, one battery, and a detachment of cavalry. Arrived at G, we discovered the mill-pond K, crossed on the dam by the road G H. After considerable deliberation, General Emory decided that this force was inadequate to attempt the movement along G H upon the enemy's right and rear, he at that time being of course ignorant of the fact that the road struck the enemy's right at Redoubt No. 1, and there passed to his (the enemy's) rear at a point nearer Williamsburg than was the enemy's center at Fort Magruder. General Emory's force was undoubtedly too weak to attempt cutting off the enemy's retreat. A careful examination of the enemy's position intensifies the regret that the pressing and repeated demands by the brigadier-general commanding, made immediately on his arrival at Hooker's position and subsequently, for re-enforcements had not been promptly complied with, in order that his desire to turn the enemy's position by diverting Kearny's division around by Allen's estate might be carried out. Had these conditions been fulfilled, the enemy must have countermanded his flank

movement up the wooded ravine C D, thereby saving part of the terrible carnage there, and his retreat must either have been entirely cut off or converted into a complete night rout. Allen's wharf and road leading up from it have been extensively used by the enemy. Several store-houses have been burned there.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. D. McALESTER,

Engineer Officer Third Corps, Army of the Potomac.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Corps, Army of the Potomac.

[Indorsement.]

NOTE.—I sent Captain McKeever with another regiment of infantry and two more batteries of artillery, belonging to General Kearny's division, so soon as they came up, making the whole force available for operating on the enemy's right flank to consist of one regiment of cavalry, three batteries of artillery, and four regiments of infantry, or about 3,000 men or upward. There was some risk to run, but the success would have been great.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,

Brigadier-General.

No. 6.

Report of Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division.

HEADQUARTERS HOOKER'S DIVISION,
Third Army Corps, Williamsburg, Va., May 10, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that under the instructions received through the headquarters Third Army Corps, dated May 4, to support Stoneman and aid him in cutting off the retreat of the enemy, my division marched from its camp before Yorktown about noon that day. We marched toward Williamsburg. After advancing 5 or 6 miles on this road I learned that Brigadier-General Stoneman had fallen upon the rear of the enemy's retreating column, and was then awaiting the arrival of an infantry force to attack him. This was 5 or 6 miles in advance of me, and immediately I left my command and galloped to the front in order to see what disposition it would be necessary to make of my force on its arrival. While here I was informed that Brigadier-General Smith's division had filed into the road in advance of my command, and that in consequence my division would be compelled to halt until after Smith's had passed. I immediately returned to the head of my column, where I found my division halted, and, as Smith's was extended, it was between three and four hours in passing. As soon as this was ascertained, and feeling that Stoneman would require no additional support, I applied to Brigadier-General Heintzelman, the senior officer charged with the advance on the Yorktown road, for authority to throw my command on to the Hampton road, which intersected that on which Brigadier-General Stoneman had halted at the identical point his enemy occupied. The angle formed by the two roads is a little less than a right angle. Obtaining this permission the head of my division left the Brick Church about dark, and it pressed forward, in order, if practicable, to come up with the enemy

before morning. This, however, I soon found would be impossible, for the roads were frightful, the night intensely dark and rainy, and many of my men exhausted from loss of sleep and from labor the night before in the trenches. The troops were halted in the middle of the road between 10 and 11 o'clock p. m., resolved to stop until daylight, when we started again, and came in sight of the enemy's works before Williamsburg about 5.30 o'clock in the morning.

Before emerging from the forest the column was halted, while I rode to the front to find what could be learned of the position of the enemy. The first work that presented itself was Fort Magruder, and this was standing at the junction of the Yorktown and Hampton roads, and on each side of it was a cordon of redoubts, extending as far as could be seen. Subsequently I found their number to be thirteen, and extending entirely across the Peninsula, the right and left of them resting on the waters of the York and James Rivers. Approaching them from the south they are concealed by heavy forest until the observer is within less than a mile of their locality. Where the forest trees had been standing nearer than this distance the trees had been felled, in order that the occupants of the redoubts might have timely notice of the approach of an enemy and early strike him with artillery. The trees had been felled in this manner on both sides of the road on which we had advanced for a breadth of almost half a mile, and the same was the case on the Yorktown road. Between the edge of the felled timber and the fort was a belt of clear arable land 600 or 700 yards in width. This was dotted all over with rifle pits. In connection with the redoubts themselves I may be permitted to state that I found them standing near the eastern and southern verge of a slightly-elevated plain, the slopes of which were furrowed with winding ravines, with an almost boundless, gently-undulating plain reaching across the Peninsula, and extending to the north and west as far as the eye could reach. The landscape is picturesque, and not a little heightened by the large trees and venerable spires of Williamsburg, 2 miles distant. Fort Magruder appears to be the largest of the redoubts, its crest measuring nearly half a mile, with substantial parapets, ditches, magazines, &c. This was located to command the Yorktown and Hampton roads, and the redoubts in its vicinity to command the ravines which the guns of Fort Magruder could not sweep.

Being in pursuit of a retreating army, I deemed it my duty to lose no time in making the disposition of my forces to attack, regardless of their number and position, except to accomplish the result with the least possible sacrifice of life. By so doing my division, if it did not capture the army before me, would at least hold them, in order that some others might. Besides, I knew of the presence of more than 30,000 troops not 2 miles distant from me, and that within 12 miles—four hours' march—was the bulk of the Army of the Potomac. My own position was tenable for double that length of time against three times my number.

At 7.30 o'clock Brigadier-General Grover was directed to commence the attack by sending the First Massachusetts Regiment as skirmishers into the felled timber to the left of the road on which they were standing, the Second New Hampshire to the right, both with directions to skirmish up to the edge of the felled timber, and there, under cover, to turn their attention to the occupants of the rifle pits and the enemy's sharpshooters and gunners in Fort Magruder. The Eleventh Massachusetts and the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Regiments were then

directed to form on the right of the Second New Hampshire, and to advance as skirmishers until they had reached the Yorktown road, and when that was gained to have word sent me.

Under my chief of artillery, Webber's battery was thrown forward in advance of the felled timber and brought into action in a cleared field on the right of the road and distant from Fort Magruder about 700 yards. No sooner had it emerged from the forest on its way to its position than four guns from Fort Magruder opened on it, and after it was still farther up the road they received the fire from two additional guns from a redoubt on the left. However, it was pushed on, and before it was brought into action two officers and two privates had been shot down, and before a single piece of the battery had been discharged its cannoneers had been driven from it despite the skill and activity of my sharpshooters in picking off the rebel gunners. Volunteers were now called for by my gallant chief of artillery, Major Wainwright, to man the battery now in position, when the officers and men of Osborn's battery sprang forward, and in the time I am writing had those pieces well at work. Captain Bramhall's battery was now brought into action under that excellent officer on the right of Webber's, and before 9 o'clock every gun in Fort Magruder was silenced and all the troops in sight on the plain dispersed.

Between my sharpshooters and the two batteries the enemy's guns in this fort were not heard from again until late in the afternoon. One of the regiments of Brigadier-General Patterson's brigade, the Fifth New Jersey, was charged with the especial care of these batteries, and was posted a little to the rear of them. The remaining regiments of Patterson's brigade, under their intrepid commander, were sent to the left of the road from where they were standing, in anticipation of an attack from that quarter. Heavy forest trees cover this ground and conceal from view the enemy's earthworks about a mile distant. The forest itself has a depth of about three-fourths of that distance. It was through this that Patterson led the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth New Jersey Regiments. Bodies of the enemy's infantry were seen drifting in that direction, and the increased musketry fire proved that many others were flocking thither whom we could not see. Prior to this moment Brigadier-General Emory had reached my position with a light battery and a body of cavalry, which were promptly placed at my disposal by that experienced and gifted soldier; but as I had no duty on which I could employ those arms of service, and as I was confined for room in the exercise of my own command, I requested that he would dispatch a party to reconnoiter and observe the movements of the rebels to the rear of my left. This was executed to my satisfaction.

It was now reported to me that the skirmishers to the right had reached the Yorktown road, when word was sent to Colonel Blaisdell to proceed with the Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Regiments cautiously down that road to destroy any rebel force he might find, and break down any barrier the enemy might have thrown up to check the advance of our forces in that direction, and when this was executed to report the fact to the senior officer with the troops there, and on his return to send me word of the result of his mission. This was done, and word sent me through Adjutant Currier, of the Eleventh Regiment.

Up to this moment there had been a brisk musketry fire kept up on every part of the field, but its swelling volumes in the direction of Patterson satisfied me from the beginning of the engagement that the

enemy had accumulated a heavy force in his front. Grover had already anticipated it, and had moved the main portion of the First Massachusetts Regiment to receive it, while, first, the Seventy-second New York Regiment of Taylor's brigade, and soon after the Seventieth New York Regiment of the same brigade, were ordered to strengthen Patterson.

Colonel Averell, of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, had with great kindness and gallantry tendered me his services and executed for me with great promptness several important services; while Lieutenant McAlester, of the Engineers, volunteered to make a reconnaissance of such of the enemy's works as were hidden from view, preparatory to carrying them by assault should a suitable opportunity present itself for that object. For this service I am under many obligations to that accomplished officer.

From the earliest moment of the attack it was an object of deep solicitude to establish a connection with the troops in my immediate neighborhood on the Yorktown road, and as that had been accomplished, and as I saw no signs of their advance, at 11.20 a. m. I addressed the subjoined note to the assistant adjutant-general Third Corps, under the impression that his chief was still there. It is as follows:

I have had a hard contest all the morning, but do not despair of success. My men are hard at work, but a good deal exhausted. It is reported to me that my communication with you by the Yorktown road is clear of the enemy. Batteries, cavalry, and infantry can take post by the side of mine to whip the enemy.

This found General Heintzelman absent; but it was returned opened, and on the envelope indorsed, "Opened and read," by the senior officer on that field. A cavalryman took over the note, and returned with it by the Yorktown road after an absence of twenty minutes.

To return. It was now after 1 o'clock, and the battle had swollen into one of gigantic proportions. The left had been re-enforced with the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth New York Regiments—the only remaining ones of my reserve—under Colonel Taylor, and all were engaged; yet its fortunes would ebb and flow, despite the most determined courage and valor of my devoted officers and men. Three times the enemy approached within 80 yards of the road, which was the center of my operations, and as often were they thrown back with violence and slaughter. Every time his advance was made with fresh troops, and each succeeding one seemed to be in greater force and determination.

The Eleventh Massachusetts Regiment and the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania were ordered to the left. The support of the batteries and the Second New Hampshire Regiment were withdrawn from their advanced position in front to take post where they could look after the front and left at the same time. The orders to the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Regiment did not reach it, and it remained on the right.

At this juncture word was received from Colonel Taylor that the regiments of his command longest engaged were falling short of ammunition, and when he was informed that the supply train was not yet up a portion of his command presented an obstinate front to the advance of the enemy with no other cartridges than were gathered from the boxes of the fallen.

Again the enemy were re-enforced by the arrival of Longstreet's division. His troops had passed through Williamsburg on their retreat from Yorktown and were recalled to strengthen the rebel forces before Williamsburg. No sooner had they joined than it was known that they were again moving to drive in our left. After a violent and protracted struggle they were again repulsed with great loss. Simulta-

neous with this movement an attempt was made to drive in our front and seize the batteries by the troops from Fort Magruder, aided by re-enforcements from the redoubts on the left. The withdrawal of the supports invited this attack, and it was at this time that four of our guns were captured. They could have been saved, but only at the risk of losing the day. Whatever of dishonor, if any, is attached to their loss belongs to the brigadier-general commanding the division, and not to his chief of artillery or to the officers or men serving with the batteries, for truer men never stepped upon the field of battle.

While this was going on in front Captain Smith, by a skillful disposition of his battery, held complete command of the road, which subsequently, by a few well-directed shots, was turned to good account.

The foregoing furnishes a faithful narrative of the disposition of my command throughout this eventful day. Between 4 and 5 o'clock Brigadier-General Kearny, with all his characteristic gallantry, arrived on the ground at the head of his division, and after having secured their positions my division was withdrawn from the contest and held as a reserve until dark, when the battle ended, after a prolonged and severe conflict against three times my number, directed by the most accomplished general of the rebel army, Maj. Gen. J. E. Johnston, assisted by Generals Longstreet, Pryor, Gholson, and Pickett, with commands selected from the best troops in their army.

The lists of the killed and wounded attest the character of the contest. The killed of the enemy must have been double my own. Of the wounded we cannot estimate. Eight hundred were left in hospitals at Williamsburg, and others were distributed among the private houses of this city, while all the available tenements in the vicinity of the field of battle are filled with them. Three hundred prisoners were taken.

I have omitted to mention the arrival early in the afternoon of Brigadier-General Heintzelman, commanding the Third Army Corps, with his staff, and to express my very grateful acknowledgments for the encouragement inspired by his presence and for the aid and support he gave me by his counsel and conduct.

As soon as darkness concealed their movements the rebels retreated in a state of utter demoralization, leaving behind artillery, wagons, &c.

History will not be believed when it is told that the noble officers and men of my division were permitted to carry on this unequal struggle from morning until night unaided in the presence of more than 30,000 of their comrades with arms in their hands; nevertheless it is true. If we failed to capture the rebel army on the plains of Williamsburg it surely will not be ascribed to the want of conduct and courage in my command.

The field was marked by an unusual number of instances of conspicuous courage and daring, which I shall seek an early opportunity to bring to the notice of the commander of the Third Corps.

At this time I can speak but in general terms of the regiments and batteries engaged in the battle of Williamsburg. Their list of the killed and wounded from among their number will forever determine the extent of their participation in this hard-fought and dearly-contested field.* Their constancy and courage are deserving all praise. My profound and grateful acknowledgments are rendered to them.

I am under great obligations to the officers of my staff for eminent services, and especially to Capt. Joseph Dickinson, my assistant adju-

* Casualties embodied in return on p. 450.

tant-general, and my aides-de-camp, Lieuts. William H. Lawrence and Joseph Abbott, who were with me throughout the day.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Army Corps.

[Addenda.]

Letter to Captain McKeever, inclosing dispatch dated "Front of Williamsburg, May 5, 1862, 11.20 a. m.," in regard to the contest during the morning.

MAY 7, 1862.

I send you herewith a dispatch which was addressed and sent you by me, as dated, under the impression that you were in the vicinity of General Sumner. The orderly went and returned by the Williamsburg and Yorktown road, and was not absent more than twenty minutes. You had left. General Sumner opened the note, read it, and returned on the envelope that he had done so. The envelope was destroyed by the rain. I request that you will, after reading it, return the within to me. It speaks for itself, and will have much to do in history hereafter.

Respectfully,

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Brigadier-General.

Captain MCKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Corps.

[Inclosure.]

IN FRONT OF WILLIAMSBURG,
May 5, 1862—11.20 a. m.

I have had a hard contest all the morning, but do not despair of success. My men are hard at work, but a good deal exhausted. It is reported to me that my communication with you by the Yorktown road is clear of the enemy. Batteries, cavalry, and infantry can take post by the side of mine to whip the enemy.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. HOOKER'S DIVISION, THIRD ARMY CORPS,
Camp near White Oak Swamp, Va., May 27, 1862.

CAPTAIN: My attention has been called to that part of Brigadier-General Kearny's official report of the battle of Williamsburg which states "and enabled Major Wainwright, of Hooker's division, to collect his artillerists and reopen fire from several pieces," and I give it my positive and emphatic denial. This statement admits of no application to any battery of mine except Smith's, and I deny that any men of his were driven from their pieces, or that the fire from his battery was suspended from the proximity or fire of the enemy's skirmishers at any

time during that day. I request that this statement may be forwarded, in order that it may be placed on record with my official report of the battle on the 5th instant.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Army Corps.

No. 7.

Report of Maj. Charles S. Wainwright, Chief of Artillery.

HDQRS. DIVISION ARTILLERY, HOOKER'S DIVISION,
Camp near Williamsburg, May 7, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to lay before the general commanding this division the following report as to the part taken by the batteries under my command in the battle of the 5th instant:

Being in rear of the infantry, we camped about 1 o'clock that morning, two batteries about half a mile this side of King's Creek and two the same distance on the other side. By 6 o'clock that morning we were again *en route*, Battery H, First U. S. Artillery, Captain Webber, and Battery D, First New York Artillery, Captain Osborn, being in advance, Captain Bramhall's Sixth New York Battery about a mile in the rear.

On arriving at the front I at once, by the general's direction, ordered Captain Webber to place his guns in battery—one in the road just at the corner of the felled timber which lay on its left, another some 20 yards in rear of this, and the other four in a field on the right of the road. They were immediately got into position, but while the first section in the road was being unlimbered Lieut. Chandler P. Eakin was shot down close by my side and Lieut. Horace L. Pike near the second piece, as also two of the privates. The drivers of the limbers taking fright, as also some of the cannoneers, they fell back about a hundred yards to the rear of their pieces. Aided by Captain Webber and First Sergeant [William A.] Harn I tried to urge and drive them forward to their guns, but did not succeed in getting a sufficient number up to open fire. I then went back to Captain Osborn's four-gun battery, which had come up, and called for volunteers to aid in manning these pieces. Every cannoneer at once sprang to the front, and headed by their officers, opened fire from four of Battery H's guns, while at the same time Captain Webber got some 15 or 18 of his men at the other two. The rain was falling fast at the time, rendering it impossible to see the exact position of the enemy. Our fire was directed in reply to some pieces on the works about 700 yards directly in our front, and at part of a field battery to our front and left, which appeared to be in the open, but which I have since ascertained was in a sunken redoubt.

Half an hour later Captain Bramhall came up, and I immediately ordered him to take position in the field to the right of the other guns, which he did in a most soldier-like manner. The ground in this field was exceedingly soft and full of stumps, so that he was only able to get five of his guns in battery. Our men soon got the range and distance of the enemy, and in half an hour more silenced their guns entirely.

They did not fire from the works in front except occasional shots again until late in the afternoon, but about 10 o'clock they opened again from the sunken redoubt and from another still farther to our left. Finding that these shots were enfilading some of my pieces I moved my right wing forward in echelon, and by noon we had again silenced them so effectually that their next effort to open fire about an hour later was a very weak one.

My men had now been in the open under fire not only of the guns we had silenced but of a very severe fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, for some seven hours, and were greatly fatigued. As all had been quiet for some time I rode to the rear to hasten up Captain Smith's Fourth New York Battery, which had been kept back by the bad roads and the baggage wagons of other divisions. It was while I was absent on this duty that the infantry supporting me abandoned the felled timber on my left, leaving my batteries entirely exposed on that flank. They (the enemy) came upon us over this timber, driving the men from the guns, which were badly mired, and having lost a large number of horses we were unable to bring them off. Captain Bramhall gallantly fought his pieces until the battery on his left was fairly in the hands of the enemy, when, finding that his men were exposed not only to the fire of the advancing foe but also to the return fire of his support on the right, he ordered his men to fall back. The enemy keeping possession of a portion of the felled timber on our left prevented any attempt again to work or remove these pieces.

So soon as I got Captain Smith's battery up I placed four of his guns in echelon on a knoll to the right of the road, just within the woods, and loaded with canister, to be ready in case the enemy should attempt to charge down the road. This was done about half an hour later. When the head of their column had approached to within some 150 yards we opened on them and effectually stopped their advance. Directly after this we suffered severely from single men of this column who had taken positions in the felled timber on the line of the road, four or five of the cannoneers falling at the advanced piece, until General Kearny furnished me with a company of sharpshooters as a support. After this charge was repelled the battery was not seriously engaged, only firing occasional shell in the direction of the works in front and on our left, which had again opened fire. At sunset, with the general's permission, I withdrew my two remaining batteries, leaving Captain Thompson, chief of artillery in Kearny's division, in charge of the position.

I regret exceedingly to be obliged to report the loss of four of Battery H's guns and one caisson, which were carried off by the enemy when they had possession. Captain Bramhall's guns were so deeply mired that they did not succeed in moving them. I have also to report the loss of 4 men killed and 2 officers and 18 enlisted men wounded, a full list of which is appended.* The enemy carried off 40 horses with the guns, and we have as many more left dead on the field, besides a number wounded and missing.

I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of my officers generally. Captain Webber, who only joined his command since our arrival at Ship Point, showed great bravery in urging his men up to the guns. Lieutenants Eakin and Pike fell well to the front at the first fire of the enemy. Captain Bramhall's conduct was that of an experienced officer, having his men in perfect command, and such as fully sustained his gallantry at Ball's Bluff last October. He was seconded

* Embodied in return on p. 450.

by all his lieutenants and men. Captain Osborn and his lieutenants in this their first engagement gave promise of making brave and efficient officers. I would especially mention among the enlisted men Sergeants Harn and [John] Doran and Privates [Daniel] Barry and [Daniel] Conway, of Battery H, and Privates [John] Shoemaker and [George O.] Westcott, of Battery D, as having done particularly good service. Captain Osborn's and Captain Smith's batteries are still in condition for service; Captain Bramhall's lacking horses, and Captain Webber's both horses and pieces.

I will furnish a more complete report of the present condition of my command as to ammunition, &c., so soon as I get my reports from the captains.

I remain, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. S. WAINWRIGHT,

Major and Division Chief of Artillery.

Capt. JOSEPH DICKINSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Hooker's Division.

No. 8.

Report of Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, HOOKER'S DIVISION,
Camp near Williamsburg, Va., May 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 4th instant, pursuant to orders received, my brigade made an advance from the camp before Yorktown on the Williamsburg road, and encamped about 3 miles from that town at 11 o'clock p. m. At daybreak on the morning of the 5th we again moved forward, and at about 6 a. m. came in view of the line of works before Williamsburg. At this time a few rebel horsemen were moving from the direction of their main work towards a position on our right, but upon discovering our advance the cavalry returned, and a line of skirmishers extending took up a position covering our whole front at a distance perhaps of about 250 yards. I then, pursuant to orders from the general commanding the division to place my brigade in position, threw forward a portion of the left wing of the First Massachusetts Volunteers, Colonel Cowdin, by company, on the left of the road, holding the remainder of the regiment in reserve on the left, while two companies of the Second New Hampshire Volunteers, Colonel Marston, were ordered forward upon the right to nearly the edge of the timber, while the remaining companies remained formed in line in the rear. This was the position occupied when the engagement commenced on both sides, but the enemy's skirmishers were soon driven in, and he opened a heavy fire with shot and shell upon our position from a strong work mounting four guns in our front and at a distance of about 800 yards. Shortly afterward the remaining portion of this regiment (seven companies) were ordered into position, also on the right, within supporting distance of a battery, which was thrown out to an advanced position upon the road. From the position thus occupied the Second New Hampshire and the portion of the First Massachusetts not only repelled the enemy's skirmishers, but drove his sharpshooters from his advanced rifle pits and silenced his heavy guns upon the works in front.

At about 8 o'clock a. m. I received information that the enemy were about to attempt to turn our left flank, and also that he had two light batteries and heavy forces of infantry in front of our left. The remaining portion of the First Massachusetts was then extended as skirmishers from our advanced position on our left in a line nearly parallel with the road, the left resting in the heavy timber, and advanced slowly over the fallen timber toward the left and forward. The Eleventh Massachusetts (Colonel Blaisdell) and subsequently the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania (Colonel Small) were deployed in the same manner upon the right, with a view, by direction of the general commanding the division, of making a connection with General Sumner's forces, who were supposed to be within supporting distance to the right. In these positions, with my whole forces closely engaged and pressing forward, the fight was severe and unceasing, and our position without support until about 11 o'clock, when General Patterson's brigade made a timely arrival to meet a heavy force which was moving upon us through the timber on our left, evidently with a view to turn our flank and cut off communication with the rear.

Soon after the arrival of this re-enforcement I received a report from the First Massachusetts Regiment that the most of the regiment was out of ammunition, and by direction of the general commanding the division I ordered a man to the rear to procure more, and receiving a fresh regiment (the Seventy-second New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Moses) as a relief, I withdrew the First Massachusetts from the extreme left and placed it along the front as a connection between the Seventy-second New York, which now took the advance position, supporting the right of General Patterson's position and the road, a position which was not at this time heavily pressed. For some hours now our whole position had been under a hot fire from a field battery placed behind a front of timber far to the left, and much of our loss had been caused by this fire, and soon after the arrival of the Seventy-second New York I received information that General Hooker desired me either to silence or take the battery above referred to, whereupon I went forward and communicated with Lieutenant-Colonel Moses, who pushed his command boldly forward in that direction until he received a cutting fire both from the front and flank, and was unable to advance farther without being entirely cut off from support or retreat unless General Patterson's brigade should dislodge the heavy force in his front.

As there was an open plain in the rear of the battery and its position was covered by a point of timber occupied by the rebels I considered any effective action at this time against it as impossible, and therefore returned to the position of my own brigade. I had hardly returned when I perceived that the rebels were gradually bearing down our forces on the left, and soon afterward, notwithstanding the gallant support of the Seventieth New York (Colonel Dwight), were overpowered and forced to retire. In so doing they were closely followed up by the enemy until he had obtained a position in rear of the left of that regiment. I then withdrew that regiment entirely from that position to support our retreating forces at the point of the woods, and just in time to unmask the position of the enemy and expose him to a most severe fire of canister from a part of a field battery thrown forward for the purpose of checking the rebel advance; and I think, from my own observation, this battery contributed more toward sustaining our position than anything else that could have been brought to bear in that part of the field.

It was now about 5 o'clock p. m., and we were, notwithstanding re-

enforcements received, losing ground and being slowly driven in, when information was received that General Kearny's division was within ten minutes of us. The exciting cheers which were then given and the striking up of national airs by a band just in rear enabled the officers with one accord to urge on any and every man, without regard to company or regiment, into one heterogeneous and well-formed line, which held our front till the arrival of General Kearny's division. I should have mentioned before that the Eleventh Massachusetts (Colonel Blaisdell) was about 2 o'clock withdrawn from the right and sent to the support of General Patterson on the left, but the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania (now commanded by Major Berry, Colonel Small having retired, being wounded early in the action) remained at or near its first position all day and all night. My other regiments, after the arrival of such re-enforcements as would admit of their being withdrawn to the rear, were encamped about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the rear.

Thus ended a day most severe upon a body of men jaded by hard labor, want of sleep, and a long march at its commencement, and who had been under an unceasing fire and exposed to a driving rain-storm for thirteen hours. The command, nevertheless, endured everything, and behaved handsomely during the whole engagement.

For special mention of many who made themselves conspicuous I would respectfully refer to the accompanying reports of the regimental commanders. I wish to say, however, that I was very much assisted during the whole day by Lieutenant Hibbert, acting assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Hubbard, aide-de-camp, who were present with me when circumstances made it practicable and at other times carrying orders, during the whole battle. For the list of killed, wounded, and missing of my command I would also refer to previous reports.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. GROVER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Hooker's Division.

No. 9.

Report of Col. Robert Cowdin, First Massachusetts Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MASSACHUSETTS INFANTRY,
First Brig., Hooker's Div., near Williamsburg, Va., May 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement of my command on May 5, 1862:

We left the camp of previous night at 5 a. m., and proceeded to a point about 2 miles distant on the Williamsburg road, arriving in sight of the enemy at about 6 o'clock. My command consisted of 3 field, 1 staff, and 22 line officers, and 682 men. The regiment was by order drawn up in a lot of dense fallen timber to the left of the road in front of the woods and facing the enemy's earthworks. Here we received orders to move forward as skirmishers. Here we received a heavy fire of artillery and musketry from the left in front. The regiment was then ordered forward by companies to front of our artillery as skirmishers to pick off the enemy's cannoneers, where they remained nearly five

* Embodied in return, p. 450.

hours, doing such service as to effectually silence the four guns of the enemy on our front. Here we lay under a severe cross-fire from a battery of the enemy placed in a redoubt at our left and front. During this time we were exposed to and annoyed by the enemy's sharpshooters in rifle pits on our front. At this time our ammunition was nearly expended, and we sent to the rear for a supply. We were soon relieved by the Seventy-second New York Volunteers, Second Brigade, Hooker's division, and ordered back to our old position, where we were ordered to remain as a reserve. In a short time we were again ordered forward, partially without ammunition, to support the Seventy-second New York Volunteers, as well as the Third Brigade, which was now engaging the enemy in the woods on our left, the Eleventh Massachusetts being in line some 30 paces in our rear. Between 2 and 3 p. m. the Third Brigade and Seventy-second New York Volunteers fell back, being heavily pressed by the enemy, who had received large re-enforcements. We were now ordered to fall back to the road, the Eleventh Massachusetts receiving the same order from one of the brigade staff officers (acting assistant adjutant-general). In falling back we received a very heavy fire from the enemy, losing a number of men. We were then ordered by the general to form on the south side of and facing the road, and prepared to resist cavalry, which was expected down the road. Other troops now rushed through our ranks from our rear. We were then ordered to the other side of the road, being still under a very heavy fire, and shortly after re-enforcements under General Kearny arrived. We were then ordered to cross the road again on the left of a brigade of Kearny's division, and advanced 800 yards into the woods. Meanwhile, the enemy being repulsed and fresh troops arriving, we were ordered back near the road, and there remained until by order of the brigadier-general commanding we encamped in woods half a mile back at 8 p. m.

During the entire day the rain fell almost in torrents. In my opinion the officers and men of my command acted with the utmost coolness and courage, exposed as they were nearly a whole day to a galling fire of artillery and infantry on our front and left. I submit a report of the casualties.*

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ROBERT COWDIN,

Colonel, Commanding First Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.

Lieut. JOSEPH HIBBERT, Jr.,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 10.

Report of Col. William Blaisdell, Eleventh Massachusetts Infantry.

HDQRS. ELEVENTH REGT. MASSACHUSETTS VOLS.,
First Brig., Hooker's Div., Camp near Williamsburg, Va.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by this regiment in the engagement before Williamsburg on the 5th instant:

I arrived with the regiment in front of the enemy at fifteen minutes before five in the morning, and was ordered by General Grover to ad-

* Embodied in return, p. 450.

vance and deploy to the right of the Second New Hampshire Regiment as skirmishers. As soon as I became unmasked my right company engaged with the enemy's skirmishers and reserve. A couple of well-directed volleys from Company E, Captain Bigelow, sent the enemy back in double-quick. On moving farther to the right, unmasking the whole regiment, I found a large force of the enemy's skirmishers, and immediately ordered Companies E, Captain Bigelow, and I, Lieutenant Robertson commanding, to deploy as skirmishers and engage the enemy at once, which was promptly and gallantly executed, the men advancing to within 300 yards of the enemy's works, driving all before them, and holding that position until 9.30 o'clock, when I withdrew my men, having received an order from General Hooker to penetrate the woods to the right and rear to ascertain if there was any enemy between us and General Sumner, and, if so, to wipe them out. I obeyed this order, and returned to my old position, after communicating with General Hancock, and reported that there was no enemy in that direction.

At this time I saw the enemy's cavalry threatening our artillery stationed on my left and rear. I fixed bayonets and put the regiment in position to repel any attack, and sent Adjutant Currier to General Grover, informing him of the re-enforcements of the enemy passing from his left and center to his right.

At about 3.30 o'clock I was ordered by General Hooker's assistant adjutant-general to march the regiment back to the left of the road and support the New Jersey brigade, which I obeyed as soon as possible, and on arriving on the ground I became immediately engaged with the enemy, who was endeavoring to turn our left flank, continuing to hold them in check until I was ordered to retire across the road in order that fresh troops might occupy our place. Up to this time my regiment was well in hand, maintaining their organization complete, with scarcely any stragglers, obeying the orders given with promptness and alacrity, doing their duty nobly after so hard a march and exposure to the severe rain.

While the regiment was engaged on the left of the road, at not more than 50 yards, a rebel officer displayed a white flag, crying out, "Don't fire on your friends," when I ordered "Cease firing," and Private Michael Doherty, of Company A, stepped forward to get the flag, and when near it the officer said to his men, "Now give it them." The men obeyed, firing and severely wounding Private Doherty, who immediately returned the fire, shooting the officer through the heart, thus rewarding him for his mean treachery.

I would here state that I was most ably and gallantly sustained throughout the day by my field and staff officers. Lieutenant-Colonel Tileston was sick, but still did not leave his post till the action closed; Major Tripp and Adjutant Currier did their duty faithfully and nobly; Quartermaster Coy acted in a manner deserving of great praise, forcing his way to the front over almost insurmountable obstacles with ammunition for the First Brigade; Surgeon Foye performed his duties in a faithful and skillful manner, dressing more than 150 wounds with his own hands. I cannot in justice particularize the line officers where every one (with two exceptions) behaved so admirably. I must, however, mention Captain McDonald, who, though suffering intense pain from a severely-scalded foot, nevertheless led his company through the entire day in the most gallant manner.

In conclusion, I will state that the officers and men of the regiment behaved bravely and coolly, obeying every order to the letter promptly,

and if there was any fault in the conduct of the regiment it lies entirely with myself, and not with the men, and it is my intention at the first opportunity to mention several cases of privates in the regiment whose gallant conduct in action deserves particular commendation.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. BLAISDELL,
Colonel, Commanding Regiment.

Lieut. JOSEPH HIBBERT, Jr.,
Act. Asst. Adj. Gen., First Brigade, Hooker's Division.

No. 11.

Report of Col. Gilman Marston, Second New Hampshire Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by the Second Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the battle of Williamsburg on the 5th instant. We arrived before the strong works which the enemy had erected in front of Williamsburg and within range of his guns about 5.30 a. m., preceded by the First Massachusetts Volunteers, and followed by the Eleventh Massachusetts Volunteers and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers. Company E, Captain Drown, and Company B, Lieutenant Boyden (Captain Colby, of Company B, being seriously ill at Camp Winfield Scott), were immediately deployed as skirmishers in the fallen timber on the left of the road by which we advanced. The remaining companies (seven) formed in line of battle in the wood and on the right of the road, the left resting thereon. About 7.15 a. m. I was ordered by General Hooker to advance the line through the fallen timber about 250 yards to the margin thereof and there shelter the men from the enemy's fire as much as possible, and be prepared to support the batteries under Major Wainwright, which were about to be placed in position in front of us. We remained in that position for more than six hours, constantly under fire of the enemy's batteries, and the rain all the while falling in torrents. I am sure no veteran soldiers could have endured the discomforts and the dangers of those six long hours with more courage and cheerfulness than did the officers and men of the Second Regiment of New Hampshire Volunteers. Companies E and B, who had been deployed as skirmishers in the morning, quickly chased the skirmishers of the enemy from the fallen timber, and then from the rifle pits, and finally into their fortifications. They then directed their attention to the cannoneers of the enemy, and so unerring was their aim that the fire of the batteries was very much enfeebled, and sometimes completely silenced.

Captain Snow, Company F, who had been on detached service at Cheeseman's Creek, arrived about 1 o'clock p. m., having marched all night to join his regiment. For several hours the fire of musketry had been very heavy in the wood some half a mile or more on the left of the road, and in advance of the position I occupied in the fallen timber. Sometimes the fire seemed to advance and again to recede, and we were doubtful how the day was going in that part of the field. About 3 o'clock p. m. the fire of the enemy suddenly increased on the left, and, apparently advancing indicated that the left was about to be turned.

As it was impossible to change front in the fallen timber where we lay and preserve any formation whatever, I got the regiment out of

the brush and moved across the road by the left flank, to aid in driving the enemy back, where our troops seemed to be very hardly pressed. The regiment had become very much broken in making its way through the almost impenetrable thickets in which we had lain for so many hours. Other regiments were in the same condition, but every man that had a musket to fire went into the fight with whatever regiment or company he happened to fall in with, and so continued until night put an end to the contest. Captain Drown had collected a company composed of his own men and those of other regiments, and bravely led them on to a body of the enemy, firing his revolver and cheering on his men, when the rebel barbarian in command exhibited a white flag, and cried out to him, "Don't fire, don't fire; we are friends," at the same time directing his men to trail their arms. Captain Drown, believing they were about to surrender, directed his men not to fire, whereupon the whole body of the enemy suddenly fired upon him, killing him instantly, and also several of his men. There was no braver man in the service of the country than Captain Drown, no truer patriot, no citizen more conscientious and upright.

There were 4 field and staff officers, 26 company officers, and 740 non-commissioned officers and privates present in the engagement belonging to the Second Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers, of whom 16 were killed, 66 wounded, and 23 missing.*

In concluding this hasty report I take leave to say that the officers and men of my regiment, notwithstanding all the fatigues and privations to which they had been subjected, were throughout the day of battle not only uncomplaining but cheerful, and apparently anxious for nothing but the opportunity to do their country in the day of battle all the service in their power.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GILMAN MARSTON.

Lieut. JOSEPH HIBBERT, Jr.,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 12.

Report of Col. William F. Small, Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. TWENTY-SIXTH REGT. PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
First Brig., Hooker's Div., Williamsburg, Va., May 5, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in accordance with orders from General Hooker, commanding division, I took up a position on the extreme right of our lines, fronting the enemy's works at this place, with a view of forming a junction with the left of General Sumner's forces. Not being able to form this junction my regiment occupied a position in front of the woods beyond the main road passing in front of the enemy's batteries. The right wing of the regiment was advanced as skirmishers, under the command of Maj. C. A. Berry, and immediately engaged the enemy's sharpshooters, and did good execution upon his gunners.

Observing a number of the enemy coming out from their works, apparently with a view of outflanking us, I proceeded to the right of the regiment and extended it still farther in that direction for the pur-

* But see revised statement, p. 450.

pose of meeting them. While engaged in this movement I received a severe wound in the right leg—a rifle-ball passing through it—and was obliged to relinquish the command to Major Berry.

It affords me great pleasure to state that the officers and men of the regiment behaved with great steadiness and gallantry, and exhibited an alacrity and precision in the performance of every movement required of them alike creditable to their patriotism and courage.

I am under particular obligations to Adj. P. P. G. Hall (who has recently recovered from a long and severe illness) for his able assistance during the engagement.

Major Berry, to whom I am also under obligations for prompt, efficient, and intelligent support, will report the further operations of the regiment, and will also furnish a list of casualties.

Very truly, yours,

WILLIAM F. SMALL,
Colonel, Commanding Regiment.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

No. 13.

Report of Maj. Casper M. Berry, Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. TWENTY-SIXTH REGT. PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
First Brig., Hooker's Div., Williamsburg, Va., May 5, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the general commanding, after Colonel Small was wounded I remained with my command in front of the enemy's works until I was ordered by General Hooker's aide to fall back on the reserve, the aide's horse being shot down while in the act of transmitting to me the order. The enemy pressing the skirmishers, I then threw out my left wing to the right of the road in the woods, for the purpose of checking any movement to outflank the First Massachusetts Volunteers' skirmishers, which were in front of us, and there remained until about 5 o'clock, until re-enforcements came up. I was then ordered by the general commanding the re-enforcements to withdraw the regiment from the front, to hold it in the rear of his command in the woods, where we remained in line of battle. I then received an order from General Sumner to take position on the left of his line, and remained in that position until dark and encamped near the same place for the night.

It affords me great pleasure to state that the officers and men of my command behaved with great steadiness and exhibited a great alacrity and precision in the execution of my commands alike creditable to their patriotism and courage.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

C. M. BERRY,
Major, Commanding Regiment.

Lieut. JOSEPH HIBBERT, Jr.,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 14.

Report of Col. Nelson Taylor, Seventy-second New York Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, HOOKER'S DIVISION,
Camp before Williamsburg, Va., May 8, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the action of the 5th instant:

The brigade arrived on the ground about 9 a. m., having been much hindered in its march from its last camp, about 3 miles back, by a drenching rain, muddy road, and the frequent passing of cavalry and artillery. Receiving an order from the brigadier-general commanding the division, I sent the Seventy-second Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Moses, to relieve the First Massachusetts. In about two hours the Seventieth Regiment, commanded by Colonel Dwight, was ordered to support the Seventy-second.

About 1 p. m., under the orders of the general commanding the division, I took the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth Regiments, respectively commanded by Colonel Brewster and Acting Colonel Burtis, to re-enforce our left, which was being hard pressed. Having conducted the regiments on the ground indicated an order came to march the regiments back on the road and to take a position parallel to it and on the right of the Seventieth and Seventy-second, which was immediately executed, and the regiments formed in line and advanced across the road, when they immediately engaged the enemy, who were now exposed to a severe cross-fire from the Seventieth and Seventy-second on the left and the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth on the right. The enemy now began to fall back slowly, but desperately contending for every foot of ground forced from. At this time a sharp enfilading fire of shot and shell was opened on our right from a field fortification opposite.

The ammunition of the troops on our left was by this time entirely expended, and they began gradually to fall back behind our batteries in the main road, and from the same cause the others on the right did the same. A few well directed shots from our batteries kept the enemy in check while the regiments were reforming and receiving fresh supplies of ammunition, which had just arrived on the ground. This was about 4 p. m., at which time re-enforcements arrived and took up the position occupied by our troops. The Seventy-second and Seventy-third Regiments were marched subsequently to the rear of the troops engaged on the left as a support, and the Seventy-fourth kept in line at the rear to answer any call that might be made upon it. No other disposition was made of the troops during the last part of the day, except that the Seventy-third was marched across the road to support a battery.

At dark the regiments of the brigade were assembled in the timber on the east side of the road, where they passed the night, having been relieved by the arrival of fresh troops. The bravery and conduct of the officers and men that fell under my observation were unexceptionable. They all did their whole duty as soldiers, and I trust to the entire satisfaction of the brigadier-general commanding the division, under whose immediate supervision and by whose direction the action was conducted. For details of the parts taken by the different regiments I respectfully refer to the accompanying copies of reports of the regimental commanders, and for the numbers killed, wounded, and

missing to the lists already forwarded to the headquarters of the division.*

In conclusion, I take occasion to express my satisfaction with the able manner in which I was assisted by my two aides, Lieuts. O. H. Hart and H. E. Tremain, the latter during the whole day, and the former until about 4 p. m., when he was injured by the falling of his horse and obliged to leave the field.

I have the honor to be, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

NELSON TAYLOR,
Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade.

Capt. JOSEPH DICKINSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Hooker's Division.

No. 15.

Report of Col. William Dwight, jr., Seventieth New York Infantry.

WILLIAMSBURG, VA., May 8, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor respectfully to submit herewith a report of the part taken by the regiment I had the honor to command in the action of the 5th instant before Williamsburg:

The regiment was ordered to remain at its bivouac on Sunday night until the Third Brigade should pass it, and also to bring up the rear of its own brigade. The regiment was therefore unable to move until the morning was far advanced, and when it did move the condition of the road was so frightful, owing to the rain that was falling and that had fallen during the night before, that its progress was slow. It arrived, however, at the scene of action before any regiment in its brigade had taken part in the engagement, and reported at once as ready for duty. It must have been between 12.30 and 1 o'clock p. m. when the acting assistant adjutant-general to the colonel commanding the brigade communicated to me the order to move my regiment to the front, to support, as he informed me, the third regiment of this brigade, or, more properly, the Seventy-second Regiment New York Volunteers. Quartermaster Fry, of the Seventy-second Regiment New York Volunteers, directed the regiment onto the field. The regiment moved for some distance through felled timber, and I observed, as it moved on, several wounded officers from the Third Brigade being taken from the field and to my left troops retreating.

When the regiment arrived at the point where Lieutenant-Colonel Moses, of the Seventy-second New York Volunteers, had stationed himself with his reserves the general features of the position were pointed out to me by that officer, and after so pointing them out in a very brief manner Lieutenant-Colonel Moses moved off to the rear, and I did not see him again. His regiment followed him piece-meal, and I was left with my own regiment, with nothing to support it but some companies of the Seventy-second Regiment New York Volunteers in its rear. These companies appeared to be under the direction of Major Stevens, Seventy-second New York Volunteers.

Following a suggestion from Lieutenant-Colonel Moses I had moved

*Embodied in return, p. 450.

the four right companies of the regiment diagonally to the right, to prevent as far as possible being outflanked in that direction. It was not long before the enemy appeared out of the woods immediately in front of me. His first regiment which appeared mistook my regiment for their friends, whom they expected in the same direction, and on seeing us loudly demanded that we should show our colors. Theirs were first shown. Their appearance created the usual doubts in the minds of my line officers. On our colors being waved a volley from the enemy passed over our heads. Our fire then opened buck and ball at not over 60 yards, and was so effective that we advanced, and the rebel regiment was supported by another regiment. The firing was maintained briskly on both sides for a long time, when, as my regiment seemed to have settled itself behind a salient line of the fallen timber, and as I felt the enemy's fire sensibly increasing, I directed a number of men from each company near me to charge over the timbers with cheers, and drive back the enemy farther and maintain their ground. I did this because, from the direction and extent of the enemy's fire and his progress on my left, I knew that the position must be held. My wish was well seconded by officers and men, and the enemy gave ground, which my men maintained until their ammunition gave out.

Immediately after this little advance I sent to the colonel commanding the brigade for re-enforcements, as the fire had been so hot as to warn me that ammunition must soon be low. The enemy were evidently re-enforced in front of me, and they attempted to regain the little ground they had lost, and this skulking contest from opposite sides of logs in front of my main body became in some cases hand-to-hand. At this point Captain Willard, of the Seventy-second Regiment New York Volunteers, came over to me from the rear and warned me of the terrible fire to which my regiment was exposed. While speaking of the position he fell at my side with a bullet through the head. Major Stevens, of the same regiment, joined me at this point. As he had been near me frequently before he asked me my opinion of the position of affairs and what had better be done. I told him we could do nothing but hold the position where we were; that the enemy's fire had proceeded so far on our left that we must depend on its being driven back by others, and I urged him to bring any troops in rear of my position up to my line. At the same time I directed my adjutant to go and see if re-enforcements could not be sent up to support me in my position.

Previous to this Lieutenant-Colonel Farnum had gone to the rear wounded, and I had received what I had deemed but a scratch in the right leg. After these two officers had left me came the most painful part of the time I spent on the field. The enemy's fire increased, and the dead and wounded fell thick and fast on all sides. The men having been short of ammunition, in many cases came to me to know what to do. I directed them to fix their bayonets and keep their place. I had the misfortune with my own eyes to see many of my best officers fall at this time, and although I had heard that there were portions of the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth Regiments New York Volunteers in my rear, and had sent several of my best officers to urge them forward to my position, I received no practical aid from any regiment. This state of affairs endured for some time, the enemy's fire increasing, mine diminishing, when I received notice from Lieutenant Nelson, of my regiment, that the colonel commanding the brigade had ordered the right of the regiment to retreat, and on looking toward the right I saw its companies pressing in. Knowing if this continued the enemy would charge on us, I endeavored to check it, and in so doing received two wounds,

one of which rendered me momentarily unconscious, the other disabled me. As soon as I was conscious I found the rebels in possession of my position. I was taken prisoner, and permitted to be carried by some of my own men (who were also prisoners) to Williamsburg. I was kindly treated, and permitted to remain on parole. Out of 33 commissioned officers who went into the engagement 22 were killed or wounded.

Where all behaved with so much gallantry it would seem to be invidious to mention any particular names, but Capt. Ben. Price, who is wounded and believed to be a prisoner; Capt. Wm. H. Bugbee, who is dead; Lieut. F. H. Nelson, who is dead, and Lieut. Joseph Zeigler, who is wounded, will be remembered by all who saw them on that day, even where many were as worthy and as purely and devotedly brave. I must not forget that my thanks are due to Major Stevens, of the Seventy-second Regiment New York Volunteers, for his conspicuous gallantry and good service during the whole time I was on the field.

I omitted to state in the proper place that while the parley concerning the flag was going on the moment they saw my national colors the rebels demanded my immediate surrender. I afterward found (when a prisoner) that they expected three of their own regiments in the very position I occupied, and that three regiments lay on my right flank during the whole time I was engaged. How far they were employed you can judge.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM DWIGHT, JR.,

Colonel Seventieth Regiment N. Y. Volunteers.

Capt. JOS. DICKINSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 16.

Report of Maj. Thomas Holt, Seventieth New York Infantry.

HDQRS. SEVENTIETH REGIMENT N. Y. STATE VOLS.,

SECOND BRIGADE, HOOKER'S DIVISION,

Camp near Williamsburg, Va., May 7, 1862.

COLONEL: I have to report that the number of men belonging to this regiment engaged in action on Monday, May 5, 1862, was about 700 men, who were under constant fire from the enemy from about 1 o'clock p. m. till about 4 or 5 p. m., after which we retired from the field, as our ammunition gave out.

I would call the attention of the commanding officer to the fact that the officers of this regiment acted bravely and did their duty, and have not a fault to find with them.

I am, your obedient servant,

THOS. HOLT,

Major, Commanding Seventieth Regiment N. Y. S. Vols.

Col. NELSON TAYLOR,

Commanding Second Brigade, Hooker's Division.

No. 17.

Report of Lieut. Col. Israel Moses, Seventy-second New York Infantry.

HDQRS. SEVENTY-SECOND REGIMENT N. Y. VOLUNTEERS,
Camp before Williamsburg, Va., May 11, 1862.

COLONEL: On the morning of the 5th instant I was ordered to relieve the First and Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Regiments, who occupied the felled woods on the left-hand side of the road, just in front of the open fields in front of the enemy's works near Williamsburg. The regiment was deployed in line, the first platoons being thrown out as pickets and skirmishers along the margin, with instructions (received from General Grover) to repress any advance, to destroy the horses and gunners of a section of a rebel battery on the left, and to protect a section of our own on the right, and in case of an opportunity presenting to take the section referred to.

Smart firing was kept up by artillery and small-arms for about an hour and a half, when heavy volleys of musketry were heard at the point held by the left of the regiment. General Grover, soon after coming up, informed me that it was the New Jersey brigade advancing on the enemy at that point. Very soon this firing became more constant and incessant, and was evidently from large bodies of troops advancing toward my position, and at the same time my pickets began to retire a little, and reported that the enemy were advancing in strength. I had sent Lieutenant Fry back to report to you and request that a regiment might be sent to my support, and at this time the Seventieth Regiment, Colonel Dwight, arrived. Four companies, with my own reserve, were immediately sent forward to the threatened point, the other six companies remaining as a reserve in the center. The enemy continued to advance, and drove in my pickets, who retired fighting without confusion, the enemy following and pouring in deadly volleys. I sought still further re-enforcements, which you brought up in person. My regiment at this time having entirely exhausted their ammunition, after four hours' fighting withdrew into the road, after having lost severely in killed and wounded.

Herewith accompanying is a list of the names of killed, wounded, and missing up to 12 o'clock this date.*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. MOSES,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

NELSON TAYLOR,

Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade, Hooker's Division.

No. 18.

Report of Col. William R. Brewster, Seventy-third New York Infantry.

HDQRS. SEVENTY-THIRD REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLS.,
Camp near Williamsburg, May 7, 1862.

COLONEL: I have to report that on Monday, the 5th instant, at about 1 o'clock p. m. I received orders from the colonel commanding

*Embodied in return, p. 450.

the brigade to advance with my regiment, for the support of the Seventieth and Seventy-second Regiments, then engaged with the enemy's right. We were taken through the woods to the left of the Williamsburg road, and formed in line of battle immediately in rear of those regiments. After remaining there a short time I was ordered to support the right, then in imminent danger of being turned. Accordingly, I returned to the road, crossed it, and entered the *chevaux-de-frise*, about 20 paces to the right of the ———.

We were then ordered to advance across the road, which was done in as good order as the obstructions would permit, and immediately upon reaching the left of the road were exposed to a galling fire from the enemy, then rapidly advancing upon that point. I immediately ordered the regiment to commence firing and to advance, which was done, and the enemy, under our steady fire, fell back, and I pushed forward as fast as the nature of the ground, obstructions, &c., would allow, still keeping up a constant fire. At this time the enemy opened upon us with a battery from their fortifications on our left, and commenced a steady fire of shell, having us immediately in their range. I still pressed the regiment forward, thinking that if we could get out of the range they would not fire upon their own friends. It seemed to me at this time as though victory was within our grasp, as they sullenly retired under our fire and theirs slackened very decidedly.

At this time my ammunition began to give out, the left and center were falling back, and the entire force of the enemy seemed turned upon the point where my regiment and the Seventy-fourth were engaged. I was consequently obliged to give the order to fall back to the woods, which we did in comparative good order.

My lieutenant-colonel (Lewis Benedict, jr.) is missing, and from all I can learn is a prisoner. My officers killed were Capt. John Feeney, of Company G, Lieut. J. J. Glass, of Company B, and Lieut. B. F. Beach, of Company C. Lieutenant Beach was sent in the morning by the colonel commanding the brigade with 6 men to reconnoiter a certain part of the enemy's lines, and while in the execution of this duty was killed. These officers all fell while in the discharge of their duties, and were brave and gallant men. The officers and men of my regiment (with but few exceptions) behaved admirably under their first exposure to fire, but I would call particular attention to Capts. C. B. Elliott, of Company I; A. A. Donalds, of Company F; M. W. Burns, of Company A, who were of great assistance to me in urging forward the men when exposed to a galling fire and obliged to advance through a thick entanglement of brush and felled timber. The most of my men were shot while climbing over felled trees. Lieutenant-Colonel Benedict was always in the advance, and having been on the extreme left of my regiment, must have been taken prisoner when they were first obliged to fall back.

I am, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

WM. R. BREWSTER,

Col. 73d Regt. N. Y. S. V., 2d Brig., Hooker's Division.

Lieut. H. E. TREMAIN,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Brigade.

No. 19.

Report of Lieut. Col. Charles H. Burtis, Seventy-fourth New York Infantry.

HDQRS. 74TH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
Camp near Williamsburg, Va., May 7, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that my regiment went into action at this place on the 5th instant about 2 o'clock p. m., myself in command, Capt. John P. Glass acting lieutenant-colonel, and John F. Chipchase, adjutant.

Agreeably to your orders, we proceeded from the woods where we had been held in reserve to a point where the enemy had been firing with fatal effect on three regiments of our division, whose ammunition had become exhausted at this moment, when a general panic seemed imminent. My regiment (with the exception of the left flank company) was marched by the right flank up the road toward and opposite the abatis and breastworks of the enemy on the west side of the road, where he was posted in strong force and well masked by large fallen timbers. Arriving at the point indicated we formed in line of battle, and marched forward under a most galling enfilading fire of grape, canister, and shell from the enemy, over the large fallen trees, which, interlacing each other, rendered the advance one of almost insurmountable difficulty. My gallant men overcame all obstacles, however, and went forward without faltering, taking advantage of such cover as the position presented, loading and firing as they proceeded with a coolness and intrepidity worthy the highest commendation. The same spirit of daring, coolness, and bravery inspired and governed the officers and men throughout the entire action, until their ammunition was expended and many of their guns had become foul and useless. It was then, and only then, that they retired, and this was done in the best of order under the circumstances.

Owing to the difficulties of the position it was impossible for me to communicate my orders to the regiment. For this reason the commandants of companies were obliged to advance and retire under cover of the fallen timber as well as circumstances would permit. The left flank company, Lieutenant Stewart commanding, having been detached from the regiment to deploy as skirmishers in advance of a portion of the Third Brigade of this division by orders from General Hooker through Captain Dickinson, performed their duties under difficulties and dangers as perilous as those performed by the balance of my regiment.

After retiring to the woods the remainder of my regiment was again formed, when General Hooker ordered me to proceed 600 yards to the rear and deploy as skirmishers, which order I was in the act of executing when one of your aides brought orders for me to form immediately into brigade line, which order was promptly obeyed.

* * * * *

The best proof I can offer in evidence of the bravery of my regiment is exemplified in the official list of the number of killed, wounded, and missing as furnished you yesterday, showing an aggregate loss among our officers and men of over 25 per cent.*

I am, colonel, your very obedient servant,

CHAS. H. BURTIS,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Col. NELSON TAYLOR, Comdg. Second Brig., Hooker's Div.

* Embodied in return, p. 450.

No. 20.

Report of Brig. Gen. Francis E. Patterson, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.

HDQRS. 3D BRIGADE, 2D DIVISION, 3D ARMY CORPS,
Camp before Williamsburg, May 9, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to the orders of the general of the division on the morning of the 5th instant I followed the First Brigade and found it engaged on the right of the Williamsburg road. The Fifth New Jersey Regiment, Colonel Starr, was detached from the brigade by order of the general and deployed to the right of the road, to support the batteries of the division. The Sixth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Van Leer, and the Seventh, Lieutenant-Colonel Carman, were deployed on the left of the road. The Eighth Regiment, Colonel Johnson, had not yet come up.

A wood extended from the road northwesterly to a line of field works that extended perpendicularly across the road in front. The Sixth and Seventh Regiments occupied this wood by a flank march and moved to the front by the right of companies about two-thirds the distance to the line of field works in front, when our skirmishers came upon the enemy's forces, as we could not see them, the woods having a growth of underbrush. The skirmishers being recalled the two regiments advanced until met by a warm fire, when the companies were formed forward into line and marched rapidly to the front some hundred paces, halted, and a file fire opened and kept up until the opposing fire was silenced, when we again advanced and were again met by a heavy fire, and the command was ordered to lie down.

It was now patent that we were outnumbered, as, in addition to a heavy fire in front, it was spreading around our left flank. Colonel Johnson, with the Eighth, having come up was deployed on the left of the regiments already in line, and for a time silenced their fire. The heaviest firing that had yet occurred was now opened on our right. It was met by a direct fire from our right and an oblique fire from our center, and silenced.

During this time the commands of officers in a large column, moving in our front and to our left, were heard, and the effort to outflank us was continued. There being no more men available, and having sent twice for re-enforcements, Colonel Johnson was ordered to change front obliquely to the rear on his right company. This for a time preserved the flank. Re-enforcements had been twice applied for—none came. Outnumbered five to one, outflanked, and out of ammunition, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Regiments, numbering when they entered the field 1,767 men for duty, to avoid being surrounded fell slowly back by my orders before a division consisting of Pryor's Virginia and North Carolina, Gholson's Mississippi and Alabama, and Pickett's Virginia brigades, forming a division of 6,000 men, with a loss of 117 killed, 284 wounded, and 235 missing, from the ground they had taken and held, within 100 yards of the end of the wood, from 8 until 1.30 o'clock, to their original position on the left of the road.

The conduct of the officers and men of the brigade, including my personal staff, was, without exception, marked by coolness, steadiness, and valor. Their loss in this their first engagement bears ample testimony to the proverbial gallantry of the State they come from. The Fifth Regiment, Colonel Starr, was separated from the brigade, and placed by order of the general of the division, on the right of the road,

and removed from my observation. Its loss was 8 killed, 70 wounded, including the colonel, and 37 missing.* It was under fire from morning until night.

Since writing the above I have obtained the following return of casualties:

Fifth Regiment, Colonel Starr, commanding.—Killed, 2 lieutenants, 7 non-commissioned officers and privates; wounded, 1 colonel, 1 captain, 7 lieutenants, 58 non-commissioned officers and men; missing, 28 non-commissioned officers and men.*

Sixth Regiment, Lieut. Col. John P. Van Leer commanding.—Killed, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 lieutenant, 37 non-commissioned officers and privates; wounded, 4 captains, 3 lieutenants, 71 non-commissioned officers and privates; missing, 26 non-commissioned officers and privates.*

Seventh Regiment, Lieut. Col. E. A. Carman commanding.—Killed, 1 lieutenant, 26 non-commissioned officers and privates; wounded, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 captains, 5 lieutenants, and 77 non-commissioned officers and privates; missing, 9 non-commissioned officers and privates.*

Eighth Regiment, Col. Adolphus J. Johnson commanding.—Killed, 1 major, 1 lieutenant, and 34 non-commissioned officers and privates; wounded, 1 colonel, 4 captains, 6 lieutenants, and 114 non-commissioned officers and privates; missing, 4 non-commissioned officers and privates.*

Recapitulation.—Killed, wounded, and missing, 2 colonels, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 1 major, 12 captains, 25 subalterns, and 456 non-commissioned officers and privates; aggregate, 498.*

The loss of the services of Colonel Johnson and Lieutenant-Colonels Van Leer and Carman and Major Ryerson is a very serious one in so far as the future service of the brigade is concerned. They had the respect and confidence of their commands and proved they well deserved it. I have yet to learn if the brigade can be handled in evolutions of the line with such a destitution of field officers. To risk a reputation so dearly earned without them, until those taking their place have learned their duties, would be injustice.

I append hereto a list of casualties.*

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. E. PATTERSON,

Brigadier General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding Brigade.

Capt. JOSEPH DICKINSON,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Corps, Army of the Potomac.

No. 21.

Report of Col. Samuel H. Starr, Fifth New Jersey Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH NEW JERSEY VOLUNTEERS,
Camp at Roper's Church, Va., May 12, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with circular from Headquarters Army of the Potomac of the 10th instant I have the honor to report the part taken by my regiment in the action before Williamsburg, Va., on the 5th instant:

Early on the morning of the 5th the regiment, worn-out by labor in

* But see revised statement, p. 450.

the trenches at Yorktown and by the preceding day's march with 100 rounds of ammunition in their knapsacks and cartridge boxes, suffering from privation and exposure, was marched to the front along a road completely enfiladed by the enemy's cannon. Debouching from the wood which lined the road on either hand, I received orders from General Hooker in person to march my regiment to the support of a battery (manned by regular troops, I have been informed) which was engaged with the enemy's chief defensive work in front. On receiving this order I marched my regiment at right angles to the road and took up a position to its right in the edge of the fallen timber or abatis in rear of the battery I was to support at the distance of about 60 yards. This position was one of great difficulty for raw troops, owing to the fact that the regiment was compelled to remain inactive, exposed to a severe fire of shell, grape, and musketry from the work in front and to a raking fire from a redoubt on its left flank, this last work enfilading the regiment from left to right.

In this position the regiment remained from about 8 a. m. until about 2 p. m., losing many men. The battery I was supporting was abandoned by its cannoneers at about 12.30 o'clock, the men retiring through my lines. The cannoneers were driven from their guns by the cannon of the enemy, as they were threatened at no time after I had taken my position by either cavalry or infantry. The enemy had turned the left flank of our position, upon which were engaged the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth New Jersey Regiments, Patterson's brigade, Hooker's division, and were slowly pressing those regiments back. Seeing this, and perceiving that defeat on that flank was probable unless re-enforced immediately, owing to the greatly-superior forces of the enemy, and also perceiving that the deserted and now useless battery would be best protected by moving my regiment forward, covering the left flank of the battery where alone it was threatened, without orders I changed front forward on my left company, and took up a position in the before-mentioned road (still enfiladed by the enemy's batteries), on the right of the regiments above named. The new line of battle was at right angles with the old. In this position my regiment was actively engaged and suffered severely, and, I believe, contributed considerably to the final result.

My loss was 103 killed, wounded, and missing. A list of the names of these I have had the honor already to submit.*

The regiment was under fire for ten hours without intermission, viz, from 8 a. m. until 6 p. m. Myself and officers were without food for sixty hours, except four or five small crackers each. The regiment was brave and, with some exceptions, behaved well for raw troops under fire for the first time.

The officers and men were not as attentive to my orders nor as prompt in executing them as I could have wished, nor as they will be, I confidently expect, in future. This is attributable to the novelty of a first action and the excitement which is natural with troops engaged with an enemy for the first time.

The names of one or two officers I shall have to recommend for dismissal for cowardice. Some privates fell to the rear with the wounded and others shirked off into the woods.

With these exceptions, I have reason to congratulate myself on having command of as gallant a regiment as is in the service. Some distinguished themselves above others for their coolness, many for their

* Embodied in return, p. 450.

courage and zeal, and all, with the above exceptions, received my approbation.

At present, for want of information, I can only mention by name those who distinguished themselves under my own observation and under the observation of officers in whose reports I place great confidence: Lieut. Col. G. Mott, Lieut. and Adjt. Virgil M. Healey (severely wounded), Capts. John Ramsey, E. C. Hopper, J. J. Cladek, and Robert S. Gould, and Lieuts. William H. Hill (severely wounded), Edward A. Acton (severely wounded), Simon P. Whitty (dangerously wounded), George S. Russell, Henry H. Woolsey, Thomas W. Eayre, John H. Moore, and John L. Pierson. The following non-commissioned officers and privates are also commended for their courage and gallantry: Sergt. Maj. William P. Wheeler, First Sergt. Guy Bryan, Company I; Sergts. Charles W. Arnett, Samuel Mustard, Company A; First Sergt. Robert H. Beecroft and Sergts. John M. Flannigan and Archibald McKaig, Corpls. James McConnell and David Miller, and Privates Patrick Kane and John Irving, Company G; First Sergt. John K. Simon and Corpl. John Z. Taylor, of Company D; First Sergt. Frederick A. Brill and Sergts. Frederick Close and John Hoehle; Corpls. Daniel F. Noe, John Sutline, and W. M. Blaise, and Privates Charles C. Dally, G. W. Dally, Charles H. Richter, Dallas Noe, John Johnson, and others of Company H. It will give me pleasure to do justice to many other gallant men in a subsequent report whose names are omitted for want of space and information.

It would be a gross neglect on my part were I to omit to mention in this place the names of the Rev. Mr. Thomas Sovereign and Assist. Surg. Henry F. Van Derveer, whose indefatigable labors and untiring zeal in attending the wounded and ministering to their comfort merit higher commendation than I can bestow.

The names of the gallant dead of the regiment will be cherished in the history of their country and State.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. H. STARR,

Colonel Fifth New Jersey Volunteers, Commanding Regiment.

Capt. CHARLES M. PREVOST, A. A. G., *Third Brig, Hooker's Div.*

No. 22.

Report of Maj. Francis Price, jr., Seventh New Jersey Infantry.

CAMP SEVENTH REGIMENT NEW JERSEY VOLS.,

May 12, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report supplementary to my report dated May 7, of the loss of the Seventh Regiment New Jersey Volunteers in the action before Williamsburg, Va., on the 5th instant:

We were ordered, on our arrival upon the field of action, to take up a position in the woods on the left of our batteries and repel any attempt of the enemy to flank our position. We entered the wood shortly after 8 o'clock in the morning, and immediately formed in line of battle on the left of the Sixth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers, the Eighth being upon our left. Two companies from the right, under command of Capt. Louis R. Francine, and two from the left, under command of Capt. Henry C. Bartlett, were deployed as skirmishers, the former to the front and the latter to the left of the regiment.

About this time the enemy appeared in force in front and drove the skirmishers from the front back upon the main body. The attack then became general along the whole line of our front. Shortly after Lieutenant-Colonel Carman was wounded and taken to the rear. I then called in the skirmishers from the left, and directed Captain Bartlett to act as major and assist me on the left of the battalion.

By this time the fire had become extremely hot, and my men were falling rapidly all around me. The enemy were drawn up less than 50 yards in front of us in vastly superior numbers and sheltered by the thick brush and a ravine, while our troops were in open wood and fully exposed to a most murderous fire, which they bore with great firmness, exhibiting the coolness and steadiness of veterans. Though several times driven back from their position they rallied again and again, and had re-enforcements reached us in time we would doubtless not only have been able to hold our ground, but have driven the enemy back upon their works behind the woods. As it was, it was not until nearly 3 o'clock, after six hours of severe fighting, that we finally retired, in obedience to orders, having expended all our ammunition and become completely exhausted and very much cut up, having lost nearly one-third of the men we took into the action. My officers and men all behaved in the best manner, and almost every one proved himself a hero.

It is a difficult matter to mark individual instances where all displayed such valor and coolness, but I cannot but remark the conduct of Captain Bartlett, Company C; Captain Sims, Company I; First Lieutenant Thompson, Company A; First Lieutenant Witherell, commanding Company F; Second Lieut. William J. Harrison, Company C; Acting Sergeant-Major Crane, Color-Sergeant Onslow, and Sergeant Maloy, who all displayed unflinching courage, coupled with remarkable coolness, under the heavy fire to which they were exposed.

I cannot close my report without mentioning Dr. J. D. Rose, our chaplain, who assisted the surgeons both on the field and in the hospitals, and did good service wherever it was needed.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANCIS PRICE, JR.,

Major, Commanding Seventh New Jersey Volunteers.

Capt. CHARLES M. PREVOST,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brigade.

No. 23.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division.

HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, HEINTZELMAN'S CORPS,

Williamsburg, Va., May 6, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that on receiving orders on the 5th instant at 9 a. m. the division took up its line of march, and shortly after came upon the crowded columns before us. At 10.45 a. m. an order was received from General Sumner to pass all others and to proceed to the support of General Hooker, already engaged. With difficulty and loss of time my division at length made its way through the masses of troops and trains that encumbered the deep, muddy single defile, until at the Brick Church my route was to the left.

At 1.30 p. m., within $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles of the battle-field, I halted my column to rest for the first time and to get the lengthened files in hand before committing them to action. Captain Moses, of the general's staff, with great energy assisted me in this effort. Almost immediately, however, on orders from General Heintzelman, our knapsacks were piled and the head of the column resumed its march, taking the double-quick wherever the mud-holes left a footing.

Arrived at 1 mile from the engagement, you in person brought me an order for detaching three regiments, one from Berry's, the leading brigade, and two from Birney's, the second, to support Emory's Horse to the left of the position. Approaching nearer the field, word was brought by an aide-de-camp that Hooker's cartridges were expended, and with increased rapidity we entered under fire. Having quickly consulted with General Hooker, and received General Heintzelman's orders as to the point of onset, I at once deployed Berry's brigade on the left of the Williamsburg road and Birney's on the right of it, taking, to cover their movements and to support the remaining battery that had ceased to fire, two companies of Poe's regiment. As our troops came into action the remnants of the brave men of Hooker's division were passed, and our regiments promptly commenced an unrelenting well-delivered fire. However, from the lengthening of the files, the gap occasioned by the withdrawal from the column of three regiments, and the silence of this battery, I was soon left no alternative than to lead forward to the charge the two companies of the Michigan Volunteers to bear back the enemy's skirmishers, now crowding on our pieces. This duty was performed by officers and men with superior intrepidity, and enabled Major Wainwright, of Hooker's division, to collect his artillerists and reopen fire from several pieces. A new support was then collected from the Fifth New Jersey, who, terribly decimated previously, again came forward with alacrity.

The affair was now fully and successfully engaged along our whole line, and the regiments kept steadily gaining ground, but the heavy-strewn timber of the abatis defied all direct approach. Introducing, therefore, fresh marksmen from Poe's regiment, I ordered Col. Hobart Ward, with the Thirty-eighth New York (Scott Life Guard), to charge down the road and take the rifle pits in the center of the abatis by their flank. This duty Colonel Ward performed with great gallantry, and by his martial demeanor imparted all confidence in the attack. Still, the wave of impulsion, though nearly successful, did not quite prevail, but with bravery every point thus gained was fully sustained. The left wing of Colonel Riley's regiment, the Fortieth New York (the Mozart), was next sent for, and, the colonel being valiantly engaged in front, came up, brilliantly conducted by Capt. G. W. Mindil, chief of General Birney's staff. These charged up to the open space, silenced some light artillery, and gaining the enemy's rear, caused him to relinquish his cover. The victory was ours.

About this period General Jameson brought up the rear brigade and the detached regiments, having previously reported them in the midst of a severe fire; a second line was established, and two columns of regiments made disposable for further moves. But darkness, with the still drizzly rain, now closed, and the regiments bivouacked on the field they had won. The reconnaissances during the night and the early patrols of the morning revealed the enemy retiring, and General Heintzelman in person ordered into the enemy's works (which our pickets of the One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania, under Lieut. J. L. Gilbert, were enter-

ing with General Jameson) the Fourth Maine Regiment, to erect its standard and to take possession in full force.

I have the honor to mark out for the commendation of the general-in-chief Generals Jameson, Birney, and Berry, my three generals of brigade, whose soldierly judgment was only equaled by their high courage, and I refer you to their reports to do justice to the names of the gallant officers and men under their immediate commands. Having confined myself principally to the center, the key of the position, I report as conspicuously distinguished, imparting victory all around, Colonels Poe, of the Second Michigan, and J. H. Hobart Ward, of the Thirty-eighth New York. Never in any action was the influence of the staff more perceptible. All were most efficient and defiant of danger. I especially notice Captain Smith, assistant adjutant-general of General Berry, and predict for him a career of usefulness and glory. My own staff were truly my means of vision in this battle in the woods.

I have to deplore the loss of my chief of staff, Captain Wilson. He was killed putting in execution my desire for a general onset at the period of the last charge, falling within the enemy's lines. Also of Lieutenant Barnard, late of West Point, at the end of the engagement, after having previously lost a horse. Capt. W. E. Sturges, my aide, was brave, active, and judicious. Lieutenant Moore, another of my aides, renewed in this field his previous distinction gained abroad. My volunteer aide, Mr. Watts De Peyster, bore himself handsomely in this his first action.

I have the honor to append the list of killed and wounded,* which, though not impairing our future efficiency, was a severe proportion for the few that were engaged. Our batteries were on the field, but not required; Major Wainwright, by much personal effort, having resumed the fire of several pieces. But Captain Thompson, the chief of my division of artillery, in the midst of a severe fire, gave me the benefit of his experience.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. KEARNY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Third Division, Third Corps.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Army Corps.

HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, HEINTZELMAN'S CORPS,
Camp Berry, Barhamsville, Va., May 10, 1862.

SIR: The events which crowded on us after the battle of the 5th—its stormy night, the care of the wounded, the attentions to the slain, the collection of the trophies, the moves of the next day—having prevented my report embracing the distinguished acts of individuals not serving in my actual presence, induced me to request that the superior authority of the commander of the corps would be employed to use as my own the separate reports of those my brigade commanders who so ably sustained my efforts by their gallantry, and who so amply fulfilled the high prestige which they had won as colonels of noble regiments.

The list of the generals of brigade comprises the names of the following officers and regiments: The right of my line consisted of the two regiments of the Second Brigade, General Birney, the Thirty-eighth

*Embodied in return, p. 450.

New York, Col. J. H. Hobart Ward, and the Fortieth New York, Colonel Riley, the other two regiments of this brigade having a mile back from the field been detached to join General Emory. The Thirty-eighth New York was the regiment that, sent for by me, charged down the road and took the pits and abatis in flank. Col. J. H. Hobart Ward has already been noticed as one of the "bravest of the brave." He reports that "Lieutenant-Colonel Strong certainly deserves mention for his gallantry. It would be unjust to mention any one line officer before another where all behaved so well. This regiment lost 128 men on the 21st of July last at Bull Run." This day there were 9 officers killed and wounded out of 19 in this regiment that went into action.

The Fortieth Regiment, Colonel Riley, performed noble and efficient services. Colonel Riley with great spirit held the right wing with half his regiment after the Thirty-eighth and half the Fortieth had been withdrawn to act under my personal direction. The part of the Fortieth acting on the road against the central pits and abatis charged down the road into the plain, passed beyond the enemy's flank, and drove off by their severe fire several pieces of artillery brought expressly against them. Fortune favored them.

The battle on the left of the line was a series of assaults by the enemy and repulses and onsets by ourselves, the fresh re-enforcements of the enemy continually tending to outflank us. General Berry was ever on the alert, and by good arrangements and personal example influenced the ardor of all around him. His regiments fought most desperately. Their loss attests it. They acted partly in the woods to the left of the road and partly in carrying the abatis. It was one of them, Colonel Poe's Second Michigan, more directly under my control, which maintained the key-point to our position. Two of its companies led off with the first success of the day whilst covering the artillery. Colonel Poe had already won a reputation in Western Virginia. He was a distinguished officer of the United States Army before taking command of this regiment. I especially notice him for advancement. His talents, his bravery, his past services merit it.*

* * * * *

The principal loss on the left of the other two regiments (the fourth of the brigade, Third Michigan, Colonel Champlin, having been detached with General Emory), serving more immediately under the eye of General Berry, was very severe. Colonel Hayman, commanding the Thirty-seventh New York, on the extreme left, was charged with guarding against the enemy turning our flank. This duty required vigilance and pertinacity.*

* * * * *

Colonel Terry, commanding the Fifth Michigan, was principally engaged in carrying rifle pits (a redoubt) in the woods. His loss is the highest on the list of killed and wounded.*

* * * * *

In closing this supplementary report on the location and merits of individual regiments it is proper to include, although not attached to my command, General Grover, who, with an untiring courage, while most of his men, having been relieved by our arrival, were taking the merited respite after their long hours of severe fighting, still brought up into line alongside of us several hundred volunteers, who followed his example, encouraging them to the fight.

* Casualty lists omitted are embodied in return, p. 450.

This report would also be incomplete did I fail to mention the meritorious services of the medical corps. They were everywhere, under the greatest obstacles, efficiently aiding the wounded and establishing ambulances. One of them, Dr. J. H. Baxter, one of Acting Surgeon-General Tripler's staff, medical inspector of field ambulances, assisted me greatly during the action by carrying orders.

Sir, with the trust that the division has done its duty and fulfilled your expectations, I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. KEARNY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Third Division, Third Corps.

No. 24.

Report of Capt. James Thompson, Second U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION ARTILLERY,
Camp near Williamsburg, Va., May 6, 1862.

SIR: Having been instructed by the general commanding the division to report the operations of the batteries under my command on the 5th instant, I have the honor to respectfully submit the following:

The batteries left camp a few miles this side of Yorktown about 10 o'clock a. m., one section of Battery G, Second U. S. Artillery, following immediately after the leading regiment of the infantry column, the remaining portion of the artillery following the leading brigade. The roads were almost impassable, owing to the nature of the soil, the storm prevailing at the time, and the magnitude of the army train. New roads were cut and old ones reconstructed in many places. The batteries succeeded, however, in reaching the vicinity of the field of action about 3 o'clock p. m. By direction of General Heintzelman (whom I met while proceeding to the front in search of the division commander) Battery G, [Second] U. S. Artillery, was moved to a field on the left, to join the force in that position. Soon after reaching this position it was ordered to the field of battle. The battery was prepared for immediate action and moved as directed. Its intended position was examined. The approaches being found greatly obstructed, and the field not admitting of battery maneuver, it was deemed advisable not to bring it into action.

One section remained near the battle-field, and the remaining sections moved at dark into camp on the left. Beam's and Randolph's batteries came into the woods near the battle-field, but were not in action against the enemy.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES THOMPSON,

Captain, Second Artillery, Commanding Division Artillery.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Kearny's Division.

No. 25.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Charles D. Jameson, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, KEARNY'S DIVISION,
Near Williamsburg, Va., Monday, May 5, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that I left camp (2½ miles this side of Yorktown) with my brigade this morning about 9 o'clock. My brigade was in rear of the column. I arrived at a point near the scene of action to-day at 4 o'clock p. m. Upon my arrival I was ordered by you to move my brigade forward to the support of the troops then engaged, which I did immediately, arranging them in the following order, viz: I deployed the Eighty-seventh New York Volunteers, Colonel Dodge, on the right of the road leading to the rebel works, the left resting on said road; the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Campbell, I deployed on the left of said road, the right resting on the road, in very close proximity to the troops engaged; the One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers was stationed a few rods in rear of the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers in column of division, and the Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers was placed some 40 rods in rear of the Eighty-seventh New York Volunteers in column of division. Soon after completing the foregoing arrangements of my troops the firing ceased, and the troops that had been engaged near the road withdrew to the rear of my brigade. I held the position first taken during the night.

Regretting that the troops under my command had not the opportunity of taking a more active part in the exciting scenes of the day, I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. D. JAMESON,
Brigadier-General.

Brig. Gen. PHILIP KEARNY,
Commanding Division.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, KEARNY'S DIVISION,
Williamsburg, Va., Tuesday, May 6, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that in accordance with your orders I sent out scouts last night for the purpose of discovering the movements of the enemy. At about 1.30 o'clock a. m. Sergeant Green, of Company A, Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, reported to me that the rebel troops were moving from their works in front of the scene of action yesterday, which fact I communicated to you immediately. At your suggestion I sent him out again with orders to approach very near the rebel works, and to make sure that his statement was correct. He returned at 3.30 o'clock a. m., fully satisfied that the rebels were deserting their works. At dawn I proceeded with two companies of the One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel McKnight, to make a reconnaissance of the rebel works. The works in front of and to the left of the road appeared to be deserted, but large bodies of infantry and cavalry were visible in the direction of Williamsburg. I advanced with 12 men of the One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, under command of Lieut. J. L. Gilbert, Company I, to the earthwork in front of the road, and found it had been evacuated and the guns and ammunition removed.

During the time I was reconnoitering the rebel works and moving forward to the first work large bodies of rebel cavalry could be seen moving from their works near Williamsburg toward the town. I then ordered forward my whole brigade, deploying four companies of the One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers as skirmishers, and with one section each of Thompson's and Randolph's batteries moved on toward Williamsburg, the rebel cavalry retreating as we advanced. Their rear left the town as my right entered. I found no troops in the town except a few deserters and several hundred sick and wounded rebels. I have not been able to ascertain the exact number, as they are in almost every house in town. I marched my brigade through the town and encamped near the college, by order of the general commanding. I have placed guards at all the principal houses in the town, and have protected all persons and property. The rebels destroyed a large quantity of ammunition just before leaving. They also abandoned four 12-pounder iron guns, one brass 6-pounder.

Hoping the course I have pursued in taking possession of the town will meet your approbation, I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. D. JAMESON,
Brigadier-General.

Brig. Gen. PHILIP KEARNY, *Commanding Division.*

No. 26.

Report of Col. Stephen A. Dodge, Eighty-seventh New York Infantry.

HDQRS. EIGHTY-SEVENTH N. Y. VOLUNTEERS,
Camp en route to Richmond, Va., May 11, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to circular from Headquarters Army of the Potomac, dated May 10, I have the honor to report that about 3 p. m. of 5th instant I received orders for my men to throw off their knapsacks, &c., and to hasten on toward Williamsburg. After going a short distance we were halted to permit a portion of General Casey's command to pass out by the only road leading on. We were informed that the affair or skirmish had ended. In half an hour Captain Potter, assistant adjutant-general, ordered us to hasten on. In obedience to such order I pressed my men on in the most speedy manner consistent with keeping them in order, part of the time double-quick, through mud mostly knee-deep, and the road filled with stumps.

I reported to General Hooker by General Jameson's order, who directed me to Brigadier-General Kearny, whom I found in the open field under the enemy's fire. General Kearny ordered me to take my command in the woods to the right of the road and there deploy them, lying down to support our forces engaged in front. I did so, and although the fire of the enemy raked the woods, my officers and men conducted themselves in a most creditable manner. We remained there all night in the rain, hungry and wet, and in the morning were ordered on to Williamsburg.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

STEPHEN A. DODGE,
Colonel Eighty-seventh New York Volunteers.

Captain POTTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Jameson's Brigade.

No. 27.

Report of Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HDQRS. BIRNEY'S BRIGADE, KEARNY'S DIVISION,
Camp near Williamsburg, Va., May 6, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that after a wearisome march of six hours on yesterday through deep mud and a drenching rain, my brigade being heavily burdened with knapsacks, haversacks, and shelter-tents, I received an order from General Kearny to relieve the troops under my command from all incumbrance and move forward to the scene of action, some 3 miles distant, as rapidly as possible. Leaving under guard all incumbrances, the brigade, although jaded and wearied, moved forward as rapidly as the roads would permit. On nearing the front, by order of General Heintzelman, through Captain McKeever, I detached the Third and Fourth Maine Regiments, and proceeded with the Thirty-eighth and Fortieth New York Regiments to the front. When I reached the front, under General Kearny's orders I deployed the Thirty-eighth and right wing of the Fortieth New York Regiments to the right of the road, and relieved opportunely fragments of regiments that had been in the fight. They marched steadily to the front, and drove the enemy, after a furious contest, from the woods. They fell back over fallen timber and opened a destructive fire from rifle pits. They were supported by their batteries, which poured a well-aimed and destructive fire into our ranks. The Thirty-eighth and right wing of Fortieth New York behaved nobly, and maintained their position.

During the contest the Thirty-eighth New York Regiment, under Colonel Ward, were ordered to charge down the main road, in advance of the Michigan regiments, and piercing the enemy's center to carry the rifle pits by the flank, and the left wing of Colonel Riley's regiment, Fortieth New York, were ordered in like manner to follow the Thirty-eighth New York to take the enemy in the rear. I sent with this wing Captain Mindil, of my staff, and under General Kearny's presence he led them to the dangerous position assigned them. Captain Gesner, of the left wing, and Captain Mindil behaved well under the terrible fire that greeted them, and led the brave officers and men under them gallantly and worthily.

Night coming on put an end to the pursuit, and amidst the darkness and rain we waited the morning.

During the night the Third and Fourth Maine, that had been previous to the contest detached by order of General Heintzelman, reported to me for duty in front, and by order of General Kearny I moved them to the front to relieve the Thirty-eighth and Fortieth New York Regiments. I pushed them on to the enemy's works, found them deserted, and troops to the left of us in possession.

My brigade has lost several gallant officers and many brave men in the contest. Annexed you will find list of killed, wounded, and missing.* Where so much gallantry was displayed it is difficult to select those most deserving of notice. To Colonel Ward and Captains Mindil and Gesner fell the good fortune to lead the most important charges, and they were well supported by the gallant officers and men under them. Colonel Riley well maintained his position, and executed the orders with coolness and efficiency.

* Embodied in return, p. 450.

The loss of the rebels in front of my regiment was terrible. Those that remained on the ground, some 40, were decently buried. The Thirty-eighth New York Regiment, or Scott Life Guard, preserved well the high reputation it gained for gallantry at Bull Run, and although in that engagement as in this it has lost 15 officers and one-third of its numbers, it is still ready to devote the balance to support our flag. I ask that Congress will by special resolution authorize this regiment to place upon its flag "Bull Run" and "Williamsburg," and the Fortieth New York, or Mozart Regiment, "Williamsburg." I trust that the general commanding the division, seeing how well two of my regiments carry out his orders, will never hesitate to rely on my brigade.

Lieutenant-Colonel Strong, of the Thirty-eighth New York Regiment, deserves especial mention for his gallant conduct. His wound, although disabling him, I am happy to report is not mortal, and he will soon be restored to his regiment.

I am, yours, truly,

D. B. BIRNEY,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. W. E. STURGIS,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Kearny's Division.

No. 28.

Report of Col. Henry G. Staples, Third Maine Infantry.

CAMP NEAR WILLIAMSBURG, VA., May 8, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my regiment during the engagement of the 5th instant:

While on the march I was ordered by Colonel Ward, then temporarily commanding, to halt and throw aside knapsacks, &c., and prepare for action, which was accordingly done. We then marched over an exceedingly difficult road to an open field near Cole's farm, and by your order were detached and ordered to report to General Emory. My regiment was then formed in line of battle with the Fourth Maine, Sixty-third Pennsylvania, and Third Michigan Regiments, in the open field in support of Captain ——'s battery, doubtless for the purpose of preventing a flank movement on the part of the enemy.

After remaining in line some thirty minutes we marched through the wood to the road near the scene of action. Night setting in, I was ordered by General Kearny to bivouac in the woods for the night. Early on the morning of the 6th I was ordered to relieve the Fortieth New York (Mozart) Regiment, then on picket, with 200 of my men, the remainder having been sent back by order of General Kearny to bring on their rations and blankets. By your order my detachment advanced on the enemy's works in line of battle preceded by skirmishers. On arriving at the battery we found the enemy had evacuated.

I am pleased to add that my men without an exception bore their fatigue without a murmur, obeyed their orders with alacrity, and were very eager to meet the enemy. Hoping we may be placed ere long in a position where we may earn more credit for ourselves and the State we represent, I remain, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY G. STAPLES,
Colonel, Commanding Third Maine Regiment.

No. 29.

Report of Col. Elijah Walker, Fourth Maine Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH MAINE VOLUNTEERS,
May 6, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to render the following report of my proceedings since halting and preparing for action at or about 3 o'clock p. m. of yesterday, the 5th instant:

In pursuance of orders received from Brig. Gen. D. B. Birney, commanding brigade, I marched my regiment to the left, and reported to General Emory. I was shortly afterward ordered to follow the Sixty-third Pennsylvania Regiment to the scene of action. On arriving where the engagement was going on it was nearly dark, and I was ordered by General Kearny, commanding the division, to bivouac for the night in the woods on the right of the road.

At 5 o'clock this morning I was ordered by General Birney to post my regiment as a picket line in the edge of the woods immediately in front of the rebel fortifications. Having arrived on this line, I observed in the open field between the woods and the fortifications Generals Heintzelman, Kearny, Jameson, and Birney, and accordingly advanced my men, and by command of General Heintzelman took possession of the fort and planted my colors upon the ramparts. The fort appeared to have been but a short time evacuated. The bodies of 5 men lay unburied there, and in the smaller work on the right we found 3 wounded men and 2 or 3 more dead bodies in the vicinity. The only article of consequence discovered in the fort was a rebel banner. This flag was of blue silk, about 3 feet square, embordered by a crimson fringe. On one side was the device of the palmetto tree encircled by a serpent; the whole surrounded by a crimson belt bearing seven stars and the motto, "*Animis opibusque parati*;" a white crescent in the upper left-hand corner. On the reverse of the flag, inclosed in a wreath of laurel, is the following:

Pickens Sentinels.
Preserve
Southern Institutions,
or
Perish with them.
January 10, 1861.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. WALKER,
Colonel, Commanding Fourth Maine Volunteers.

P. S.—I have to add that one of my men, Corpl. S. M. Perkins, of Company K, having got separated from the regiment while going through the woods, took part in the action with the Second Michigan Regiment, and received a wound in the left hand, rendering amputation of his thumb necessary.

E. WALKER.

Capt. G. W. MINDIL,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 30.

Report of Col. J. H. Hobart Ward, Thirty-eighth New York Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-EIGHTH REGIMENT,

May 6, 1862.

In accordance with instructions from division headquarters I have the honor to report that on the 5th instant, after a long and dreary march over horrid roads and under a drenching rain, at or about 5 p. m., under the direction of Brigadier-General Birney, my regiment formed in open order in the wood fronting the enemy's works in the vicinity of Williamsburg, with directions to advance to the opening on the field, but not to fire unless they could hit. The line was accordingly formed and advanced to the edge of the woods, when, under a heavy fire, it was deemed necessary to silence it if practicable. I advanced seven companies of my command over the fallen timber with the intention of dislodging the enemy.

As nearly all the subsequent movements were performed under the direction of General Kearny, it would probably be unnecessary to particularize. Suffice it to say, under the most galling fire I ever saw the men sustained themselves nobly, being repulsed and returning the charge three times. The same occurred with the three companies under Lieutenant-Colonel Strong.

The following is a list of officers killed and wounded. Killed—Capt. C. S. Dewitt and Lieut. William Sharp. Wounded—Lieut. Col. J. C. Strong, Capts. G. M. Dennett, A. Funk, and S. C. Dwyer, Lieuts. Robert S. Watson, Edward Miller, and Walter Scott.

The above nine officers are more than one-third of the officers of the regiment.

The number of enlisted men [killed and wounded] is 61 and the missing 10.

Lieutenant-Colonel Strong certainly deserves mention for his gallantry.

It would be unjust to mention any one line officer before another when all behaved so well.

This regiment lost 128 men at Bull Run on July 21 last.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

J. H. HOBART WARD,

Colonel Thirty-eighth Regiment [New York Volunteers].

Capt. W. E. STURGIS,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. 38TH REGIMENT NEW YORK STATE VOLDS.,

Camp Winfield Scott, Va., May 11, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 5th instant this regiment left camp, about 3 miles from Yorktown (*en route* to Williamsburg), at 9 a. m., in the midst of a severe storm, which had commenced about dark the evening previous. The retreat of the enemy from Yorktown with their artillery and wagon train, together with the heavy rain, had rendered the roads almost impassable. In some instances the men would sink above the knee, the men at this time being encumbered with heavy knapsacks, three days' provisions in the haversacks, and 40 rounds of ball cartridges. Before leaving camp and while on the march the artillery in front could be distinctly heard, which had

a tendency to encourage our men notwithstanding the rain, which continued to fall in torrents, but it was more of a struggle to overcome the obstacles than any attempt at marching in order. About 3 p. m. I received orders from General Birney, commanding brigade, to have my command relieved from all incumbrances except their arms and ammunition, with directions to move up to the front (3 miles in advance) as rapidly as possible, the greater part of the way (where the nature of the ground would permit) at a double-quick pace.

On arriving near the front, under the direction of General Birney my regiment filed to the right of the road into the woods, and then deployed in open order, fronting the enemy's works in the vicinity of Williamsburg. General Birney had in the mean time formed the Fortieth New York in our rear as a support.

The general now directed me to advance cautiously to the edge of the woods, but not to advance in the open field beyond, and not to fire unless they could hit, but after driving the enemy from the woods to hold my position until further orders. I accordingly advanced with the seven left companies of the regiment (the remaining three being under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Strong), and in obedience to orders drove the enemy from the woods. As the enemy retreated across the open space and road I continued to drive them. At this critical juncture General Kearny, commanding division, seeing the advantage to be gained, appeared on the field and gave me the instructions I required—"to pursue them across the road and charge them in their rifle pits and endeavor to get a position in their rear." That they obeyed the order with alacrity and promptness would but poorly express the enthusiasm manifested by the men on receiving the order to charge. How well they performed their duty under the galling fire from thousands of muskets, from batteries, and rifle pits is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the repulse we at first received, at every charge we gained and eventually drove them from their works and remained in them until after dark, when we were relieved by other troops.

Farther to the right, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Strong, my three right companies operated, who, under the inspiration of their noble commander, performed the most brilliant feats, and, following the example of the general of division and brigade, charged across the road and step by step drove the enemy through the slashing, which was so dense that officers and men had their clothing torn into shreds. This command was also repulsed and again rallied by Colonel Strong, and pushed the enemy beyond their works, when a junction was formed by the regiment.

During the entire fight the enemy contested every step, raining volley upon volley upon our devoted troops. The rallying cry of the enemy—"Bull Run"—also had its effect upon our troops, who were determined to "have no more Bull Runs." Our noble officers and men were continually dropping around us, though instead of having a dispiriting effect this nerved our men to desperation. How well they performed their duty the list of killed and wounded will testify. Having but 24 officers engaged, 9 were killed and disabled. Although my regiment had before been tried and not found wanting, I have just reason to be proud of their action on the 5th. Two of my officers, Captain Dwyer and Lieutenant Watson, were prisoners, and were forced to deliver up their swords to the enemy, and were again rescued by our gallant men. The loss of the enemy in our front must have been at least 600, as the field and their rifle pits were literally piled up with killed and wounded.

To mention any one officer or soldier over another would be gross injustice to the rest, and if it is deemed necessary to mention those who behaved well I would find it necessary to forward my muster rolls.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

J. H. HOBART WARD,
Colonel Thirty-eighth Regiment N. Y. Volunteers.

Capt. G. W. MINDIL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 31.

Report of Col. Edward J. Riley, Fortieth New York Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS FORTIETH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
Near Williamsburg, Va., May 6, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In pursuance of orders from your headquarters I respectfully submit the following report of the proceedings of the regiment under my command during the attack upon the works in front of Williamsburg.

In the neighborhood of 3 p. m. of the 5th instant we, in conjunction with the Thirty-eighth New York, were ordered to advance to the front, in order to drive back the enemy's skirmishers. Reaching the front we followed the Thirty-eighth by the flank into the woods upon the right-hand side of the road, when the Thirty-eighth were sent forward in line, while the Fortieth were divided in two wings, the right wing going forward to immediately support the Thirty-eighth and the left wing to act as reserve.

Having not a single field officer present on duty, I went forward with the right wing and advanced into the felled timber, where, after getting to the front, I discovered the enemy, upon whom we opened fire, they returning it hotly with musketry and shells. I also discovered that we were unmasked by the Thirty-eighth New York moving toward the right, when, considering some support necessary, I searched for my left wing, and found that they had been ordered to the left of the road by General Kearny, who gallantly led them forward until by a brisk dash they drove the enemy from the left of the timber back toward their rifle pits. Our men held their position thus until night-fall, when the enemy retired to their intrenchments. After night, various rumors being sent along the line to come in, &c., and finding that a large number of men, being utterly exhausted, were going in to rest, and having no orders to come in or hold our ground, I came in and found Brigadier-General Birney, who ordered me to take those men of the right wing back from where they were formed in the road and establish a strong picket line along the front where the right companies were stationed and to let the left-wing companies remain in, which I immediately did, re-establishing the line myself. About 6 a. m. the following morning we were relieved. Having learned that the general commanding division desires the names of the officers of the left wing with a view to commend them, I would respectfully recommend that the right wing deserves equally honorable mention, they having maintained steadily their advance under a galling cross-fire until the enemy ceased firing and retired, and having sustained a greater loss in killed and wounded than the left wing, and I was much pleased with their

steadiness during the whole movement, this being the first occasion our regiment was ever under fire.

I would here respectfully ask that my surgeon, who was detailed some time ago to the division hospital by order of General Hamilton and who still remains there (Dr. Dexter), be detached and ordered to immediately rejoin his regiment.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

Your obedient servant,

E. J. RILEY,

Colonel Fortieth New York Volunteers.

Capt. W. E. STURGIS,

A. A. A. G., 3d Div., 3d Corps, Army of the Potomac.

No. 32.

Report of Brig. Gen. Hiram G. Berry, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., KEARNY'S DIV., THIRD CORPS,

[May 6, 1862.]

I have the honor to report that I moved my brigade from camp in advance of Yorktown yesterday morning in conformity to orders, my brigade taking the lead of the column. Nothing of interest occurred until near 10 a. m., when I found the road blockaded by troops and trains in advance. Hearing heavy firing at the front, and seeing that the troops that immediately preceded me moved very slowly—or at least it seemed slow to me—I resolved to push my brigade through to the front at all hazards. I have the gratification of knowing that my course in this respect met with the approval of the general, who was pleased to instruct me to continue to move rapidly, keeping along the artillery and ammunition train. I at once dispatched Lieutenant Sturgis, of my staff, to the rear, with instructions to push forward all the regular artillery of the division, and also to do anything requisite and necessary for the rapid advance of the troops and ammunition. I am happy to say Lieutenant Sturgis was successful in his efforts and contributed much to the advance.

I pushed forward with my brigade to the rebel earthworks to the left and in rear of the Brick Church, and there ordered my men to lay aside their knapsacks and everything cumbersome. After halting a few moments for rest, I ordered my command forward. Arriving within 2 miles of the field, I turned over to Captain McKeever, assistant adjutant-general Third Corps, the Third Regiment Michigan Volunteers, Colonel Champlin, to act as reserve and support on our left; consequently they were not engaged in the action. I advanced with the three remaining regiments, and arrived at the scene of action at about 2.30 o'clock p. m., and at once put my command into action under the eye and supervision of the general, the Fifth Michigan, Colonel Terry, taking the left side of the road in timber, supported on the left by the Thirty-seventh New York, Colonel Hayman. I formed these regiments in loose order, the left extending far into the timber, for the purpose of outflanking the enemy on that side. I placed one company in rear of the extreme left as a support. The Second Michigan Volunteers was placed part on either side of the road, six companies being held as a reserve and located on the left side.

As soon as these hurried arrangements were completed (and no time was to be lost, as all our artillery was in jeopardy) I ordered the troops on the left to advance and charge. They nobly responded and charged with much enthusiasm, driving the enemy entirely out of the timber and into and partly through the fallen timber, causing him to leave a large number of his killed and wounded on the ground. The enemy was strongly posted in an old rifle pit, and caused the previous (General Hooker's) troops much annoyance in the forenoon. In the rifle pit in front of the Fifth Michigan 63 of the enemy's dead were found, the majority of whom were shot through the head. The Fifth Michigan held possession of the rifle pit until the close of the action, and remained in them till morning. The Thirty-seventh New York, still farther to the left, were continually engaged. The enemy made frequent attempts to turn our left at this point and were as often repulsed, and always gallantly and quickly. The Second Michigan operated mostly under the immediate eye of the general, and I saw only those on the left side of the road. They behaved gallantly and prudently, always making sure of their aim when firing. Those companies held as reserves were ordered into action by the general, and most nobly did they acquit themselves.

I take great pleasure in noticing the gallant conduct of Colonel Terry, of the Fifth Michigan. He was injured in the early part of the engagement by a spent ball, but continued in the battle to the end and conducted his men gallantly. Colonel Hayman, Thirty-seventh New York, led his men in fine style, always being where most needed, and by his cool, quiet manner assured his officers and men around him. Colonel Poe, Second Michigan, brought up his men gallantly, not unnecessarily exposing any of his command, but when the time came all were brought into action in a soldierly manner. We captured some 20 prisoners, who informed us they were from different regiments—numbering 1,600 men, and were posted in front of our left. It was this number that some 800 of our men charged and forced to return at the point of the bayonet.

I am pleased to make favorable mention of the conduct of Lieut. Col. S. E. Beach, wounded in the thigh; Maj. J. D. Fairbanks, who had his horse shot under him, and Lieut. C. H. Hutchins, acting adjutant, all of the Michigan Fifth, and am glad to learn from Colonel Poe, Second Michigan, that all his officers bore themselves throughout in a soldierly and brave manner.

Colonel Hayman, Thirty-seventh New York, reports the conduct of all his officers worthy of commendation, particularly those of the six left companies, commanded by Captains Maguire, Clark, De Lacy, O'Beirne, Diegnan, and First Lieutenant Hays; also deems worthy of special notice First Sergt. Lawrence Murphy, Company K, and Sergt. Martin Conboy, Company B; also to favorable consideration Corp. Patrick Kiggan, Company C; Corpl. James Boyle, Company C; Private Charles O'Brien, Company C, and Private Henry Brady, Company F.

I would also call your attention to the conduct of my aides, Lieutenants Sturgis and Ladue, both of whom by their coolness and bravery were able to render me important service during the day; and I wish to make particular mention of my acting assistant adjutant-general, Captain Smith, Fourth Maine Volunteers, who was continually under fire during the engagement, and rendered me great aid in leading and directing the troops. His conduct was, indeed, most gallant and noble. The casualties of the day have been many, comprising some of the

finest officers and best men in my brigade, the names of whom will be furnished as soon as can be correctly ascertained. The number is as follows:

Fifth Michigan.—Lieut. James A. Gunning, killed; Lieutenant-Colonel Beach, severely wounded; Capt. E. T. Sherlock, Company A; Capt. Heber Le Favour, Company F; Lieutenant Tillotson, Company H; 29 non-commissioned officers and privates killed; 99 non-commissioned officers and privates wounded; 54 non-commissioned officers and privates missing, most of whom will come in.*

Second Michigan.—Lieut. R. D. Johnson, Company A, wounded; Capt. W. R. Morse, Company F, severely wounded; Capt. W. B. McCreery, Company G, wounded; 14 non-commissioned officers and privates killed; 37 non-commissioned officers and privates wounded; 14 non-commissioned officers and privates missing.*

Thirty-seventh New York.—First Lieut. Patrick H. Hays and First Lieut. Jeremiah O'Leary, killed. Capt. James T. Maguire, Capt. William De Lacy, Second Lieut. John Massey, Second Lieut. Edmund W. Brown, and Second Lieut. James Smith, wounded; 20 non-commissioned officers and privates killed; 64 non-commissioned officers and privates wounded; 5 non-commissioned officers and privates missing.* Aggregate killed, 65; aggregate wounded, 208; aggregate missing, 73. Total aggregate, 346.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. G. BERRY,

Brigadier-General Volunteers, Comdg. Third Brigade.

Lieut. W. E. STURGIS,

Act. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Kearny's Division.

No. 33.

Report of Col. Orlando M. Poe, Second Michigan Infantry.

WILLIAMSBURG, VA., May 6, 1862.

SIR: For the information of the general commanding I have the honor of reporting as follows concerning the part taken by the Second Regiment Michigan Volunteers in the action of yesterday:

The regiment was put into action by direction of the general commanding. Two companies deployed as skirmishers on the right of the battery, which had then ceased to fire. Two companies more on the left also deployed as skirmishers, the road thus dividing the front of the line equally. The remaining six companies were held in reserve. An hour afterward one company more was thrown to the right in support and another to the left.

At about 5.30 p. m. the remaining four companies were sent forward to relieve those who had been hotly engaged and who had exhausted the greater part of their ammunition. The regiment was put into its position with orders to hold it, which they did effectually. The right wing was under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Williams and the left under command of Major Dillman, while in person I exercised a general supervision over the whole line.

Numerous acts of individual bravery were performed. Indeed, so far as I could judge, it was a fight of individuals, as must necessarily

* But see revised statement, p. 450.

be the case upon ground of the character of that upon which the action of yesterday took place. The conduct of officers and men was perfectly satisfactory, and among them all it is next to impossible to distinguish. Still, I must mention Sergeants Dobson, wounded, and Boughton and Corporals Loomis, severely wounded, and Wallace, killed, whose conduct came under my own eye. Corporal Wallace, although wounded, refused to leave the field, and fought until a ball passed through his head, killing him instantly. The general commanding headed a charge of one company of this regiment commanded by Captain Handy, and is better able to judge of the manner in which his example was followed than I am.

The strength of the regiment when it went into action was about 300 men, the balance having been wearied out by the fatiguing march which preceded that event. The loss was as follows: 1 sergeant, 3 corporals, and 10 privates killed; 3 commissioned officers, 6 sergeants, and 30 privates were wounded, of which about 5 are mortal wounds; 1 corporal and 14 privates missing.

Recapitulation: 14 killed; 39 wounded, of whom one is a prisoner; 15 missing, who are probably prisoners. Total loss, 68.*

Although in the hottest of the fight, yet our loss is comparatively light—a fact which I attribute to our having our men deployed as skirmishers instead of being in line of battle; still, it is one out of every five engaged.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

ORLANDO M. POE,

Colonel, Commanding Second Michigan Volunteers.

Captain STURGIS,

Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., Kearny's Division.

No. 34.

Report of Col. Henry D. Terry, Fifth Michigan Infantry.

HDQRS. FIFTH REGIMENT MICHIGAN INFANTRY,
Williamsburg, Va., May 6, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report to you, for the consideration of the brigade general, a statement of the engagement of yesterday near Williamsburg, Va., with a portion of the rebel enemy, so far as came under my observation. The Fifth Regiment of Michigan Infantry, under my command, arrived at the scene of action about 2-30 o'clock p. m., and in pursuance to the directions of your general at once deployed in line of battle in the woods to the left of the road leading to Williamsburg, the right resting a few rods from the road. The enemy was strongly posted in our front, with sharpshooters, using the weapon known as the Mississippi rifle. The Fifth moved forward in line of battle until the enemy were in full view, when a brisk fire was opened on them by our men, who fired very steadily. Perceiving that our men were suffering from the fire of his rifles, a charge was ordered, which resulted in the retirement of the enemy for a short distance, when a sharp fire was interchanged, and he again retired under a charge to a rifle pit in the edge of the woods, where he made a determined stand and opened a brisk fire with severe effect. Another

* But see revised statement, p 450.

charge was ordered, and our men marched up on the double-quick and leaped into the rifle pits and carried the position and retained it. The enemy fled in confusion, leaving 63 dead in the field, besides the wounded. The wounded of the enemy found on the field I ordered carried to the hospital, to be cared for by the surgeons.

The loss of the regiment has been quite severe in killed and wounded, an account of which will be fully stated in a separate report. It is due to justice to state that the conduct of the officers and men, individually and collectively, has been entirely satisfactory. So far as I have observed, or been informed, the conduct of each and every one was such as to contribute to the final result. I remained upon the field during the entire time, with the exception of about ten minutes' absence, owing to having received a slight wound too unimportant to mention except in this connection.

I cannot submit this report without bearing testimony to the gallant conduct and coolness of Lieut. Col. S. E. Beach and Maj. J. D. Fairbanks during the entire action. Lieut. C. H. Hutchins, acting adjutant of the regiment, and Capt. E. M. Smith, of the brigade staff, were of much assistance by their courage and activity on the field. Just before the close of the engagement Lieutenant-Colonel Beach was severely, but it is believed not dangerously, wounded by a shot received in the thigh. Major Fairbanks had his horse shot under him. Captain Sherlock, Company A, was wounded in the arm, and Captain Le Favour, Company F, in the cheek and arm, early in the action, and later Lieutenant Tillotson, Company H, was severely injured by a shot in the hand. I am pained to be compelled to state that Lieut. James A. Gunning, commanding Company C, was shot through the heart and instantly killed just at the moment of victory.

Very respectfully submitted.

H. D. TERRY,
Colonel, Commanding.

Capt. E. M. SMITH,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. 5TH MICH. INF., 3D BRIG., KEARNY'S DIV., 3D CORPS,
Army of the Potomac, May 11, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In view of the fast and the hasty manner in which the original report of the part this regiment took in the battle of the 5th instant before Williamsburg was drawn up I desire to make for the consideration of the general commanding the brigade a further statement as a supplementary report, which I now have the honor to transmit.

When the regiment entered the woods at the point previously mentioned we had just finished a march of $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles at double-quick through a deep mud and a drenching rain, and that, too, after a preceding march of several miles over the worst of roads. During the latter rapid march the brigade was met by Captain McKeever, the assistant adjutant-general of the commander of our corps, who with much earnestness stated that it was necessary the troops should be at once upon the field. The men pressed on with more eagerness and entered the woods at once, and moved forward in line of battle to the results before mentioned. No Union troops were in the woods when this regiment entered, closely followed by the New York Thirty-seventh (Colonel Hayman), which did its duty, if I may be permitted to say so, through

the whole engagement; but the enemy were there in large force, as the list of the killed and wounded of the Fifth Michigan will too forcibly bear testimony, a full and perfected report of which is herewith submitted.* Nineteen prisoners, five of whom were wounded, were taken and sent in to brigade headquarters.

Our wounded have been well cared for and sent to the general hospital, for which I am indebted to the skill, care, and attention of the surgeon, Dr. Moses Gunn, the assistant surgeon, Dr. Everett, and the hospital steward, Dr. Adams. The dead sleep upon the field of our victory, and they sleep well. Their graves mark the spot where (beside the same breastworks) our Revolutionary fathers fought and fell before them, and though perhaps no report may be made of their devotion to the Union and the Constitution of the country, their surviving comrades will never forget them.

I most humbly and respectfully ask that some mention may be made of them, so that when this sad war is over we will return to our homes and feel that we can ask no higher honor than the proud consciousness that we belonged to the Army of the Potomac.

All of which is most respectfully submitted.

Your obedient servant,

H. D. TERRY,
Colonel.

Capt. E. M. SMITH,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 35.

Report of Col. Samuel B. Hayman, Thirty-seventh New York Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-SEVENTH N. Y. VOLUNTEERS,
Camp at Williamsburg, Va., May 6, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to a circular from brigade headquarters of this date I have the honor to submit the following report of the part performed by my regiment in the action of yesterday:

After a fatiguing march through rain and mud from camp near Yorktown the regiment reached the place of engagement, located in heavy timber and undergrowth, near Williamsburg, about 3 o'clock p. m. It was placed in position on the left of the Fifth Michigan, parallel to the supposed line of the enemy, and Company B, Capt. James T. Maguire, was deployed as skirmishers nearly perpendicular to my line to protect my left flank. An almost continuous fire was soon opened upon the regiment by a concealed foe, which lasted about an hour, and which was returned with spirit for some time, when I ordered the fire to cease until the enemy could be seen, to avoid an unnecessary loss of ammunition.

A scout was now sent to my front to observe the enemy, which soon returned and reported him moving to my left. This seemed to be confirmed by his fire, which was delivered in front and on my left. The whole regiment was now moved some distance to the left, and six companies deployed in extended order in a line, making something less than a right angle with my original line, as it was upon these six companies that the enemy exerted his greatest efforts, and they compelled

* Embodied in return, p. 450.

him to abandon his design in that direction and retire entirely from the woods after a contest of probably an hour's duration. The companies on the right accomplished a like result in reference to the enemy in front. The enemy carried most of his wounded with him, but a considerable number of his dead and some wounded were left, and three different parties seeking for the dead were captured by my pickets during the night.

After the enemy had retired eight companies of my regiment were deployed as skirmishers, extending from my original right to the left as far as the plain in front of Williamsburg. The other two companies were detached by order of Brigadier General Berry—one to man, the other to defend the battery. No sign of the enemy was discovered by the pickets during the night, except small details looking for his dead.

The conduct of all my officers I consider worthy of commendation, I will, therefore, enumerate the names of those present:

Lieut. Col. Gilbert Riordan, Maj. Patrick H. Jones, Adj. James Henry, Capt. Philip Dougherty, First Lieut. James Keelan, and Second Lieut. Peter J. Smith, Company A; Capt. James T. Maguire, First Lieut. Chas. G. Vosburgh, and Second Lieut. William J. Fennon, Company B; Capt. James R. O'Beirne, First Lieut. Jonathan W. Barley, and Second Lieut. Edmund W. Brown, Company C; Capt. John Long, First Lieut. James D. Clarke, and Second Lieut. James H. Markey, Company D; First Lieut. John F. McConnin (commanding), and Second Lieut. John Kiernan, Company E; Capt. Anthony J. Diegnan, First Lieut. Jeremiah O'Leary, and Second Lieut. James Smith, Company F; First Lieut. Patrick H. Hays (commanding), and Second Lieut. John Massey, Company G; Capt. Luke G. Harmon and Second Lieut. William C. Green, Company H; Capt. William T. Clarke, First Lieut. George W. Baillet, and Second Lieut. Constant S. Trevitt, Company I; and Capt. William De Lacy and First Lieut. Richard J. Murphy, Company K.

It is but just to say that the courage of the officers of the six left companies were most severely tested, and on that account their commanders are worthy of special notice. They were commanded by Capt. James T. Maguire, Clarke, De Lacy, O'Beirne, and Diegnan, and First Lieutenant Hays. I also deem worthy of notice First Sergt. Lawrence Murphy, Company K, and First Sergt. Martin Conboy, Company B. The conduct of the enlisted men of the regiment is deserving of the greatest praise, and without individual courage, under the circumstances of the engagement, but little could have been accomplished, and it is therefore to this circumstance I attribute in a great measure the success of my command.*

* * * * *

I would also commend to the special consideration of the general commanding the following men, who, after being severely wounded, captured a number of prisoners: Company C, Corpl. Patrick Kiggan, Corpl. James Boyle, and Private Charles O'Brien; Company F, Private Henry Brady.

The regiment has to deplore the loss of two of its most valuable officers, First Lieuts. Pat. H. Hays and Jeremiah O'Leary, who were killed whilst gallantly leading their men in the most destructive fire of the enemy. The colonel commanding feels in the loss of these officers

* Nominal list of casualties here omitted embodied in return, p. 450.

and the brave men who fell with them the great sacrifice incurred in the success of the regiment.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. HAYMAN,
Colonel, Commanding Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers.

No. 36.

Report of Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Corps.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
New Kent Court-House, Va., May 14, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the operation of the Fourth Corps in the battle of Williamsburg on the 5th of May:

To enable you to understand the occurrences of the 5th instant it is necessary to allude to some of the movements of the days previous.

Smith's division arrived in front of the enemy's works late in the afternoon of the 4th instant; Couch's and Casey's divisions arrived and bivouacked at night-fall in the neighborhood of the Half-way House, about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles, by the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, from Fort Magruder. I arrived at the White House after dark, having left Warwick Court-House at 3 o'clock p. m., fifteen minutes after the receipt of my orders to march.

In the advance from Warwick River I received orders from Brigadier-General Sumner, who commanded the left wing during the operations before Yorktown, and in accordance with his instructions I directed two brigades, with two batteries and a regiment of cavalry, to reconnoiter the country toward Grove's wharf and the Half-way House, the infantry to proceed, if possible, to the Half-way House. Some conflict of orders arose, which will be seen by a reference to Brigadier-General Naglee's report (he having been in command of the reconnaissance).

On the advance the abandoned works of the enemy at Lee's Mill were found to be of great strength. The enemy had buried torpedoes in the ground, one of which exploded, killing 1 and wounding 6 others of Casey's division.

On my arrival at the White House I found there Brigadier-Generals Sumner and Heintzelman. The former, by right of seniority, assumed command, though none of his own corps were present. One division of Heintzelman's corps, under General Hooker, arrived in front of the enemy by a road branching to the left, and one division of my corps (Smith's) had arrived by the main road. Between the two divisions the rain had converted a portion of the ground into an impassable quagmire, and another portion, in the field of fire of the enemy's works, was a thicket of woods, through which it was nearly impossible for infantry to pass.

On my arrival it was too dark to judge of the field, which was mostly covered with forests. I learned, however, that some of our regular artillery and cavalry had been repulsed; that the enemy had a line of strong earthworks in front, and that his defenses stretched across the narrowest part of the Peninsula. Consequently I anticipated a battle for the next day, and accordingly wrote a peremptory order to Couch and Casey to move forward with their divisions the next morning at the break of day. To give greater force to the order I sent it by Cap-

tain Suydam, my adjutant-general, who delivered it in person about midnight, and, notwithstanding the frightful condition and blocking up of the roads, I anticipated that those divisions would begin to arrive as early as 9 o'clock a. m. It was from four to seven hours later, however, before those divisions arrived in presence of the enemy. The delay, which was most unfortunate, is accounted for by Generals Couch, Casey, and Naglee to have been caused by conflicting orders from General Sumner and by the return of a portion of Graham's brigade for their knapsacks. No orders in regard to the movement of those divisions originated with me except the one above referred to, conveyed by Captain Suydam.

Early in the morning of the 5th instant the indications of a battle were not very apparent. A moderate cannonading was kept up, and the musketry fire, at first very slack, continued gradually to increase. About 8 o'clock 16 negroes came in from the neighboring farms. I questioned one of them and General Sumner ordered the examination of the others. Their reports did not agree, but they encouraged the belief that some of the enemy's works on his left were not occupied. To ascertain the condition of things directly in front I went out through the curtain of woods occupied by Smith's division to reconnoiter. After advancing 800 yards from the White House I came to an opening partly of fields and partly of felled trees. By passing along this wide open space I could see Fort Magruder, which is built directly across the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, and beyond, in the direction of James River, I could see another fort. I could also see to my right of Fort Magruder four other forts, one of them the scene of Hancock's subsequent conflict. Beyond these toward York River the view was intercepted by tall timber. Many rifle pits could be seen scattered over the cleared space, averaging about a mile in width, stretching across the Peninsula, and within which all the forts were situated. To my left a spur of woods extended out toward Fort Magruder, and hid the position occupied by Hooker, where the noise of battle was increasing, and between me and the forts there was a valley, the bottom of which I could not discern.

At first I could scarcely see any troops of the enemy, but by the aid of a powerful glass pointed at the crest of Fort Magruder and the work in front of me I could discover the heads of rebels in numbers rising here and there along the parapet to look over. Hastening back after my reconnaissance, I reported that the works in front of us were not to be taken by assault with our small force then in position. I therefore recommended the turning of their left, and that was the opinion of General Sumner also.

Parties had been sent out by General Sumner to examine the ground, and between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. Brigadier-General Hancock was ordered by General Sumner to assail the enemy's left. I accompanied Hancock's brigade, and on leaving General Sumner said to me: "Take the enemy's works on our right and hold them." After proceeding nearly a mile, the head of the column led by General Hancock debouched into an open space, from which a fresh earthwork, apparently strong, was distinctly visible. Sending word to General Hancock that I wished to speak to him, I met that officer about 500 yards from the enemy's fort. I said to him, "General, I am not here to assume command of your brigade, but to look on and examine the country." I remained in the open field, examining carefully in every direction, until General Hancock sent a staff officer to report that he had possession of the enemy's fort, which was found vacant. The message returned by

me to General Hancock by the staff officer (Capt. John Hancock, assistant adjutant-general) is reported by that officer, as well as other messages relating to re-enforcements which I promised to urge forward, in one of the documents which accompany General Hancock's reports.

Recognizing the vital importance of the position gained I returned with the utmost speed to General Sumner's headquarters, and requested him to send a regiment of cavalry immediately to General Hancock's assistance, and stated that other re-enforcements ought to be sent as quickly as they could be obtained. I believe the cavalry was not sent, but for what reason I do not know. Frequent applications were afterward made by General Smith and others for support for Hancock, but except that one of the two batteries sent followed about an hour after the other no re-enforcements reached him till after several hours from the time that he occupied the first fort nor until after he had repulsed the enemy. General Smith omits to state in his report that when he came to me to ask for re-enforcements for General Hancock I urged compliance with his request, but that General Sumner stated that he had no troops to spare for that purpose.

General Hancock continued to advance and took another fort, and from this position he inflicted injury upon the enemy to the extent of some 500 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. His brigade was composed of the Fifth Wisconsin, Colonel Cobb; Sixth Maine, Colonel Burnham; Seventh Maine, Colonel Mason; Thirty-third New York, Colonel Taylor, and Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Irwin, assisted by Wheeler's and Kennedy's batteries. General Hancock maneuvered his men with consummate skill, and his own gallantry, as well as that of his troops, was conspicuous in a very high degree. His report is herewith inclosed, and is very full and minute. Brigadier-General Brooks' brigade, of Smith's division, having bivouacked near the enemy, occupied a portion of the front during the action, and was in support of Mott's battery, which was placed in a position to enfilade a field battery sent by the enemy to harass General Hancock's position. In the afternoon Brooks was ordered by General Sumner to re-enforce Hancock, but after proceeding nearly a mile the order was countermanded, and he returned. Brigadier-General Davidson, of Smith's Division, being absent, sick, his brigade was attached during the day to the brigades of Hancock and Brooks.

At about 1 o'clock p. m. General Peck, of Couch's division, having passed Casey, arrived at headquarters, and by direction of General Sumner was thrown into the woods, forward and to the left, toward the point where the battle was raging with the utmost fury against Hooker's division, of Heintzelman's corps. I accompanied General Peck's brigade until after it entered the woods; but the important directions which General Peck in his report says I gave him (and which my morning's reconnaissance and the noise of battle on our left enabled me to give) had much less to do with the admirable dispositions afterward made by him than his own coolness and good judgment. During an hour and a half Peck's brigade, composed of the Fifty-fifth (Colonel De Trobriand) and Sixty-second (Colonel Riker) New York Volunteers, and the Ninety-third (Colonel McCarter), Ninety-eighth (Colonel Ballier) and One hundred and second (Colonel Rowley) Pennsylvania Volunteers, continued to stand its ground alone against the furious onslaught of the enemy, inflicting great loss upon the rebels, and suffering comparatively little itself, owing to General Peck's admirable disposition of his forces. Toward night he was re-enforced by the Seventh Massa-

chusetts, Colonel Russell, and Second Rhode Island, Colonel Wheaton, of Devens' brigade, Couch's division, and by two regiments, Ninety-second New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, and Ninety-third New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Butler, of Palmer's brigade, and three regiments, the Eighty-fifth Pennsylvania, Colonel Howell; One hundred and first Pennsylvania, Colonel Wilson, and One hundred and third Pennsylvania, Major Gazzam, of Keim's brigade, all from Casey's division. General Peck speaks well of the services of those regiments, and when the ammunition of his own men was exhausted he relieved them with six of these fresh regiments, who held the position during the night, General Devens commanding on the left and General Keim upon the right.

With the exception of a few men of the New York Fifty-fifth, who gave way before a very hot fire, and a few in the Pennsylvania Ninety-eighth, who betrayed a temporary unsteadiness, General Peck speaks in the highest terms of the good conduct of his troops; and in holding so long a position against overwhelming numbers they displayed a kind of courage the most difficult of all to exercise.

Considering the parts taken by the brigades of Generals Peck and Hancock on the right and left of the Fourth Corps in the late action, and in view of the fact that bad conduct or lack of vigor on the part of either might have lost us the battle, I deem it my duty to dwell at some length upon this portion of my report. Those two brigades, as well as the divisions of Couch and Smith, to which they respectively belong, I regard, after nearly six weeks of daily comparison, and after witnessing the conduct of both in the presence of the enemy, as equally excellent. The killed in Hancock's brigade were just half the number killed in Peck's brigade and the wounded less by 9. But Peck, I think, inflicted less damage upon the enemy than Hancock. Hancock took a considerable number of prisoners and a flag from the enemy, and Peck recaptured and held a battery which Hooker had lost. Peck met the enemy when he was flushed with his success in the repulse of a portion of Hooker's division, and Hancock broke in upon his left flank with astonishing audacity. If Peck had given way the enemy would have broken our center, and a rout might have ensued. If Hancock had failed the enemy would not have retreated. After seeing both brigades enter upon the scenes of their exploits, after having collected all the facts and all the results, I am convinced that Brig. Gen. John J. Peck and Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock and their respective brigades are equally deserving of praise and reward for the parts they took in the battle of Williamsburg, and I commend these words to the memories of all those who cherish our cause and honor its defenders.

As the day advanced it became apparent that the enemy were receiving re-enforcements much more rapidly than we were. The sound of his discharges showed that Hooker was hard pressed, and that the enemy was gaining ground in the woods toward the open fields around the White House. The most urgent appeals had come from Hooker for supports, and they had been repeatedly asked for Hancock. Finally, about 3 p. m., General Sumner ordered me, in conformity with my expressed wish as well as his own, to go down and bring forward the re-enforcements. I rode with dispatch, and on my way down to the church at the fork of the road (a little more than a mile off) I encountered troops of Couch's division marching up. I urged them on with all speed. At the opening opposite the church I found five regiments of Casey's division, the greater part of them with their arms stacked. I put them on the march without a moment's delay. Naglee's brigade

was moving up the branch road toward Hooker's position. General Casey and General Naglee had gone at the head of the column. I sent a staff officer immediately to find them, and in the mean time I dispatched the rear portion of the brigade myself (having faced it about) to the front from which I had come. The moment General Naglee joined me I returned in company with him, arriving at the White House about fifteen minutes before the arrival of the commanding general, and considerably in advance of the head of Naglee's column.

General McClellan sent for me and assumed command, and from him I received orders. The general quickly comprehended the state of the field and gave many directions to the fresh troops, ordering forward, among other troops, Naglee and his brigade, and the Tenth Massachusetts, Colonel Briggs, which advanced with great promptness to re-enforce Hancock, and in a very short time the battle ended in our victory.

As the forces engaged on the right in the battle of Williamsburg on the 5th instant belonged exclusively to the Fourth Army Corps, commanded by me, under Major-General McClellan, and as I was subject, until his arrival on the field, to the orders of Brig. Gen. E. V. Sumner, I have endeavored to confine my report principally to such facts as came under my own immediate observation and to such ideas as originated with me. The allusions made to Brigadier-General Sumner connected therewith are all, I think, sustained by the reports of commanders subordinate to me, and I desire that those reports may all be made public, and that a copy of my report be furnished to General Sumner.

The small number of troops actually in position early in the morning and our ignorance of the ground were most embarrassing circumstances. General Sumner received in my presence the most urgent appeals through General Stoneman and others to support Hooker by re-enforcements, and through General Smith and others, as well as through me, he was requested to support Hancock. His reasons for the orders he gave in answer to such solicitations it is not my province to know, nor do I pretend to say.

Confining myself to the ideas suggested by the command of my own corps and to the time prior to the arrival of General McClellan on the field, I am bound to declare that I took the necessary precautions to have my three divisions in the presence of the enemy at an early hour of the day, but that, in spite of my efforts, there was but one there until the afternoon. If they had all arrived as early as 2 o'clock p. m., and if Hancock had been re-enforced as early as 3 o'clock p. m., the victory would have been one of the most brilliant of the war.

The commanders of the First, Second, and Third Divisions, Brigadier-Generals Couch, Smith, and Casey, have made reports, which, with the documents and reports attached to them, are herewith submitted. The names mentioned for praise in the various reports and the names of the killed, wounded, and missing will be forwarded as soon as the lists can be prepared. General Couch and General Smith (who was longest in the field) made excellent dispositions of their troops and were very active. Brigadier-General Casey arrived too late to take part in presence of the enemy, but he was prompt in dispatching a brigade to the support of Hancock and in maturing arrangements for the night. The enemy evacuated their works about 3 a. m. of the 6th, under cover of the darkness. Two companies of the Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Neill, were the first to take possession of Fort Magruder, as that regiment had been the first to plant the Stars and Stripes on the works at Lee's Mill.

From the time of the movement to advance from Warwick Court-

House on the 4th till after the enemy had retreated beyond Williamsburg I received the most zealous assistance from the officers composing my staff, Maj. (now Brig. Gen.) A. Baird, inspector-general and chief of staff; Capt. C. C. Suydam, assistant adjutant-general, and his assistant, Lieut. S. J. Smith, Second Rhode Island Volunteers; Lieut. B. C. Chetwood, First Artillery, and Lieut. O. Jackson, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, aides-de-camp; Lieut. L. J. Howard, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, acting ordnance officer, and Capt. C. D. Blanchard, chief quartermaster of the corps. To the unceasing assiduity and skill of the medical director, Surg. Joseph B. Brown, U. S. Army, also of my staff, the wounded are greatly indebted. In the arduous duties of his profession he was nobly assisted by Brigade Surg. T. Rush Spencer, medical director of Smith's division.

The battle of Williamsburg has demonstrated the effect of organization, military discipline, and instruction upon the Army of the Potomac. The troops met the enemy with perfect steadiness, and delivered their fire with an effect which the prisoners captured describe as most deadly. But the courage and skill of the troops are much less to be wondered at than the good temper and fortitude with which they have borne hardships—exposure to mud, rain, and hunger—during the battle, before and after it. These qualities, according to Napoleon, are more essential to the character of a soldier than courage itself.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, *Adj. Gen., Army of the Potomac.*

No. 37.

Report of Maj. Joseph H. Whittlesey, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 4-7.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH CAVALRY,
Williamsburg, Va., May 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in conformity with the orders of the general commanding Fourth Army Corps on the 4th instant I led the advance with my regiment, under the command of General Naglee, from Lee's Mill toward this place, having sent one squadron (Lieutenant Sweet's) on a reconnaissance toward Grove's wharf, on James River, and encamped for the night with Naglee's brigade near the Half-way House. On the 5th the march was continued through mud and rain, under the orders of General Casey, to the vicinity of Fort Magruder, and on the morning of the 6th, after the enemy were driven from that and the other forts of their second line, I again encamped with General Naglee's brigade on the right of our line of battle on the banks of York River, and this morning reported with the regiment to the commanding general of the Fourth Army Corps at this place.

All the arduous and various duties incident to an advance through narrow and difficult roads, in mud and rain and in face of the enemy, were performed by every officer and man of the regiment with alacrity, intelligence, and spirit.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. WHITTLESEY,

Major, Fifth Cavalry, Commanding Regiment.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM, *Adjutant-General, Fourth Army Corps.*

No. 38.

Report of Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.

HEADQUARTERS COUCH'S DIVISION,
Williamsburg, Va., May 8, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that at 1 o'clock p. m. of May 5 the head of my division, consisting of Peck's brigade only, arrived on the ground in rear of the center of our line of battle, and was by direction of General Keyes posted by me on the Williamsburg road, running there through a dense wood to the right of Hooker and supporting him, he being then fiercely engaged. Peck soon moved forward, and for an hour and a half was opposed by nearly the whole of the enemy's disposable force in front. Fort Magruder, distant 400 to 600 yards, with its plunging fire of shells and grape, covered the assaults of their infantry and cavalry, but the determined courage of this gallant officer and the steadiness of his brigade foiled all attempts to drive him from the ground.

The left of the Fifty-fifth New York was twice forced back, but the Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers and the Sixty-second New York Volunteers, coming up furiously, recovered the space lost. Devens' brigade arrived, and moved forward with the Seventh Massachusetts and Second Rhode Island to re-enforce Peck, the Tenth Massachusetts being ordered to support Hancock. General Palmer with two regiments of his brigade, Ninety-second New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, the Ninety-third New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Butler, and General Keim with his brigade were pushed forward as supports, and were partially engaged, General Palmer himself being called to another part of the field by General McClellan.

The Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania, Hooker's division, coming back through my left, was halted by an officer of my staff and reformed by General Devens. This regiment and one of Brooks' were held in reserve. General Keyes being absent for a time in another part of the field, I received orders directly from General Sumner, who gave me all the supports required to maintain the position, placing the whole force of the center under my orders. Graham's brigade, General Graham being absent, sick, arrived at 5 p. m., and was held as a reserve.

Most unfortunately, from the nature of the ground, artillery could not be used to advantage.

The center having been placed under my command, the following dispositions, which received the approbation of the general commanding the army and of Generals Sumner and Keyes, were made for the night: To the front Peck, ably supported by Keim on his left and Devens on his right; six regiments in reserve, including the First U. S. Chasseurs, Lieutenant-Colonel Shaler, posted to picket to the left and rear, and two batteries covering the road entering the woods. Keim's brigade during the night covered the four guns abandoned on my left, and prevented the enemy from carrying them off. Thus disposed, my drenched and wearied troops lay down on their arms.

At 3.30 a. m. of the 6th the pickets reported that the enemy appeared to be evacuating the works in front, and at light General Devens sent out Captain Reed, Seventh Massachusetts, with 20 men, to reconnoiter. This officer went around Fort Magruder, entered the barracks, and took one prisoner, finding a large number of wounded rebels.

At 4 a. m. Colonel Adams, commanding Graham's brigade, relieved Brooks, Smith's division, on my right, and Colonel Neill, Twenty-third Pennsylvania, pushed forward two companies and occupied the small

works to the right of Fort Magruder, the enemy being in full retreat, and at sunrise these strong works were in the possession of my division.

General Heintzelman's corps subsequently moved out in force and occupied Williamsburg.

The comparative smallness of the loss is due to the heavy woods we occupied and to the fact that the rebels knew not our exact position.

The following is the list of casualties :

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Peck's brigade.....	18	81	26
Graham's brigade.....	1	2
Devens' brigade.....	1
Artillery detachment.....
Total.....	19	84	26

Capt. G. B. Shearer, Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, is among the killed. I have also to state that burying parties from my command have interred 1 officer and 43 privates of the rebel forces.

I desire to express my gratitude to General McClellan for his encouragement and confidence and to Generals Sumner and Keyes for their approbation and support.

Captain Walker, my assistant adjutant-general, and my aides-de-camp, Lieutenants Edwards and Burt, rendered me the most valuable assistance, maintaining perfect composure while under the fire of the enemy's shot and shell. The latter officer was slightly wounded.

I respectfully refer you to the appended reports of General Peck and Devens, Colonel Adams, commanding Graham's brigade, and Major West, commanding artillery detachment, for more detailed accounts of their respective operations, and as showing more particularly the conduct of the command. There was very little faltering, and I beg you to say to the general commanding that I want no higher earthly honor than to be the commander of the First Division of his corps.

I have not thought it proper to call on Generals Keim and Palmer for reports, as they belong to the division of General Casey, though for the time under my command. It may be mentioned here that on the night of the 3d instant I gave directions to have the rebel works to my front on the Warwick thoroughly reconnoitered, as well as on Sunday, the 4th, with a view of carrying them by assault on that night, but they were evacuated by the rebels without awaiting my action.

All which I respectfully submit.

D. N. COUCH,

Brigadier-General, Commanding First Division, Fourth Corps.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM, A. A. G., Hdqrs. Fourth Army Corps.

No. 39.

Report of Maj. Robert M. West, Chief of Artillery.

HDQRS. LIGHT ARTY., 1ST DIV., 4TH ARMY CORPS,
Camp near Williamsburg, Va., May 6, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the operations of the division of artillery during the engagement of yesterday :

Flood's and McCarthy's batteries at about 3 p. m. were posted by

direction of General Sumner in reserve in rear of General Peck's line of operations. Subsequently one piece of Flood's battery was moved to the point in front where the Williamsburg road enters the woods. While this piece was in position at the latter point Private Eugene Sherry, of Flood's Battery D (Pennsylvania Reserve Artillery), was so dangerously wounded by the explosion of a shell as to render amputation of both legs necessary. I inclose the surgeon's report. No portion of this artillery was engaged, all the points at which artillery could operate having been occupied by artillery from other divisions.

I have the honor to be, captain, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

ROBT. M. WEST,
Major and Chief of Artillery.

Capt. FRANCIS A. WALKER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 40.

Report of Col. Julius W. Adams, Sixty-seventh New York Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of operations May 4-7.

HEADQUARTERS GRAHAM'S BRIGADE,
Williamsburg, May 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the operations of this brigade since the morning of the 4th instant:

The brigade consists of the First Long Island Regiment, the Thirty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, First U. S. Chasseurs, Sixty-first and Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and attached to it a battery of the First Pennsylvania Artillery, commanded by Captain Miller.

Orders were received from division headquarters to take two or three regiments of my command and a section of Captain Miller's battery and capture the forts on Warwick River in front of Dam No. 2, below Lee's Mill. Accordingly the Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Neill, and the First Long Island, Lieutenant-Colonel Cross, were ordered forward. Upon arriving in front of the main works it was presumed that they had been abandoned by the enemy; however, no precaution was omitted to guard against a surprise. The river and deep marsh immediately in their front required the combined efforts of the whole force for nearly two hours to effect a passage.

The works, which were quite extensive and very strong, were found abandoned by the enemy. At this point we received orders to join the column of General Naglee, ordered to the front on a reconnaissance. The march was accordingly resumed, the remainder of the brigade having in the mean time joined. We halted for the night after a march of about 7 miles, and, being without supplies of any kind or means of transportation, were compelled to send a large force back to camp to bring them up. This detained us, owing to the terrible state of the roads, until the next day at 3 p. m., when, receiving orders to proceed to the front without delay to re-enforce the remainder of the division, then hotly engaged with the enemy, we resumed our forward movement (Captain Miller's battery had previously advanced upon the receipt of written orders and has not joined the brigade since), and night coming on before we could get into position, owing to the violent storm, the brigade bivouacked near the headquarters of the Fourth

Army Corps. The Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers was ordered to the front, and the First U. S. Chasseurs, Lieutenant-Colonel Shaler, was posted as pickets in advance, a company of the Sixty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, as also one of the Thirty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, being detailed to guard the prisoners near headquarters.

At 3.30 a. m. (6th) the brigade was ordered into position in a belt of woods within a half a mile of Fort Magruder and its supporting batteries, the Sixty-first and Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers in front, and the First Long Island and Thirty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers in reserve. The flank companies of the Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, thrown out as skirmishers, advanced and (Captain Maxwell in command) entered it without opposition, it having been abandoned about an hour previously, many of the wounded of the enemy being found in their hospitals.

Through my aide, Lieutenant Adams, I was ordered to report in writing to the commander-in-chief the condition, strength, and character of the enemy's works, and at 7 a. m. was ordered to advance with the brigade, Major Farnsworth's cavalry in my front, and to take possession of the city of Williamsburg, receiving special orders from General Keyes, commanding the army corps, not to advance beyond the city, which instructions were obeyed.

It is unnecessary to allude to the long and violent rain-storm and the unparalleled condition of the roads further than as they served to exhibit the energy and untiring perseverance of both officers and men.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. W. ADAMS,

Colonel First L. I. Vols., Comdg. Graham's Brigade.

Capt. FRANCIS A. WALKER,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters Couch's Division.

No. 41.

Report of Brig. Gen. John J. Peck, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS PECK'S BRIGADE,
Battle-field near Williamsburg, Va., May 6, 1862.

SIR: On the 5th instant Couch's division was ordered to move after that of General Casey. About 11 a. m. I came up with Casey's command, which was halted, and, hearing heavy firing to the front, passed on by it to the headquarters of General Keyes. About 12 m. I received orders to move my five regiments and two batteries in support of Hooker's division, already engaged on the extreme left. The command was urged on with all possible speed over bad roads and in a drenching rain. General Keyes met me, giving some important directions. General Couch, although quite ill, accompanied me to the field, reporting my arrival and advising in the dispositions. The condition of the road, limited space for artillery, with the risk of loss, warranted the leaving of the batteries with the reserves. After several fruitless efforts to find General Hooker, on the part of myself and staff, I proceeded to examine my position, while awaiting developments in his direction. Early in the afternoon I found a regiment of General Grover's, Hooker's division, moving back along the Williamsburg road. The officers stated that the ammunition was getting short and that the enemy was

driving in the front. This regiment remained inactive within my lines, as I did not wish to disturb arrangements of General Hooker.

On receiving an intimation by a messenger of the general desiring that I should engage the enemy on his right I moved up the One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers, deploying on the right of the main road. In furtherance of the same object I pushed forward the the Fifty-fifth New York Volunteers correspondingly on the left. Learning that a battery farther to the left needed support, I dispatched the Fifty-fifth New York for that purpose. Soon after I examined the ground far to the left, and placed the Sixty-second New York Volunteers in position, where the regiment found cover, and held on until its ammunition was expended. Many conflicting reports reached me from time to time respecting the enemy's movements on the left and right, which I endeavored to reconcile with the idea that the main road was the key of the position. Reports of a movement against my front were quickly followed by a general shower of shot, shell, and canister from the several batteries, and the advance of infantry displaying Union colors. My line was pressed back under this combination of circumstances. At this juncture I moved to the left center the Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers. The regiment came into line handsomely, and by the additional weight of fire I was enabled to recover by degrees the ground from which the line had receded.

Feeling the influence of these supports on the front the enemy moved to the right, opposite the One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers, where he made long and repeated efforts to secure a permanent lodgment in the woods. This regiment could not withstand the vigorous onslaught of such superior numbers, and retired some distance, so that I greatly feared I should not be able to hold on with the brigade. At this crisis I led forward to the right and front my last regiment, the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, which, in spite of some indications of disorder, was placed in position, and the enemy was promptly repulsed along the whole line. Before night General Couch sent for my support General Devens, with Colonel Russell's Seventh Massachusetts and Colonel Wheaton's Second Rhode Island. Soon after General Palmer reported with two regiments, and General Keim with three more. General Palmer, much to my regret, was called away for other duty by General McClellan.

The supply of ammunition in the cartridge boxes having been exhausted, I was compelled to relieve my brigade with six of the fresh regiments. Those on the right I placed under the immediate command of General Devens, and those on the left under General Keim. Every preparation was made to resist a night attack. Pickets were thrown out in front and extended to the right to those of General Smith. On the left repeated efforts were made to connect with General Hooker, but without success.

At daylight I directed Generals Devens and Keim to examine their respective fronts with caution, and to send forward small parties to the enemy's works in case of his withdrawal. This was done, and several of them occupied.

It is very gratifying to say that the four-gun battery which was captured was retaken by my brigade, and remained under the guns of the Sixty-second New York, Fifty-fifth New York, and Ninety-third Pennsylvania at the close of the engagement.

The enemy's object was the seizing of the Williamsburg road. He had cut another route through the timber a short distance from the road, which formed a junction with it, under the fire of his principal

batteries. His possession of these communications would have compelled the abandonment of the woods, endangered the reserves of artillery and the trains. A large body of cavalry was held in hand to dash along the avenues in case of the success of the attack.

Not far from 3.30 p. m. General Heintzelman sent word by Captain Morris that he was in command on my left; that I must hold on to the woods at all hazards, and he would send support. The message was cheering, but the aid failed to reach me, having probably been called for at some other point.

My thanks are especially due Generals Sumner, Keyes, and Couch for the lively interest manifested by them, as shown by the liberal supports which they dispatched so soon as at command. The latter, in spite of severe illness, communicated with me many times, and came after midnight in the woods, through all possible discomforts, to see if anything was desired. Captains Parker and Walker, Lieutenants Edwards and Burt, of his staff, all conveyed orders of importance, for which I am under obligation.

General Devens came on the field and reported with Colonel Russell's Massachusetts regiment, where the enemy's batteries were in full play, and requested that I would give him a position on the advance. General Keim soon followed with Colonel Howell's regiment. Both generals were zealous and judicious. Colonels De Trobriand, Riker, Rowley, Ballier, and Johnston commanded regiments with coolness and discretion. The latter had his horse shot under him. Colonel McCarter went into action with his regiment and did good service, although very much indisposed. Colonels Russell's and Howell's regiments quickly gained places at the weakest points of the line, and deserve especial mention for their services. Colonels Wheaton, J. H. Wilson, Anderson, and Butler, and Major Gazzam, of the One hundred and third Pennsylvania Volunteers, were very efficient, and only needed a renewal of the action to exhibit their soldierlyship.

Many charges upon advanced parties of the enemy, repeated sharp contests for the battery, well-directed fires upon cavalry, exhibitions of tactical knowledge and address in holding men like a rock under heavy cross-fires, were reported by commanders or under my own observation. So much of patient endurance and soldierly bearing was displayed that it is impossible to discriminate. With the exception of a small number of the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania and Fifty-fifth New York the conduct of all officers and men in this command was highly gratifying. Brigade Surg. S. R. Haven, Capt. William H. Morris, assistant adjutant-general, aides Lieuts. S. Titus (quite sick), Charles R. Sterling, and Daniel Lodor, jr., were all actively employed on the field, and discharged their duties to my entire satisfaction. Brigade Quartermaster John S. Schultze and Commissary Capt. M. J. Green were diligent in their departments.

It is proper to observe that while I was engaged with one portion of my brigade on General Hooker's right, the other was detained on the road by superior authority, for the passage of General Kearny's artillery to his left, so that I was directly and indirectly aiding both flanks during that detention. The regiments arrived just in time to save my position.

The accompanying* list includes the names of many of the best men in the command, whose loss is deeply regretted. They poured out their blood in defense of constitutional liberty, and their memories will be

* Embodied in return, p. 450.

cherished by a grateful people. The comparative smallness of the loss is a matter of congratulation, and is due in part to the holding back portions of the troops until the proper moment arrived for moving each successive reserve. The trees and undergrowth caused much of the canister that beat upon the woods like hail to fall harmless. Many shells passed over the command, bursting far in the rear. The infantry fire of the rebels was less destructive in consequence of its elevation. All were directed to prostrate themselves when possible on hearing the report of artillery.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN J. PECK,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. FRANCIS A. WALKER,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Couch's Division.

No. 42.

Report of Col. Thomas A. Rowley, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. OLD 13TH OR 102D PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
Camp near Williamsburg, Va., May 8, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by the old Thirteenth or One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers at the engagement on the 5th instant at this place, as follows:

The regiment, being in the advance of the brigade on the march, on arriving at the scene of action at 1.30 p. m. was formed in line of battle on left-hand side of the road through a dense forest to the right of where General Hooker's division was engaged. After remaining in this position a short time, the sound of musketry apparently becoming closer, General Peck ordered that the regiment march by the right flank and take a position in front of the timber, where a cross-fire could be given the advancing columns of the enemy.

On approaching the opening three companies were thrown out as skirmishers on the extreme right. The skirmishers, taking position, opened fire on the enemy's left, who, upon receiving our fire, opened upon us a terrific fire of artillery from their earthworks and fired a very destructive missile from their rifle pits, which exploded when striking. The enemy then made a charge toward us, having a battery of field pieces and their left flank supported by horsemen, in addition to their earthworks bearing upon us. Our skirmishers now assembled on the batallion, when the regiment opened upon the advancing enemy, firing by file, which was kept up until they fell back apparently beyond effective range of our guns. At this time the other regiments of our brigade came into action and assisted in repulsing their repeated advances afterward made. We held our position, firing by volley whenever opportunity offered of preventing them advancing in line, and by file at the occupants of the rifle pits, or any who rendered themselves conspicuous in rallying or reconnoitering.

Our loss has been 3 killed and 37 wounded, one of whom has since died.* Several of those reported are but slightly wounded, and will be on duty in a few days.

* But see revised statement, p. 450.

The men generally behaved with coolness and deliberation during the entire time we were under fire (five hours), and several exhausted every round of ammunition in their boxes. I have been so well satisfied with their conduct that I think it unnecessary after their first engagement to designate any particular instance of bravery. Our position was occupied about twilight by the Second Rhode Island Regiment, at which time the fire of the enemy had ceased.

Very respectfully submitted.

THOS. A. ROWLEY,

Colonel One Hundred and Second or old Thirteenth Pa. Vols.

JOS. BROWNE, *Adjutant.*

Capt. W. H. MORRIS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 43.

Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Devens, jr., U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., COUCH'S DIVISION, FOURTH CORPS,

May 6, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report in reference to the affair near Williamsburg that the portion of this brigade with me (Second Rhode Island, Seventh and Tenth Massachusetts) was ordered to leave its camp beyond Lee's Mill on May 5, and followed the line of march of General Peck's brigade. At about a mile below the Brick Church the battery of artillery attached to the brigade could not be moved, and the road was in such condition and so blocked by teams that it was impossible to move the infantry past them. An order was also received there that the ammunition wagons and ambulances of the divisions of Generals Hooker and Kearny should have the first claim to the road.

I at length succeeded in passing the infantry beyond the obstructions in the road, and with the Seventh Massachusetts arrived at the open plain near the White House, known as ———, at about 2 o'clock p. m. The Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Russell, was placed at the left of a line which was being formed at the *débouchure* of a road from the front to the plain. In a few moments an order was received for the regiment to move forward to the support of General Peck, who was actively engaged in front, tenaciously holding his position against very persistent attacks of the enemy. The regiment moved steadily forward in line under a severe and well-directed fire of shot and shell with which the enemy were sweeping the woods, which, however, became less dangerous as the regiment resolutely and rapidly passed within the range at which the enemy were firing, and the comparatively small loss which I have to report is due under Providence to the spirit and determination with which it thus breasted the artillery fire. After advancing to within some 50 feet of the front I was met by General Peck, who directed me to throw the regiment more to the right of his line, which was then seriously menaced. This was accordingly done, and the regiment placed in line on the right of and supporting the Ninety-eighth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, of General Peck's line. After this disposition was made, General Peck's troops being much exhausted, I sent for the Tenth Massachusetts and Second Rhode Island, having been informed that they had now come up.

The Tenth Massachusetts had been sent necessarily to another position, but the Second Rhode Island, Colonel Wheaton, was sent forward. With this I relieved the One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers, of General Peck's brigade, at about one hour before dark, and immediately after relieved the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania with the Seventh Massachusetts, moving the latter to the left of the point where it had been originally posted.

The place of the Seventh Massachusetts was then taken by the One hundred and third Pennsylvania Volunteers, of General Keim's brigade. The fire of the enemy substantially ceased at night-fall, but the troops remained in position during the night, I having been assigned by General Peck to the charge of the right wing of the line held by him.

A little while after sunrise a careful examination of the work known as Fort Magruder indicated that it was abandoned, although two or three horsemen were still about and in it. There was, however, on the open plain to the right and rear of this work a large body of cavalry deployed. By my direction Colonel Russell ordered a detachment of 15 men of the Seventh Massachusetts to cross the woody ravine between the plain on which Fort Magruder is situated and our own line and observe more nearly. Captain Reed, of Company K, Seventh Massachusetts Volunteers, in charge of the party, crossed the ravine to the edge of the plain, and—the few scattered horsemen seen at first having disappeared in the mean time—subsequently crossed the plain to the front of the fort, passing along the front and right flank, and fully satisfying himself that it was abandoned, two heavy guns only having been left upon it. As Captain Reed was moving along the right flank, a staff officer, purporting to be from General Kearny's division, who rode out from our left, directed him to pass around to the left of the fort and to the barracks there, which he did, finding the barracks entirely untenanted except by a single rebel soldier, whom he took prisoner.

I report the following as the list of casualties in this brigade in the affair: Andrew S. Lawton, killed; Nathaniel Geary, amputation of right leg above the knee; Patrick Hein, flesh wound, slight; all of Company A, Seventh Massachusetts Volunteers.

In conclusion, it is but justice to both the Seventh Massachusetts and Second Rhode Island to say that they moved forward with great spirit and alacrity to the positions assigned them, and maintained them as long as the enemy continued in their front with calmness and resolution.

I inclose a report of Colonel Briggs, of the Tenth Massachusetts Volunteers.

And I remain, captain, very respectfully, yours,

CHAS. DEVENS, JR.,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. FRANCIS A. WALKER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 44.

Report of Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division.

HEADQUARTERS SMITH'S DIVISION,

May 10, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report, for the information of the brigadier-general commanding Fourth Army Corps, that on the morning

of the 4th instant, soon after daylight, General Hancock rode up to me bringing two contrabands, who informed me that the works in front of us had been evacuated. I immediately directed General Hancock to call for a few volunteers from each regiment of his brigade to cross the dam in front of us, and made the necessary dispositions of my artillery and infantry to cover as much as possible the crossing of these men, in case the work should still be occupied. Before, however, the troops arrived at the points designated, at about 5.30 a. m., Lieutenant Custer, Fifth Cavalry, and Captain Read, assistant adjutant-general to General Brooks, had crossed the dam and taken possession of the works. The Fifth Vermont being near at hand, I ordered it forward at once to occupy the works, and other regiments were immediately ordered in as a support.

Work was immediately commenced on the dam to make it passable for artillery and cavalry, and at about 7 a. m. the squadron of cavalry under my command was thrown across the dam and ordered to the front to reconnoiter. Information was soon received from Captain Chambliss, commanding the squadron, that he had come up with the rear guard of the enemy, consisting of a large force of cavalry and a force of infantry. Captain Chambliss was ordered to retire, as I was then in no condition to support him, and the information was telegraphed to the general-in-chief and the generals commanding the left wing and Fourth Corps.

About 8 o'clock my artillery began to cross. I immediately ordered a battery with General Hancock's brigade forward to support the cavalry. About this time a dispatch was received from the general-in-chief ordering me not to engage the enemy, as he had made arrangements for cutting them off. Captain Chambliss had, however, been cautiously following their retreating rear guard, and by the time I overtook the advance, about 11.30 a. m., it was within a mile of the Yorktown and Williamsburg road. Here I received a positive order from General Sumner to halt, and occupied myself pushing reconnaissances to ascertain whether we could turn the head of Skiff Creek, the bridge over which had been burned (and in the endeavor to put out the fire Lieutenant Custer had burned his hands), and also to ascertain if a practicable route could be found to the Yorktown road, the road directly in front of us being impassable. Both these reconnaissances were successful.

Between 2 and 3 o'clock General Sumner came up, and ordered the division forward on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road. I came up with General Stoneman's command at about 5.30 p. m. As fast as the division arrived it was ordered by General Sumner to be formed in three lines of battle, preparatory to charging upon the enemy's lines.

At about 6.30 p. m. the order to advance was given. Before the first line got fairly into the woods I took the responsibility of halting the third line, ordering it to remain in support of the artillery, and as a reserve for the other troops to fall back upon in case they were driven in. On finding the utterly impracticable nature of the woods in front of us I endeavored to find General Sumner, to get authority to halt the troops, but failing in that, I sent an aide to find General Hancock to order a halt. I then sent to General Heintzelman, stating the circumstances, and asking him to authorize a halt. The reply came back that he was expecting General Hooker to attack on the left, and under the circumstances could not give the requisite authority.

About 8 o'clock, while endeavoring to get the troops of the right wing into order, I was very much relieved by hearing from General

Hancock that, failing to communicate with me, he had taken the responsibility of halting the left wing. The right wing was immediately ordered to bivouac in the open field where it then found itself, and I then proceeded to look for General Sumner, whom I afterward found in the woods with Generals Hancock and Brooks. I then received instructions with reference to posting the reserve brigade and to be ready to attack the works at daylight. The reports of Generals Hancock and Brooks and Captain Chambliss* with reference to the operations of their respective commands this day are herewith inclosed.

At daylight on the morning of the 5th it was raining hard, and while waiting for sufficient light to get into the woods to reach General Sumner I was informed by him that he had ordered the command to retire, as some of the regiments were without rations. I then proceeded to post the command in its new position, and while doing so learned that the enemy's works (reported the night before to be a single line open in the rear) consisted of a line of inclosed redoubts, extending to our right as far as the eye could reach. I immediately asked that engineer officers of the command might be ordered to make a reconnaissance. Captain Stewart, of the Engineers, detailed for this duty, made a reconnaissance to the right of Fort Magruder, but from the nature of the ravines and the flanking power of the redoubts found no suitable point of attack.

In a conversation with Captain Stewart he told me that a negro had informed him that there was a road across a dam on our right, leading to Williamsburg, a distance of about 3 miles. I then asked him to take four companies from my command as an escort, and proceed to make an examination as to the correctness of this report. A little after 10 a. m. Captain Currie, my assistant adjutant-general, returned to me from Captain Stewart, and reported that a redoubt had been found apparently unoccupied, commanding a dam which was practicable for artillery to cross. This report was immediately made to General Sumner, who insisted on Captain Stewart being sent for. On Captain Stewart's arrival, to confirm his previous report, I received permission to order a brigade forward to take the work if possible, and General Hancock was immediately detached for that purpose. In addition to the orders received from General Sumner he was ordered by me to go as far as prudent in his own estimation. Later in the day I received an order to detach a brigade from the division to the support of General Hooker. General Brooks was ordered for this purpose, but I went back to expostulate against the breaking up of my command, and to ask that I might go with the two remaining brigades of the division to re-enforce General Hancock, who had sent in word that he had already taken two forts. Permission was granted, and the remainder of the division was being drawn out on the road when I received orders not to proceed, but to place my troops in a position to resist an attack on the ground we then occupied. This was done, but later in the day I again urged that I might be allowed to proceed to the support of General Hancock as the most expeditious mode of terminating the attack upon the left. This request was denied.

About 12 m. four pieces of Captain Mott's battery were ordered into position in front of the Vermont brigade, more to annoy and distract the enemy than with the hope of accomplishing any permanent good. The object seemed to have been attained. Still later in the day Lieutenant Farquhar arrived with a message from General Hancock. He

* See p. 440 for Chambliss' report; Hancock's and Brooks' reports follow, Nos. 49 and 50.

was immediately sent to the commanding general with a renewal of the request so often made. Permission was again granted, and again the troops were on the road, when the order was given to place them in position to resist an attack upon the position then occupied. About 5 p. m., the general-in-chief arriving on the field, re-enforcements were at once ordered, and I joined General Hancock in time to get the troops posted just before dark.

The report of General Hancock will show the various messages sent me by him during the day and the answers returned by order of the commanding general. To the engagement of General Hancock's command (consisting of the Fifth Wisconsin, Sixth Maine, and Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, of the First Brigade, and the Thirty-third New York and Seventh Maine, of the Third Brigade), which took place in the afternoon, I cannot pretend to do justice. The brilliancy of the plan of battle; the coolness of its execution; the seizing of the proper instant for changing from the defensive to the offensive; the steadiness of the troops engaged, and the completeness of the victory are subjects to which I earnestly call the attention of the general-in-chief for his just praise.

The accompanying sketch,* made by Captain West, acting topographical engineer of the division, will serve to define General Hancock's position. Captain Ayres' report will be found with the accompanying documents.

Very respectfully,

WM. F. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Fourth Corps, Army of the Potomac.

No. 45.

Report of Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery.

HEADQUARTERS LIGHT ARTILLERY, SMITH'S DIVISION,
Camp near Williamsburg, Va., May 8, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the operations of my command for the two days of active duty, the 4th and 5th instant:

Pursuant to orders the artillery moved forward, crossing Dam No. 2 by hand, pieces unlimbered, and occupied their proper places in the column on the march. Wheeler's and Cowan's batteries were placed in position in the open space behind the woods, and about 200 yards from it, which skirts Queen's Creek.

About 10 o'clock a. m. of the 5th, pursuant to orders, I directed Cowan's battery to report to General Hancock, to move to the right with his brigade. Subsequently I sent Wheeler in the same direction with that brigade. I inclose reports of the operations of those batteries on that day.

About 12 m., pursuant to General Smith's orders, I posted four pieces of Mott's battery under his command in front of the woods, and opened fire upon the enemy's works in front about the same time that the two batteries with General Hancock opened upon the same works from the

* Not found.

right flank. This cross-fire had a favorable effect and was evidently very annoying to the enemy, artillery being seen to retire from a threatening move made upon Hancock's brigade and their fire turned upon the four pieces. As the fire slackened Mott's pieces were withdrawn, and his battery and my own moved around to the dam over Queen's Creek and put into camp.

I inclose extracts of the reports of the battery commanders during these operations.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. B. AYRES,
Captain, Fifth Artillery, Commanding.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

No. 46.

Report of Lieut. Charles Kusserow, Adjutant of Artillery.

HEADQUARTERS CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,
Smith's Division, Camp No. 11, in the field, May 8, 1862.

CAPTAIN: According to the order I received I have the honor to report of all circumstances in my knowledge occurring on the day of the 5th instant during the fight of General Hancock's brigade:

After the detail of General Hancock's brigade to our right I saw General Keyes, commanding our *corps d'armée*, coming to the White House (headquarters), and calling out that General Hancock went across the dam on our right, occupying the first fort, without having found any resistance of the enemy. Captain Ayres immediately ordered me to lead Captain Wheeler, with his battery, as quick as possible to General Hancock's support. Executing the order, I found General Hancock's brigade occupying one redoubt nearly one mile beyond the enemy's first fort, and advancing against another fort occupied by the enemy's infantry. Lieutenant Cowan, with his battery, had engaged the enemy, but being too far off for good effect, he advanced to a distance of 800 yards to said fort by an order given to him by Captain Currie.

General Hancock held Wheeler's battery in reserve, and having disposed of all his staff officers, ordered me to ride as quickly as I could, reporting to General Smith what I had seen, and asking him at once for larger supports, himself with his troops not being able to secure sufficiently his right and right rear flank. General Smith sent me back to General Hancock to report to him that he had ordered four regiments for his support. By this ride I found Lieutenant Parker, of General Hancock's staff, who told me the said four regiments were on the road. Having delivered this message to General Hancock I stopped some time in our batteries, Wheeler's battery being posted on the right of Cowan's. The fire of Captain Wheeler was of good effect, being directed on columns of infantry and cavalry and little bodies of artillery moving behind one fort farther on the right.

The enemy suddenly formed line of battle, and General Hancock ordered me to report this fact to General Smith, asking again for re-enforcements. Riding back, I missed on the road the four regiments sent, as said before, and heard by General Brooks that they were or-

dered back. I found General Smith in presence of General Sumner. Stating the fact of General Hancock's position dangerous in case of a retreat, and at the same time expressing General Hancock's hope of great success when sufficiently re-enforced, I received General Sumner's order for General Hancock to retire, which order General Smith repeated, explaining to me that he wanted General Hancock to occupy his first position. On my return to General Hancock I reported that he had nothing to expect, and that General Smith wished him not to advance farther. Then I rode back to Captain Ayres, reporting to him the position of our batteries and the state of our affairs, begging him at once to do everything in his power to bring re-enforcements to General Hancock.

We happened to stay near General Smith, who had just received the order—I should rather think the permission—to bring up the rest of his division to General Hancock's support, but we had not yet made 800 yards with the head of the column when the order was given to return. Some time after that I heard that General Hancock was given up, when Major-General McClellan arrived and immediately ordered General Casey's division to advance on our right for General Hancock's support.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CH. KUSSEROW,

First Lieutenant and Adjutant of Artillery.

No. 47.

Reports of Capt. Charles C. Wheeler, Battery E, First New York Light Artillery.

ADJUTANT: The battery under my command, by order of General Hancock, took position some 1,700 or 1,800 yards from Fort Magruder on May 5, and opened fire first on an earthwork some 500 or 600 yards to our right and front; then, after firing about six shots, turned our guns on a battery placed at the corner of the woods near Fort Magruder; afterward upon Fort Magruder itself, and finally, when the enemy charged our position, we turned our guns upon them as they advanced, firing case-shot and canister. By your own request I consented to lend Captain Cowan, in command of Kennedy's New York Battery, some ammunition, and owing to a change by him (not ordered by me) of his empty gun-limbers with two limbers of my caissons, and owing to the rapid firing which the quick advance of the enemy rendered necessary, an exact account of the elevation and number of shots fired cannot be given.*

At this battery near the woods, and at infantry passing near it to the enemy's front, and at artillery passing to their front and retiring, we fired at 5° more or less about 60 case-shot and 17 time-fuse shells. At Fort Magruder we fired 9 percussion shells, 5 falling short, 4 exploding within the fort. Fully two-thirds of the case-shot and time-fuse shells fired at the battery near the woods did not explode. Those that did explode appeared to produce good effect, as the battery took a new position more to their rear during the firing. The elevation for reaching Fort Magruder was 5 $\frac{7}{8}$ °, and the effect of the four that exploded in the

* List of ammunition expended omitted.

fort was to produce considerable confusion among those serving the guns there. When the enemy charged our position we opened upon him with case-shot at about 700 or 800 yards, killing and wounding several before they came within range of canister. I only used here three guns, one having become unserviceable from an axle broken by firing at high elevation. When the enemy reached the point which our skirmishers had held, some 300 yards to our front and right, we gave him canister from these pieces, continuing the three pieces until the enemy was about 100 or 150 yards from the battery. I then ordered my left piece to the rear, it occupying a bad piece of heavy ground; kept up fire from two right pieces until the enemy were within 20 yards of the fence inclosing the house in the yard of which my battery was placed, I having placed my limbers in a position near the guns that they might be limbered up rapidly, and keeping up the fire in that position. Our last piece retired from the yard as the enemy reached the fence. I took a new position in the left of the fort, on the slope, and opened again with canister; and, as the enemy retreated, with case-shot.

My loss was 1 killed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. C. WHEELER,

Captain, Commanding Battery E, First N. Y. Artillery.

First Lieut. CHARLES KUSSEROW,

Adjutant and Chief of Artillery, Smith's Division.

CAMP IN THE FIELD, NEAR WILLIAMSBURG, VA.,

May 8, 1862.

CAPTAIN: By order of Captain Ayres, chief of artillery, the battery under my command proceeded to the position taken by General Hancock on the 5th instant, and by his order came into battery on the right of the position occupied by the battery commanded by Lieutenant Cowan, and some 1,700 or 1,800 yards from Fort Magruder, and opened fire first on an earthwork 600 yards to our right and front, then upon a battery placed at the corner of the woods near Fort Magruder, and upon bodies of infantry passing to the front of the enemy's position, and upon artillery passing to their front and returning, afterward firing upon the fort itself, and finally, when the enemy charged our position, the guns were turned upon them as they advanced, firing case-shot and canister. The earthwork on our right was struck by several of our shells, some of them grazing the parapet and passing into the farther embankment. The fire upon the battery appeared to be effective, as the enemy changed its position, and several of our projectiles were exploded in the fort.

About 5 p. m. I proceeded to the general to report a piece disabled, its axle broken by firing at a high elevation, when he ordered me to retire the batteries, one at a time, to the ridge some 400 yards to our rear. Returning to the batteries, I perceived the enemy advancing in force, and opened upon him with case-shot. When he reached the fence where our skirmishers had been, some 300 yards from us, we commenced firing canister, and the disabled piece was sent to the rear. When he arrived within 150 yards of our position I sent to the rear the left piece, which occupied heavy ground and from the position of the enemy was no longer effective, and placing the limbers of the remain-

ing pieces so that they could be rapidly limbered up, continued the fire with canister until the enemy was within 20 yards of the fence inclosing the house in the yard of which the battery was placed, when we retired, and by General Hancock's order took a position on the left of the earthwork, on the ridge, again opening with canister and firing until, from the nature of the ground, the enemy could not be reached, when I ordered the battery into the road in rear of the earthwork, and soon afterward, by General Hancock's order, placed two guns on the right of the earthwork and fired at the enemy retreating through the edge of the woods.

After dark, by order of General Smith, I placed another gun in position on the right of the earthwork. Our loss is 1 killed.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. C. WHEELER,

Captain, Commanding E Battery, First N. Y. Artillery.

Capt. JOHN HANCOCK,

A. A. G. to Gen. Hancock, Comdg. 1st Brig., Smith's Div.

No. 48.

Reports of Lieut. Andrew Cowan, First New York Battery.

CAMP IN THE FIELD,
May 8, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the morning of Monday, May 5, in accordance with the orders of Capt. R. B. Ayres, commanding artillery Smith's division, I reported to General Hancock with my battery, and by the general's order followed the second regiment of his command. I first came into battery on a ridge about 600 yards in front of the first rebel work. Soon after it was occupied by our troops I moved forward and came into battery on the right of the second work, and, by order of General Hancock, opened fire upon the fort some 1,200 yards to our front and left. After throwing twenty shells and case I moved forward, and by direction of Major Currie posted two of my pieces on the right and four on the left of the road, about 350 yards from the fort on our left and 500 from that on our right, and immediately opened fire on both of these works. The enemy brought two or three pieces to bear upon us from the woods on our left of their barracks, and they evidently had excellent range of my position. Many of their shells, however, failed to explode. I directed the fire of two pieces upon the artillery and three upon the works and large bodies of infantry moving from the woods and barracks to the forts.

At about this time Capt. C. C. Wheeler, commanding Battery E, First New York Artillery, came into battery on my right between the buildings. I had lost one man (Private Edmund K. Terry), killed by a 6-pound shot while manfully performing his duty as No. 1 at the piece; also Lucius A. Goodyear slightly injured, a 12-pound shell (spent) striking him on the shoulder and side. I have to mention Private William A. Sears, of my battery, who, upon the No. 1 being killed, stepped over his body, and taking his sponge, performed the duty of No. 1 during the remainder of the action.

I experienced much difficulty from the extreme softness of the ground, the trails and wheels at each recoil of the piece sinking in the mud.

To Captain Wheeler, as senior officer, I address the remainder of my report, though I received no orders through or from him during the action.

I am, sir, very respectfully, yours,

ANDREW COWAN,

Lieutenant, Commanding First New York Battery.

Captain HANCOCK, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

CAMP IN THE FIELD,

May 8, 1862.

SIR: Soon after you had taken position on my right in the action of May 5, upon the enemy withdrawing his artillery to a more secure position in his rear, I ordered my battery to cease firing, unless at large bodies of infantry or cavalry. About dusk I perceived a regiment of the enemy's infantry filing from the woods on our right to the fort, and quickly threw two spherical case into them, hurrying them to the rear at double-quick. Immediately after I saw the rebels advancing in line of battle in large force along our entire front. I opened on them with spherical case and afterward canister, and continued firing till, perceiving a squadron of cavalry on their left preparing to charge, I deemed it prudent to retire. As my guns were sunk nearly to the hubs it was a work of much difficulty. I succeeded in bringing off all the pieces, and came into battery again on the rise of ground on the right of the fort.

The ground was so heavy that it was difficult for the horses to draw the pieces. We fired with case and canister from this place till ordered to retire by General Hancock, when I fell back 2,000 yards, and placed my battery in position to return at the general's order. In bringing my battery off the field I had Privates James Neville and Levi Cleveland slightly wounded; one team horse wounded. Lieutenant Wright had his horse wounded. After dark, by order of General Smith, I placed three pieces on the left of the upper work and two on the right of the center.

My men did their duty well.

I am, sir, yours, respectfully,

ANDREW COWAN,

Lieutenant, Commanding First New York Battery.

Capt. C. C. WHEELER, *Comdg. Battery E, First N. Y. Artillery.*

No. 49.

Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.

CAMP NEAR ELTHAM, VA.,

May 11, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to instructions I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations of my command during the 4th and 5th instant:

On the morning of the 4th instant at daybreak two contrabands came

into our camp at Lee's Mill and reported that the enemy had evacuated their lines during the night. They were sent to General Smith at once, and arrangements were immediately made to send troops across the dam opposite our position to ascertain if the enemy had in fact abandoned their works there. I called for four or five volunteers from each regiment of my brigade (the names are herewith inclosed) to cross the creek and take the chances of the works being evacuated. I was also directed to take three regiments to cover my front, and to follow the volunteers across the dam. However, by the time I was ready General Brooks had determined the fact of the abandonment, and the works were immediately occupied by our troops. A squadron of our cavalry which had been sent to the front reported that they had seen the retreating force of the enemy, and I was at once sent by General Smith in the advance with the regiments immediately at hand—the Fifth Wisconsin, Forty-third New York, and Forty-ninth New York Volunteers.

On arriving near the cavalry skirmishers were thrown out and an advance made about 4 miles to Lebanon, where we arrived at 12 m. I here received an order to halt. General Smith now overtook me and assumed command. Previous to this time, finding the enemy had fired a bridge on Skiff Creek, on the direct road to Williamsburg, I sent first a party of cavalry to extinguish the fire if possible. They were fired upon by the enemy, and retired after exchanging shots. I then ordered four companies of the Second Vermont, under Lieutenant-Colonel Stannard, to the burning bridge and to extinguish the flames, which duty they performed, first driving the enemy away, and saving the sleepers of the bridge.

During the forenoon the enemy's retreating pickets occasionally discharged their pieces at Captain Chambliss' cavalry in advance. Many tents were found along the road still standing, with some small-arms, tents, &c., which had been thrown from the wagons on the enemy's retreat to lighten them. A number of the enemy's wagons, with their smith-forges, &c., were also abandoned. About 3 o'clock p. m. my brigade, followed by that part of the division which had come up, was ordered to proceed to a point near Whittaker's house, where General Stoneman and the artillery were said to be engaged with the enemy. Coming on the ground at Whittaker's at 5.30 p. m., I formed line of battle, two of my regiments on the right of the road and two on the left, with skirmishers thrown out in front. General Sumner and General Smith arrived immediately and directed subsequent operations. General Brooks' brigade, having now arrived, formed a second line in my rear. I was then ordered to advance to the front of the opening, to allow space for the Third Brigade (also under my command) to form its line in rear of General Brooks.

At this point I was directed to detach two companies with Captain Bugh, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, who under the guidance of Captain D'Orleans marched to the opening occupied during the contest of the day by Captain Gibson's battery, for the purpose of bringing off a piece of artillery which had been left in the mud for want of force to draw it to the rear. Arriving on the ground and exchanging shots with the enemy's pickets, it was reported by the cannoneers who went with the party as guides and looked over the ground that the piece had already been removed. I was next ordered to send five companies down to the right, to observe the position of the fort and the enemy's lines, if possible. Before they returned General Sumner had directed an assault of the enemy's work to be made by the division, the First Brigade leading in line of battle preceded by its skirmishers, General Brooks'

brigade following in double column. We advanced in this manner across the open space into the woods. It had then become dark. The woods were found to be thick and tangled, and difficult to penetrate in the darkness. General Smith took personal command of my two right regiments; I of the two on the left. I soon found that my two regiments were making an angle too much to the right and approaching the two right regiments, and that it was impossible to get through the woods, keeping our formation, without more light, so close and tangled was the undergrowth. I halted my regiments to reform the line, and then meeting General Brooks, whose line of columns had closely approached me and intermingled with my line, I consulted with him, and he also being of the same opinion, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to defer the assault until daylight, or until we could understand the locality of the enemy, concerning which we had been misled, as the road to Fort Magruder at the entrance of the woods made a right angle to the left, which we knew nothing about until after we had crossed it. I determined to halt and await instructions.

General Sumner at this moment came to my lines, and directed the troops to bivouac on the spot and to defer the assault until daylight. A few moments afterward I received an order from General Smith to the same effect. General Sumner bivouacked with us. Before daylight General Sumner concluded, instead of persisting in the assault at that point, to see what could be done toward turning the enemy's right. After daylight we were ordered to fall back to the edge of the woods to allow the troops to get their knapsacks and rations. It commenced raining during the night, and so continued during the day (5th May).

About 11 o'clock a. m. on the 5th instant, being encamped in line of battle in the edge of the woods which separated us from Fort Magruder, and receiving a message from General Smith that he wished to see me at his headquarters at Whittaker's house, I there met him and Brigadier-General Sumner, commanding the left wing of the Army of the Potomac. General Sumner directed me to take four or five regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery and proceed by a road to the right, crossing Cub Dam Creek, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant, and to take possession, if possible, of the enemy's work on the opposite side of the creek commanding the dam at this point. There was a report that it was evacuated. General Smith subsequently authorized me to advance farther if I thought any advantage could be obtained, and if I required them to send to him for re-enforcements. I accordingly detailed from Hancock's and Davidson's brigades, then under my command, the Fifth Wisconsin, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, and Sixth Maine Volunteers, of my brigade, and the Seventh Maine and Thirty-third New York Volunteers, of General Davidson's brigade, leaving the remaining regiments of both brigades in camp. At the same time Lieutenant Cowan's New York battery of six guns was ordered to report to me.

Proceeding toward the point in question, I left three companies of the Thirty-third New York Volunteers at the junction of a road leading to my right, not knowing its terminus, and proceeded until we came out of the woods into an open country, with York River in view, about 1 mile to our right. From this point I turned to the left and soon came in sight of the work overlooking the dam. The dam at this work was about 75 yards in length, the breast of it forming the roadway across the creek, there being no practicable way of getting into the work either to the right or left unless by this narrow passage, owing to the depth of the water and the flood above and below it. It was learned from some contrabands that the enemy had occupied this work the

previous night in force, but for some unexplained cause it was now believed to be evacuated. However, to meet any emergency, I made my dispositions for an assault under the supposition that the enemy might be present.

At this time, General Keyes having appeared in view of the work, sent for me. I accordingly left my command, and having met him, and understanding that his object was to make a reconnaissance of the country between my command and the river, I expressed to him some anxiety on that subject, and requested from him some cavalry, to which he replied that a regiment would be ordered to report to me immediately.

I now placed the artillery in battery on the crest of the hill in front of the enemy's fort at short range, deployed skirmishers on the right and left of the road, and sent the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, preceded by skirmishers, under command of Major Larabee, and followed by the Sixth Maine in column of assault, across the dam and into the work, Lieutenant Custer, Fifth Regular Cavalry, volunteer aide, leading the way on horseback. Finding the fort unoccupied, and being in possession of it, I left a garrison of three companies of the Thirty-third New York to protect my rear. I immediately threw my skirmishers forward into the open field in rear of the work, the remainder of my infantry in line of battle behind them, with the artillery in the center. I now, at 12 m., sent a message to Generals Keyes and Smith that I had already occupied the position at Cub Creek Dam. Knowing that the work about 1,200 yards in advance commanded the position I was then in, I felt the importance of securing it at once, and therefore requested General Smith to send me a brigade of infantry, in order to cover accidents and to secure my rear from assault from the woods bordering the open plain on my right and left. Farther down the stream than the work at the dam, and overlooking York River, another fort was seen, which we believed to be unoccupied, and which I wished to examine.

I was now anxiously awaiting the arrival of the cavalry to reconnoiter this last-mentioned redoubt and the skirts of the timber in my front and on my right flank and rear. To my application to General Smith for re-enforcements I received a reply that he would send me four regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery immediately. I accordingly advanced in the order above mentioned and took quiet possession of the next redoubt. Feeling that my rear and right flank would be protected by the re-enforcements, I determined to advance my line sufficiently beyond the redoubt to drive the enemy out of the two nearest works in my front now occupied by him, and also to make a diversion in favor of that portion of our forces (understood to be under command of General Hooker) which were engaged with the enemy directly in front of Fort Magruder. Observing that our present position was a very important point, having a crest and natural glacis on either flank extending to the woods on the right and left, giving me about sufficient space to develop my front and entirely commanding the plain between me and Fort Magruder, I immediately threw three companies of the Thirty-third New York into the redoubt and deployed my line on the crest, with the artillery on the right and left of the redoubt, throwing my skirmishers 1,000 yards in advance, and covering the whole breadth of the plain, which at that point was considerably wider than at my position, and continuing so to Fort Magruder. I also threw flankers on my right and left, connecting with the skirmishers. From my position here Fort Magruder with all its surroundings could be distinctly

seen and all positions of the enemy on the plain between us. The two redoubts were respectively distant from my skirmishers 300 and 400 yards, the one on the left being nearest. The plain, extending about one mile to the rear and also to the front, was fringed by a dense mass of timber on my right as far as Fort Magruder, and was traversed by a narrow road, which gave a practicable passage for troops to the rear of that fort and to Williamsburg.

On arriving at the second redoubt and taking the position before referred to, the skirmishers advancing, I found that the enemy in the redoubt to the left and front were uncertain who we were. One of my staff officers here informed me that a signal was made by the enemy, in reply to which I placed the national colors on the parapet of the redoubt in my possession, on seeing which the enemy deployed his skirmishers on my front and commenced firing, our line of skirmishers being then but a few hundred yards distant from them. The enemy were soon driven off, and our skirmishers took up the position previously indicated and separated from the enemy by a line of fence extending across the plain. I then halted the skirmishers and directed them to lie down.

Captain Wheeler's battery of four guns having joined me at this time, the artillery was advanced about 600 yards in front of the redoubt and placed in battery, leaving the caissons in the rear of the redoubt. At the same time I advanced the Fifth Wisconsin Regiment until it occupied a position some distance to the right of the battery, where it was partially screened from the enemy's view by some low frame buildings and the palings surrounding them. The Sixth Maine and the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers advanced in line and took position on the left of the artillery. The infantry were then all ordered to lie down, while the battery was directed to open fire upon the redoubts in front of us preparatory to an assault when the expected re-enforcements should arrive. The Seventh Maine Volunteers were also advanced about 100 paces from the crest and diagonally to my line of battle to protect my right flank. I then threw skirmishers from the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania through the woods to my left and front, and at the same time directed skirmishers to be deployed from the Seventh Maine to my right and rear to protect me from assault from that direction, concerning which I was very anxious, as the space from my right through the woods to the creek which skirted the other side of the woods toward Williamsburg was greater than I could occupy with my troops, and I had serious apprehensions of an attack from that quarter by troops from that place or from Fort Magruder.

I then sent a detachment of skirmishers from the Thirty-third New York Volunteers to sweep the woods to the front of my right flankers. They proceeded about one mile without opposition and returned, taking the position of an advanced line of flankers, connecting with my skirmishers. At this time the enemy lined the parapets of the two redoubts on our front with infantry and delivered their fire, and immediately opened upon us with some artillery. Our batteries replied and threw shell into both redoubts with precision, and finally with the fire of our skirmishers drove them out of their works, our advanced skirmishers killing many of them as they debouched from the gorges which were on the right side of each work as we stood with reference to them. There was now no apparent obstacle to prevent us from taking possession of these redoubts had the re-enforcements arrived. I did not think it prudent to do so until that time. At this juncture I received a message by Lieutenant Kusserow, of the artillery, as coming from General

Sumner, to the effect that I must fall back to my first position. Knowing General Smith's disposition to strengthen me and to make a movement in this direction, I sent a message by Lieutenant Crane, of General Smith's staff, stating that I ought to be re-enforced, and after some time received a reply through Lieutenant Crane that I must fall back to my first position, and that I could not be re-enforced on account of movements on the left.

I then sent Lieutenant Farquhar, of the Engineers, back to represent to General Sumner my position, with a view of showing the disadvantage of falling back at that time and giving up the advantages we had already secured, for which we might have to fight again the next day in order to recover, besides the bad impression it would make on my troops, and the inspiring effect it would have upon the enemy, who were then engaged in a furious contest with our troops in front of Fort Magruder. I directed Mr. Farquhar to inform General Sumner that I would obey the order to fall back if no answer should arrive when a reasonable time had elapsed. While I was awaiting a reply to this message the crisis of the battle in front of Fort Magruder appeared to have arrived, and in order to furnish all the assistance possible our battery threw percussion shell into that fort. The artillery also fired into all the re-enforcements and caissons passing into Fort Magruder at and before this time. This annoyed the enemy so much that he finally brought out one or two pieces of artillery and turned them upon our advanced line, exploding shell within the line of our skirmishers, and in one instance reaching our battery. Previously the enemy had thrown round shot into the battery, killing and wounding some of our men. Our artillery was superior in efficiency to theirs, and the enemy, perceiving this, ceased firing. In the mean time I had two pieces disabled, one from carelessness in placing the shell in the piece in an improper position, and the other from its being fired at an elevation so great that the axle was broken.

Affairs remaining in this position, and Lieutenant Farquhar not having returned, at 4.20 p. m. I addressed a written communication to General Smith, stating that I would wait a reasonable time to get an answer from General Sumner before falling back. I awaited an answer to this communication till 5.10 o'clock p. m. The clouds had become very heavy over us and the rain was drenching the troops. I concluded to make my dispositions for the night. I was just giving my orders to fall back and occupy the crest on which the redoubt was situated, as a preparatory movement to a further withdrawal, hoping, however, that I might yet receive re-enforcements before I was fully prepared to make a final movement to the rear. I trusted that the thickness of the weather would prevent the enemy from observing that I was retiring, and had delayed for some little time with that object in view.

Just at this moment I observed that the enemy were throwing infantry into the redoubts on my front and that my skirmishers were firing on them. I immediately apprehended danger. A column of the enemy's cavalry now came out from behind a point of the woods near the redoubt to the right. The skirmishers kept up a constant fire upon this cavalry, doing good execution, at about 400 yards distance. Observing these movements, I immediately dispatched a staff officer to General Smith to notify him of the state of affairs. The enemy still persisting in their attempts to form, preparatory to a charge on my artillery, I ordered some shell to be thrown into them, and then directed the artillery to retire rapidly, piece by piece, to my second line. About this time I was informed that a regiment of the enemy had gone into

the woods on my left, with a view of flanking me there, and seeing the enemy's infantry break through the woods in front of the right flank of my advanced line, and anticipating a still more serious movement from that direction toward my rear, I ordered the two regiments on the left of the battery to fall back in line of battle to the crest on the left of the redoubt.

The Sixth Maine Regiment, the nearest to the battery, retired about half the distance to the crest, and then halted, faced to the front, and waited to collect their skirmishers, who were holding the ground in front with the greatest pertinacity against those of the enemy, who had occupied the left redoubt.

In the mean time the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, on the left of the Sixth Maine, retreated steadily until it came to the crest, when it halted, faced to the front, called its colors and guides on the line, and dressed as if on parade. The Sixth Maine Regiment again faced to the rear, and falling back to the crest established a perfect line in the same manner as the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

The Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, which was on the right of the battery, on first seeing the enemy's cavalry debouch from the woods had formed square to repel an assault. This cavalry, after great persistence, having been checked by our skirmishers and artillery, and a brigade of the enemy's infantry having broken through the woods and commenced deployment, I directed the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers to fall back in line of battle, fighting. The colonel had not thought of retiring until he received this order. The last piece of artillery, having thrown several discharges of canister into the enemy when within 100 yards, now limbered up and fell back as rapidly as possible, the ground being exceedingly heavy, to our second position.

The Fifth Wisconsin Regiment, which had been firing for some time, then commenced retiring in the direction of the redoubt, disputing the ground inch by inch, and assisted somewhat by the artillery from the crest. Previous to this I had ordered the Seventh Maine Volunteers, on my extreme right, to fall back behind its original line, with its right thrown back against the woods, in order to be ready to meet an assault from that quarter. Intending to place the Fifth Wisconsin into and on the right and left of the redoubt, I withdrew the three companies of the Thirty-third New York Volunteers who were in it, and formed them on the left of the Seventh Maine, placing a portion of my artillery between them and the redoubt. The necessity of throwing back the Seventh Maine, and also the three companies of the Thirty-third New York, to make my right flank more secure, prevented me from having a direct fire from them over the crest.

I had great difficulty in getting the artillery into position on the right and left of the redoubt, owing partly to the bad state of the ground from the long-continued rain, and partly to the fact that in the gallop from their first position the cannoners had generally been left behind. Some few pieces unlimbered, and several discharges were delivered at the enemy; but finding the firing very slow, seeing also that the enemy had no artillery in his advance, and having sufficient infantry to line the whole crest, I ordered the artillery back to a third position on the plain between us and the dam, sending the caissons and the disabled pieces in advance. I then threw two companies of the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania in the woods on the left, to give me notice of the approach of the enemy from that direction. Colonel Mason, of the Seventh Maine, anticipating my order in this, as in every case, threw a portion

of his regiment into the woods in his rear, to defend a road leading to the right of our position toward Williamsburg.

Fearing that the Fifth Wisconsin would not arrive in time I directed four companies of the Sixth Maine, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler, to march into the redoubt, and now only waited for that gallant regiment, the Fifth Wisconsin, already sorely pressed by the enemy, to get into position before I advanced to the attack. When the advanced companies of the Fifth Wisconsin had reached the crest I formed a part of them on the left of the redoubt, on the same ground from which I had taken the four companies of the Sixth Maine, to garrison the work, and formed the remainder behind the crest on the right of the redoubt. At this moment the advance of the enemy was under the crest and within 30 paces of my command. I ordered a forward movement to the crest. The whole line advanced cheering, and on arriving there delivered two volleys, doing great execution. The order was then given to charge down the slope, and with reiterated cheers the whole command advanced in line of battle. A few of the leading spirits of the enemy were bayoneted; the remainder then broke and fled. The want of protection in my rear, and expecting an assault from that quarter every moment, I ordered a halt at the foot of the slope, and delivered a terrible fire along the whole line, expending from 15 to 20 rounds. The plunging fire from the redoubt, the direct fire from the right, and the oblique fire from the left were so destructive that after it had been ordered to cease and the smoke arose it seemed that no man had left the ground unhurt who had advanced within 500 yards of our line. The enemy were completely routed and dispersed.

The circumstances before mentioned only prevented me from reaping the entire fruits of the victory by continuing the advance. The second line of the enemy, yet in position on our front, seemed to halt paralyzed. At the movement of the advance, having sent for a section of artillery, I directed a few shells to be thrown at them, when they disappeared. The regiment that had entered the woods on my left flank also retreated rapidly, not having had time before the defeat of the first line to become engaged with us. Having learned from the prisoners captured that the enemy had sent two regiments to my right and rear I made preparations to receive them, expecting an immediate attack, knowing full well the importance of the position I held, and the necessity the enemy was under of driving me across the dam, if they intended holding Fort Magruder that night. As soon as the action was decided I sent out men to succor the wounded and collect the dead for burial. The flankers of the Thirty-third New York Volunteers, who had been on my right, held their position during the fight, with the exception of one small company, which was separated from the remainder by one of the enemy's columns piercing them in passing through the woods. They are missing, supposed to be taken prisoners. These skirmishers were in a favorable position to capture fugitives of the enemy when they made their disorderly retreat before our line, and they returned burdened with them.

It being now late in the evening, and my re-enforcements not yet having arrived, I could not pursue with prudence the retreating enemy, and held my position, believing it to be the best ground for us, should the enemy renew the contest. For these reasons I permitted the enemy to pick up a great many of the wounded and dead on the field and in the woods. A large number were thus carried off, and many died in the woods, of which we had no account at that time, although they were

discovered the next day, together with those in the hospitals, in the rear of the woods and in Williamsburg.

The enemy's assault was of the most determined character. No troops could have made a more desperate or resolute charge. The Fifth North Carolina was annihilated. Nearly all of its superior officers were left dead or wounded on the field. The Twenty-fourth Virginia suffered greatly in superior officers and men. The battle-flag of one of the enemy's regiments was captured by the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, and sent by me as a trophy to General Smith. For 600 yards in front of our line the whole field was strewn with the enemy's dead and wounded. Shortly after the action was decided General Smith came on the field, and announced that he was bringing up strong re-enforcements. The Third Regiment Vermont Volunteers, of General Brooks' brigade, soon after arrived. I posted them on the right and rear. General Naglee's brigade followed, and afterward the Forty-ninth and Seventy-seventh New York Regiments, of General Davidson's brigade, all of which I posted, by order of General Smith, to meet any contingencies. Captain Ayres, with his and Mott's artillery, arrived later.

The troops under my command behaved with a spirit and steadiness unsurpassed by veterans, so much so, that they murmured when ordered to fall back from the first position. Having had to detach so many at various points as I advanced, and also to protect my flanks, my battalions numbered but about 1,600 men when I engaged the enemy. By the evidence of an officer who noted the time the action continued twenty-three minutes from the time of the enemy's appearance until his repulse. When it commenced, the contest in front of Fort Magruder appeared to have ended. I learned from the prisoners captured that we had been attacked by two brigades of infantry, of six regiments, numbering about 5,000 men, and some cavalry. The enemy's advance was commanded by Brigadier-General Early, who was wounded during the action.

Our troops at night bivouacked in the rain on the ground they had so handsomely won, lying down on the battle-field, which was saturated by long-continued rains. It is also but just to mention that since daylight the morning of the 4th instant the troops had had no regular rations, owing to our sudden and prompt movement, and that they did not have any until late in the day of the 6th instant, the baggage wagons and supply trains having been forced off the road to allow the passage of the troops and artillery to the front.

The wounded of the enemy received the greatest care and attention from our men wherever they were found. On the night of the action they were placed in the redoubt, and my only regret is that, owing to circumstances, they were obliged to bivouac with us.

I feel free to mention as especially deserving the highest commendations the following-named officers: Col. R. F. Taylor, Thirty-third New York Volunteers; Col. Amasa Cobb, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, who commanded the regiment which suffered so severely; Col. E. C. Mason, Seventh Maine Volunteers; Col. William H. Irwin, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers; Col. Hiram Burnham, Sixth Maine Volunteers; Lieut. Col. C. H. Chandler, Sixth Maine Volunteers, who commanded in the redoubt during the action; Capt. Charles C. Wheeler, Battery E, First New York Artillery; First Lieut. Andrew Cowan, commanding First New York Battery.

Our loss in killed, wounded, and missing was as follows: Commissioned officers, 5 wounded, 1 missing; non-commissioned officers, 4

killed, 13 wounded, 5 missing; privates, 6 killed, 70 wounded, 25 missing. Aggregate, 10 killed, 88 wounded, 31 missing.

The number of killed reported was small, from the fact that the report was made at the moment the contest was ended. A number of our wounded died that night and the next morning.

The enemy's loss, so far as we could determine the facts with any certainty, was 120 killed on the field, 250 wounded, and 160 prisoners; aggregate, 530.

I transmit herewith the reports of all the commanding officers engaged, together with the statement of every staff officer by whom I sent messages to commanders or by whom I received orders. I merely transmit these last in order that justice may be done to every one and to get at this early day a record of all the facts, and thus to prevent misapprehensions hereafter caused by infirmity of memory or other circumstances.

The following persons have been especially named by their commanders for good conduct during the action:

Capt. William A. Bugh, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, who commanded a company of skirmishers at the point where the enemy debouched, and opposed them with the greatest obstinacy and fell on the field, severely wounded, when he was captured by the enemy as they hurried on to assault our line, but was recovered by us after the action. Adj. T. S. West and Lieuts. Enoch Totten and J. B. Oliver are named by the commander of the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers as having displayed great coolness and gallantry during the engagement. Color-Sergt. George B. Madison, Company B, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, is also especially mentioned by his colonel for gallant conduct. Although severely wounded early in the action, he clung to his colors and carried them in safety to the crest. Private W. A. Sears, First New York Battery, is also especially commended by his commanding officer for his gallant conduct during the fight.

Col. R. F. Taylor, of the Thirty-third New York Volunteers, also highly commends the conduct of First Sergt. Sylvester Porter, Company H, of that regiment. Although cut off from the line of skirmishers by the enemy, he succeeded in bringing in his squad of 8 men, capturing four times their number of prisoners, one of whom was a captain of the Fifth North Carolina Regiment.

For the names of other officers particularly mentioned by their colonels for good conduct I would respectfully refer you to the reports of their regimental commanders, herewith transmitted. I also desire to mention Private John Malone, Company B, Sixth Maine Volunteers, my orderly bugler, for his gallantry on this occasion.

My duties are due to Surg. T. Rush Spencer, medical director of Smith's division, for his attention to the wounded after the fight, and also to those of his assistants who were present during the contest, namely, Surgs. S. S. Mulford, Thirty-third New York; F. S. Holmes, Sixth Maine, and S. B. Hunter, Seventh Maine Volunteers, and Assistant Surgs. G. W. Martin, Sixth Maine; George D. Wilber and C. E. Crane, Fifth Wisconsin; D. E. Dickenson, Thirty-third New York Volunteers; John F. Huber, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, and J. Theo. Riley, U. S. Army.

For the success of the day I am much indebted to the valuable staff officers of my own and other commands whom circumstances placed with me on this occasion. Their intelligence and promptness in carrying orders prevented any errors. Their names are as follows:

Capt. L. D. H. Currie, assistant adjutant-general to General Smith;

Lieut. C. R. Crane, ordnance officer, General Smith's staff; Capt. F. A. Aiken, volunteer aide to General Smith; Capt. Edward Martindale, acting commissary subsistence, General Davidson's brigade; First Lieut. Charles Kusserow, adjutant to Captain Ayres, commander of artillery; Second Lieut. F. U. Farquhar, of the Engineers; Second Lieut. G. A. Custer, Fifth Regular Cavalry, acting topographical engineer; Lieut. W. H. Long, aide to General Davidson, and to Capt. John Hancock, assistant adjutant-general; First Lieut. William G. Mitchell, aide-de-camp; First Lieut. I. B. Parker, aide-de-camp; Second Lieut. C. S. McEntee, acting brigade quartermaster, members of my own staff.

After the artillery was withdrawn Capt. Charles C. Wheeler, commanding Battery E, First New York Artillery, acted as an aide to me, and, with Lieut. G. A. Custer, Lieut. W. G. Mitchell, and Lieut. I. B. Parker, was of the greatest value in the crisis of the fight in carrying my orders for the advance.

The whole strength of my command did not at any time exceed 2,547 men.

I have hitherto transmitted detailed lists of all the killed, wounded, and missing of the command.*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. Smith's Division.

List of the non-commissioned officers and privates who volunteered their services on Sunday, May 4, to enter the enemy's works at Garrow's Farm, near Lee's Mill.

Sergt. Edward K. Holton, Company B, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers.
Corpl. Lemuel Rossiter, Company B, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers.
Private Rollin R. Wheeler, Company B, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers.
Private Peter Spies, Company C, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers.
Private Charles Daring, Company C, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers.
Private William McClure, Company E, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers.
Private Edwin A. Heath, Company F, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers.
Private Oscar Perry, Company F, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers.
Private William H. Barnes, Company H, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers.

Private Christopher J. Ostrander, Company H, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers.

First Sergt. William Sherwood, Company E, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Corpl. Davis H. Law, Company B, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Private James Hockenberry, Company K, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Private John Ginithan, Company K, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Private John C. Ross, Company K, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

* Embodied in return, p. 450.

Private James C. McCord, Company K, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Private William Rosenburg, Company K, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Private James Gross, Company K, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Private Peter Rhoads, Company E, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Private Andrew Brown, Company E, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Private G. W. Hinkle, Company B, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Corp. William F. Lindsley, Company K, Forty-third New York Volunteers.

Private Joseph Murphy, Company I, Forty-third New York Volunteers.

Private Samuel D. Hart, Company F, Forty-third New York Volunteers.

Private Charles H. Porter, Company A, Forty-third New York Volunteers.

Private John J. Davis, Company B, Forty-third New York Volunteers.

Respectfully transmitted.

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

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Correspondence relative to the re-enforcement of General Hancock May 5.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, SMITH'S DIVISION,
Camp No. 11, in the field, near Williamsburg, May 8, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that on the 5th instant, immediately upon our forces occupying the first work above the dam, at about 1 o'clock p. m., you directed me to inform General Keyes, who had been on the ground just previous to our starting to cross and take the fort, and was just entering the woods about half a mile from the scene of operations, returning to his headquarters, that our men were occupying the work. General Keyes directed me to return and tell you that he believed there were two works farther on that he wished you to occupy, commanded by two small earthworks that were also to be occupied by a small force, but not to weaken your force too much, and that you were to move cautiously. He also told me to say to you that he would immediately send you the regiment of cavalry he had promised you before you crossed the dam. When I returned, in about fifteen minutes after, the second fort was occupied, and our forces in position in front of it, ready to advance on two forts about 800 yards in advance of us. You then ordered me to return to General Keyes, and also to go to General Smith, and inform them that you were occupying the second work, and were about taking the two in front, commanded by Fort Magruder, and also that you wanted and must have re-enforcements to occupy them when taken, as well as to support you in your position, there not being sufficient men to protect your flanks. Generals Keyes and Smith both told me to say to you that you should have them, and that re-enforcements had already been ordered, of both cavalry and infantry, to the amount of one regiment of cavalry and a

brigade of infantry, some of which were on the road moving forward, all of which I reported to you.

About 5 o'clock p. m. the enemy were discovered marching in force from the wood in front of our skirmishers from the right. You immediately ordered me back to General Smith again for re-enforcements, none of which had arrived up to that time, who told me to say to you that a division of infantry and two regiments of cavalry had been ordered up by General McClellan, and also that you must hold your position. When I returned the action was just ending and the enemy repulsed.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN HANCOCK,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Brig. Gen. W. S. HANCOCK,
Commanding First Brigade, Smith's Division.

HEADQUARTERS SMITH'S DIVISION,
May 8, 1862.

GENERAL: I desire to state for your assistance a few facts I know concerning the affair of the 5th instant. I went, by direction of Brigadier-General Smith, on a scout with Captain Stewart, of the Engineers, with four companies of the Fourth Vermont, with a view of finding out if there was a road by which the left flank of the enemy might be turned. In accordance with those instructions I arrived with Captain Stewart in the open space opposite the works on this side of the dam. It was then exactly 10 o'clock. I immediately returned, thinking the work was unoccupied, and reported to General Smith, and afterward, by his direction, to Brigadier-General Sumner. After a short delay I was ordered to go with a command under you to show you the work in question. I concluded we arrived before it about 11.45, and after you had made your dispositions, which it is unnecessary for me here to repeat, I proceeded with the Fifth Wisconsin and Sixth Maine up to the work, and, according to your instructions, I posted the Fifth Wisconsin on the right and the Sixth Maine on the left (after taking the fort in question), facing toward another fort in line of battle. Your subsequent dispositions I need not necessarily speak of. I know you sent repeated messages earnestly asking for support, and that you received in reply only positive instructions to fall back and only occupy the fort first taken, abandoning the one in front of it.

At 4.20 I sent by your directions a dispatch to General Smith, a copy of which I inclose, and about 5 o'clock you were going to carry out your instructions and take up a position for the night, keeping possession of the fort above the dam, when the enemy attacked with great force, attempting to turn your right flank. A few minutes afterward I went by your directions for re-enforcements, feeling that the moment was most critical, and that if the enemy were strongly supported you might not be able to maintain your ground on this side of the dam, and, in fact, that you might be cut to pieces.

I met the Third Vermont on the road, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the rear of your then position, and directed Colonel Hyde, in command, to double his regiment up to you. I proceeded as fast as I could to headquarters, and saw General Smith, who informed me that General McClellan had arrived and had ordered a whole division to support you.

I put General Naglee's brigade on the road, and as soon as he allowed me galloped back, to find that you had utterly routed the enemy.

I have the honor to be, general, your most obedient servant,

L. D. H. CURRIE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Brigadier-General HANCOCK,

Commanding First Brigade, Smith's Division.

[Inclosure.]

MAY 5—4.20 p. m.

I shall allow a reasonable time to get an answer to my previous messages to General Sumner before falling back to the fort with the creek in my rear. General Sumner has ordered me to fall back to my first position, which I believe to be the fort first occupied; if not, please correct me.

WINFD S. HANCOCK,

Brigadier-General.

General SMITH.

CAMP No. 11, May 8, 1862.

GENERAL: The following is a statement of the more important orders and messages transmitted and delivered by me, as your acting aide-de-camp, during the day of the battle of Williamsburg, on the 5th instant:

At about 3.15 p. m., by your direction, I returned from the field to General Sumner, and stated to him your occupation of two of the enemy's evacuated forts and of the enemy's appearance in the third, of the firing between the skirmishers of each side and of the artillery, and of your desire for re-enforcements. General Sumner instructed me to say that re-enforcements could not be sent, and that you were to fall back to your original position.

An official letter, dated May 5, 4.20 p. m., and directed to Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, commanding division, was then placed in my hands by you to be delivered to him, with verbal instructions to hand the letter to General Sumner in case I could not readily find General Smith. Going back as quickly as possible, and meeting General Smith within 40 rods of Mason's house, General Sumner's headquarters, I delivered the letter to him, who, after reading it, sent me back to you with a verbal message instructing me to say that in regard to falling back or occupying the position you then held you could exercise your discretion, and act without reference to re-enforcements.

In coming back to you with this message I met, at about half the distance, Captain Currie, the adjutant-general of General Smith's division, riding at a furious rate. He halted only long enough to ask me if my horse was fresh and able to go fast, and stating that General Hancock had suddenly been attacked by a large force; that he was severely suffering, and that besides the enemy in his front five or six regiments of the enemy were threatening his left flank. Redoubling the energies of my own horse by a vigorous use of the spur, I reached you just in season to see the last of the retreating rebels. After delivering my message you directed me to return to General Smith with the welcome intelligence that the enemy had been repulsed, that you had full possession of the field, and that the enemy's dead were lying thickly

on the ground in front of our lines. No time was lost in hastening to General Smith with this news, whom, having received Captain Currie's important statement, I met coming with several regiments to your relief. Giving General Smith your message, I returned to you in company with Colonel Key, of General McClellan's staff.

In going the last time to General Smith I took occasion to correct a false impression prevailing among retreating stragglers that you had been defeated, and also to assure General Brooks, whom I met coming with re-enforcements, that we had won the day. Beyond the order conveyed to the advanced skirmishers while engaged with the enemy not to go farther than an indicated point the above are the leading ones I had the honor to transmit.

I am, sir, very truly and respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRED. A. AIKEN,

*Capt., and Volunteer A. D. C. to General Smith,
and your Acting A. D. C. on the 5th instant.*

Brig. Gen. W. S. HANCOCK.

CAMP NEAR WILLIAMSBURG, May 7, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit to you the following report of orders carried by me on the 5th instant:

Just as the Sixth Maine and Fifth Wisconsin crossed the dam at the first fort General Hancock sent me back to inform General Smith that he had possession of the fort. General Smith, upon receiving the message, sent me to General Hancock to ascertain how many troops he needed, and whether there was any road near his position leading to Williamsburg in the rear of the enemy. When I arrived, the brigade had advanced and taken possession of another fort and the artillery were shelling a third to the front and right of us. I delivered General Smith's message to General Hancock, and returned at once to General Smith with the reply that "there was such a road, and that he ought to send up another brigade to cover accidents." General Smith's answer was, "I will send General Hancock four regiments at once." This message I carried to General Hancock immediately.

About 5.15 p. m., when the enemy had debouched from the woods and attacked us, I took an order to the Fifth Wisconsin and Sixth Maine Regiments to fall back, fighting in line of battle, toward the fort. Later in the action, when our whole line advanced down the slope, driving the enemy before it, I went back to bring up the artillery, one section of which came up and took up a position on the right of the fort.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. B. PARKER, JR.,
Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.

Capt. JOHN HANCOCK,

Assistant Adjutant-General, First Brigade, Smith's Division.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

May 11, 1862.

SIR: In accordance with your request I would report that at 3.30 p. m. on the 5th instant you ordered me to return to General Sumner and report to him that your advanced position could only be rendered

safe from being flanked by the enemy by your being re-enforced; that in case he could not send you re-enforcements you would comply with his orders and fall back to the position you first occupied on crossing the dam on our right, but that you did not wish to do so, as it would discourage your troops and proportionally encourage the enemy. You also asked me to state both to General Sumner and General Smith your exact position. I returned to the headquarters of General Sumner and there met General Smith. I explained to him what you had desired me, and he asked me to go to General Sumner, and after detailing to him your position to respectfully suggest that the remaining two brigades of his (Smith's) division might be sent as re-enforcements. I did so, and General Sumner ordered me to direct General Smith to proceed at once to your support. Before, however, the remainder of the division was fairly in motion the order was countermanded, and General Smith was sent to support the center, and it was not until late in the evening and after you had repulsed the attack of the enemy that re-enforcements arrived to support you. I then returned by your order, having in charge an enemy's flag, to general headquarters.

I have the honor to be, general, yours, most respectfully,
 FRANCIS U. FARQUHAR,
Second Lieutenant of Engineers.

Brig. Gen. W. S. HANCOCK,
Commanding First Brigade, Smith's Division.

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 HEADQUARTERS SMITH'S DIVISION,
Camp near Williamsburg, Va., May 8, 1862.

GENERAL: In compliance with your request I have the honor to make the following written statement of the official messages transmitted by me between Brigadier-General Smith, commanding division, and yourself, during the engagement of Monday, the 5th instant:

Being with you at about 2.30 p. m. on that day, while your artillery was playing upon the enemy's works and your infantry was getting into position, you desired me to go immediately to General Smith with this message: "Please tell General Smith that I think he ought to send me re-enforcements at once, as the enemy are getting very thick in front." I started immediately, arriving at headquarters of the division at about 3 p. m.; but General Smith being absent on the field, and General Sumner being present, I communicated your message to him in person, and at once received this reply: "I have just ordered General Hancock to fall back to his first point, sir, and cannot send him re-enforcements." I then went immediately for General Smith, whom I met very shortly on his return, and communicated to him the message I had received from you, at the same time stating that I had communicated it also to General Sumner, and adding his reply. General Smith then gave me these instructions: "Go at once to General Hancock and tell him that I have wanted and have tried to re-enforce him, but that General Sumner has positively forbidden to allow any re-enforcements to be sent to him until more troops come up from the rear." This message I communicated to General Hancock in person at about 3.30 p. m.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. R. CRANE,
Lieutenant and Ordnance Officer, General Smith's Division.

No. 50.

*Report of Col. Hiram Burnham, Sixth Maine Infantry.*HEADQUARTERS SIXTH MAINE REGIMENT,
On Battle-field, near Williamsburg, May 7, 1862.

SIR: Last Sunday morning, the 4th instant, I received orders at day-break from headquarters of the First Brigade to get my regiment under arms and cross Warwick Creek into the enemy's fortifications, which were said to be evacuated. I immediately complied with these orders and filed across the creek upon the dam in front of the rebel battery, where the action of the 16th of April occurred. We found the extensive and formidable works of the enemy completely deserted. In many places the camp-fires were still burning, while the knapsacks, blankets, clothing, and articles of camp and garrison equipage, which were scattered about in the wildest confusion, gave evidence of the haste and terror with which the retreat of the enemy had commenced. I was ordered back to camp to prepare for the pursuit. Tents were immediately struck, knapsacks packed, rations issued to the men, and all other preparations made with the utmost speed.

At 11 o'clock a. m. everything was in readiness, and accordingly we took up the line of march. Recrossing Warwick Creek, we passed through the deserted fortifications and took the road leading toward Williamsburg. After proceeding some 4 miles a halt was ordered, and the men were allowed to rest for a short time. When we again started my regiment was placed in the advance, and for 3 or 4 miles we pushed on very rapidly, when we emerged into a large open field, but a short distance from the place where our cavalry had discovered the enemy a little earlier in the afternoon. Here a halt was ordered; my command was deployed in line of battle, and the men were allowed to rest until other regiments came up. Additional forces soon arrived and were deployed. It was now late in the afternoon and night was fast closing in. We were ordered to advance in line through the woods in front, for the purpose of discovering a battery occupied by the enemy. As the men were excessively fatigued by the labor of the day it was deemed best for them to leave their knapsacks in the field under charge of a guard. I then threw out skirmishers and advanced with my command toward the enemy. The forest through which we passed was very dense, and as it was growing darker every moment we were obliged to move on with the utmost caution. At length we came into a field with timber fallen on each side of it, as if to allow a battery a free range. Beyond this field I threw my skirmishers some distance, but it was now quite dark, and I was unable to find the battery for which we were searching.

At this juncture of affairs a halt was ordered. I drew in my skirmishers and marched my command to the edge of the field of which I have just spoken. Here, without overcoats or blankets, we bivouacked for the night in the fallen timber. Toward morning a heavy rain-storm set in, and our situation was unpleasant in the extreme. As daylight dawned and the objects around us gradually assumed distinct forms we discovered the fortifications of the enemy just on our right, and not more than half a mile off. These fortifications were swarming with men, and we could also see them moving about on the outside, while farther back troops were drawn up in line of battle.

In accordance with orders received from General Hancock I moved

my regiment around a point of woods out of sight of the enemy. Here we remained until 11 o'clock a. m., when I moved my command, with the force designed to operate against the enemy's left flank, down a road to the right until I approached Queen's Creek. This creek was dammed up at the point where we struck it, while the opposite bank was strongly fortified. It was found that these works were unoccupied by the enemy, and a regiment was sent across the dam and past the fort at its end on the double-quick. My own regiment followed, and in turn the whole force crossed over, moved up, and formed line of battle in the open field beyond. The line was then moved up to another fort a short distance ahead, which the enemy evacuated as we approached. In front of this fort our field artillery came into position and opened the attack on the enemy's left flank by shelling him smartly. We were now close upon the enemy, and the action was going on in earnest. My regiment was ordered to take position on the left of our artillery, for the purpose of supporting it. Directly in our front, perhaps half a mile ahead, were two of the enemy's earthworks, filled with his infantry, while farther on was Fort Magruder, in the center of his line.

After our batteries had fired a few rounds we moved up some 80 or 100 rods. Here our artillery opened a terrible and effective fire, which soon drove the enemy out of his nearest earthworks. This fire was replied to by a couple of guns stationed in the edge of the woods, and also by the guns of Fort Magruder. As the fire grew hot I ordered my regiment (which was still supporting our batteries on the left) to lie down in place, that the men might be less exposed. The shot and shell fell thickly around us for the first half hour, when our batteries succeeded in silencing the two pieces of field artillery in the woods. After this only the guns from the fort replied to our artillery, but the fight still raged with considerable spirit. Matters continued thus for three or four hours, when, between 5 and 6 o'clock p. m., we perceived that the enemy was preparing to charge upon our batteries. One brigade was deployed directly in our front and moved steadily down upon us in line of battle.

At the same time another brigade filed through the woods on our right, for the purpose of flanking us and thus rendering our defeat certain. Our line was then ordered to fall back and we began to retire slowly, but not until our right flank was attacked hotly from the woods. When my regiment had fallen back half way to the fort I halted it, faced it about, and waited, for the double purpose of allowing my line of skirmishers to come up with the regiment and the Fifth Wisconsin to come up with us.

Both of these ends having been accomplished, I again faced my command about and continued to retire, in accordance with the order I had previously received. The enemy were now close upon us. Seeing us fall back they fancied that we were in full retreat and their exultation knew no bounds. They poured out from the cover of the woods and rushed on toward us, crying out, "Bull Run," "Ball's Bluff," &c. It was with difficulty that I restrained my men from facing about and taking vengeance for these taunts upon the spot. When we reached the fort my command was in perfect order, and as my men faced about I read in their faces the stern determination to suffer death in any form rather than give up an inch of ground. My four right companies were placed in the fort, under charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler. Up to this time not a gun had been fired in my command. The rebels had now reached the rail fence in our front, not 15 rods from us. On they came, evidently feeling sure of success. But it was our

turn now. Every man was in his place, and we poured a volley into them which thinned their ranks terribly. Blinded and dismayed they still pressed on, firing wildly at random. Again our forces poured into them, sending death and destruction into their midst. They wavered, they faltered, they halted. We saw our advantage. Sending forth cheer on cheer we steadily advanced and poured into them until the rout was complete. The force which had attacked us was transformed into a mob and fled wildly across the field. The battle-field being ours, my men assisted in collecting the wounded and bestowing the best care upon them which the circumstances would allow.

I would particularly call the attention of the general commanding the First Brigade to the gallant and efficient conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler and Major Harris, both of whom rendered me the most valuable assistance. In the line officers I can make no distinction whatever. They were all at their posts, and each one did his duty nobly and manfully.

I am, sir, very respectfully, yours,

HIRAM BURNHAM,

Colonel, Commanding Sixth Maine Volunteers.

JOHN HANCOCK,

Assistant Adjutant-General, First Brigade.

No. 51.

Report of Col. Edwin C. Mason, Seventh Maine Infantry.

THIRD BRIGADE, SMITH'S DIVISION, FOURTH CORPS,
Hdqrs. 7th Maine Vols., Camp near Williamsburg, Va., May 6, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my regiment during the engagement of yesterday at this point. Being under the orders of Brigadier-General Hancock, of the First Brigade, of Smith's division, during the advance of the force under his command on this position, my regiment was held in reserve and ordered to support the Fifth Wisconsin. When the general took up a position before the enemy's works my regiment was posted on the right, and about 300 yards in rear of the batteries. My orders in this position were to prevent the enemy from outflanking us on the right. I remained in this position until about 5 p. m., when the enemy advanced in force to storm our position and take the batteries. As the artillery and supports fell back I slowly retired to the rear, halting frequently. This movement was necessary to enable me to unmask the woods on my right. After retiring about 75 yards I halted, and threw a strong flanking party into the woods, to check a flank movement of the enemy, should he attempt it, and also to give me time to change my front.

Being now at liberty to turn my attention to the front, I saw that the general had placed the artillery in position on the right and left of the fort in our possession and the infantry in line of battle on the crest of the slope. The enemy was rapidly advancing in lines of battle, the first one being within 150 yards. General Hancock, now having his entire force in battle order, gave the order for the line to advance on the enemy. I immediately gave the order to fix bayonets and charge. With cheers the men dashed forward, and as the regiment came on the brow of the hill I threw in a volley. A few moments afterward the line was

halted by order of General Hancock. I immediately opened a slow fire by file, concentrating the fire on the broken groups of the enemy. Few shots were thrown away and the fire was quite effective. Soon the enemy were in full retreat, and by the order of the general I ceased firing.

My thanks are due to the officers and men for their good conduct. The only difficulty I had was in making them fall back and afterward in the charge of preventing them from dashing forward in pursuit of the enemy. I am happy in stating that although 60 of my men had their clothes pierced with bullets, I had not a man either killed or wounded.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

E. C. MASON,

Colonel Seventh Maine Volunteers.

Capt. T. S. GRIFFING,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brigade.

No. 52.

Report of Col. Robert F. Taylor, Thirty-third New York Infantry.

HDQRS. 33D REGT. N. Y. S. VOLS., 3D BRIG., SMITH'S DIV.,
Camp in the Field, May 6, 1862.

For the information of the brigadier-general I would respectfully report, viz: That I received orders to report with my regiment to Brigadier-General Hancock at about 12 m. on the 5th instant and to take my position on the left of the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania. After proceeding to the forks of the road I was ordered to place three companies to guard that point, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Corning. I was soon after ordered to withdraw them and take my position on the right of Wheeler's battery. Before I had time to reach it the battery was moved across the dam. I was then ordered to place three companies in the earthworks above the dam, who were put under the command of Major Platner. On arriving at the works in front of those occupied by the enemy I was then ordered to place three companies in them and to deploy the remainder (four companies) as skirmishers in the woods and on the right of the front line of attack.

Information having been received that the enemy was throwing up earthworks on our right I dispatched a small reconnoitering party to the front and right of the skirmishing line, but could discover nothing. Soon after a large body of the enemy was seen to leave the fort in front of our line and file into the woods occupied by my skirmishers. I was then ordered by General Hancock to rally my skirmishers, which order I had immediately transmitted to them, but by this time they had become engaged with the enemy. I then ordered them to hold their position. The three companies inside of the fort were now ordered to support a section of Wheeler's battery, which had retired from its advanced position to a line parallel with the front of the fort. The enemy having then advanced within a few hundred yards of our line General Hancock ordered me to charge, which was obeyed, and a well-directed fire threw their ranks into confusion, driving their left flank into the wood upon the reserves of my skirmishers, who succeeded in capturing over one hundred prisoners.

I cannot refrain from expressing my approbation of the valuable

services of Lieutenant-Colonel Corning and Adj. Charles T. Sutton, who performed all the duties devolving upon them with alacrity, skill, and gallantry. To the promptness and coolness with which they acted is in a great degree to be attributed the success of the necessarily rapid movements of the regiment. I could not with any justice discriminate between the exertions of the officers of the line. All of them conducted themselves with ability in their preparations to receive the enemy and bravery in resisting their attack and taking advantage of their repulse.

I regret to record that First Lieut. George Brown, in command of Company D, was severely wounded early in the engagement, while actively discharging his duties at the head of his company. He received the immediate attentions of the surgeons, Drs. Mulford and Dickenson, whose labors that day were prompt and efficient.

The conduct of my men, although for the first time face to face with the enemy, was all that I could desire of them. I would, however, especially mention First Sergt. Sylvester Porter, Company H, who, although cut off from the line of skirmishers, succeeded in bringing in his detachment of 8 men with safety, and securing four times their number of prisoners, one of whom was a captain of the Fifth North Carolina Regiment.*

* * * * * *

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. F. TAYLOR,

Colonel Thirty-third Regiment New York State Volunteers.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

No. 53.

Report of Col. William H. Irwin, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. FORTY-NINTH REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
Camp No. 11, in the Field, May 6, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to an order from brigade headquarters of this date I have the honor to report that this regiment was formed in line of battle yesterday on the left of the First Brigade, and moved forward in support of the battery on the right in the open ground in front of the second fort, over which its colors were hoisted. The men were ordered to lie down during the rapid and heavy artillery fire, and remained thus until Lieutenant Mitchell, of the brigade staff, informed me that the enemy had moved in force from the woods on our right, which their severe fire confirmed. I at once formed my line, and seeing the battery retiring, and also the Sixth Maine and the other regiments on my right returning to their original line on the flanks of the fort, I faced by the rear rank, and marched at the parade step to the slashings along the line, then faced to the front, and commenced firing on the enemy, who were rapidly and boldly advancing, and were then in good rifle range. I ordered my right wing to fire obliquely to the right, and their close and steady volley struck with terrible effect on the enemy, and when they came within easy distance the whole line opened upon them by file.

When General Hancock ordered the line forward to charge the

* Statement of casualties embodied in return, p. 450.

enemy who were rushing upon us, my regiment, loudly cheering, moved rapidly and steadily to the front, with their colors advanced and their line accurate. A regiment of the enemy was advanced to the woods on my left. I deployed by the left flank two of my companies (I and K, Captains De Witt and Neice) as skirmishers, and covered the left of the line, and held the woods until the enemy retreated. As far as possible all random and desultory firing was prevented. My men were ordered to fire low and select their mark, and they obeyed. It would seem impossible for any more trying circumstances to surround a regiment than those which, in common with the other regiments of the brigade, pressed on my men. They were weary, had lost sleep, made a forced march over bad roads in wretched weather, and were for the first time confronting their enemy in line of battle.

The admirable discipline of the brigade gave the men the coolness of veterans. My guides were thrown on the line, and it was formed under fire as if on parade. It would be invidious for me to name as worthy of praise any of my officers when all alike deserve it, but I cannot omit to state how well I was supported by Lieutenant-Colonel Brisbane, Major Hulings, and my adjutant, Lieut. E. D. Smith; and that my assistant surgeon, Huber, was present during the action at his post near the regiment, promptly attended to our wounded, and then repaired to the general hospital and gave most efficient aid. The surgeon, Dr. Gobrecht, was absent, by order, on detached duty at brigade hospital.

I am, captain, your obedient servant,

W. H. IRWIN,

Colonel, Commanding Regiment.

Capt. JOHN HANCOCK,

Assistant Adjutant-General, First Brigade, Smith's Division.

No. 54.

Report of Col. Amasa Cobb, Fifth Wisconsin Infantry.

HDQRS. FIFTH REGIMENT WISCONSIN VOLUNTEERS,
Camp No. 11, in the Field, May 6, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that yesterday, the 5th instant, at about 10 o'clock a. m., pursuant to your orders, and following you, I marched my regiment, the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, from Whitaker's farm (where I had lain on my arms the previous night) by the road to the right, striking the line of the enemy's works near Queen's Creek. Upon arriving where the road *débouchés* in a large open field, I turned to the left and deployed my regiment, facing the right earth-work of the enemy on the opposite side of Queen's Creek, throwing out skirmishers on my front and left, under the immediate command of Maj. C. H. Larabee. I crossed the stream at double-quick and occupied the work, which I found deserted by the enemy. I then marched my regiment out of the work and formed in line of battle facing the second work, which was distant about 800 yards. Here I was joined by other regiments of the brigade and a battery of artillery, which formed on my left.

Receiving your order to advance, I threw out Companies A, E, and G as skirmishers on my front and right and marched upon the enemy's work. This, like the other, was found entirely deserted. From this work three similar but larger works were in plain view at a distance of

1,000 and 2,000 yards, respectively, to the front and left. These works were thickly studded with the enemy's infantry and sharpshooters, who opened a galling fire on my skirmishers, who, being thrown well forward, came within their range.

Pursuant to your orders, I again advanced about 400 yards, and sent forward Companies D and K, under the immediate command of Lieut. Col. H. W. Emery, to support my line of skirmishers. The battery having taken a position near some lone farm houses, and being engaged in shelling the enemy's works, I held my remaining five companies to support it, keeping my men well under cover of the crest of a slight elevation, my right resting on a thick wood, well covered by my line of skirmishers, and frequently lying down to avoid the return shots from the enemy's artillery. I maintained this position until about 4.30 o'clock p. m., when a sharp fire of musketry on my line of skirmishers announced the approach of the enemy, who appeared in a long line of infantry and cavalry at a distance of about 400 yards in my front and penetrating the wood on my right. From my position I could then see only the cavalry. Holding my position until the battery had passed to the rear and reached a place of safety and apprehending a charge, I formed my men in square to resist cavalry, but the cavalry, being effectively checked by the fire of my skirmishers, fell in rear of the infantry. I then reduced my square, formed in line of battle, and opened fire on the infantry, who had already commenced a sharp fire on my right, my left being to some extent covered by the farm buildings above mentioned, which buildings at the same time greatly prevented the effectiveness of my fire. After maintaining this position for some time I received your order to fall back fighting, which I proceeded to execute to the best of my ability.

In falling back to the point indicated I was immediately unmasked by the buildings and found myself in front of the enemy's center, a heavy regiment, afterward ascertained to be the Fifth North Carolina, which was supported on either flank by other troops, all of whom advanced rapidly, concentrating upon me a rapid and heavy fire. My men fell back in good order, every man loading as he retreated, wheeling and returning the fire of the enemy with a rapidity and coolness worthy of veterans.

In this manner I fell back slowly to the line of battle which had already formed, and with your assistance formed my regiment in the center, a space having been left for that purpose. You then ordered a charge, and the whole line moved forward with a short and well-directed fire, driving the enemy before them like chaff, they fleeing in wild confusion, leaving the field over which they had just pursued my retiring line literally strewn with their dead and wounded, and leaving their battle-flag behind them, which was brought in by one of my men, who handed it to a staff officer to be conveyed to you.

During the entire day my officers and men behaved with great coolness and energy, manifesting a carelessness of danger bordering on recklessness. It is not too much to say that all did their duty, did it well, and at the right time. Saying thus much of all, I cannot refrain, in justice to my own feelings on the field of battle when the result was uncertain, from making special mention of the coolness and gallantry of Adj't. T. S. West and Lieuts. Enoch Totten and J. B. Oliver, whose positions were near me during the engagement, and whose assistance to me in encouraging the men, both by word and example, deserves my gratitude and admiration. Color-Serg't. George B. Madison also deserves special mention. Although severely and painfully

wounded in the knee in the early part of the engagement, he carried the colors steadily and gallantly to the last.

Capt. William A. Bugh, of Company G, was dangerously wounded in the first attack on the line of skirmishers and was disarmed by the advancing foe. He was, however, brought in after the rout of the enemy, and great hopes are entertained of his recovery. It is reported to me that the captain behaved with great coolness and bravery.

The casualties of the day in my regiment are 8 killed on the field, 50 wounded, 2 of whom have since died; none missing.* A detailed report of killed and wounded is herewith respectfully forwarded.

I have the honor to be, general, your most obedient servant,

AMASA COBB,

Colonel Fifth Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers.

General W. S. HANCOCK,

Commanding First Brigade, Smith's Division.

No. 55.

Report of Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, SMITH'S DIVISION.

May 7, 1862.

SIR: It having been reported that the enemy had evacuated his works early on Sunday morning, 4th instant, this brigade was under arms, and the Fifth Vermont, under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, was sent across the dam. No enemy being discovered, immediate arrangements were made for pursuit. The brigade moved in rear of Hancock's, and on arriving in front of the enemy's intrenchments, placed to protect Williamsburg, the brigade was formed in a line of double columns, in support of Hancock's brigade, deployed in line. This disposition was made with a view of carrying by assault the enemy's works. These arrangements were completed and the advance ordered about dark. It took but a very short time to discover the utter impracticability of any such move. Nothing was known of the country, and an entirely erroneous idea of the nature of the works prevailed.

After a short advance the different lines were halted, and the troops bivouacked on the ground they were on. On the morning of the 5th new dispositions were made; the brigade was put in position to cover our front and support for a short time Mott's battery, placed to enfilade a field battery sent by the enemy to harass Hancock's brigade, that had been sent to turn the enemy's left.

The brigade was kept in this position the most of the day, an eyewitness to the movements of the enemy against Hancock's brigade. Twice it received orders to go to his support. The first time the order was countermanded before starting; the second order was countermanded, and the brigade ordered peremptorily back after it had gone more than half the distance that separated the two brigades. The order to go to his support was given on the receipt of news from our left that the enemy could be seen in large force bearing down on Hancock. He was vigorously assaulted as we were returning to our former position.

On our return the Third Vermont, that had been in advance, now

* But see revised statement, p. 450.

marching in the rear, was overtaken by a staff officer from General Hancock, and at his instance returned and went to his support, not getting there, however, until the enemy had been handsomely repulsed.

There are no casualties to report, although the brigade was exposed to quite a number of shots from the enemy's artillery.

Very respectfully,

W. T. H. BROOKS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Smith's Division.

No. 56.

Report of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division.

HEADQUARTERS CASEY'S DIVISION,
Near Williamsburg, May 8, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that on Sunday, the 4th instant, I received notice from the general commanding the Fourth Corps that the enemy were supposed to be evacuating the line on our front. I immediately ordered my division under arms, with one day's rations in their haversacks. I advanced to the front, the First Brigade, General Naglee, in advance. I advanced with care at first, but soon ascertained that the enemy had evacuated the forts in my front, into which I immediately directed my division to move. The rebels had buried a number of torpedoes in the road leading to their works, one of which exploded and killed 1 and wounded 6 men of the Fifty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers.

I ordered the First Brigade of my division, and General Graham's brigade of Couch's division, which had been temporarily placed under my charge, the whole under the command of General Naglee, to make a reconnaissance in front. I soon after received orders from General Sumner to advance with the other two brigades of my division.

On the morning of the 5th instant I arrived within $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of the front at about 10.30, and rode forward and reported to General Sumner, who directed me to remain, to endeavor, if possible, to get up some subsistence for the men, some of whom had been without subsistence for twenty-four hours. It was raining hard at the time, and the men were without shelter-tents or blankets.

About 1 o'clock p. m. I was ordered by General Keyes to advance to the front, and while making my preparations so to do I was directed by General Sumner to move to the support of General Hooker, on the left. I immediately formed my division and moved off, with the First Brigade leading, and gave directions for the other brigades to follow. After proceeding 3 miles I was overtaken by an express, directing me to obey the first order from General Keyes. I immediately counter-marched, and returned as quickly as possible.

In the mean time the troops of my division in my rear, with the exception of the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers, had been sent to the front, as I ascertained, by the order of General Keyes. Soon after arriving in front General McClellan came up, and directed me to proceed with my division to sustain General Hancock on the right, who was reported to be in a very precarious situation.

The Second and Third Brigades of my division had been placed toward the left of the line previous to my arrival, but at what point I was unable to ascertain.

I directed the First Brigade, under the immediate command of General Naglee, to proceed as directed by the commanding general.

The Second and Third Brigades, as will be seen by the inclosed reports of their commandants, did good service on the left, and I have good reason to believe that the opportune arrival of the First Brigade saved General Hancock from a probable severe disaster.

The officers and men of the division behaved in a very creditable manner, and I know from personal observation that the First Brigade, under General Naglee, was formed as a sustaining force in a prompt and skillful manner. The staff officers of my division performed their duty as promptly and satisfactorily.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,

Brig. Gen., Comdg. Third Division, Fourth Army Corps.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Fourth Army Corps.

No. 57.

Report of Brig. Gen. Henry M. Naglee, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.

CAMP NEAR WILLIAMSBURG, VA.,

Headquarters First Brigade, Casey's Division, May 7, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of orders from General Keyes and General Casey (A, B, and C, attached), the brigades herein referred to were in motion by 9 o'clock a. m. on Sunday, the 4th instant, and were by 10.30 a. m. in occupation of the formidable works at Lee's Mill, which had been evacuated on Friday night, May 2, as reported by me. All of the surrounding country was covered with heavy fallen timber, and in the roads were buried torpedoes, which were not discovered until an explosion of one of them killed 1 and wounded 6 others of Colonel Dodge's Fifty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers.

At 1 p. m. Colonel Adams (Graham's brigade), Major Whittlesey's Fifth Cavalry, and Colonel Bailey's four New York batteries joined the column, and shortly afterward Captain Suydam, assistant adjutant-general to General Keyes, permitted a copy of a portion of a map of the immediate vicinity of Lee's Mill to be taken, and reiterated the orders above referred to.

Colonel Davis, with the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, with one section of Captain Regan's battery, reconnoitered the country toward Grove's wharf, and found none of the enemy. With the remainder of the force we proceeded, with the caution recommended by General Casey, in the direction of the Half-way House. We passed through the various and many field works 3 miles from Lee's Mill, and without any hinderance continued until we came into the main road leading from Yorktown to Williamsburg, where, when within 2 miles of the Half-way House, at 2 p. m., my advance guard had met Governor Sprague, who informed us of the position of affairs near Williamsburg, and that it was abso-

lutely necessary that some infantry should be sent forward forthwith. This I immediately intended to do. Major Whittlesey's cavalry had already passed. The advance of four companies of infantry had marched up, and to my surprise the remaining troops did not arrive. Starting back to ascertain the cause, one of my aides informed me that General W. F. Smith had assumed the authority of countermanding the orders of General Keyes, and had halted my column without advising me of it. About an hour and a half afterward I learned that General Sumner had arrived upon the ground and ordered my column to halt where it was; that he had preferred the troops of General Smith, and was advancing by another road.

After following for an hour I finally overtook General Sumner, who, after disapproving of the orders of General Keyes, with much hesitation finally directed me to follow in the column immediately in rear of General Smith. Placing the regiments of the brigade that had been so unceremoniously halted in motion, with the purpose of placing the Fifth Cavalry and my advanced infantry in their proper places in column, I hastened by another road to the place on the York and Williamsburg road where two and a half hours before I had met Governor Sprague, and where now I had the extreme satisfaction of learning that Brigadier-General Heintzelman, of the Third Army Corps, had passed, and had ordered that my brigades should halt and allow his division to pass in front of them. All of these extraordinary interruptions being reported to General Casey, he ordered that we should at once encamp.

At 8 a. m. on Monday, the 5th, all of the First Brigade had arrived at a point midway between the Brick Church at the Half-way House and the line of the enemy, not more than a mile and a half from the latter, and there remained five and a half hours, and until by verbal orders General Sumner ordered the brigade to a position in the woods in front of his headquarters. Returning to execute this order, I informed General Casey of it, and he produced a written order from General Sumner, directing the division to support General Hooker. This required it to move in the opposite direction. After a march of two hours, the artillery half of the time up to the axles in the mud, the cavalry horses plunging, and the men in mud to their ankles, we arrived immediately in the rear of General Hooker at 3.30 p. m., the very moment he was driven back by the enemy. We were preparing to support him, when another order came for all to countermarch and return in haste. I ordered the front battalion to do so, and returning to counter-march my rear battalions, found they had been halted by General Keyes $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles in my rear. Not waiting for the former, I at once proceeded with the latter, and arrived at the headquarters of Generals Sumner, Keyes, and Heintzelman at 4.30 p. m., General Keyes accompanying me from the point where he had halted the four battalions. General Keyes and myself arriving in advance of my column, I requested of him to know immediately something of the position the brigade would occupy, and went with him for that purpose, and was shown a position about 500 yards in front of the headquarters of the three generals above named, and ordered to deploy the brigade and hold it in reserve.

Returning to the head of my column that had come up I met General McClellan, who had just arrived upon the ground. Learning the critical state of affairs—that our left had been turned and Hooker driven back; of the exposed and critical position of General Hancock, who had turned the left of the enemy at 1 p. m., and who, notwithstanding that during four hours he had constantly sent for re-enforcements and had received none; that by his last dispatch he was already

yielding the advantages he had so gallantly held all day, with the certainty if unsustained the victory that had been within our grasp since 1 p. m. was about to be turned into an inglorious defeat, and that Hancock's command if not immediately sustained would be cut off or be cut to pieces—he immediately ordered the First Brigade of General Casey's division to proceed with the utmost dispatch and sustain General Hancock.

The announcement of General McClellan's order was received in a manner that indicated but too plainly to his friends and our enemies the infinite satisfaction that his presence had immediately caused. The brigade started off amidst the pelting rain, with the mud to their ankles, at a double-quick step, and made the distance through bog and mire and water in less than an hour. They arrived upon the ground held against great odds by General Hancock and his brave men for so long a time. They had been forced back over half a mile. To retreat farther before the enemy across the mill-dam by which the approach had been made was impossible, and there was no alternative but to surrender or to be cut to pieces. They were holding on, fighting desperately, yielding inch by inch, still hoping for relief, when intelligence of the arrival of General McClellan reached them, and that assistance was rapidly coming. The inspiration was immediate. The relief was seen coming in the distance. The charge and shout that followed was terrific, and bore down everything before it, and the enemy fell back with great loss. General Hancock indicated the line where he was most exposed, and by the time it was occupied it became dark. Although they had eaten nothing since the day before, wet for fifteen hours, cold and chilled, without overcoats or tents, not permitted to make fires, the troops stood by their arms the entire night, with constant rain pouring upon them, and never made a murmur. They knew that the roads were blocked up with artillery, ammunition wagons, ambulances, and all kinds of the material of war, wedged together in the most indescribable confusion, all buried in the mud, and that it was impossible to bring up the provision trains.

The enemy abandoned their position before Williamsburg at 3 a. m. on Tuesday, the 6th instant.

The names of those killed and wounded by the bursting of the torpedo are attached (marked D).*

All of which is respectfully submitted.

Very respectfully, &c.,

HENRY M. NAGLEE,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. HENRY W. SMITH,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Inclosure A.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS,
Warwick Court-House, May 4, 1862.

General Casey is ordered by me to send out a brigade and two batteries, to be joined by another (Graham's) from Couch's division, and a

* This list contains the following names: Private John Pruyne, killed; Sergeant L. W. Welch, Privates Hiram Lathrop, John Catterson, George H. Wheat, Harrison N. Mott, and Martin G. Palmer, wounded; all of Company F, Fifty-second Pennsylvania Infantry.

battery to reconnoiter the country toward the Half-way House and toward Grove Wharf. The brigadier from Casey's division will take charge of the whole force. I wish them to act with caution as well as vigor, and to send word back to Lee's Mill for me often. A regiment of cavalry will be sent also, and I wish that to be ordered to look out for the enemy in the direction of Grove Wharf, and the artillery and infantry pushed forward to Half-way House if possible. Strong working parties must repair roads and bridges as far as the troops advance.

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

Brig. Gen. H. M. NAGLEE,

Or other Brig. Gen. in charge of Brigade from Casey's Div.

[Inclosure B.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS,

Warwick Court-House, May 4, 1862.

SIR: I wish you to send a brigade immediately to Lee's Mill, where it will be joined by Graham's brigade, and then the two to reconnoiter the country toward the Half-way House and Grove Wharf. A regiment of cavalry will be sent toward Grove Wharf, and you will send also two batteries of artillery with the brigade which is to go forward. Graham being sick, I would prefer you should send Naglee, who will take direction of the whole reconnoitering force, and send word back often to me. Send strong working parties to repair the roads as far as the troops advance and occupy Lee's Mill strongly.

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

Brigadier-General CASEY, *Commanding Division.*

[Inclosure C.]

HEADQUARTERS CASEY'S DIVISION,

May 4, 1862.

GENERAL: I am directed by Brigadier-General Casey to say that you have your brigade under arms at 9 o'clock a. m. to-day. The men will have one day's rations in their haversacks.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY W. SMITH,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[General NAGLEE.]

No. 58.

Report of Brig. Gen. William H. Keim, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HDQRS. KEIM'S BRIGADE, CASEY'S DIVISION,

Williamsburg, Va., May 8, 1862.

CAPTAIN: Owing to severe indisposition I followed my brigade slowly, it being in temporary command of Colonel Howell on May 5.

When I arrived the Eighty-fifth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers was in front, then the One hundred and third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Major Gazzam commanding; next the One hundred and first Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Wilson. The Ninety-sixth Regiment New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Gray commanding, had been ordered by General Sumner to protect the Eighth New York Battery and after the regular battery of Robertson. The brigade advanced to the support of General Palmer's brigade. The Eighty-fifth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Howell, was in advance of General Palmer's brigade over the fence into the woods under a brisk fire of the enemy. At that time, when the fire was hot and heaviest, General Keyes rode up and addressed my brigade a few spirit-stirring remarks, who heartily cheered the general and resumed the work of destruction with more zeal.

General Palmer being called off, I assumed command of the Ninety-second (Colonel Anderson's) and the Ninety-third (Lieutenant-Colonel Butler's) Regiments New York Volunteers. I ordered Colonel Howell to the front to relieve the Ninety-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, who immediately encountered a sweeping fire, which was returned with spirit and effect. The One hundred and first Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Wilson, I ordered to the left of the clearing across the road as a reserve. The One hundred and third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Major Gazzam commanding, was also ordered to the front, to support General Peck. I was assigned the command of the left, General Peck the center, and General Devens the right. About 5.30 the musketry fire had nearly ceased, the battery in front keeping up its fire until dark, two hours afterward.

Taking into consideration that the men had only one day's rations since Sunday morning, no overcoats, woolen or gum blankets, they evinced a spirit of endurance and heroic courage worthy of veterans, and the men and officers are entitled to praise for their arduous and successful efforts. The troops remained under arms all night, rainy and unpleasant. I was with General Peck and General Couch during the night. Sounds were heard of cutting wood, and commands were given to "Forward, march," which induced a belief that the enemy were about evacuating. At daybreak I ordered a company of Colonel Howell's regiment to reconnoiter toward the fort. Everything appeared quiet, when some cavalry from Williamsburg rode downward into the fort, so they withdrew. After the cavalry left the fort the effort was renewed and were steadily advancing, when General Heintzelman rode up and ordered my men back, he entering the deserted forts first which my brigade had aided materially to conquer.

My staff officers, Capt. N. L. Jeffries, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Stewart, jr., aide-de-camp, rendered me efficient aid.

The state of my health must be the apology for this imperfect report.

* * * * *

Respectfully submitted.

WM. H. KEIM,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. HENRY W. SMITH,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Casey's Division.

No. 59.

Report of Brig. Gen. Innis N. Palmer, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, CASEY'S DIVISION,
Near Fort Magruder, May 6, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the following as the operations of the troops under my command at the battle of yesterday before Fort Magruder:

On leaving our camp on the morning of the 5th, to move on to the front, three regiments of my brigade (the Eighty-first, Eighty-fifth, and Ninety-eighth New York Volunteers, under the command respectively of Lieutenant-Colonel De Forest, Colonel Belknap, and Colonel Dutton) did not move forward with the brigade, as most of the men of these regiments had returned to their previous camp to bring up their supplies, which had been left in the hurry of moving to the front. The regiments were left in charge of Colonel Dutton, the senior officer. I proceeded with the two remaining regiments, the Ninety-second New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, and the Ninety-third New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Butler, to the battle ground, where I was directed by General Sumner, the officer in command of the left, to place these regiments in position where we could hold a portion of the woods immediately in front of Fort Magruder.

At this time General Casey, my division commander, was engaged in another part of the field, and I was directed by General Couch, the senior officer at that portion of the field where they were engaged, to take command of all that portion of the division engaged near me. This comprised, besides my regiments, three regiments of the Second Brigade, under General Keim.

Brigadier-General Peck, who was hotly engaged with the enemy a little to the left of my line, having sent for re-enforcements, I was directed by General Couch to send two regiments to his (General Peck's) support. I immediately sent two regiments of General Keim's brigade, under Colonel Howell, of the Eighty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers. Of the operations of these two regiments I respectfully refer you to the reports which I presume General Keim and Colonel Howell will make to you.

Shortly after sending this support I was informed that some of the regiments under General Peck's command were getting short of ammunition, whereupon I was directed by General Couch to take the three remaining regiments of my command and relieve three of General Peck's. This was instantly done, but just as these last were placed in position I received an order from General Casey to proceed with my brigade to the position occupied by himself, as it was of vital importance that General Peck should be sustained. General Couch directed that no change be made at that time.

It was by this time nearly dark, and the whole of my command was left to hold the position they had taken up. These facts were immediately reported to General Casey and to General McClellan through General Keyes, who approved of the disposition. Most all the men in my command were in action for the first time, but conducted themselves throughout very handsomely. They were exposed for some time to a warm fire, but in the regiments of my own brigade I have no casualties to report.

Of the operation of the three regiments left in charge of Colonel Dutton I respectfully refer you to his report,* herewith inclosed.

The Ninety-second and Ninety-third Regiments New York Volunteers of my command held their position until early morning, when it was discovered that the enemy were evacuating their fortifications, and they went forward to occupy this point.

During the day I was much indebted to Capt. Nathan Reeve, assistant adjutant-general, to Lieut. Fitzgerald Noble, aide-de-camp, and to Col. A. J. Morrison, formerly of the Seventh New York Cavalry, who was acting as volunteer aide.

I am, sir, very respectfully, &c.,

I. N. PALMER,

Brig. Gen., Commanding Third Brigade, Casey's Division.

Capt. HENRY W. SMITH,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Casey's Division.

No. 60.

Report of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Second Corps, with congratulatory order from General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,

May 16, 1862.

I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement of the 5th instant near Williamsburg, Va.:

On the afternoon of the 4th instant I received an order from the commanding general to relieve the forces occupying the field works in front of Williamsburg by a brigade of my command. My brigades being small, I ordered two for that service, that of Brig. Gen. R. H. Anderson and that of Brigadier-General Pryor; also Macon's battery, under Lieutenant Clopton, two guns under Captain Garrett, and two under Captain McCarthy.

Early on the morning of the 5th instant the enemy's sharpshooters drove our picket guards in. An unsuccessful attempt was soon made to recover the ground, but the re-enforcement was found to be insufficient, and the second party was driven in; the enemy all the while re-enforcing rapidly.

Skirmishing was kept up for an hour or two, when I ordered Brigadier-General Wilcox's brigade to re-enforce General Anderson, and put Brig. Gen. A. P. Hill's brigade in motion, so as to be in convenient supporting distance. These forces were soon brought into action, and the sharp skirmishing of Wilcox's brigade developed the position of the enemy in that direction, to our right. Our troops pressed steadily on, gradually driving the enemy back, developing his great strength as he retired.

Brigadier-General Pickett's brigade was sent forward to General Anderson's support about 10 o'clock. Meanwhile our army and supply trains were moving on; so slowly, however, that Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's division was fortunately so delayed as to be left within my reach.

At 12 o'clock it became evident that the trains would not be out of my way before night, and that I could, therefore, make battle without

* Not found.

delaying the movement of our army. Orders were therefore given to General Anderson to organize columns of attack upon the enemy's positions and batteries, using the brigades of Wilcox and A. P. Hill and such of his forces as could be spared from the redoubts, the attack to be supported by Pickett's brigade. We could not afford to rest longer under the enemy's long-range guns and superior artillery and we were wasting much ammunition. General Anderson was ordered to seize the first opportunity to attack the most assailable position of the enemy.

Soon after giving these orders I rode to the field, and arrived in time to witness the successful issue of the first grand assault. The attacking columns were well arranged and gallantly led by General Anderson and most ably seconded by the gallant brigadiers and other officers, Pickett's brigade taking part in the attack.

The advanced positions so extended my lines that I found it necessary to bring other forces upon the field. I ordered Brigadier-General Colston's brigade forward, and sent to Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill for one of his brigades. Meantime our troops continued to press forward and drove the enemy steadily back—soon so rapidly that Brigadier-General Stuart ordered his cavalry forward, taking it for a rout. He led his command forward in gallant style. I gave him instructions, however, to move with great caution, as I did not think that the enemy was yet in confusion. Exercising due caution, he soon found himself under a severe fire of fresh troops. Taking advantage of the ground, he put his cavalry into a safe position and withdrew them.

At 3.30 o'clock I received messages from some of the brigadiers that their ammunition was getting short. Ours being in our wagons, and therefore unavailable, my only means of furnishing it was to get fresh troops. I consequently sent to Major-General Hill for the balance of his division. Colston's brigade and two regiments of Early's brigade, of Hill's division, were ordered forward through the woods at our right, to report to Brig. Gen. A. P. Hill.

About this time General Johnston joined me, but, with his usual magnanimity, declined to take command. His presence, however, with an occasional valuable suggestion, were enough to insure success.

Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill joined me about the same time, and was anxious to take an active part in the battle, having with him the balance of his division.

Occasional efforts were made by the enemy to regain his lost positions, and one of them bore some appearance of success, when a well-timed fire from Colonel Jenkins, with his artillery and sharpshooters, staggered the advancing forces, and our troops soon drove them back.

By the time that Colston's brigade and the two regiments of Early's brigade reached our front our forces had advanced as far as we could well venture, considering the surrounding circumstances. These re-enforcements enabled us to hold our new position with comparative ease.

A diversion against our left flank was made about 5 o'clock and Major-General Hill was ordered to watch it, leaving Brigadier-General Featherston's brigade as my reserve. General Hill soon reported that it was time to make the attack there, and I ordered him to feel the enemy with caution. He arranged his forces for the attack with excellent judgment, but in the hurry of bringing the troops into action some of the officers failed to take due advantage of the ground and exposed them to a fire which was not absolutely necessary, and the effort to drive the enemy from that part of his position failed. This mishap could have been remedied by an extreme flank movement and complete victory won; but, as I have intimated before, we were not in a condi-

tion to increase our responsibilities, and a great delay might have endangered other operations of the army.

This battle was a very handsome affair, and the able brigadiers and the officers and soldiers under them are entitled to all the honors due to distinguished gallantry and zeal.

My part in the battle was comparatively simple and easy, that of placing the troops in proper positions at proper times.

The conduct of the whole affair is due to the officers and soldiers. I have never seen troops go into action in better order, better spirits, or with more enthusiasm. The order was preserved throughout the day, as well as the spirit, and after a long day's battle, lasting until quite dark, and with a heavy rain pouring down, our regiments were brought from the field in as good order as from an ordinary day's march, some of the brigades marching back with complete organization.

It is exceedingly gratifying to say that no soldier left the field unauthorized. Our gallant wounded, who were able to make their way, left the field unassisted, preferring to go alone rather than take a soldier from his post. Bodies were usually brought in by 4 men; never by more than 6, and parties of 50 or 60 prisoners were guarded to the rear by 12 or 15 men.

Inasmuch as this effort of the enemy was supposed to be for the purpose of detaining us, in order to give him time to arrange other important operations in the direction of Richmond, it was deemed unwise to make the action any more general. In addition, our provisions and ammunition were ahead of us in our trains and could only be had by going to them.

So far as this particular action was concerned these circumstances seemed to operate greatly against us, and the almost impassable roads were equal drawbacks. These combined circumstances rendered it absolutely necessary that the captured arms and several of the field pieces should be abandoned. I sent an ax to General A. P. Hill, with orders to destroy the pieces that we could not remove from the field; but he had passed them so far, and night coming on, they could not be found. Four pieces are all that are reported as being secured, 8 regimental standards, and 400 prisoners. The wounded prisoners, however, were released, except the officers, who were allowed the privilege of remaining on parole or following us on the march. They preferred their parole.

It is worthy of mention that every piece but one of the enemy's artillery was captured by the repeated and brilliant charges of our troops. As before stated, but four could be taken off the field.

Our forces engaged amounted to about 9,000; those of the enemy probably to 12,000. Though he continued to throw in fresh troops until quite dark, our fresh troops were only sent to replace those whose ammunition was expended. Many of our men, however, replenished their boxes from the knapsacks and cartridge boxes of the enemy's killed and wounded.

Our loss in valuable officers and men has been severe. We have, however, every reason to think it but slight compared to that of the enemy. All officers and men agree in the idea that the ground was strewn with the enemy's dead to an extent far exceeding our loss. While we weep with the friends of our gallant dead, we must confess that a soldier's grave, in so holy and just a cause, is the highest honor that man can attain.

A false impression was made on my mind by our men bringing in the enemy's wounded. The natural inference was that our own

wounded had been taken care of, and this was confirmed by statements from different persons. Since leaving Williamsburg I have learned that some of our killed and wounded were not cared for.

Of the gallant Mott, colonel of the Nineteenth Mississippi Volunteers, I ask leave to adopt the language of the lieutenant-colonel of his regiment in his report of this officer's conduct, bearing, and influence :

Justice to the dead requires me to say that the spirit, order, and noble courage which this regiment exhibited is due alone to the efficiency which it had attained under the discipline and influence of its late commanding officer, Col. C. H. Mott. The deep gloom which pervades his entire command attests the extraordinary hold he had upon the admiration, confidence, and love of his officers and men. This accomplished soldier, model gentleman, and devoted patriot has given his life to his country. No richer contribution, no nobler sacrifice, can ever be laid upon its altar.

The service and the country have alike sustained a grievous loss in the death of Col. G. T. Ward, commanding the Second Florida, and Lieut. Col. Thomas E. Irby, commanding the Eighth Alabama. Colonel Ward fell almost at the first fire, as he was leading his men most gallantly into action. Colonel Irby fell after his command had been for some time hotly engaged, and not until he had given many proofs of great skill and courage.

Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, a hero of many battle-fields, was conspicuous for the ability and courage exhibited in planning the left attack. In that attack Brigadier-General Early was severely wounded through the body while leading his brigade in an impetuous assault on the enemy's position.

Brig. Gen. R. H. Anderson was placed in command on the right, and his disposition of his forces and manner of leading them into action displayed great ability and signal gallantry and coolness.

The brigades of Generals C. M. Wilcox and A. P. Hill were long and hotly engaged. Ably led by those commanders, they drove the enemy from every position. The latter brigade, from its severe loss, must have been in the thickest of the fight. Its organization was perfect throughout the battle, and it was marched off the field in as good order as it entered it.

Brig. Gen. George E. Pickett, greatly distinguished on other fields, used his forces with great effect, ability, and his usual gallantry.

Brig. Gen. Roger A. Pryor had but a portion of his brigade engaged. He used his small force with effect in making a successful attack, and, toward the close of the conflict, in repelling a vigorous assault of the enemy.

Brigadier-General Colston, though last upon the field, was hotly engaged until darkness put an end to the struggle.

The brigades of Anderson, under Cols. M. Jenkins, Wilcox, A. P. Hill, and Pryor, deserve particular mention for the good order of their march during the night and the following day.

Colonels [James L.] Kemper, [Samuel] Garland (severely wounded, but remaining at the head of his regiment), [M. D.] Corse, [L. B.] Williams (seriously wounded), Maj. W. H. Palmer (slightly wounded, but remaining with his regiment); Col. R. W. Jones, of the Fourteenth Louisiana; Lieut. Col. Z. York, Colonels [John] Bratton, [John R. R.] Giles, [Samuel] Henry, [J. J.] Woodward, [A. M.] Scales, [P. W.] Roberts, [W. R.] Terry, and [Lieutenant-Colonel] Hairston, of the Twenty-fourth Virginia (both severely wounded); [Joseph] Mayo, [Thomas] Ruffin, jr., and Lieutenant-Colonel [L. Q. C.] Lamar (favorably mentioned by three of the brigadier-generals), discharged their difficult duties with marked skill and fearlessness.

I must refer you to the report of brigade and regimental commanders for evidences of the admirable conduct of subordinate officers and men.

The artillery was well served, and Macon's battery, under Lieutenant Clopton; Dearing's battery, Captain Dearing commanding; Stuart Horse Artillery, under Captain Pelham; Stribling's battery, Captain Stribling commanding; two pieces of Garrett's battery, under Captain Garrett and Lieutenant Coke, and two pieces of McCarthy's battery, under Captain McCarthy, were distinguished for the effectiveness and rapidity of their fire. The batteries of Captain Dearing and Lieutenant Clopton delivered their fire under an incessant and galling fire from the enemy's sharpshooters.

I am under many obligations to Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, who, while waiting for an opportunity to use his cavalry, was exceedingly active and zealous in conducting the different columns to their proper destinations and in assisting them to get properly into action.

I am also indebted to Maj. E. P. Alexander, Captains Latham, Mason, and Harvie, and Lieutenants Washington and Hampton, of the staff of the commanding general, for valuable assistance in conveying orders to different points of the field.

My sincere thanks are expressed to my personal staff, Captains Sorrel, Manning, J. W. Fairfax, and Lieutenant Goree. All of these officers so conducted themselves on the field as to give me great pleasure, satisfaction, and assurance. Captain Manning bore the colors of one of the regiments in a charge and slew three of the enemy himself, receiving a slight wound and another ball through his clothes.

To Dr. Cullen, chief surgeon, and Surgeons McConkey, Chancellor, Thornhill, Gaston, Post, Peel, Lewis, and Maury our thanks are eminently due for their assiduous labors day and night in the arduous duties of their department.

Casualties.	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and privates.	Total.
Killed.....	24	264	288
Wounded.....	75	900	975
Missing.....	3	294	297
Total.....	102	1,458	1,560

The reports of brigade commanders are forwarded with this, together with full lists of the casualties.

No report of the engagement has been received from Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's division further than his list of casualties.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES LONGSTREET,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. THOMAS G. RHETT, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DEPT. NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
No. —. } May 6, 1862.

The commanding general announces to the army an important success achieved yesterday in the repulse of the enemy's attacks upon the

position of our rear guard near Williamsburg and the driving his forces to the woods by the troops of Major-Generals Longstreet and Hill and Brigadier-General Stuart, commanded by the former. He congratulates those engaged upon the honors they have won, and offers them the thanks of the army for their admirable conduct. This result was foreshadowed by the manner in which the brigades of Kershaw and Semmes and cavalry commanded by Colonel Wickham and Major Butler, of Hampton's Legion, under Brigadier-General McLaws, repulsed the Federal advanced guard on the preceding afternoon.

By command of General Johnston:

THOS. G. RHETT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 61.

*Return of Casualties in the Confederate forces.**

Troops,	Killed			Wounded.			Missing.			Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.		
Early's brigade:											
2d Florida.....	1	3	4	2	29	31			5	40	Attached.
2d Mississippi Battalion.	1	4	5	1	29	30		6	6	41	Attached.
5th North Carolina.....											No report.
23d North Carolina.....				1	4	5		3	3	8	
24th Virginia.....	3	27	30	9	84	93	2	64	66	190	
38th Virginia.....				1	7	8			1	9	
Total.....			39			167			81	287	
Hill's brigade:											
1st Virginia.....		11	11	7	22	29		1	1	41	
13th Virginia.....	1	12	13	5	59	64				77	
17th Virginia.....	1	25	26	5	100	105		3	3	134	
17th Virginia.....	3	14	17	2	45	47		10	10	74	
Total.....			67			245			14	326	
Jenkins' brigade:											
4th South Carolina.....		2	2	1	9	10				12	2 enlisted men mortally; since dead.
5th South Carolina.....		2	2	1	18	19				21	
6th South Carolina.....		1	1	2	21	23		3	3	27	Lieut. W. J. Campbell, and 1 enlisted man mortally.
Palmetto Sharpshooters		4	4		22	22		3	3	29	
Louisiana Foot Rifles ..		1	1		1	1				2	
Total.....			10			75			6	91	
Pickett's brigade:											
8th Virginia.....											Loss not reported by regiments.
18th Virginia.....											
19th Virginia.....											
28th Virginia.....											
Total.....	2	24	26	9	129	138	1	25	26	190	
Pryor's brigade: Total.....										214	Killed, wounded, and missing not separately reported.
Wilcox's brigade:											
9th Alabama.....		10	10	3	42	45			6	61	
10th Alabama.....											
19th Mississippi.....	1	14	15	3	82	85				100	11 mortally wounded.
Total.....			25			130			6	161	
Pelham's battery.....					2	2				2	
Grand total.....										1,251	

* Compiled from the reports and returns, and incomplete.

No. 62.

Report of Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY BRIGADE,
In Bivouac, May 10, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of May 5, near Williamsburg:

At daylight, the 5th instant, I rode down to reconnoiter the ground, and beyond it, from which the enemy had been repulsed the evening before. I directed a company (Captain Hobson's) of the Fourth Virginia Cavalry, near by, to proceed cautiously down the Telegraph road and reconnoiter the position and movements of the enemy. It had not proceeded far before meeting with one of the enemy, who surrendered on the spot, and I returned to question him. I had scarcely emerged from the woods when a brisk fire was opened by the enemy's skirmishers along the edge of the woods to my left. Appreciating at once the danger of the company which had just started down the Telegraph road, diverging from the other at this point, I asked who would volunteer to run the gauntlet to bring back Captain Hobson's company. Capt. W. E. Towles my volunteer aide, promptly accepted the service and performed it with credit and success. As he returned with the company he found the enemy's infantry in his road, but, nothing daunted, he seized the musket of the nearest one and bore it off in triumph, with an entire regiment of the enemy's infantry close to his left. Thus began the battle of Williamsburg, which terminated so gloriously to our arms. The enemy did not push forward as if attacking in earnest, but lingered at the edge of the woods, firing at long range. I therefore believed, and so reported to General Longstreet, commanding the rear portion of the army, that it was intended merely to annoy our rear and delay our march. I nevertheless held my cavalry in hand ready to dash upon any force that might debouch into the open ground in front of Fort Magruder. The firing from the woods continued obstinately for several hours without any indication of an advance and the long-range rifles of the enemy were beginning to tell upon the garrison of Fort Magruder. General Anderson deployed some skirmishers in front and endeavored to dislodge the enemy, but they were forced to retire. The enemy still did not venture to the front; but a battery of rifled pieces opened near the edge of the woods upon the open space, and, holding my cavalry near the two redoubts to the right of Fort Magruder, I assumed the direction of the pieces in those redoubts during the rest of the day, and I will here pay a merited tribute to the excellence of the execution done by them, commanded by Capt. W. Robertson Garrett, who, notwithstanding the hail-storm of bullets and shells, kept up an accurate and incessant fire upon the enemy's battery until it was silenced, and then upon his line after the brigades of infantry in the woods to the right had driven the enemy to the edge of the woods near the Telegraph road. When the enemy took this position I directed the left pieces of Fort Magruder to enfilade his line, which from their situation could be done. That brave and gallant officer Colonel Jenkins replied that he was just going to do it. The artillery thus gave most essential aid to our infantry in their advance of triumph over every position the enemy took until he was entirely routed. Antecedent to the rout, however, occurrences of importance should be narrated, for which I, from a stand-point observing the entire field, had peculiar facilities.

I received orders from General Longstreet that the enemy's position was to be attacked, and that with my cavalry I should co-operate with General Anderson. The first brigade which moved into the woods to the right, with the view of attacking the enemy in flank, was Brigadier-General Wilcox's, which continued in action throughout the day. General Wilcox sent me word that he needed additional troops on his right. General Pryor being most convenient, I informed him of the fact, and he, with great promptness, moved with a regiment and a half at once for the ground. General Anderson commanded in person on the scene of conflict; consequently, I frequently found it necessary to take the responsibility of dispatching re-enforcements of artillery, as well as infantry, to points obviously requiring them. Brigadier-General Hill's brigade followed Brigadier-General Wilcox's and then Brigadier-General Pickett's, Wilcox's brigade holding its own until they came up. The tide of battle rolled very perceptibly before these veteran brigades as soon as they were fairly engaged, and my volunteer aide (Captain Farley), who was in the entire fight, speaks in the highest terms of the heroic courage and fighting tact of the Eleventh and Seventeenth Virginia, of Hill's brigade, and also of the Ninth Alabama and Nineteenth Mississippi.

About this time Lieutenant-Colonel Martin (Jeff. Davis Legion), who had been previously dispatched to reconnoiter to the left of Fort Magruder, reported a force of the enemy there, with artillery and infantry, screened by the woods, and we soon received unmistakable evidence by a reverse fire of artillery from that direction upon Fort Magruder and the redoubts to the right. This was evidently premature, and appeared to be an attempt to divert us from our signal success on the right. I kept General Longstreet informed of every stage of the action and my impressions of it. The force on the left could not be ascertained, as it was entirely screened by the woods; but failing to improve an enfilading fire on Fort Magruder and the redoubts to the left, and reverse fire upon those on the right, by a vigorous attack, greatly strengthened by his accidental occupancy of our left redoubt, left vacant by mistake, convinced me that *there* he was either weak, timid, or feigning, and in neither contingency to be feared. Colonel Jenkins had strong apprehensions that he would be forced to leave his position on account of the signal advantage the enemy had in possessing that redoubt. I, however, sent him Bearing's battery and other artillery I found unemployed and detached the remainder of Pryor's brigade from the right to re-enforce him, and notified him that other re-enforcements were coming rapidly up, and to hold his ground at all hazards a little longer.

At this juncture a rifle piece was directed to fire from near a large tree on the road a direct fire, with evident effect upon the enemy's last position on the right. Affairs were culminating at their crisis, and I sent a messenger to inform General Longstreet that all the troops were now engaged, and that Jenkins was hard pressed on his left, and to say that I deemed his presence necessary on the field. I presume he met this messenger near the scene of action, for he soon after rode up and made the final disposition, which I need not mention, for the accomplishment of a glorious result.

Soon after General Longstreet's arrival Captain Farley, of whom I have already made mention, galloped up on a horse captured at the battery, and announced the enemy routed and in flight. The Stuart Horse Artillery, attached to my brigade, having just arrived upon the field (having been detached for some days at Bigler's Wharf), I ordered it forward under the gallant Pelham, and the cavalry at hand, intending

to press the pursuit to the uttermost. I stopped the battery near the woods for the cavalry to pass, but just before the column entered the woods a brisk fire from riflemen, being a reserve, no doubt, to cover the enemy's retreat, opened from the dense woods near the Telegraph road, obliging the cavalry to retire. I was at this juncture in advance at the captured battery. I ordered the Horse Artillery at once into action; but before the order could be given Pelham's battery was speaking to the enemy in thunder tones of defiance, its maiden effort on the field, thus filling its function of unexpected arrival with instantaneous execution and sustaining in gallant style the fortunes of the day, keeping up a destructive fire upon the enemy until our infantry, having reformed, rushed forward, masking the pieces. I directed Captain Pelham then to take a position farther to the left and open a cross-fire on the Telegraph road, which he did as long as the presence of the enemy warranted the expenditure of ammunition.

Darkness soon closed upon the scene, and our troops were withdrawn from the field of victory to resume their march, not, however, until all the wounded (for whom we had no transportation) were removed to the houses of residents of Williamsburg.

I make no mention of what transpired on the left after General Longstreet's arrival, as I had no participation in it. The cavalry brigade (a battle during the whole of which it was exposed to the danger without the privilege of participating in the conflict) occupied the attitude of menace, by no means indispensable to the success, for the enemy, having a full view of the terrible "Black Horse," ventured not to the open ground, so essential to his own development and artillery maneuver.

During the fire to which the cavalry was exposed several casualties occurred. Minute reports from regiments have not, however, been received, but will be forwarded as soon as obtained.

Maj. William H. Payne, Fourth Virginia Cavalry, upon whom devolved the command of the regiment (in consequence of Col. B. H. Robertson's sickness and Lieutenant-Colonel Wickham's being severely wounded the day before), received a very severe, and I fear mortal, wound in the face, the command thereafter devolving upon Capt. R. E. Utterback.

The Jeff. Davis Legion of Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, had one man killed.

The Wise Legion Cavalry, under Col. J. Lucius Davis, and the Third Virginia Cavalry, under Col. Thomas F. Goode, all evinced under fire that unfaltering intrepidity which augurs well of their action whenever the opportunity of conflict may offer, and bore without a murmur from daylight until dark exposure to a drenching rain, which was a prominent attendant feature of the battle. I respectfully refer you to the reports of regimental commanders, to follow, for instances of individual courage and gallantry of their respective commands.

I will take occasion here to speak of the meritorious conduct of Colonel Jenkins, South Carolina Volunteers, in command at Fort Magruder, who, under the most trying circumstances, showed all the attributes of the gallant officer and heroic commander.

The names of the officers and batteries of artillery, who from time to time during the action performed such distinguished service in Fort Magruder and the redoubts, are unknown to me, but are doubtless mentioned in the reports of other commanders. I beg leave to accord to them the palm of well done, and to add that my aide, Captain Farley, who acted with the infantry, reports that these batteries had effectually silenced the artillery of the enemy before our infantry reached it.

Captain Pelham's report of the conduct of the Stuart Horse Artillery is herewith forwarded. The battery was composed mostly of raw militia from Floyd County, Virginia, who had received but a few weeks' drill, yet, under the indefatigable exertions of Captain Pelham, ably seconded by his lieutenants and non-commissioned officers, they that day won the name of veterans. The daring and efficient conduct, under circumstances of great personal danger, of Capt. John Pelham, First Lieut. James Breathed, William McGregor, Sergt. Charles R. Ford, Corpl. Moses Felrey, gunner to the Blakeley, and the brave men under them, came under my own observation. In order to appreciate the value of the service rendered by my staff and escort I beg it to be remembered that I was a medium of communication between the different commanders and with General Longstreet, and gave orders to other commands than my own whenever necessary.

The conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Brien, First Virginia Cavalry, my chief of staff, is deserving special mention. His efficiency as a staff officer on the field was hardly excelled by his gallantry as a soldier.

Maj. Dabney Ball, in action always transformed into the "bold, dashing huzzar," displayed all the admirable qualities which he has so often had ascribed to him on the field.

Lieut. Chiswell Dabney, my aide-de-camp, was active and brave in the discharge of every duty.

Lieut. Redmond Burke was ever under great personal danger, and led more than once the re-enforcements sent to Colonel Jenkins to their positions.

Lieut. J. T. W. Hairston, C. S. Army, on duty with my brigade, rendered very essential and gallant service during the action.

Captain Towles, to whose daring reference has already been made, is entitled to high commendation for the continued exhibition of a quality so desirable in cavalry service.

Capt. W. D. Farley has always exhibited such admirable coolness, undaunted courage, and intelligent comprehension of military matters that he would be of invaluable service as a commanding officer assigned to outpost service.

Rev. John Landstreet, chaplain First Virginia Cavalry, was as conspicuous for gallantry and usefulness on the field as he is distinguished for eloquence in the pulpit, and I am greatly indebted to him for the voluntary and important assistance rendered me during the day as well as on previous occasions.

Two gentlemen, who had joined me but a few days before as volunteer aides, Capts. Samuel Hardin Hairston and Samuel G. Staples, gave evidence, by their coolness, intelligence, and conspicuous gallantry, of future distinction in arms, and were of invaluable service to me.

It gives me pleasure to record my obligations to my escort, composed of select young men of rare merit, for their zealous and efficient service, rendered totally regardless of danger, in bearing important verbal dispatches to and from the various commanders; duties which ordinarily devolve on staff officers of rank and experience, but which were performed by them with the most commendable exactitude. Their names are: Corpl. Henry Hagan, First Virginia Cavalry, who was fully up to his reputation for brilliant and dashing courage previously earned; Chief Bugler S. R. Steele, First Virginia Cavalry, was with me most of the day, and Privates Frank S. Findlay, R. M. Hickman (who had his horse killed under him while carrying an important order), Thomas Hollingsworth, Ed. Landstreet, J. McDonald, E. L. Parker, C. P. Ripley,

S. M. Routh, J. H. Thomson, R. C. Tomlin, Mortimer Weaver, and C. C. Whiting (the last mentioned quite a youth), displayed signal zeal and intelligence in the discharge of his duty:

A list of prisoners taken and property captured has, I presume, been furnished by other commanders in their reports.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Cavalry.

Maj. THOMAS G. RHETT,

A. A. G., Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia.

No. 63.

Report of Capt. John Pelham, commanding Stuart Horse Artillery.

BIVOUAC, NEAR NEW KENT COURT-HOUSE, VA.,

May 8, 1862.

GENERAL: In pursuance to orders I submit for your inspection a report of the part taken by the Stuart Horse Artillery in the engagement near Williamsburg:

On the 2d instant I detached the section of mountain howitzers, under Lieutenant Shepherd, to report for duty at brigade headquarters, and reported with the rest of my battery (six pieces) to Colonel Lee, at Bigler's Wharf.

On the 4th the mountain howitzers were engaged in a skirmish below Williamsburg. The following is Lieutenant Shepherd's report:

NEAR NEW KENT COURT-HOUSE, VA.,

May 8, 1862.

CAPTAIN: May 2 I reported, with the two mountain howitzers, to General J. E. B. Stuart. At 4 p. m. on the following day I took position on a small stream which empties near Grove Landing, where I remained until 1 p. m. of the 4th, when I was moved, under General Stuart's direction, on the main road toward Williamsburg. Here a skirmish took place. I fired three rounds spherical case, and then retired, following the cavalry by Grove Landing, then up the Beach road to Williamsburg.

One of my men (Private James W. Smith), having taken sick, was sent to the rear, and was probably taken by the enemy.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. T. SHEPHERD,

Second Lieutenant, Stuart Horse Artillery.

Capt. JOHN PELHAM,

Commanding Stuart Horse Artillery:

Between 10 and 11 a. m. May 5 I received orders from brigade headquarters to proceed immediately to Williamsburg. I left five of my pieces in Williamsburg, and reported with three (two 12-pounder howitzers and one 12-pounder rifled gun, Blakeley) to General J. E. B. Stuart on the field about 2 p. m.

I took position to the right and in front of Fort Magruder, and opened fire on the enemy, who occupied the woods on the road to Lebanon Church. Here I detached Lieutenant Elston, with two men, to bring off some captured artillery. In a few minutes they returned on foot, their horses having been shot down as soon as they made their appearance at the guns. I held this position under a heavy fire until General Hill's brigade moved up and deployed in front of my battery, when I moved to the left and took position on the Yorktown road, to

enfilade the enemy's lines. Here the metal bed of the elevating screw of my Blakeley gun gave way; but it was retained on the field and did good service. I remained in this position until 5 p. m., when I withdrew for want of ammunition.

I fired 286 rounds of spherical case and 4 of canister from the 12-pounder howitzers and 40 percussion shell and 30 solid shot from the Blakeley gun. Total of 360.

During the entire engagement both officers and men acted with commendable calmness and courage. The example of cool, conspicuous bravery set by Lieutenants Breathed, McGregor, and Elston was emulated by my non-commissioned officers and men.

Casualties as follows: 2 men wounded, Summers and Gibson; 4 horses killed, 3 wounded, and 13 escaped from horse-holders, all of which have since been found except two.

On the morning of the 6th I left Williamsburg, and encamped at a brick school-house half a mile from Burnt Ordinary.

About 10 a. m., May 7, I received orders from the brigade commander to return to the rear, with a rifled gun and howitzer. The howitzer was left at the Methodist Church, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles beyond Burnt Ordinary, under Lieutenant Breathed; the rifled gun was placed in position about a mile farther on. The enemy's cavalry made their appearance in the edge of the woods in front of us, and I fired five shots at them. The shot fell, well scattering them, but I could observe no other effect. I then retired in the rear of the main body of our forces.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. PELHAM,

Captain, Stuart Horse Artillery.

Brig. Gen. J. E. B. STUART, *Commanding Cavalry.*

No. 64.

Report of Brig. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Second Division.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,

Bivouac on Chickahominy, May 10, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade—composed of the Seventh Virginia Regiment, Col. J. L. Kemper; Eleventh Virginia, Col. Samuel Garland; the Seventeenth Virginia, Col. M. D. Corse, and the First Virginia, Col. Louis B. Williams—in the battle of the 5th instant, near Williamsburg:

The brigade was ordered under arms early on the morning of the 5th, and I was directed to take such positions on the Yorktown road that I might support either the right or left of our line as the occasions demanded. A heavy fire of artillery having been directed for some time against the redoubts in front of Williamsburg, between 8 and 9 [o'clock] I received Major-General Longstreet's order to move my brigade forward to the support of Brigadier-General Anderson, occupying the redoubt known as Fort Magruder. The brigade was immediately put in motion, moved forward on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, and halted to deposit knapsacks, while I sent forward my aide-de-camp, Capt. F. T. Hill, to report to General Anderson my advance and receive his orders.

In the mean time, accompanied by Captain Dearing, of the artillery, I rode forward to find covered approaches to Fort Magruder, the open ways being plowed by round shot and shell. Just as I had finished this examination Captain Hill reported that General Anderson needed no support, and having received a request from General C. M. Wilcox to support him, I moved the brigade across the fields under a heavy fire of artillery, which was borne with all the steadiness of veterans, and formed it in line of battle in rear of the redoubts and in supporting distance of General Wilcox, reporting in person to General Wilcox my position and readiness to support him when needed.

At 10.30 [o'clock] General Anderson sent me an order to move down to the woods occupied by General Wilcox, some 800 yards in front of my position, and assist in driving back the enemy, who had deployed in force. Very soon the firing began. General Wilcox having attacked, and my own brigade reached the scene of action, Colonel Kemper, of the Seventh, was directed to throw his regiment forward in line and engage the enemy. His men dashed in with a cheer, driving back the enemy, who were advancing, in consequence of the regiment in front having given way, and with admirable skill and coolness changed front as they fell back, and put his regiment in position behind a fence, facing the enemy, and within 45 yards of them. The Eleventh Virginia, Colonel Garland, was moved forward by the flank on the prolongation of Kemper's original line, with directions to clear his right, face to the left, and feel the enemy. The dense wood prevented an accurate estimate of distance, and Colonel Garland's three left companies were still in rear of Kemper, when the Eleventh was moved forward to the front. Major [Maurice S.] Langhorne was directed to take charge of them and form on Colonel Kemper's right. The Seventeenth, Colonel Corse, being next in order, was ordered to follow in rear of Colonel Kemper, and, moving forward with great steadiness and gallantry, its left wing was thrown forward, so that it was formed in a line of battle on Colonel Kemper's left and prolonging his line. The Seventeenth encountered a heavy fire in making this advance before the wheel was made and suffered severely. The First Virginia, Colonel Williams, having been placed under the orders of General Wilcox at his request, they were conducted to the fight on our extreme left. The position of my line was this: Two sides of a rectangle, seven companies of the Eleventh forming the short side, the three companies of the Eleventh, the Seventh, and the Seventeenth the long, the enemy being in the re-entering angle, facing the long side. A regiment of regular infantry—I think the First—had formed line immediately opposite the Seventeenth, and were quietly awaiting its appearance when Colonel Kemper called my attention to them. We soon discovered they were enemies, when Colonel Kemper's regiment and a part of the Eleventh, at a rest behind the fence and a distance of 45 yards, poured into them a deadly volley, which distinctly marked the line of formation by the dying and the dead. The enemy, however, replied steadily and rapidly. The Seventeenth opened from the left, and Garland from the right was heard pouring in a continuous storm of lead. Then was the time, and Kemper's regiment was ordered to charge them, and, led by their gallant colonel, they bounded over the fence, Colonels Garland and Corse at the same moment, with that military quickness and intuition that proves the thorough soldier, advanced their own lines, and the enemy were forced back step by step—my own men eagerly pressing them—until the enemy reached an extensive field of felled timber, which

afforded them excellent cover, and where, encouraged by their reserves and fresh troops, they rallied and again made a stand.

My brigade was now in advance, and was formed facing the new position taken by the enemy, at a distance from them of about 30 yards, the Eleventh on the right, the Seventh in the center, and the Seventeenth on the left.

The roar of musketry now became louder than ever and for some two hours was encouragingly kept up.

In the mean time the First Virginia, fighting its way through, had marked its way around and joined the left of my line, the right wing of the Nineteenth Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel Lamar, intervening.

Reports were soon made me that our ammunition was being exhausted, and the enemy were again charged with the bayonet by the whole brigade and utterly routed. The superior nerve and enthusiasm of our men will ever drive them back when the bayonet is resorted to.

It was during this charge I saw Colonel Williams cheering his men on and nobly followed by them. I directed him to push the enemy with vigor, which he did, and following them up, in conjunction with one or two companies of the Ninth Alabama, captured a battery of eight guns just beyond the fallen timber. Colonel Williams, having but few men, requested Colonel [John B.] Strange, of the Nineteenth Virginia, who just then came up, to detail some men to secure the captured pieces, as also a color, which was left with the battery, and the inscription "To hell or Richmond" on it. This regiment, in conjunction with some others, still continued to advance, driving the enemy back. Colonel Williams fell severely wounded through the body about 6 o'clock, when the command devolved on Major [William H.] Palmer, who, though slightly wounded himself, held every position they had taken until directed to fall back after dark.

The successful charge of the brigade above alluded to having been accomplished, the Seventeenth Virginia halted on the ground from which the enemy had been driven, and Colonel Corse was directed to refill his cartridge boxes from those of the enemy's dead, who were plentifully and opportunely strewn around.

Colonels Kemper and Garland, finding their line somewhat confused from the charge, withdrew their regiments back to the edge of the woods and there reformed them, refilling cartridge boxes from those of the enemy.

This was about 5 o'clock, and General Colston coming up with his brigade, his regiments were sent forward and to the right and my brigade were allowed to lie down in line, though exposed to heavy fire all the time. The time was employed also in taking off our wounded and gathering some small-arms lying around us and in the fallen timber.

About 7 o'clock I received the order of Major-General Longstreet, through General Pickett, to withdraw my brigade from the field, and thus ended victoriously for us on the right one of the most obstinately-contested battles ever fought.

My own brigade was actively and constantly engaged in the front for seven hours. Many of my men fired over 60 rounds of cartridges, and for two hours longer we were lying passive under a heavy fire, ready to spring to it again should the enemy rally to the fight. We drove the enemy from every position he took, captured all his knapsacks, and never suffered him to regain an inch of lost ground. My own brigade was fortunate in taking seven stands of colors, about 160 prisoners, and

shared with the Ninth Alabama the honor of taking eight pieces of artillery.

Our loss has been heavy, and the Eleventh, Colonel Garland, suffered most severely. His regiment ever pressed forward where the chance of winning glory seemed most dangerous. But all the regiments fought with a heroism that, if persisted in, must ever drive back the foe from our soil.

My aide-de-camp, Captain Hill, bore my orders with promptness.

My brigade surgeon, Dr. M. M. Lewis, was untiring in his attentions to the wounded, and richly deserves this slight mention.

Private John C. Hunt, of Company L, Third Virginia Cavalry, one of my couriers, made himself remarked by his activity and cool courage under fire.

The whole brigade did its duty, and when that is said all is said.

Colonel Kemper, of the Seventh, was conspicuous throughout for his daring and energy.

Colonel Garland, of the Eleventh, though wounded early in the action, refused to leave the field, and continued to lead his regiment until the battle was over, and his example had a most happy effect in showing his men how to win the victory.

Colonel Corse, calm and equable as a May morn, bore himself like a true soldier throughout.

Colonel Williams, being separated from the brigade, acted pretty much throughout the day upon his own judgment, and I have to thank him for the admirable manner in which he handled his regiment.

My field officers—Lieutenant-Colonels [David] Funsten, [W. T.] Patton, [Morton] Marye, and Majors [M. S.] Langhorne, [Arthur] Herbert, [William H.] Palmer, and [C. C.] Flowerree—were brave, active, and energetic in the discharge of their duties.

Among those who by the fortune of war were most prominently brought forward and noticed are Captain Simpson, Cadet J. Herbert Bryant, acting adjutant; Color-Sergeant Hatcher, and Color-Corporal H. H. Bradley.

Private Travers, of Company H, took a stand of colors with his own hands.

This regiment mourns the loss of three gallant officers—Captain Humphreys, Lieutenants Addison and Carter—all of the Seventeenth.

Captain Mitchell, of the First, received the swords of two officers, and Cadet Thomas H. Mercer, assigned to the First, was remarked both by his regimental commander and myself for coolness and daring.

Corp. Lee M. Blanton, though wounded in the head, refused assistance, and himself captured General Patterson's carpet-sack, with his commission, and took 2 prisoners to the rear.

Adj. J. Lawrence Meem, of the Eleventh, was indefatigable in his endeavors to secure the victory, and aided greatly the result.

Private James D. Walkup, of Company K, captured a stand of colors.

Adjutant Starke, of the Seventh, is particularly mentioned by his colonel for his efficiency and gallantry, as well as Sergeant-Major Tansill, Sergeant Dutcher, and Private Mays, acting color-bearer, who had his flag shot from his hand twice and twenty-seven bullet-holes through it, but who continued to bear it bravely to the last.

I cordially indorse Colonel Kemper's high encomiums upon the conduct of Mr. Camp Beckham, late a cadet at the Virginia Military Institute. His conduct was the admiration of all who saw him, and this chance was often presented me.

My thanks are due to Captain Charles Pickett, of General Pickett's staff, for efficient aid at a critical moment.

Lieutenant-Colonel [L. Q. C.] Lamar, of the Nineteenth Mississippi, volunteered to serve under my orders, having become separated from his brigade, and was eager to bear his part in the day's fray, nobly seconded by the right wing of his regiment. He rendered me most efficient service.

I append herewith a list of the killed and wounded.*

All of which is respectfully submitted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. P. HILL,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. G. MOXLEY SORREL, *Assistant-Adjutant General.*

No. 65.†

Report of Col. Montgomery D. Corse, Seventeenth Virginia Infantry, of battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, May 31–June 1.

— — — — —, 1862.

At 4 p. m. I moved my regiment by the left flank, following the Eleventh, in double-quick time for $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles down the Williamsburg road, passing for 500 yards under a heavy artillery and infantry fire to a wood-pile to the left of the Barker House, where we halted for a few minutes to close up the ranks and permit the men to recover breath. The Eleventh was soon put in motion. I followed by the left flank, filing to the right in front of the redoubt and rear of the Barker House and the enemy's camp and the open space beyond, encountering a gallant infantry fire from the enemy stationed in the edge of the woods and meeting numbers of our troops falling back, which prevented me from presenting a compact line to the enemy. After advancing some distance I received an order to fall back and reform behind the trenches, which was done in tolerably good order, which position we held until near night-fall, holding the enemy in check until they were driven from their position.

The regiment was then reformed with the brigade, and moved forward through the enemy's camp and occupied the woods beyond, from which they had been driven. About 9 p. m. we were withdrawn and bivouacked a mile to the right and rear of the position occupied by the brigades in the afternoon.

In the advance into the enemy's camp Color-Corporal Morrill was struck down, wounded in three places, and rose upon his elbow to cheer the men forward. The colors were caught by Captain Raymond Fairfax, Company I, and handed to Color-Corporal Diggs, who instantly fell wounded. They were taken by Private Harper, Company E, who retained them until the close of the day. Sergeant-Major Francis fell mortally wounded some distance in advance of the regiment. He was a gallant soldier and most estimable gentleman. Sergeant Basye, Company F, was killed while gallantly charging the enemy far in advance of the regiment. Lieut. William Gray was killed while bravely cheering his men on. His conduct has been remarkable for heroism on every occasion in which he has been under fire. Captain Knox, Company

* Embodied in No. 61.

† Misplaced.

G, Captain Fowle, Company H, and Captain Burke, Company D, were wounded while leading their companies. Lieutenant Adie was wounded while gallantly doing his duty. Lieut. Thomas V. Fitzhugh received a wound while passing through a shower of lead in the voluntary act of carrying an order to Colonel Moore, of the Eleventh Alabama Regiment. Major Herbert was wounded while passing through a sheet of fire to take charge, by your order, of some companies of Colonel Moore's regiment, to the right and rear of our position, having volunteered for the service; Colonel Moore having previously fallen desperately wounded. Colonel Marye acted with his usual gallantry.

M. D. CORSE,
Colonel, Commanding.

No. 66.

Report of Brig. Gen. R. H. Anderson, C. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., CENTRAL FORCES,
Camp near Christian's Mill, May 10, 1862.

CAPTAIN: Under the instructions which I received on the evening of the 4th instant I occupied at about dark the redoubt near Williamsburg with the troops of General Pryor's and my own brigade, to which Captain Macon's battery, under command of Lieut. William I. Clopton, two guns of Captain Garrett's battery, and a section of Capt. Edward McCarthy's battery, of the Richmond Howitzers, were temporarily attached.

At 6 o'clock in the morning of the 5th our pickets, under the command of Maj. C. S. Mattison, were driven from the York and Lee's Mill roads, and they retired from the felled woods which lay in front of the redoubts. They were directed to recover their positions, and, supported by two companies of Colonel Jenkins' regiment, a prompt and spirited attempt was made to accomplish that object. Our skirmishers were at first successful and continued to press the enemy back through the timber, but the rapidly-increasing numbers of their opponents compelled them at length to retire to the principal field work, called Fort Magruder. By the time they re-entered this work the enemy had brought cannon to bear upon it. Their fire was vigorously returned by our artillery, while sharpshooters of both sides engaged each other with their rifles. After this sort of encounter had continued for some time I directed General Wilcox to occupy the forest on the south side of the felled wood and to assail the enemy from that side. This was speedily executed, and the result showed that the enemy was present in large force. That part of General Pryor's brigade which was not required to hold the redoubts was ordered to co-operate with General Wilcox, and I left Fort Magruder to direct the operations on the right. At the same time I called on Generals Hill and Pickett to join me with their brigades. Upon the arrival of General Hill's brigade it was sent rapidly into the woods to the right of General Wilcox. General Pryor was placed on the right of General Hill, and orders were given to advance and drive the enemy back. A very warm encounter immediately ensued. The enemy had the advantage of entire concealment in the thickets until our troops were within a very close range, and from his hiding places he poured tremendous volleys upon our men, but nothing could check their ardor. As soon as the fire of the

enemy disclosed his position they rushed upon him and compelled him to retire. General Pickett arrived with his brigade and took a position on the extreme right. That part of Pryor's brigade which had been left in the redoubts was brought up and the fight grew hot.

At this time Captain Stribling's Fauquier Artillery and Captain Dearing's Williamsburg Artillery came up and took post on our left, where they rendered great service against the assaults of the enemy upon Fort Magruder. On the right the enemy was steadily driven from the woods to the fallen timber, in which he endeavored to make a stand, but the spirit of our men was fully aroused. Step by step and hour by hour they continued steadily to advance and to compel the enemy to give ground. All his cannon except one were silenced or captured, and victory seemed almost within our grasp, when night came on and put an end to the conflict.

Of the results of the engagement I cannot at present give an accurate account. Commanders of brigades have had neither time nor opportunity to make their reports. A full report will be rendered as soon as it is practicable. The evidences left upon the ground show that the advantage lay largely on our side in the numbers of killed and wounded. The woods were literally strewn with the dead and wounded of the enemy and with his arms and equipments.

With the imperfect information which I at present possess I can only point out the gallant conduct of the commanders of brigades and batteries, and express my warmest admiration for their zeal and alacrity. The noble courage shown by the men generally needs only a fair field to secure its most precious rewards and to bring freedom and peace to our country.

The fearless bearing and the unceasing assistance rendered by them requires from me a particular notice of the members of my staff—Capt. T. S. Mills, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. Edward J. Means, acting aide-de-camp, and Mr. E. M. Anderson, volunteer aide-de-camp. The last of these was my brother. He has given his life to his country's cause.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

R. H. ANDERSON,

Brigadier-General, Provisional Army.

Capt. G. MOXLEY SORREL,

A. A. G., Second Division, Central Forces, Army of the Potomac.

No. 67.

Report of Col. M. Jenkins, Palmetto Sharpshooters, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,
—, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report concerning the Second Brigade during the battle of the 5th instant near Williamsburg:

The morning of the 5th and the opening of the battle found the brigade in occupation of five breastworks, being the center, disposed as follows, under the direction of General R. H. Anderson: Battalion of Louisiana Foot Rifles, Captain Goodwyn commanding, in redoubt to the

right of Fort Magruder; Jenkins' Palmetto Sharpshooters and Colonel [John R. R.] Giles' Fifth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers, in Fort Magruder, with six companies under Colonel Giles; Maj. W. M. Foster, under orders from General Anderson, took charge, with three companies Fifth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers, of redoubt to the left of Fort Magruder, and Lieut. Col. J. M. Steedman, with three companies of the Sixth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers, the next redoubt to the left. Col. John Bratton, with the remaining companies of the Sixth Regiment, was in position in a skirt of woods near to and left of Fort Magruder. Maj. C. S. Mattison, with his battalion, of the Fourth South Carolina Volunteers, was deployed as skirmishers in front of Fort Magruder, and opened the battle.

About 6 a. m. the firing between the skirmishers began, and Major Mattison was re-enforced by Captains Kilpatrick's and Evins' companies, from the Palmetto Sharpshooters. Under the personal supervision of General Anderson the skirmishers advanced and forced the enemy to the woods, and afterward retired to Fort Magruder.

At 6.30 a. m. firing from Fort Magruder began, picked riflemen from the Palmetto Sharpshooters replying to the enemy, and Captain McCarthy, with two pieces Richmond Howitzers, and Lieutenant Clopton, with three pieces Richmond Fayette Artillery, from Fort Magruder, and Lieut. John A. Coke, of Captain Garrett's battery, with one piece, whose ammunition giving out, was relieved by Lieutenant Palmer, of same battery, from redoubt on the right, commenced firing, which was kept up nearly all day with great gallantry and to good effect.

I passinglly call attention to the admirable service of the artillery in Fort Magruder under most trying circumstances. The enemy's sharpshooters, with superior range of guns, commanded the fort, and one after one the gallant men were shot down, until I was compelled to supply their want with infantry from the Palmetto Sharpshooters. The Fayette Artillery suffered particularly and acted with great gallantry.

The fighting on the right of our line becoming earnest, General Anderson left to take charge, and placed me in command of the brigade, and Lieut. Col. Joseph Walker replaced me in command of the Palmetto Sharpshooters.

During the whole morning a constant and heavy fire of rifle and cannon was kept up between the redoubts and Fort Magruder and the enemy's center, and by my orders volleys from the long-range guns (rifle muskets) were fired upon the enemy's artillery with perceptible good effect, compelling them to change position and slacken their fire.

About 10 a. m. a considerable body of the enemy advanced under shelter of a fence oblique to Fort Magruder, and by my orders were permitted to come unmolested within close musket range, when a heavy artillery fire and musketry and rifle from the Fifth South Carolina Volunteers and Palmetto Sharpshooters speedily drove them to the woods.

No change of importance—a deadly fire from the front continuing on us, with some loss on our side—occurred until about 3 or 4 p. m., when the enemy advanced a heavy column to the left and opened a battery, raking our position in the redoubts and Fort Magruder. As the report of their movement was made by Lieutenant-Colonel Steedman, I personally reconnoitered, and observing the strength of their position and numbers, reported the fact to the commanding general, Major-General Longstreet, and made the following disposition to meet the demonstration: The Sixth Regiment, Colonel Bratton, was ordered

to move and support the two redoubts fronting the enemy, both of which were already occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel Steedman with three companies of that regiment. Major Mattison, with his battalion, was ordered to take post on the left of Colonel Bratton in a skirt of woods, and all the artillery then with me in Fort Magruder were placed, supported by Colonel Giles, with six companies Fifth Regiment, to reply to the enemy's guns from the left, the fire in front having nearly closed.

Major Foster having retired from his redoubt, supposing it untenable, and the enemy threatening an advance on the left, he was ordered to report to Colonel Bratton.

Prompt re-enforcements having been sent by the commanding general, I replaced Major Foster with three companies of the Fourteenth Alabama, under Major Royston, and placed Captains Dearing's and Stribling's batteries and three pieces of Donelsonville Artillery, under Lieutenant Fortier, in position to answer the heavy fire from the enemy's left battery and a new battery from their right center, which now opened a terrible cross-fire.

Captain Dearing for a while singly met the two batteries, and deserves great credit for his handsome conduct, and assisted by the other batteries, the pieces of the enemy on their left and right center were compelled to cease their fire and any farther advance prevented in that direction.

At this time our gallant comrades on the right had driven the enemy step by step until his line lay exposed to our enfilade fire from Fort Magruder. Here, assisted by fallen timber and a strong position, he stubbornly resisted the advance of our troops. Seeing the critical moment, I changed front promptly with all the artillery under my command and opened from the right battery and Fort Magruder a heavy cross-fire of cannon and rifles. In a few minutes the enemy's line gave back, and our gallant right pressed them and completed the victory.

By orders from the commanding general Captain Stribling's battery was placed on the right of Fort Magruder to fire upon the enemy in the woods, and was supported with coolness and efficiency by Major Anderson, commanding six companies of Palmetto Sharpshooters. About this time the attack upon the enemy's right was made by a portion of General D. H. Hill's division in which, through some mistake and the orders of the officer commanding the attack the two redoubts occupied by Colonel Bratton's regiment were for a time left unoccupied by the advance of that regiment and a part of the Fifth South Carolina Volunteers.

My thanks are due Lieutenant Love for promptly reporting the fact, and I immediately reoccupied the left breastwork with Major Mattison's battalion, he having very properly refused to leave the post I had given him in charge except on my order, and I sent two companies of the Fourteenth Alabama to re-enforce him.

Lieutenant-Colonel Steedman, with a discretion and good judgment shown repeatedly during the day, had advanced under what he deemed compelling orders, very carefully covering his breastworks, and upon the repulse of the left resumed his position.

Nothing of special interest occurred after this. The enemy at all points kept up an annoying fire until night closed the scene.

I must speak in the highest terms of the conduct of the batteries and troops under my command; the coolness and determination evinced under a trying fire, for the most part beyond our range, augurs well for the future.

To the officers in command of regiments and detachments I must accredit a prompt and discriminating readiness to obey my orders, and my thanks are due Colonels Bratton and Giles, Lieutenant-Colonels Steedman and Walker, who commanded the Palmetto Sharpshooters; Majors Mattison and [William] Anderson, Lieut. Col. A. Jackson, Captain Goodwyn, and the various battery commanders, for their cheerful and intelligent assistance during the day.

Major Whitner, volunteer aide to General Anderson; Captain Mills, his assistant adjutant-general; Captain Manning, aide-de-camp to the commanding general; Captain Seabrook, adjutant to the Palmetto Sharpshooters; Captain Dick, and Lieutenant De Lisle gave me efficient assistance as a staff; and I must allude here to the handsome conduct of the couriers sent me from Colonel Robertson's cavalry regiment.

The troops of this brigade, I am glad to report, [are] in a much improved condition for a fight, encouraged by the victory in which they participated, and having full trust in the generalship of their generals.

The surgical staff of the brigade attended well to their duty in very exposed positions.

I append a list* of our lamented killed and wounded, who gave all to hold the position assigned them by the commanding general. The list has been sent in.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. JENKINS,

Colonel Palmetto Sharpshooters, Commanding Second Brigade.

Captain SORREL,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Corps.

No. 68.

Report of Brig. Gen. George E. Pickett, C. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., SECOND DIV., SECOND CORPS,

May —, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 5th instant, at about 8 a. m., my brigade being then on the march from our bivouac in rear of the old College of William and Mary, I received an order from Major-General Longstreet to counter-march it and follow in rear of General Wilcox's brigade. My brigade was halted near the old college for some time, and then ordered to move toward the redoubts in front of the town, halting at the point where the King's Mill [road] branches from the main road. I was directed to inform Brigadier-General Anderson of my presence in case of his needing support. I proceeded to obey this order, Captain Dearing's battery leading. When within some 200 yards of the point designated I halted the brigade, finding that the enemy had the exact range with their guns of the ground immediately in advance, firing at every horseman who made his appearance. I at once sent forward my aide (Lieutenant Pickett) to Fort Magruder to inform General Anderson of our whereabouts. His reply was he did not need any assistance at that time, and to remain in my position. Half an hour subsequently I received an order

* Embodied in No. 61.

from General Anderson by a courier to bring in my brigade as soon as possible. Hearing quite a sharp firing in the point of woods to which I was being led, and not knowing the nature of the ground to be suitable for the maneuvering of artillery, I ordered Captain Dearing to remain where he then was until I ascertained where I should need him.

Upon my way to the skirt of woods I met with General Stuart, who pointed out the best route to be taken, and in a few moments I reported to Brigadier-General Anderson. Learning from him that the battery in Fort Magruder had suffered very much, I, with his consent, sent back an order to Captain Dearing to take a section of his battery and proceed to their relief, which was promptly executed.

General Anderson ordered me to take my brigade in the woods to the right of the point at which General Wilcox had first entered it, and where General Hill with his brigade had also gone in to his assistance. The object was to extend well to the right, and, if possible, to turn the enemy's left flank. I had scarcely, however, filed in with one regiment (the Eighth Virginia) when I was recalled. I gave the necessary directions to Colonel Berkeley, commanding the Eighth, and upon reaching the edge of the woods was ordered to move on the other three regiments to the front to sustain our forces, already hotly engaged. This separated the Eighth from the rest of the brigade during the action.

Moving rapidly forward at a double-quick, the Eighteenth, followed by the Nineteenth and Twenty-eighth, relieved a portion of Wilcox's brigade, which had suffered severely. We drove the enemy in front back until he took shelter in a very strong position of felled trees, forming a perfect abatis. Here I placed the Eighteenth (Lieutenant-Colonel [Henry A.] Carrington) in line, and the Nineteenth (Colonel [John B.] Strange) on its left. Finding the ground on the left of the Nineteenth occupied by the Nineteenth Mississippi Regiment (Colonel [Christopher H.] Mott) and the Seventeenth Virginia (Colonel Corse), I placed the Twenty-eighth slightly in rear as a reserve for the Eighteenth and Nineteenth, in case either of them should need support. The enemy was evidently about this time strongly re-enforced, as I judged from their cheering, and advancing to within some 30 or 40 yards of our position, and opening a most severe, well-directed, and determined fire along the front of the Eighteenth and right of the Nineteenth Regiments. These regiments sturdily, however, maintained their ground, returning the fire with most telling effect. This furious, close, and deadly work was kept up some half an hour without cessation or giving way on either side. There, I think, the enemy was again re-enforced, from their renewed cheering and clear ringing of their guns.

Fearing lest our men were wasting their ammunition, I consulted with Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington, and finding he had no field officers, told him to use his utmost endeavors on the right of his regiment to prevent his men from throwing away a shot, while I would personally superintend the execution of the order on the left and pass it on to the Nineteenth. While endeavoring to do so, much to my surprise, I found the whole line from right to left falling back through the woods, abandoning our dearly-bought position. Some one, it appears, had passed an order down from the right of the line to fall back. This I let them know at once to be false; that no such order had been given and none should be given by me, and in a few minutes, by the valuable assistance of Lieut. Col. Henry Gantt and my aides, Lieutenants Baird and Pickett, they were stopped in time to save a great disaster,

and moved forward again, all coming up gallantly with a cheer and reoccupying our old places.

Finding the ammunition getting short in the Eighteenth, which had suffered very much, the Twenty-eighth relieved it, Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington falling a sufficient distance to the rear to partially refill his cartridge boxes from the knapsacks of the enemy's dead.

It was at this time that I sent a courier to the major-general commanding to inform him that we were in want of ammunition, and I met with the gallant and lamented Colonel [Thomas E.] Irby, with four companies of [the] Eighth Alabama Regiment, of General Pryor's brigade, who reported to me for duty. I led him some distance and directed him to move slightly to the right of where the Eighteenth had been. He rushed on eagerly at the head of his men, and coming close on a party of the enemy, was about firing, when they called out, "We are friends; don't fire," at the same time holding up their hands. While partially turning to caution his men not to fire the accomplished cowards poured in a deadly volley, killing the brave colonel and many of his men, and instantly, upon the fire being returned at such short range, took to their heels. I ordered his body to be immediately carried from the field.

About this time re-enforcements from Colston's and Pryor's brigades having come up, upon consultation with Generals Hill [and] Pryor a general charge along the whole line was determined on, and I moved to the right to look after the Eighth. Just at this moment, when the charge was being made, the enemy on the right, who had been quite silent for some time, appeared again in numbers, but were gallantly repulsed by the Eighth Regiment, of my own, and the Fourteenth Regiment, of Pryor's brigade, and were driven from the field from the right to the left, the Nineteenth, supported by the Eighteenth, taking a battery and a number of prisoners, the Twenty-eighth advancing at a charge, by order of General Wilcox, over an open space in front of the captured batteries and under a heavy fire, but still driving the enemy before them.

It was in this charge that Colonel [Robert C.] Allen, of the Twenty-eighth, was for a few minutes in the hands of the enemy, but was rescued by his own presence of mind and the timely assistance of some of his men.

Shortly after this I reported in person to the major-general commanding, and received the instructions from him concerning the bringing off our wounded and retiring after dark. These instructions I communicated to all the brigadier-generals except General Pryor, the darkness and smoke preventing my finding him. I, however, dispatched messengers to find him.

The gallantry and energy exhibited both by officers and men cannot be too much praised. After hard night marches, drenching rains, and but scanty rations, they met an enemy well fed, superior in numbers, better armed and equipped, and well posted, and drove them a mile during the engagement. It is with pleasure I state to the major-general commanding that their confidence in their own ability and cause is redoubled since this action.

The ground in front of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth was literally covered with dead.

The color-bearer of the Eighteenth, Sergt. Solon A. Baston, was shot down while gallantly waving the standard in front of the regiment and leading it to the charge.

I cannot close without mentioning the many thanks that are due to

the regimental commanders and Lieutenant-Colonel Gantt for their promptness in carrying out orders, and when separated from me the ability they evinced in conducting their regiments.

I take pleasure in calling attention to the efficient service rendered to my own as well as to other brigades by the gallant Captain Manning, aide-de-camp to the major-general commanding.

To my personal staff—Lieutenants Baird and Pickett and Captain Croxton—I am much indebted for the continuous and arduous duties they performed under a most galling and annoying fire. Captain Croxton having been sent with an order, was during the early part of the engagement with General Pryor and Lieutenant-Colonel Berkeley, of the Eighth. These gentlemen speak of his being of great assistance to them.

I respectfully call the attention of the major-general commanding to those specially mentioned in regimental reports by their colonels.

I must mention also the dastardly subterfuges of an enemy pretending to be civilized, such as raising a white flag and pretending to surrender in order to stop our fire to allow their re-enforcements to come up and enable them to pour in a deadly volley upon an honorable and too unsuspecting foe.

Our loss was quite severe:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Officers	2	9	1
Enlisted men	24	129	25
Total	26	138	26
Grand total			190

The brigade entered the action with 1,529 muskets. Accompanying is a full list of casualties.*

I am, captain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

GEO. E. PICKETT,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. G. MOXLEY SORREL,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 69.

Report of Brig. Gen. Roger A. Pryor, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.

HEADQUARTERS BRIGADE, May 10, 1862.

CAPTAIN: About 9 o'clock on the morning of the 5th I received verbal orders from several sources to move my command to the support of Brigadier-General Wilcox, who was expecting to engage the enemy to the left of my front. As my brigade was distributed among four redoubts, which Brigadier-General Anderson had instructed me to hold at every hazard, and as I had received no authoritative command to evac-

* Not found. See No. 61.

mate them, I did not feel at liberty to move away more than a single regiment, especially as I was informed by an aide of General Anderson that it was General Hill's brigade which had been directed to re-enforce General Wilcox. Thus, with one regiment—the Fourteenth Louisiana, Colonel Jones, 400 men—and three companies of the Eighth Alabama, 120 men, Lieutenant-Colonel Irby commanding, I moved forward 600 paces across an almost impenetrable abatis, and entered the woods in which the enemy were engaged somewhat to the right of General Wilcox's position. Being on the extreme right of our line, I deemed it prudent to place Lieutenant-Colonel Irby in position to observe the enemy and to intercept any attempt to flank us as we moved forward to the attack. Throwing forward two companies of the Fourteenth Louisiana as skirmishers I pressed on through the wood. Very soon my skirmishers encountered the enemy in force and were driven in; whereupon I deployed the regiment and pushed on at a charge. We were received by so close and overwhelming a fire that we were staggered and embarrassed for a moment, but the regiment speedily rallied, resumed the forward movement, and drove the enemy before us. We pressed on, fighting with intermittent severity for at least a mile from the point at which we originally encountered the enemy. Apprehending lest we might possibly become detached from our line, and by our advanced position be mistaken for the enemy, I determined to halt and hold the ground then in our possession.

Meanwhile I went to bring Lieutenant-Colonel Irby's command. I did this myself, because no other person knew his position, but by reason of our own change of ground I was unable to find him. I returned to the Fourteenth Louisiana, where I was soon joined by Maj. O. K. McLemore, with three companies of the Fourteenth Alabama and 40 men of the Thirty-second Virginia Battalion, under Captain Segar, in the aggregate 150 men. This force took position on the right of the Fourteenth Louisiana. Not long afterward we were again assailed by the enemy with extreme fury and pertinacity, but my command held the ground with admirable courage and tenacity. After a combat of a half hour's duration the enemy desisted from the fight.

At this moment Lieutenant-Colonel Lamar, of the Nineteenth Mississippi, just issuing from a severe but successful struggle, came up with his regiment, and reported that he had been sent to my assistance. Two of his companies I threw forward to my right to arrest a reported flank movement of the enemy; the balance I held in reserve. In this position we remained until 8 p. m., when, in pursuance of instructions from Brigadier-General Pickett, I moved my command from the field.

Of the operations of Lieutenant-Colonel Irby's command I know nothing personally. From reports submitted to me by Captains Phelan and Loughry I learn, however, that Colonel Irby's [command] was carried into action by order of Major [General] Longstreet; that he encountered the enemy in great force; that he fell at the first volley; that imitating his heroic example, his command behaved in the most admirable manner, and that they maintained their ground to the close of the battle.

I regret very much that the detachments from the Eighth and Fourteenth Alabama Regiments and Thirty-second Virginia Battalion fought mainly beyond my observation, because I am thus denied the privilege of signaling to the major-general commanding the many instances of good conduct and courage which they exhibited. I saw enough, however, of Major McLemore's bearing to perceive in him the

qualities of a superb soldier—resource, courage, and coolness, all in the highest degree.

With Colonel Jones I was associated throughout the day, and assuredly a more devoted and more capable officer the service cannot boast. At every moment of the fight he animated his men by a conspicuous display of fidelity to duty and indifference to danger. Lieutenant-Colonel York, of the same regiment (Fourteenth Louisiana), also conducted himself in admirable style.

The fall of the gallant Irby, Eighth Alabama, I lament, not less because of his engaging qualities as a gentleman than by reason of the loss sustained by the country in his death.

Captain Leech and Lieutenant Bradley, of the Fourteenth Louisiana, greatly distinguished themselves.

Captain Wrenn, my assistant adjutant-general, deserves especial mention for the intelligence, alacrity, and courage exhibited in communicating my orders.

In conclusion, captain, I beg to protest that no exclusive compliment is intended in particularizing the foregoing names. I distinguish them because their conduct chanced to fall immediately under my observation.

I owe it to the officers and soldiers of my command to declare that their valor and devotion realized my highest conception of patriotic duty.

I append a list* of casualties, from which it will be seen that out of a force not exceeding 700 men carried into action we left 174 killed and wounded, exclusive of 20, of whom we have no account.

I have the honor to be, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROGER A. PRYOR,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Captain SORREL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 70.

Report of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army, commanding Brigade.

HDQRS. WILCOX'S BRIGADE, LONGSTREET'S DIVISION,
Near Richmond, Va., May 25, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the engagement of the 5th instant, near Williamsburg, Va.:

On the evening of the 3d instant, after dark, that portion of my brigade that was under my command was withdrawn from Wynn's Mill and concentrated at Lebanon Church, where it remained till near daylight the following morning. The march was then resumed along the road leading to Williamsburg, the road being almost impracticable for wagons and artillery, rendered so by recent and unusually heavy rains. The enemy pursued, and slight collisions occurred between our and their cavalry, the last of these in the vicinity of Williamsburg, near 5

* Not found. See No. 61.

p. m., in which the enemy were repulsed with a loss of a few prisoners, some killed, and wounded. The brigade continued its march through and beyond Williamsburg for about one mile and bivouacked at 5.30 p. m.

[At] 7 a. m. on the 5th instant the brigade was counter-marched through the town by order of the division commander, with instructions to report to Brig. Gen. R. H. Anderson, on the line of redoubts; and I was informed that the other brigades were in rear of the redoubts near, and could be called upon for support should it be found necessary. On approaching the line of redoubts the brigade came within range of the enemy's artillery, engaged at the time with the artillery in the second redoubt from the right and about 1,200 yards in front. The enemy had shown themselves early in the morning of the 5th in front of the line of redoubts.

Having reported to General Anderson through one of my staff, orders were received to occupy with my brigade a dense and heavy pine forest to the right of an old field, in which was the enemy's battery, then returning the fire from the redoubts, this forest extending toward and to the James River, on which the enemy's left was supposed to rest. An open field intervened between the line of redoubts and this forest. One of my regiments (the Nineteenth Mississippi, Col. C. H. Mott) was moved forward promptly toward this wood, following a ravine which would both screen it from the enemy's view and protect it from the fire of his artillery. The Ninth and Tenth Alabama [Regiments], Colonels [Samuel] Henry and [J. J.] Woodward, followed in rear some 300 yards. As the Nineteenth Mississippi approached the woods a company of skirmishers deployed to the front, entered it, and without encountering the enemy Colonel Mott halted his regiment after advancing a short distance into the woods. The other regiments were halted in the open field in rear. Colonel Mott was soon directed to move forward his skirmish line, feeling for the enemy. In a few minutes several shots were heard—a slight skirmish ensued, in which three of the enemy were captured; one belonging to the Seventy-second New York, one to the Sixth [New] Jersey, and the other to Second New Jersey.

The Nineteenth Mississippi was ordered forward into the woods, which were so dense that a colonel could not see his entire regiment when in line of battle. After moving forward a short distance the regiment was halted and the other two moved up close in rear, the Tenth Alabama extending in part beyond the right flank and the Ninth Alabama beyond the left flank of Mott's regiment. This movement caused no further development of the enemy's position or strength. The two flank companies of the Nineteenth Mississippi, Captains Macon and Martin, were now thrown forward as skirmishers, with orders to advance as far as practicable, drive in the enemy's skirmishers, and retire only when forced to do so by superior numbers. The skirmish line had penetrated less than 200 yards when they became involved in a brisk skirmish, the enemy's shots wounding men in the regiments in rear. Soon the quantity of fire indicated by its increase that the enemy's line of battle had been encountered.

After a spirited skirmish of some ten or fifteen minutes the two companies retired, having captured a lieutenant and some 10 or 12 men. Captain Macon, the senior of the two captains, was mortally wounded, and to the clear and intelligible report of this officer, while suffering intensely from his wound, is to be attributed much of the credit due for our success during the subsequent part of the day. He reported the enemy's line of battle at about 200 yards distance in our front and nearly parallel with ours; theirs, in part, behind a rail fence, their right

extending beyond our right, and in front of their left low and boggy ground. This report was confirmed by the prisoners captured, the latter also stating that there were three brigades in my immediate front.

Being now fully aware of the proximity of the enemy and of his superior numbers, I dispatched a staff officer at once to Brig. Gen. A. P. Hill, with request to move forward at once. The Tenth Alabama was moved by the right flank, so as to uncover the Nineteenth Mississippi, and then by the left flank into position in line on its right; the Ninth Alabama formed in like manner on its left. A few shots were heard in front of the Tenth Alabama, and report made from that regiment that commands given by the enemy were heard, revealing the fact that his left still extended beyond our right flank. The two left companies of the Ninth Alabama were detached and placed in rear and at right angles with the right of the Tenth, in order to protect this flank. I beg to be excused for entering into details, but am thus particular in giving the dispositions of my force, for it consisted at this time of one entire regiment (Nineteenth Mississippi), eight companies of the Tenth Alabama, and nine of the Ninth Alabama; in all about 1,100 men. One entire regiment (Eleventh Alabama) was absent, and one officer and ten men from each company present detailed to accompany the wagons and to assist them over the difficult parts of the road.

Brig. Gen. R. A. Pryor responded to my message sent to General Hill, and came to my support with two regiments of his brigade. General Hill had not been instructed to come to my support, and referred to General Longstreet. These were formed on the right of my command; the detached companies of the Ninth returned to their regiment.

The order to forward was now given. The line advanced boldly against the enemy, and became almost instantly engaged with the enemy in a close musketry fight. A heavy fire being concentrated on the Tenth, both in its front and from its right flank, it was thrown into some confusion and gave way. It soon reformed, in less than 100 yards, and returned to the attack with cheers.

General Hill reported at this time with his brigade, which was ordered into action, covering Pryor's two regiments and the Tenth Alabama. One of his regiments, First Virginia, Colonel Williams, 195 strong, was placed by myself in position in rear of the Ninth Alabama, with orders to follow and support that regiment and to assist in driving the enemy back. Hill's brigade went into action cheering, and advanced with great boldness. The musketry was more than doubled, and raged furiously. The enemy was made to yield ground rapidly. Brigadier-General Pickett's brigade soon followed and went into line on the right of Hill's brigade. One regiment of this brigade (Twenty-eighth Virginia, Colonel Allen) was placed in position by myself and directed to move forward to support the Nineteenth Mississippi and assist in the attack against the enemy. The musketry was now incessant and heavy, covering our whole front, and continued from this time, 11 a. m., with but little intermission, until near dark.

Being the senior officer present on the field, I gave orders to the different brigades as they arrived and personally directed portions of these into positions. This caused me to be separated during the first part of the advance of my own brigade. Having disposed of the troops as above indicated, during the remainder of the day I had charge of the left of the line, in which were portions of my own, Hill's, and Pickett's brigades, and later in the afternoon other troops sent as re-enforcements. When the advance was first made, as previously stated, the troops became almost at once engaged. The Ninth Alabama encoun-

tered the enemy in position slightly elevated. They pushed forward eagerly over a flat and boggy soil, and after a sharp engagement dislodged the enemy and followed him into the fallen timber beyond. This consisted of large, full-grown pines that had been felled, forming such an entangled mass of logs and brush as to render it difficult to penetrate. This regiment had advanced but a short distance when it entered an open field swept by the artillery from one of our redoubts in rear. The enemy were pursued over the logs and through the brush, every log being used as a breastwork or cover for the enemy. The Nineteenth Mississippi met the enemy compactly formed under cover and in rear of a fence and piled-up logs. This regiment, led by its intrepid colonel, after a few minutes of close musketry, less than 30 yards, charged the enemy, and a stubborn fight ensued, but the enemy were forced to yield, leaving the ground thickly strewn with the dead and wounded. Driven from the fence and piled logs, they attempted to form in rear, but were again forced back, and sought refuge in the fallen timber.

It was directly and close in front of the fence that the gallant Mott fell mortally wounded, being pierced through the breast with a Minie bullet, leading his regiment in the charge with the heroism of a true and veteran soldier.

The Tenth Alabama reformed, as before stated, and pressed on vigorously. Its major, W. H. Forney, was soon stricken down with a painful wound while leading his regiment, displaying both coolness and skill.

The line of march of the regiment was marked by the enemy's dead.

This regiment, after reaching the fallen timber, received orders from General Hill.

The Nineteenth Mississippi, after the fall of its highly-esteemed and brave colonel, was commanded during the remainder of the day by its lieutenant-colonel, L. Q. C. Lamar. This officer, suddenly called to the command of his regiment, acquitted himself creditably throughout this long and stubbornly-contested musketry fight, proving himself in all respects a competent, daring, and skillful officer.

After the enemy had been driven into the fallen timber this regiment, as well as others, refilled their cartridge boxes from those of the enemy's dead. Their knapsacks contained 60 rounds.

The Nineteenth Mississippi was ordered from this part of the field farther to the right by General Hill, and subsequently received orders from General Pryor. The Twenty-eighth Virginia, Colonel Allen, occupied the ground vacated by the Nineteenth Mississippi. The enemy were in the fallen timber in front. The Ninth Alabama had continued to press on after the enemy, forcing him from log to log used by them for cover. It was annoyed by an occasional shot from the battery, whose fire was mostly directed against the redoubt. As it approached nearer the battery grape and canister were showered upon it in rapid volleys. The musketry having almost ceased in front of the Twenty-eighth Virginia, I moved to the front some 70 or 80 yards, and seeing infantry off to the left closely engaged with the enemy in rear of the battery, which had ceased firing, I ordered the Twenty-eighth Virginia forward, and on reaching the battery found that it had been taken by the Ninth Alabama. Some 250 or 300 yards beyond the captured battery was a heavy forest, under cover of which the enemy might drive us from the battery. The Twenty-eighth Virginia and Ninth Alabama were ordered into this wood, and had scarcely entered it when they became engaged in a sharp musketry fight. A message was sent to the

division commander asking that re-enforcements might be sent to the support of these two regiments. It was now near 5 p. m. My request was promptly complied with, and Col. George T. Ward, Second Florida, and Lieutenant-Colonel [John G.] Taylor, Second Mississippi Battalion, both under command of Colonel Ward, were ordered in on the left of the Ninth Alabama. These troops had been engaged but a few minutes when the gifted and chivalric Ward fell, pierced through the breast with a Minie ball.

The Fourth North Carolina, Colonel [George B.] Anderson, and the Third Virginia, Colonel [Joseph] Mayo, reported to me quite late, near dark, and while it was raining violently. They were held in rear, it being near dark, and after dark rejoined their proper commands.

Night closed the contest. On the right we had met the enemy on ground selected by himself in a dense forest some 400 or 500 yards wide. He was driven from this back into the fallen timber over this, and through an open field beyond the Yorktown road, and again into a dense forest. A battery of six rifled pieces was captured, a few prisoners, and many killed and wounded.

The brigade was engaged from 9 a. m. until dark. Did not leave the field until 11 p. m.; reached camp 12.30 a. m., and at 2 a. m. resumed the march in retreat for Richmond. It will be seen that the troops were on duty for fifteen hours, exposed to heavy, drenching rains, and more than half of this time fighting, and mostly close musketry.

The conduct of both officers and men in this their first collision with the enemy was in all respects worthy of commendation, fighting with a courage and spirit that could not fail to inspire the utmost confidence as to our final success in our war for independence.

Among those that call for special notice are the lamented Col. C. H. Mott, Lieut. Col. L. Q. C. Lamar, Captains Macon, [Thomas J.] Hardin, Coffey, and Lieutenants Jones and Lindsay, Nineteenth Mississippi; Lieutenant-Colonel Woodward, Major Forney (left in hospital at Williamsburg with a serious wound), and Lieutenant Shelley, Tenth Alabama; in the Ninth Alabama, Captains Warren, Smith, Gillis, and King. The companies of the first two were the first to enter the captured battery.

Captain Gillis, greatly distinguished for courage, displayed an example of coolness set to his men. He was mortally wounded.

Captain Murphy, of the Ninth, conspicuous for pertinacity and courage, [was] painfully wounded in the arm. He remained in the field, [and] commanded his company until shot through the body and borne from the field.

I am indebted to my staff—Captain Harris, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Reading, aide-de-camp—for services promptly and cheerfully rendered at all times during the battle, their duties taking them frequently under close musketry fire.

The brigade surgeon, Dr. Peel, and the different regimental surgeons were on the field, conveniently located for prompt care and attention to the wounded, and were attentive and skillful in the discharge of their duties.

A list of casualties having been previously forwarded, it will suffice to state that my loss was 231 killed and wounded.

I am, sir, respectfully, &c.,

C. M. WILCOX,
Brigadier-General.

Maj. G. MOXLEY SORREL, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 71.

Report of Col. Samuel Henry, Ninth Alabama Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH ALABAMA REGIMENT,
May 11, 1862.

SIR: I beg leave to submit the following brief summary of facts as my official report for the Ninth Alabama Regiment on May 5, at Williamsburg, Va.:

At between 7 and 8 a. m. we were moved from our camp to the rear of the redoubt on the right of the road leading from Williamsburg to Wynn's Mill, where we remained until near 9 a. m., and were then moved to the edge of the woods on the right of the field, on the right of said road, to support the Nineteenth Mississippi Regiment. We had not been in this position long before a rapid firing commenced on our right and very soon in front of the Nineteenth Mississippi Regiment. The two left companies were now ordered to be sent, so as to support the Tenth Alabama Regiment in case the enemy attempted to turn its flank. Immediately thereafter a rapid fire commenced in front of the Nineteenth Mississippi Regiment, when we were ordered to close on said regiment. We were not long in this position until the two left companies were ordered back to the regiment, when Brigadier-General Wilcox ordered us to move by the left flank, so as to unmask the Nineteenth Mississippi, and then to advance on the enemy's battery. This placed our regiment on the extreme left of the advancing line and in the field between our own and the enemy's batteries. It was now near 11 o'clock, when the regiment was ordered to advance. Major Williams was ordered to the left of the regiment and Adjutant Featherston on the right, with orders to feel for the left of the Nineteenth Mississippi, so that we might act in concert all the time with our advancing lines. This disposition was made because, having no lieutenant-colonel, there were five companies on the left wing and only four on the right, Company F (Capt. T. H. Hobbs) having been detached from the regiment on April 5, at Lee's farm.

The regiment was now ordered to advance, and was very quickly under the enemy's fire, but continued to advance, and soon reached a ravine, where the enemy, from behind his cover, poured a continuous and telling fire into our ranks. Advance now seemed impossible, the cut-down timber being so thick as to form almost a series of breastworks, preventing company officers from advancing their companies in line; but the men had to wind and work their way through as best they could, while the enemy, concealed from our men, using every log as a breastwork, were pouring into them a continuous and galling fire; yet the officers and men displayed great coolness and moved at the command and slowly drove the enemy back. The advance continued almost uninterruptedly and without wavering almost 200 yards, contesting every foot of ground with the enemy in his strong places, our men having to expose themselves all the time to the enemy's fire, while he, in greatly superior numbers, used every log and the fallen timber for protection. The left of the regiment was now near the road, and not more than from 50 to 75 yards from the enemy's nine-gun battery, across the road in the field. We had received no re-enforcements and the regiment had been between four and five hours in the fight, and the original force (333) with which we went into the fight was now much reduced. The enemy seemed here to have made a determined

stand, and made a demonstration as if to turn our left flank, while some of the companies thought an order to fall back was given, which they executed in good order. Seeing this falling back, I at once determined to rally them in the ravine over which we had passed, and accordingly hastened to the ravine, where the companies were rallied and again moved forward. As these companies were advancing, that part of the companies that had not fallen back made a move for the battery, some of them acting with Captain Warren and his company and others with Captain Smith and his company. The rallying companies at the same time made a dashing move for the battery, which was taken in fine style. The Ninth Alabama got into the battery, accompanied by Captain Mullins, of the Nineteenth Mississippi, with part of his company, and very soon thereafter a portion of a Virginia regiment got into the battery. Soon after the taking of the battery our redoubt fired twice into it, when the order was given by one of the captains of this regiment to plant the colors on the battery, whereupon Captain Warren and Lieutenant May each mounted a gun and called for the colors, whereupon Lieutenant Jones, of the Nineteenth Mississippi, mounted the gun and planted the colors over the battery. No time was spent to gather trophies; the enemy was pursued to the woods and the field cleared of his presence.

It was now apprehended, from the enemy's movements in the woods across the road, that he would attempt to retake the battery, and our line was immediately formed. The line was made up of the Ninth Alabama, one small company of the Nineteenth Mississippi, some 15 or 20 men from the Tenth Alabama, and from 100 to 150 men from a Virginia regiment, making from 350 to 400 men.

Brigadier-General Wilcox here ordered the enemy to be charged, the command for which was given the instant the general gave the order. It was about 200 yards across the field to the woods where the enemy was. The charge was made with a zeal and determination that would have done honor to tried veterans, not a man faltering.

After reaching the woods this regiment held its position about one hour, at least half of which time our ammunition was nearly exhausted, and eventually, when our ammunition was quite exhausted, I thought it best to fall back, as the men had been under fire about seven hours and were drenched with rain, which had been falling all day. I now gave the order, and the regiment fell back and was reformed beyond the road, and was then, by Brigadier-General Wilcox's order, marched to the rear. The regiment took during the day some 70 prisoners.

Annexed please find a list of killed, wounded, and missing.*

In concluding this report you will permit me to assure you of the coolness and gallantry of both officers and men during the entire day.

Respectfully submitted.

SAM. HENRY,

Colonel Ninth Alabama Regiment.

Capt. W. A. HARRIS,

A. A. G., General Wilcox's Brigade, Army of the Peninsula.

* Nominal list omitted; recapitulation embodied in No. 61.

No. 72.

Report of Col. J. J. Woodward, Tenth Alabama Infantry, of operations May 4-5.

CAMP TENTH ALABAMA REGIMENT,
Near Long Bridge, Va., May 11, 1862.

On our march from our position near Yorktown to this point we arrived at Williamsburg the evening of the first day, being the 4th instant.

The enemy pursued and showed himself on the morning of the 5th before our line of breastworks in the suburbs of the city by opening with cannon on our batteries. His infantry, which could not be seen by us, was supposed to be in an extensive forest in front of our batteries on the right. To ascertain his whereabouts and strength that portion of the Second Brigade (General Wilcox's command) which was together and with us at the place was ordered out. It was the Nineteenth Mississippi and parts of the Ninth and Tenth Alabama.

About 9 o'clock we arrived near the forest alluded to, General Wilcox attending in person and directing our respective positions. The Nineteenth Mississippi was ordered into the heart of the forest. That fraction of my command (Tenth Alabama) which was present, not more than 320 men, was ordered by the general to the right of, near to, and somewhat to the rear of, the line of direction of the Nineteenth Mississippi. This position was taken certainly within a few minutes after the hour of 9 o'clock. I soon discovered the enemy in considerable force moving toward our right, about 75 to 100 yards from and parallel to a low fence running through the said forest and inclosing part of it with a field, through which we passed in obtaining our position. We were within the inclosure, our right resting nearly on the fence, and our line such as to make the angle between it and the fence in front about 45°.

From our right wing, in consequence of its proximity to the fence, the enemy could be seen distinctly by individuals and small parties wherever the small growth was thin enough to admit of it. Becoming satisfied that the object of the enemy was to turn our flank on the right I wheeled to the right, bringing up my entire command to the fence, and at the same time moved to the right flank, so as to defeat his object if it was to flank us. We were thus confronting the enemy, my right being considerably beyond his left.

We took this position about 10 o'clock and held it for about an hour and a half. Immediately on taking it an irregular, scattering fire ensued along the principal part of my line, which was returned by the enemy.

About 11.30 o'clock General Wilcox ordered my command to be thrown outside of the fences and to press on the enemy. I immediately threw forward my right wing, advanced within full view and short distance (say 50 to 75 yards) of the enemy, and commenced the general engagement.

After firing some (say ten) minutes a man walked up a ravine from our right and in rear of our line, claiming to belong to the Second Louisiana Regiment, saying, "You are firing on your friends." I had been previously apprised that a body of our troops would be thrown into the woods near the ground which my right wing occupied. With a view, therefore, to interrogate this individual and ascertain whether we were firing at our friends from any part of the line I commanded

to cease firing. Immediately upon the cessation of our fire a heavy fire was poured upon us, but without any considerable effect. Instantly the word retreat was heard, and the line commenced retiring. I ordered it to halt and resume its proper front; but from the noise of the tramp through the leaves and woods, which prevented me from being heard or some other cause, the order was not executed, and the retreat continued until the entire line was within the inclosure we had left. Here meeting General Wilcox, the line was halted by him, I being some 50 yards in its rear.

On coming up I again led the command to the ground which it had retreated from, and the general engagement was renewed with great spirit and coolness by both officers and men and with telling effect. We drove the enemy before us from point to point, marking our trace with his dead bodies and baggage until he took refuge behind the mass of brush heaps and logs made by the felling of the forest before our batteries, which covered a large extent and was some 300 or 400 yards from where the engagement commenced.

Here we kept up a brisk fire on him until 2.30 o'clock. The ammunition of many of the men being exhausted, a Virginia regiment, which was in our rear some 50 to 75 yards and not engaged, took our place. We retired and replenished our cartridge boxes from those of the killed of the enemy and then returned again near the scene of action, to give any necessary support or relief to our line.

We remained on the ground until night closed on us. The further prosecution of the battle being impracticable, we retired, and, by order of General Wilcox, returned to our camp at about the hour of 12 o'clock at night, thus closing a period of fifteen to seventeen hours from the time we left camp in the morning, with natures exhausted by a cold and constant rain throughout the entire time, by the fatigues of the battle, by the march in the darkness of the night through mud and water, often half leg deep, and by hunger.

The loss in killed, wounded, and missing will be found in the annexed list.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. J. WOODWARD,

Colonel Tenth Alabama Regiment.

Capt. W. A. HARRIS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 73.

Report of Lieut. Col. L. Q. C. Lamar, Nineteenth Mississippi Infantry.

HDQRS. NINETEENTH REGIMENT MISSISSIPPI VOLS.,

Near Long Bridge, Va., May 13, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command during the action of the 5th instant:

At about 8.30 a. m. Col. C. H. Mott, then commanding our regiment, was ordered by General Wilcox to make a sortie from the second redoubt, on the right of Fort Magruder, through a field into the forest supposed to be occupied by the enemy in large force. Throwing forward Company A, under Captain Macon, as skirmishers, the regiment

* Not found. See No. 61.

was deployed, took position first in the skirt of the woods and afterward, in obedience to the order of General Wilcox, advanced about 150 yards farther up the hill.

Captain Macon was again ordered to deploy his company as skirmishers 50 yards in front, along the whole line of the regiment, from right to left. In the execution of this order he encountered a skirmishing party of the enemy and drove it back, killing several and taking two prisoners.

Company B, under Captain Martin, was ordered to skirmish from the left of the regiment, in concert with Captain Macon—engaging the enemy's skirmishers a second time, and driving them back until they came upon a large force posted behind a rail fence which ran parallel with our line of battle. The two companies at once retired, but not in time to escape the effects of a heavy discharge of musketry, in which Captain Macon was shot through both thighs and two other men wounded.

To the clear and intelligible account of the position and probable force of the enemy, given by this gallant officer while suffering the greatest agony, no small part of our subsequent successes is due. Some ten minutes after these companies were recalled a heavy fire was opened on the Tenth Alabama Regiment, which had been posted to the right. This continued about fifteen or twenty minutes, when I judged from the cheers of our men the enemy were repulsed.

A short time after this firing ceased our regiment received the order of General Wilcox to fix bayonets and drive the enemy from the position in which he had been discovered.

In consequence of the dense undergrowth and uneven ground Colonel Mott had placed the right wing of the regiment under my command, and directed me to operate with it according to my own discretion. At the command of our colonel the men advanced with great spirit and steadiness. A destructive fire was at once opened upon us by the enemy. In the first volley, as I was afterward informed, Colonel Mott fell, shot through the body while cheering on his men. The fight became at once general along our whole line. The men under my command pressed on to the attack with the utmost eagerness and yet with perfect coolness, keeping our line as unbroken as the nature of the ground would allow and firing with deliberation and telling effect. The enemy, partially protected by the fence behind which they were posted, contested the ground most stubbornly. The opposing lines could not have been more than 30 yards apart, and for a time I expected a hand-to-hand conflict with the bayonet; but at last, wavering before the impetuosity and undaunted resolution of our men, the enemy began to yield the ground, continuing to fire as they retired.

Just as we reached the fence above alluded to the [First] Virginia Regiment came upon our right companies, having been sent as reinforcements. They continued with us, two companies fighting in line with my regiment, the others in the rear acting as a support. Passing the fence, where, in evidence of the precision of our fire, the enemy lay slain in large numbers, my men continued to drive the enemy before them until they reached an open place of felled timber, which formed an abatis for the enemy. Being on open ground, I deemed it proper to halt my command in order to connect it with the left wing, so that the unity and organization of the regiment could be preserved and the whole put under the command of its colonel.

The operations of the left wing of the regiment up to this time I cannot report from personal observation, but from Maj. John Mullins and

other reliable sources I learn that the companies of which it was composed moved with the most perfect order in line with the right wing until the first position of the enemy was carried; that here, coming upon the abatis of felled trees, the progress of the extreme left companies was impeded; that owing to a severe fire from their left, supposed by them to have come from our own troops through mistake, they were thrown into some confusion, which was increased by an order to fall back and reform; but that, though to some extent scattered, they fought on eagerly, and the list of their killed and wounded shows them to have been in the thickest of the fight. Captain Mullins, of Company E, with portions of other companies, charged through the intricate network of fallen trees upon the enemy, to our left. The color-sergeant (— Peebles) bore the colors in front, and when shot down still upheld them until Private William P. Meaders took them from his hand. Pierced through the arm by a rifle-ball, he, with his other hand, delivered them to Private John Halloran, of Company C, who had become separated from his own company. Lieutenant Jones then seized them and bore them on until they were triumphantly planted on the enemy's cannon, the taking of which this company shared with the Ninth Alabama Regiment.

Unable to find my left wing, and discovering that troops of other brigades were on both flanks of my command, I ordered it to advance. Our re-enforcements had pressed on and now occupied the front, and were most hotly engaged. I drew up my men within supporting distance, ready to advance and take the front at a moment's notice.

For an hour we were exposed to a galling fire, which was borne with the same firmness that marked the conduct of the men in their first successful attack. Here Captain Coffey, of Company D, received a wound, which, though not dangerous, was painful and disabling. It gives me pleasure to say that during the day this officer's conduct was both gallant and skillful.

While in this position I was joined by Capt. W. G. Martin, of Company B, and learned from him for the first time of the fate of Colonel Mott and the position of our left companies. I directed him to return, for the purpose of collecting these companies and to send them to me. The gallant bearing of this officer, and the valuable assistance rendered me in the management of the regiment, deserves particular notice.

In a short time Lieutenant Norris, in command of Company B; Lieutenant Kimes, in command of a portion of Company G, and Lieutenant Allen, in command of Company K, reported to me. I at once placed their respective commands in their proper position in the regiment, and they performed their duty the remainder of the day with zealous fidelity. I was also joined here by Major Mullins, who reported to me that he had been engaged in reforming the men and sending them forward. While with me, he evinced his entire readiness to perform the duties of his office and to assist me in the management of the regiment. The [First] Regiment, which was on my left and somewhat in front, had now expended its ammunition, and moved from its position by filing to the rear by the right. I threw my regiment forward to the position thus vacated, and applied in person to Brig. Gen. A. P. Hill, commanding (with his brigade) that portion of our line, for permission to hold it with my regiment as a part of his brigade, and received his consent. At this juncture the fire slackened on my new position, but growing exceedingly severe to my right, I was ordered by General Hill to throw my regiment in that direction to support the troops thus hotly engaged. In the execution of this order I encountered Brigadier-General Pryor,

with one of his regiments, very closely engaged with the enemy. General Pryor at once ordered me to throw two of my companies to the right, to arrest an apprehended attack [flank?] movement of the enemy. The remaining portion of the regiment was held in reserve. The enemy here ceased his attack, and in this position I remained until near 8 p. m., when, pursuant to orders, I moved my regiment from the field. From the time the order to advance was given until the conflict terminated this regiment was under fire, and through it all both officers and men bore themselves with an intrepidity which merits the highest commendation.

Where all were so conspicuously brave it is almost invidious to discriminate. First Lieutenant Thomas and Second Lieutenant Lindsay, of Company A, did their duty well and bravely. Captain Vaughan, First Lieutenant Phipps, and Second Lieutenant Burney, of Company F, deserve the highest commendation for the manner in which they handled their company, composed, as it was, in large part of raw recruits. Third Lieutenant Owens, of the same company, though acting commissary of the regiment, joined the company and behaved in the most gallant manner. Lieutenant Key (Company D), when his captain was forced by his wound to leave the field, took command of the company, and acted with coolness and courage throughout. The officers and men of Company H, under Captain McKenzie, fought with resolution and enthusiasm. Its gallant commander received a most painful wound while leading on his men. To Captain Hardin and Lieutenant Barksdale, of Company I, and Capt. N. H. Harris, of Company C, especial praise is due not only for their gallant bearing on the field, but for their unremitting attention to their respective commands. The conduct of their men was admirable. Second Lieutenant Dean and Third Lieutenant Tyson, of Company I, were wounded, fighting bravely at their posts. I would here acknowledge my obligations to Lieut. M. B. Harris, of Company C, for the essential service he did me as acting adjutant of the regiment. I avail myself of this opportunity to express my thanks and the gratitude of the regiment to our surgeon, Dr. Robert H. Peel, assisted by Dr. Amos, of Virginia, for their prompt attention and kind provision for our wounded.

I append herewith a list of the casualties in this regiment, from which it appears that our loss amounts to 100 killed and wounded.* In consequence of heavy details and sickness among our recruits we carried into the field only 501 men.

In conclusion it is proper to state that my active connection with this regiment has been until recently very slight, and justice to the dead requires me to say that the order, spirit, and noble courage exhibited by this regiment are due alone to the efficiency which it had attained under the discipline and influence of its late commanding officer, Col. C. H. Mott. The deep gloom which pervades this command attests the extraordinary hold he had upon the admiration, confidence, and love of his officers and men. This accomplished soldier, model gentleman, and devoted patriot has given his life to his country. No richer contribution, no nobler sacrifice, can ever be laid upon its altar.

I have the honor to be, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. Q. C. LAMAR,

Lieut. Col., Comdg. Nineteenth Regiment Mississippi Vols.

Capt. W. A. HARRIS, A. A. G, *General Wilcox's Brigade.*

* See No. 61.

No. 74.

Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding division, of operations April 6 to May 9.

HEADQUARTERS, January 11, 1863.

MAJOR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill of the battle of Williamsburg. The report is just received. There are many reasons to think that the battle was an important one, and a great deal of the credit of it is due to Major-General Hill and his gallant division.

I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. LONGSTREET,

Lieutenant-General, Commanding Corps.

Maj. W. H. TAYLOR,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report the part taken by my division from the time of leaving the Rapidan until after the battle of Williamsburg:

The division left the Rapidan on April 6, 1862, and the advance brigade (Griffith's) reached Grove's Wharf, on the James, on the 9th. I was immediately assigned to the command of the left wing of the line of defense, extending from below Wynn's Mill to York River, a distance of about 6 miles. After the arrival of my whole command we had but about 15,000 men, extending over a line about 12 miles long. The defenses were of the weakest character, and the radical mistake had been made of leaving the dense timber standing almost within stone's throw of the redoubts. The fire of the Yankee sharpshooters was, therefore, very annoying during the whole siege. No line of intrenchments or rifle pits extended along the banks of the Warwick, and there was consequently no shelter against the superior artillery of the Yankees. Yorktown itself was surrounded by a most defective system of fortifications. The magazines were of the flimsiest character, and the gun which enfiladed one face would give a reverse fire on another. Heavy details were kept at work day and night to remedy the defects, strengthen the intrenchments, and secure shelter for the men.

The Yankee force in our front was enormous, and it has since been ascertained to have amounted to 158,000 men. The cautious leader of this immense host seemed, however, unwilling to risk an assault, though a determined attack of one-third of his force must have been successful. Two abortive attempts to pierce our lines were made. The most formidable of these was at Lee's Mill. It was badly managed by the Yankees and was a bloody repulse. After this McClellan commenced the surer if not more gallant method of the sap. He fell back some distance and began ditching, and waited for his mortars and siege guns.

Major-Generals Smith and Longstreet arrived with their divisions, and General Joseph E. Johnston assumed command. General Magruder was given charge of the right, General Longstreet of the center, General Smith of the reserves, and I of the left, including Yorktown and Gloucester Point.

The gunboats of the Yankees were specially directed to the annoyance of Yorktown and Gloucester Point, but thieves and marauders are always cowardly, and the Yankee pirates seldom ventured within range of our guns, contenting themselves with a distant cannonade. Thousands of shells were thrown in and around these two places, crowded with troops and horses, moving carelessly in all directions, and yet there were but 2 men killed and not a single horse.

Finding that the Yankees were not likely to attack by water, many of the heavy guns were moved from the river banks and placed on the land side. Heavy traverses had to be constructed and bomb-proofs erected, and work of almost every conceivable kind to be done. The weather was wet and cold, and the men were generally without tents. One-third of the men had to be kept in the wet trenches day and night. Fatigue, watching, cold, and wet told on the health of the troops, and the hospitals were soon crowded. The powder was carefully husbanded at first, but learning that the position would be evacuated, I resolved to spend all our heavy ammunition upon the "restorers of the Union." Their working parties were impeded and reconnaissances made hazardous.

The whole line was evacuated on the night of May 3. The better to deceive the Yankees, a furious cannonade was kept up until midnight on the 3d. The infantry abandoned the lines at dark on the 4th, leaving the heavy artillery alone to protect the place. This kept up a storm of shot and shell until midnight, as on the 3d, and then suddenly ceased, and the guns were quietly spiked. The garrison being gone, I left with staff and couriers between 12 and 1 o'clock.

The Yankees had been delayed between five and six weeks by a force on their first landing about one-twentieth as large as their own, and at no time equal to one-third of their own. They had now, however, brought up an immense number of mortars and siege guns and were just ready to open upon Yorktown, and their mortification and regret were very great at our not waiting to be pelted by long-range guns, to which we had nothing to reply.

The evacuation was eminently wise. It deprived the Yankees of their favorite diversion—firing at long range upon an unresisting foe. It enticed them away from their gunboats farther into the interior, where they were soundly thrashed in June and July.

We lost very little by the retreat, save some medical stores, which Surgeon Coffin deserted in his flight on the 1st instant. The heavy guns abandoned were all of the old navy pattern, taken at Norfolk, of little more use than so much cast iron.

We reached Williamsburg, 12 miles from Yorktown, about sunrise on the 4th and rested that day. The Yankee cavalry made its appearance, but after being charged by Hampton remained quiet and civil the balance of the day. General McLaws, however, had some successful skirmishing with the Yankee infantry. All the troops (except Longstreet's division and mine) were moved on to Eltham's Landing, in anticipation of an attempt to cut off our retreat.

My division left Williamsburg on the morning of the 5th, leaving Longstreet holding the earthworks around Williamsburg. The division had waded but a few miles through the mud and slush when the heavy firing in our rear announced that Longstreet was engaged. I soon received an order from him to hurry back to his assistance.

On reaching the ground the Second Florida and Mississippi Battalion were sent to the support of the troops on the right. The brigades of Early, Rains, Featherston, and Rodes, of my division, were placed in

position on the extreme left. General Early held the front line. He soon after reported to General Longstreet in person that there was a Yankee battery in his front on the edge of a woods and asked leave to take it with his brigade. General Longstreet approved of the movement, and directed me to accompany it. Neither Longstreet nor myself knew the precise position of the battery, and both were entirely ignorant of the ground. We, however, agreed in the general plan of getting in rear of the battery by passing through the woods to the left of its supposed position. I reconnoitered the ground as well as I could, but could not distinctly locate the battery by the sound, as it was hid by an intervening woods. I discovered, however, that there was a stream to be crossed, skirted by very dense undergrowth difficult to penetrate, in front of the right wing of Early's brigade.

On my return this brigade was moved forward in line of battle across an open wheat field. General Early took charge of the left wing, consisting of the Twenty-fourth and Thirty-eighth Virginia Regiments, and I took charge of the Twenty-third and Fifth North Carolina Regiments, of the right wing. I directed this wing to halt as soon as the stream was crossed and undergrowth penetrated, to get the whole brigade in line, and sent my adjutant, Major Ratchford, to General Early to know whether he had got over, the thickness of the undergrowth being such that the troops on the left could not be seen. We had not halted five minutes when I heard shouting and firing immediately in our front, and a voice, which I took to be General Early's, above all the uproar, crying, "Follow me." I directed the right wing to move rapidly forward, and went myself in advance of it. I soon discovered a small, open field, with an extensive woods in front of it. All on the right was an open space of many acres, in which was an earthwork occupied by our troops. I could see nothing of General Early or the Yankees. I soon, however, met an aide galloping up from him, stating that General Early was far over on the right in the open field chasing the Yankees; that he was wounded and needed re-enforcements, and had ordered a regiment in the earthwork to his support. At the same moment almost Major [P. J.] Sinclair, of the Fifth North Carolina Regiment, rode up with a message from Colonel [D. K.] McRae, of that regiment, asking permission to join the Twenty-fourth Virginia.

I regretted that our troops had gone into the open field, where the ground was so heavy that they could march with difficulty, and where they were exposed for half a mile to the full sweep of the Yankee artillery; but it was now too late to change the order of things, and there was some hope of success from a direct attack, if made rapidly. I therefore gave a reluctant consent to Colonel McRae, urging him to move forward briskly.

The woods on the left were full of Yankees, and a column moving across the open field would be exposed to a fire in flank. It was necessary, therefore, to clear it of the Yankees. I rode into it, and found there the Thirty-eighth Virginia, huddled up and in considerable confusion. The Yankee shells and balls were falling among them, and their crowded condition was such as to increase the mortality. Line of battle was formed with considerable difficulty, but when formed they were directed to move on through the woods and drive out the Yankees. The Twenty-third North Carolina Regiment had been lost sight of from the moment of being ordered to advance from the creek. It was at length found, halted by a fence. I ordered it to change front, so as to come in on the left of the Thirty-eighth Virginia and sweep the woods. The

regiment was badly drilled, and it took some time to execute this simple maneuver.

The Yankees were now rapidly falling back to an abandoned earthwork on the edge of the woods, several hundred yards from the earthwork from which General Early had ordered a regiment to his support. The Twenty-fourth Virginia and Fifth North Carolina were pressing on vigorously through the heavy ground, exposed to a most murderous fire, but not halting or faltering for a moment. There was but one possible chance of success, and that was to push rapidly forward, under the crest of the hill, the regiment (Sixth South Carolina, I think) which General Early had ordered to his support, so as to gain the flank of the earthwork, while the troops in the woods should gain its rear. I found the South Carolina regiment halted, and in spite of my efforts and those of my staff, together with the active exertions of Captain Early (of the general's staff), the movement was made slowly.

We had gone but a short distance when the Thirty-eighth Virginia joined us, having emerged from the woods contrary to orders. These two regiments moved on, but the attack of the Twenty-fourth Virginia and Fifth North Carolina was made without their co-operation and ended in a bloody repulse.

Colonel McRae lost his lieutenant-colonel, John C. Badham, a gallant and accomplished officer, and one-half of his men. Col. W. R. Terry and Lieut. Col. Peter Hairston, Twenty-fourth Virginia, were severely wounded, and a large proportion of officers and men were struck down. The other regiments were withdrawn to the cover of the woods, where, to my surprise, I found the Twenty-third North Carolina halted. Why this halt was made I never knew.

The turning of the Yankee position was still deemed practicable, but I soon found that the confusion was so great, arising mainly from the want of drill and discipline, that all idea of farther advance was abandoned.

Rains' brigade was brought into the woods and all our wounded removed from it, after which we retired back to the wheat field. It was now fairly dark, and the division remained in line of battle all night, without fire, during a cold and wet rain. The night was one of almost unparalleled suffering. With two divisions McClellan had received such a check that he immediately telegraphed for re-enforcements, stating that "Joe Johnston is before me with an army greater than my own."

Longstreet, on our right, aided by my two regiments, had been completely successful, not only checking, but driving the Yankees, capturing many fine pieces of artillery and taking about 500 prisoners.

On our left we had been less fortunate. We unquestionably lost more men than the Yankees and failed to take their guns, but we drove them back nearly a mile and made an important diversion in favor of our troops on the right, which were at that time sorely pressed. It was afterward ascertained that McClellan was so much alarmed by this movement on our left that he hastened there in person with every available man he could bring up.

The courage exhibited by the Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia made, too, a wonderful impression upon the Yankees, and doubtless much of the caution exhibited in their subsequent movements was due to the terror inspired by the heroism of those noble regiments. History has no example of a more daring charge.

I have always regretted that General Early, carried away by his impetuous and enthusiastic courage, advanced so far into the open

field. Whether he would have succeeded had the other two regiments of his brigade (the Twenty-third North Carolina and Thirty-eighth Virginia) pushed rapidly on must forever remain an undecided question. There was no lack of coolness or zeal upon the part of the commanders of these regiments, but they had so neglected drill and training that the simplest movements were attended with trouble and delay. My division had been remodeled at Yorktown, and I scarcely knew my officers by name. Add to this serious drawback that none of the officers knew the ground nor the position and strength of the Yankees, and that the men were badly drilled and disciplined, it cannot be wonderful that the brigade did not effect all that was expected of it; but it contributed largely to retard McClellan, to demoralize his troops, and to secure our retreat from a vigorous and harassing pursuit. I know but little of what was done by my two regiments sent in on the extreme right.

Colonel Ward, of the Second Florida, a noble, gallant, and accomplished officer, fell there at the head of his regiment. He was greatly beloved by all who knew him, and had won a high reputation for his soldierly bearing.

My division constituted the rear guard on the 6th. Thousands of soldiers had sought shelter from the storm of the night before in barns and outhouses, and it was with the utmost difficulty they could be driven out. Cold, tired, hungry, and jaded, many seemed indifferent alike to life or capture. The roads were in a truly horrible condition. Horses could with difficulty wade through the mud and slush, and to footmen the task seemed almost impossible. The straggling was enormous, but more especially on this the first day after leaving Williamsburg. The Yankee cavalry followed slowly in our rear picking up stragglers, who had too little life and energy to keep up. If they expected to rest by falling back they were miserably deceived, for they were immediately trotted to the rear under Yankee sabers.

Six miles from Williamsburg we encountered a swamp of the most formidable character. Here many wagons and ambulances were found abandoned and had to be destroyed by the rear guard. The Yankee pursuit, rendered very cautious by the battle of the day before, ceased altogether at this point. We were harassed no more on the march by the troops under the immediate command of McClellan. However, as was anticipated by General Johnston, a portion of the Yankee army landed at Eltham's to intercept our retreat. Franklin's whole corps had come up York River.

Hood, with a single brigade, attacked their advance on the 7th and drove them back to their gunboats. Franklin troubled us no more. His experience gained with the Texans had been ample and satisfactory. He desired no more of it.

On the fourth day of our march from Williamsburg we reached Long Bridge, on the Chickahominy, where we halted for some days.

There had been no depots of supplies established in our rear, and the suffering of the men from hunger had been very great on the march. For three days there were no regular issues of rations, and the men subsisted on parched corn and the plunder of the neighborhood. Several thousand had thrown away their arms and straggled off to Richmond, either to procure food or to escape the perils of battle.

The reorganization of the army at Yorktown, under the elective system, had thrown out of service many of our best officers, and had much demoralized our army. The high fighting qualities exhibited by the soldiers subsequently at Seven Pines and the battles around Richmond, notwithstanding these untoward circumstances, are striking proofs of

the favor of Heaven, the justice of our cause, and the indomitable pluck of Southern troops. Our Revolutionary sires did not suffer more at Valley Forge than did our army at Yorktown and in the retreat from it. Notwithstanding the rain, mud, cold, hunger, watching, and fatigue I never heard a murmur or witnessed a single act of insubordination. The want of discipline manifested itself only in straggling, which was and still is the curse of our army. This monstrous evil can only be corrected by a more rigid government and a sterner system of punishment than have yet been introduced into our service.

The list of casualties has been previously submitted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. H. HILL,
Major-General.

Maj. G. MOXLEY SORREL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 75.

Report of Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.

LYNCHBURG, VA., June 9, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of my brigade on Monday, May 5 last, near Williamsburg:

In accordance with orders received the evening before, my brigade was in readiness to take up the line of march from its camp west of Williamsburg toward Richmond at 3 a. m. on the 5th ultimo, but having been detained by the difficulty with which the brigades, with their trains, that preceded it, moved off, about or a little before noon, just as my regiments were formed for the purpose of commencing the march, I was directed by Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill not to move my infantry; and in a short time I was ordered by him to march back and report with my regiments to Major-General Longstreet at Williamsburg, which I did, having with me my brigade proper, consisting of the Fifth North Carolina Regiment, commanded by Col. D. K. McRae; the Twenty-third North Carolina Regiment, commanded by Col. John F. Hoke; the Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment, commanded by Col. William R. Terry, and the Thirty-eighth Virginia Regiment, commanded by Lieut. Col. Powhatan B. Whittle; to which were attached the Second Florida Regiment, commanded by Col. George T. Ward, and the Second Mississippi Battalion, commanded by Lieut. Col. John G. Taylor.

After reporting to Major-General Longstreet my command, by his orders, was halted in the open space in rear of the college buildings, where it remained until some time between 3 and 4 p. m., when I was ordered by General Longstreet to move to the support of Brigadier-General Anderson, of his division, at or near Fort Magruder, and to send a messenger to let him know that I was coming. I immediately put my command in motion, moving as rapidly as the condition of the streets would permit, and sent my aide, Lieut. S. H. Early, to inform General Anderson of the fact. Before reaching Fort Magruder I was met by Lieutenant Early, who informed me that General Anderson was not at the fort, but somewhere to the right, where his troops were engaged with the enemy, and that Brigadier-General Stuart, who was in charge at Fort Magruder, requested that I should send four regiments to the right and two to the left of the fort. Before this movement could

be executed General Longstreet himself overtook me, and directed me to carry the whole of my brigade to a position designated by him, to the left and rear of Fort Magruder, and await further orders. I proceeded in that direction, General Longstreet himself going to the right in the direction of a heavy musketry and artillery firing which was going on. In a few minutes, and before my command had proceeded far toward its destination, I received an order from General Longstreet, through one of his staff officers, to send him two regiments, which I obeyed by sending to him the Second Florida Regiment and the Second Mississippi Battalion, under the command of Colonel Ward, of the Second Florida Regiment. With the remainder of my command, being my brigade proper, I proceeded as near as practicable to the position designated by General Longstreet on the left and rear of Fort Magruder, and formed my regiments in line of battle on the crest of a ridge in a wheat field, and near a barn and some houses, with a wood some 200 or 300 yards in front, in which position we were not in view of any body of the enemy, though we were soon informed by the firing from a battery in or beyond the woods toward Fort Magruder that a portion of the enemy were in our front.

In a short time Major-General Hill arrived, and having ascertained that the enemy had a battery in front of us, he informed me that he wished me to attack and capture the battery with my brigade, but before doing so he must see General Longstreet upon the subject. General Hill and myself, with my aide, Lieutenant Early, then rode to the front to see if what appeared to be a small stream at the edge of the woods would offer any obstacle to the advance of my brigade, and having ascertained that it would not, General Hill went to the right to see General Longstreet, and I proceeded to inform my regiments that they would, upon the return of General Hill, advance to the attack of the enemy's battery and troops in front, and to give them directions as to their conduct. In a short time General Rains' brigade came up and took its position just in rear of and close to my brigade, and some pieces of artillery also came up, which I was proceeding to place in position, but General Hill returned and, after informing me that the attack was to be made, himself posted the artillery so as to cover the retreat of my brigade if it should be compelled to fall back.

As soon as General Hill had completed his dispositions he gave the order to the two regiments on the right to move forward, which I presume was intended for the whole brigade, but the order was not heard by me or the regiments on the left; but seeing the regiments on the right moving and General Hill with them, I ordered the other two regiments to move forward, and the whole brigade was thus put in motion, the Fifth North Carolina Regiment being on the right, next to it the Twenty-third North Carolina, then the Thirty-eighth Virginia, the Twenty-fourth Virginia being on the left. General Hill being on the right and accompanying the brigade, I placed myself on the left with the Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment for the purpose of directing its movements, as I was satisfied from the sound of the enemy's guns that this regiment would come directly on the battery. The brigade advanced through the wheat field and then through a thick woods, about half a mile in all, when it came upon an open field in view of Fort Magruder, at the end of which farthest from the fort the enemy had taken position with a battery of six pieces, since ascertained to be Wheeler's New York battery, and some two or three pieces from another battery called Kennedy's, which were supported by a brigade of infantry, under the command of Brigadier-General Hancock. In this

field were two or three redoubts previously built by our troops, of at least one of which the enemy had possession, his artillery being posted in front of it near some farm houses and supported by a body of infantry, the balance of the infantry being in the redoubt and in the edge of the woods close by. The Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment, as I had anticipated, came directly upon the battery, emerging from the woods over a fence into the field within musket range of the farm houses at which the battery was posted. This regiment, without pausing or wavering, charged upon the enemy under a heavy fire, and drove back his guns and the infantry supporting them to the cover of the redoubt mentioned and of the woods and a fence close by, and continued to advance upon him in the most gallant manner. I looked to the right to see if the other regiments were coming up to the support of the Twenty-fourth, but not observing them doing so, I sent orders for them to advance.

These were anticipated by Colonel McRae, of the Fifth North Carolina Regiment, who was on the extreme right of my brigade, and marched down with his regiment, as soon as it was possible for him to do so, to the support of the Twenty-fourth and the attack of the enemy, traversing the whole front that should have been occupied by the other two regiments.

Having received a very severe wound shortly after the charge made by the Twenty-fourth on the enemy's battery, I became so weak from loss of blood and suffered such excruciating pain that I was unable to direct the operations of the brigade, and was compelled to retire from the field just as the Fifth North Carolina Regiment, under the lead of its gallant colonel, made its charge upon the enemy's artillery and infantry, but its conduct has been reported to me by impartial witnesses. This regiment, in conjunction with the Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment, made an attack upon the vastly-superior forces of the enemy, which for its gallantry is unsurpassed in the annals of warfare. Their conduct was such as to extort from the enemy himself the highest praise; but these regiments were not supported by the other two regiments of the brigade.

The Twenty-third North Carolina Regiment, it seems from the report of its commanding officer, was ordered by General Hill to change its front before it got through the woods, which brought it in rear of the Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment, but it never got out of the woods. The Thirty-eighth Virginia Regiment, it seems, started to obey my order, though it was so late in doing so that before it got fairly under fire the Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia had been ordered by General Hill to retire. Had these two latter regiments been properly supported they would unquestionably have captured the enemy's artillery and routed his infantry. As it was, the enemy was compelled to withdraw the most of his pieces from the field, and these two regiments did not give way, notwithstanding the fearful odds against them, until ordered to retire by General Hill. As a matter of course they suffered severely, their loss being heaviest while falling back.

A number of valuable officers were killed in both regiments. The Fifth North Carolina Regiment lost its lieutenant-colonel, J. C. Badham, a most excellent and gallant officer. It lost also several captains and lieutenants while gallantly performing their duty. The Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment did not suffer so severely in killed, but Captain Jennings and First Lieutenant Radford, two officers of great worth, were killed on the field, and Captain Haden was mortally wounded.

A number of prisoners were taken in these two regiments owing to the fact that in retiring through the woods back to the position from which they had advanced they lost their way and fell into the hands of a body of the enemy that was in the woods.

Returns of the killed and wounded in these two regiments were sent to me, but it has been since ascertained that they are so inaccurate that I forbear to send them, and must refer to the regimental commanders for correct returns.

So well did the officers and men of these two regiments do their duty that it would be invidious to discriminate; but I may be permitted to mention especially the gallant conduct and undaunted courage displayed by the field officers of both regiments: Col. D. K. McRae, Lieut. Col. J. C. Badham, and Major Sinclair, of the Fifth North Carolina, and Col. William R. Terry, Lieut. Col. Peter Hairston, and Maj. Richard L. Maury, of the Twenty-fourth Virginia, all of whom proved themselves eminently worthy of the positions held by them in their regiments. Of these officers, unfortunately, Lieutenant-Colonel Badham was killed on the field and Col. William R. Terry and Lieutenant-Colonel Hairston were severely wounded.

I do not wish to be understood as casting reproach upon the Twenty-third North Carolina and Thirty-eighth Virginia Regiments, both of which have since that time encountered the enemy on another field and suffered heavily.

I have received no report of the part taken by the Second Florida Regiment and the Second Mississippi Battalion, on the right, the only reports to me being lists of the killed and wounded. I have no doubt they performed their duty well.

On the list of killed in the Second Florida Regiment is found the name of its colonel, George T. Ward, as true a gentleman and as gallant a soldier as has drawn his sword in this war, whose conduct under fire it was my fortune to witness on another occasion. His loss to his regiment, to his State, and to the Confederacy cannot be easily compensated.

My regular aide, First Lieut. S. H. Early, and young Mr. John Morrow, of Richmond, a volunteer aide, were both on the field under fire and discharged their duties admirably.

Accompanying this report are copies of reports of some of the regimental commanders.

My own report has been delayed thus long because I have been unable to undergo the labor of writing it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. EARLY,
Brigadier-General, P. A. C. S.

Maj. J. W. RATCHFORD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 76.

Report of Col. D. K. McRae, Fifth North Carolina Infantry, commanding brigade.

HEADQUARTERS EARLY'S BRIGADE,
May 10, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report, under your order, the casual-

ties in the Fifth North Carolina, commanded by me on the 5th in the battle near Williamsburg:

About 3 p. m. my brigade was formed in line of battle, composed of the Fifth North Carolina, on the right; Twenty-third North Carolina (Colonel Hoke) next; the Thirty-eighth Virginia (Lieutenant-Colonel Whittle) next, and Twenty-fourth Virginia (Colonel Terry) on the extreme left, with orders from General Early to ascertain the position and charge a battery of the enemy supposed to be stationed in the woods in our front. After the formation of the line we were moved forward by the direction of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, with instructions to approach the enemy close with trailed arms, without firing, until close upon him.

The line passed down into a marshy ravine and my regiment found itself in a dense undergrowth composed chiefly of pines, which made the advance in line difficult. On the verge of the field beyond I halted and reformed the line and examined for the enemy's battery. Not seeing any indications of his presence, I advanced the line about 100 yards into the field, and as soon as I did so a battery, situated at a distance of 700 to 900 yards on the left opened upon us with shell. I immediately changed the direction of the line so as to face toward this point, and found that this battery was posted in a skirt of woods near a redoubt, around and in which there appeared to be at least a brigade of the enemy. As soon as I made this movement I found that the line was broken, and I could neither see Colonel Hoke, with the Twenty-third North Carolina, nor Lieutenant-Colonel Whittle, with the Thirty-eighth Virginia. The approach to the battery was through an open field of soft earth, without any cover for my troops, and feeling great anxiety, I dispatched my adjutant (Lieutenant McRae) and Maj. P. J. Sinclair to General Hill, with a request to be informed what battery I was to charge. Major Sinclair returned with an answer that I was "to charge the battery which opened on us, and to do it quickly." I immediately put the line in motion, and the men sprang off at a rapid pace.

About this time a regiment, which I found afterward to be the Twenty-fourth Virginia, Colonel Terry, engaged the enemy at some 300 yards to my left, in front, and drove him out of some houses toward his redoubt. Finding the Twenty-third and Thirty-eighth still absent, I saw the necessity of connecting my line with this regiment to support it, and at the same time get the cover of the houses referred to. I ordered my line to advance, obliquing to the left, and when I found my men advancing too rapidly and sufficiently obliquing, I ordered a halt, passed to the front of the line, and urged my men to move less rapidly and to press more sensibly to the left, and, to compose them, I ordered them to lie down. The enemy had now commenced to fire upon us with rifles, which began to be fatal, and this moment I observed Captain Early, General Early's aide, some distance on my left waving me on. I then pushed on. My color-bearer was first struck down, when his comrade seized the flag, who fell immediately. A third took it and shared the same fate; then Capt. Benjamin Robinson, of Company A, who carried it until the staff was shivered to pieces in his hands. Under this fire of grape from the battery and volleys from the infantry the regiment continued to advance until I found a slight shelter of a low fence within 100 yards of the redoubt. The fire was terrific; my men and officers were falling on every side. The Twenty-fourth Virginia, on my left, was suffering in like proportion. I had delivered my first fire at the distance of about 150 yards, and my men were now firing with effect upon a body of the enemy who were retreating into the redoubt.

At this time Colonel Terry fell upon my left; Lieutenant-Colonel Hairston also, and the horse of Major Sinclair had been killed under him. Lieutenant-Colonel Badham fell upon my right, and I found that Major Maury, of the Twenty-fourth Virginia, and myself were the only field officers remaining mounted. I had previously sent my adjutant to General Hill, announcing my loss and the danger of my position, and earnestly begging re-enforcements; but finding my force too small, and the position fatally destructive, I did not wait his return, but ordered my command to fall off down to the cover of the fence, and immediately after I received the order to retreat. The charge upon the battery was not attended by success. I have no doubt it would have been had the Twenty-third North Carolina and the Thirty-eighth Virginia, as originally designated, participated in the assault, for the enemy were so much disconcerted at the persistent advance of the troops that he drew off one or more of his pieces, and his infantry, under the severe fire of the two regiments, hastily sought shelter in and behind the redoubt. How heroically my men and officers endeavored to execute the charge intrusted to them the list of casualties hereto appended will exhibit; and it is a matter of pride to the survivors, as it was to all engaged, to know that their whole conduct was under the direction and immediate observation of their major and brigadier generals, the latter who fell while bravely leading the attack.

All of my officers and men behaved with equal courage, and no discrimination can be made among them. My regiment is now so reduced as to be inefficient. I beg that it may be speedily supplied, and I ask you, general, in calling to the attention of the Department this request, to suggest that my first lieutenants, who are now with me, may be assigned to the companies which have lost their captains by death, wounds, and imprisonment, except in the case of Capt. H. C. Jones, who was wounded, but who escaped, and who, I hope, will soon resume his command.

My adjutant, who was with me throughout the fight, rendered me valuable assistance, and his good conduct did not, I am sure, fail to attract your attention.

I beg to bring to your notice another instance of patriotic action which merits remark—Mr. Nicholson C. Washington, a young gentleman of Saint Louis, who volunteered as a private in my ranks and on this occasion accompanied me as my orderly on the field. He maintained his position by my side and delivered my orders along the line with coolness and precision. I ask your favorable consideration to his claims for a commission.

I was unable to bring off more than 40 of the wounded.

I have the honor to accompany this with a list of casualties in this and other regiments of this brigade.*

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

D. K. McRAE,
Colonel Fifth North Carolina Regiment, Commanding Brigade.

* See No. 61.

No. 77.

Report of Maj. Daniel H. Christie, Twenty-third North Carolina Infantry.

BIVOUAC TWENTY-THIRD REGT. NORTH CAROLINA TROOPS,
May 6, 1862.

COLONEL: By request of Colonel Hoke, who is sick and off duty, I have the honor to hand you the following report of the part taken by the Twenty-third Regiment North Carolina Troops in the battle near Williamsburg on Monday, May 5:

The regiment was marched from its position to the scene of the engagement, and formed nearly opposite where the enemy's right was supposed to rest and on the left of Colonel McRae's (Fifth North Carolina) regiment, occupying the right of the brigade. Having received orders to charge a battery in front, and ordered forward, we moved in brigade battle line, encountering serious obstacles to rapid movement. On reaching an open field, about 400 yards distant, I was directed by General Hill to change direction perpendicular to the former line of march. Leading the regiment by the left flank about 600 yards, I was ordered by General Hill to throw the men in line of battle in this new direction, maintaining which threw the regiment upon the left of the brigade, which involved delay, as the right companies had to be formed into line at a run, as the entire movement was in double-quick time.

I had charge, by direction of Colonel Hoke, from this point, of these new companies forming the left wing, to bring them up and form them upon the right companies, which he was leading. A fence, two ravines, and woods of thick undergrowth, with fallen timber intervening, impeded the progress of the main movement.

Having advanced about 600 yards, the right companies were halted for the left to form upon them. Here we were fired upon by the enemy's pickets, in the woods on our left, covering a considerable force, which was returned with a loss to the enemy of 4 killed and several wounded, involving little injury to us.*

At this juncture the Thirty-eighth and Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiments, who had been ordered to retreat, broke over our lines. Under orders from General Hill we covered the retreat of these regiments, retiring in good order.

The officers and men manifested coolness and determination.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DANL. H. CHRISTIE,
Major, Commanding.

No. 78.

Report of Lieut. Col. Powhatan B. Whittle, Thirty-eighth Virginia Infantry.

CAMP THIRTY-EIGHTH VIRGINIA REGT., May 8, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that about 3 p.m. of the 5th instant this regiment was drawn up in line of battle at a wheat field about 1½ miles north of Williamsburg along with three other regiments of the same brigade, viz, the Twenty-fourth Virginia and Fifth and Twenty-third North Carolina.

* Casualties embodied in No. 61.

About 4 p. m. the whole line was ordered to charge a battery on the extreme right of the enemy. The charge was made through the wheat field and up a steep hill of wood-land beyond, the troops marching in line and at a double-quick. Orders were given to keep our left closed with the Twenty-fourth Virginia, and on our right to keep our right closed with the Twenty-third North Carolina. After marching about 1,200 yards I found that the companies on the left had become detached. Having no guide, and finding no enemy, I marched the remaining seven companies by the left flank in the direction of the sound of the firing, and rejoined the other three companies at our own battery.

Here I received orders, through the aide of General Early, to march on the battery. I marched through the open field under a heavy fire of the enemy, which was returned by a portion of the regiment. Having proceeded about 250 yards at a double-quick, and having formed in line of battle under the fire of the enemy, orders were received from General Hill to retire to the woods, about 100 yards distant, which was done, the regiment reforming in the woods. Orders were then received from General Hill to retire to my first position in the wheat field, which were promptly obeyed.

The officers and men of my command were much exhausted by marching at double-quick in line of battle over so great a distance, up hill and through thick undergrowth, but behaved throughout with the greatest coolness and gallantry.*

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

POWHATAN B. WHITTLE,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Thirty-eighth Virginia Regiment.

Captain ———, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Indorsement.]

———, ———, 1862.

There is a mistake in this report in stating that the brigade was moved to the attack in double-quick time. This regiment, having fallen behind in marching through the wheat field, was ordered to double-quick until it got up with the other regiments, it being then about 50 yards behind.

J. A. EARLY,
Brigadier-General.

MAY 7, 1862.—Engagement at West Point (Barhamsville), or Eltham's Landing, Va.

REPORTS, ETC.

- No. 1.—Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. Army, commanding division.
- No. 2.—Return of Casualties in Union forces.
- No. 3.—Capt. Richard Arnold, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery.
- No. 4.—Capt. Josiah Porter, Battery A, Massachusetts Light Artillery.
- No. 5.—Capt. William Hexamer, Battery A, New Jersey Light Artillery.
- No. 6.—Lieut. Emory Upton, Fifth U. S. Artillery, commanding Battery D, Second U. S. Artillery.

* List of casualties omitted above is embodied in No. 61.

- No. 7.—Brig. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
 No. 8.—Brig. Gen. John Newton, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.
 No. 9.—Col. John M. Gosline, Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Infantry.
 No. 10.—Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith, C. S. Army, commanding Reserve.
 No. 11.—Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting, C. S. Army, commanding First Division.
 No. 12.—Brig. Gen. John B. Hood, C. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.
 No. 13.—Col. Wade Hampton, Hampton (S. C.) Legion, commanding Second Brigade.

No. 1.

Reports of Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. Army, commanding division.

HEADQUARTERS FRANKLIN'S DIVISION,
At Brick House, May 7, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that this morning, about 7 o'clock, our pickets were driven in on our left flank, and that after skirmishing for about two hours the action became quite sharp at the right extremity of that flank. Our reserves were driven in several times, but returned to their positions each time with ardor. Finally we held the position which we had taken in the morning, and at several points of the line advanced our positions. Wherever we advanced the enemy was found in rifle pits. The day has been a success, and but for the extreme want of forage and provisions, owing to the deficiency of transportation and the difficulty of landing, we might have followed it up. As it is, I congratulate myself that we have maintained our position.

General Newton's command was most severely engaged, and his conduct and that of General Slocum, who has charge, respectively, of the right and left wings, was admirable.

All of the officers and men behaved admirably, and with transportation and forage we could move on to-morrow. I respectfully request that instructions may be given to send up forage and transportation immediately, as we are entirely tied down for want of them.

General Sedgwick's infantry has arrived. The killed and wounded amount to nearly 100. A more detailed report will be given as soon as possible.

Very respectfully,

W. B. FRANKLIN,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

General R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS OF DIVISION,
White House, Va., May 17, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the landing of my division on York River near West Point on the 6th instant, and of the action with the enemy near the point of disembarkation on the 7th instant:

In obedience to the orders of the general-in-chief the division left Cheeseman's Creek, Poquosin River, during the night of the 4th and morning of the 5th instant, using for the infantry and a portion of the cavalry the transportation which had brought them from Alexandria, and for the artillery canal-boats fastened together in pairs, decked over so as to serve as wharves, and a few barges and schooners.

The whole flotilla arrived at Yorktown on the 5th instant, and, with the exception of the cavalry and wagons, started from that place early on the morning of the 6th instant. I arrived at the point designated for the landing at 3 p. m., the artillery arriving, however, at 5 p. m. The landing commenced as soon as a reconnaissance of the shore was finished, and the infantry was all landed, under the brigade commanders, by 2 a. m., and the artillery under the superintendence of Capt. Richard Arnold, Fifth Artillery, chief of artillery of the division, was ready for action by 10 a. m. on the 7th instant, the greater part of it having been landed by midnight.

My ignorance of the topography of the place of landing, and the fact that the enemy's cavalry and infantry were seen in the woods surrounding the plain upon which we landed as soon as the landing began, convinced me that something was to be feared from the enemy in the morning. During the night one of our pickets and one of the enemy's were killed and 2 prisoners were taken by our pickets. From these we learned that the enemy was in large force in our front, and that we were to be attacked in the morning. Extraordinary precautions were taken during the night to prevent the success of an attack. The roads approaching the landing were obstructed by felled trees, the vigilance of the sentinels was redoubled, the wood surrounding the plain upon which the landing was made was thoroughly watched by pickets which were posted by Colonel Bartlett, Twenty-seventh New York Regiment, general officer of the day, and to their watchfulness and efficiency our success of the next day is to a great extent due.

About 7 o'clock a. m. on the 7th instant General Newton and myself made a reconnaissance of the position on foot, which convinced us that our right and left flanks and front were protected by creeks, and that the only dangerous point of the position was a space about 200 yards wide at the right of the left flank. Through this space the road from the interior entered the open plain, flanked on both sides by a thick wood. There is a dam in front of our position over which infantry might pass, but it was well protected by a strong picket.

Reconnaissances were sent out in all directions to obtain as accurate a knowledge of the country as possible, and nothing was heard from the enemy until about 9 o'clock in the morning. Then firing between the pickets in the vicinity of the road entering the plain from the interior commenced, and increased in violence until the action became severe, between 10 and 11 o'clock. Between 7 and 9 o'clock General Newton's brigade had been ordered to take position to guard the road and its *débouché* from the wood.

I had been to the fleet, endeavoring to expedite the departure of the transports which had brought us up, when the firing commenced, and I did not hear of it until signaled by General Slocum, between 10 and 11 o'clock. I immediately went ashore, and found that the arrangements which had already been made were ample to repel any force which the enemy could bring against us. Newton's brigade, consisting of the Eighteenth, Thirty-first, and Thirty-second New York and the Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania, was holding the wood and road under a severe musketry fire. This brigade was supported on the left by part of Taylor's brigade, consisting of the Third and Fourth New Jersey Regiments, and by the Fifth Maine Regiment, of Slocum's brigade. In its rear were Hexamer's New Jersey and Upton's regular batteries, under command of Captain Platt, Second Artillery. They were supported by five companies of the Sixteenth New York Regiment, under Colonel Howland. The remainder of Taylor's brigade, the First and Second

New Jersey Regiments, supported the batteries, and at the same time were in reserve to repel any attacks upon the approach by the dam.

On the left Dana's brigade, of Sedgwick's division, which had that morning landed, was posted, with Porter's Massachusetts battery on its left, resting upon the river. Captain Wilson's New York battery, of four guns, was held in reserve in the center. The Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania Regiment, Colonel Cake, was placed in front on the left. The Twenty-seventh New York Regiment, Colonel Bartlett, was on picket during the night of the 6th. Three companies helped to commence the contest on the next day. They behaved well, and Captain Jay, of that regiment, was distinguished for his good conduct and good sense. The other seven companies of this regiment supported Wilson's battery during the day. Two companies of the Sixteenth New York Regiment were in the commencement of the engagement, and behaved well. Captain Curtis, in command of one of them, was severely wounded. These two and the remaining three companies of this regiment supported Wilson's battery.

At the beginning of the action the pickets were driven in upon their supports, which held their ground well, falling back steadily when necessary without confusion. Two regiments, the Thirty-second New York and a portion of the Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, were thrown into the woods to support the reserves, and after a hard fight were driven in good order to the edge of the wood.

The line was then formed with six companies of the Eighteenth New York Regiment, under command of Colonel Young, the Fifth Maine Volunteers, under Colonel Jackson, the Thirty-first New York Volunteers, under Col. C. E. Pratt, and was afterward re-enforced by six companies of the First and four of the Second New Jersey Regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel McAllister, First New Jersey Regiment. With this force, after a sharp contest, the position of the morning was soon recovered, and by 3 o'clock p. m. the line was considerably advanced in front of its first position.

At this time the action had virtually ceased. The enemy had placed a battery of three pieces on the river on our extreme left. This fired a few shots at our transports and gunboats, but a few shots from the latter soon quieted it. No other attack was made. At 5 o'clock I placed the troops of Colonel Taylor's brigade, consisting of four New Jersey regiments, in the position held by the four regiments previously engaged, with orders to find out during the night the position of the enemy, and if possible to push farther to the front. He performed his work well, though without an engagement, and occupied a position 2 miles in advance early next morning. By means of the signals the gunboats were requested to shell the woods on our left, and did very efficient service, making some very effective shots at a distance of more than 2 miles.

The artillery had but little opportunity for firing, but its presence was what saved us from an overwhelming attack by superior numbers. The energy shown by Captain Arnold in getting it first upon the transports at Cheeseman's Creek and then building his wharves and getting it all landed between 5 o'clock in the evening and 10 o'clock of the next morning is worthy of the highest commendation. Captain Arnold was also very efficient during the day in placing the batteries.

I recommend to your favorable consideration Col. C. E. Pratt and Col. R. Matheson, of the Thirty-first and Thirty-second New York Regiments. Their regiments lost heavily, and were handled with great judgment and skill by their colonels.

I respectfully refer you to Brigadier-General Newton's report for the names of others engaged who particularly distinguished themselves.

Generals Slocum and Newton commanded the left and right wings respectively, and both showed superior skill in placing troops on the field; and General Newton, who had the good fortune to have his brigade in action, showed also great judgment in handling his regiments under fire.

The arrangements for the care of the wounded were made under direction of Brigade Surgeon Hamilton, acting medical director of the division, and were admirable. No wounded man suffered from want of any attention that it was possible to afford him, and all had their wounds dressed immediately after they were brought in.

I regret that our loss was so heavy, but it is no larger than might have been anticipated, considering the severity of the attack and the numbers engaged on both sides. The number of officers killed and wounded is uncommonly large, and the small number of wounded in proportion to the number killed leads to the inference that the few that are missing are wounded and in the hands of the enemy.

I have been informed by Acting Brigade Surgeon Oakley that he saw one of our dead who had had his throat cut by one of the enemy. No comment is necessary.

I inclose a list of the killed, wounded, and missing, which is as complete as it can be made at present.*

As the action was confined to a comparatively small part of the division, it is only justice to the whole division to say that their conduct was admirable during the whole day. Those who were not engaged were ready and anxious to be called into action, though it was generally supposed that the force which engaged us was far superior to that which it was in our power to bring against it.

The services of all my staff were rendered well and efficiently. The only one who ran any extraordinary risk was Capt. J. P. Baker, First Cavalry, aide-de-camp, who afterward, by his presence of mind in directing the fire of the guns of Lieutenant Upton's battery at a critical moment, was the means of saving the life, or at least the liberty, of Captain Montgomery, General Newton's assistant adjutant-general.

Very respectfully, yours,

W. B. FRANKLIN,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

* See No. 2.

No. 2.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
5th Maine		1		2			3
1st New Jersey				3			3
16th New York		5	1	7			13
31st New York	4	19	2	31		27	83
32d New York	3	9	2	53			67
95th Pennsylvania		7	1	7		1	16
New Jersey Light Artillery, Battery A.				1			1
Total	7	41	6	104		28	186

No. 3.

Report of Capt. Richard Arnold, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery.

CUMBERLAND, VA., May 13, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of the artillery brigade, of General Franklin's division, from Sunday, the 4th instant, up to the disembarkation at the head of York River, opposite West Point, as well as the part it performed during the action which took place on the 7th instant:

An order was received at 10 o'clock a. m. on the 4th instant to embark the artillery at Poquosin River for Yorktown. This was accomplished, and the fleet was in motion at 12 o'clock on the following day, arriving opposite Yorktown at dusk. Here we remained until the following morning, when, by General Franklin's order, we steamed for West Point, arriving at about 5 p. m. The place for disembarkation being designated, the steamer Boardman, towing the principal part of the artillery and the pontoon train, moved successfully, without obstructions or detention, directly to the shore, where wharves of canal-boats were speedily placed, and three batteries were run on shore at 10 p. m. At 10 a. m. the next morning all the batteries of the division complete were landed. So from 6 o'clock p. m. of one day to 10 a. m. of the next four complete batteries were transferred to an unknown shore on wharves of our own arrangement and ready for immediate action.

During the night of the 6th rumors were in circulation that an attack would be made in the morning by the enemy. About 9 o'clock a. m. the pickets were seriously engaged, and Company D, Second Artillery, under Lieut. E. Upton, Fifth Artillery, and the First New Jersey Battery, under Captain Hexamer, all commanded by Capt. E. R. Platt, Second Artillery, were ordered to report to and were placed in position by General Newton. Captain Wilson, First New York Battery [F, First New York Light Artillery], was ordered to report to General Slocum, and was placed in the center. Capt. J. Porter, First Massachusetts Battery, finished the disembarkation about 10 a. m., when it was attached to General Dana's brigade and placed on the left, resting on the

river. The engagement was almost exclusively confined to the infantry, carried on in dense woods; but the service rendered by Captain Hexamer when the enemy appeared on the border of the woods, and the accurate firing of shell from the battery commanded by Lieutenant Upton, which resulted in routing a portion of the Hampton Legion and releasing Capt. J. E. Montgomery, assistant adjutant-general to General Newton, who had been taken prisoner by them a few minutes before, contributed greatly to the repulse of the enemy, and gave all our troops on this flank increased confidence.

All the batteries except Captain Wilson's, which was placed partly in reserve, fired during the day, and from the most reliable authority I believe with accuracy and good execution. All the artillery fire was delivered over the heads of our men, and in no instance was there any wavering or falling back, notwithstanding some of the shells, owing to defective fuses, burst in their midst. The conduct of the men in this particular was worthy of veteran troops. I saw enough to feel assured that when the opportunity offers the artillery will do credit to the infantry of the division, whose steadiness under severe fire and against superior numbers was so signally attested in this their first engagement.

I cannot close this report without acknowledging the untiring zeal of Capt. Jeff. Parks, of the steamer Boardman, and Captain Perry, of the Fifteenth New York Volunteer Engineers, assigned to duty with me from the time of the embarkation at Poquosin River to the landing near West Point.

The following is the only casualty during the day: Private Stehwein, First New Jersey Battery, seriously wounded in the arm.

For the detailed operations of each battery, as called for by circular from chief of artillery, I would respectfully refer you to the inclosed copies of reports of their respective commanders.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

RICHARD ARNOLD,

Captain, Fifth Artillery, Commanding Artillery Brigade.

Capt. E. SPARROW PURDY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 4.

Report of Capt. Josiah Porter, Battery A, Massachusetts Light Artillery.

CAMP NEWTON, VA., May 9, 1862.

SIR: In accordance with the circular issued from the office of the chief of artillery I have the honor to make the following report of the part which my battery (A, Massachusetts Artillery) took in the affair of the 7th instant:

The battery was put into position between 9 and 10 o'clock a. m., according to your direction, on the extreme left of our lines, about 600 yards from the woods in front, the left resting on the river. Not long after, and before any firing on the part of the artillery, by order of Brigadier-General Slocum, four guns (three 10-pounder Parrotts and one 12-pounder howitzer) were put in battery about 400 yards farther to the right. No other change of position was made during the day. In the course of the forenoon, by direction of Brigadier-General Slocum, several shells were thrown from the Parrott guns over the woods in front, at ranges of 2,600, 3,000, and 3,600 yards.

Early in the afternoon the enemy opened with shell from a battery concealed in the woods opposite our left. We responded immediately with shell from our Parrotts, and it is believed with effect, for their firing soon ceased and was not recommenced during the day. The firing from the Parrott guns of the left section, which was much the nearest to the supposed position of the enemy's battery, was at an elevation of $7\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$, with 6-second fuses. The enemy threw seven shells in all. Most of them passed over or near our left and burst among the shipping in the river, a piece of one striking the smoke-stack of a steamer. Two exploded within 40 yards of our left section. Later in the afternoon several shells were thrown from our Parrott guns at long ranges in a direction indicated by Brigadier-General Slocum.

About 5 o'clock p. m. a company of cavalry was seen to pass across the open space near the White House on the farther side of the creek or bend in the river on our left. By order of Brigadier-General Dana, who was present with the left section, Lieutenant Sleeper commenced firing immediately with his Parrott gun at an estimated distance of 2,300 yards; elevation, $5\frac{3}{4}^{\circ}$ and 6° ; 7-second and 8-second fuses burst short. A 10-second fuse with 6° elevation exploded precisely as desired. Of the effect or success of the long-range firing nothing is known except by reports that cannot be relied upon. The woods, which so effectually screened the enemy, prevented us from seeing where our shells fell or exploded. Owing to the noise of the musketry in the woods and the artillery on our right the bursting of the shells could not always be heard.

The amount of ammunition expended during the day is as follows: 34 rounds 10-pounder Parrott shells; 3 rounds 10-pounder Parrott case-shot.

It should be remarked that 6 out of 34 rounds of shell, with 7, 8, and 10 second fuses, exploded within 20 yards of the pieces from which they were fired. It was thought that this might be attributed to the fuses setting too loosely in the wooden fuse plugs of the shells. Accordingly we fired and successfully threw case-shot, which have metallic fuse plugs. The fuses can be made to fit more tightly in the metallic plugs than the wooden ones.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSIAH PORTER,

Captain Battery A, Massachusetts Artillery.

Capt. RICHARD ARNOLD, *Comdg. Artillery Brig.; Franklin's Div.*

No. 5.

Report of Capt. William Hexamer, Battery A, New Jersey Light Artillery.

WEST POINT LANDING, May 9, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with an order from headquarters of the chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac, dated April 22, 1862, I submit to you the following report concerning the action at West Point Landing on the 7th instant:

At 9.30 o'clock a. m. I received an order from General Newton to place one section of my battery a short distance opposite the woods near the landing, which order was complied with, the left section (howitzers) performing the duty. Soon afterward I was ordered to

bring my right and center sections to the right of the line of battle formed by General Franklin's division.

Upon my arrival upon the designated ground skirmishing between our troops and the enemy had already begun in the woods directly in front. General Newton ordered me not to commence firing until the enemy would show himself outside the woods, which was done at 12 o'clock by the Fifth Alabama Regiment, they firing on my battery with rifles, wounding one of my cannoneers badly. I then opened fire with my 10-pounder Parrotts and threw five spherical case-shot with $1\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ of elevation and with $1\frac{1}{2}$ -second fuses, which caused the retreat of the Alabama troops. I then commenced shelling the woods in the direction where I knew the enemy to be located, judging from the smoke arising from the discharged muskets, until the firing of the infantry in the woods in front of us ceased entirely.

We have fired five spherical shots on $1\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ elevation and $1\frac{1}{2}$ -second fuses, and twenty shells with 5° elevation and 6-second fuses, and fourteen shells with 7° elevation by 8-second fuses. The fuses used were the paper fuses and the shot exploded very correctly, except from one piece, in which four shells exploded successively soon after leaving the muzzle, notwithstanding the fuse was cut very carefully and under my special supervision.

The effect of our fire upon the enemy must have been good, judging from their speedy retreat and the reports of some of the men of our division, who were following up the enemy in the woods.

I only have to add that my men behaved well on this occasion, and executed all movements quite as steadily as on the drill ground.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. HEXAMER,

Captain, Commanding Battery A, New Jersey Artillery.

Capt. E. R. PLATT, *Chief of Artillery, General Franklin's Div.*

No. 6.

Report of Lieut. Emory Upton, Fifth U. S. Artillery, commanding Battery D, Second U. S. Artillery.

BATTERY D, SECOND ARTILLERY,
Near West Point, Va., May 10, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this battery in the action near West Point, Va., May 7, 1862:

The battery was ordered to embark at Ship Point on Sunday, the 4th instant, and arrived off West Point the evening of the 6th. Preparations were immediately made to disembark, and at dawn on the 7th the battery was in park ready for action. At 9 a. m. the enemy's column were reported moving on our left; the horses were hitched in, and I reported the battery ready to Captain Platt. Orders were received to move at 10 a. m. The battery occupied several positions in reserve, but was not engaged until about 12 m., when, under the orders of Captain Platt, it took position in the center of a large field, on a point commanding the approach of the enemy, and at a distance of about 1,400 yards from the woods which the enemy was occupying. One round of shell was fired by Captain Platt's orders. The fuses were cut at five seconds. The first shell burst in the edge of the woods, but all the

others burst far short of their mark. Two of the shells exploded at a distance not greater than 900 yards from the guns and very near to Hexamer's battery, which was in front and slightly on our left.

Not being able to rely upon the fuses a round of solid shot was fired, all of which was seen to enter near the edge of the woods. The firing was then ceased and the battery took up an advanced position on the right and in line with Hexamer, about 600 yards from the woods. Five spherical case were fired from this position, when the enemy retired. The battery was hitched up all night, but no further demonstration was made. There were no casualties in the battery. The firing has been reported as very accurate by those of our infantry who were in the engagement and witnessed the effect. Too great praise cannot be accorded to Captain Arnold, through whose untiring exertions the artillery was disembarked and enabled to participate in the action.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EMORY UPTON,

First Lieutenant, Fifth Artillery, Commanding Company.

Brig. Gen. W. F. BARRY,

Chief of Artillery.

No. 7.

Report of Brig. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE,
Near West Point, Va., May 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in the engagement which occurred to-day I was in command of the center and left wing of our forces. It was apparent soon after the commencement of the engagement that the efforts of the enemy were to be directed mainly against our right wing, and at the request of General Newton I sent re-enforcements to him, consisting of the Fifth Maine Volunteers, the Sixteenth and Twenty-seventh New York Volunteers, which are attached to the brigade under my command. The brigade of General Dana and the Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, of my brigade, were retained on the left.

All of our troops, so far as my observation extended, behaved with great coolness and bravery. The First Massachusetts Battery, under command of Captain Porter, is entitled to great credit for the accuracy of its fire.

I am greatly indebted to Capt. H. C. Rodgers, Captain Hopkins, Captain Sturdevant, and Lieutenants Wead and Shannon, members of my staff, all of whom were actively engaged during the entire day; also to Lieutenant Harbert, Fourth New Jersey Volunteers, and Lieutenant Landon, adjutant Seventh Michigan Volunteers, who volunteered their services as staff officers, and proved of great assistance to me.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. SLOCUM,

Brigadier-General Volunteers.

Capt. E. SPARROW PURDY,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 8.

Report of Brig. Gen. John Newton, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,
West Point, Va., May 8, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the result of the action with the enemy on the 7th instant:

Early on the morning of that day, the division having landed at this place the night previous, I made, as far as time permitted, an examination of the ground upon which we had landed, and aided by information obtained from Captain Jay, of the Twenty-seventh New York Volunteers, whose gallant conduct during the day deserves honorable mention, I became satisfied that the map of the locality furnished us was entirely incorrect in a military point of view, in consequence of which it became necessary to change the location of my brigade to the right of the position, which, with the approval of the general commanding the division, was done at once.

A little before 9 a. m. the pickets commenced firing on the front of the right of our position, and I immediately directed Captain Hexamer's battery to harness up and proceed to that point. Pickets then signaled the enemy approaching in large force, with cavalry and artillery, upon the right, which was occupied by my brigade. I immediately disposed of the infantry and Captain Hexamer's battery so as to prevent the debouch of the enemy's cavalry and artillery upon the plain occupied by our forces. In the mean time the firing of musketry in front became very quick and rapid and in heavy volleys, indicating the presence of a large force before us. After a gallant and obstinate resistance our pickets and several reconnoitering parties which had been sent out were driven in by overwhelming forces. The pickets fell back in good order, and, being re-enforced by two regiments, were again sent forward. By 11 a. m. the force of the enemy engaged had become so great that my men were forced back to the edge of the woods, retiring slowly and in excellent order.

Being now satisfied that the attack was made by the enemy with serious intentions and in full force, I threw into the woods in front of the right four regiments, with directions to feel the enemy and maintain their ground at all hazards. I am happy to say that this was effected, and that for three hours, until 3 p. m., when the action terminated, my position was firmly held, when the enemy slowly retired.

My object from the commencement was to hold the woods in front of the right, through which the only practicable road to our position passed, and to prevent the enemy deploying his cavalry and artillery upon the clear space; and in this, owing to the steadiness of the infantry of the division and the skill and efficiency of the batteries of artillery, under the command of Captain Hexamer and Lieutenant Upton, I was successful.

General Slocum, who commanded the left and center of the division, generously furnished me with all the assistance I required, the enemy not having seriously attempted his position. The troops engaged on our side were the Thirty-first and Thirty-second New York Volunteers, six companies of the Eighteenth New York, three companies of the Sixteenth New York Volunteers, three companies of the Twenty-seventh New York Volunteers, the Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, six companies of the First Jersey, and the Fifth Maine Volunteers.

All the troops engaged behaved with great steadiness, and I will only particularize the Thirty-first New York Volunteers, Col. Calvin E. Pratt, and the Thirty-second New York, Col. Roderick Matheson, who suffered the severest losses. The Thirty-first charged the enemy in the woods and drove them before them until they gained an advantageous position, which, supported by the First New Jersey, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel McAllister, they heroically maintained until the end of the action against greatly superior numbers of the enemy. The Thirty-second New York made a brilliant advance, driving superior forces with the bayonet for a considerable distance through the woods, until their progress was arrested by the enemy's reserves and a battery of artillery, when they retired slowly and in good order to their position. I may add that the Eighteenth New York, Col. W. H. Young, advanced firmly upon the enemy, received several volleys at close range, and, singular to state, without losing a man or without firing a shot in return. The steady advance of this regiment on my left, supported by the Fifth Maine, Colonel Jackson, was of great service. The Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Gosline commanding, behaved very well, bringing on the action with the enemy and keeping him well occupied.

Our loss in the action was 200 killed, wounded, and missing; that of the enemy I have no means of ascertaining. I am under great obligations to Col. A. T. A. Torbert, of the First New Jersey, general officer of the day, for re-enforcements which he brought up from time to time during the day, and to Captain Platt, who commanded the battalion of artillery engaged, for his efficient services.

I regret to add a long list of killed and wounded amongst the officers engaged. Captain Heiss, of the Thirty-first New York, with a single company in front of a regiment of the enemy, disdaining to retire, was killed, whilst his two lieutenants, Klein and Schickhardt, were wounded, the former mortally and the latter severely. Of this one company all the non-commissioned officers save 1 were killed, and 40 privates killed and wounded, evincing a degree of heroism which is worthy of all praise.

Captain Fuller, of the same regiment, who was intrusted with the duty of protecting the left flank, repulsed with great loss three companies of the enemy who made that attempt, in which service Lieutenant Babcock, of his company, was mortally wounded. Captain Fuller speaks in the highest terms of this lamented officer, and of his second lieutenant, A. E. King. Lieutenant Pross, of same regiment, was killed, and Lieutenant Frossard badly wounded, whilst advancing boldly upon the enemy. Captain Sloan, of same regiment, deserves the highest mention for his bravery, coolness, and judgment during the action.

Of the Thirty-second New York Captains Young and Brown and Lieutenant Wallace were killed whilst urging their men forward against overwhelming forces. Colonel Matheson, commanding this regiment, speaks in the most exalted terms of the gallantry displayed by these lamented officers, and also of Lieutenants Twaddell and Stone, who were severely wounded whilst leading their commands against the enemy.

Captain Curtis, of the Sixteenth New York, whilst bravely leading two companies in a charge, was shot in the left breast and severely wounded.

Captain Beattes, of the Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, was severely wounded in the shoulder whilst performing his duty.

Many instances of heroism amongst the officers and men have been brought to my notice, but where they are so numerous the report must be necessarily incomplete.

I cannot close this report without making honorable mention of the gallantry and efficiency of my staff, Capt. James E. Montgomery, assistant adjutant-general; Lieuts. Samuel W. Waldron, jr., and William Russell, jr., aides-de-camp, and Capt. James K. Seofield, commissary, who were actively employed during the day in transmitting my orders through the heaviest fire.

Captain Montgomery, in transmitting orders, had his horse shot under him and was made prisoner by the Hampton Legion, from whom he afterward escaped.

The enemy committed inhuman barbarities upon some of the wounded. One was found with his throat cut, and another bore the marks of eight bayonet stabs in his body.

I have no means of ascertaining correctly the force of the enemy. We know, however, that it was at least General Whiting's division, including the Hampton Legion. Besides this a large body of the enemy, at least 20,000 strong, were supporting the attacking force.

The attack which they made was evidently with a view to prevent the division molesting their line of retreat from Williamsburg to Richmond, and to drive us into the river if they obtained the advantage.

The battle lasted from 9 a. m. until 3 p. m. The gunboats rendered efficient service by throwing shells into the enemy at a distance of 2 miles.

From coincidence of reports received before and after the battle there is no doubt that this was a well-planned and desperate attempt on the part of the enemy.

I omitted to mention that Captain Gilmore, who commanded the three companies of the Sixteenth New York engaged, has received the commendation of his superior officer for the skill and gallantry displayed during the action.

Besides the mangling of bodies the enemy is reported on reliable authority to have rifled the persons of the wounded and dead of all articles of value and to have taken portions of their clothing. The enemy was not only repelled in his attempt upon our position, but at the end of the day we occupied with our troops a position in advance of that held at the commencement of the action.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN NEWTON,

Brig. Gen., Comdg. Right Wing General Franklin's Division.

Capt. E. SPARROW PURDY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 9.

Report of Col. John M. Gosline, Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. 95TH REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS,

Brick-House Point, Va. (near head of York River).

May 8, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report to you the following in regard to the engagement of yesterday, 7th instant, in which this regiment took part:

I received orders from brigade headquarters between 6 and 7 o'clock on the morning of the 7th to deploy the regiment under my command as skirmishers through the woods against which the enemy was supposed to be. Accordingly I deployed seven companies—A, B, C, D, E, F, and K—to right and left of road leading directly through the wood, holding the three remaining companies near the edge and center of the wood as a reserve; Lieutenant-Colonel Town commanding the right wing, Major Hubbs the left, and myself the center, we moved cautiously, and when near the outer edge of woods discovered a detachment of the enemy's cavalry, the denseness of the foliage, however, rendering it impossible to ascertain their exact number. Our skirmishers immediately opened fire upon them, driving them out of the woods and over a slight rise of ground. Continued our advance, and before reaching the top of the rise were met by a full regiment of infantry, supporting the cavalry of the enemy, which had been lying in ambush, apparently awaiting our advance. Orders were immediately given for the skirmishers to fall back, which they did in order, keeping their places and at the same time continuing a brisk fire upon the enemy. As we fell back upon the main road (still firing) we came upon a barricade of felled trees, supposed to have been thrown across by our pickets of the previous day and night. Thinking it more than probable the enemy might endeavor to advance upon us with cavalry and artillery in force, I immediately took means to retain possession of the barricade and thus prevent any attack in that quarter, which position we continued to hold until relieved by the Thirty-first and Thirty-second New York Volunteers. I then formed the regiment in line, flanking our artillery on the left, in which position we remained until the close of the engagement.

During the whole day the regiment conducted itself in a manner highly creditable, and more particularly so when we consider the difficulty of the situation and the fact that most of the men were on this occasion under fire for the first time.*

Killed (privates).....	1
Wounded (privates).....	7
Missing (privates).....	7
Total	15

I have the honor to be, yours, respectfully,

J. M. GOSLINE,

Colonel Ninety-fifth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Capt. JAMES E. MONTGOMERY,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brigade.

No. 10.

Report of Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith, C. S. Army, commanding Reserve.

HEADQUARTERS RESERVE,

Cross-Roads, Va., May 12, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a report just received from Brig. Gen. W. H. C. Whiting, commanding a division of this

* Nominal list omitted, but see revised statement, p. 618.

corps, with reports of commanders under him, describing an engagement with the enemy on the 7th instant, between Barhamsville and Eltham's Landing—the latter place being nearly opposite West Point, on the south side of the Pamunkey River.

At Barhamsville the line by which my command was retiring formed an angle, at which the trains were much exposed to the enemy. Owing to difficulties in getting artillery and baggage over the roads I had been directed by General Johnston to halt there until the troops in the rear could be brought up. During this halt a fleet of transports, protected by gunboats, appeared at the head of York River, and from them the enemy commenced landing troops.

After examining their operations I selected a position for the division of General Whiting, and directed him to prevent the enemy from advancing upon Barhamsville until all the trains had passed.

The nature of the ground at the point chosen by the enemy for their landing and the protection afforded by their gunboats rendered an attack at that time and place not advisable, and I preferred to let them land and move out beyond the protecting range of their heavily-armed iron-clad vessels. The latter it was supposed they would attempt during the night or early next morning.

The command proper of Major-General Magruder, then under Brig. Gen. David R. Jones, was placed at my control by General Johnston, and he directed the commands of Major-Generals Longstreet and Hill to be brought within close supporting distance.

On the morning of the 7th, after becoming satisfied that the enemy did not intend to advance in force from under the protection of their gunboats, I directed General Whiting to drive their skirmishers from the dense woods and endeavor to get position in the open ground between the woods and the river, from which he could reach their place of landing and their transports with his artillery fire.

After quite a sharp contest the enemy were driven back through the woods for a mile or more, when it was found that from the positions attained the range was too great for our fire to reach the transports, and that the troops and material already landed were completely covered from view by a bluff bank near the edge of the river. I then directed the troops to be withdrawn out of reach of the fire of the gunboats and to resume their position nearer Barhamsville. The enemy remained close under cover, protected by their gunboats.

Referring to the reports of the several commanders for details, it is only necessary for me to state that the Texas Brigade, under command of Brig. Gen. John B. Hood, supported on the right by the Hampton Legion and the Nineteenth Georgia Regiment, of Colonel Hampton's brigade, were selected and ordered forward by General Whiting, to drive the enemy from the woods then occupied in front of their landing. Later in the day the Tennessee Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Anderson, was placed in position to support and cover the left flank of the Texans.

All the troops engaged showed the finest spirit, were under perfect control, and behaved admirably. The brunt of the contest was borne by the Texans, and to them is due the largest share of the honors of the day at Eltham.

The Texas Brigade lost 8 killed and 28 wounded. In the other portions of the command there were 12 wounded and none killed.

The loss sustained by the enemy is not accurately known, but it was much greater than ours.

The number of prisoners taken and sent to Richmond was 46.

That night we continued our march without interruption to New Kent Court-House.

The affair at Eltham forms one of the most interesting incidents of the march of my command in retiring from Yorktown out of the Peninsula. The route is nearly parallel to a deep, navigable river, filled with vessels of war, gunboats, and transports of the enemy. Along this river are many most favorable landings, and good, lateral roads leading from the river, intersecting our line of march at almost every mile, and at points varying in distance between 1 and 3 miles from the river. This delicate movement has been successfully accomplished.

The comfort and quiet with which the march of the troops has been conducted on this line is largely due to the admirable dispositions and watchfulness of the cavalry rear guard, first under Col. Fitz. Lee and more recently under Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, supported from day to day by brigades detailed for this purpose.

All of my staff officers have been untiring in their efforts to assist me in conducting this movement.

The whole command is in the finest spirits and in excellent condition, anxious to meet the invaders at any odds.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. SMITH,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. THOMAS G. RHETT,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Department of Northern Virginia.

No. 11.

*Report of Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting, C. S. Army, commanding
First Division.*

HDQRS. DEFENSE OF CAPE FEAR RIVER, N. C.,
November 14, 1862.

MAJOR: Having learned that no record had been received at the War Department of the battle of Eltham's Landing, fought on May 7 last, by my division, then forming part of the Reserve Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith, I beg leave to supply a copy. It is defective in wanting the report of the gallant Col. (now Brig. Gen.) Wade Hampton, which was with the original, together with the names of the killed and wounded. Otherwise it is word for word from the notes on which my original report was written.

We have since learned that the enemy's losses were very heavy in that battle. It was very creditable to the officers and men, and produced important results on the enemy's movements. It is due to the division that the record of one of the most brilliant of its many battles should be supplied on the files of the War Office. I have, therefore, to request that you will ask the major-general commanding the department to have this forwarded. If I am not mistaken, he himself sent in the originals with a report of his own.

Very respectfully,

W. H. C. WHITING,
Brigadier-General, late Commanding First Division.

Maj. SAMUEL W. MELTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Richmond, Va.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, RESERVE CORPS,
Camp, near New Kent Court-House, Va., May 8, 1862.

MAJOR: The following are matters of interest connected with the engagement yesterday in the vicinity of Eltham's Landing:

On the 6th instant, at 12 m., I received intelligence that a portion of the enemy's fleet had anchored off West Point and was preparing to land troops. Observing the boats carefully, I thought they might contain from twelve to sixteen regiments. The landing commenced very soon after they anchored, and light troops were thrown out to scour the woods; these were not interfered with. The major-general commanding the Reserve Corps rode out and personally examined the ground and approaches and observed the fleet. Upon that he directed a change of position of the First Division, which was accordingly made, the troops bivouacking in order of battle. During the night I ascertained that artillery was being landed, perhaps one battery and several regiments, supposed to be one brigade.

Early on the 7th the major-general directed me to attack the enemy, who was extending his line of pickets, and drive his advance back to the cover of his gunboats, to prevent any interference with the march of the main column. Accordingly, I directed Brigadier-General Hood, commanding the Texas Brigade, to advance on the Brick House and Barhamsville road and attack, while Colonel Hampton, commanding Second Brigade, should detach the Legion infantry and the Nineteenth Georgia to skirmish on our right, the Third Brigade being in reserve. They had hardly entered the timber when fire was opened. The woods were very dense and extensive. From the moment of entering, the enemy, though several times re-enforced, were steadily driven back by these brave troops. Two attempts were made to flank us in force—one on our left, repulsed with great vigor by the First Texas, directed in person by General Hood, and one on the right, beaten back by Colonel Hampton himself with the Legion infantry. The appearance of Brig. Gen. S. R. Anderson, with the Tennessee Brigade, sent forward by the major-general in support of our left, rendered that flank secure. The line—composed of the three Texas regiments (First, Fourth, and Fifth) under Brigadier-General Hood, and the Legion infantry, about 450 strong, under Lieutenant-Colonel Griffin, but personally directed by Colonel Hampton, the whole supported by General Anderson on the left and the Third Brigade on the right—had driven the enemy fairly before it for over $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles through a very dense forest, in which it was impossible to see over 30 or 40 yards. The coherence, discipline, and bravery of the troops were conspicuous. The fire of the enemy was heavy, but very high, which accounts for our small loss. That of my troops was deliberate and reserved, for, though engaged for four hours, they did not expend over 7 or 8 rounds.

At 12 m. the enemy were driven under the cover of their gunboats, which opened at random on the timber, but with no effect. Large numbers of their dead and wounded were left on the ground over which they were driven. While in this position one more effort was made by the enemy on our right, but speedily repulsed. I then ordered up Major Lee, with two rifled pieces, and Captain Reilly, with two Parrott (Manassas) guns, to occupy a bluff on the river and attempt to reach their transports. The battery was supported by the Sixth North Carolina, Colonel Pender, which had been posted all the morning in advance on our extreme right. The battery opened, but

the range was too great, and the battery was withdrawn, the density of the woods making it useless on land. A gunboat got into position against the bluff just afterward, and got its range with great accuracy and rapidity, firing exceedingly well. The only effect, however, was the wounding of 2 of the Sixth North Carolina—not dangerously, however. Our ambulance train was then ordered up and the dead and wounded cared for. The enemy left many of his upon the field. The most painful cases of the latter were taken up by our surgeons and carried in to be attended to.

At this time (between 1 and 2 p. m.), the object designated having been accomplished, I ordered Brigadier-General Hood and Colonel Hampton to withdraw the line and take position in line of battle, to cover the march of the force from Barhamsville. This was done leisurely. Prisoners taken in action reported General Franklin to be in command of the enemy. Brig. Gen. John Newton, of Virginia, commanded the brigade at first opposed to us. I gathered also, but am not sure, that one brigade of the enemy was under command of Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny.

To the conspicuous gallantry of Major-General Hood and Col. Wade Hampton, with the small number of brave troops immediately under their command, the credit of the engagement is due, and the result, which it was designed to effect, was that the large baggage, ordnance, and artillery train was quietly and successfully moved, in perfect order, within three-quarters of a mile of 20,000 of the enemy upon our flank.

My thanks are due to all of my staff for their service during the day; to Maj. J. H. Hill, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Strong, aide-de-camp, in disposing the reserves; especially to Colonel Upson, of Texas, and Captain Vanderhorst, of South Carolina, aides, and Captain Frobel, of the artillery, who accompanied the advanced troops wherever they found the enemy, and to the troopers of the Hampton Legion, under Sergeant Beattie, attached to headquarters, all of whom brought me important information and did their duty well.

I take occasion to make my acknowledgments to Brigadier-General Anderson, of Tennessee, who, arriving on the field at a critical moment to the support of General Hood, and placing two of his regiments in the fire of the enemy, courteously waived the command, although senior to us all. I am informed that a few of his soldiers were wounded.

I transmit herewith the reports of Brigadier-General Hood and Col. Wade Hampton, by which you will see that our loss is very small—8 killed, 32 wounded, and none missing. We took 46 prisoners.

Very respectfully,

W. H. C. WHITING,

Brigadier-General, Commanding First Division of Reserves.

Maj. JASPER S. WHITING, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 12.

Report of Brig. Gen. John B. Hood, C. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS TEXAS BRIGADE,
Near Barhamsville, Va., May 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that at 7 o'clock this morning, agree-

ably to your instructions, Col. J. J. Archer, with his regiment, Fifth Texas, of this brigade, proceeded on the blind road leading to Eltham's Landing, on the Pamunkey River, to reconnoiter and drive in the skirmishers of the enemy. He soon met them and drove them steadily in front of him.

I at once proceeded with the remainder of the brigade, Col. John Marshall's (Fourth Texas) regiment, Col. A. T. Rainey's (First Texas) regiment, Col. W. T. Wofford's (Eighteenth Georgia) regiment, Lieut. Col. S. Z. Ruff commanding, and the battery of Capt. W. L. Balthis, on the road leading from New Kent Court-House to this landing.

On arriving within some 20 paces of our cavalry pickets the enemy suddenly appeared, deployed as skirmishers, and immediately opened their fire. The Fourth Texas Regiment was in front and their arms unloaded, as I had not thought it necessary to load so long as I was within our line of pickets. They, however, soon loaded under the enemy's fire and drove them back into the timber. Leaving at this point the battery and the Eighteenth Georgia Regiment, I threw forward the Fourth Texas as skirmishers, supported by the First Texas Regiment, driving the enemy through a dense forest with considerable loss.

The enemy during this time were re-enforced and placed in position to receive me. The First Texas Regiment was accordingly attacked with a terrible fire on its flank by two regiments. I immediately threw one wing of this regiment back and the other forward, which caused some little confusion, which being soon rectified, they, with Captains Porter's and Martin's companies, of the Fourth Texas Regiment, and a platoon of Captain Carter's company, of the same regiment, charged gallantly forward, driving the enemy in utter confusion in front of them. Immediately after this Colonel Archer came up with his regiment and took position on the right in line of battle.

Having driven the enemy a distance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, through a most difficult forest, forcing him under the protection of his gunboats, I then at 2.30 p. m., according to instructions, gathered up the killed and wounded and returned in perfect order to the bivouac I left in the morning.

I would respectfully state that Colonel Hampton, with about 400 of his Legion, forced the enemy on the right to return to the protection of their gunboats, and that General Anderson arrived about noon with two regiments and held securely my left flank.

I captured some 40 prisoners and secured 84 stand of arms. The density of the forest and the large area over which the engagement extended prevented my securing more of the latter without permitting my men to straggle.

The force engaged against me was one brigade in the beginning, and I am of the opinion that it was considerably re-enforced.

The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was heavy, and I think, from personal observation, that it could not have been less than 300, although it was impossible to approximate to the exact number in consequence of the facts already referred to.

Capt. W. H. Sellers, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. D. L. Sublett, aide-de-camp, rendered me most efficient services in bringing forward the troops and transmitting orders.

The conduct of officers and men, one and all, was beyond all praise.

My attention was particularly called to the great gallantry of Captain

Decatur, of the First Texas, who fell under the heavy fire upon the flank of his regiment.*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Texas Brigade.

Maj. JAMES H. HILL, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 13.

Report of Col. Wade Hampton, Hampton (S. C.) Legion, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE,
—, —, 1862.

MAJOR: In pursuance of orders from General Whiting to take the Legion into the wood adjacent to the Brick-House Ferry, on the morning of the 7th instant I ordered the infantry battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Griffin, to proceed on the road from Barhamsville to the York River and to attack the enemy, reported to be then in occupation of the woods. The Nineteenth Georgia Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson commanding, was ordered to take position near the entrance of the road into the woods. The two flank companies of this regiment were detached to act as skirmishers, together with two from the Legion, the four being placed under the command of Major Conner, of the Legion. Major Lee was directed to hold four rifled pieces in readiness either to support the infantry or to attack the shipping of the enemy if this latter was found practicable. The skirmishers entered the wood, two companies on each side of the road, followed by the infantry of the Legion. As soon as we entered the woods General Hood's command opened fire on the enemy on our left, and soon afterward I fell in with the Fifth Texas Regiment, Colonel Archer commanding, which had got into the same road we were pursuing. Fearing a collision between my command and that of General Hood, should they be thrown together in the thick woods, I acceded to the request of Colonel Archer, and allowed him to precede me until he had formed a junction with General Hood. After that the line was drawn at right angles to the road, General Hood being on the left and my command on the right of it. In this order we advanced, driving back the enemy, who seemed to be re-enforced constantly, to the very edge of the woods. As soon as their own men were clear of the woods the enemy opened fire on us from their gunboats and a field battery in our front. Anticipating an attempt to turn my right flank, I sent, by permission of General Whiting, for the Nineteenth Georgia, which came to me at double-quick and took position rapidly and steadily on my right, though the fire of the enemy was then very heavy. Soon after they had taken position an order came directing them to move to the support of Major Lee, who had opened fire on the vessels of the enemy.

General Hood had withdrawn his command by this time and before I could withdraw the Legion a strong attack was made on the line of Colonel Griffin, which resulted in wounding 4 of my men. My men returned this fire, and, responding to my order to charge with a cheer, drove the enemy back.

* Nominal list of casualties omitted shows 8 killed and 29 wounded.

Colonel Griffin was now left quite alone, and as soon as the wounded could be placed in the ambulances I withdrew the Legion from a position which had become very precarious.

I am happy to say that I lost in killed no men; 4 were wounded.

As I sent back various prisoners taken by the Texans, I am not quite sure of the number taken by my men. My officers of the Nineteenth Georgia report the number as 12.

I take great pleasure in saying that the conduct of officers and men met my entire approval. Colonel Griffin, in command of the Legion, handled them admirably, while Major Conner did the same with his four companies of skirmishers.

Colonel [Thomas C.] Johnson and Maj. A. J. Hutchins, of the Nineteenth Georgia, behaved as well as I could desire, while Major Lee again displayed the soldierly conduct for which he is conspicuous.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WADE HAMPTON,

Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade.

Maj. JAMES H. HILL,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

MAY 7-8, 1862.—Reconnaissance to Mulberry Point, James River, Va.

Report of Maj. Robert Morris, jr., Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

CAMP SIXTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY,

Near Yorktown, May 8, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the result of a reconnaissance made last night and this morning in obedience to orders of May 7, received at 4 o'clock p. m. on the 8th:

In command of our squadron of the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, I left camp near Yorktown at 5 p. m. on the 7th, and reached the ground of an old camp, marked C on sketch No. 1, at 1 o'clock a. m. I found the map which was furnished me quite inaccurate after leaving Lee's Mill. The country was heavily timbered and the roads almost impassable. I found three guns in the large fort on Mulberry Point, all 7-inch bore, after pattern in the inclosed rough sketch; the carriages burnt; also the carriages of four other guns destroyed in like manner. The magazines were three in number, two destroyed by fire, the third not yet finished. I also found some 200 7-inch cannon balls, a lot of spades, picks, wheelbarrows, and timber ready for use.

The small fort on the extreme point is not completed and is surrounded by swamps, the only approaches being by the river and beach. It contained nothing but cooking implements.

I was informed that the enemy advanced their works and camps on Friday last, and all the residents about this point have left. I discovered grain to the amount of 500 bags; also some cattle. Two gunboats with steam up remained on the opposite shore during the morning. As they displayed no flags, it is impossible to say on which side they belong.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBT. MORRIS, JR.,

Major, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

MAY 8, 1862.—Engagement near Sewell's Point, Va.

Report of Capt. James F. Milligan, U. S. Army.

NORFOLK, VA., May 8, 1862.

A lively engagement now going on with the enemy's gunboats and monitor, who are shelling Sewell's Point.

J. F. MILLIGAN,
Captain, Signal Corps.

HON. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH, *Secretary of War.*

MAY 10, 1862.—Occupation of Norfolk and Portsmouth, Va., by the Union Forces.

Report of Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, U. S. Army, and congratulations from President Lincoln.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
Fort Monroe, Va., May 12, 1862.

SIR: On the 9th of May (Friday afternoon) I organized a force to march against Norfolk.

On Saturday morning, the 10th of May, the troops were landed, under the direction of Colonel Cram, at Ocean View, and commenced the march toward Norfolk, under the direction of Brigadier-Generals Mansfield and Weber, who proceeded on the direct route by way of Tanner's Creek Bridge, but finding it on fire, they returned to the cross-roads, where I joined them and took the direction of the column.

I arrived by the old road and entered the intrenchments in front of the city at 20 minutes before 5 p. m. I immediately proceeded toward Norfolk, accompanied by the Hon. Secretary Chase, and met the mayor and a select committee of the common council of Norfolk at the limits of the city, when they surrendered the city, agreeably to the terms set forth in the resolutions of the common council, presented by the mayor, W. W. Lamb, which were accepted by me so far as related to the civil rights of the citizens.

A copy of the resolutions have been already furnished you.

I immediately took possession of the city, and appointed Brig. Gen. Egbert L. Viele military governor of Norfolk, with directions to see that the citizens were protected in all their civil rights. Soon after I took possession of Gosport and Portsmouth.

The taking of Norfolk caused the destruction of the iron-clad steamer Merrimac, which was blown up by the rebels about 5 o'clock on the morning of the 11th of May, which was soon after communicated to you and the President of the United States. On the 11th I visited the navy-yard, and found all the work-shops, store-houses, and other buildings in ruins, having been set on fire by the rebels, who at the same time partially blew up the dry-dock.

I also visited Craney Island, where I found thirty-nine guns of large caliber, most of which were spiked; also a large number of shot and shells, with about 5,000 pounds of powder, all of which, with the buildings, were in good order. So far as I have been able to ascertain we have taken about two hundred cannon, including those at Sewell's Point

batteries, with a large number of shot and shells, as well as many other articles of value to the Government.

Troops have been stationed at the navy-yard, Craney Island, Sewell's Point, and other places.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General, Commanding.

P. S.—Please to inform me what orders the President gave the flag-officer, Goldsborough, in regard to the removing of the guns from Norfolk to Fort Monroe. The flag-officer says he received verbal orders to remove the guns.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 16, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. JOHN E. WOOL,
Commanding Fortress Monroe :

I have the honor to transmit to you the following order.

P. H. WATSON,
Assistant Secretary of War.

[Inclosure.]

Order thanking General Wool for the capture of Norfolk.

The skillful and gallant movements of Maj. Gen. John E. Wool and the forces under his command, which resulted in the surrender of Norfolk and the evacuation of strong batteries erected by the rebels on Sewell's Point and Craney Island and the destruction of the rebel iron-clad steamer Merrimac, are regarded by the President as among the most important successes of the present war. He therefore orders that his thanks, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, be communicated by the War Department to Maj. Gen. John E. Wool and the officers and soldiers of his command for their gallantry and good conduct in the brilliant operations mentioned.

By order of the President, made at the city of Norfolk on the 11th day of May, 1862.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

FORT MONROE, VA., *May 17, 1862.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War :

With a grateful heart I hasten to acknowledge the receipt of your several dispatches by telegram of the 16th instant, including the order and thanks of the President. For the honors so generously conferred on me I assure both you and the President neither shall have cause to regret.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

MAY 15, 1862.—Engagement at Fort Darling, James River, Va.

Report of Commander William Smith, U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. Steamer Wachusett.

U. S. STEAMER WACHUSETT,
City Point, James River, May 19, 1862.

GENERAL: I left West Point on the 15th instant (by order of the Hon. Secretary of the Navy), in company with the Maratanza, for Hampton Roads, to come up the James River. Last evening we arrived here.

On the 15th instant the Galena, Monitor, Naugatuck, Port Royal, and Aroostook ascended this river to within about 8 miles of Richmond, when they met with obstructions in the river which prevented their farther advance. The obstructions consisted of a row of piles driven across the channel, and three rows of vessels sunk also across the channel, among them the Yorktown and Jamestown. Just below these obstructions on the south or west side of the river were very formidable batteries, mounting fourteen guns, among them 11-inch shell, 100-pounder rifles, and nothing less than 8-inch shell guns. The river there is very narrow, the bank some 200 feet high, and the guns so situated that they can be pointed directly down on the decks of the vessels. The sharpshooters can come on the banks and pick off the men on the vessels' decks. The gunboats were engaged about four hours with the batteries and then retired, having expended their ammunition.

Our loss was 12 killed and 13 wounded; the vessels not much injured, except the Galena, which had eighteen shots through her sides and deck. The rebel papers admit that a few of their men were killed and wounded; some deserters say they amounted to several hundred. The river is so narrow and crooked and the banks so high that the gunboats cannot take a position for shelling the batteries except within a very short distance of them and directly under their guns. A gunboat cannot turn under steam in the river. Commodore Rodgers, of the Galena, who commanded the expedition, is decidedly of the opinion that the works cannot be reduced without the assistance of land forces.

We have now at this point the Wachusett, Galena, Maratanza, Port Royal, Aroostook, and Monitor, ready to assist you in your movements. I shall keep this river open if possible to Walls' Bluff, where the batteries above mentioned are situated.

I will station a vessel about 2 miles above this point, on the north side of the river, near the residence of Col. Hill Carter, from which point there is a good road to Charles City Court-House, and where you can communicate with me if you desire to do so.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. SMITH,

Commanding U. S. Steamer Wachusett.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,

Commanding Army of the Potomac.

MAY 17, 1862.—Expedition up the Pamunkey River, Va.**REPORTS.**

No. 1.—Maj. George L. Willard, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry.

No. 2.—Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres, Fifth U. S. Artillery.

No. 1.*Report of Maj. George L. Willard, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry.***CAMP NEAR WHITE HOUSE, VA.,****May 18, 1862.**

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with verbal orders from Brig. Gen. A. Porter, I left this place at 9 o'clock a. m. yesterday, with a small force, consisting of Companies F and G, Eighth Infantry, 10 men of Company B and 15 men of Company D, Seventeenth Infantry, and 34 of Captain Steel's company of Sturges Rifles, making a total of 140 enlisted men, with the following-named officers: Capt. R. T. Frank, Lieuts. A. T. Smith and E. Carter, Eighth Infantry; Captain Steel and Lieutenant Foster, of the Sturges Rifles; Lieut. F. A. Field, Eleventh Infantry, and Asst. Surg. J. H. Frantz, medical department. We embarked on board the tug-boat Seth Lowe, where I found Captain Murray, U. S. Navy, with whom I had been directed to co-operate in an attempt to capture or destroy a fleet of steamers and schooners the Confederates had taken up the Pamunkey River. Capt. R. B. Ayres, Fifth Artillery, with two guns, soon came on board, when we steamed up the river, and at 10 o'clock a. m. overtook the gunboat Currituck. She preceded us up the river. Contrabands came aboard at Putney's Mill, and reported the enemy's pickets 30 strong at Smith's Store, 10 miles from the White House. White flags were flying from nearly all the houses on the banks of the river.

At 12 o'clock m. we discovered a dense smoke ahead. The river being narrow, the gunboat was frequently aground, causing some detention.

At 2 o'clock p. m. we passed through the "Thoroughfare," a very narrow channel, which the enemy had attempted to obstruct by felling trees from each bank into the stream. Passing through with slight detention, we soon found the channel effectually stopped by two sunken schooners, which we were unable to move. Under these circumstances, upon consultation with Captain Murray, I landed all the infantry, except a small picket, on the left bank (north side) of the river, and pushing our way through a thick growth of underwood for nearly a mile reached the cause of the smoke, which proved to be one propeller, one large steamer, and seven schooners. They were burning rapidly, although the iron work had not yet fallen. They lay in the river in all directions, and as the smoke and noise of burning timbers could be seen and heard still farther up the river, no doubt of the complete destruction of all the vessels in the river exists.

Having satisfied myself that the object of the expedition had been accomplished, we returned at 4 o'clock p. m. to the steamers. The river at the point the channel was obstructed was so narrow that it was necessary to back down some distance before we were able to turn the boats. We returned to this place at 7 o'clock p. m. on the same day.

During my absence from the steamers a sailor from the gunboat reported a body of troops on the south side, drawn up in line of battle, at

a point nearly opposite the burning vessels. I had left a small picket on that side, and the non-commissioned officer in command sent a negro to ascertain if the report of troops was correct. The negro returned a few moments after the command had re-embarked and reported a large force of soldiers drawn up in the road leading from the burning fleet to the Chickahominy Swamp and just within a line of woods some distance from the river. As my party passed through the woods on the other side we met with no resistance. Some of the burning vessels appeared to have been partially loaded, one of them with coal. A negro reported that he had been hauling corn from the vessels to Chickahominy Swamp. The distance from the White House to the point where the vessels were burned is about 20 miles.

It affords me pleasure to say that I believe Captain Murray, of the Navy, was perfectly satisfied with the result of the expedition, as was also Captain Nicholson, who accompanied the expedition. The gunboat Currituck was carried up the stream by her officers with great boldness in a very narrow and crooked stream, the decks being completely commanded in many places by the high banks of the river. The officers and soldiers of my command were prompt and willing and eager to engage the enemy. On the passage down it was reported that some horsemen were following the boats. I did not see them.

The necessity of retiring from the gunboat from the narrow river before night prevented a very thorough examination of the burning vessels, it being nearly 4 o'clock p. m. when we reached them.

Before closing my report I would respectfully call the attention of the general to the fact that a small body of infantry occupying any of the commanding points on a narrow stream could clear the decks of a gunboat slowly working its way up. The fire of 100 men directed upon the exposed decks of a gunboat at 50 or 60 yards' distance would effectually prevent the use of her guns and kill or drive her crew below. If possible, the boats for such service should be arranged to protect the crew while working the guns and ship. The 12-pounder mountain howitzers, to fire spherical case and canister at short ranges, would add much to the defense of troops attacked in such a position, as its lightness would permit its being used and landed if necessary with great ease.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. L. WILLARD,
Major, Nineteenth Infantry.

Capt. JAS. McMILLAN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 2.

Report of Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres, Fifth U. S. Artillery.

CAMP IN THE FIELD, VA., May 21, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that pursuant to instructions I proceeded with a section of my battery on board the steamer Seth Lowe on the morning of the 17th instant at the White House Landing, on the Pamunkey River. A command of infantry was also on board, under Major Willard, Nineteenth Infantry. We proceeded, together with one gunboat and Commanders Murray and Nicholson, U. S. Navy, up the Pamunkey, the object of the expedition being the capture or

destruction of some rebel steamers and sail vessels (laden) known to be some 25 miles up the river.

On going about 20 miles we saw a dense volume of smoke suddenly arise from what it was evident were the steamers and vessels of the enemy. We then made every exertion to hasten our progress, to save a part of the property, if possible. However, on arriving to within about a mile of their locality we found an impassable barrier across the river, which is quite narrow at that point, formed of a sunken canal-boat, filled with stones, &c. Failing in our efforts to remove it Major Willard landed on the east side of the river with his command, and proceeded to the vicinity of the burning boats. Two steamers and some twenty sail-boats were found in flames.

The objects of the expedition having been thus accomplished we returned, arriving at our point of departure at dark.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. B. AYRES,
Captain, Fifth Artillery.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

MAY 18-19, 1862.—Reconnaissance toward Old Church, Va.

Report of Capt. James W. Forsyth, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry.

CAMP NEAR TUNSTALL'S STATION, VA.,
May 20, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that in obedience to orders from headquarters Army of the Potomac I reported on the morning of the 18th instant to General Humphreys, Topographical Engineers, for duty in his department. General Humphreys directed me to report to Captain Stewart, of the Engineer Corps, with General Stoneman. I accordingly proceeded to do so, but found on my arrival at General Stoneman's camp that Captain Stewart had left two hours previously. Not having any means to find him, at the request of Lieutenant Bowen, Topographical Engineers, who was on the same duty, I joined his (Lieutenant Bowen's) party for the purpose of making a reconnaissance on the main road to Richmond via the Long or New Bridge.

After proceeding cautiously along this road for about 7 miles we came to a road running northwest to a place called Old Church. Having heard all along the route that the enemy were in force at that point, and knowing that General Stoneman was still 5 miles in our rear, we left our escort to guard the forks, and proceeded with a party of 12 men on our original route. In the mean time we sent word to General Stoneman to the effect that the enemy were in force at the Old Church, so that he might send up re-enforcements. After moving on about a mile farther we came to a road leading to the southwest, which had the appearance of being a side or bad-weather road to the main one. We followed this road about 2 miles (the latter half of which was about west), and having heard that the enemy were in force at Cold Harbor, we took a by-road running due north, which brought us back to our original route.

About a mile and a half from the crossing we were joined by Lieutenant Custer, Fifth Cavalry, on the same duty, with the escort of a

squadron of cavalry. We followed this road for 2 miles, and then struck another leading from Cold Harbor to Old Church. We were informed by residents of the vicinity that the enemy's pickets were established along this route, and had passed but a few moments previously. We immediately threw forward pickets from our escort, and in a short time discovered seven of the enemy's cavalry, whom we attempted to capture, but without success. Having heard all along the route that a larger force was at the Old Church, we returned to General Stoneman's camp, about 5 miles back on the road.

On the following morning (19th) we started with an escort of three companies of the Sixth Cavalry, under Major Williams, and retraced our original route, continuing until we reached Cold Harbor, where we drove in the enemy's pickets, they retiring to Gaines' Mill, where our cavalry had a slight skirmish with them. In company with Lieutenants Bowen and Custer I then followed the road leading via Bottom's Bridge to Richmond for about 2 miles, when I could distinctly hear the whistling of the locomotives on the railroad.

In ordinary weather all the roads I traveled were passable, but in wet weather would require working in several places. There are plenty of good camping grounds along the whole route.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES W. FORSYTH,

Captain, Eighteenth Infantry.

Brig. Gen. ANDREW PORTER, *Pro. Mar. Gen., Army of Potomac.*

MAY 19, 1862.—Skirmish at City Point, James River, Va.

Report of Capt. William H. Willis, Company I, Fourth Georgia Infantry.

CAMP ON THE HEIGHTS, VA.,

May 20, 1862.

ADJUTANT: On Sunday, the 18th instant, I was ordered, with my command, to City Point, to relieve the company on picket duty there and to observe the movements of the enemy's gunboats.

We arrived in the afternoon and at once entered upon our duties. During the evening four additional boats arrived, making six steamers and two schooners, all of which were anchored a short distance below City Point.

On Monday morning two small parties left the fleet to visit the town, but my instructions were such as prevented me from attacking them. In the mean time I received a dispatch from Major-General Huger to push forward my pickets and keep them offshore. In the afternoon Captain Albert, of the Twenty-second Georgia Regiment, arrived, to relieve my command, and we were engaged in calling in my pickets and posting his, when we observed a boat, containing 20 persons, leave the fleet, and head for the landing in the town. We watched the landing of this party, and at once determined to attack them with our advance pickets, composed of a lieutenant, sergeant, and 9 men each. With my detachment I attacked the boat, while Captain Albert entered the town and captured 4 officers and 5 marines as prisoners. The party in the boat pushed off and we fired into them.

I called to them to come ashore and surrender, which they persistently refused to do, although their colors were down and some of the

men imploring for mercy. We kept up the fire on the boat until, I can safely say, no one on board, 6 or 8 in number, escaped, all being killed or wounded.

An officer on board of this boat—a mate, as I learned from the prisoners—a daring and reckless man, fell a prey to his rashness.

Our fire was not returned, though the enemy were armed with navy pistols and the skirmish was at short range at the outset.

The men engaged behaved most gallantly.

As we retired the enemy's gunboats moved up and commenced a promiscuous shelling of the fields and woods in rear of the town, none of which came near us.

Being relieved of duty at that post I returned, with my command, on the train, in charge of the prisoners, who were delivered to Major-General Huger, with officers' sword, cutlasses, and pistols captured.

Respectfully submitted.

WM. H. WILLIS,

Captain Company I, Fourth Georgia Volunteers.

Adj. PHIL. COOK, *Fourth Georgia Volunteers.*

MAY 20-23, 1862.—Operations about Bottom's Bridge, Chickahominy River, Va.

REPORTS.

No. 1.—Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, of operations May 20-21.

No. 2.—Brig. Gen. John J. Peck, U. S. Army, commanding brigade.

No. 3.—Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, commanding division, of operations May 20.

No. 4.—Brig. Gen. Henry M. Naglee, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Casey's division, of operations May 20-23.

No. 5.—Col. David McM. Gregg, Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

No. 1.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Corps, of operations May 20-21.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
Camp near Bottom's Bridge, Va., May 20, 1862—11.30 a. m.

GENERAL: I have to report the result of a reconnaissance made by Major Harlow and party, of Colonel Russell's Seventh Massachusetts Volunteers, this morning. The party, consisting of Captains Holman and Whitcomb's companies, got into the skirt of the woods this side just before daylight. Captain Holman saw the bridge. It appeared to have been blown up in the center. They were fired upon on reaching the woods from rifle pits on the opposite bank. One sergeant is missing and one man wounded. It is thought that the sergeant had strayed off to the left. The river at the bridge is 10 yards wide; the swamp perhaps 60 or 100. I inclose a copy of a sketch sent in by Colonel Russell.*

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G., *Army of the Potomac.*

* Not found.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
Camp near Bottom's Bridge, Va., May 21, 1862—6.45 a. m.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that at daylight this morning Colonel Russell pushed one of his companies across at Bottom's Bridge. His companies on the railroad have also thrown a picket over at that point. He has at the former, besides his own four companies, a regiment to support him. He reports that during the night he partially laid the railroad bridge, so that infantry can pass, and that he can soon repair Bottom's Bridge.

I have already telegraphed to you for instruction in the matter of building the bridges. I can, if it is thought advisable, throw over a considerable force, but will not make any further advance movement until receiving instructions.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. D. KEYES,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Corps.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

P. S.—Colonel Gregg writes that his pickets also have crossed at Bottom's Bridge; that he has taken a deserter. He has not yet arrived, however, and I do not delay sending this to take his examination.

E. D. K.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS,
Camp near Bottom's Bridge, Va., May 21, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with your instructions of the 19th instant, I detached a brigade of Couch's division, two batteries, and Colonel Gregg's cavalry, to assist Lieutenants Comstock and McAlester in a reconnaissance in the vicinity of Bottom's Bridge. Brigadier-General Peck, who commanded the party, carried out his instructions literally as far as practicable, as his report, herewith inclosed, will show.

On the 19th instant I had given orders to Generals Couch and Casey to examine their positions thoroughly, Casey to examine particularly in a northerly and northwesterly direction. Under that order General Casey left yesterday morning with Naglee's brigade and two batteries by a road leading toward the railroad in a direction nearly perpendicular to the road to Bottom's Bridge. Fearing a clash, I gave precise verbal and written orders to General Casey to expose no part of his forces to the view of the enemy at or near Bottom's Bridge. As soon as I had finished examining some contrabands I hastened to the front, and took post between the railroad and the Bottom's Bridge road on an elevation within 600 yards of the railroad bridge. From that point I could see the enemy across the railroad bridge and all that was passing this side of Bottom's Bridge. I remained there in observation between two and three hours. The enemy threw five or six shells before any of our artillery replied at all.

As my orders to General Casey were so explicit, I did not for a moment suspect that the two regiments and section of a battery down from my left belonged to his division, and I was so well pleased with their movements that I found no occasion to send any orders, though I was only a few hundred yards away. Finally one of Casey's batteries, which had been standing on the hill about 150 yards to my rear, opened, throwing shells over the woods near Bottom's Bridge. I went

immediately to Colonel Bailey to order him to cease firing in that direction. From him I learned that the troops near the woods at Bottom's Bridge were a part of Naglee's brigade.

Hastening down to the house near Bottom's Bridge, I succeeded in finding General Naglee, and explained the orders for the reconnaissance to him. As his men occupied the woods and the open space this side, I did not deem it expedient at that late hour to displace them by a portion of Peck's brigade, which was concealed in rear of the house from which General McClellan made his observations.

I inclose a copy of my letter to General Casey, his reply, and the explanation of Brigadier-General Naglee.

The result of the operations of yesterday is that we have both bridges and the river between them. The enemy had at least one battery, some cavalry, and sharpshooters opposed to us. Our pickets are across the Chickahominy. I have advanced one brigade of Couch's division to the opening this side of Bottom's Bridge, and will to-day or to-morrow, unless otherwise ordered, move my whole command to the Old Tavern and beyond.

The report of the casualties of yesterday has not yet come in. We had several men wounded.

I remain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

[Inclosure No. 1.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS,

May 20, 1862.

SIR: As the orders for the engineers to examine Bottom's Bridge, and above and below, came from general headquarters and are explicit, I have made a detail of a brigade from Couch's division to assist in the reconnaissance. My orders also direct that as small a force as possible must be exposed to the view of the enemy. Under such circumstances I deem it proper to order that you do not under any circumstances expose any portion of your command to the view of the enemy at or near Bottom's Bridge during your reconnaissance to-day.

I remain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

Brig. Gen. SILAS CASEY, *Commanding Division.*

[Inclosure No. 2.]

HEADQUARTERS CASEY'S DIVISION,

Near Cross-Roads, May 20, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In answer to your communication of this day's date I have the honor to reply that as soon as I saw General Naglee after receiving your orders I communicated them to him. I saw him soon after he had taken possession of the railroad bridge across the Chickahominy.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,

Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding Division.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Indorsements.]

MAY 20, 1862.

Brigadier-General Casey is respectfully requested to ascertain from Brigadier-General Naglee his reasons for disobedience to the orders referred to by me.

E. D. KEYES,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

Respectfully referred to Brigadier-General Naglee, who will report at once on this matter.

By order of Brigadier-General Casey :

C. H. RAYMOND,
Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.

[Inclosure No. 3.]

CAMP NEAR RAILROAD,
Three Miles from Chickahominy, May 20, 1862.

CAPTAIN : In answer to the indorsement upon the communication of General Casey to Captain Suydam, of even date herewith, I would reply that I went by verbal orders from General Casey to the Chickahominy, by the way of the railroad, with the purpose first to ascertain the situation of the railroad bridge and to secure it, and then to drive the enemy to the right bank of that stream that the left bank might be examined. The first purpose was accomplished before General Casey had come upon the ground, and two companies of skirmishers had deployed into the swamp, and had already advanced half of the distance between the railroad bridge and Bottom's Bridge before General Casey came upon the ground, and informed me of what was then for the first time made known to me, that General Barnard was below Bottom's Bridge making a reconnaissance. It was then too late and impossible to recall my skirmishers, who had been instructed to hold the entire left bank of the Chickahominy from 1,200 feet above the railroad bridge along that bank as far as we might proceed.

The above was fully explained to General Keyes. The force upon the ground was not my brigade, but two regiments only, numbering about 1,200.

If any interference has occurred it has been through some misapprehension, and certainly with no intention or even knowledge of any interference.

Very respectfully, &c.,

HENRY M. NAGLEE,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. HENRY W. SMITH, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 2.

Report of Brig. Gen. John J. Peck, U. S. Army, commanding brigade, of operations May 20.

HEADQUARTERS PECK'S BRIGADE,
Near Providence Church, Va., May 20, 1862.

In obedience to instructions, my brigade and two batteries were held in readiness until about 12 m. this day to support a reconnaissance to

be made by General Barnard. On receiving an intimation that the general had passed on, I pushed forward my command with all speed to the front. From the time of leaving camp, artillery fire was heard at intervals in the direction of the railroad bridge.

On joining General Barnard, I stated that I had my brigade and two batteries ready to support him in his reconnaissance, and requested him to state the dispositions he desired me to make. After a consultation, I gave the general two companies of infantry and Lieutenant Comstock two more, and established some eight companies on the flanks for observation, screened by the woods. The balance of my command, including Colonel Gregg's cavalry, I placed in close proximity, but out of view of the enemy's pickets, in accordance with my own judgment and directions received personally from General Keyes.

While making these dispositions the firing was continued on the right by troops of General Casey's division. A section of one of his batteries was advanced down into the Bottom's Bridge road with infantry supports. This battery kept up a rapid fire, with but little or no response from the enemy, until after the close of the reconnaissance. This movement of General Casey's on to my front was wholly unnecessary, inasmuch as the ground was already occupied with Colonel Russell's Seventh Massachusetts Regiment, placed there by General Couch, and the whole of my command being in hand. In my judgment the fire of the artillery must have in some degree embarrassed the reconnaissance of General Barnard.

At the conclusion of the general's examination I reported to General Keyes, and in accordance with his directions brought away my command a little after 5 p. m., save the Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, which was left in support of the front.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN J. PECK,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Headquarters Keyes' Fourth Corps.

No. 3.

Report of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, commanding division, of operations May 20.

HEADQUARTERS CASEY'S DIVISION,
May 23, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that, in accordance with the authority given me to make such reconnaissance as I might think proper to the north and west, I proceeded to organize one on the morning of the 20th instant, the day after the arrival of my division. I directed General Naglee, with two regiments, to proceed down the railroad, and, if possible, to the bridge across the Chickahominy. With two batteries of artillery and one regiment of infantry I proceeded to the road leading to Bottom's Bridge and thence along a road passing to the right. I placed the guns near the railroad and about half a mile from the bridge, where the road crosses the Chickahominy. I soon went down near the bridge and found General Naglee, who had been successful in driving in the enemy's pickets and taking possession of

the bridge, extinguishing the fire which had been communicated to the structure by the enemy. I found that he had some time previous to my arrival deployed a line of skirmishers along the river bottom.

Soon after my arrival the enemy brought down to the opposite end of the bridge three pieces of artillery, and endeavored to drive away our sharpshooters, in which they did not succeed. I ordered four pieces of artillery to be brought down and placed near the bridge, and soon succeeded in driving the enemy's pieces from their position. I remained on the ground until 5 o'clock, when I gave orders to repair the bridge and for the pickets to cross over as soon as this was accomplished. A short time after the pickets were ordered away from the bridge, as I was informed by General Devens, but not until a number had succeeded in crossing. The result of the reconnaissance was to put us in possession of the bridge and supply important information which had been sought for some days.

The conduct of General Naglee was prompt and skillful and the troops behaved well. I inclose his report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 4.

Report of Brig. Gen. Henry M. Naglee, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Casey's division, of operations May 20-23.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., CAMP ON RICHMOND ROAD,
Three Miles from Bottom's Bridge, May 21, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I would respectfully report that in accordance with the order of General Casey, at 9 a. m. yesterday I proceeded with the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, Colonel Davis; Fifty-sixth New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Jourdan; one company, under Captain Harvey, of 50 selected men, from the Eleventh Maine; two companies, commanded by Captains Davis and Silver, of 100 men, selected from the Fifty-second Pennsylvania, and two batteries of the Eighth [?] New York, Colonel Bailey's, to make a reconnaissance of the railroad bridge and the left bank of the Chickahominy from that point to Bottom's Bridge.

We arrived upon the ground at 10 a. m. Twenty men of the Eleventh Maine were ordered to proceed cautiously along the northern side of the embankment of the railroad until they should get under cover of the woods and thence to the bridge, with instructions to drive away the pickets of the enemy which were within the cut at the railroad guard-house on the left bank as well as those on the other side. The other 30 were deployed obliquely to the right and rear of the 20, and ordered to clear the woods and hold the bank of the river above the railroad bridge. Captain Orem, of Company B, of the One hundred and fourth, was placed in their rear to support them and protect our right flank. At the same time 20 selected men were started along the left side of the railroad embankment with 80 others, ordered to deploy diagonally to their left and rear and gradually, after clearing the woods,

to hold the bank of the river. Behind these Captains Marple and Pickering, Rogers and Harvey, Companies A, E, F, and K, of the One hundred and fourth, were placed at proper intervals to support them, and the remaining five companies of Colonel Davis' One hundred and fourth followed as a reserve. The Fifty-sixth were placed on rising ground parallel with the river and about three-quarters of a mile in rear.

A few shots at the pickets at the railroad bridge made them disappear. We had but scarcely entered the wood south of the railroad before we found ourselves in a thick jungle, the ground covered with water from 2 to 5 feet in depth, intersected in many directions with small currents. We soon found the main channel, which was from 30 to 50 feet in width, with from 4 to 6 feet water. After we had waded slowly along for some 400 yards several shots from our front and right indicated the presence of the enemy. Our men, accustomed to hunting, picked off four of the enemy from the right bank and soon after several others from the border of the creek.

We then proceeded along the creek until about 300 yards of Bottom's Bridge, where we found the enemy in more force, and firing became more frequent. We gradually advanced, however, until we came upon the point of woods at the turn immediately in front of Bottom's Bridge, which we found was the center of a converging fire from the entire circumference of the circle made by the creek below the bridge. Here we maintained ourselves, but at a great disadvantage, the least exposure by any one drawing a dozen shots from the enemy. Our arms were superior, and we kept them at long range. They had before opened upon us with three pieces of artillery from a battery on rising ground at some distance from the creek, but their shot passed over the skirmishers in the swamp and over the One hundred and fourth, which had been gradually moved along parallel with the wood as they proceeded, and struck upon the ground occupied by the Fifty-sixth. Three other pieces had been brought down by the enemy to the railroad and opened upon our sharpshooters at the bridge. General Casey, who had come upon the ground in that vicinity, ordered down four pieces of Colonel Bailey's battery, which soon silenced and drove them off.

Some time prior to this four pieces were ordered to open from the ground to the left and slightly in rear of the Fifty-sixth, and two others from a point on the Bottom's Bridge road within 500 yards of the bridge, the skirmishers there for the time being withdrawn. With these dispositions of our forces the work was accomplished, the enemy were silenced, and the reconnaissance completed.

We had but one man badly wounded. We found the railroad bridge to be 600 yards long, extending over a swamp through which the Chickahominy runs, the latter crossing the railroad bridge 30 yards from the east end of it, the river being at the crossing over which the bridge has been burned 75 feet wide, with a depth of 5 feet. The width of the swamp decreases very rapidly, so much so, that at a short distance below the bridge a point was found where the width of the river was but 35 feet, and where the causeways on both sides to connect with the bridge would not exceed in length 30 yards, and the whole, of a width of 40 or 50 feet, could be made in one day. The bottom of the river, of the swamp, and of the currents that intersect each other in every direction is hard, and the depth of water averages from 2 to 5 feet. We found the average width of the river to be but 35 feet, and that with the exception of the swamp at the railroad bridge it is seldom more than 100 yards wide, and that at many points between the bridges

crossings can be made with but little difficulty. The right bank of the river we found to be firm above the water and gradually rising, until at a half a mile from the river the ground becomes quite elevated. The ground between the railroad and the road to Bottom's Bridge is swampy, and from the river to the rising ground behind Watson's house is too boggy and cut by ditches to allow the passage of horses, but infantry may get over it. The railroad bridge should be saved from further destruction, for which purpose General Casey, confirming my order to the sharpshooters that 100 of them should hold the abutment on the west side, also ordered a sufficient number of experienced axmen from the Eleventh Maine to repair the bridge during the night. When we arrived in the morning we found the bridge still burning, but finding their can-tees too slow a process, the men passed the water in their caps and extinguished the flames. By observation we found the stream had overflowed its banks, that it was rapidly falling, and actually fell 6 inches during the day.

I cannot conclude this very satisfactory report without referring, in terms of unqualified commendation, to the gallant conduct of all present at the reconnaissance of the railroad and Bottom's Bridges. Our troops, driving the enemy back from the railroad bridge, repulsed the cavalry and artillery sent to retake it, and examined the ground 600 yards beyond the western end. Up to their middle in water, they drove the enemy from the railroad to Bottom's Bridge, where, becoming concentrated, our artillery opened upon and scattered them. A complete and thorough description of the river and the surrounding country was obtained. The location of two of their batteries was discovered, and the enemy was so much disheartened that the bridge and river were abandoned during the night. Ten or twelve of the enemy were reported killed by our infantry. The number killed by our artillery it is impossible to ascertain.

I regret exceedingly to close so very satisfactory a report with a notice of the conduct of those detailed from the Second Division to guard the bridge at night, and who in the most unceremonious manner ordered away the troops above referred to, who after taking the bridge from the enemy volunteered to remain and hold it and to rebuild during the night the portion that had been destroyed.

All of which is respectfully submitted by your obedient servant,

HENRY M. NAGLEE,

Brigadier-General.

Capt. HENRY W. SMITH,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

BOTTOM'S BRIDGE, May 23, 1862—5.45 p. m.

GENERAL: I have just returned after a hard day's work. Under the within extraordinary order I marched my brigade to the point designated. Took the two companies of cavalry and a detachment of 170 of the Fifty-sixth New York. Went out the main road from the bridge toward Richmond to the road parallel with the Charles City road, and between it and the Chickahominy. Found nobody knew anything of it. With one company of the cavalry and 30 men I explored it, the above road, and found the road clear. Driving off detached portions of 10 to 30 cavalry, joined the balance of the detachment, which I had sent directly out from Bottom's Bridge. I then went out the road leading from Bottom's Bridge across the White Oak Swamp Bridge,

and finally to the Charles City road; thence by it to the crossing with the Quaker road, leading to the James River. Went down this to within 3 miles of the James River. Returned and pursued the Charles City road 2 miles beyond the intersection with the Quaker road to a point 10 miles from Richmond.

By this time it was 4 p. m. We had accumulated such a force of cavalry before us that, with the fatigue, lateness of the hour, and distance from our supports, I considered it prudent to return. The country through which I passed is evacuated most literally. The roads have no new wagon-tracks since the rains of last night, and until we crossed the road from James River few marks of the passage of cavalry.

Yours,

NAGLEE.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

No. 5.

Report of Col. David McM. Gregg, Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

CAMP AT BOTTOM'S BRIDGE, VA.,
May 23, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that, agreeably to orders, this morning, with eight companies of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, the Seventh Regiment Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Russell, the Twenty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Neill—the infantry all under command of Colonel Russell—I proceeded on the main road toward Richmond. After passing our outer pickets I proceeded cautiously, making a thorough examination of the country to the front and between the main road and railroad. I examined all the roads to the right and left. The roads leading away from the main road are unimportant, and do not connect any main roads. The country to the front is rolling, with frequent cultivated tracts. A half mile beyond our pickets I came upon the enemy's pickets, which, after firing upon us, retired on the road. Following along the road a mile farther I met the enemy's pickets in greater force, the picket being composed of cavalry and infantry. When discovered the enemy's picket was upon the western side of a plain, under cover of timber. I sent through the woods companies of infantry to the right and left, drove away the picket, and put to flight the whole or the greater portion of a regiment of infantry and a force of 300 to 400 cavalry. The enemy moving away to my left through the woods, I did not deem it safe to follow, lest a movement should be made against my left and rear. One of the enemy was killed. From this point, 3 miles from the Chickahominy and 10 miles from Richmond, I returned to this camp.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. McM. GREGG,

Colonel Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

Lieut. Col. A. V. COLBURN,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Potomac.

MAY 22, 1862.—Reconnaissance to New Castle and Hanover town Ferries, Va.

Report of Col. Richard H. Rush, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry (Lancers).

CAMP AT CROSSING OF COLD HARBOR ROAD
AND PIPINGTREE LANDING ROAD,

May 22, 1862—8.30 p. m.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that your order to make a reconnaissance with my whole regiment was received at 2.30 o'clock to-day, and in obedience thereto I have visited New Castle Ferry and Hanover town Ferry, and collected all the information in my power, the result of which is as follows:

I find that there are no troops of the enemy within the circuit of my march in passing on the near river road and the main river road, passing Rockett's Tavern, Old Church House, and crossing the country over toward Page's and Dr. Brokenborough's and the cross-roads from this point. I questioned by detached parties all houses within sight of the roads and find as follows: That on last Thursday "right smart cavalry went on the near river road toward Richmond," but not as many as my regiment; that on Friday and Saturday detached bodies of the enemy left this section of country and went toward Richmond; that on Sunday they had all gone, but that one company of about 100 cavalry, rebels, had encamped at Old Church, but the approach of our cavalry had caused them to leave. On Monday no rebels were heard of in my circuit. On Tuesday a company of rebel cavalry, supposed to be Captain Newton's, had passed over the road from Hanover town Ferry toward Old Church. On Wednesday none of the rebels were heard of, but the people seemed to have expected the arrival of our troops; that this morning five wagons and a carriage, with one soldier as guard, had passed at an early hour toward Richmond over the main river road. I heard of the rebels being at Hanover Court-House, 12 miles from Old Church. As for Hanover town, there is no town there. There once was one, but it is gone, and there is a ferry there, not fordable. The country I have passed through is very rich, and the farms are all stocked—sheep, cattle, &c., rich fields of grain and grass, and the ladies and families at home. I also fell in with the son-in-law of Ed. Ruffin, of Virginia, a Mr. Sayres, and learned much from him. There is no indication of any troops of either party ever having been quartered in this section of country or of having passed much through it. Upon my return to camp I received the order from Colonel Tyler, and will move with his command to-morrow morning to Old Church and carry out the orders of General Porter.

I have a picket near the forks of the Pipingtree Landing road, with vedettes on the three roads uniting at that point on duty to-night.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

RICH'D H. RUSH,
Colonel Regiment of Lancers.

General MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

MAY 23-24, 1862,—Skirmishes at Ellison's Mill, New Bridge, and Mechanicsville, Va.

REPORTS.

- No. 1.—Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac.
 No. 2.—Lieut. Nicolas Bowen, Topographical Engineers, U. S. Army.
 No. 3.—Col. Dwight A. Woodbury, Fourth Michigan Infantry.
 No. 4.—Brig. Gen. John W. Davidson, U. S. Army, commanding brigade.
 No. 5.—Capt. John C. Tidball, Second U. S. Artillery.
 No. 6.—Lieut. Alexander C. M. Pennington, Second U. S. Artillery.
 No. 7.—Capt. Charles C. Wheeler, Battery E, First New York Light Artillery.
 No. 8.—Lieut. Col. Selden Connor, Seventh Maine Infantry.
 No. 9.—Lieut. Col. Joseph W. Corning, Thirty-third New York Infantry.
 No. 10.—Col. James B. McKean, Seventy-seventh New York Infantry.
 No. 11.—Col. Beverly H. Robertson, Fourth Virginia Cavalry.
 No. 12.—Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.
 No. 13.—Col. A. Cumming, Tenth Georgia Infantry.
 No. 14.—Col. T. G. Hunt, Fifth Louisiana Infantry.

No. 1.

Reports of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Saturday, May 24, 1862.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President* :

Three skirmishes to-day. Drove rebels from Mechanicsville, 7 miles from New Bridge. Fourth Michigan about finished Louisiana Tigers; 50 prisoners; 50 killed. Our loss 10 killed and wounded.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

—
 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,
May 24, 1862—9 p. m.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

Advanced guard had an artillery skirmish near Mechanicsville yesterday afternoon. It was carried this morning by Davidson's brigade, and the enemy driven completely over the river at New Bridge. Five hundred of Fourth Michigan, under Colonel Woodbury, covering a very gallant reconnaissance made by Lieutenants Bowen and Custer, came upon the Louisiana Tigers, and handled them terribly, taking some 50 prisoners and killing and wounding very large numbers, with a loss of 2 killed and 7 wounded. On the Bottom's Bridge road General Naglee drove the enemy from the Seven Pines, 5 miles from the bridge. I would request that these localities be not published. The papers soon reach the enemy.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

No. 2.

Report of Lieut. Nicolas Bowen, Topographical Engineers, U. S. Army.

CAMP NEAR COLD HARBOR, VA.,

May 25, 1862.

GENERAL: In accordance with orders received from you I proceeded yesterday morning (24th instant), with Captain McMillan, Second U. S. Infantry; Captain Forsyth, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry; Lieutenant Custer, Fifth U. S. Cavalry; Messrs. Churchill and Humphreys, *attachés* of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, and an escort of the Fourth Michigan, Colonel Woodbury commanding, and a squadron of the Second U. S. Cavalry, Captain Gordon commanding, to make a reconnaissance of the Chickahominy River between New Bridge and a point about 2 miles above. We proceeded to a Mr. Hogan's house, and from there, under cover of the woods, we reached a point about 200 yards from the river. Near this point, about half a mile above the bridge, Lieutenant Custer, Messrs. Churchill, Humphreys, and myself had found a good ford and had crossed the river on the previous day (23d). About 60 men were deployed as skirmishers, dashed out of the woods at a double-quick, half the number crossing the river, the whole forming a line perpendicular to the river, and moving down toward the bridge, the main body moving by the flank parallel to the river. About 300 yards from the crossing we found the enemy and charged them. Captain Gordon, with his squadron, now made a charge down to the bridge, to try to cut off the enemy, who were on the other side of the river. He was not able to effect this. The bridge was burned and the ford not suitable for cavalry at this point. The enemy could be seen on the opposite side running at double-quick, deployed as skirmishers, and not 30 yards from us.

The balance of four companies of the Fourth Michigan were immediately thrown over the river and formed a line parallel to the stream. As our men had all moved at a double-quick, we were thus enabled to cut off a number of the enemy. Our men crossed under a severe fire, the water in places being up to their armpits, obliging them to take off their cartridge boxes and hold them above their heads.

Our whole line was now formed in a ditch on the opposite side of the stream, this ditch being a portion of a fence, and more than knee-deep in water.

We covered the bridge and drove the enemy back beyond musket range, when they opened upon us with artillery. The enemy, strongly re-enforced, advanced upon us, but we held him in check till our ammunition gave out. No re-enforcements coming to our aid, and the object of the reconnaissance being accomplished, it was deemed advisable to withdraw our troops. This was done in most excellent order under a fire of artillery and musketry, the men carrying across a deep stream everything from the field excepting the dead of the enemy. They treated the enemy with the greatest kindness, giving the wounded their water-proof coats and blankets, the want of which was felt during a severe rain that lasted the whole time of the reconnaissance.

All of the officers and men were exposed to a severe fire of musketry and part of the time to that of artillery. The action lasted over four hours. The strength of the enemy, from the accounts of the prisoners taken, was one brigade, under General Semmes. Two regiments of this brigade were driven back a mile or more by four companies of the

Fourth Michigan, and the whole force held in check by the same four companies, the other six companies and the cavalry forming the reserve on this side of the stream. Our loss was 1 killed, 1 mortally wounded, and about 5 or 6 less severely. The loss of the enemy was 22 prisoners, including 1 lieutenant, unhurt, and 17 wounded in our possession.

By the accounts of prisoners since taken and by what we could observe the enemy's loss in killed, &c., was at least 100, including a field officer and several other commissioned officers. I would respectfully ask that the names of the following persons be placed before the general-in-chief as having displayed the most gallant bearing under a severe fire: Captain McMillan, Second U. S. Infantry; Captain Forsyth, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, to whose cool judgment much is due; Captain Gordon, Second U. S. Cavalry, for his dashing charge; Lieutenant Custer, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, who was the first to cross the stream, the first to open fire upon the enemy, and one of the last to leave the field; Messrs. Churchill and Humphreys, *attachés* of the Topographical Engineers. These two last-named gentlemen, with Lieutenant Custer, deserve the most honorable mention for their conduct on the previous day (23d) in crossing the river at the ford. Too much praise cannot be given to Colonel Woodbury and his command, as well as to that of Captain Gordon, a small command of about 50.

For the topographical details I would refer to the sketch of Captain McMillan and Mr. Churchill. Our men have since held possession of the bridge.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
NICOLAS BOWEN,

First Lieutenant, Topographical Engineers.

General A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Chief Top. Engs., Army of Potomac.*

[Indorsement.]

HDQRS. TOP. ENGS., ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 27, 1862.

Respectfully submitted to the chief of the staff.

The commanding general of the army has been already made acquainted, by a verbal report from me, with the admirable manner in which the reconnaissance near New Bridge was conducted by Lieutenant Bowen, and how well he was aided by those associated with him. At my request, a written report has been made, from which it is apparent with what gallantry those associated with Lieutenant Bowen and the officers and men of the escort performed their duty. I beg leave to bring to the notice of the commanding general the skill, gallantry, and energy exhibited by Lieutenant Bowen in executing this reconnaissance.

A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Major, Comdg. Top. Engs., and Brig. Gen. Vols.

No. 3.

Report of Col. Dwight A. Woodbury, Fourth Michigan Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH MICHIGAN VOLUNTEERS,
May 24, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to orders received from General Porter I have to report that with 500 of my regiment and one squadron of the Second

Cavalry, Captain [Gordon], we arrived at an early hour on the banks of the Chickahominy about three-quarters of a mile above New Bridge. The first platoon of Company A was thrown forward as skirmishers, supported by the second, with instructions to cross the river and beat the woods in front, in order to feel the position of the enemy. They crossed without difficulty at double-quick, and not discovering the enemy, except a few cavalry pickets on the hill some miles distant, at once deployed and followed down the river, supported by balance of the regiment on this side. The skirmishers approached within about 400 yards of the bridge, when they came upon the camp of the enemy, who were apparently unaware of our presence, being gathered in squads through the camp. The skirmishers at once opened fire upon them, throwing them into confusion. They, however, rallied, deployed as skirmishers, when I at once put three companies over to support our skirmishers, the men being compelled to wade up to their armpits. At this time the firing became rapid, and the enemy being re-enforced by two regiments from their right, I sent over five companies more at the crossing near the destroyed bridge, and after sharp firing for half an hour the enemy were driven entirely from their position, our men maintaining their ground.

Their artillery having opened upon us, and discovering the enemy in strong force on the hills thrown forward as skirmishers, I deemed it prudent to retire, which we did in good order, bringing over our own wounded, together with some 10 or 12 of the enemy's. We took some 37 prisoners, including 1 officer. The enemy's loss could not have been less than 150 killed and wounded. We counted in front of our companies 28 dead, and could see them lying in all parts of the field. Our loss is 1 killed and 7 wounded, 2 probably mortally.

I cannot close this report without mentioning the gallant conduct of Captain ——* and Lieutenant Bowen, of General McClellan's staff. Captain ——* was first to cross the river with the skirmishers, and was with them during the engagement. Lieutenant Bowen was in the thickest of the fight, and had his horse shot under him. The conduct of my own officers was, without exception, faultless, and both officers and men gave conclusive evidence of their coolness under fire.

I am, captain, with much respect, your obedient servant,

DWIGHT A. WOODBURY,
Colonel Fourth Michigan Volunteers.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH PROVISIONAL ARMY CORPS,
Cold Harbor, Va., May 24, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded. From the reports I hear, and from this I can but believe, the Fourth Michigan Regiment behaved most admirably and was well handled. The result proves it.

F. J. PORTER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

* Reference is probably to Lieut. George A. Custer.

No. 4.

Report of Brig. Gen. John W. Davidson, U. S. Army, commanding brigade.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SMITH'S DIVISION,
Camp near New Bridge, Chickahominy River, Va., May 26, 1862.

I have to make the following report of the affair at Mechanicsville, Va., on the morning of the 24th :

About noon on the 23d instant I received orders from you to move my brigade and Wheeler's battery up to Mechanicsville and occupy that point to protect the rear of General Stoneman's advance, which was to operate on the railroad. On the arrival of General Stoneman at Brandy Run Bridge, about one mile this side of the village, he found the enemy in position on this side of the village, who opened upon him with their battery. After an artillery combat of about half an hour's duration he silenced their battery and turned the affair over to me. I moved my brigade and artillery across the stream, but night coming on, and being satisfied the enemy had not evacuated the village, and knowing nothing of the approaches to it nor of their force, I determined to postpone further operations until daybreak of the next morning. On advancing my pickets about 600 yards we were fired upon by those of the enemy. At daylight in the morning I attacked the village. The enemy opened upon us at the same time with their artillery and infantry, who fired upon our advanced lines from the houses, barns, trees, and hedges. I advanced my battery of four pieces a section at a time, and finding it was difficult to silence the enemy's guns with four pieces, I sent back to General Stoneman for a section of horse artillery, who promptly sent up Captain Pennington's section of Tidball's battery. As soon as it arrived I threw forward my whole line of skirmishers, pushed forward my pieces upon the enemy, properly supported, to within between 300 and 400 yards of the village, and concentrating my fire, silenced their pieces and drove them out of the houses. As soon as I saw this being accomplished the Seventy-seventh New York Volunteers, Col. James B. McKean commanding, which had occupied during the engagement the road on the right of the village, was thrown into it upon the heels of the retreating enemy, who in their flight left behind them a part of their knapsacks and a flag of one of their regiments. Two prisoners fell into our hands, who informed us that the force opposed to us was the Eighth and Ninth Georgia Regiments, numbering, one, 700, and the other, 800 men; two sections of the Washington Light Artillery of Louisiana, and a squadron of cavalry.

The Seventh Maine and Forty-ninth New York Vols., of my brigade, were posted on the right and left of the road, supporting batteries. Part of the Thirty-third New York Vols. formed my line of skirmishers, and the remainder of the regiment was held in reserve. My casualties were 2 killed and 11 wounded; 1 artillery horse killed and 1 wounded.

All my officers and men behaved with great coolness under fire. The enemy's artillery practice and that of their sharpshooters was good. I regret to say that Col. E. C. Mason, commanding the Seventh Maine Volunteers, was stunned and injured in the early part of the action by a fall from his horse, caused by the explosion of a shell under him. His valuable services were thus lost to me. Lieut. Col. J. W. Corning, Thirty-third New York Volunteers, rendered me valuable services in command of my advanced line of skirmishers. My staff, Captain Martindale, Captain Russell, Lieutenants Long, Cameron, and McGunnegle, were active during the engagement.

Besides the force at the village the enemy had in sight during the day at different times a disposable force of three regiments of infantry to our left on the Richmond road, and two regiments of infantry and three pieces of artillery on our left and rear across the Chickahominy. During the engagement the enemy opened fire upon us from a battery on the Richmond road, but their shots fell short.

After occupying the village I drove their skirmishers across the bridge over the Chickahominy on the Dispatch road to Richmond and cut the nearest bay across the river. I would especially mention to the commanding general the dashing conduct of Captain Wheeler, of the New York battery, and Captain Pennington, of Tidball's regular battery.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

J. W. DAVIDSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. L. D. H. CURRIE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

No. 5.

Report of Capt. John C. Tidball, Second U. S. Artillery.

CAMP NEAR MECHANICSVILLE, VA.,
May 25, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that about 12 m. on the 23d instant my battery was ordered from its camp near New Bridge, over the Chickahominy River, for the purpose of shelling the ground occupied by the enemy in the vicinity of that bridge.

The pieces were placed in battery near the mansion of Dr. Gaines, and from there opened a steady and well-directed fire on the point indicated. The enemy made no reply, but, from the report of those in the balloon, fled from their position. After firing 93 rounds the battery was withdrawn, and a few minutes afterward started on its march toward Mechanicsville. A few rods after the head of the column, of which the left section of my battery constituted an advanced portion, had passed the bridge over Bell's Creek, several cannon-shots were fired by the enemy from pieces on the eminence immediately in our front.

Immediately the commanding general (Stoneman) directed the leading section to be brought in battery on the top of the hill, which from the winding of the road was upon the left hand. In a few seconds this was done, and the pieces opened upon a section of the enemy posted at a little greater elevation, in full view and about 1,000 yards distant. A few rounds from my pieces caused them to withdraw behind the hill upon which they were situated. From this position they continued firing for about half an hour, but all their projectiles passed over my section and did no damage. This section was commanded by First Lieutenant Dennison, Second Artillery, and it gives me much pleasure to testify to the skill and ability with which he managed it under fire. The non-commissioned officers and privates of this section also did their duty nobly. Having a scarcity of cannoneers, the drivers voluntarily dismounted and assisted at the service of their guns. Private Keck was most conspicuous in this duty. The remaining four pieces of my

battery—the right section, under First Lieutenant and Brevet Captain Pennington, and the center, under Second Lieutenant Clarke—were posted under your immediate directions on the other side of Bell's Creek from that upon which was stationed the section of Lieutenant Dennison. From this position they kept up for some time a fire upon the enemy, and owing to the nature of the ground and their distance were particularly exposed to the missiles of the enemy, but fortunately no injury whatever was sustained. The section under Lieutenant Dennison fired 74 shots; the other two sections fired 25 together.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. C. TIDBALL,

Captain, Second Artillery, Commanding Horse Company A.

Lieut. Col. WILLIAM HAYS, Comdg. Horse Brig.

No. 6.

Report of Lieut. Alexander C. M. Pennington, Second U. S. Artillery.

MECHANICSVILLE, VA., May 26, 1862.

CAPTAIN: My section having been detached from the battery on the morning of the 24th instant to join Brigadier-General Davidson, at his ardent request for a section of flying artillery, he being then engaged with the enemy who occupied the village of Mechanicsville in force with infantry and artillery, I have the honor to make the following report as to how the section was employed from the time I left you at 7 o'clock a. m. on the 24th until I rejoined the battery at 12 o'clock m. on the 25th:

Immediately upon leaving you I started the section at a brisk trot down the road toward the scene of action, and when I arrived about 1,000 yards from the village I halted my section in a field upon the right-hand side of the road until I could find General Davidson, which I soon did, and asked him where he wished me to place my guns. I had sent one of my cannoneers on ahead to inform General Davidson that the section was on its way to join him, and when I arrived he had already selected the spot from which I was to open. It was in a wheat field, which gradually sloped up toward the houses in which the enemy was concealed, the highest point of the slope being about 200 yards from the buildings. Before entering the field a fence had to be taken down, for which purpose General Davidson sent for some infantry, but as they were some distance off I dismounted my cannoneers to avoid delay. After tearing down a sufficient amount I mounted the cannoneers and started the section up the slope at a trot until I reached the top of the rise, when I brought the section into battery. The enemy opening a brisk fire upon us as soon as we appeared above the rise, I sent my limbers well back under cover of the slope and opened a well-directed and deliberate fire of canister upon the buildings.

After I had fired a few rounds of canister the enemy opened a section of artillery upon us, some of the shot striking very near the battery. I directed one of my guns upon the spot where I supposed the enemy's guns to be situated and fired three shells, each of which burst apparently near the enemy's battery. After my third shot the enemy ceased firing and removed their pieces. My other piece in the mean time kept up a rapid fire upon different parts of the village and the woods adjacent, the riflemen in the buildings keeping up all this time a brisk fire

upon us. Finding that my ammunition was getting low I sent back to you for the limbers of the caissons, which were promptly sent, and arrived when much needed. The enemy under the heavy fire kept up upon them were finally compelled to evacuate the town, and I received an order from General Davidson to cease firing and remain in battery till further orders. A heavy rain set in just as I commenced firing and did not cease during the action. The firing notwithstanding was well kept up. An examination of the buildings after the affair testified to the accuracy of the firing, as the buildings were completely riddled with shell and canister. After the village had been occupied by our troops General Davidson ordered me to place one of my guns in the village to sweep the roads leading to the bridges and the other he wished to go with him. He told me that I could either stay with the gun in the village or accompany that which went with him. Preferring to remain in the village, I sent the other gun under its chief of piece, Corporal [William] Mathes, with General Davidson. I remained in the village on picket duty during the night, and the next morning my other gun, which had been actively employed under fire during its absence, joined me by order of General Davidson. General Davidson spoke very highly of the services rendered by the piece while with him. After this piece joined me it was placed at the junction of the Ashland and Richmond roads, to sweep a road leading to a bridge across the river some distance below, where the Richmond road crosses it. At 12 m. I was relieved by order of General Stoneman, and returned to the battery.

It gives me much pleasure to state that the men served the guns with alacrity, coolness, and ability. Sergt. [William] Brauns and Corporal Mathes deserve a great deal of credit for the manner in which they handled their pieces. I fired during the action 58 rounds. Corporal Mathes while detached fired 47 rounds, but replenished his limbers from the caisson.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. C. M. PENNINGTON,

First Lieutenant and Brevet Captain, Second Artillery.

Capt. J. C. TIDBALL, *Comdg. Light Co. A, Second Artillery.*

No. 7.

Report of Capt. Charles C. Wheeler, Battery E, First New York Light Artillery.

CAMP SEVEN MILES FROM RICHMOND,
General Smith's Division, May 26, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In accordance with orders from Captain Ayres, chief of artillery, General Smith's division, I reported to General Davidson, commanding Third Brigade, with the battery under my command, on the 23d instant, at 3 p. m., and proceeded with the brigade to the position taken by it near a branch of the Chickahominy, remaining in reserve during the cannonade that took place that afternoon near said branch until about 6 p. m., when by General Davidson's order I went into battery on a ridge covering the ground to the right and front. Just about dark we crossed the stream and went into battery on a steep bank, relieving a section of horse artillery there, and remaining in battery during the night of the 23d.

Early on the morning of the 24th, by order of General Davidson, I sent one piece of artillery to the right of the road leading to Mechanicsville, under charge of Lieutenant Parker, who opened fire upon two pieces of artillery in the village at a distance of about 1,600 yards, apparently with good effect, and after firing two shells at a body of troops drawn up in line of battle across the Chickahominy, at a distance of about 3,000 yards, causing them thereby to change their position for one less exposed, I opened fire with two pieces on the troops of the enemy occupying Mechanicsville, keeping one piece in reserve. The fire from the two pieces was quite effective, as the enemy quickly and repeatedly changed the position of his pieces and finally for a while ceased firing. The general then ordered the entire battery to the right of the road and to a position 800 yards nearer the village, when we opened a heavy fire upon the houses and woods in rear, occupied by the enemy, and advanced by half battery until we were within about 500 yards of the village and keeping up the fire until the enemy retreated. The houses were much cut up and torn by our shells.

When the infantry took possession of the village we went into battery on the left of the road on a ridge commanding the road leading directly across the Chickahominy, remaining there until about 4 p. m., when by order of General Davidson I placed the battery in position near the place first occupied by it on the 23d, and commanding the road and country toward Mechanicsville. I remained in battery here until the morning of the 25th, when by order of the general I placed the battery on the left of the road near the bridge crossing the branch near the mill, one section commanding the country toward the Chickahominy and one section to enfilade the road leading to the bridge. Here I remained until about 5 p. m., when by order of General Davidson I proceeded to Mechanicsville, placing one section to command the road leading from the village to the right and leaving one piece in reserve. We remained here in battery until the morning of the 26th, when, after firing two percussion shells at a body of troops across the Chickahominy, distant some 2,800 yards, exploding both shells directly in front of them and putting them into some confusion, by order of the general I returned to camp. I have lost no men killed or wounded. I have lost one horse killed by cannon-shot and one wounded by rifle-ball.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. C. WHEELER,

Captain, Commanding Battery E, First New York Artillery.

Captain MARTINDALE,

A. A. G. to General Davidson, commanding Third Brig.

No. 8.

Report of Lieut. Col. Selden Connor, Seventh Maine Infantry.

CAMP OF SEVENTH MAINE VOLUNTEERS,
Third Brigade, Smith's Division, May 26, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 24th instant, the date of the affair at Mechanicsville, I received orders to join my regiment with the three companies of it which under my command had been doing picket duty the previous night. I found the regiment at about 6 o'clock a. m., and immediately took command, as Colonel

Mason had been disabled a few minutes before by a fall from his horse. The regiment was in line of battle behind a ditch and thicket on the extreme left of our line, and about 300 yards in advance of its bivouac the night before. In obedience to orders, received after remaining in this position about an hour, I moved forward in line of battle 200 yards, and halted, ordering my men to sit down, in order to avoid the balls which came over the crest of the hill from the enemy's skirmishers.

At the expiration of twenty or thirty minutes I moved the regiment farther to the front and a little to the right, into the open field, to support the skirmishers of the Forty-ninth New York, which were only 50 yards in front of me, on the crest of the hill intervening between my regiment and the enemy, located in the skirts of the village. Here we were much exposed, the hill not being high enough to shield us from the enemy's sharpshooters, who fired upon us from trees and housetops. The bullets fell thickly around the regiment, but fortunately one man only was wounded, and he slightly, although several had their clothing pierced.

Soon after, in obedience to orders, I detached Company G, Lieutenant Johnson commanding, to support two guns, which were posted by General Davidson in person upon the crest of the hill, thus securing so short and direct a range that the enemy was soon dislodged and forced to retreat. As soon as the enemy started to leave I was ordered to the top of the hill, when the action, so far as I saw, ceased. My men did not have an opportunity to fire a shot, but they were cool and steady under a fire which they could not return.

Respectfully submitted.

SELDEN CONNOR,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Seventh Maine Volunteers.

Lieut. WILLIAM H. LONG,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brigade.

No. 9.

Report of Lieut. Col. Joseph W. Corning, Thirty-third New York Infantry.

CAMP IN THE FIELD, May 26, 1862.

GENERAL: I have to report that, in obedience to orders from you on the morning of 24th of May instant, I detached Companies B, G, and K, of the Thirty-third Regiment New York State Volunteers, and marched them a short distance in advance of the leading regiment of the brigade, and there deployed Company K, commanded by Capt. Patrick McGraw, Lieut. B. Byrne, to the right of the road running westerly to Mechanicsville, and Company B, commanded by Lieut. H. J. Draime, Lieut. John W. Corning, Company G, Capt. T. B. Hamilton, Lieut. A. E. Eustaphieve, being placed near the center of the line and about 50 yards to the rear, and moved forward from the point where the deployment was made to the village. The march was over cleared fields, the ground gradually ascending.

Near sunrise, as the line of skirmishers arrived upon the crest of the hill, about 200 yards to the eastward of the turnpike, we discovered a body of infantry moving rapidly south down the turnpike. I ordered the skirmishers to fire upon them, when they broke and ran, filing to the left, under cover of a dwelling-house and outbuildings, of which there was a continuous line, to within 50 yards of the position then oc-

cupied by my skirmishers, and at the same time a piece of artillery opened fire on the woods on the right of Dr. ——'s house and another opened fire on my right from a position to the north of that house. I soon ascertained that the enemy had a much larger force than I at first supposed, including some cavalry, and that they were concealed in and behind every building, behind the fences, and some in trees, from which cover they kept up a brisk fire, and, at the same time, were so concealed that my men could seldom see one, so as to return the fire. I then allowed the skirmishers to fall back about 20 yards, in order that they might get under cover of the hill. As soon as the artillery got their fire to bear and to do execution upon the buildings the enemy began to leave them rapidly, and soon after appeared to be retreating. I then moved the line of skirmishers up to the crest of the hill, and as I saw the Seventy-seventh New York Volunteers advancing on double-quick I ordered on my men, arriving in the place simultaneously with that regiment, and found the place entirely vacated by the enemy. I immediately changed the front of the line of skirmishers to the left, and advanced them southerly to about half-way from the village to the Chickahominy and halted, where we remained until late in the day we were relieved by the picket guard.

The officers of the several companies discharged their duty with much deliberation and bravery, and the men generally stood the severe fire to which they were for a time entirely exposed remarkably well. The casualties of my command on that day were 1 private killed, 1 sergeant and 2 privates wounded, of Company K, and 1 private of Company G wounded. Several others had their clothes perforated with balls, and some guns were damaged.

Respectfully submitted.

JOS. W. CORNING,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Thirty-third Regiment New York Vols.

No. 10.

Report of Col. James B. McKean, Seventy-seventh New York Infantry.

HDQRS. SEVENTY-SEVENTH REGT. N. Y. S. VOLS,
Near Mechanicsville, Va., May 26, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the afternoon of Friday, May 23 instant, this regiment and the rest of the Third Brigade, Smith's division, advanced toward Richmond by the road leading through Mechanicsville, and when we were between 2 and 3 miles from and in front of that village we were fired upon by the enemy's artillery, stationed in a field by the side of the road about half a mile in front of us. The position of the enemy commanded the bridge by which we were to cross a portion of the Chickahominy swamp. A deep ravine, swampy and miry, lay on our right, and entering the swamp mentioned above nearly at right angles.

In obedience to the commands of Brigadier-General Davidson I deployed my regiment as skirmishers and pushed through the miry ravine on our right into and through the field beyond. Then sweeping around to the left, we skirmished through the first-mentioned swamp about a mile to the right of the bridge—a swamp through which it was impossible to drive or lead the horses of the field and staff, and where I, my officers and men, sank deep in the mud and water. On ascending the

opposite side and moving to the left toward the bridge I found that the enemy had retired to Mechanicsville, more than a mile farther back. I here rejoined the rest of the brigade that had crossed by the bridge.

It was now, and for some time had been, quite dark. I threw out, by General Davidson's directions, two companies of pickets toward Mechanicsville, who found themselves near the enemy's pickets, and were several times fired upon by them during the night. Shots were thus received as late as 2 o'clock on the morning of the 24th. The rest of the regiment slept on their arms.

At daybreak on the next morning the brigade was placed in position for battle. By the order of General Davidson I put my regiment in line of battle in an open field to the right of the road and moved it forward toward the village. On approaching the summit of a gentle acclivity about a quarter of a mile in front of the village the enemy opened upon us with shell, canister, and solid shot. The men did not recoil, but continued to advance. By General Davidson's order I soon halted the regiment, the fire of the enemy continuing and increasing. I then commanded, "Down, men! down!" when the men fell to the ground, and the shot of the enemy passed over them, doing little damage. At length, by the command of General Davidson, for the double purpose of giving place to Wheeler's battery and taking a less exposed position, I moved the regiment some 20 or 30 rods to the right, and halted in a gentle hollow in the field, receiving several discharges of canister and shell from the enemy's guns while moving to and after taking that position.

Wheeler's battery then most effectually riddled the village, driving the enemy's sharpshooters out of the buildings, and causing his artillery to reply at longer and still longer intervals until it was silent. General Davidson then commanded me to charge upon, seize, and hold the village. Breaking my regiment into column by companies I put them on a double-quick, and with a prolonged and defiant shout they rushed toward the village and the foe. The enemy's artillery dashed down the road toward Richmond; his infantry, many of the men throwing off their knapsacks, ran across a broad field in rear of the village and into the wood. The village and the enemy's position were taken. Two of my companies, deployed as skirmishers, followed the retreating enemy through the field and through the adjoining wood. We had the pleasure of capturing an artillery or cavalry flag from the enemy. It is the "Stars and Bars," and bears the motto, "Victory or death." We took one prisoner, who was wounded so late in the engagement that he had not been sent to the rear.

I ought not to conclude this report without expressing my conviction that had the plans and orders of the general commanding been less skillful and considerate this regiment would have to mourn some scores of slain, whereas it sustained a loss of 1 killed and 6 wounded.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. B. McKEAN,

Colonel Seventy-seventh Regiment N. Y. S. Volunteers.

Lieut. WILLIAM H. LONG,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 11.

Report of Col. Beverly H. Robertson, Fourth Virginia Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH VIRGINIA CAVALRY,
Near Meadow Bridge, Va., May 24, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to state that, in obedience to orders received from Major-General Magruder, commanding the right wing, I proceeded yesterday afternoon with the Eighth and Ninth Georgia Regiments, one 8-pounder rifled gun from the Washington Artillery, and one 6-pounder howitzer, belonging to the Wise Artillery, both commanded by Capt. T. L. Rosser, of the Washington Artillery, and a portion of the First and Fourth Virginia Cavalry, to reoccupy Mechanicsville, from which our cavalry force had retired on the day previous. The rifled gun, being speedily placed in position, opened fire upon the enemy's cavalry, drawn up on the opposite hill, doing considerable execution, as was plainly visible. The enemy soon opened a battery of six pieces and rapid firing was kept up for a considerable time. As our gun was completely sheltered, the enemy did not obtain its range, and hence few or no casualties occurred on our side. Later in the afternoon (about sundown) this piece was withdrawn and necessary arrangements made for a renewal of hostilities in the morning.

Soon after daylight next morning an extended line of infantry skirmishers was seen advancing upon the river road, which was promptly met by our sharpshooters and speedily driven back behind the crest of a hill parallel to the turnpike. Heavy skirmishing with musketry then ensued for thirty minutes, when our howitzer opened upon a house in and behind which many of the enemy had sought shelter. They were soon put to flight, and, as well as I could judge, with considerable loss. By this time one of the enemy's batteries had opened a brisk fire, doing some damage to the horses of the howitzer, the location of which seemed to be accurately ascertained.

For some length of time the skirmishing between the infantry continued, the enemy being invariably driven back whenever they made their appearance. I then ordered an observation to be made from the top of a house by means of a ladder, and learned that two regiments of infantry and three pieces of artillery were marching to my left. I had scarcely ordered the Ninth Regiment, Col. R. A. Turnipseed, forward to prevent my left flank being turned, when the enemy's artillery in that direction opened such a galling fire upon our howitzer that [it] was compelled to retire. I then ordered the whole line to fall back some 300 yards to a sheltered position in the woods, leaving the skirmishers to cover this movement, which they did effectually. The fighting had been kept up for about four hours, and the retirement was made in perfect order, and a new line of battle on the skirts of the woods rapidly established, under a terrible fire from the enemy's cannon, at a very short range. As soon as our two pieces had fairly commenced a rapid exchange of shots I received an order to withdraw my entire command to the other side of the Chickahominy, which was effected without further loss.

The visible force of the enemy consisted of three regiments of infantry, two batteries of artillery, and one regiment of cavalry. Their loss must have been considerable. Five are known to have been killed to-day and two yesterday.

Our loss is as follows: Eighth Regiment, Col. L. M. Lamar, 2 wounded (1 mortally and left on the field); Ninth [Regiment], Colonel

Turnipseed, 3 wounded; Wise Artillery, 2 wounded. Captain Rosser received a severe flesh wound in the arm, which, though, did not prevent his commanding his pieces while the engagement continued.

My thanks are especially due to Colonel Lamar for the prompt and efficient execution of orders in the disposition of the infantry forces. The officers and men behaved most gallantly; their coolness and steadiness under fire bespoke them veterans worthy of the fame so dearly bought on the plains of Manassas.

Captain Rosser displayed much judgment in placing his pieces, which, under his personal supervision, were served in the most handsome style.

My adjutant, Lieutenant Martin, rendered invaluable assistance in the rapid and timely transmission of orders.

The squadrons of the First and Fourth Virginia Cavalry, being in reserve, were not called into action.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

B. H. ROBERTSON,
Colonel, Commanding.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Cavalry Brigade.

No. 12.

Report of Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, R. W. D. P.,
Outpost, New Bridge, Va., May 25, 1862.

CAPTAIN: Herewith I have the honor to transmit the report of Col. T. G. Hunt, commanding the Fifth Louisiana Volunteers, of the bloody skirmish between his regiment and the enemy on the 24th instant at New Bridge, to which is appended a list of his casualties. The enemy's loss is unknown, but supposed to be equal to ours.

A portion of the Tenth Georgia Volunteers, Colonel Cumming, was thrown forward as skirmishers, with proper reserves and supports, to the support of the Fifth Louisiana Volunteers; but the latter having driven the enemy to the river, Colonel Cumming was ordered to halt his skirmishers under cover of a ditch some hundreds of yards to its rear, and Colonel Hunt to establish the Fifth Louisiana Volunteers on Colonel Cumming's right, to await an attack in force which was expected. Colonel Cumming's loss was 3 wounded, a list of which will be found herewith.

A gun of Captain Manly's battery was brought into requisition, but fired only a few rounds, owing to the proximity of the combatants. The affair terminated by a discharge from this gun.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

PAUL J. SEMMES,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. T. S. McINTOSH,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 13.

Report of Col. A. Cumming, Tenth Georgia Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS TENTH GEORGIA REGIMENT,
In the Field, May 27, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 24th instant the pickets of the Fifth Louisiana Regiment having been attacked while guarding New Bridge by a force of the enemy that crossed the stream above them, by direction of the brigadier-general commanding three companies of my regiment (C, E, and I) were sent to the support of the Louisiana regiment. They advanced as skirmishers and deployed on the left of that regiment. When it fell back they also withdrew a few hundred yards out of the immediate fire of the enemy, who was concealed and entirely out of view, many of his men being across the stream and out of reach of our smooth-bore guns. The three companies held the position they took up until dark, when they were relieved by other companies of the regiment. While exposed to the fire of the enemy, but unable to reply to it, 3 men were wounded, all of C company; 1 of them, Sergeant Adams, seriously in the head; the other 2 slightly. Two days before, the same company (C), while on duty at New Bridge, killed 2 Yankee cavalry soldiers, left on the field, and 1 horse.

Yours, respectfully,

A. CUMMING,
Colonel, Tenth Georgia Regiment, Commanding.

Captain CLEMONS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 14.

Report of Col. T. G. Hunt, Fifth Louisiana Infantry.

NEW BRIDGE, May 24, 1862.

GENERAL: In pursuance of the regulations I have the honor to submit the following report:

The Fifth Regiment Louisiana Volunteers was on picket duty this morning on the south line of the Chickahominy River at New Bridge. One of its companies was deployed as skirmishers on the line of the river, on the right of the bridge, and two were deployed on the left of it. The left of the line of skirmishers rested on a ford. The other companies were held in reserve.

About 9.30 a. m. the enemy having, it is believed, crossed the river at a ford $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles above our brigade, appeared suddenly and unexpectedly, in considerable force, on the left flank of the skirmishers and opened a brisk fire upon them. The skirmishers were thrown into confusion and retreated some distance in disorder; but several of the companies of the reserve and the company on the right of the bridge, being promptly thrown forward, they rallied and reformed, and these forces engaged the enemy. The enemy on the opposite side of the river co-operating with their forces on our flank, effected a crossing and drove our troops back about 400 yards. Upon this the order was given to all the companies of the regiment to charge. It was gallantly executed, and the enemy was forced back and compelled to recross the river.

Rallying on the other side of the river, and probably re-enforced and availing themselves of the superior shelter afforded by the trees there, they delivered a galling fire upon the regiment. The regiment suffering severely, it was commanded to retire, and it did so in good order to the distance of 400 or 500 yards, when it was halted and deployed in line. The contest then ended. The enemy withdrew from the river. The skirmish lasted upward of two hours. It was commenced under circumstances unfavorable to the regiment; but I am gratified to state that the officers and men conducted themselves boldly and faithfully.

A proper detail was sent forward to bring off the wounded and the dead. A detailed report of casualties from the adjutant of the regiment, annexed to this report as a part of it, shows 18 killed, 23 wounded, and 34 missing; in all, 75.* Second Lieutenant Pindell, of Company B, who had been assigned to the command of Company I, was killed while gallantly leading the company to the charge; Second Lieutenant Johnson, of Company H, was severely wounded in the right arm; Second Lieutenant Steinmark, of Company D, was shot through the breast. The wound has not proved fatal.

I have the honor to be, general, with great respect, your obedient servant,

T. G. HUNT,

Colonel, Commanding Fifth Regiment Louisiana Volunteers.

Brig. Gen. PAUL J. SEMMES.

MAY 24, 1862.—Reconnaissance toward Hanover Court-House, Va.

REPORTS.

No. 1.—Col. Robert O. Tyler, First Connecticut Heavy Artillery

No. 2.—Col. Richard H. Rush, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

No. 1.

Report of Col. Robert O. Tyler, First Connecticut Heavy Artillery.

CAMP NEAR OLD CHURCH,

May 24, 1862—10.45 a. m.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that since my report of 6 a. m. I have returned to this place. Colonel Rush reported as the result of his reconnaissance that he had found the enemy in strong force enough to confirm the more moderate reports which had reached us (say from 3,000 to 5,000), and that there was a show of pursuit on their part. I placed the infantry in position and allowed the Lancers to pass, but receiving no attack I returned to this point, having just destroyed the Hanover (Old Town) Ferry and one between that and the Court-House by scuttling the boats and cutting the ropes. I still hold New Castle Ferry, but have not secured the boat at Pipingtree. My pickets and vedettes are placed as before. An officer sent out yesterday spent the day without finding General Stoneman.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. O. TYLER,

Colonel, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. FITZ JOHN PORTER, *Comdg. Fifth Army Corps.*

* The list reports 10 officers and 17 men killed, 2 officers and 21 men wounded, and 10 officers and 33 men missing.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH PROVISIONAL ARMY CORPS,
Cold Harbor, Va., May 24, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded. Under the circumstances I approved of the course pursued by Colonel Tyler. Since his return Colonel Warren, Fifth New York, and Captain Weeden, Rhode Island Battery, have joined the command stationed at Old Church.

F. J. PORTER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

No. 2.

Report of Col. Richard H. Rush, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

CAMP AT OLD CHURCH,
May 24, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to your orders verbally given at the foot of the hill near Dr. Brokenbrough's, on the Hanover Court-House road, I proceeded in the direction of the Court-House with two companies of my regiment and an advance guard of 40 men, in all about 125 men. When I first left Hanover town I rose a hill, passed through thick wood for three-quarters of a mile, and then emerged on an open cultivated meadow extending below and in front of us for nearly $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, perfectly level, with hedges and trees in various lines. When we first descended from the wood into the meadow the road was much concealed by the trees on each side, but very soon we found ourselves in full view from the whole plain. With the previous information that we had received before I left your command to make this reconnaissance in regard to the strength of the enemy at Hanover Court-House and on the road previous to getting there I had to feel my way with great care.

At the point marked A on the sketch herewith forwarded I ascertained from the negroes that news of the approach of your whole column had been brought half an hour before, and that "old master" had at once gone down to the road and informed a rebel picket of 15 men (mounted), who, they informed us, had left as we approached, all except one man, who was left at an angle of the road and sent off at full speed toward the wood as we appeared half a mile off. I sent 15 men in pursuit, following with 20 more at 200 yards, and we soon reached the wood. Word was here brought me from the front that the rebels, about 10 to 15, had just emerged again from this wood and were passing over an open space again on the other side. As soon as I got to this open space I halted my 20 men, and heard again from the front that in leaving the wood where I then was the rebels had been increased to from 35 to 50, who had passed rapidly over this open space of about 500 yards, where they were halted and some 12 to 20 of them dismounted, all fronting us, and as I heard there was a strong infantry picket soon to be met, I assumed this must be the place, as the cavalry at once halted in the wood, the edge of which on each side gave a dense cover to infantry that entirely commanded the road. My advance party of 15 having informed me of this state of things, and as we were then nearly 4 miles from Hanover Court-House, I deemed it of no use to attack this picket, as I had every chance of losing many men, and, at

most, only driving them farther to their rear, with the ordinary contingencies of battle of not being successful. Except my 15 advance I did not show any more of my men, but withdrew and rejoined the main body, having pushed my reconnaissance $4\frac{1}{4}$ miles from where I left the main body.

From all the information I could get, sifting it and properly weighing it, I assume that this morning there was a force at Hanover Court-House of not less than 3,000 infantry, six pieces of cannon, and 300 cavalry, four regiments of infantry having arrived day before yesterday. I further think that they are now in sufficient force to move upon us at this point with success, and would suggest at least four pieces of artillery and another regiment of infantry to make this place up to the Hanover Ferry secure.

Very truly, yours,

RICH'D H. RUSH,
Colonel Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry (Lancers).

MAY 24-27, 1862.—Reconnaissances to Seven Pines, Va., and skirmishes.

REPORTS.

No. 1.—Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Corps, of operations May 24.

No. 2.—Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, commanding division, of operations May 25.

No. 3.—Brig. Gen. Henry M. Naglee, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.

No. 4.—Col. William W. H. Davis, One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania Infantry, of skirmish May 24.

No. 1.

Report of Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Corps, of operations May 24.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS,
May 24, 1862—2 p. m.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that the reconnoitering party started this morning according to your orders. Soon after I ordered up a brigade of Couch's division as a support.

Shortly after the firing commenced I started myself and went to the front, where I remained until the enemy were driven beyond the fork of the roads referred to in your orders. General Naglee encountered the enemy nearly a mile this side and drove them some distance beyond.

It is probable that the deserter sent over to you this morning brought correct information, as the enemy had a battery of artillery and apparently considerable infantry, with some cavalry. The woods concealed him to a great degree. I gave directions to General Naglee to hold the fork of the roads without incurring too great risk and to send out scouts about that position.

I had my whole corps in readiness to meet a general attack, but do not think that any was intended. Our troops behaved with a great deal of spirit. We had one man killed and one officer and several men

wounded. General Naglee had his horse shot dead under him. We had one artillery horse killed, and I think some others wounded.

I shall before night make dispositions to picket the road between here and the forks of the road, which are much nearer the railroad than the map would indicate, and are about 2 miles from my headquarters, and nearly 5 miles from Bottom's Bridge.

While at the front a staff officer of General Heintzelman came up with Lieutenant McAlester. I sent back word to General Heintzelman to request that he should post a force at the Burnt Chimneys in my rear, also a force on the road leading down the Chichahominy between the chimneys and the bridge; also that he should put a force at railroad bridge and establish his pickets well forward on the railroad on this side of the Chickahominy, he being much nearer that position than I am.

If these dispositions are approved I think there is no apprehension of a general attack during the night, on account of the badness of the roads.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.*

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ORDERS.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,

May 24, 1862.

Brigadier-General Casey, commanding division, will send out this morning on an extended reconnaissance toward Richmond five regiments of infantry and two batteries of artillery, under Brigadier-General Naglee. The Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Colonel Gregg, will accompany and assist in the reconnaissance. Brigadier-General Naglee will report in person at these headquarters for instructions at 8 o'clock.

By order of Brigadier-General Keyes:

C. C. SUYDAM,

Captain, Assistant Adjutant-General.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

May 24, 1862—7.45 a. m.

GENERAL: Your instructions for the reconnaissance of to-day as received from headquarters Army of the Potomac are as follows:

You will, if possible, advance to the Seven Pines, or the forks of the direct road to Richmond and the road turning to the right into the road leading from New Bridge to Richmond, and hold that point if practicable.

You will leave pickets upon all the roads branching off in your rear, with a chain of cavalry sentinels to communicate with these headquarters. After your arrival at the Seven Pines you will reconnoiter the country well to your front and on your flanks, and will report frequently anything of importance that you observe. You will push the reconnaissance as far toward Richmond as practicable without incurring too much danger.

By order of Brigadier-General Keyes:

C. C. SUYDAM,

Captain, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Brigadier-General NAGLEE, *Commanding Reconnaissance.*

No. 2.

Report of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, commanding division, of operations May 25.

HEADQUARTERS CASEY'S DIVISION,
May 29, 1862.

I have the honor to report that in obedience to instructions I directed General Naglee on the 25th to make a reconnaissance in front to the position I assigned to the One hundred and fourth and Fifty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers from the First Brigade; the Eighty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Second Brigade; and the Eighty-fifth and Ninety-eighth New York Volunteers, Third Brigade. I directed two batteries of artillery (Regan and Spratt) to report to him. About one mile from camp he met the enemy, and succeeded in driving them for 2 miles—about one-half mile beyond the cross-road at the Seven Pines. I arrived on the ground when the reconnaissance was within about three-fourths mile of its termination, and accompanied it to the point. I saw no reason to alter the disposition which General Naglee had made.

The reconnaissance was a very successful one, and was conducted by its commander with skill and promptness. The troops behaved well. The day was rainy and disagreeable.

I directed General Naglee to remain and hold the cross-roads, and re-enforced him with five regiments of infantry.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

[Indorsement.]

MAY 31, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded.

Being personally present with the advance at the close of the reconnaissance, and for an hour and a half before it ended, I can testify to the good conduct of the troops and the gallantry of General Naglee.

E. D. KEYES,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

No. 3.

Report of Brig. Gen. Henry M. Naglee, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.

GENERAL: A reconnaissance was ordered by General Keyes of the Williamsburg road on the 23d of May, but Colonels Gregg, Russell, and Neill found the enemy in such force that they returned without making much progress. On that night General McClellan telegraphed to General Keyes upon the subject, and the above orders and instructions were issued on the following morning.

In obedience with these instructions, on the rainy morning of the 24th, leaving the Eleventh Maine and Fifty-sixth New York and One hundredth New York in camp, they having been on duty the day previous, the Fifty-sixth, Lieutenant-Colonel Jourdan, having marched

with me over 30 miles in the reconnaissance made on the 23d from Bottom's Bridge to the Turkey Island Creek Bridge, the other regiments of my brigade, the Fifty-second Pennsylvania, Colonel Dodge, and the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, Colonel Davis, were in motion at an early hour. At 8 o'clock they were joined by the Eighty-fifth Pennsylvania, Colonel Howell, Eighty-fifth New York, Colonel Belknap, and Ninety-eighth New York, Colonel Dutton, and Battery H, Lieutenant Mink, First New York Artillery, and Regan's Seventh Independent New York Battery, both under the command of Colonel Bailey, of the First Regiment New York Artillery. Gregg's cavalry did not report until 1 p. m.

The column was formed and in motion by 9 a. m., leading out the Williamsburg road. We encountered the first pickets of the enemy at ——— Run, about 1½ miles from Bottom's Bridge. These retired as our skirmishers approached, but they increased rapidly in numbers as we advanced. About 10 o'clock a deserter was brought to division headquarters and taken to the headquarters of General Keyes, and a courier was dispatched for me to return, that I should ascertain that the forces in my front were Hatton's brigade, of five regiments of Tennessee infantry, two batteries, and a portion of Stuart's cavalry, all under the command of General Stuart.

Returning to my command at 12 m. I deployed the Fifty-second Pennsylvania on the right of the Williamsburg road and extended it across the railroad and ordered a sufficient support to follow up the railroad. The One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania was deployed to the left of the Williamsburg road. Without much resistance we pressed forward until we came to the woods next beyond the Savage Station, where the enemy were prepared to resist our farther advance. Regan's battery was placed in position in the front edge of the timber on the right of the road and shelled the woods on the left of the road, which was about 600 yards from the battery. This wood extended about 400 yards along the road, and terminated in a line perpendicular with it, which line produced across the road was the commencement of the woods on the right of the road, parallel to which the Fifty-second Pennsylvania had been deployed, and toward which it was ordered to advance until it should be protected by some houses and sheds, and an orchard and a fence, 300 yards from the woods. This movement of the Fifty-second Pennsylvania with the shelling from Regan's battery lessened materially the fire of the enemy on the left, and the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania was ordered forward, and the wood on the left of the road was entirely cleared.

Our attention was now directed to the wood in front of the Fifty-second Pennsylvania, where the fire was increasing, and at the same time to the batteries of the enemy, which some time before had opened and had been directing their fire upon our batteries and the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania. From the front of the wood, now occupied by the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, I discovered that the line of battle of the enemy was formed just within the edge of the wood, which crosses the Williamsburg road about half a mile from the Seven Pines Corner; that his artillery was in front near the house on the left of the road, supported by infantry lying in the hollow, and that the wood in front of the Fifty-second Pennsylvania on the right of the road was occupied by a regiment of skirmishers.

Bringing the oblique fire of the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania to assist the direct fire of the Fifty-second Pennsylvania I pushed forward the Eighty-fifth Pennsylvania along and behind the railroad,

and ordered the Fifty-second Pennsylvania to advance from the fence and buildings directly into the wood in front of them. At the same time I pressed forward to the fence just left by the Fifty-second the Ninety-eighth New York, which had been formed parallel to them, 600 yards in their rear, in a line with and supporting Regan's battery. This combined movement forced the enemy to leave precipitately the wood on the right. This is the wood immediately in rear of the line of rifle pits occupied by General Kearny on the 1st of June, the wood on the left, occupied by the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, being that immediately in rear of the rifle pits occupied by Generals Casey and Couch on that day.

It was now about 4.30 p. m. The batteries of the enemy had annoyed us considerably, and it became necessary to drive them from their position. The sharpshooters of the Fifty-second Pennsylvania, selected from men who had lived with the rifle constantly by them in the lumbering counties of Pennsylvania, were ordered forward, under Captain Davis. At the same time a section of Mink's battery was added by Colonel Bailey to Regan's battery. Having thus advanced our right we soon corrected the ranges of our artillery, and within half an hour the effects were apparent. The artillery of the enemy could no longer stand against the fire of our artillery and sharpshooters, and were compelled to withdraw. At the same time I discovered an unsteadiness in the ranks of the enemy, and I hurried forward Gregg's cavalry, followed by the remaining two sections of Mink's battery, which were brought into action within 400 yards of the enemy's line, supported by the Eighty-fifth New York and One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, the Fifty-second Pennsylvania being on the right. These movements threw the enemy into disorder, and Gregg was ordered to charge, but after proceeding some 200 or 300 yards he received a volley from some skirmishers who occupied a thicket on the right of the road, and he dismounted his command, fired his carbines, and wheeled into a depression in the ground. I was preparing to follow with skirmishers, and to order a second cavalry charge, when an aide of General Keyes brought orders from him that no farther pursuit should be made, lest I "should bring on a general engagement," and I was requested to communicate in person with General Keyes, whom I found a mile and a half in the rear. The troops slept on the wet ground (for it had rained all day) in the exposed positions last above indicated, and the picket guard for the night (which was necessarily a heavy one) was undisturbed.

On the following morning, the 25th of May, I ordered the Eighty-fifth Pennsylvania, Colonel Howell, to be deployed to the right of the railroad, extending to the Chickahominy, and to examine the space between the road and the river, which he did, and reported at 11 a. m. that he had examined the country indicated and had found none of the enemy. The Fifty-sixth New York was then ordered to occupy the road leading to the river by the house of Mr. Mickie. In the mean time, discovering none of the enemy in force on either of my flanks, at 12 m. I ordered Captain Davis to extend his sharpshooters between the Williamsburg road and the railroad, and to advance cautiously and so slowly that his advance could hardly be discovered. At 4 p. m. having gained a mile, and feeling that the enemy would resist in force any farther advance, I took the Eleventh Maine, Colonel Plaisted, that had joined me, the Fifty-second and One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, and two sections of Bailey's artillery, and moved forward to meet any resistance the enemy might oppose to Captain Davis. We had scarcely started when a dispatch was received indicating that the enemy

was assembling in front. Hurrying past the Seven Pines, I found Davis' sharpshooters occupying the front of the wood some 500 yards beyond the "Pines;" that their lines extended perpendicular to the Williamsburg road and across to the neighborhood of the Fair Oaks Station on the railroad, and that the enemy were forming in the open fields beyond the wood-pile. I immediately ordered the artillery to open upon the enemy, advanced the picket line to that of the sharpshooters, and ordered the Eleventh Maine and the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania to show themselves as supporting them. The shells thrown over the wood were most fortunate in their range and direction, and the enemy dispersed.

On the following day, the 26th of May, by 3 a. m. the remaining regiments of my brigade were already in position to support the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania and the picket line established by the Eleventh Maine and Fifty-second Pennsylvania. At 6 a. m. a rebel force of two regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and one battery approached, but it avoided my picket line, kept beyond our range, and soon after disappeared, evidently reconnoitering our position. I then ordered Davis to advance another mile, which he did without opposition, and which brought our picket line to the distance of about 5 miles from Richmond, and was as near as I considered it prudent to go.

On the following day, with a portion of Davis' sharpshooters, the line on the right was advanced from the road to Mickie's to the Nine-mile road and Garnett's field, and thence along Garnett's field to the Chickahominy.

In this extended reconnaissance of four days the troops behaved admirably well, and especial thanks are due to Colonels Bailey, Davis, Dodge, Howell, Dutton, Dunlap,* Plaisted, and Jourdan, and to Captain Davis and his sharpshooters, who contributed more than any others to the successful advance of our lines from Bottom's Bridge, 9 miles, to the most advanced line held before Richmond.

Constant occupation and much sickness must plead my excuse for not making this report at the proper time.

The casualties were reported immediately after they occurred.

Very respectfully, &c.,

HENRY M. NAGLEE,
Brigadier-General.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

No. 4.

Report of Col. William W. H. Davis, One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania Infantry, of skirmish May 24.

HEADQUARTERS 104TH PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS,
Camp near Savage Station, Va., May 25, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to transmit the following report of the operations of the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers in action with the enemy near Savage Station on the 24th instant:

The regiment crossed the Chickahominy the third time yesterday morning at daylight, and after resting long enough at the rifle pits on this side to cook rations they moved up the road toward Richmond on a reconnaissance. The force consisted of the One hundred and fourth

* Belknap.

and Fifty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, a light battery, and a squadron of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, with three regiments of infantry as a reserve. The troops marched about a mile out the main road, when they were halted, with directions to remain until further orders. Meanwhile it had commenced to rain and the road was so slippery that the marching was difficult.

After remaining there about half an hour the general came up and ordered an advance, when we moved on. We had marched about 3 miles and were near Savage Station, on the Richmond and West Point Railroad, when the enemy in considerable force, and consisting of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, was discovered immediately in front. Preparations were at once made for attack. Company A, Captain Rogers, One hundred and fourth, and one company of the Fifty-second Regiment were thrown forward on the right of the road as skirmishers, with Company F, Capt. A. Marple, as support, while Companies B, Captain Orem, and D, Captain Swartzlander, of the One hundred and fourth Regiment, were thrown forward on the left of the road as skirmishers and support. The remaining companies of the One hundred and fourth were drawn up in line of battle in a large field just behind a wood on the left of the road, and the Fifty-second was drawn up in the same position on the right of the road. The battery stood in the road near where the infantry reserve were stationed, ready to move to any designated point. The skirmishers were now ordered to advance, and in a few minutes their rifles announced that they were engaged with the enemy. As they advanced we moved down the slope of the field toward the woods, which the skirmishers entered, and the regiment was halted about 300 yards from it and remained standing in line of battle. On the right the skirmishers had to advance several hundred yards across an orchard and open fields to a wood which the enemy held. In the middle of these fields stood a small farm-house, with the necessary outbuildings, behind which some of the enemy had taken shelter. They opened a brisk fire on our skirmishers as they advanced, but the battle gradually pushed them away from their cover across the orchard and into the woods, where Captains Rogers and Marple followed in quick pursuit. The operations of my skirmishing companies on the left of the road were concealed by the wood, but I knew by the more distant crack of their rifles that they were driving the enemy before them. Major Gries, of the One hundred and fourth, was ordered into the wood to give a general direction to these two companies, where he rendered most efficient service, and by his steadiness and courage under a warm fire received the encomiums of his men.

In a few minutes the booming of a cannon away to the front announced that the artillery of the enemy had opened upon us, and almost at the same moment a shell dashed among us, but hurt no one. This was the opening of the fight in earnest, and for several hours a brisk fire of shot and shell was poured into us. The first man of my regiment who was struck was Corporal Thompson, a member of Company D, acting as skirmishers in the woods in front. He was hit by a rifle-bullet in the stomach, which ranged around to the back, where it was cut out. When he received the wound he stepped out of the ranks, leaned his rifle against the tree, and said to the company: "Boys, I am done for; but you stand up to it." He was immediately sent to the hospital in the rear.

The fight commenced a little after 10 o'clock in the morning, and it was 3 o'clock in the afternoon when the last shot was fired, when the enemy was driven from his ground and our troops moved up and occu-

pied it. The six companies of the One hundred and fourth, under my immediate command, were in line of battle the greater part of this time, and under fire without an opportunity to pull a trigger. To add to their unpleasant position the rain poured down in torrents.

Besides the wounding of Corporal Thompson, Private Brown, of Company C, was killed by a 3-inch shell, which struck him in the head. Another private of the same company was wounded in the finger, and Private Rohr, of Company D, was struck in the leg by a piece of shell. The shell which killed Brown struck Lieut. Diller B. Groff, commanding the company, in the right breast, giving him a painful but not a fatal wound. There were many narrow escapes, and a Providential interference alone saved us from a heavy loss. Lieutenant Yardley came near being killed, and he moved his head to one side just in time to prevent it being taken off by a shell. Several other instances of the kind occurred. A number of the men had their muskets struck, and one had his mouth filled with dirt thrown up by a shell which burst near him.

It affords me pleasure to bear testimony to the admirable manner in which the officers and men of my regiment behaved, who were as cool and steady under fire as though they had been in action times without number, instead of the third time.

I am under obligations to Chaplain Gries for the services he rendered in the action, both in hospital, assisting to dress the wounds, and helping to carry the wounded from the field.

Lieutenant Haney, of Company A, was fired at three times by a rebel skirmisher, but escaped unhurt. A member of the same company came suddenly upon one of the enemy in the woods, when the following conversation took place, viz: Rebel—"Who are you?" Union soldier—"Who the devil are you?" whereupon the rebel put his rifle and burst his cap, and then took to his heels. The Union soldier fired at him in turn, but missed.

W. W. H. DAVIS,

Colonel One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania Vols.

Capt. GEORGE H. JOHNSTON,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., First Brigade, Casey's Division.

MAY 25-26, 1862.—Expedition from Bottom's Bridge to James River, Va.

Report of Lieut. Frank C. Davis, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry.

CAMP THIRD PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY,

May 26, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to orders received from Col. William W. Averell, commanding Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, yesterday, with a command of 1 sergeant and 10 men, I proceeded across the country to James River, opposite City Point, and communicated with Captain Rodgers, commanding gunboat Galena, and retired to camp near Bottom's Bridge to-day at 11 o'clock a. m. without accident. The incidents of my route and information gained thereon are as follows:

Leaving Bottom's Bridge I took the road to White Oak Creek Bridge. No signs of the enemy to that point. Of Mr. Britton, resident near the bridge, I learned that he had seen 2 of the enemy's pickets in his oat-field that morning and 4 more near there. Took the road bearing to

the right from the bridge (White Oak Creek), proceeded 2 miles, and entered the Long Bridge road. At this point I learned that there were 10 or 12 of the enemy's mounted pickets at a house 300 yards to my right. Turned to the left down the Long Bridge road 1 mile, and took a road to the right, leading across to the Charles City Court-House road, 4 miles. The enemy had not been seen on this road since Friday last, and then only a few pickets. At this point learned that a Lieutenant Tyler, quartermaster of one of the enemy's regiments, had passed down that road (Charles City Court-House road) that morning toward Charles City Court-House in search of forage. No further signs of the enemy in that vicinity.

At this point took the road to the right, leading into the main road from Charles City Court-House to Richmond, about 4 miles. At this point turned to the right and followed the Richmond road 3 miles; then took a road to the left, leading down to the river at a point about 2 miles above City Point. Here, leaving my command in charge of the sergeant, under cover of the wood on the bank near the landing (Mr. Hill Carter's landing), I took a boat with two negroes and visited the nearest gunboat, the Galena, and communicated to the commander, Captain Rodgers, the following message, to wit:

The army is now advanced to within 7 miles of Richmond, the right, center, and left being on an average at that distance and gradually advancing:

I received from Captain Rodgers the following:

The Galena is lying in the river opposite City Point. The Port Royal, Naugatuck, and Monitor are lying about 3 miles below City Point. One gunboat is above City Point, around the Peninsula, distant by the river 8 miles, though within sight of the Galena. No gunboats above this.

The enemy are supposed to be 4,000 or 5,000 strong not far from City Point. His pickets come down into the town (City Point). While I was there the Galena threw two shells at them into the town. The enemy appears in squads of 6 or 8 along the banks. The river is clear for the gunboats to within 8 miles of Richmond. At that point it is blockaded, and there is a fortification mounting thirty heavy guns on the right bank of the river.

From what information I could gain the enemy is not in force on the Peninsula below City Point or 8 or 10 miles above. Concerning the country above that point I could learn nothing.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. C. DAVIS,

Second Lieutenant, Company D, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry.

To the ADJUTANT *Third Pennsylvania Cavalry.*

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY,

In the Field, May 26, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded.

Yesterday morning I received orders from the general commanding Third Corps to send a small party, if it go without too much risk, to communicate with the gunboats on James River. As no communication in the shape of a message was given, I directed Lieutenant Davis to deliver the one he has reported within.

WM. W. AVERELL,

Colonel Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, Third Corps.

N. B.—Captain Rodgers, upon the receipt of this communication, immediately forwarded it to Commodore Goldsborough in writing.

MAY 26, 1862.—Reconnaissance toward Hanover Court-House, Va.

REPORTS.

No. 1.—Lieut. Col. William N. Grier, First U. S. Cavalry.

No. 2.—Col. Gouverneur K. Warren, Fifth New York Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, Second Division, Fifth Corps.

No. 1.

Report of Lieut. Col. William N. Grier, First U. S. Cavalry.

HDQRS. FIRST REGIMENT U. S. CAVALRY,
Camp at Walnut Grove Church, May 26, 1862—8 p. m.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that, pursuant to instructions contained in the accompanying letter of General Marcy, and the indorsement thereon, made from your headquarters, I left this camp at sunrise this morning, my command consisting of my own regiment and Barker's squadron of McClellan Dragoons.

My advance guard drove in the enemy's pickets to within about 3 miles of Hanover Court-House. One of the pickets wounded and taken prisoner. All white persons and negroes I found were questioned with regard to the movements of the enemy and their strength at or near Hanover Court-House. The result of my examination of them was to the effect there are several regiments stationed at or near Hanover Court-House, artillery, cavalry, and infantry. General Branch is said to be in command. I am inclined to think that 5,000 to 6,000 is, as yet, the maximum number of troops stationed there. I could not gain any reliable information with regard to the movements of troops along the Virginia Central Railroad. I was told that the whistle of the cars had not been heard since Friday last. The wounded prisoner was not in condition to be brought in on horseback, but will be brought here to-night or early to-morrow in an ambulance procured from the Surgeon of Rush's regiment of Lancers.

Very respectfully,

WM. N. GRIER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, First Cavalry.

General P. ST. G. COOKE,
Brig. Gen., U. S. Army, Comdg. Division Cavalry Reserve.

No. 2.

Report of Col. Gouverneur K. Warren, Fifth New York Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, Second Division, Fifth Corps.

HEADQUARTERS AT OLD CHURCH,
May 26, 1862—5 p. m.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that I went on the roads out toward Hanover with a portion of my command this morning, to reconnoiter and destroy the bridge, if it could be accomplished without incurring risks incommensurate with its importance. We arrived in the vicinity of the bridge nearly at the same time as the command of Colonel Grier, who drove in the pickets toward Hanover Court-House

and captured one. We pursued another small body across the bridge on the Pamunkey, which fired upon us across the river, but without hitting any one. Lieutenant-Colonel Duryea, while we were wholly ignorant of the strength of the enemy on account of the concealment of the trees, led his command across the bridge without firing a gun, but the mounted pickets had gotten out of range on the other side, and it was impossible for the Lancers, without taking more time and exertion than was justifiable, to catch them. They pursued about a mile. The bridge we completely tore down and threw into the stream. Your note reached me at this point, and I returned, as did also Colonel Grier. I shall destroy three bridges on the Totopotomoy Creek. I think there is no enemy nearer than the vicinity of Hanover, which secessionists admitted was occupied by their troops. I shall endeavor to move off as soon as the order comes, but I hope it will not be necessary before daylight-to-morrow. I have a very bad headache, which makes writing difficult for me.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. K. WARREN,
Colonel, Commanding.

General FITZ JOHN PORTER, *Commanding Fifth Army Corps.*

[Indorsement.]

Respectfully forwarded for the information of the commanding general. There is another road leading from Old Church to Hanover Court-House; at least so says the map.

F. J. PORTER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

MAY 27-29, 1862.—Operations about Hanover Court-House, Va., including engagements at Slash Church and Kinney's Farm, May 27.

REPORTS, ETC.

- No. 1.—Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac, of engagement May 27.
- No. 2.—Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, U. S. Army, commanding Fifth Army Corps.
- No. 3.—Return of Casualties in the Union forces engaged at Hanover Court-House, Va., May 27.
- No. 4.—Brig. Gen. William H. Emory, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade Cavalry Reserve, of operations May 27-28.
- No. 5.—Capt. Charles J. Whiting, Fifth U. S. Cavalry.
- No. 6.—Capt. James E. Harrison, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 28.
- No. 7.—Capt. William P. Chambliss, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 29.
- No. 8.—Capt. William B. Royall, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 27.
- No. 9.—Lieut. Abraham K. Arnold, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 27-28.
- No. 10.—Maj. Lawrence Williams, Sixth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 27-28.
- No. 11.—Capt. Henry Benson, Second U. S. Artillery.
- No. 12.—Capt. Charles Griffin, Fifth U. S. Artillery, of engagement May 27.
- No. 13.—Capt. Augustus P. Martin, Battery C, Massachusetts Light Artillery, of engagement May 27.
- No. 14.—Capt. George D. Allen, Battery E, Massachusetts Light Artillery, of operations May 27-28.
- No. 15.—Brig. Gen. George W. Morell, U. S. Army, commanding division.
- No. 16.—Col. Hiram Berdan, First U. S. Sharpshooters, of engagement May 27.

- No. 17.—Brig. Gen. John H. Martindale, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of engagement May 27.
- No. 18.—Col. Charles W. Roberts, Second Maine Infantry, of engagement May 27.
- No. 19.—Col. James Barnes, Eighteenth Massachusetts Infantry, of operations May 26-29.
- No. 20.—Col. Jesse A. Gove, Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry, of operations May 27-28.
- No. 21.—Maj. Edwin S. Gilbert, Twenty-fifth New York Infantry, of engagement May 27.
- No. 22.—Col. James McQuade, Fourteenth New York Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of engagement May 27.
- No. 23.—Col. Thomas Cass, Ninth Massachusetts Infantry, of engagement May 27.
- No. 24.—Lieut. Col. Charles H. Skillen, Fourteenth New York Infantry, of engagement May 27.
- No. 25.—Col. Samuel W. Black, Sixty-second Pennsylvania Infantry, of engagement May 27.
- No. 26.—Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, of engagement May 27.
- No. 27.—Col. Henry A. Weeks, Twelfth New York Infantry, of engagement May 27.
- No. 28.—Col. Henry S. Lausing, Seventeenth New York Infantry, of operations May 27-28.
- No. 29.—Col. Stephen W. Stryker, Forty-fourth New York Infantry, of engagement May 27.
- No. 30.—Lieut. Col. James C. Rice, Forty-fourth New York Infantry, of engagement May 27.
- No. 31.—Col. John W. McLane, Eighty-third Pennsylvania Infantry, of engagement May 27.
- No. 32.—Col. Gouverneur K. Warren, Fifth New York Infantry, commanding brigade.
- No. 33.—Col. Robert O. Tyler, First Connecticut Heavy Artillery, of operations May 22-June 1.
- No. 34.—Col. Elisha G. Marshall, Thirteenth New York Infantry, of operations May 27-28.
- No. 35.—Brig. Gen. L. O'B. Branch, C. S. Army, of engagement May 27, with congratulations from General R. E. Lee.
- No. 36.—Col. James H. Lane, Twenty-eighth North Carolina Infantry, of engagement May 27.

No. 1.

*Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac, of engagement May 27.**

“MC CLELLAN’S,” May 27, 1862—6.30 p. m.

Have this moment heard from F. J. Porter, with his division. He has taken Hanover Court-House. Little loss on our side; many killed, wounded, and prisoners of rebels. Captured one of their guns. The enemy made another stand at railroad, out of which our men were driving them at date of dispatch. Rebels, 13,000 in number, commanded by General Branch. The expedition promises perfect success in all its objects, which you will now readily divine. Porter has cavalry and horse artillery to follow up.

GEO. B. MC CLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

* See also general report, pp. 33-37.

No. 2.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, U. S. Army, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH PROVISIONAL CORPS,
Camp near New Bridge, Va., May 29, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report my return to this camp with the command placed under my orders on the 26th instant, to execute in the vicinity of Hanover Court-House special instructions of the major-general commanding.

I take great pleasure in stating that the expedition was eminently successful. The following objects were accomplished:

The defeat and rout at Hanover of Brigadier-General Branch's command, which comprised about 8,000 Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia troops, with the loss to them of 8 officers and more than 1,000 men killed, wounded, and made prisoners, the capture of one gun and many stand of arms, and of camp equipage, officers' baggage, &c., and of army stores to a much greater amount than we could bring away, in addition to a still larger quantity destroyed by the enemy in his flight; the destruction of extensive bridges on the Virginia Central and the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroads, and on the main wagon roads leading north from Richmond (including the destruction of telegraphic communication on those roads), thus cutting off the rebel force in Northeastern Virginia from all rapid relief from that city and from the avenues available for retiring on it, except via Lynchburg. This also excludes Richmond from two of its four remaining avenues of supply; the destruction of all bridges over the Pamunkey and the roads on our right, thus securing us from any attack on our right and rear.

I have the honor further to report that the movements since Friday last [23d] of Colonel Warren's command from Old Church along the Pamunkey, with the design of destroying the bridges and cutting the railroads, has caused the rapid retreat to Richmond from before Fredericksburg of General Anderson's command. This releases for active operations the large force there under General McDowell, and I think must have relieved the Government of all apprehension of an attack on Washington.

I take great pleasure in bearing testimony to the admirable manner in which the command has acquitted itself. The behavior of officers and men showed the benefit of the good training at Hall's Hill and elsewhere, given last winter by their brigade and regimental commanders. The regiments behaved most gallantly. Some, as occasion required, were heroic in their brave and successful resistance to the shock of vastly-superior numbers, holding their ground against all odds till relief arrived. Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, and Michigan were all represented, no State or section taking any exclusive part in any labor or danger, and the sons of each fought as becomes national soldiers, and bore with cheerfulness the long marches through heavy rain and mud and the exposures and privations incident to a forced march without shelter or supply trains. The regulars were also actively and laboriously engaged, and performed their highly important duty with the same success and cheerfulness.

Where all showed the same devotion to their country and the same alacrity in its service I cannot in this preliminary report speak of individuals or point out regiments specifically, and shall defer doing so till

I receive the reports of commanders, who will designate the services of each. I shall then take occasion to refer to the valuable and important service rendered by the Signal Corps, and also by the aides the commanding general has so kindly furnished me, as well as by the other members of my staff.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTH PROVISIONAL ARMY CORPS,
Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 9, 1862.

GENERAL: The various and almost incessant occupations in connection with the repeated movements of this corps have prevented the completion by the proper officers of the reports which should have been received at these headquarters of their respective shares in the services it has rendered, and have thus delayed my report to you detailing those services.

The death of many officers in the late engagements makes it impossible that full reports of the services of their commands should ever be completed. Now, at the first leisure moment, I have the honor to present in a narrative form a succinct record of some of the earlier operations of this corps.

Under the direction of the major-general commanding certain measures for the protection of the right flank of the army in its advance toward Richmond were put in my hands, beginning simultaneously with the march of the army from the Pamunkey. Among these were the clearing of the enemy from the upper peninsula as far as Hanover Court-House or beyond, and the destruction of railroad and other bridges over the South Anna and Pamunkey Rivers, in order to prevent the enemy in large force from getting into our rear from that direction, and in order, further, to cut one great line of the enemy's communications—*i. e.*, that connecting Richmond directly with Northern Virginia.

In pursuance of these plans I left at the time of our first advance a regiment at Mount Airey (White House road) to operate in connection with the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, for the destruction of bridges, boats, &c., on the Pamunkey above White House. These forces, afterward consolidated into a brigade, consisting of the Fifth New York and First Connecticut Volunteers, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry and Weed-en's Rhode Island battery, were placed in command of Colonel Warren, Fifth New York Volunteers, and posted at Old Church, from which point their efforts were successful in destroying all means of communication over the Pamunkey as far toward Hanover Court-House as was deemed prudent without the co-operation of an additional force.

In further pursuance of the same plans, and in accordance with verbal instructions of the major-general commanding, at 4 a. m. on the 27th May I marched from New Bridge with the division of General Morell, preceded by an advance guard of two regiments of cavalry and a light battery, under command of Brigadier-General Emory. At the same hour I put in motion from Old Church the brigade under Colonel Warren. These two commands were to fall upon the enemy, whom I had

reason to believe were camped in strong force near Hanover Court-House. The first command, under my immediate direction, was to take the enemy in front, while Colonel Warren, taking the road along the Pamunkey, was to fall upon him in flank and rear. Amidst a pelting storm of rain, through deep mud and water, the command struggled and pushed its way to Peake's Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, 2 miles from Hanover Court-House, where we came in presence of the enemy.

Here preparations were at once made for battle by sending forward as skirmishers on the direct road to Hanover Court-House the Twenty-fifth New York Volunteers, Colonel Johnson, and Berdan's Sharpshooters, to engage the enemy's skirmishers and to hold him in check while Morell's division, slowly pushing through the swampy roads, could be brought up and deployed under the protection of a portion of Benson's battery, which was thrown into position so as to sweep the road.

In the mean time a squadron of cavalry and a section of artillery, supported by other cavalry, was sent to the left on the Ashland road to guard our flank and to destroy the railroad and telegraph at the crossing. This force soon became engaged with a portion of the enemy apparently attempting to outflank us. On the arrival of Martindale's brigade I dispatched it to support the last-mentioned force, confident that we could with Johnson, Berdan, and Benson hold the enemy in front until another brigade could be formed. Butterfield, soon coming up, formed his regiments and moved them in two lines, under the protection of woods and wheat fields immediately in front of the enemy, where he placed them until he could ascertain the position of the enemy. This done, he moved rapidly to the front, covered by skirmishers, driving the enemy before him, and capturing one piece of artillery and many prisoners. The enemy here having been put to flight, and one body of them seen moving in the direction of Hanover Court-House, the cavalry, with the light artillery, was sent in pursuit. In the mean time the infantry was formed in readiness to move to a point where I knew the enemy had been camped. At this time Colonel Warren's command joined, having been delayed in repairing bridges destroyed by the enemy.

Learning that the retreating force had been seen moving toward our right, I directed Martindale to collect his brigade and move up the railroad, by which route he would fall in rear of the place before mentioned as the former location of the enemy's camp. At the same time I directed Colonel Warren to push on with his cavalry and destroy the public and private bridges across the Pamunkey east of the railroad. I immediately put the rest of the command in motion for Hanover Court-House, but had scarcely reached that point with the head of the column when I received information from a signal officer that the enemy were appearing in our rear.

The command was immediately faced about and marched back (left in front) to the former battle-field, where I found a portion of Martindale's brigade contending against great odds. Morell's brigade (Colonel McQuade commanding), which was not up at the first action, was thrown upon the enemy in front and flank. A portion of Butterfield's brigade, under his immediate direction, hearing the sound of musketry, had taken the shortest route from the advanced point it had reached, and also moved toward the rear of the enemy. These supports pushing rapidly upon him drove him from his position on the road toward Ash-

land, and we followed in pursuit till darkness put a stop to the operations for that day.

The succeeding day was occupied in gathering in the results of our victory. Of the enemy's dead we buried about 200. Our prisoners, wounded and unwounded, were forwarded to your headquarters—about 730. The gun already mentioned as having been captured was a 12-pounder howitzer. In addition to it we took one caisson, a large number of small-arms, some of them of new and valuable description. Two important military railroad trains were captured and destroyed by General Stoneman's and General Emory's commands respectively.

Still more important, however, were the indirect results of our victory, obtained by rapid movements on Ashland and the Richmond and Fredericksburg and Virginia Central Railroads. The reconnaissances on that day were pushed toward Ashland, one under direction of Colonel Gove, Twenty-second Massachusetts, on the road from Hanover to Richmond. This passed through the abandoned camp of General Branch, from which the enemy in their rapid flight the previous night had carried off but a small part of their baggage and supplies. At the point where the road to Ashland branches to the right the enemy's pickets were discovered, and on being pressed and driven in to their supports, divulged the presence of a large force of all arms south of Ashland, between the turnpike and the Fredericksburg Railroad. The advance guard of another reconnaissance on the direct road from Hanover to Ashland pushed into Ashland, there discovering a brigade of Anderson's division on its way from Fredericksburg to Richmond. Another command, under Major Williams, Sixth Cavalry, was engaged in the destruction of the road bridges over the Pamunkey and the Virginia Central Railroad bridge over the South Anna. These, in connection with the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, were also engaged in pursuing the enemy, large numbers of whom were captured. Captain Harrison, of the Fifth Cavalry, took two armed companies of the Twenty-eighth North Carolina Regiment and Rush's cavalry one company. The following day I arranged for the destruction of the turnpike bridge and the Fredericksburg Railroad bridge over the South Anna, which duty I intrusted to Major Williams, Sixth Cavalry. It was successfully accomplished.

I beg to refer to the reports of Major Williams and General Emory, and to commend for the consideration of the commanding general the officers and non-commissioned officers therein mentioned with special credit.

In order to hold in check any force which might be detached to cut off Major Williams I sent one column (cavalry) under the direction of General Emory to threaten Ashland and push in there if possible; also another command (of all arms) under Colonel Warren to push into Ashland on the direct road. General Stoneman's command, which had on the previous night been placed under my orders, I pushed from Leech's Station toward Ashland as a support to Warren.

Sykes' division of regulars, which had arrived within 3 miles of my headquarters on the previous night, was held in reserve and directed to support General Stoneman. With these forces I designed to clear Ashland. The advance of General Emory, under Captain Chambliss, entered Ashland, and drove from it a small portion of the enemy, destroyed the bridge over Stony Creek, and broke up the railroad and telegraph. About half an hour after he had retired the advance of Colonel Warren entered Ashland and captured 12 of the enemy, who had immediately reoccupied the place on the retirement of Captain Chambliss.

Finding that much of the public property, of no great value, could not be carried off or destroyed without wanton injury to private property and danger to the lives of the sick and wounded left by the enemy, these officers, acting under previous instructions, inflicted no further injury.

All the objects of the expedition having been accomplished, the command returned that evening to their respective camps.

I refer the major-general commanding to the reports herewith inclosed of the several officers concerned.

In closing this report I desire to express my admiration for the conduct of the officers and men in the laborious march to Hanover; the steadiness with which they turned from the pursuit of a retreating foe to meet the unexpected attack of an unknown force in their rear; the confidence they evinced in their officers; the good order in which they went into action. Specially worthy of note was the firm resistance Martindale's brigade presented to the attack of a superior force, holding it in check till it could be met and routed by the remainder of the division.

I have further to express the highest satisfaction at the manner in which the troops were handled in action by their division, brigade, and regimental commanders. General Morell, commanding division, and his brigadier-generals, Martindale and Butterfield and Colonel McQuade; also General Emory and Colonel Warren, and Captain Benson, commanding mounted battery, and Major Williams and Captains Chambliss and Arnold, of the cavalry; also Capt. Charles Griffin, of Fifth Artillery, commanding Morell's artillery, each in his operations earned the favorable notice of his superiors. Col. C. W. Roberts, Second Maine, is specially deserving of commendation, as also Colonel Johnson, Twenty-fifth New York, and Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, Forty-fourth New York.

I have the honor to refer to the reports of those officers, herein forwarded, with their inclosures. I desire also to express my thanks to Maj. A. S. Webb, captain, Eleventh Infantry, whose assistance as guide and volunteer aide was invaluable; also to Major Myer, signal officer, the almost indispensable services of whose corps were in continual requisition during the operations. Major Myer posted the signal officers most advantageously, and at once in person communicated their reports, which enabled me to direct operations most successfully.

I wish also to make known my admiration for the gallantry and good conduct of my personal staff, who were constantly employed under fire in the duties of their respective positions. I designate Captain Locke (assistant adjutant-general) and Captains Kirkland, Mason, and Norton, and Lieutenants Monteith and McQuade. Brigade Surgeon Lyman, medical director of my corps, was indefatigable in his attention to our wounded and those of the enemy. In this connection I would also mention Brigade Surgeons Waters and Bentley, both of whom were untiring in their services.

The command met and defeated on this occasion was the division of North Carolina and Georgia troops, said to have been 8,000 or 9,000 strong, under Brigadier-General Branch.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 3.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces engaged at Hanover Court-House, Va., May 27, 1862.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
2d Maine.....		3	1	28			32	
9th Massachusetts.....		1		11		1	13	
22d Massachusetts.....				1		8	9	
Massachusetts Light Artillery, Battery C.....				2			2	
Massachusetts Sharpshooters, Second Company.....								No loss reported
16th Michigan.....				2			2	
Michigan Sharpshooters, Brady's company.....								No loss reported.
12th New York.....				2		1	3	
13th New York.....				7			7	
14th New York.....				4			4	
17th New York.....						8	8	
25th New York.....	4	24	8	71	1	50	158	
44th New York.....		27	3	56			86	
62d Pennsylvania.....				6			6	
83d Pennsylvania.....				8			8	
1st U. S. Sharpshooters.....				7	1		8	
5th U. S. Cavalry.....		2					2	
6th U. S. Cavalry.....				1			1	
2d U. S. Artillery, Battery M.....		1		2			3	
5th U. S. Artillery, Battery D.....				3			3	
Total.....	4	58	12	211	2	68	355	

No. 4.

Reports of Brig. Gen. William H. Emory, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Cavalry Reserve, of operations May 27-28.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, CAVALRY RESERVE,
Cavalry Camp near Richmond, Va., May 30, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to instructions received from General Porter, commanding Fifth Army Corps, the following is a report of my operations in the late engagement near Hanover Court-House:

My command consisted of the Fifth and Sixth U. S. Cavalry and Benson's battery of light artillery, and was assigned the advance. The road from here there is intersected by other roads every 2 or 3 miles. On many of them the enemy's pickets were found and run off by our cavalry, and small detachments left to watch the roads. Near where the roads to Hanover Court-House and Guiney's Station unite a portion of the enemy's forces were discovered, drawn up in order of battle. The light battery was directed to open upon them. The cavalry was placed on the left and rear to support it, and under cover, from the effects of the enemy's fire. The infantry was now deployed by General Porter, and the direction of affairs in front taken by him. At this moment Captain Arnold, with a squadron of the Fifth U. S. Cavalry, who I had left to watch the Guiney's Station road, coming in on our left and rear, reported to me that a detachment of the enemy's cav-

ally occupied the road to the Guinea's Station. I directed him to drive them away and see what was on it. This he did in handsome style, losing only 2 of his men. It resulted in the discovering of an infantry force in that direction, protected by woods. I left Captain Arnold to operate on General Martindale's left, the officer left by the general commanding to attack the force in that direction. Captain Benson very soon silenced the enemy's guns and completely unhorsed one piece, which was subsequently taken possession of by our infantry (Lansing's New York).

After the infantry fight which took place in front of Benson's battery was over, and it was supposed, in fact, that nothing of any consequence was on our left, my command, re-enforced by Colonel Lansing's regiment (Seventeenth New York Infantry), was moved forward in quick pursuit. One entire regiment (Twenty-eighth North Carolina Infantry) was thus cut off and most of them subsequently captured. The pursuit had been continued $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles beyond Hanover Court-House and 5 miles from the field of battle, when orders were received from the general commanding to return with all possible haste to assist the attack in the rear. I had some difficulty in withdrawing promptly my advanced parties, who had been directed by me over different roads and short-cuts to intercept the enemy.

Early next morning, still re-enforced by Colonel Lansing, I was ordered to go forward and destroy the South Anna railroad bridge and all the road bridges crossing the same river, which was done effectually. During this time it was necessary to hold in check and threaten the forces in Ashland, which were much superior to my own. For this purpose I sent Captain Whiting, commanding the Fifth U. S. Cavalry, with three squadrons of his regiment, toward Ashland, where he discovered the enemy to be in considerable force. In pushing forward Lieutenant Walker made a very handsome charge, driving the enemy's pickets 3 miles through a bad road. To destroy the bridges on the South Anna, Major Williams was detached with the Sixth U. S. Cavalry, a section of Benson's artillery, under Lieutenant Hains, and two companies of infantry (Lansing's regiment).

These objects being accomplished, I received urgent orders that night to push on and destroy the railroad bridge on the Fredericksburg road over the same river, and if possible to reach the railroad at or near Ashland and ascertain the enemy's exact force, and, if possible, expel him. To accomplish the first object I re-enforced Major Williams with two companies of infantry, and sent Captain Chambliss, of the Fifth U. S. Cavalry, to make a close reconnaissance of Ashland, and occupy the attention of the enemy while Major Williams destroyed the railroad bridge, that afterward my forces might be united to march on Ashland.

Major Williams' command halted 2 miles in advance of me in a well-selected position, and Captain Abert was sent forward with his squadron, who destroyed the bridge, and the whole command returned to my reserve at 11. Captain Abert, Sixth U. S. Cavalry, in advance of his (Williams') command some distance, destroyed the communication on the Fredericksburg Railroad. Lieutenant Kerin, of the same regiment, did the same thing on the Virginia Central Railroad, neither knowing what force they might encounter, but both pushed on by a desire to accomplish the object which the general commanding set forth in his instructions to be so important to the success of this army. Captain Chambliss pushed his reconnaissance with boldness and spirit, and found the enemy retiring from Ashland, and pushed his rear guard on the road to Richmond a mile and a half. He learned upon what he

considered reliable information that the main body of the enemy, 6,000 strong, left there an hour previous. He reports many evidences of a hasty retreat.

During the second day Bugler Pfaff, of Company A, Sixth U. S. Cavalry, the moment when the forces of the enemy in my front outnumbered me very considerably, reported a body of the enemy's infantry in our rear. I sent Captain Harrison, with his squadron, accompanied by my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Elbert, to capture these, or, if too many, to hold them in check. It proved to be two companies of the regiment we had intercepted the day before. Captain Harrison captured them—2 captains, 1 lieutenant, and 96 privates. The whole number of prisoners captured by my command during the three days was 1 major, 2 captains, 2 lieutenants, and 238 privates. The loss in the command during the same time was only 3 killed and 3 wounded. It is my duty to that command to say that, although without provisions from the night of the second day, and a portion of them engaged upon the demoralizing though necessary military duties of destroying lines of military communication, not a depredation has been committed, within my knowledge, upon any citizen or private property in the beautiful and fertile district in which it was operating.

The reports of commanders of regiments and the captain commanding the battery of artillery, which I have directed to be sent in, will correct any defects or injustice I may do individuals in this report.

I herewith send the reports of Major Williams, commanding Sixth U. S. Cavalry; Captain Whiting, commanding Fifth U. S. Cavalry, with the reports of his five squadron commanders, none of the other reports having come in.

A command of this kind to be effective is frequently so scattered that acts of merit occur not known to the commander, of which I am reminded by omitting to mention that Lieutenant Balder, of the Sixth U. S. Cavalry, drove in the pickets nearest the enemy, and drove them so closely he captured 2 of them well mounted.

My staff, Adjutant-General Audenried, and aides (Lieutenants Elbert and Wade) were with me, and rendered good service.

The first squadron of the Sixth U. S. Cavalry, composed of Companies B and H, commanded by Captains Kautz and Savage, led the advance, which they have done most of the way from Yorktown, in the most gallant style.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. EMORY,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.

Captain LOCKE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, CAVALRY RESERVE,

In the Field, June 2, 1862.

SIR: I desire to state, what I omitted to state in my report of the Hanover affair, that on the first day, May 27, I separated the train from the locomotive, captured the mail and a train loaded with corn, sugar, and tobacco, at the Hanover station, near the Court-House. The mail was sent to General Porter, and the corn, sugar, and tobacco issued to the troops of my brigade. I did not mention this in my written report to General Porter, because I mentioned it verbally, and considered the subsequent operations in front of so much more importance

(I refer to those on the South Anna and at Ashland), and because I was with my staff in advance of the Court-House on the 27th, and then gave the personal directions in regard to the disposition of this property, which I had left in my rear, and which I see is now credited to another force. I could not have safely advanced without cutting the line at the Hanover Depot.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. EMORY,
Brigadier-General.

Captain LOCKE,
Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, CAVALRY RESERVE,
In the Field, June 6, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose you the report of Captain Benson, commanding Battery M, of the Regular Artillery, attached to my command at the battle of Hanover.* I regret this report did not arrive in time to go in with my own, as it gives some details and notice of individual acts which I desire to call to the attention of General Porter, commanding general on that occasion. I cordially indorse the commendations of Captain Benson, and also ask attention of the general commanding, who was himself present, to the conspicuous gallantry and cool judgment displayed by Captain Benson himself. It will be recollected that when the enemy was engaged it was without regard to his force and before the body of the division came up. It was my good fortune to have had this same officer and his battery with me on the 4th of May, in the affair on the left preceding the battle of Williamsburg, where I had occasion to notice his conduct in similar terms.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. H. EMORY,
Brig. Gen., Commanding First Brigade, Cavalry Reserve.

Captain LOCKE,
Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps.

No. 5.

Report of Capt. Charles J. Whiting, Fifth U. S. Cavalry.

CAMP HEADQUARTERS FIFTH CAVALRY,
May 30, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the operations of my regiment at the battle of Hanover Court-House on May 27, 1862:

On the 27th, after the enemy was repulsed, my regiment, with the exception of Lieut. A. K. Arnold's squadron, was ordered to advance, and upon reaching a by-road Captain Royall was detached with his squadron to follow the direct road. The balance of the regiment followed Captain Benson's battery down the by-road, when we came to an opening giving us a view of the enemy and what I supposed to be a wagon train, which I pointed out to General Emory, who ordered me

* See Benson's report of June 5, No. 11.

to try and cut it off. I started across the country to do so, but upon nearing it found that it was not a wagon train. I kept on, however, and soon came in sight of Captain Royall, who was on my right and front; came to a road leading to Ashland, which I followed until we came to a dense woods, unfit for cavalry operations not supported, and sent word back to General Emory. During the absence of my messenger Captain Royall, on my right, had halted and sent me word that the enemy was in front of him. I moved up to him, when Captain Royall's squadron was deployed as skirmishers to the right, and captured 73 prisoners in a wheat field, the balance of their regiment having taken to the woods. I then received an order to return to the command immediately to resist an attack in the rear.

On the 28th Captain Harrison and Lieut. A. K. Arnold were detached from the regiment with their squadrons, and I was ordered by Brigadier-General Emory to go with a section of artillery and two companies of infantry to support Maj. L. Williams, who had been ordered to go with the Sixth Regiment U. S. Cavalry to burn a bridge on the Pamunkey River. Upon reaching Major Williams I found that he was in no need of support, and as soon as I saw the bridge burning returned. I was then ordered by Brigadier-General Emory to go with my regiment to the Ashland Station and ascertain if the enemy was in force, and if not, to destroy the railroad. When within about 3 miles of the place, my advance guard, commanded by Lieutenant Walker, met the enemy's pickets and drove them in, capturing one of them when within 500 yards of the depot. From Lieutenant Walker's report of what he saw and the report of the prisoner I was satisfied that the enemy was in large force, and that the only course was for me to return, which I did, reaching camp just before dusk.

The operations of the 29th were unimportant (except what is reported by Captain Chambliss). We reached our present camp about 1 o'clock at night.

I will add that upon every occasion officers and men did all that could be expected of them. Captain Owens, though sick when we left camp, kept his saddle all the first day.

The inclosed reports of squadron commanders give a more detailed account of the operations of the regiment.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. J. WHITING,

Captain, Fifth Cavalry, Commanding Regiment,

Lieut. J. C. AUDENRIED,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 6.

Report of Capt. James E. Harrison, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 28.

HANOVER COURT-HOUSE, VA.,

May 29, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in accordance with instructions received from General Emory, commanding First Brigade, cavalry reserve, I left Hanover Court-House on the morning of the 28th in-

stant with my squadron (Companies B and E, Fifth U. S. Cavalry) in pursuit of a party of the enemy's infantry, who, it was reported, were trying to make their escape across the Pamunkey River. After a rapid march of about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles over very bad roads and heavy plowed fields I succeeded in overtaking and surrounding them before I was discovered. I found them in a thick woods near the bank of the river, and closed in upon them with drawn pistols. As soon as they saw me they sprang up in a body and called to me not to shoot, that they were willing to surrender. The captain commanding them came forward and handed me his sword and surrendered to me 96 prisoners, including 2 captains and 1 lieutenant, with all their arms and accouterments. They were armed with the Enfield rifle. I then ordered the captain to form his men and have the caps taken off their guns and their bayonets unfixed, after which I returned with them to General Emory's headquarters, and reported my operations to him. General Emory then ordered me to turn them over to the provost-marshal. Having accomplished this, I returned to Hanover Court-House and rejoined the regiment.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. HARRISON,
Captain, Fifth Cavalry.

Lieut. THOMAS E. MALEY,
Adjutant Fifth Cavalry.

No. 7.

Report of Capt. William P. Chambliss, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 29.

IN THE FIELD, NEAR HANOVER COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
May 29, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to instructions from Captain Whiting, commanding the regiment, I reported to General Emory, commanding cavalry brigade, with two squadrons of the Fifth U. S. Cavalry, composed of I, D, K, and G Companies, commanded respectively by Lieutenants Arnold, Watkins, Walker, and McIntosh, at 5 o'clock this morning, for detached service. I was instructed by the general commanding to take the road to Ashland Station, about 8 miles distant, pursue it as far as the station, unless met by the enemy in force, and to capture the town and station if possible, but if unable to do this I should gain accurate information as to the force of the enemy at that point, and whether he was stationary or moving, and ascertain if he was being re-enforced; that I should at all events make such demonstrations as to induce the belief on the part of the enemy that an attack was intended, and continue thus to amuse him until I was satisfied Major Williams had had time to destroy the railroad bridge above Ashland.

In obedience to these instructions I moved forward on this road, scouring the woods on each side to a point about three-fourths of a mile from the station, keeping the general informed by frequent messengers, as instructed by him, as to my progress and the incidents connected therewith. At this point I halted my command under cover of the woods, and sent Lieutenant Watkins with a few men forward on

the main road and Lieutenant Walker on a road leading to the left of the town, with instructions to get as near the station as possible without being seen, and ascertain if it was occupied by too large a force of the enemy for us to take it by a charge. I directed Lieutenant Arnold with his squadron to hold the road pursued by Lieutenant Walker, and support him if necessary, and Lieutenant McIntosh with the other squadron to support Lieutenant Watkins. Lieutenant Walker became engaged with the enemy's pickets, captured two of them, and drove the others in. Upon the report of these officers, being satisfied that we could carry the town by a dash, I united the squadrons, ordered the charge to be sounded, and we entered it at full speed, the enemy fleeing to the woods without firing a shot. We captured 10 prisoners, a quantity of commissary stores and forage, some camp and garrison equipage, ammunition, and arms. A number of the enemy's tents were still standing, and other evidences of a hasty retreat were seen in all directions. I destroyed the telegraph wires, but did not deem it advisable under the circumstances to destroy the public property taken. Most of the property was stored in the station-house, a large frame building, surrounded by the residences of the inhabitants. Had I fired it the town would have been destroyed. Moreover, I had reason to believe that the town would be occupied by our forces in the course of the day and the property rendered useful to the service. Upon a statement of the reasons influencing my action to the general commanding he was kind enough to approve the course I had pursued.

We also took possession of a hospital of the enemy full of his sick, in charge of Hospital-Steward Minor, of the Forty-third Virginia Regiment, whom I paroled and left with them. I ascertained from reliable information that the main body of the enemy, about 6,000 strong, left the town, taking the direct road to Richmond, about an hour previous to our entrance into it. I directed Lieutenant Arnold, with his squadron, to advance upon the Richmond road and gain what information he could as to the retreat of the enemy. He advanced about a mile, when he came up with and was fired upon by his pickets. This fact being reported to me, I deemed it prudent to recall him. The officers and men of the command executed with promptness and to my entire satisfaction all that I required of them during the day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. P. CHAMBLISS,

Captain, Fifth Cavalry, Commanding.

Lieut. THOMAS E. MALEY.

Adjutant Fifth Cavalry.

No. 8.

Report of Capt. William B. Royall, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 27.

CAMP OF CAVALRY BRIGADE,
Near Richmond, Va., May 30, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In compliance with your order I have the honor to report the operations of my squadron, Companies C and A, on the 27th of May, 1862, at the battle of Hanover Court-House:

After the enemy were repulsed in the morning I was ordered to go

as far as possible on the main road leading from the battle-field to Hanover Court-House. I proceeded about a mile beyond the Court-House, capturing 5 prisoners *en route*. Here I was joined by the remainder of the regiment. My squadron was then deployed on the right of the road as skirmishers, where it captured in all 73 men (infantry), among whom were 1 major, 2 captains, and 1 lieutenant. After skirmishing for some distance I was recalled.

I have the honor to be, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. B. ROYALL,

Captain, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, Commanding Company C.

Capt. C. J. WHITING,

Commanding Fifth Cavalry.

No. 9.

Report of Lieut. Abraham K. Arnold, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 27-28.

CAMP FIFTH REGIMENT CAVALRY,

May 30, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: In obedience to the orders from the captain commanding the regiment I have the honor to report the operations of my command during the engagement on the 27th near Hanover Court-House. In obedience to the orders of the general commanding I was detached with my squadron to reconnoiter the road to Ashland. After proceeding some distance I found the enemy in force. On returning I was ordered to take a position on the left of the line of battle. Soon after the enemy attacked immediately in my front and left, when I moved to the right. During the whole of the engagement my squadron was under fire. I lost 2 men killed, Privates Leo Hentz and James Lason, Company I. Company K had 4 horses wounded. I took 9 prisoners. The next morning I was detached to scour the country north and west of the battle-field.

I captured 24 prisoners, with their arms and accouterments.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. K. ARNOLD,

Lieutenant, Fifth Cavalry, Commanding Company I.

Lieut. THOMAS E. MALEY, *Adjutant Fifth Cavalry.*

No. 10.

Report of Maj. Lawrence Williams, Sixth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 27-28.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CAVALRY, IN THE FIELD,

May 30, 1862.

SIR: Pursuant to instructions from the headquarters of the Fifth Provisional Army Corps I have the honor to submit the following report:

On the 26th instant I was ordered to report to Brigadier-General

Emory with the Sixth Cavalry, to form a portion of the cavalry force of the advance guard of that portion of the army designed to operate in the direction of Hanover Court-House under Major-General Porter. We marched about 7 o'clock on the 27th, and about 12 came up with the enemy at Winston's farm, about 2 miles from Hanover Court-House. A short engagement ensued, in which the Sixth Cavalry was for a time exposed to a very correct, though fortunately not a very destructive, fire from the enemy's battery. Whilst supporting Benson's artillery Private Smith, of Company H, and 2 horses were wounded. The enemy soon retreated in the direction of Hanover, which point was occupied by a squadron of the Sixth Cavalry under Captains Sanders and Hays. Whilst pushing the enemy in his retreat, which had now become very rapid, the advance guard was recalled, in consequence of a force attacking our rear. The pursuit was abandoned. The Sixth Cavalry camped on the evening of the 27th on the battle-field.

On the morning of the 28th I was ordered to burn the railroad bridge over the South Anna River. I proceeded with four squadrons of the Sixth Cavalry to Wickham's farm with materials for firing the bridge. The nature of the ground being such as to preclude a large cavalry force acting with safety or advantage, Lieutenant Kerin was ordered to take a platoon, supported by the regiment, and fire the bridge if possible. Although a work of great labor it was done in about three hours, completely destroying the railroad communication.

At 12 o'clock on the night of the 28th Lieutenant Kerin left the camp with about 20 men, and successfully fired and destroyed the county bridge about 200 yards above the railroad crossing. He was assisted in both operations by Lieutenant Coats, and both deserve the highest praise for the effectual manner in which they discharged their duty. Another bridge was also burned by Captain Cram. This was a bridge which Rush's Lancers had fired on the 27th, but owing to the suddenness of their having withdrawn from the front were unable to entirely complete its destruction.

On the night of the 28th I received instructions to destroy another bridge over the South Anna, over which passed the Virginia Central Railroad. The enemy were supposed to be in force at this bridge. A section of artillery under Lieutenant Hains and four companies of the New York Seventeenth were added to my command. With this force I proceeded to the cross-roads leading to Ashland, Taylorsville, and the bridge. It having been reported that 8,000 rebels were at Ashland, a force probably at the bridge, and one also at Taylorsville, I determined not to give up my position on the main road. Captain Abert's squadron was ordered in advance as a reconnoitering party. The three roads were well scoured, the firing of the bridge found practicable, and effected by Captain Abert in about an hour. Captain Kautz' squadron supported Captain Abert during the operation. My force then returned to camp, and the Sixth Cavalry on its arrival there ordered to the present one, a distance of 14 miles, which we reached at 12.30 o'clock at night, having been in the saddle eighteen out of the twenty-four hours.

I am, sir, with great respect,

LAWRENCE WILLIAMS,

Major, Sixth Cavalry, Commanding.

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Advance Guard, near New Bridge, Va.

No. 11.

Reports of Capt. Henry Benson, Second U. S. Artillery.

CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE,
May 31, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the general commanding the Fifth Army Corps, that I joined the brigade of Brigadier-General Emory with my battery of horse artillery early on the morning of the 27th instant, in compliance with instructions of the evening previous. My strength was as follows: Four officers, 109 non-commissioned officers, mechanics, privates, &c., 141 horses, and six 3-inch rifled guns, with caissons and ammunition complete. Early in the afternoon I received orders from the general commanding to move the battery rapidly to the front. The battery was moved forward and placed in position as follows: One (right) section, under Lieutenant Barlow, was placed on the road to Hanover Court-House, whilst another, the center section, under the command of Lieutenant Chapin, was moved to a position in a large field to the left of the road leading to the railroad station. Both soon became engaged with the enemy's infantry. The left section, under command of Lieutenant Hains, was for the time held in reserve.

An order from the general commanding to move a section forward and shell the buildings at the railroad station was at this time partially executed. The enemy being in position in a dense woods on the left and in front of the center section, it was found necessary to force them from it before the section could move to the desired point. To effect this object I moved Lieutenant Chapin's section to a commanding position, one piece in the road and the other in a peach orchard to the left, and after a few well-directed discharges of canister and shell (percussion) routed the enemy from their cover.

About this time General Morell informed me that he had pushed skirmishers in the woods to the left and front of the section. The firing was thereupon discontinued for a time. On my return to my battery I found that the sections of Lieutenants Barlow and Hains had been moved forward and placed in position in a large field to the right of the Hanover road, and were engaged with the enemy's artillery and infantry. I now directed the fire of the battery (four guns) on the infantry in position in rear of a building (afterward used as a hospital) and on the right and left of the Hanover road. The enemy were soon forced to retire from their position in confusion. Lieutenant Chapin's section having joined me, I moved the battery to the right and a little in front of its former position. Intervals between the guns were increased and the caissons and detachments of the cannoneers' horses placed under cover of the woods, and then the fire of the whole battery was concentrated upon the enemy's artillery, which, after a sharp and well-directed fire, were entirely silenced. One 12-pounder howitzer, which could not be removed in consequence of one of the team horses having been killed by a fragment of a shell, was taken possession of by some of the Seventeenth New York Volunteers—at least I understood such to be the case. As soon as our fire had silenced the enemy's guns the battery moved rapidly forward in pursuit with the cavalry on the Hanover road. Our fire was again opened on the retreating infantry in the vicinity of the Court-House. The battery afterward returned to the enemy's first position and camped for the night.

Our loss during the day was 1 ordnance mechanic, Henry Krantz,

killed; 2 cannoneers severely wounded, William Cope and Joseph F. Francis; 2 horses killed, 1 wounded, and 1 missing. On the 28th the sections of Lieutenants Barlow and Hains were detached to support commands pushed forward in pursuit of the enemy, &c. On the 29th one section, under Lieutenant Hains, was detached to support Major Williams' command, and on its return the battery marched back to the camp of the artillery reserve near New Bridge, where it arrived on the morning of the 30th at 8 o'clock.

Before closing this report I cannot omit the opportunity offered of bringing to the notice of the general commanding the admirable conduct of my officers and men during the days mentioned. The sections of Lieutenants Barlow, Hains, and Chapin were commanded by those officers with discretion, skill, and coolness. Lieutenant Barlow had the good fortune to be closely engaged with the enemy's infantry, and performed his work well. He speaks in high terms of the intelligence, coolness, and bravery of Sergeant Reilly, chief of one of his pieces. My non-commissioned officers—in fact, all of my men—behaved so well that it is a difficult matter to speak of one without giving the names of all. Sergeants Flood, Hasenzahl, and Corporals Brower and Leese deserve particular notice. I take the liberty in this report of expressing my thanks to General Emory for the handsome support he gave me until the battery returned to this camp.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY BENSON,

Captain, Second Artillery, Commanding.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,

A. A. G., Fifth Prov. Army Corps, Camp near New Bridge.

CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE,

June 5, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit, for the information of the general commanding the brigade, the operations of my battery of horse artillery on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of May, 1862:

The battery engaged the enemy's artillery and infantry on the road to Hanover Court-House, some 3 or 4 miles from that place, early in the afternoon of the 27th. After a severe fire of shell and case-shot he was forced to retire from the different positions occupied by him during the engagement. The battery, with the Fifth and Sixth Cavalry, then moved rapidly forward in pursuit, and when within a mile of the Court-House a fire of percussion shell was again opened upon his retreating infantry, after which the battery camped for the night near the enemy's first position. Loss during the action was 1 ordnance mechanic, Henry Krantz, killed, and Cannoneers Francis and Cope severely wounded; 2 horses killed, 1 wounded, and 1 missing.

On the 28th the battery moved forward to Hanover Court-House. The sections of Lieutenants Barlow and Hains were detached to support commands sent to destroy the enemy's railroad bridges.

On the 29th the section of Lieutenant Hains was detached to support Major Williams' command, and on the return of the section the battery marched for the camp of the artillery reserve, where it arrived on the morning of the 30th at 8 o'clock.

I take this opportunity to bring to the notice of Brigadier-General Emory the handsome conduct of my officers and men during the en-

gement and the days subsequent. At one time one of the guns of Lieutenant Barlow's section engaged the enemy's infantry at very short range (about 100 yards), and with canister forced it back in confusion. On another occasion the section of Lieutenant Chapin engaged their infantry in a dense wood at some 250 yards, and soon routed them out of their cover. All the officers, Lieutenants Barlow, Hains, and Chapin, managed their sections with discretion, coolness, and energy. Lieutenant Barlow speaks in high praise of the bravery, intelligence, and coolness of Sergeant Reilly, who was chief of one of his pieces. All my men behaved so well that I find great difficulty in naming one without giving the names of all. Sergeants Flood, Pfeffer, Lance Sergeant Hasenzahl, and Corporals Brower and Leese deserve particular notice.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY BENSON,
Captain, Second Artillery.

Lieut. J. C. AUDENRIED,
Act. Asst. Adj. Gen., Brigade of Cavalry, near New Bridge.

NOTE.—After the shelling of the infantry the battery moved on to the Court-House, and a section was advanced 2 miles beyond it.

W. H. EMORY,
Brigadier-General, &c.

No. 12.

*Report of Capt. Charles Griffin, Fifth U. S. Artillery, of engagement
May 27.*

CAMP NEAR HANOVER COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
May 28, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with the orders of the 27th instant from the general commanding the division the batteries were assigned as follows: Battery C, Massachusetts Artillery, to General Martindale's brigade, Battery E to Colonel McQuade's, and Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, to General Butterfield's brigade, and for a detailed account of the Massachusetts batteries attention is respectfully called to the reports of their commanders.

Battery D, Fifth Artillery, left camp near Dr. Gaines' at 5.30 a. m., and arrived on the field of action about 1 o'clock, and by direction of General Porter was sent under the command of First Lieutenant Kingsbury to relieve two pieces of Battery M, Second U. S. Artillery, which were firing on the road to our left. Lieutenant Kingsbury directed one section, under command of First Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett, to move about 200 yards to the front of the position occupied by the guns of the Second Artillery. One piece was placed on a little rise in the road and the other in a plowed field to the left, and opened on two pieces of the enemy, one 6-pounder and one rifled gun, distant about 1,500 yards. The fire was kept up with spirit on both sides for about an hour, when the enemy's guns were silenced. Our guns told handsomely, killing 3 horses and striking one caisson twice, one shot exploding the ammunition-chest of the limber, and according to the information of the prisoners killing 1 man and wounding 4 more and 3 horses. The same source states that our guns dismounted one piece, which was carried

away, and completely disabled the section, killing and wounding quite a number of cannoneers.

It is but just to specially call the attention to the commander of the section, First Lieutenant Hazlett, First Sergt. Samuel Peeples, and Corporal Timothy Gready, gunners to the pieces.

About 3 o'clock p. m. the battery, by order of General Porter, moved in the direction of Hanover Court-House, and had proceeded about 2 miles when, heavy firing being heard in our rear, it was turned back, and about 5 o'clock commenced firing at the enemy, about 1,800 yards distant. The enemy occupied the position held by our guns at 1 o'clock and was heavily pressed by our musketry. Our infantry soon after routed them, when the battery was moved to the front by Lieutenant Kingsbury through an open plowed field, firing advancing, our infantry protecting the flanks, and driving the enemy before them until the halt was sounded.

The battery fired 169 rounds (10-pounder Parrott gun) of percussion shell and shrapnel, the performance being highly satisfactory, nearly every projectile bursting. Three privates were slightly bruised, 2 horses killed, 1 (Lieutenant Kingsbury's) wounded. The officers of the battery were First Lieuts. H. W. Kingsbury and C. E. Hazlett, Second Lieuts. L. M. Harrison, H. B. Reed, and C. H. Carroll, all of the Fifth Artillery; and where officers and men, after a march of 20 miles through rain and mud, behaved with such courage, willingness, and alacrity it would be difficult to mention any others specially by name.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. GRIFFIN,
Captain, Fifth Artillery.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 13.

Report of Capt. Augustus P. Martin, Battery C, Massachusetts Light Artillery, of engagement May 27.

NEAR PEAKE'S STATION,
Hanover County, Va., May 29, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement of one section of my battery on the afternoon of the 27th instant, under command of First Lieutenant Dunn:

The section came into battery near the road on Harris' farm, near Peake's Railroad Station, supported on the right by the Second Regiment Maine Volunteers and a detachment of the Twenty-fifth New York Volunteers, and on the left by the Forty-fourth Regiment New York Volunteers, the whole under command of Brigadier-General Martindale. The woods, about 800 yards in front, where the enemy were supposed to be secreted, were shelled. The enemy soon formed in line of battle in front of the woods, and advanced toward our force, when the support fell back suddenly 20 or 30 yards, leaving the pieces uncovered, and so much exposed to the enemy's fire that it was found impossible for the cannoneers to remain at their posts, and they retired with the infantry until the enemy broke and retreated in rear of the woods. They expended during the engagement the following amount of ammu-

munition: Thirty-five rounds spherical case, 7 rounds shells, 1 round solid shot; total, 43.

Private James B. Robinson was severely wounded in the neck, and John Ryan slightly wounded in the abdomen. I also lost 3 horses killed and 2 horses wounded.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. P. MARTIN,
Captain Battery C, Massachusetts Artillery.

Capt. CHARLES GRIFFIN,
Chief of Artillery, Porter's Division.

No. 14.

Report of Capt. George D. Allen, Battery E, Massachusetts Light Artillery, of operations May 27-28.

HDQRS. BATTERY E, (FIFTH) MASSACHUSETTS ARTILLERY,
Camp near Gaines' Mill, May 30, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to General Orders, No. 49, from General Morell, and a verbal order from Captain Griffin, to report to Colonel McQuade, commanding Second Brigade, Porter's division, this battery marched early in the forenoon of May 27 in rear of this brigade. We were too late to take any part in the first skirmish near Hanover Court-House, but followed on with the rest of the division until ordered by General Porter to turn back, as firing was heard in our rear. We followed Captain Griffin's battery, but took no part in the engagement.

On Wednesday, the 28th, we were ordered by Captain Griffin to go down the road we came in the rear of our advance force. Here we remained until ordered forward again into a field, where we encamped.

Thursday we received orders from Captain Griffin to march back to our old camp at Gaines' Mill, where we arrived at midnight. No ammunition was expended and no casualties occurred to the battery.

GEO. D. ALLEN,
Captain.

Captain GRIFFIN.

No. 15.

Report of Brig. Gen. George W. Morell, U. S. Army, commanding division.

HDQRS. PORTER'S DIV., FIFTH ARMY CORPS (PROVIS'AL),
Camp, near New Bridge, Va., June 7, 1862.

Pursuant to orders from the general commanding the corps my division left camp at an early hour on Tuesday morning, 27th ultimo, for Hanover Court-House. For several hours the rain fell in torrents, but about noon the clouds broke away and during the latter part of the day the heat was oppressive. Colonel Berdan's regiment of Sharpshooters led, followed by the First, Third, and Second Brigades, each brigade escorting a battery of artillery, the whole preceded by a strong detachment of cavalry, with a battery of light artillery (Benson's), under command of General Emory.

After marching a few miles I was directed to send forward a regiment to report to General Emory, for which purpose the Twenty-fifth New York, Colonel Johnson, was designated. This will account for that regiment being so far in the advance when we encountered the enemy. Being ordered to post a section of artillery, supported by a regiment of infantry, at the cross-roads to secure our communications, I assigned a section of Martin's battery and the Forty-fourth New York Volunteers, Colonel Stryker, to that duty.

The head of the column came upon the enemy near the intersection of the road by which we were moving with the one from Ashland to Hanover Court-House, and a few minutes later, when I arrived on the ground at the head of the infantry, the Twenty-fifth New York, which had been marching with the cavalry, had commenced skirmishing. Colonel Berdan's regiment was deployed and sent forward. General Martindale, with the Second Maine, Colonel Roberts, and Twenty-second Massachusetts, Colonel Gove, the only regiments of his brigade present, was ordered to the left, with Griffin's battery (relieving a section of Benson's), to observe the railroad near Peake's Station. The Third Brigade, General Butterfield, was ordered to deploy in the field to the right and to advance.

By order of General Porter I dispatched an order to Colonel Stryker to come up from the cross-roads with his command, and then repaired to the extreme right and front. When I arrived there I found part of Berdan's Sharpshooters under the major at the southerly edge of the woods on the right of the Hanover road, with skirmishers in front, and part under the colonel at the northerly edge of the woods on the left of the road, Benson's light battery being considerably to the rear, firing through the interval at the enemy, who were posted in the open field near Dr. Kinney's house, with two field pieces.

The Twenty-fifth New York had advanced with the cavalry, and part of it, after the cavalry disengaged itself from the column, pushing forward too rapidly, lost two companies as prisoners and received a volley at Dr. Kinney's house from the enemy, which inflicted a severe loss. This occurred before I went to the front. Part of Berdan's regiment and Butterfield's brigade, having made its way through the woods on the left of the road, advanced in admirable order through the wheat field (Berdan on the right) toward the enemy, who, posted near Dr. Kinney's house with two field pieces, after firing a few shots abandoned his position, leaving a brass 12-pounder howitzer in possession of the Seventeenth New York Volunteers, Col. H. S. Lansing. On the left the enemy, though in strong force, retired to the woods before General Martindale after a brisk cannonade, but returned at a later period to renew the fight. This closed the first affair of the day.

The whole force was now ordered by General Porter to move on toward Hanover Court-House, and all did so except General Martindale, who, having sent the Twenty-second Massachusetts (Colonel Gove) forward through the woods by way of the railroad, remained with the Second Maine (Colonel Roberts) at the junction of the roads to watch the enemy. Whilst alone with this small regiment he ascertained that the rebels whom he had previously driven to the woods were approaching from the direction of Peake's Station. He recalled the remnant of the Twenty-fifth New York, assumed command of the Forty-fourth New York, which had opportunely arrived from the cross-roads with a section of Martin's battery, made his dispositions to meet the attack, and sent forward for re-enforcements.

The rear brigade (the second) and Griffin's battery were opposite the

large white house (Winston's) and the Third Brigade and cavalry in advance of them when the order came to return to the assistance of their comrades. The Second Brigade immediately faced to the rear, and was led by Colonel McQuade at a rapid pace directly through the fields toward the point where the firing was heaviest, leaving the road clear for Griffin's battery.

A severe battle was evidently raging in the woods at the lower end of the wheat field and the open fields beyond, the chief struggle being at the easterly corner of the woods, nearly opposite the junction of the roads. Griffin's battery was placed in the field to the left of the road, near the position that Benson's had occupied. The Fourteenth New York Volunteers (Lieutenant-Colonel Skillen) was led to the easterly corner of the woods, where the firing was heaviest, and there found General Martindale with the Second Maine resisting the principal attack of the rebels. The men were almost exhausted, their ammunition was nearly expended, yet they were manfully holding their ground against superior numbers, when the Fourteenth New York Volunteers came to their relief and took the fight off their hands. And it was time, for the gunners had been driven from their pieces, the remnant of the Twenty-fifth New York had broken and been reformed at a distance to the rear, and the right wing of the Forty-fourth New York had given way. It was the turning point of the fight. The Second Maine withdrew, the Fourteenth New York Volunteers opened fire, and the enemy began to give way.

A few minutes later Berdan's Sharpshooters, the Sixty-second Pennsylvania, (Colonel Black), and Ninth Massachusetts (Colonel Cass), who had gone into the woods, gaining ground at the same time to the right, made themselves felt on their flank and rear, and they fled.

Griffin's battery moved forward, supported by the Thirteenth New York (Colonel Marshall), first to a position near Harris' house and then beyond Peake's Station to the right of the railroad, and the enemy were driven far into the woods.

The Third Brigade, being farther from the field than the Second, did not, with the exception of the Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers (Colonel McLane), arrive in time to take part in the action. This regiment, with General Butterfield, returned by the railroad, and aided materially in securing prisoners. The Fourth Michigan (Colonel Woodbury) was held in reserve by General Porter. The Fifth New York (Lieutenant-Colonel Duryea) came on the ground by the main road just after the close of the action.

Darkness had now overtaken us, and our wearied soldiers bivouacked for the night, having been under arms since 3.30 o'clock in the morning, and marched at least 20 miles, partly through rain and mud.

I inclose the reports of the commandants of brigades, regiments, and batteries, to which I beg leave to refer for detailed accounts of the operations of the several corps, and also for the casualties of the day.

On the 28th Colonel Gove, with his regiment, the Twenty-second Massachusetts Volunteers, and a troop of the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, made a satisfactory reconnaissance toward Richmond by way of the Ashland road, a report of which I also inclose.

On the 29th four companies of the Seventeenth New York Volunteers, under command of Captain Grower, marched 5 miles with the Sixth Cavalry and Benson's light artillery, burning a bridge. In the afternoon of the 29th the whole command returned to camp.

I am informed that the force opposed to us was the North Carolina brigade, commanded by General L. O'B. Branch, and composed of the

Seventh, Eighteenth, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-seventh Regiments, with others temporarily attached. We sent in nearly 600 prisoners, besides the wounded.

To my assistant adjutant general, Capt. R. T. Auchmuty, and to my aides, Lieuts. J. E. Williams and I. Seymour, jr., I am indebted for the prompt and cheerful performance of duty and accurate transmission of orders, their zeal at times leading them to incur greater exposure than the exigencies of the moment required.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. MORELL,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 16.

Report of Col. Hiram Berdan, First U. S. Sharpshooters, of engagement May 27.

HDQRS. FIRST REGT. BERDAN'S U. S. SHARPSHOOTERS,
Camp near Gaines' Mill, May 30, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In compliance with circular order of this date I have the honor to report a detail of the action of my command in the battle of Hanover, on the 27th instant.

In the forenoon my regiment was deployed in the edge of the woods in front of the enemy's battery, to co-operate with the Twenty-fifth New York on the right and another regiment on the left. They all advanced together through the open field upon which the enemy retired. At the second attack in the afternoon I deployed my regiment in the woods with the intention of attacking the enemy to the left and in the rear. In so doing we came across a North Carolina Regiment stationed behind the earth fence on the cross-road, near the house where General Morell's headquarters subsequently were. After a few rounds from our skirmishers the enemy retreated, leaving 17 killed, 27 wounded, and 31 prisoners. The latter were employed in carrying off the wounded and burying the dead.

Of my command none were killed, and the only prisoner was Dr. G. C. Marshall, my regimental surgeon, who was on duty at the little house used as the first hospital. He was taken just as the second action commenced.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. BERDAN,
Colonel, Commanding U. S. Sharpshooters.

Capt. R. T. AUCHMUTY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 17.

Report of Brig. Gen. John H. Martindale, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.

HDQRS. MARTINDALE'S BRIG., FIFTH PROV. ARMY CORPS,
Camp near New Bridge, Va., May 30, 1862.

I have the honor to make through you the following report of the operations of this brigade on the 27th instant at the battle of Hanover,

near Peake's Station, for the information of the general commanding in chief, in compliance with paragraph 743 of Army Regulations. My brigade consisted of the following regiments: Eighteenth Massachusetts, commanded by Colonel Barnes; Twenty-fifth New York, commanded by Colonel Johnson; Thirteenth New York, commanded by Colonel Marshall; Twenty-second Massachusetts, commanded by Colonel Gove; Second Maine, commanded by Colonel Roberts. Previous to the 27th instant the Thirteenth New York had been sent on detached service and was separated from the brigade. On the morning and afternoon of the 26th of May the Eighteenth Massachusetts had been sent on picket duty and were not relieved so as to return to camp until the morning of the 27th. They were detained in consequence, and did not leave camp and arrive at Hanover in time for the battle.

I broke camp and started for Hanover Court-House shortly after 3.30 o'clock a. m. in the midst of a heavy rain, through a muddy and tedious road, with my remaining three regiments, and in the following order, viz: First, the Twenty-fifth New York; second, the Twenty-second Massachusetts; third, the Second Maine. Martin's battery was placed between the Twenty-fifth New York and Twenty-second Massachusetts. On the route the column was halted and Berdan's regiment of sharpshooters passed to the front of my brigade. Still farther on the route I received orders to throw forward a regiment to precede the whole column as skirmishers, and I sent the Twenty-fifth New York, which in officers and men was nearly 400 strong. I was thus left with only two of my regiments under my immediate command, viz, the Twenty-second Massachusetts and Second Maine, the former about 800 and the latter about 350 strong.

In this order my brigade proceeded until I reached the commanding general of the army corps at the junction of our route with the main road from Richmond to Hanover Court-House, being a point about 1 mile east of Peake's Station. Herewith I transmit a diagram on which distances have been entered after actual admeasurement by pacing them. The diagram is as correct as it can be made without surveyors' instruments. * * * I then received orders from the general commanding the army corps to move to the left along the Richmond road, skirmishing as I advanced, and to strike the railroad, break it up, cut the telegraph wires, and drive back the enemy, should I meet one, and in executing these orders to use my discretion. A section of Benson's battery was furnished for the purpose.

At this point on the left and west of the route by which we had approached from New Bridge was cleared land, the north side of which was bounded by a dense wood for a length of 700 yards. On the edge of this wood was a ditch and bank surmounted by a close wicker fence. At 592 paces or yards on the left or west of the junction of our route from New Bridge with the Richmond and Hanover road was a house with outbuilding, door-yard and garden. West of the garden and yard was a swampy piece of ground, which made a clearing of about 200 paces, when woods were again reached. Passing through these woods about 100 yards cleared ground was again reached about 300 paces from the junction of the highway to Richmond and railroad. From this junction the railroad bore in a straight course northeasterly toward Hanover Court-House, passing through a large wheat field until it entered the dense woods north of the highway and door-yard already described.

I proceeded to execute the orders given to me by forming the Twenty-second Massachusetts in line of battle, and the regiment advanced, pre-

ceded by skirmishers, which beat the woods on the north (my right), passed through the door-yard and garden, across the swampy ground and woods still farther west, until they came in view of the railroad. Colonel Gove, of the Twenty-second Massachusetts, who led this movement, immediately reported to me that the enemy had a train of cars on the track, and that a large force was forming there in line of battle. I sent forward the whole of his regiment to him on the left and south of the Richmond road, and opened with artillery from the door-yard in the direction which he indicated. The Second Maine was immediately moved to the north of the Richmond road near to the railroad where it entered the woods toward Hanover. The battery which I had in command was withdrawn and Griffin's battery substituted. A section of this battery was sent forward on the Richmond road to the line occupied by the Twenty-second Massachusetts and opened fire. The enemy responded with artillery, which was near the junction of the highway and railroad, but was hid from view, as was supposed, by the excavation made for the railroad. The enemy's battery was soon silenced by Griffin's battery, and I subsequently learned had been withdrawn.

In the mean time the Second Maine tore up a part of the rail from the railroad track and cut and carried off a few lengths of telegraph wire, and it also appears that a similar work was done by Captain Sampson, of the Twenty-second Massachusetts. At this point of time I did not know that the enemy's battery had been withdrawn, and I made dispositions to attack it. Finding the enemy was superior to me in numbers I sent notice of the fact to the commandant of the corps, and that they had opened on me with artillery, and for two regiments, or at least one, to re-enforce me. But I ordered forward the Second Maine across the railroad into the wheat field preparatory to an attack from that direction. The enemy was in view, and while my command was in this position I received a communication from the commandant of the corps that the enemy were leaving our front and right, evidently retreating toward Fredericksburg or north, and requesting me to push to the right, and that there were then no regiments which he could give me, repeating the injunction that the enemy was on my right, and directing me to push up that way and join the rest of the force. I returned an answer that the enemy was on my left—not on my right—along a road to my left, and not to my right. Having dispatched this notice I recalled the Twenty-second Massachusetts and Second Maine and battery, and placed them in the road to Hanover, leading with the Twenty-second Massachusetts, followed by the battery, and closing with the Second Maine.

This formation was adopted in the expectation that I could thereby constitute a sufficient rear guard and protect not only the battery but our line of communications, should they be threatened, and which it was obvious were very much in peril if we left the enemy in our rear. A small force of cavalry was stationed near the garden and house already mentioned. As my column was put in motion, and I think after it had got under way, I received an order from the commanding general of the corps to push up the railroad as fast as I could and to halt when I came to the road from Hanover Court-House, and in the order was informed that our cavalry were pursuing the enemy. At nearly the same time I received another dispatch from the commanding general of the corps in reply to my message that the enemy were on my left, and not on my right, directing me to let them go, and informing me that Stoneman would strike them, and that I was then moving on them.

These dispatches convinced me that the commanding general of the corps was acting under some great mistake and misinformation, and having failed to impress him by the dispatches I had sent, I started forward to see him personally. On turning the corner of roads at the junction of the route from New Bridge with the Richmond and Hanover road I met the commanding general of division and saw the Twenty-second Massachusetts returning. I found that they had been ordered to return and march up the railroad. I objected to it, and proposed to the commanding general of the division to go forward to the commanding general of the corps and inform him in person of the force in rear and the danger to our line. The commanding general of division replied that I could communicate by an orderly, and should go up the railroad. Thereupon I dispatched an orderly with information to the commanding general of the corps, and ordered the Twenty-second Massachusetts to go through the woods to the railroad and follow it up, but asked to be permitted to assume the responsibility of remaining with the Second Maine Regiment to cover the battery and the column in rear. This was not forbidden, and I soon proceeded with the battery and the Second Maine. As a precaution, a mounted vedette was ordered to watch the enemy in our rear and report any demonstration made against us. The regiment had scarcely turned the corner of the woods, marked D, when the commandant of the cavalry came forward and informed me that the skirmishers of the enemy were advancing, and had reached the house, garden, and door-yard where my first battery had been planted. This was within 700 yards of the rear of my column. I immediately sent forward a notice of the fact to the commanding general of division, and asked for the return of the Twenty-second Massachusetts. Colonel Roberts immediately halted his regiment, the Second Maine, and changed front to the rear on its first company in perfect order. It was then marched in line of battle back across the road from New Bridge and halted. Skirmishers were immediately thrown forward.

At this time I saw a regiment, which proved to be the Forty-fourth New York, coming along the route from New Bridge, commanded by Colonel Stryker. I informed him of the difficulty, and he placed his regiment under my orders. I directed it to be formed under cover of a ravine, faced southwesterly toward the woods on the left of the open ground in front, and to throw skirmishers into the woods. This was promptly executed. A section of Martin's battery shortly came along, and I directed it to be placed in battery on the left of the Second Maine Regiment. The skirmishers were already slightly engaged, and the battery opened fire. At this juncture it was reported to me that the hospital, where we had wounded men and sick, about a mile back on our route, was in possession of the rebels, and with much reluctance I sent one wing of the Forty-fourth New York to relieve it.

Scarcely had the left wing of this regiment been put in motion and passed from my sight when a regiment of the enemy deployed in line of battle in front of the garden and door-yard, and advanced toward the Second Maine. The Second Maine Regiment immediately fixed bayonets. The enemy advanced within about 450 yards and fired by battalion. They halted. The Second Maine Regiment and battery responded, and soon the enemy marched at a double-quick into the woods on my left, and where the skirmishers of the Forty-fourth New York had been sent. At the same time that the rebels made this charge toward us I discerned a body of the enemy moving from the rear of the garden and door-yard into the thick woods on my right. I

immediately ordered the return of the wing of the Forty-fourth New York. A fragment of the Twenty-fifth New York, about 150 strong, was one-half a mile distant in the woods toward Hanover Court-House. I had already sent for it to come to my support. I thought it improper to move the Second Maine at that time to the cover of the woods until I could procure some other support for the battery to replace that regiment. My aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Davis, reported to me that there was a large number of stragglers and guards of ambulances under the trees along the road by the edge of the woods, and I dispatched him to compel them to form in line, to watch the woods, and guard my right flank, as far as practicable. I intrusted the execution of that duty to him, and I learn with pleasure that quite a number of men from the Twenty-second Massachusetts, and I think also from the Ninth Massachusetts and Fourth Michigan, maintained their posts at that point under his command. I also sent Lieutenant Davis to hasten the march of the Twenty-fifth. As soon as it had reached the ground I ordered it to replace the Second Maine, on the right of the battery, and moved the Second Maine just to the cover of the woods already indicated, with further directions to throw skirmishers into the woods.

Before the skirmishers could be started the enemy opened a murderous oblique fire from the edge of the woods over the crest of the wicker fence which skirts it, already described. The fire which had been sent from the woods on our left and had for a short time been suspended was again resumed. I had sent an order to the Forty-fourth New York to form a line of battle, angular or curved outwardly, toward the woods on the left. In this formation there was some displacement, as I have learned, of the regular order of the companies from right to left.

The fire of the enemy was now crossed on the battery, the Twenty-fifth New York and the right of the Forty-fourth New York. I was posted at this time 65 paces in rear of the left of the Second Maine and right of the Twenty-fifth New York. Soon the fire of the battery was silenced, and I discovered that my center was giving way. Presently the Twenty-fifth retired, and also the gunners of the batteries. The smoke was moving toward me and I could not identify at this time the parties, but there was a rapid and presently a disorderly movement to the rear. I moved across the line of the retreat, endeavoring to halt it and reform a line. Here I found the colonel of the Forty-fourth retreating, and then concluded that his entire regiment had broken. I called to him to rally the men and form them behind the fence on the edge of the woods. For a time my orders were not heeded, but presently the men began to obey my commands, and quite a number came forward from the fence and formed a line on the rising ground in front. Here Captain Gleason, of the Twenty-fifth New York, under my orders, took command of this line. Lieutenant McRoberts, of the Forty-fourth, seeing what I was attempting to do, came to me, saying that he had 10 men with him and awaited my orders. He immediately aided in the formation of the line.

At this time the largest part of the Twenty-fifth New York had gathered around the colonel, who had been wounded, near a house to the right, 300 paces in rear of the Second Maine. The colonel sent for his men posted with me, which had been reformed to move to that point, and I directed them to proceed there. Here a line was formed on the colors of the Twenty-fifth Regiment. It is due to Lieutenant McRoberts to say that he has reported to me that he had been ordered to retire by

Colonel Stryker, and when from the second line the flag of his regiment was in view he immediately returned to it. The battle had now lasted quite an hour, and although the center of my line was broken under a cross-fire which was entirely destructive and insupportable, still the Second Maine on the right, I believe every man, and the largest body of the Forty-fourth New York, with the lieutenant-colonel and major, on the left, maintained their ground without flinching. It is now disclosed that they were assailed by four times their number. The ammunition was nearly exhausted, as was reported to me by Major Chaplin of the Second Maine, but the two pieces of artillery, which rested in battery without a gunner and within less than 200 yards of the enemy on the right, did not induce a man of them to come from the shelter of the woods in which he was covered.

Re-enforcements at length arrived under the command of the commanding general of the division and the corps. The Fourteenth New York, of Morell's brigade, commanded by Colonel McQuade, was in advance, and approached the position of the Second Maine. By orders of the commanding general of division, Lieutenant-Colonel Skillen, commanding the Fourteenth, formed his regiment with great promptitude agreeably to my directions, and moved to the relief of the Second Maine. At this moment I saw still farther in rear Griffin's battery firing directly across the line of the Forty-fourth New York at a long range, exceeding 1,200 yards, and not knowing on what information he was acting and fearing a mistake, I rode up in front of it to have the battery thrown forward.

The woods on the north of the Richmond road, from which the enemy had been assailing my right flank and center, are about 500 yards in width, and on the northeastern side there is an open field, and Captain Griffin directed me to the commanding general of the corps on that field, where I found him, and described the position of my command, and learned that the Ninth Massachusetts and Sixty-second Pennsylvania Regiments, of Morell's brigade, had been deployed into these woods. That movement necessarily ended the battle on the right, because it was assailing the enemy in rear, while the Fourteenth New York held them in front and on their left flank. An order was then immediately sent by the commanding general of the corps to the Fourteenth New York to cease firing, it being apparent that the Ninth Massachusetts and Sixty-second Pennsylvania had marched long enough to come within range of the fire of that regiment. For the rest, the enemy was routed, and it remained for those who had come to our relief to follow in pursuit and gather up the fugitive prisoners.

The Twenty-second Massachusetts had gone up the railroad agreeably to orders and could not reach the battle ground in return until the victory had been achieved. I ought not to omit a reference to the participation of the Thirteenth New York in the fight. Just after I had reached Griffin's battery, to induce the suspension of its fire until it had advanced farther, I met the Thirteenth New York, and saw it file past me with cheers to the support and relief of the Forty-fourth New York. I leave it to the officer having the regiment under command to notice its action, which has been reported to me as prompt and gallant. This regiment, as reported to me, advanced so as to encounter and respond to some of the last and retiring volleys of the enemy and drove him from the shelter of the woods in that direction. Here the Thirteenth New York met its casualties in killed and wounded. Captain Powers, my assistant adjutant-general, and my aides-de-camp, Lieutenants Martindale and Davis, behaved throughout this severe fight with signal

bravery and discretion. All of them were repeatedly under a hot fire of musketry.

I have already commended Lieutenant-Colonel Rice and Major Chapin, of the Forty-fourth New York, to the honorable consideration of the commanding general by reciting their conduct. A part of the Forty-fourth New York broke, and could not be rallied, but they were subjected to the same fire which drove the gunners from the battery and caused the Twenty-fifth New York to retire. The heroic endurance of the Twenty-fifth New York, its wounded commanders (Colonel Johnson and Lieutenant-Colonel Savage and Adjutant Houghton), its severe losses of brave officers and men, repel the idea that they would retire where the bravest soldiers are expected to stand their ground. The behavior of the Second Maine was gallant in the extreme, and no praise bestowed for brave and meritorious military services can be deemed extravagant when applied to Colonel Roberts and his whole command.

I rest in the opinion that had the Twenty-second Massachusetts Regiment remained with me the enemy could have been repelled without further assistance, for that regiment and its able commander had been with me far to the left, and understood the topography of the country in that direction.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

Your obedient servant,

JOHN H. MARTINDALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. R. T. AUCHMUTY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 18.

*Report of Col. Charles W. Roberts, Second Maine Infantry, of engagement
May 27.*

HDQRS. SECOND REGIMENT MAINE VOLUNTEERS,
Gaines' Mill, May 30, 1862.

GENERAL: My command having been engaged in the late battle at Peake's Station, or Hanover, on Tuesday last, the 27th instant, I submit the following report, viz:

Agreeably to orders from brigade headquarters, at about 4 o'clock on Tuesday morning, the 27th instant, in a driving northeast rain-storm, my command, comprising in all, officers and men, 409, with but 330 rifles, two days' rations, and 60 rounds of cartridges per man, were drawn up in line ready for a move. Between the hours of 5 and 6 a. m. the order to march was received, and directly following the Twenty-second Regiment Massachusetts, Colonel Gove, the New York Twenty-fifth, Colonel Johnson, being in advance.

After a forced march of 14 miles in a northerly direction, between the hours of 12 and 1 o'clock we arrived at Peake's Station, so called, located upon the Virginia Central Railroad. Upon my arrival here, however, and just as my command had emerged from the woods which skirted the roadside into an open field, I found that Colonel Johnson, with his command, on the right of the road, were actively engaging the enemy. At this point I was instructed by General Martindale to immediately form line of battle with my command. Having done so,

and then doubling column on the center, together with Colonel Gove's command, who were deployed as skirmishers, I advanced to the front toward the railroad on the left of the road over which we had passed during the day. Colonel Gove's skirmishers advanced as far as the railroad and then deployed to the left, not crossing the road. I then moved my command, still doubled on the center, to the right of the Hanover road, so called, running easterly from the railroad station, and here I received orders to halt.

At this juncture a section of Captain Griffin's battery arrived, and being stationed on my left between Colonel Gove and my command, commenced shelling the woods across the railroad and over a wheat field. While they were getting ready, however, to discharge their pieces I was ordered to send a company of skirmishers across the railroad and over the wheat field to ascertain, if possible, whether there was any of the enemy in the woods beyond. For this duty I detailed Company G, Captain Sargent. Meanwhile another portion of my command was very industrious in destroying the railroad, telegraph, &c., which was in that locality successfully accomplished.

Captain Griffin's battery now having opened, a reply was received from a small field piece, which the enemy had either stationed on the railroad or in a ravine in the wheat field. My command then received orders to cross the railroad at once into the wheat field beyond; then deploying into line of battle advance and take the enemy's artillery. I immediately moved accordingly, but being in line of battle, and having advanced about 500 yards, the fire of the enemy ceased.

At this time my skirmishers from Captain Sargent's command notified me that there was a strong force of the enemy, consisting of two or three regiments, in the woods to my right. I immediately halted my command, and notified General Martindale that the enemy had changed the position of their artillery and were in strong force on my right. I was then ordered to recall my skirmishers, and return across the road to my original position, when orders came from General Porter to advance at once toward Hanover Court-House. At this time all the force left was my own command and several caissons belonging to Captain Griffin's command. They being slightly imbedded in the mud, I was ordered to remain in their rear, also to assist in extricating them, which consumed some twenty minutes' time. They finally moved on at a brisk pace up the Hanover road, my command following in the rear.

We had proceeded but a few yards beyond where the road over which we advanced intersects the Hanover road when an officer of the Fifth Cavalry, much excited, desired to know where General Martindale was. I informed him, he at the same time telling me that the devils were after us in full force and we would be cut off. I immediately, by the order of General Martindale, moved my regiment by the right flank into the open field on the right of the road; then halted and changed front to the rear on first company; then advanced in line of battle (my right company, Captain Wiggin, being thrown forward as skirmishers) across the road leading to Peake's Station, some 40 rods; there came to a halt. My skirmishers, cautiously advancing, were here fired upon by the skirmishers of the enemy, who were distinctly visible in the skirts of the woods in front, some 400 yards from my main force.

The Forty-fourth New York Regiment, Col. Stephen W. Stryker, having been detached and acting as a guard to a section of Captain Martin's battery, opportunely arrived just at this time. The battery

was then placed in position, my regiment on the right, the Forty-fourth on the left. Some well-directed shells were then thrown from the battery, both into the woods in front, also to the right and left, which seemed to check the advance of the enemy's forces. At this time General Martindale, hearing that they were attempting to flank our left, sent an order to Colonel Stryker to deploy his regiment as skirmishers in that quarter. The enemy, however, before Colonel Stryker could have done much execution, appeared boldly in front, advancing in perfect order, the red colors of the right and left general guides, also the Stars and Bars defiantly flying. Meanwhile my skirmishers had retired. When they had advanced to within about 400 yards of us they fired a volley. Before it reached us, however, my command, by my orders, were on the ground, and most of their bullets passed harmlessly over us. I immediately gave the order to rise up, fire by battalion, at the same time directing the battery to open upon them. We kept up a brisk fire upon them for nearly twenty minutes, but they retreated to the left into the woods after our first volley.

At this time Colonel Johnson, of the Twenty-fifth New York, with but 175 men—his regiment having been badly cut up in the earlier part of the day—was ordered to relieve me. While I was being relieved I ascertained that the enemy were rapidly advancing on my right through the woods. Informing the general commanding of the fact, he ordered me to meet them. I immediately did so, and had just time to get outside of a hedge fence on this side of the woods when through the fence muzzle met muzzle, the fight waxing warm. In this position I remained one full hour holding the enemy in check. The Twenty-fifth New York, from the raking fire on their right, their force being very small, and the colonel wounded, were obliged to retire. The battery at this time was left by the cannoneers, the fire being too hot for them. The Forty-fourth New York still remained on the left of the battery, receiving a galling fire, but not in a position to return it to advantage, their rifles bearing too great an elevation.

My ammunition being nearly exhausted, many of my men having fired away their 60 rounds, I anxiously looked for re-enforcements, when finally I espied a regiment, the New York Fourteenth, under Lieutenant-Colonel Skillen, coming to our relief. Then such a shout arose from my command that the enemy, wavering, gradually commenced to fall back, the Fourteenth getting upon the ground and opening, and a shell or two from one of Captain Griffin's guns stationed in the rear dropping among them, and a force on their left advancing, they finally retired and the rout was perfect. I was then relieved, and advancing a short distance bivouacked for the night on the right of the road leading to Hanover Court-House.

In this affair I cannot but bestow upon my entire command the highest praise, both for bravery, coolness, and a strict obedience to orders, and it would be doing a great injustice to mention any individual cases. Among those who fell, however, I will mention Sergt. B. F. Smart, Company H, one of the bravest and most faithful of men, who at the battle of Bull Run served with great valor; also Sergeant Murch, of Company B; Private Pollard, of Company G, who at Bull Run was wounded and taken prisoner. Among the wounded Color-Sergt. J. H. Sylvester, Company B, falling at the first fire, is deserving of praise in delivering up into proper hands his colors and then quietly crawling to the rear. Sergeant Rowe, Company E, seriously wounded, also exhibited great coolness; also Sergt. Maj. Charles Ellis. Great credit is also due to Surgeon Morrison and Assist. Surg. A. D. Palmer, who, among the hiss-

ing of bullets, had a solicitous care not only for the members of their own regiment, but also for all those of the division to whom their attention was called. Lieut. Samuel W. Hoskins, regimental quartermaster, although a non-combatant to some extent, excelled in coolness.

In conclusion, as rumor at one time reported a section of Captain Martin's battery taken, I will add that such was not the case; furthermore, that the pieces were not polluted by rebel hands, the colors of the Forty-fourth New York Regiment floating over them continually during and after the action.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. W. ROBERTS,

Colonel, Commanding Second Maine.

General J. H. MARTINDALE,

Commanding First Brigade, Porter's Division.

No. 19.

Report of Col. James Barnes, Eighteenth Massachusetts Infantry, of operations May 26-29.

HDQRS. EIGHTEENTH REGIMENT MASS. VOLUNTEERS,
In Camp near Chickahominy Bridge, May 30, 1862.

SIR: In conformity with instructions I have the honor to report the operations of this regiment since Monday, 26th instant:

On that day, under orders to march from the camp at Kidd's Mill, the regiment engaged in the process of exchanging the smooth-bore muskets, until that time in use, for the new Springfield rifled arm, were directed to follow the other regiments of the brigade as soon as the exchange could be completed. Subsequently four companies of the regiment were directed to perform picket duty in front of the position then occupied. The remaining companies of the regiment proceeded at an early hour to follow the brigade, and on arriving at this camp four more companies were detached to join those then on picket duty, and proceeded late in the evening upon that service. At a still later hour orders were received to withdraw the pickets upon being relieved by several companies of the regulars, which was accordingly done, and the companies returned to this camp at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 27th in the midst of heavy rain and over very difficult roads, having thus been engaged in constant duty for twenty-four hours and consequently much wearied and drenched in the heavy rains.

The division being directed to march at 3.30 a. m. it was deemed necessary to afford the regiment some repose, and I was directed to follow the division as early as practicable after they had obtained it. At an early hour the line was formed and at about 10 o'clock put in motion for Hanover Court-House, a distance of 15 miles, and though much impeded on the way by transportation and artillery trains which occupied the roads, which in some places were almost impassable on account of the heavy rains of the night before, arrived in good order at the camp of the brigade at a late hour of the afternoon, but not in season to take part in the action of the day, in which the rest of the brigade had had the honor of participating to a greater or less extent. On the way I learned that a party of the enemy's forces had appeared suddenly in front of a house about 2 miles in advance upon the road,

which was occupied as a hospital, and though designated as such by the hospital flag, they had fired upon it. I hastened forward, hoping to be able to punish them suitably for so barbarous an act, but they had disappeared as suddenly as they came, without being able to take the occupants as prisoners, which they attempted.

Encamping for the night on the field of battle, the next day (28th) the regiment was directed to perform picket duty to the front, and on the following day (29th) returned to this camp.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES BARNES,
Colonel, Commanding.

Capt. CHARLES J. POWERS,

A. A. A. G., First Brig., Porter's Div., Prov. Corps d'Armée.

P. S.—The regiment collected and carefully buried on the 28th 17 bodies of the enemy. As far as was ascertained, one was the body of a captain, 2 of corporals, and 14 of privates. On the 29th the body of another private was discovered in the woods and buried. Names of the enemy buried were not ascertained.

No. 20.

Reports of Col. Jesse A. Gove, Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry, of operations May 27–28.

HDQRS. TWENTY-SECOND MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT,
Near Peake's Station, Hanover, Va., May 28, 1862.

CAPTAIN: Agreeably to instructions, at 10 o'clock this morning I left camp with my regiment and one company of the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, under command of Captain Muirheid, for the purpose of making a reconnaissance in the direction of Richmond. Crossing the railroad in a westerly direction, I proceeded along the Richmond and Ashland road about 2 miles, where the roads separate. The former turns to the left, while the latter keeps on nearly in a straight line. A sign-board nailed to a tree reads as follows: "Richmond 13 miles; Ashland 5 miles." Inquiries from several negroes in the vicinity confirm the correctness of these distances.

For more than 1 mile on either side of the road I found an innumerable number of huts and bough houses, with evidence at every step of their recent occupation and precipitate evacuation. Before my arrival at the junction of the roads I found a company of the Fifth U. S. Cavalry, under command of Lieutenant Arnold. He informed me that he had been on both roads a considerable distance, and on the Richmond road had discovered the enemy's pickets within a mile. The Richmond road turns at an angle of 45° to the left, with thick undergrowth in the timber, thereby rendering it impracticable to retire except by the road. Ashland being within striking distance, provided I advanced a distance of 3 miles, it became an easy matter for the enemy to fall on my rear. I requested, therefore, Lieutenant Arnold to advance his company to the forks of the road and to throw out vedettes along the Ashland road and in the trails and wood roads leading out, and to communicate with me if the enemy made his appearance in that direction. He complied cheerfully with my request, while I advanced, throwing out skirmishers and flankers to the front and on the flanks.

My progress was necessarily slow, owing to the thick undergrowth in the heavy timber to the left of the road, rendering it almost impossible to get through.

When I had proceeded about a mile on the road a picket of three horsemen were discovered, who on our approach retired. At this point a road turns to the left, which I was informed crossed the railroad a distance of 1 mile. On the left of the road for a distance of 3 miles but one house appears, while to the right occasional farms are visible, though off the Richmond road, on a by-road that strikes what the negroes call the Telegraph road, leading from Ashland to Hughes'. At every turn in the road these horsemen on our approach would fire and retire.

A distance of about 3 miles brought us to an opening in the timber. As the cavalry were advancing up a rise to enter this opening several shots of the enemy were fired, and as we continued on they were discovered in force, advancing at a charge, about 200 yards distant. Quickly I directed a counter-march and to take up a slow gallop, while I ordered my column, being concealed from their view, to step out of the road into the edge of the cover in line of battle and await orders. This was quickly executed, but the enemy refused the invitation. I advanced the cavalry a second time, but could not induce them to pursue.

From this point it is $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles to Hughes'. The clearing for a mile is a series of cultivated farms and entirely open. A very large cavalry force had been along the road last night in the direction of Richmond.

From all I could learn I think the enemy had a strong picket just in my front of cavalry and infantry, and this is further confirmed by seeing infantry passing to my right and rear in considerable force, with a view of attacking me in the rear.

My movement evidently had been discovered, for on my return to the fork of the roads Lieutenant Arnold informed me that their pickets were advanced quite near him on the Ashland road.

There is no point along the road, as far as I went, where cavalry or artillery could be used outside of the road. I crossed a small creek about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, the water very much discolored, as though it was the drainage of a thickly-wooded swamp. The character of the whole country is low and swampy. I transmit herewith a sketch of the country examined.

Respectfully submitted.

JESSE A. GOVE,

Colonel Twenty-second Massachusetts Regiment, Commanding.

Capt. CHARLES J. POWERS,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. First Brigade, Porter's Division.

HDQRS. TWENTY-SECOND MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT,
Camp near Gaines' Mill, Va., May 29, 1862.

CAPTAIN: Pursuant to instructions, I have the honor to report that at 11 o'clock p. m. on the night of the 26th instant I received orders to march at 3.30 in the morning, with two days' rations in haversacks, 60 rounds of ammunition per man, and in light marching order. At 4 a. m. on the 27th instant I marched out of camp, following Martin's battery, in the midst of a drenching rain, which had continued unceasingly

throughout the night. After a fatiguing march of eight hours, having been previously ordered to the front, we arrived at 1 p. m. at the junction of the Richmond and Hanover road, leading to the Court-House.

To the right and front our forces were already engaged, whilst to the left the enemy appeared in force near the railroad station. At this juncture a small cavalry force charged down the Richmond and Ashland road, which crosses the railroad, and soon returned with information that the enemy was in force.

I was then directed by General Martindale to advance my regiment to the left and get possession of the railroad. I deployed Company A, Captain Sampson, as skirmishers, the center along the road, while the remainder of the regiment, under Major Tilton, moved forward in line of battle to a house to the left of the road, where a section of Benson's artillery was in battery and had opened fire. I directed Captain Sampson to advance with his skirmishers to the right of the road and seize the railroad and telegraph and destroy the connection. This duty was promptly performed, and in a very satisfactory manner. I had previously detached Company D to support him. To the left of the road I advanced with the line of skirmishers, supported by Company F, Captain Thompson, across a slough, to a belt of woods, beyond which was a large opening in the timber, and two regiments of the enemy drawn up in line of battle, about 1,200 yards distant. A few well-directed shots from this line of skirmishers drove back their cavalry vedettes, which were advanced and within 300 yards. Seeing that the line of attack or defense was at this point, I directed Adjutant Sherwin to order forward my regiment, and to report to General Martindale that the enemy was moving to our right, and that the artillery, which was doing no execution from its present position, should be thrown forward.

I reported to General Martindale in person the great necessity of throwing forward artillery, which I would support on the left—a line of skirmishers and one company—the Second Maine being on its right. A section of Griffin's battery was quickly thrown forward, and as soon as it opened the enemy replied, supported by a regiment of infantry on its right and immediately in my front. By a well-directed fire of the artillery it exploded a caisson, and the enemy soon retired, the infantry moving back into the woods to our left and rear.

Lieutenant Davis, aide-de-camp to General Martindale, soon rode up and asked me what I had to report, and stated that I was to withdraw my regiment. I expressed my great surprise, and stated my conviction that they were moving on our rear, and to guard against it I had thrown back the left of my regiment and thrown out a small picket in that direction to observe them. I complied, however, reluctantly, and after collecting that portion of my command on the right of the road withdrew.

As I proceeded up the road to the right I met Captain Mason, of General Porter's staff, who informed me that General Martindale's entire brigade was ordered up the railroad to make a junction with his advanced forces. I informed him that General Porter could not understand our position, and expressed my apprehensions that the enemy would attack us in the rear, and wished he would report the facts to him. Before he could communicate with General Porter, however, our forces were too far in advance in pursuit of the enemy in front to avoid the attack or meet it with sufficient force. I counter-marched my command, and General Martindale ordered me to file into the woods, and after striking the railroad to follow it to where the road to the station crosses it. I complied with this order, and in the march cut the tele-

graph wire in several places, destroyed a water tank and culvert, and removed several rails.

When about 1 mile on the road rapid musket firing, with artillery, was heard in the rear. After marching about 2 miles on the road I arrived at the road indicated, where I met Captain Locke, of General Porter's staff, who informed me that we were attacked in the rear, and that all the troops were returning. Without waiting further time I moved up upon the main road and marched back and reported to General Porter, who directed me to move my regiment forward as a support. The enemy having been completely routed, I bivouacked for the night with my regiment by the house where we took up the first position in the earlier part of the afternoon.

With a march of not less than 22 miles and being under arms more than fifteen hours the conduct of my entire command met fully my most sanguine expectations. My casualties for the day were very slight, having 1 wounded and 8 missing, a list of which has already been furnished you.

On the morning of the 28th I made a reconnaissance in the direction of Ashland and Richmond, an account of which is embodied in a separate report.*

At 8 o'clock this evening I arrived at this camp, having left with the rest of the brigade at 1 p. m.

Respectfully submitted.

JESSE A. GOVE,
Colonel, Commanding.

Capt. CHARLES J. POWERS,
Asst. Adj. Gen., Hdqrs. First Brigade, Porter's Division.

No. 21.

Report of Maj. Edwin S. Gilbert, Twenty-fifth New York Infantry, of engagement May 27.

HDQRS. TWENTY-FIFTH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLS.,
Camp near New Bridge, June 2, 1862.

This regiment left camp near New Bridge with the advancing column about 4 o'clock a. m. May 27. After advancing some 10 miles we were ordered to the front to act as skirmishers. After marching some 2 to 3 miles we came to the junction of the New Bridge road with the one leading toward Hanover Court-House. Our column, marching by the right flank, had just entered this road when we were ordered to deploy as skirmishers. The first division, Companies C and B, under command of Captain McMahon and Lieutenant Olcott, filed to the right of the road into a wheat field, loaded, and deployed; second division, Companies E and G, under command of Captain Preston and Lieutenant Connor, deployed on the left of the road, their right resting on the road; third division, Companies F and K, under Captain Harris and Lieutenant Graham, deployed to the left of second division, Lieutenant-Colonel Savage taking immediate command of the skirmishers on the left of the road and Colonel Johnson the skirmishers on the right of the road; the fourth and fifth divisions, Companies D, I, A, and H, were left as a reserve, under my command. I ordered them to file to the right into the

* See report dated May 28, above.

wheat field, where they formed line of battle, loaded, and advanced in rear of the right skirmishers. The skirmishers on the right advanced at first through an open field and then into a wood. The skirmishers on the left advanced first through the woods, then into a wheat field that reached quite up to Dr. Kinney's house. The skirmishers advanced rapidly on the left through the woods and through the wheat field toward the house.

Colonel Johnson, after accompanying the right until they reached the wood, turned into the road, so that he was just between the first and second divisions, Lieutenant-Colonel Savage advancing with the left. The skirmishers on the extreme right had advanced but a few hundred yards into the wood when a few shots were fired upon them. Captain McMahon going to the left of the first division, Lieutenant Olcott took command, and ordered the skirmishers to advance, which they did until they came to a pine opening resting on a road that runs in the direction of the line of skirmishers and strikes the road at Dr. Kinney's house.

Here our skirmishers on the right received a heavy volley that drove them back upon their little reserve, where they rallied and remained some twenty minutes. During this time the left advanced. As they approached the house they were suddenly fired upon from a skirt of woods on their right and across the road. Colonel Johnson, riding up to the house, gave orders for the skirmishers to rally upon the house. They did so. As they arrived at the house a heavy fire was opened upon them from across the road. Lieutenant-Colonel Savage was wounded, Lieutenant Fiske killed, and several privates killed and wounded. The skirmishers fell behind the house. Then they rallied around the barns, being unable to hold their position at the house. Here Captain McMahon was killed. The enemy crossed the road in large force, at least a regiment, and fell upon them at the barn. Here Lieutenant Thompson was killed and Lieutenant Halpin mortally wounded.

Colonel Johnson, seeing it impossible to withstand the enemy, gave the order to retire. The third division fell back to the woods far to the left toward the railroad, the second division falling to the rear not as far to the left. Nearly all of the third division are missing, among the number Captain Harris. We suppose that they were taken prisoners by the enemy, who retired around in that direction when they left the house. Most of the second division found their way back to the reserve under my command, which at this time was in the wood on the right of the road.

While these events were transpiring, the reserve, moving in line of battle on the right of the road, had arrived at the wood on the right. Having seen our skirmishers on the left advance rapidly to the house, and hearing firing, I gave orders to have the fence torn down on each side of the road, that I might cross the road by the left flank and support our skirmishers on the left. While these orders were being executed the adjutant, O. C. Houghton, came from the colonel with the order, "Rally on the reserve." I, forming the reserve immediately, formed my men behind the fence on the right of the road at right angles with the road. Here I awaited for our skirmishers to fall back. They not coming, I advanced a few rods into the woods, anxiously awaiting orders.

After some little time had passed Colonel Johnson returned to us; also, as I have stated before, quite a number of the skirmishers from the left came to the reserve. The skirmishers on the right, after lying some twenty minutes, while the firing was taking place, at the house,

again advanced to the road that comes out to the Richmond and Pamunkey road in front of the house. Across this road they saw the enemy in some force. The skirmishers fired upon them, when the enemy retreated, leaving some knapsacks and a drum.

The whole force of the enemy there, which appeared to be at least one regiment, accompanied by two white wagons, swept around to our left. The skirmishers, not deeming it prudent to advance into the open field, remained in their position, not having heard the order of Colonel Johnson to retire. They remained here until recalled from their position after the enemy had been driven from the house by our artillery and our advancing column.

Colonel Johnson, soon after returning to the reserve, sent out Captain Maxwell, with Company H, to the right of Lieutenant Olcott, fearing a force in that direction. Captain Maxwell went out and joined Lieutenant Olcott on the right and remained there until recalled, something like an hour afterward. Captain Maxwell sent in in the mean time 2 prisoners found in the woods. We remained in the woods, lying down to keep out of range of our artillery, which had come up and opened upon the enemy. The enemy replied at first quite lively, but were soon silenced.

The Berdan Sharpshooters came up near the wood in line of battle behind us.

The firing soon after ceasing, the colonel gave orders to recall our skirmishers, and at the same time sent out Lieutenant Vanderzee to pick up the killed and wounded. While he was giving these orders Lieutenant Martindale rode up and informed the colonel that we were wanted in the rear, as there was a force there.

I should have stated that while lying in the woods one column advanced and marched by us—I know not how many regiments, but quite a number. The colonel ordered the regiment back into the open field, where we rested. Instead, however, of joining our brigade, the colonel and myself went up to the house to see our dead and wounded. They lay in the yard in front of the house, between the house and barn and behind the barn. I also counted 8 dead and 1 wounded rebels. The latter I had brought to the house.

While here, something like an hour after we left our regiment, Lieutenant Martindale came again to Colonel Johnson and desired him to have his regiment join the regiments in the rear, as most of the column had passed on and General Martindale expected an attack in the rear. After some further delay we returned to our regiment and marched back to where we first deployed as skirmishers. We found that the battle had already begun. The Second Maine was drawn up near the junction of the road, their right resting upon the Richmond road, the Forty-fourth New York Volunteers still farther to the left, along a point of woods running in the direction of the New Bridge road. The rebels appeared along a wood at right angles with the Richmond road and some distance, say 600 yards, beyond the New Bridge road. We were soon marched along so as to occupy a position between the two regiments and behind two pieces of artillery. The firing was quite brisk, and lusty cheering was given on both sides.

The rebels, finding that they could not drive us in front, endeavored to flank us on the right. Our regiment was ordered to take the place of the Second Maine, the Second Maine taking a position farther to the right and against the fence. The movement was hardly completed when the enemy opened from the woods upon our right flank, giving us an enfilading fire. Our regiment, now consisting of about 150 men, many

of them being still absent picking up the dead, fired for a short time, but soon seeing that it was impossible to hold such a position, were ordered to withdraw. This was done in some confusion, for at this point Colonel Johnson's horse received four balls, killing him instantly, the colonel himself being wounded in the thigh, the adjutant, O. C. Houghton, being also wounded and his horse shot, Lieutenants Hicks and Coglan receiving wounds also. Many of the men fell dead and wounded. We endeavored to rally a few yards to our rear, just under the brow of a hill, but having so few men and the fire being so severe we found it impossible. General Martindale, who was present, endeavored to form line for us. The colonel, though wounded, still retained command. I gave the order to fall back in the skirt of the woods to the right and a little to rear of the Forty-fourth. While the left was obeying this the colonel gave the order to form in line behind the block-house, some 600 yards to the rear. Here we formed line by aid of General Martindale and rested.

Thus ended the fight as far as this regiment was concerned. We rested for the night here. The next day we picked up our dead and buried them. The third day at about 1 o'clock we were ordered back to camp, where we arrived about dark.

E. S. GILBERT,

Major, Commanding Twenty-fifth Regt. New York Volunteers.

No. 22.

Report of Col. James McQuade, Fourteenth New York Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of engagement May 27.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, PORTER'S DIVISION,
Camp at New Bridge, Va., May 30, 1862.

In obedience to circular of this date, from headquarters Fifth Provisional Army Corps, I have the honor to submit the following report of the action of this brigade in the battle of Hanover:

The brigade, comprising the Fourth Michigan Volunteers, Col. D. A. Woodbury; Ninth Massachusetts Volunteers, Col. Thomas Cass; Sixty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, Col. S. W. Black, and Fourteenth New York Volunteers, Lieut. Col. C. H. Skillen commanding, marched from camp about 7 o'clock on the morning of the 27th instant, being in the rear of column. Progress was very much impeded by the heavy rain then falling, the bad condition of the roads, and the interference of supply trains. The brigade halted in a wood about 4 miles from Peake's Station, in order to allow the stragglers from the preceding brigade to regain their regiments. While there firing was heard in front, and I pushed on as expeditiously as possible to Dr. Kinney's house (where the first skirmish took place), arriving after the enemy had retired. I remained there while Colonel Warren's command was taking its place in column, and then, in obedience to orders, advanced along the Hanover road.

After reaching the wood about a mile from that point Captain Mason, of General Porter's staff, rode up and informed me that General Martindale reported the enemy advancing to attack him in the rear, and that his force was inadequate to resist the attack. I halted the brigade and awaited orders, while Captain Mason went forward to report to General Porter. Shortly afterward I received an order to march back

to the assistance of General Martindale. The brigade returned left in front, and the regiments were formed in column by companies as they successively arrived in the wheat field in rear of Kinney's house.

At this point I was informed that Martin's battery had been silenced and two guns taken by the enemy, and that General Martindale's command was in imminent danger. Although the men were very much fatigued by the long march, I appealed to them to hurry to the support of their comrades, and they obeyed with the utmost alacrity. I immediately pushed forward the Fourteenth New York along the Richmond road, where General Martindale was engaged. General Morell, commanding division, being present, took immediate command of this regiment, relieving the Second Maine Volunteers and Twenty-fifth New York Volunteers, which had theretofore borne the brunt of the attack, and had nearly exhausted their ammunition. The enemy was then preparing to charge on Martin's battery, but a destructive fire by battalion from the Fourteenth New York, followed by brisk and well-sustained file firing, compelled him to retire.

As the Fourteenth New York was engaged in front, the Sixty-second Pennsylvania and the Ninth Massachusetts entered the wood from the wheat field, the Ninth behind the Sixty-second, and attacked the enemy on his left flank. In a short time the retreat became a complete rout, and the enemy, closely pressed by the Ninth and Sixty-second, fled in every direction. The Fourteenth New York was then ordered by General Porter to cease firing and advance farther along the Richmond road to support Griffin's battery, which had taken position to open fire on the retreating enemy. The Ninth Massachusetts and Sixty-second Pennsylvania continued the pursuit of the rebels through the woods until dark, when the Fourteenth and Sixty-second, by order of General Porter, were withdrawn and encamped with the Fourth Michigan on the open space in front of the wood. The Ninth Massachusetts remained in the wood until morning, when it returned and joined the rest of the brigade.

A large number of prisoners and a considerable quantity of arms were taken.

The Fourth Michigan Regiment was not engaged, but was held in reserve in the wheat field. The fierce and irresistible attack of the other regiments routed the enemy so completely that it was not necessary to bring the Fourth into action.

All the troops under my command displayed the utmost courage and coolness during the battle. Veterans could not have done better.

I am happy to report that the casualties in this brigade were comparatively few, as will be seen by the accompanying report.*

A burial party, under command of Major Patterson, Sixty-second Pennsylvania, buried 1 man of this command and 51 of the enemy.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. MCQUADE,

Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade, Porter's Division.

Capt. R. T. AUCHMUTY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

*Embodied in return, p. 685.

No. 23.

Report of Col. Thomas Cass, Ninth Massachusetts Infantry, of engagement May 27.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEERS,
May 28, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: The Ninth started in the morning with the brigade under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Guiney, as the poor state of my health prevented me from accompanying it whilst it rained so heavily as it did at the beginning of the march. So soon as the weather promised to be tolerably fair, although very faint and weak from an illness of three weeks, at times more or less severe, I joined my command on the way to the Virginia Central Railroad.

Passing the scene of the struggle that had taken place but a short time before our arrival between the Twenty-fifth New York and a party of rebels and down the Hanover road, where the brigade halted for a brief period, no firing was heard. Soon, however, it was evident that the enemy intended a demonstration on our rear, he making a detour from our front around to the left. "About-face, forward," was the command, and the troops retraced their steps. The Vincent house passed, now on our left, a little way on the road this regiment moved into a field on the right into column of companies through a wheat field to near the verge of a wood in which the fight seemed to rage heavily. Everything indicated a fierce contest in the front. Colonel McQuade, our brigade commander, accompanied by some artillery officers, rode up to us, and rising to full height in his saddle, and with full emphasis said, "Colonel Cass, the enemy has taken two pieces of Martin's battery, and I want the Ninth Massachusetts to retake them, which I know they can and will."

A line of battle was formed. I repeated to my men the wish of their brigade commander, "Forward, Ninth!" A loud and vigorous cheer was given, and a bold dash made into and through the woods by my command. For some time not a shot was fired by them. Every eye seemed distended to catch a glimpse of the retiring foe in some force. Prisoners of war were captured in fives, tens, twenties. Onward heroically and determinedly the boys of the Ninth pushed their way, notwithstanding a long and fatiguing march from early in the morning, it then being about 5 o'clock. Our charge was over felled trees, through brush and tangled brambles, swamps such as Virginia produces, over a ditch and fence from behind which the enemy poured a hot fire, but which was charged upon with redoubled energy, he scattering in every direction.

All the obstacles that could be thrown in the way of an advancing force in a close wood by a resisting foe were surmounted. Six companies got out to the roads and into the fields and small orchard on the left, where the enemy still held ground behind and in the vicinity of four or five houses and huts. At the farther house Captain O'Leary's company (F) captured 17 prisoners, and an ambulance at the nearest one, leaving several wounded Confederates in the houses. The woods were cleared by both wings. The line was reformed as it moved along in the wheat field in the teeth of an incessant fire, miraculously doing us but little hurt. Companies I and F were deployed out on the right and left flank with a view to engage the attention of the enemy, who had now, after leaving the two pieces of artillery of Martin's battery in rear of the houses in the orchard, taken up a position behind a fence

and two houses on its left, extending across the field to the verge of a wood running at right angles to the one from which we had issued. They poured at us then a scorching and heavy fire, flying over and around us in a perfect torrent. Down and up the steep banks of the cut made for the railroad I moved my regiment by the right flank. Having cleared the railroad, a solid front is again presented to the enemy. Another dash at right-shoulder-shift arms is made toward him, when he precipitately fled, closely pursued by the two companies deployed as skirmishers.

During the fight we had 1 mortally wounded, Sergt. Daniel J. Regan, Company G, and 11 seriously and slightly. The starry banner of the Union, side by side with our green flag throughout the fight, came out of it unscathed, while the latter was pierced by eight buck-and-ball shots and the lower tie torn away.

I am well pleased with the bearing of both my officers and men, all endeavoring for a victory in the contest.

Respectfully submitted.

THOMAS CASS,

Colonel, Commanding Ninth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.

Lieut. C. B. MERVINE, A. A. A. G., *Second Brig., Porter's Div.*

No. 24.

Report of Lieut. Col. Charles H. Skillen, Fourteenth New York Infantry, of engagement May 27.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
Camp at Gaines' Mill, Va., May 29, 1862.

SIR: About 4 p. m. on the 27th instant the regiment under my command had the honor to engage the enemy near Hanover, in this State. We were under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. George W. Morell, and under his directions marched in column of companies, left in front, through the field 600 or 800 yards from and in front of the enemy, who had a strong position, with a large force, in the woods, and who were preparing to charge on the Forty-fourth and Twenty-fifth New York and the Second Maine Regiments, thereby endangering a battery placed in a field near them.

As soon as my regiment had advanced pretty well in the field I ordered them to right-wheel by companies, and then changed front forward on the sixth company, after which I hurried forward and engaged the enemy so warmly that they were compelled to fall back, soon after which I received orders to "Cease firing," to allow one or two regiments of our brigade to charge the enemy's left flank. I was then ordered to support Griffin's battery, which I continued to do until dark.

I take pride and pleasure in stating that both officers and men under my command behaved with admirable courage and coolness during the entire battle.

I am happy to state that the damage to the regiment was very light—none killed, 4 wounded (1 severely, 3 slightly), being all the casualties.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

Very respectfully,

C. H. SKILLEN,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Fourteenth New York Volunteers.

Col. JAMES MCQUADE, *Commanding Second Brigade.*

No. 25.

Report of Col. Samuel W. Black, Sixty-second Pennsylvania Infantry, of engagement May 27.

HDQRS. SIXTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS,
Gaines' Mill, May 30, 1862.

COLONEL: Until our return to the camp it was not in my power to report the part taken by this regiment in the battle of Hanover Court-House. On Tuesday, the 27th instant, after a march of about ten hours, we were halted nearly 2 miles beyond the ground occupied by General Martindale with a portion of his brigade. The report that he was about to be attacked by a very large force from the rear was confirmed by rapid and heavy firing. By your order we retraced our steps, moving left in front, following the Fourteenth New York and followed by the Ninth Massachusetts and Fourth Michigan.

Having passed through a large wheat field the Fourteenth New York filed to the left and front of the woods, from which the enemy were pouring a very fierce fire. I was ordered to enter the woods about 150 yards from the front and take the enemy on the flank. This order was executed as rapidly as the nature of the ground would allow. A deep ravine and swamp were passed, and on the crest of the high ground beyond I was enabled to form a very fair line and deliver a destructive fire. A few volleys drove the enemy from our front into quick retreat. A large part of their force breaking to the right and rear, I instantly moved by the right flank and struck the railroad. By this movement I uncovered the Ninth Massachusetts, which pushed forward through the woods to the open field in front. I ordered the two right companies, L and A, to pursue up the railroad, while I crossed the road into the woods with the rest of the regiment.

Obliquing to the left I came into an open field on the skirt of another wood. I paused, closed up the line, and had a good view of the rebels, making a stand at some distance to the left and front, against the fire of the Ninth Massachusetts and Griffin's battery. As quickly as possible I pushed forward by the edge of the wood, to try and cut off the rebels from what I supposed would be their line of retreat. About half a mile forward the woods projected some distance, and through these I sent Captain Wright with four companies from the right as skirmishers, deployed at close intervals, and moved on with the remainder of the regiment.

Before we could reach the enemy's flank and rear he broke before the pressure on the left and fled, however not before we had done him some damage and captured a number of prisoners. The recall having been sounded, I called in the skirmishers from the wood, turned back, and joined the Ninth Massachusetts at ——— house.

In the course of the afternoon's operations we captured 81 prisoners, including 7 officers. From a great many arms taken about 75 were brought into camp.

By the annexed statement it will be seen that our loss is only 6 men wounded, none killed, and not one missing.* I would do the brave and faithful men I have the honor to command injustice if I refrained from expressing in strong terms my admiration of their conduct from first to last. In common with the other regiments of your brigade they went into action with their bodies broken by fatigue and their physical

*Embodied in return, p. 685.

strength wasted by the hard toils of the day; but their spirits failed not, and they went in and came out with whatever credit is due to dangers bravely met and the noblest duty well performed.

The line officers were with their men with scarcely an exception, and behaved admirably. Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzer and Major Patterson did their whole duty with spirit, gallantry, and effective energy. Adjutant Brown rendered excellent assistance and handsomely performed his duties. Surgeon Kerr was ordered to other labors in the brigade, and I was left with only Dr. Webb, the assistant surgeon. But he deserves thanks for his attentive skill and well-timed presence on the field.

By the habitual care and unfailing foresight of Quartermaster Howden the men had rations sufficient for all their wants.

Respectfully,

SAM'L W. BLACK,
Colonel, Commanding Regiment.

Col. JAMES MCQUADE,
Commanding Second (Morell's) Brigade.

No. 26.

Report of Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, of engagement May 27.

HDQRS. 3D BRIG., PORTER'S DIV., 5TH PROV. ARMY CORPS,
Near New Bridge, Va., May 30, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I would respectfully report that in compliance with orders received at 10.30 p. m. the 26th instant, my brigade marched toward Hanover Court-House at about 6 a. m. of the 27th. Our orders were to march at 3.30 a. m. The regiments were up and in readiness, but did not form line and start, waiting the movement of the brigade that was ordered to precede us. The rain was so severe as to prevent the men from building fires; they could not get them to burn, and in consequence many started on the march without coffee. Our march to the battle-field near Hanover Court-House was the most severe I have ever experienced. Half an hour before the fight began I hardly thought it possible for my men to pitch camp and prepare supper, so much fatigued were they with the march in mud, rain, and sun.

When the head of my column approached the position indicated as A on the map, where Benson's battery was in action, General F. J. Porter personally indicated to me the position he desired me to take with my brigade, indicating it, as understood by me, in the direction marked by the arrow C on the accompanying sketch.

I formed my brigade in the order mentioned below and as per sketch: On the first line the Seventeenth New York, Colonel Lansing, on the right; Eighty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel McLane, on the left, with skirmishers in front. The second line, Twelfth New York, Colonel Weeks, in rear of the right; Sixteenth Michigan, Colonel Stockton, in rear of the left.

Having personally surveyed the field, as well as having sent out some of my personal staff, I determined to change the position for attack very slightly from that indicated by General Porter, for the purpose of covering my approach to the enemy. I directed the command to move

through the woods in the order indicated above and halt at the point on the edge of the woods indicated by the fence marked * * * I then ascended a small tree, where I was informed by Major Bartram, of the Seventeenth, I could discover correctly the whole position of affairs and act accordingly. Doing so, I found the enemy drawn up in line near the house and orchard (afterward used for general hospital and headquarters of General Porter), with a section of a battery in action, supported by the Thirty-eighth North Carolina Regiment. I since learned from prisoners that this regiment was about 1,300 strong.

To my right and rear was Benson's battery, and I think a section of Weeden's (the cavalry in rear), replying to the fire of the enemy's guns. A portion of the Twenty-fifth New York and a few of Berdan's Sharpshooters were in the positions indicated on the sketch. I determined to attack vigorously, and at once ordered the command forward in the order heretofore mentioned. The regiments, though much reduced in numbers by the march, the guards left in camp and with the wagons, moved up in the most admirable order, with all the precision of dress parade—skirmishers' firing gradually accelerating their pace. They charged the enemy and drove him back, capturing one of his cannon, with caisson and ammunition complete, except the horses. We pursued rapidly and captured many prisoners. The enemy were completely routed.

After getting a long distance in advance of our first position I was informed by a prisoner that eight regiments of the enemy had gone to our right and rear. I deemed this of sufficient importance to halt from the pursuit and await support on my right or further orders. I did so, and threw out skirmishers on my right and left flank. I immediately advised General Porter of the circumstances. General Porter and General Morell came on the ground afterward, bringing up the batteries and cavalry on my right. General Porter shortly afterward directed me to push on to Hanover Court-House and railroad station, which was done most rapidly considering the fatigued condition of the men, in order of battle as before, except that the Sixteenth Michigan (Colonel Stockton) led the left across the railroad bridge, and the Eighty-third Pennsylvania the right, by the ravine and road, and all moved across the Machumps Creek by the flank. I had ordered arms stacked with two regiments, and had sent an aide for the others to come in the field between the station and Court-House, when an order came from General Porter to move my command back to the rear to support General Martindale, who had been attacked from the rear.

As soon as possible I made my dispositions to return, ordering the Twelfth and Seventeenth New York to return by the road, and taking the Eighty-third Pennsylvania and Stockton's Sixteenth Michigan back by the railroad, with a view to flank the enemy and support General Martindale in whatever position I might find him. I could only judge of the location by the report of musketry, the dense woods hiding from sight any indications or points of position. As we approached the woods near the railroad the cheers of the enemy, with their unceasing volleys of musketry, led me to believe that they were gaining an advantage. I called upon my men to forward at double-quick and cheer. They responded with a will, cheering lustily. Our cheers were evidently heard by the enemy, for they slackened their fire apparently, and as we subsequently learned withdrew, whether to avoid being flanked or driven back from the front I am unable to say.

We pushed into the woods and came up on their flank, capturing many prisoners, in fact encumbered ourselves with them, and found

that we were in front of the Ninth Massachusetts, our line perpendicular to theirs. We pushed on and came out on the road where Griffin's battery was just preparing to open fire (point marked H on the sketch). I was unable to get my horse across the ditch and fence on the road-side; crossed on foot, borrowed a horse from some one, and pushed the Eighty-third forward to press the enemy. Asked Lieutenant Kingsbury to push forward a portion of his battery, which was done, to the position marked K, supported by the Eighty-third Regiment.

Shortly afterward General Morell came up to the front in person. From him I obtained permission to push in the Fifth New York Zouaves, with a view to press and rout the enemy as completely as possible, and to bring up more troops. Everything was going on handsomely in front. My only desire now was to push forward troops enough to utterly rout the enemy and capture all the prisoners possible. I went back to get up more men—the enemy's fire slackened, the sun went down, and the day was ours.

By General Porter's orders we camped on the battle-field. I inclose the reports of Colonel Lansing, Seventeenth New York Volunteers; Colonel McLane, Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers; Colonel Stryker, Forty-fourth New York Volunteers. I have mislaid Colonel Stockton's, Sixteenth Michigan, but will send it as soon as found.

I had neglected to mention that the Forty-fourth were detached by General Morell on the march at the cross-roads, 3 miles from the scene of the engagement, and I saw nothing of them until after the fight. They were under General Martindale while in action.

I would call attention to Colonel McLane's report as showing the position of affairs at the close of the fight and the turning point of the second engagement.

Where all the regiments did so well it is improper to discriminate. The splendid bearing, under their baptismal fire, of the Eighty-third Pennsylvania and Seventeenth New York was worthy of the highest praise. The Eighty-third was in both fights, and behaved like veterans in the last as in the first.

The instances of individual gallantry were numerous. Major Von Vegesack, of my staff, was inside the enemy's line of skirmishers while making a reconnaissance to get information for me; was fired at six times, and narrowly escaped with his life. To him, as to Captain Hoyt, Lieutenant Livingstone, and Actg. Lieut. E. M. Fisher, I was particularly indebted for valuable and efficient aid in the field of battle. Quartermaster C. B. Norton was with me during the warmest portion of the engagement, and was of great service to me, behaving with gallantry. Lieutenant Seymour, of General Morell's staff, also aided me at one time in an important matter.

We turned over to the guard from all the regiments about 225 prisoners. Captured 160 stand of arms, which were forwarded to Colonel Kingsbury, of the ordnance department; one 12-pounder howitzer, now in possession of the Seventeenth New York Regiment; one Union Defense Committee wagon, now in possession of my brigade quartermaster (this wagon was probably taken from our forces at the battle of Bull Run); a hospital wagon with stores, which was turned over to Capt. Charles B. Norton.

I desire to call attention to the praiseworthy behavior of Lieutenant Burleigh, of the Seventeenth New York, who with some of his men sent out in the first fight as skirmishers, did not return by the route to join their regiment, but joined the Eighty-third and fought well.

The list of killed, wounded, and missing in my brigade is attached

hereto in schedule marked A.* I regret to add that Lieut. Henry W. Perkins, aide-de-camp on my staff, was taken prisoner. He was left behind on account of having been sick with fever for ten days; but anxious to be present at the battle, rode up in an ambulance, and was resting in the hospital at the time it was attacked. He was taken by the enemy, though too weak to sit on a horse.

I am, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,

Brig. Gen., Commanding Third Brigade, Porter's Division.

Capt. R. T. AUCHMUTY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

P. S.—I desire to call attention to the names of the officers mentioned in the reports of the regimental commanders, particularly those of the Forty-fourth New York Volunteers.

There were 19 of the enemy's dead buried by my command. We could not bury those we killed in action, owing to the lack of tools. The few we did bury we had to borrow tools.

No. 27.

Report of Col. Henry A. Weeks, Twelfth New York Infantry, of engagement May 27.

HDQRS. INDEPENDENCE GUARD, 12TH REGT. N. Y. VOLS.,
Camp near Hanover Court-House, Va., May 28, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that upon entering the action yesterday my command was much reduced in numbers by the severity of the march, yet rallied cheerfully under the sound of the distant firing. By order the regiment was formed in line of battle, the left reaching across the road, and then moved forward in line into the wood. After halting some time flanked by the right from the wood formed column by division, and moved forward in rear of the artillery through the open fields as far as the railroad; flanked through the woods, and reached the road to Hanover Court-House. Just as we reached it an order came from General Porter stating that our rear was attacked, and ordering our return to our former position. Faced about at once and, left in front, urged my command on. Upon reaching the open field formed line of battle and advanced until ordered to halt, collect stragglers, and hold ourselves in readiness. At the conclusion of the action bivouacked in the open field, where we still remain.

In noticing the fact that some of my stragglers are reported to have joined other commands and acted worthily, I have to report one such in hospital with severe wound in hand and one missing from Company B. Also, a member of Company K received a slight contusion on the thigh, not disabling him, upon first entering the field.

Three of the enemy received a rude burial at our hands near the spot where they fell.

Respectfully submitted.

HENRY A. WEEKS,

Colonel, Commanding Twelfth New York Volunteers.

Brig. Gen. D. BUTTERFIELD.

*Embodied in return, p. 685.

No. 28.

Report of Col. Henry S. Lansing, Seventeenth New York Infantry, of operations May 27-28.

HDQRS. 17TH REGT. N. Y. VOLS., 3D BRIG., PORTER'S DIV.,
Provisional Army Corps, May 30, 1862.

GENERAL: This regiment left camp on the morning of the 27th instant at 5 a. m., on the right of the Third Brigade, in a heavy rain-storm, and after a long march through heavy roads, deep with mud, debouched upon the plain in line of battle, where we found a field battery engaged with Benson's battery of ours. Colonel Johnson, of Twenty-fifth New York Volunteers, was moving toward the woods on the right, when we immediately moved to the left, covered by two companies of skirmishers, A and B, the first under command of Second Lieutenant Fox, and the latter under command of Captain Grower, both under the immediate command of Major Bartram. After feeling the wood for some distance I changed front, and formed on the edge of woods, on the right of the rebel battery, and facing it obliquely, there awaited your orders. On receiving them, to advance, at once moved the skirmishers forward upon the battery, followed by the rest of the regiment in quick time, in line of battle and arms at right-shoulder shift, cheering, exchanging shots with the enemy, killing and wounding several. Our fire was upon the battery, and as in approaching the gunner who fired the last shot being killed by a private of Company A (Flood), the enemy retreated, and we captured the piece, a 12-pounder howitzer; then changing our line more to the left, drove in their skirmishers, and were advancing to flank those in retreat, when we were ordered to halt. Forty prisoners captured, among them 2 officers, were sent to the rear, and Lieutenant-Colonel Morris, being too ill to proceed, was left with 8 men in charge of them.

Under your order we then moved on toward Hanover Court-House on the right of the Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, but were separated by a deep ravine and compelled to go to the right, and thus lost sight of the Eighty-third, but continued to advance, and just arrived there when I received orders to return, as the enemy were in our rear. My men, though wearied, pushed back with energy, and arrived near the ground of conflict just as the enemy retreated or had commenced to break. The regiment bivouacked upon their first battle-field.

During the absence of the regiment Lieutenant-Colonel Morris, seeing the enemy advancing, compelled his prisoners to draw the cannon to our front, now become the rear, and thus insured its safety. This piece is, I believe, the first one captured in the field by the Army of the Potomac.

On the morning of the 28th instant I was ordered to proceed to Hanover Court-House to seize the depot and provisions and support the cavalry command of General Emory and Benson's battery. Five companies under command of Colonel Morris made a reconnaissance with the cavalry and a section of artillery to the left of the road. Three companies were on picket twenty-four hours. On the morning of the 29th instant, at 5 a. m., four companies, under command of Captain Grower, marched 5 miles with the Sixth Cavalry and Benson's horse artillery, burning a bridge. Upon their return, at 1 p. m., we retraced our march to the battle-field. Arriving there, received orders to join the brigade and march for our camp at its present site near New Bridge.

General Butterfield being ill, the undersigned took command of the brigade and marched it to camp, leaving Hanover at 3.30 p. m., but in consequence of detentions made by the troops and trains ahead did not arrive in camp until 3.30 a. m. At this morning's roll call all were present, although half my command had marched some 30 miles. Both officers and men behaved nobly, without an exception. As the result of the engagement I have to report none known to be killed or wounded; 8 missing. There were no dead buried by this regiment.

Respectfully submitted.

H. S. LANSING,

Colonel, Seventeenth Regiment New York Volunteers.

Brig. Gen. D. BUTTERFIELD,

Commanding Third Brigade.

In behalf of the regiment I respectfully request that the howitzer be forwarded to Fortress Monroe, and from there to New York when the regiment shall return, to be turned over by them to the ordnance office, after their final parade, previous to being mustered out of service.

Respectfully,

H. S. LANSING,

Colonel Seventeenth New York Volunteers.

HDQRS. 17TH REGT. N. Y. VOLS., 3D BRIG.,
MORELL'S DIV., 5TH PROV. ARMY CORPS,
Chickahominy Run, June 4, 1862.

CAPTAIN: Having seen the report of Colonel McLane, of the Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, on his action at Hanover Court-House, and seeing that he claims to have taken the howitzer claimed by me in my report, beg most respectfully that the general commanding the division take some means to decide to whom the honor belongs before the report from his headquarters is sent in. I am prepared to prove all I claim in my report.

Very respectfully,

H. S. LANSING,

Colonel Seventeenth Regiment New York Volunteers.

Capt. R. T. AUCHMUTY,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 29.

Report of Col. Stephen W. Stryker, Forty-fourth New York Infantry.

HDQRS. FORTY-FOURTH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLS.,
May 30, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I beg leave to submit to the general commanding the following report of the engagements of the Forty-fourth Regiment New York Volunteers on Tuesday, May 27, 1862, with a rough sketch of the battle ground:

We were marching with the brigade. I received orders from General Morell, commanding division, to halt at the cross-roads and make such disposition of the force under my command as to secure the rear of our

forces against surprise. The force present were the Forty-fourth New York Volunteers and one section of Martin's battery, Massachusetts Artillery. I posted one company of the Forty-fourth on each of the roads about one-half mile from the crossing, with sufficient vedettes in commanding positions to guard against any surprise. In about one hour from the time I halted I received orders from General Morell to move the force under my command to the front as soon as possible. As soon as my companies rejoined the regiment we moved up the road already taken by the division. I soon came up to General Martindale, who ordered me to support him, as the enemy had appeared in force on his front and had driven in his skirmishers. I placed my force under his command, was ordered to put my regiment into column by division, afterward changed into column of companies, right in front, closed in mass, and we were moved into a hollow out of sight of the enemy. The general immediately ordered skirmishers to be thrown forward to skirt the woods on our left, which was done by the two right companies of my regiment.

Information being received at that time that the enemy had attacked the hospital, which was about one-half mile to the rear, the general ordered me to take five companies of my regiment and disperse what force of the enemy I found there. I started with the left wing, marched down the road, right in front, came to where the woods are on each side of the road, halted my command, threw out skirmishers, and had just given the command "Forward," when the enemy poured a volley of musketry in our ranks. I ordered a reply, which was executed in a splendid manner, the men behaving with perfect coolness. The enemy appeared to be within 75 yards of us, and I should judge from 150 to 200 strong. As a feint I gave the order to prepare for a charge, and immediately marched the force to the rear and formed line of battle facing the woods, sent for the remaining companies of the right wing, doubled the line of skirmishers, gave them the proper support, reported to the general by mounted orderly, and asked permission to advance and clear the woods of any concealed enemy found there. Before a reply came I saw the enemy advancing in front of General Martindale's force. I immediately recalled my skirmishers and marched to his support at double-quick. Before arriving received orders to form on the left of the artillery, which would bring us in line about 20 feet from the road and parallel to it.

While we were deploying into line of battle the enemy opened a terrific cross-fire on the whole force, commencing on our left and running to the right, ranging from 150 to 500 yards distance. I opened fire immediately with the force deployed, and in a few moments ordered my men to fall back under cover. The left was partially protected after getting in the road. The third, fourth, and fifth companies gained partial protection just after crossing the road. The first and second companies could not get any protection until retiring some distance in the field. They very soon, however, joined the regiment near the center, and fought nobly during the remainder of the engagement.

On seeing how my command was situated, with no protection to our left, and knowing a force of the enemy was concealed in the woods within musket range only a short time before, and also seeing the enemy's troops moving toward our left, I reported the fact to General Martindale, and asked that re-enforcements might be sent there. He ordered me to rally what men there were coming across the field behind a fence in the edge of the woods where he had taken shelter. I saw the Twenty-fifth New York retiring across the field, delivered my or-

ders to the colonel, who was on foot and wounded. He said his orders were to form behind the house, and I saw part of his command had already reached there. I rode several times across the field, trying to make the men rally behind the fence and make a stand, knowing the small force engaged could not hold out a long time against the superior force of the enemy. Our force at that time had been reduced to the Second Maine Volunteers, who were holding their ground gallantly, and the Forty-fourth New York Volunteers. The Twenty-fifth New York Volunteers and the cannoneers of the artillery had both left the field, the cannoneers abandoning their pieces, and I would say here that in my judgment it was impossible for men to stand in their position, being within short range of a murderous cross-fire from a concealed enemy. I felt it my duty to report to the commanding general, whom, I was informed, was only a short distance from us, our situation, which I did, and immediately joined my regiment again.

After the re-enforcements came up, turning the enemy's left, and their fire slackened, I formed my regiment in line of battle and advanced about half-way across the field. Knowing the enemy to be retreating, and sufficient troops having arrived to follow them, I deemed it prudent to halt my command and take care of our dying and wounded men. As soon as they were properly cared for we went into bivouac to the rear of the battle-field, very much wearied, but perfectly satisfied with our share of the day's work.

I cannot let the occasion pass without bringing to notice of the commanding general the noble conduct of all the officers and men in my command. I would especially mention my field and staff officers. Lieut. Col. J. C. Rice behaved in the most gallant manner. His horse was shot under him and his sword was shot away from his side, which only appeared to renew his exertions to do his duty. He performed deeds of valor we expect only of veterans. Maj. E. P. Chapin was seriously wounded early in the engagement while gallantly cheering on the men. Adj. E. B. Knox was also seriously wounded while gallantly urging the men to renewed exertions to repulse the foe, and I would also report before the engagement ended all officers and men were fighting in exposed positions in the road, having nearly gained their original line, being almost out of ammunition, were only waiting orders to show the enemy they knew how to use the bayonet. I have requested Lieutenant-Colonel Rice to report the individual conduct of officers and men which came under his notice during the engagement, which will be sent to you as soon as received. Please find inclosed corrected report of killed, wounded, and missing.*

All of which is respectfully submitted.

I remain, captain, your obedient servant,

S. W. STRYKER,

Colonel Forty-fourth Regiment N. Y. State Volunteers.

Capt. THOMAS J. HOYT, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 30.

Report of Lieut. Col. James C. Rice, Forty-fourth New York Infantry, of engagement May 27.

HDQRS. FORTY-FOURTH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,

Bivouac near Hanover-Court-House, Va., May 28, 1862.

SIR: I beg leave to report to the commanding officer of the regiment

* Embodied in return, p. 685.

the details of the severe engagement of yesterday, and also the gallant conduct of many officers and soldiers of his command which personally came under my notice during the contest. Especially do I desire to place upon record some instances of individual courage which transpired during that determined and heroic stand of nearly two hours against a force not less than four times our own—incidents which, as we remember the dead and the wounded, seem to be worthy of the most enduring memorials.

Yesterday at 2 o'clock in the afternoon our regiment, with a section of Martin's battery, which had been detached and halted at the cross-roads by orders of General Morell, commanding the division, for the purpose of guarding the advance from any attack of the enemy in the rear, was ordered to the front again, where our forces had already engaged the enemy. As our regiment, with the section of artillery in advance, was moving to the front we came up to the position of General Martindale, who was on the left of the road, in command of the Second Regiment of Maine Volunteers and the Twenty-fifth New York Volunteers, closely watched the movements of the enemy, who had just made his appearance in force in front and in the edge of woods skirting the open field.

Scarcely had General Martindale ordered the section of artillery in position and established the line of battle when brisk firing of musketry was heard in the woods on our left and in the vicinity of the hospital. The general at once ordered a detachment of two companies from the right of our regiment to deploy as skirmishers and to advance to the edge of the woods. While this order was being executed information was received that the enemy was surrounding and threatening the hospital. Five additional companies, under the command of Colonel Stryker, were ordered to its relief. The enemy at once attacked the detachment under command of the colonel, and he deemed it to be his duty to retire and to recall the line of skirmishers, and forming a line of battle with the entire regiment, to force the enemy from his position. Scarcely had the line been formed before two regiments of the enemy in line of battle, with colors advanced, were seen moving against General Martindale's position, with the evident intention of forcing back his lines and capturing the section of artillery. Our regiment was at once ordered to the general's support, but the Twenty-fifth New York Volunteers and the Second Maine Regiment, with a vigorous fire from the artillery, drove back the enemy in great confusion.

Our regiment had scarcely been formed in line of battle on the left of the artillery before three or four regiments of the enemy's forces had suddenly moved to the right of General Martindale's position, and they at once poured into his entire command a most deadly fire. The two right companies of our regiment in the vicinity of the artillery were exposed to a very severe fire, and an order was given by the commanding officer of the regiment for these companies to fall back to the woods under cover. For a time I lost sight of these two companies, but soon afterward I had the pleasure of seeing them in the midst of the desperate struggle, fighting most gallantly by the side of their companions in arms.

At the outset of the engagement the commanding officer of the regiment retired for the purpose of consulting with the general as to bringing up re-enforcements, and hence the responsibility of the command rested upon me. I will merely say that during the entire struggle I tried to do my duty. The officers and men vied with each other in deeds of bravery, and all were determined to never yield their ground

till either victory or death should rescue them from the contest. It was a long and unequal contest, but as both officers and soldiers preferred death to retreat, determination and courage at length brought with them victory. It was unflinching courage alone that gave us the success of the day. The enemy greatly outnumbered us. His fire swept through our ranks like a storm of hail. Our banner was pierced by over forty of the enemy's balls. Four times the colors were struck down, and as soon as they fell they were again raised by volunteer hands. Our cartridges became greatly reduced, and we supplied our necessities by collecting those of the dead and wounded.

Often during the engagement the enemy attempted to leap the fence and embankment in his front, but was repulsed by our deadly fire and the effect of great cheering, which I often caused to be made by our line, to give hope to ourselves and terror to the enemy. Most of the officers during the engagement used the muskets of the dead and wounded with great effect, which added great courage to the men. In the midst of the struggle, when the road was filled with the dead and dying and the enemy seemed to take hope, information was received by me that our cartridges would soon give out. Knowing that we should receive a charge from the enemy and be overpowered if we slackened our fire for a moment, I ordered the men to fix bayonets and be prepared for a charge, determined that no fortune should cause us to lose the day. For the space of one hour the struggle was desperate, our muskets, even, so heated by the continued firing that the soldiers used the water from their canteens to cool them, while many of our arms were shattered by the sweeping cross-fire, and many wounded soldiers loaded muskets through the contest for others to fire.

After the engagement had closed and before the surgeons had arrived on the field (they having been prevented by the enemy from leaving the hospital on the road to the rear), the wounded were tenderly cared for by their surviving companions, and the heroic dead were carefully collected together and becomingly laid out in the field in line facing the retreating foe. This last act, after the smoke of the battle had rolled away and the contest was over, gave a completeness to the victory and a soldier-like chivalry to the scene, before the curtain of the night fell, which never can be forgotten.

The compensation for our great loss in killed and wounded (which exceeds 20 per cent. of the entire force with which we entered the engagement) consists in saving the section of artillery which was abandoned from the hands of the enemy, in saving the command of General Martindale from a certain repulse, and especially it consists in showing to ourselves as a regiment and to the army that true courage and patriotism, even in an unequal contest, are able to conquer and secure a victory.

In commending the brave conduct of our own regiment I would not forget to mention the equally gallant bearing of the officers and soldiers of the Second Maine, the Twenty-fifth New York State Volunteers, and those connected with the artillery, our companions and brothers-in-arms, who did their entire duty throughout the engagement. I would also gratefully mention those regiments of our own brigade who made such unwearied efforts to come to our relief, and who had the honor of following up the retreat of the enemy and taking a large number of his force prisoners of war. Nor would I forget to acknowledge in this report the kind hand of an overruling Providence in vouchsafing to our arms this important victory.

I desire to commend to the favorable notice of the commanding

officer the following-named officers, whose brave conduct during the engagement would have done honor to much older and more experienced soldiers: Maj. E. P. Chapin, Adj. E. B. Knox, Capts. Freeman Conner, L. S. Larrabee, G. M. Love, A. W. Shaffer; Lieutenants Woodworth, Becker, Kelly, Royce, Anthes, Burdick, Fox, McMillan, Gibbs, Nash, McRoberts, Herendeen, and Gaskell.

I desire to notice also in this report some particular instances of personal bravery and patriotism which fell under my notice during the engagement.

Adjutant Knox was waving his sword and cheering on the men by my side, when a musket-ball from the enemy shattered his arm, breaking both bones. He retired a few paces, bound up his arm with his handkerchief, and with his sword waving in the uninjured hand came back, and assisted me in encouraging the men to victory till he fainted from exhaustion.

Lieutenant Woodworth rallied and cheered the men on from the commencement to the end of the engagement, while volleys of balls scattered the dead around him, and Lieutenant Becker did the same. These two young officers especially attracted my attention, as they were frequently near me.

Lieutenant Royce exposed himself frequently to the most deadly fire to save the wounded who fell in front of the road. He used the musket continually and gave great courage to his men.

Lieutenant Gaskell would not allow his company to fall back even to the road, although exposed to a severe fire, and although every company on his right had fallen back under cover, but steadily delivered volleys into the enemy till he was personally ordered to take his company back ten paces to the road.

Captain Larrabee had not a man leave his ranks from the commencement to the close of the action, and when asked in the midst of the struggle if his company would follow me in a charge upon the enemy, replied, "All of my company will follow you save the dead!"

Captain Love had raised a volunteer squad from his company to draw off the abandoned artillery from the field amid the severest fire, and was consulting with Major Chapin in regard to a charge of the regiment to precede the design, it having been thought best by these two officers that a charge should precede the attempt to draw off the artillery. Major Chapin was passing along the lines to consult with myself in regard to this project when he was severely wounded.

Corporal Young, Company F, fell pierced with balls as he boldly rushed forward and raised our fallen flag from the ground. It was the second time he had raised it and waved it in the face of the enemy. Private Frank B. Schutt, of Company G, twice raised the flag when it was shot down. It gave me pleasure to take his name, as I saw him engaged in this heroic act and to commend his conduct before his companions-in-arms on the ground. He replied that as long as he lived I should never see that flag in the dust. A wounded man (Corporal Chandler, Company F), with three balls through his body, refused to have me remove him, as my time was too valuable to attend to him. He afterward received two more (severe) wounds, but I believe he still lives. Private Leland, Company F, fired over 20 rounds after he had been twice wounded in the head and after his finger had been shot off. He still lives, and is on bivouac with the regiment. A wounded soldier, after the contest was nearly over, spoke feebly to me as I passed, and called me by name. I paused, stooped over to hear some dying request to a fond mother or sister, but all he said was this, "Colonel,

is the day ours?" "Yes," I replied. "Then I am willing to die." He sleeps with the other heroic dead on that field, and they all sleep well.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES C. RICE,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Lieut. E. A. NASH,
Acting Regimental Adjutant.

[Indorsement.]

Respectfully forwarded.

This report was received subsequent to the sending in my report. I submit it as a most interesting account of the fight in the Forty-fourth, stating many matters which the colonel seems to have overlooked.

Very respectfully,

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,
Brigadier-General.

No. 31.

Report of Col. John W. McLane, Eighty-third Pennsylvania Infantry, of engagement May 27.

HDQRS. EIGHTY-THIRD PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS,
3D BRIG., MORELL'S DIV., 5TH (PROV.) ARMY CORPS,
Camp near Hanover Court-House, Va., May 28, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my command in the engagement of yesterday:

When the head of my column reached the field in front of the enemy we were ordered to file to the right and throw off blankets and tents. This completed, we advanced in line of battle across the field. At the fence by the field we threw out as skirmishers Companies A, Captain Sigler, and B, Captain Apple, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Vincent, and the whole command crossed the road and advanced in line through the woods to a point opposite the enemy's guns (marked B in diagram annexed), where we were ordered to halt and await orders. Here we sent word by Adjutant Lamont of the appearance of a regiment of the enemy (the Twenty-eighth North Carolina, as it proved) in the field, 400 yards to the front, behind some straw stacks. General Butterfield then ordered us to bear to the right and advance to the attack. We did so. Our skirmishers immediately engaged those of the enemy, upon whom they had been firing for some time, drove them backward through the ravine on our left, killing 2 and capturing 8.

The line of our own skirmishers at this time was not a prolongation of that of the Seventeenth New York Regiment, which was advancing on the right, but rather in echelon, our right some 10 or 20 yards in advance of and overlapping their left. The enemy's guns were directly in front of our right. These skirmishers had fired for fifteen minutes upon the battery before the advance of the regiments from the wood, and, as we found, had pierced with two rifle-balls the same horse whose leg was broken by a shell.

As we approached firing upon him the enemy fled, abandoning one of his pieces—a 12-pounder brass howitzer of Captain Latham's battery.

Three of our skirmishers passed around the right of the piece, and a sergeant of Company A returned with 2 men and some 10 prisoners and dragged the piece to the large tree, where it remained until the brigade returned. I claim for the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, by the fire of its skirmishers, and for this brigade, by the advance of two of its regiments, the honor of causing the flight of the supports of this battery and the abandonment of one of its guns.

Here we were ordered to halt. General Butterfield then appeared, and cheering for our success, we were ordered to advance again. Company G, Captain Knox, under Major Naghel, was here ordered to scour the woods to the extreme left of our line of skirmishers beyond the railroad, and report what was there. This was done. Having taken some prisoners and reported the woods clear, he was ordered to skirmish to the front. Meantime the regiment and the other skirmishers were advancing. The two companies of skirmishers along the woods on the main road to Hanover Court-House captured some 30 prisoners, a captain among the number, who fired and endeavored to retreat. The main body of the regiment passed along the railroad to an open field on its right through this in line, halted by General Butterfield's command, then advanced to the Hanover Court-House road and up it to the Court-House, and passed then into the field on the left to rest. Almost immediately orders came from General Butterfield and General Porter, through Captain Norton, to return, as the enemy was in our rear. We moved at once toward the railroad, down it, met the Sixteenth Michigan, crossed the railroad to right, formed line to the rear and right of the Sixteenth Michigan, and advanced through the wheat fields in the direction of the heaviest firing of the enemy. At this moment General Butterfield appeared, and raising his cap, started by rousing cheers from the regiment, gave the intelligence of re-enforcements near at hand. We took the double-quick across the plowed field, flung out our skirmishers, Captain Brown and Lieutenant Wilson, and plunged into the woods, where the musketry was now sharp and constant. We found the enemy almost immediately. The skirmishers opened fire, and commenced pressing him back so rapidly that we captured here more prisoners than we could justifiably detach men to guard. We were obliged to send them to the rear in large squads, under charge of single sentries, and abandon their guns.

We found at this moment from the prisoners that two of the regiments to which they belonged were in the woods to the right and quite to the rear of our regiment, in line of battle at right angles to that of our own, now advancing rapidly through the woods. Word was immediately sent to General Butterfield, through Major Von Vegesack, reporting the fact. Our right company of skirmishers was here subjected to a volley from the enemy in the woods up the railroad track. Evidently fearing that their left was exposed to a flank movement, the enemy began falling back. Passing over the railroad track, clambering up the hill and through the swamp, we came out of the woods immediately in front of the enemy upon the road, where several sections of Griffin's battery, under Lieutenants Kingsbury and Hazlett, were getting into battery. We remained but a moment. General Butterfield came up. Perceiving this to be the decisive moment of the day, he called for a horse and ordered us, fortunately, at once to advance in front of the battery and engage the enemy, now out of the woods and in the field. Questioning the lieutenants in command of the battery as to whether the angle of elevation would permit us to pass through them, and finding they were firing at regiments of the enemy

farther to the left, we moved by flank through them; went forward into line of battle in the field to the right of the road near the hospital; obliqued to the right to cross the railroad track, here excavated some 10 feet. When rising the opposite bank the enemy from two regiments poured into us a terrible volley out of the wheat field ahead. Instantly ordering the men to lie down and fire lying, we received their volleys and returned them as constantly for from ten to fifteen minutes. Nothing but the protection offered by the edge of the bank and the half prostrate position of the men saved us from severe loss. That our fire was destructive is proven by the statement of an intelligent sergeant of the right company of one of those regiments whom we captured afterward, that when the regiment broke but 2 men of his company were left standing. Here we lost 8 men.

The fire of the enemy slackening we rose, formed line to the right of the railroad, and advanced firing, the Ninth Massachusetts on our right, the enemy retreating, until we reached two houses, some 200 yards in front. The enemy now broke and fled into the woods to the left. We halted, and indicating to Lieutenant Hazlett, now approaching with one section of his battery, where the enemy had gone, he unlimbered in the center of our line, two companies falling back 10 yards for the purpose, and dropped shrapnel around them until not a rebel was to be seen. The Thirteenth New York had while the battery was playing crossed from the left to the right of the road, and the Sixty-second Pennsylvania, getting into the woods on the right, had so far passed around as to be in our front after the enemy had disappeared.

Darkness was now come. We then gathered up our wounded, placed them in ambulances, and sent them, under charge of our own surgeons, to the hospital. Under orders from yourself we returned to the spot where we had left our tents and blankets and bivouacked for the night.

I have great pleasure in alluding to the admirable conduct of both my officers and men. Foot-sore and exhausted after their long march and rapid pursuit of the enemy they returned to the relief of their overpowered friends, and advanced in the last attack with a spirit and style which were truly handsome. They opened the firing of the brigade in the morning and they closed with their firing the battle in the evening. The number of prisoners taken, which we handed over and hold receipts for, is 118. At least 30 more were taken by us in way through the last woods crossed, but which the sentries were obliged to turn over to other regiments.

I deem it proper to speak of the intelligent and efficient service rendered me throughout the day by your staff officer, Major Von Vege-sack. I wish also to mention that Lieutenant Burleigh, separated from the skirmishers of the Seventeenth New York, fought with my regiment well.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN W. McLANE,

Colonel.

Capt. THOMAS J. HOYT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 32.

Report of Col. Gouverneur K. Warren, Fifth New York Infantry, commanding brigade.

HEADQUARTERS BRIGADE,
Old Church, Va., May 30, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the result of the operations of my command in the county of Hanover Court-House, Va., on the 27th, 28th, and 29th instant:

The command consisted of about 630 men of the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry (Lancers), Colonel Rush; of Captain Weeden's Rhode Island battery, of six rifled field pieces; of 785 men of the First Connecticut Volunteers, Colonel Tyler; of about 725 men of the Fifth New York Volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Duryea, and of 475 men of the Thirteenth New York Volunteers, Col. E. G. Marshall. Colonel Marshall is the only officer that has yet submitted a report to me, and I herewith transmit it.

The command left Old Church for Hanover Court-House (distant 12 miles) about 6.30 o'clock a. m. on the 27th, during a drenching rain. The muddy state of the roads delayed us a good deal, and the swollen condition of the streams compelled us to make a bridge over Machumps Creek, at a point where it is usually fordable. I took the road crossing at this point, as it was the best, and I was informed the one crossing lower down was destroyed and the place occupied, so that I feared a long delay in forcing a passage.

Before we reached Hanover the battle had commenced between General Porter's main column and the enemy, and they were broken and routed just as we arrived, about 3 p. m. Being directed to pursue the enemy with my force to the east of the town toward the Pamunkey River, I went with Rush's cavalry (Lancers), Sixth Pennsylvania, rapidly to the river, and destroyed the wagon-road bridge, capturing a whole company (Captain Johnson's) of the Twenty-eighth North Carolina, just before they reached it. While engaged here, a distance of about 3 miles from the battle ground, a second fight occurred there. The infantry and artillery who were on their way to the bridge were faced about and marched back to the scene of conflict.

Colonel Marshall, having the rear of the column in the advance, now found himself in front, and became engaged actively in the conflict, supporting Griffin's battery, and had 7 of his men wounded.

The Fifth New York Volunteers and the First Connecticut were formed in line of battle and moved promptly forward under their respective commanders, as did Weeden's battery, but before they could reach the enemy he broke and fled under the fire of the other portions of our forces. Two of Colonel Rush's horses gave out and died from exhaustion on the pursuit toward the Pamunkey, and night put an end to our pursuit. Colonel Marshall's regiment bivouacked on the extreme advance of our left, and during the night brought in many wounded and prisoners. During the 28th working parties were engaged burying the dead and taking prisoners, and a second wagon-road bridge across the Pamunkey was destroyed.

On the 29th, a large part of my command moved up on the road to Ashland, and the advance, consisting of two squadrons of the Lancers, reached there a short time after the force under General Emory, having been delayed somewhat in ascertaining the character and numbers of a mounted picket of the Fourth Virginia Cavalry, numbering 18 men, 8

of whom we captured, with their horses and equipments. Ashland had been abandoned by the enemy in great haste on the previous day.

We were unable to do any damage to the railroad beyond removing a few rails.

We returned to Old Church that evening and night, marching till midnight.

The day previous to our advance on Hanover Court-House we made an extended reconnaissance with a large force and destroyed a bridge over the Pamunkey at Mrs. Hemly's. These fatiguing marches were performed with cheerfulness by the command, though all suffered much from fatigue. Our operations were attended with no casualties except to the Thirteenth New York Volunteers, but were conducted constantly in the face of danger, and with a spirit which showed the willingness of the command to meet it wherever their duty calls them.

Thrown together as my command was for the first time I have special reason to speak of the promptness and energy with which the different commanders obeyed my orders and seconded me in all my endeavors to carry out your instructions. I submit herewith a table called for by your circular, from which it will be seen that in my command none were killed or missing, 7 were wounded, and 173 prisoners captured by us.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. K. WARREN,
Colonel, Commanding.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 33.

Report of Col. Robert O. Tyler, First Connecticut Heavy Artillery, of operations May 22-June 1.

CAMP NEAR GAINES' LANDING,
June 1, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report for the information of Brigadier-General Sykes that my regiment has been employed from the date of its being detached on special service (May 22) until that in which the brigade has reported with its division (June 1), as follows:

Thursday, May 22, the regiment marched from White House by Tunstall's Station to the cross-roads at Mount Airey, 9 miles. I there found the Thirteenth New York Volunteers (Colonel Marshall), and the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry (Colonel Rush). In the afternoon a reconnaissance was made by the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry along the banks of Pamunkey and a special report forwarded.

Friday, May 23, the three regiments of which I was in command marched from Mount Airey to Old Church (5 miles). A careful reconnaissance was made of all the roads leading to the Pamunkey and to Hanover Court-House. Upon these strong infantry pickets were established, and cavalry vedettes observed the ferries at Hanover, New Castle, and Pipingtree. A copy of the survey which was made by Major Doull, Second New York Artillery, extended as far as Mr. Hawes' shop ($5\frac{3}{4}$ miles from Old Church and 7 miles from Hanover Court-House), was forwarded next day. The provost duty was performed by Thirteenth New York Volunteers. In investigating the neighborhood, the provost-

marshal discovered that Mrs. General Lee was staying at Mrs. Sayers' house, within our picket lines. A large quantity of commissary and some naval and light-house stores were found by this officer. A detailed report has been made.

Saturday, May 24, in accordance with instructions received, I made a reconnaissance in force with the three regiments under my command toward Hanover Court-House. Ascertaining that the enemy was established there in considerable strength the infantry was drawn up in position near Mrs. Newton's house (about 5 miles from Old Church), and the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry advanced 2 miles, to Widow Huntley's, and found the enemy in force. During the reconnaissance Colonel Marshall destroyed the ferry at Hanover town, and Major Doull, having ascertained that a private ferry existed about 2 miles above Hanover town and about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the main road, in a deep salient bend of the river, took 3 men of the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry and destroyed it. The ferry-boat being on the north side of the stream, a man of Company I swam over and brought it across. A re-enforcement, consisting of the Fifth New York Volunteers, under your command, and Captain Weeden's Rhode Island battery having arrived in the evening, I turned over the command of the detached force to you.

Monday, May 26, one battalion of my regiment, under command of Major Hemingway, accompanied the force under your command to destroy the bridge over the Pamunkey near Widow Huntley's. While the Fifth New York crossed the river and destroyed the bridge this battalion deployed and showed front toward Hanover Court-House, to cover the operation in that direction. During the same day a detachment of the regiment, under Captain Rockwood, Company E, marched to New Castle Ferry, with orders to destroy all means of crossing the river from that point down until he communicated with the gunboats. At New Castle Ferry Captain Rockwood burned the ferry-boat and captured four row-boats, in which he embarked one-half of his detachment and proceeded down the river, the other half moving along the banks in support.

About 2 miles down Captain Rockwood captured four row-boats, and about 4 miles (by river) found a ferry called Basset's Landing, and twelve boats, one of them a small yacht, called the Teazer, said to have been used at Yorktown. The whole were capable of transporting about 500 men at a time across the stream. All these were destroyed, and fifteen boats found between this point and Pipingtree, where he destroyed the ferry-boat, and between that point and North Berry seventeen more boats, besides some in process of construction; one of these an open boat, propelled by steam. At North Berry, about 4 miles below Piping Ferry, Captain Rockwood found the ferry-boat already destroyed; and having ascertained that the gunboats had been up that far he disembarked and encamped for the night. This operation, in concert with that undertaken by the column under your command, completed the destruction of all the means of crossing the Pamunkey below Hanover Court-House. The distance from New Castle Ferry by Newberry by river is about 22 miles.

Tuesday, May 27, the regiment formed part of the column under your command which advanced toward Hanover Court-House. When you advanced with the cavalry, leaving the infantry under my command, the regiment was deployed to attack the enemy in the wood on the Hanover Court-House road, but they retired before the woods were entered. When the column was ordered to counter-march, to repel the attack of the enemy upon our left rear, as the advance of the brigade

was so much impeded by the artillery that it was impossible to bring all the regiment up together, I directed Colonel Marshall, commanding the Thirteenth New York Volunteers, who, being on the left flank, led, and Lieutenant-Colonel Duryea, commanding the Fifth New York, to deploy in the open ground near Dr. Kinney's house, and report for orders to Brigadier-General Porter. I did the same with my regiment. The Thirteenth New York were ordered to support Captain Griffin's battery on the left flank. They were seriously engaged and did great execution upon the enemy. The Fifth New York deployed and entered the wood on the right, and in support of this movement and to prolong the attack in this direction I deployed my regiment and entered the woods. Unfortunately the enemy retired too rapidly to enable either the Fifth New York or my own regiment to operate upon their flank. Upon the final retreat of the enemy we retired, and encamped at Dr. Kinney's. The regiment marched about 18 miles this day. A captain of Virginia cavalry was taken prisoner by this regiment.

Wednesday, May 28, the regiment furnished burying parties. A detailed report of the number buried has been furnished.

Thursday, May 29, the regiment formed part of the column under your command, which advanced toward Ashland, and came into position to defend the fork of the Richmond and Ashland roads in force, while the reconnaissance was pushed forward by the cavalry. The regiment returned thence to Dr. Kinney's, and by night marched to Old Church, marching in all about 18 miles.

Saturday, May 30, the regiment marched from Old Church to Cold Harbor, and on Sunday, June 1, joined the headquarters of the division.

Although not actually under fire during this period the regiment has many times taken those preparatory steps for action which are more trying to new troops than actual conflict, and they have shown a spirit and steadiness which convinced me that they may be depended on upon occasion. My field, staff, and line officers have shown themselves capable and efficient.

I need not call to your attention the valuable character of the services of Major Doull, Second New York Artillery, as they must have come constantly under your notice.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. O. TYLER,

Colonel First Connecticut Artillery.

Colonel WARREN,

Fifth New York Volunteers, Commanding Brigade.

No. 34.

Report of Col. Elisha G. Marshall, Thirteenth New York Infantry, of operations May 27-28.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,

Camp at Old Church, Va., May 30, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to state that on the 27th instant, after a tedious march of 15 miles to Hanover Court-House, being in advance of this brigade with my regiment, and meeting General Fitz John Porter, commanding, I asked him for orders, and was directed to take position on the left of Griffin's battery. I immediately did so, bringing up my regiment in line of battle, and found the enemy in front, which I after-

ward learned from prisoners taken to have consisted of two North Carolina regiments.

As soon as I was certain of the position of the enemy I commenced firing, and with Captain Griffin's battery we alone followed the enemy from half to three-quarters of a mile, receiving a handsome volley from him. We succeeded in drawing their fire when we opened upon them, which, with the murderous fire from Griffin's battery, caused them to retire completely routed. I should say that during the latter part of the engagement the left wing of Colonel Cass' Ninth Massachusetts Volunteers came up on the right of Griffin's battery and did good execution and behaved gallantly. It is unnecessary for me to add that Griffin's battery behaved with its well-known bravery.

The remainder of your brigade could not get into action, and therefore I was acting under my own orders before the engagement, only receiving instructions from General Porter, and finally from General Morell, who came up and made disposition of the troops that night. I remained that night in advance of our army at the rebel hospital about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from General Porter's headquarters.

I turned in 84 stand of arms and 55 sets of accouterments to the Eighteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, who relieved me on the morning of the 28th, and to Dr. Lyman three chests medical stores. The enemy threw away everything, even their arms, and many officers their swords.

The ground over which I fought I caused to be examined, and there were found to be 127 dead and wounded, one of which I judged to be a colonel, from the fact that he was partly covered by his dead horse. His coat was gray, with black velvet trimmings upon the ends of his sleeves, running to a point, and on either side of his collar were three velvet stars.

Allow me to say that the Thirteenth New York Volunteers behaved as soldiers. I do not mention any in particular, as all did well.

I account for my small loss from the fact that twice I received a well-directed fire from the enemy with my men lying down by my orders, we afterward opening upon them.

During the morning of the 28th, while at the hospital referred to, my men buried a considerable number of the enemy's dead found in the woods and fields to our front and right.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. G. MARSHALL,

Colonel Thirteenth New York Volunteers.

Col. GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN,

Fifth New York Volunteers, Comdg. Detached Regiments.

No. 35.

Report of Brig. Gen. L. O'B. Branch, C. S. Army, of engagement May 27, with congratulations from General R. E. Lee.

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,

May 29, 1862.

I have the honor to report, for the information of the general commanding the division, that, in order to cover the railroad against small parties of the enemy, and at the same time to carry out other views and

wishes of General Johnston, which he had communicated to me, I moved my camp on Monday last from Hanover Court-House to Slash Church. The position was selected because, while fulfilling other requirements, it was at the mouth of a road leading to Ashland, which assured me of a means of retreat if assailed by the large forces of the enemy in close proximity to my front. I took up the position with a knowledge of its dangers, and all of my arrangements were made accordingly. No baggage train encumbered me, and my command bivouacked Monday night, infantry supports being thrown out for the cavalry pickets.

Tuesday morning the enemy were reported to be advancing on the road to Taliaferro's Mill, and I sent Colonel [James H.] Lane, with his own regiment (Twenty-eighth North Carolina) and a section of [A. C.] Latham's battery, to support the pickets and repel any small party. At the same time Colonel [Thomas] Hardeman's regiment (Forty-fifth Georgia) was sent to repair the railroad at Ashcake, where it had been obstructed by the enemy the day before, and watch any approach of the enemy on that road.

About the middle of the day the enemy opened fire from a battery near Peake's Crossing. Latham's battery soon got into position to reply, and, after a sharp action, silenced it. In the mean time a severe cannonade had been going on in the direction of Lane, showing that he too had been attacked. As soon as the battery in the road had been driven off I sent Colonel [Charles C.] Lee, with his own (the Thirty-seventh) and the Eighteenth (Col. Robert H. Cowan's) regiments to re-enforce him. When these two regiments had proceeded about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles the enemy was found strongly posted across the road. On learning this I galloped forward (leaving orders for Latham to follow as quickly as possible), and was informed by Colonel Lee that the force of the enemy consisted of two regiments of infantry and some artillery. My plan was quickly formed and orders were given for its execution. Lee, with the Thirty-seventh, was to push through the woods and get close on the right flank of the battery. Hoke, as soon as he should return from a sweep through the woods on which I had sent him, and Colonel [Benjamin O.] Wade's (Twelfth North Carolina) regiment was to make a similar movement to the left flank of the battery, and Cowan was to charge across the open ground in front, Latham meantime bringing all his guns to bear on their front. Hoke, supported by Colonel Wade, had a sharp skirmish in the woods, taking 6 prisoners and 11 horses, but came out too late to make the movement assigned to him, and Lee having sent for re-enforcements, I so far changed my plan as to abandon the attack on the enemy's left, and sent Lieutenant-Colonel Hoke to re-enforce Colonel Lee, relying on the front and right flank attack. Colonel Cowan, with the Eighteenth, made the charge most gallantly; but the enemy's force was much larger than had been supposed and strongly posted, and the gallant Eighteenth was compelled to seek shelter. It continued to pour heavy volleys from the edge of the woods, and must have done great execution. The steadiness with which this desperate charge was made reflects the highest credit on officers and men. The Thirty-seventh found the undergrowth so dense as to retard its progress; but when it reached its position poured a heavy and destructive fire upon the enemy. This combined attack of the Eighteenth and Thirty-seventh compelled the enemy to leave his battery for a time and take shelter behind a ditch bank.

For two hours the cavalry pickets had been coming in from the Ashcake road reporting a heavy force of the enemy passing around my

right by that road, and Col. B. H. Robertson, of the Virginia cavalry, who was near Hanover Court-House, had sent me repeated messages to the effect that a heavy body from that direction was threatening my line of retreat. I had already learned that my brigade was engaged with an entire division in its front, but continued the contest in the hope that the cannonade would attract to me some re-enforcements, taking the precaution, however, to keep R. P. Campbell's (Seventh North Carolina) and Hardeman's (Forty-fifth Georgia) regiments in hand to cover the retreat in case my expectations should not be realized. Finding I could remain no longer without being surrounded, and hearing of no re-enforcements, and feeling assured from the firing that Lane had made good his retreat to Hanover Court-House, I determined to draw off. This, always difficult in the presence of a superior enemy, was rendered comparatively easy by the precaution I had taken not to engage my whole force.

Campbell was ordered to place the Seventh across the road, so as to receive the enemy if they should attempt to follow. Orders were then sent to Lee and Cowan to withdraw in order. They were hotly engaged when the order was received, but promptly withdrew. Colonel Cowan, in an especial manner, attracted my attention by the perfect order in which he brought out his regiment, notwithstanding the severe and long-continued fire he had sustained from both infantry and artillery. The regiments marched to the rear without haste or confusion, and went up the Ashland road. A cautious attempt was made by the enemy to follow, but a single volley from the rear guard of the Seventh arrested it. The march was continued without interruption to Ashland, where I was ordered by General Johnston to report to Major-General Hill. All my subsequent movements having been under orders received from him in person, they need not be detailed.

Having but one wagon and one ambulance, I was under the necessity of leaving a portion of my wounded. The enemy left a portion of their killed on the ground which we subsequently occupied.

My senior surgeon established his hospital in a house on which the hospital flag was conspicuously displayed. It was not in nor near the line of fire. I saw many shells thrown by the enemy explode immediately over and around the house. It could not have been undesigned.

Colonel Lane, with the Twenty-eighth Regiment, has rejoined the brigade, but I have not received his report of the engagement he had with the enemy. As soon as received will be forwarded to you.

My loss (exclusive of Colonel Lane's command) was 66 killed and 177 wounded.

An entire division was engaged against me, and, as you are aware, a large part of General McClellan's army was in supporting distance.

The officers and men of my command conducted themselves in a very handsome manner both in the engagement and on the march. The enemy may have captured stragglers enough to offset the prisoners we took from them in the open field, but they took no body of my troops. Twice during the day the enemy were driven back, the last time taking shelter behind a ditch bank at the edge of the woods. From this position I did not succeed in driving them.

I have the honor to be, yours, very respectfully,

L. O'B. BRANCH,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. R. C. MORGAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

June 3, 1862.

GENERAL: The report of your recent engagement with the enemy at Slash Church has been forwarded by Major-General Hill. I take great pleasure in expressing my approval of the manner in which you have discharged the duties of the position in which you were placed and of the gallant manner your troops opposed a very superior force of the enemy. I beg you will signify to the troops of your command which were engaged on that occasion my hearty approval of their conduct, and hope that on future occasions they will evince a like heroism and patriotic devotion.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General.

Brig. Gen. L. O'B. BRANCH, *Commanding, &c.*

No. 36.

Report of Col. James H. Lane, Twenty-eighth North Carolina Infantry, of engagement May 27.

HDQRS. TWENTY-EIGHTH REGT. NORTH CAROLINA VOLS.,

Near Richmond, June 1, 1862.

GENERAL: In obedience to your orders I proceeded to Taliaferro's Mill on the morning of the 27th of May with 890 of my regiment and a section of Latham's battery, commanded by Lieut. J. R. Potts. While I was there, examining the ground for a suitable position for my forces information was received that the enemy was approaching in the direction of Hanover Court-House. I immediately retraced my steps, marching left in front, and throwing out a platoon of Company G as flankers, under Capt. George B. Johnston, to my right, the supposed direction of the enemy, while the other was thrown to my left and front, under Lieut. E. G. Morrow. It was not until we had nearly emerged from the pine thicket in front of Dr. Kinney's that we discovered some of the enemy ambushed in the same to our left, and where we were not expecting them. The regiment was immediately halted, faced by the rear rank, and wheeled to the right through the woods, pouring a deadly fire into a portion of the Twenty-fifth New York Regiment as they executed the movement. As soon as we cleared the thicket and appeared in the road running by Dr. Kinney's to Richmond another portion of the enemy, previously concealed in the wheat and behind the house immediately in front of us, opened a sharp fire, which was promptly returned by the Twenty-eighth.

The regiment was then ordered to charge, and did it most gallantly, many of them, shouting, leaped the ditch and high fence inclosing the field of wheat, while the rest rushed into the yard and around the house. The enemy, armed with Springfield rifles, were "flushed" like so much game, and dropped back into the wheat before our unerring marksmen. Here and in the woods we killed and wounded not less than 200 and took a large number of prisoners, only about 75 of whom we were able to send to the rear, and put in charge of a small detachment of cavalry from the Fourth Virginia Regiment, which was retiring from the mill. It was not until we had swept the Twenty-fifth New York Regiment before us and passed nearly across the wheat field that

we found ourselves in the presence of a whole brigade, commanded by General Martindale, about 400 yards distant from our extreme right—left as faced. The enemy opened a heavy fire on us from two batteries planted upon an eminence between the balance of your brigade and ourselves, but fortunately fired too high, and gave us time to reform in an open field on the opposite side of Dr. Kinney's dwelling and in a direction perpendicular to our previous position. Our flag-bearer was shot down while we were reforming, but one of his comrades seized the flag and bore it onward. It was here that I sent to you for re-enforcements, stating that we had been cut off by an overwhelming force. I also sent a courier to Hanover Court-House for assistance, with instructions to proceed to Hanover Junction, if none could be had there.

After we had reformed, the men, heated and excited, threw off their knapsacks, made heavier than usual by the drenching rain of the previous night, were advanced a short distance and made to lie down, while the section of artillery, previously planted in the road, was ordered to take a more commanding position in rear of the dwelling, between 600 and 700 yards from the enemy's guns; after which we opened a brisk and well-directed fire, forcing the enemy to withdraw one of his pieces, which was thrown forward a little on the same side of the road with ourselves. Lieutenant Potts and the men under him behaved with great gallantry and must have done considerable execution. This unequal contest was maintained for three long hours, in expectation of assistance either from you or Hanover Junction. During the artillery firing Capt. W. J. Montgomery, with his company, was ordered to the right to observe the enemy and check his advance up a hollow not far from the artillery, while Captain Johnston, with a part of his company, was sent to the left to reconnoiter. Company B, under Capt. S. N. Stowe, and the remainder of Company G, under Lieutenant Morrow, was held as a support to our two pieces. Captain Montgomery soon informed me that the enemy were throwing a large force through a wooded ravine on our right to surround us. He was immediately recalled and ordered to follow the head of their line along a fence running parallel to the road, and the other companies of the regiment, except those named above, were directed to follow. After prolonging our line in this new direction, and finding the enemy still going on and throwing at the same time sharpshooters between our infantry and artillery up the hollow that Captain Montgomery was first ordered to defend, while their artillery was pouring a hot fire upon us (they having got our range), and as we could see a strong infantry reserve in rear of their batteries, it was deemed advisable to retire. I was not able to recall Captain Johnston from the left, and was forced to leave the dead and badly wounded on the field, together with an old ambulance, a two-horse wagon, and our knapsacks. The 12-pound brass howitzer also had to be left, as 1 of the horses was killed and 3 others badly wounded. We know the names of 7 killed and 15 wounded as we retreated across the field to the road under the enemy's fire, and a few in the woods where the engagement first commenced. Exposed all the previous night to a drenching rain, without tents, deprived of food, having marched over a horribly muddy road with unusually heavy knapsacks, and having fought bravely and willingly for three hours in anticipation of being re-enforced, we were not in a condition to retreat. Many of my brave men fell from exhaustion on the road-side, and I am sorry to inform you that many of them are still missing, but trust that in a few days the number will be greatly reduced, as some are finding their way back to camp daily.

We were pursued by infantry, artillery, and a regiment of cavalry

beyond Hanover Court-House, where I received a dispatch from you stating that you had yourself engaged another portion of the enemy.

Guns were placed on the railroad hill formerly occupied by the Twenty-eighth Regiment as a camping ground, which prevented our retreating by the Ashland road, as we had anticipated, and forced us to take the right-hand road to Taylorsville, along which we were shelled a short distance. The cavalry pursued us beyond Colonel Wickham's farm, and were only prevented from making a charge by our throwing the regiment into a field and making it march along the fences, while Lieutenant Potts protected our rear with his Parrott gun.

We succeeded in reaching Taylorsville about sunset, and for three days we were endeavoring to join the rest of the command, and had scarcely anything to eat.

Lieut. Col. Thomas L. Lowe and Maj. S. D. Lowe bore themselves well during the action and were of great assistance, often in the execution of their duties passing through the hottest fires. Major Lowe was unaccountably separated from the regiment after passing Hanover Court-House, and is still missing. Adj. D. A. McRae and Captain Gibbon, A. C. S., also rendered me great assistance in carrying orders, and proved themselves brave men.

Both Surg. Robert Gibbon and Asst. Surg. R. G. Barham allowed themselves to be taken prisoners rather than leave the wounded. Surgeon Gibbon subsequently succeeded in making his escape, the wounded having been cared for and sent, in accordance with orders of a Federal officer, to a Federal hospital. We were at one time deceived by the flag of the Twenty-second Massachusetts Regiment, which is nearly white, when our firing ceased, and John A. Abernathy, our regimental hospital steward, volunteered to meet it, and was fired upon by the enemy. Though Companies D and E took most of the prisoners, yet the new Springfield rifles, repeaters, and swords, now in the possession of the regiment, show that all behaved well, and it would be invidious in me to discriminate among the company officers and men, when all acted so well their respective parts. This is the first time that the Twenty-eighth has been under fire. Their bravery has been thoroughly tested in this unequal contest; and though they have proved themselves courageous, our escape from such an overwhelming force can be but regarded as providential.

Two companies of Colonel Lee's Thirty-seventh North Carolina Volunteers, which were doing picket duty at Taliaferro's Mill, came up during the artillery firing, and were ordered to keep themselves covered in the woods beyond Dr. Kinney's residence. I have not learned the casualties in these two companies. Colonel Lee will incorporate their report in his own.

Respectfully,

JAMES H. LANE,

Col., Comdg. Twenty-eighth Regiment North Carolina Volunteers.

Brig. Gen. L. O'B. BRANCH.

MAY 29, 1862.—Skirmish near Seven Pines, Va.

Report of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS CASEY'S DIVISION,
Camp in advance of the Seven Pines, May 29, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that at daylight this morning

the enemy attacked my advanced picket on the Richmond road. They took advantage of the dense fog, and approached very near before being discovered. The pickets behaved nobly, and drove the rebels back in disorder. They left a wounded prisoner on the ground, who states that their force consisted of 300 men, of the Twenty-third North Carolina Regiment. We lost 1 officer and 1 private killed, and 2 enlisted men wounded. The officer killed (Maj. John E. Kelley, of the Ninety-sixth New York Volunteers, who commanded the pickets) is a great loss to the service. I knew him well when orderly-sergeant of the Second Infantry. I have inclosed a list of the killed and wounded. Capt. George W. Gillespie, of the One hundred and third Pennsylvania Volunteers, who commanded the pickets after the death of Major Kelley, behaved very well.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM, *Asst. Adjt. Gen., Fourth Army Corps.*

MAY 31—JUNE 1, 1862.—Battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, Va.

REPORTS, ETC.

- No. 1.—Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac, and resulting correspondence.
- No. 2.—Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac.
- No. 3.—Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, U. S. Army, commanding Second Corps.
- No. 4.—Brig. Gen. Israel B. Richardson, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.
- No. 5.—Capt. George W. Hazzard, Chief of Artillery.
- No. 6.—Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.
- No. 7.—Col. Thomas J. Parker, Sixty-fourth New York Infantry, commanding First Brigade.
- No. 8.—Col. Edward E. Cross, Fifth New Hampshire Infantry.
- No. 9.—Col. Francis C. Barlow, Sixty-first New York Infantry.
- No. 10.—Col. Thomas J. Parker, Sixty-fourth New York Infantry.
- No. 11.—Lieut. Col. Charles F. Johnson, Eighty-first Pennsylvania Infantry.
- No. 12.—Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
- No. 13.—Col. John Burke, Sixty-third New York Infantry.
- No. 14.—Col. Robert Nugent, Sixty-ninth New York Infantry.
- No. 15.—Lieut. Col. Patrick Kelly, Eighty-eighth New York Infantry.
- No. 16.—Brig. Gen. William H. French, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.
- No. 17.—Col. Paul Frank, Fifty-second New York Infantry.
- No. 18.—Col. Samuel K. Zook, Fifty-seventh New York Infantry.
- No. 19.—Col. Joseph C. Pinckney, Sixty-sixth New York Infantry.
- No. 20.—Col. John R. Brooke, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Infantry.
- No. 21.—Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division.
- No. 22.—Col. Charles H. Tompkins, Chief of Artillery.
- No. 23.—Lieut. Edmund Kirby, Battery I, First U. S. Artillery.
- No. 24.—Capt. John A. Tompkins, Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery.
- No. 25.—Capt. Walter O. Bartlett, Battery B, First Rhode Island Light Artillery.
- No. 26.—Capt. Charles D. Owen, Battery G, First Rhode Island Light Artillery.
- No. 27.—Brig. Gen. Willis A. Gorman, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.
- No. 28.—Lieut. Col. John W. Kimball, Fifteenth Massachusetts Infantry.
- No. 29.—Col. Alfred Sully, First Minnesota Infantry.
- No. 30.—Col. James A. Suiter, Thirty-fourth New York Infantry.

- No. 31.—Lieut. Col. Henry W. Hudson, Eighty-second New York Infantry.
No. 32.—Brig. Gen. William W. Burns, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
No. 33.—Brig. Gen. N. J. T. Dana, commanding Third Brigade.
No. 34.—Col. W. Raymond Lee, Twentieth Massachusetts Infantry.
No. 35.—Col. Ira R. Grosvenor, Seventh Michigan Infantry.
No. 36.—Maj. John H. Richardson, Seventh Michigan Infantry.
No. 37.—Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, U. S. Army, commanding Third and Fourth Corps.
No. 38.—Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Third Corps.
No. 39.—Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations May 31–June 4.
No. 40.—Brig. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
No. 41.—Maj. Thomas Holt, Seventieth New York Infantry, of operations May 31–June 5.
No. 42.—Col. George B. Hall, Seventy-first New York Infantry, of operations June 1–4.
No. 43.—Lieut. Col. Henry L. Potter, Seventy-first New York Infantry, of operations June 1–2.
No. 44.—Col. Nelson Taylor, Seventy-second New York Infantry, of operations May 31–June 4.
No. 45.—Maj. William O. Stevens, Seventy-second New York Infantry, of operations June 2–3.
No. 46.—Capt. Charles B. Elliott, Seventy-third New York Infantry, of operations June 1–4.
No. 47.—Col. Charles K. Graham, Seventy-fourth New York Infantry, of operations June 1–4.
No. 48.—Col. Samuel H. Starr, Fifth New Jersey Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.
No. 49.—Lieut. Col. Joseph Trawin, Eighth New Jersey Infantry, of operations May 31–June 5.
No. 50.—Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division.
No. 51.—Brig. Gen. Charles D. Jameson, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.
No. 52.—Lieut. Col. Richard A. Bachia, Eighty-seventh New York Infantry.
No. 53.—Col. Charles T. Campbell, Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry.
No. 54.—Lieut. Col. Elhanan W. Woods, Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry.
No. 55.—Col. Alexander Hays, Sixty-third Pennsylvania Infantry.
No. 56.—Lieut. Col. A. S. M. Morgan, Sixty-third Pennsylvania Infantry.
No. 57.—Col. Amor A. McKnight, One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Infantry.
No. 58.—Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
No. 59.—Col. J. H. Hobart Ward, Thirty-eighth New York Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.
No. 60.—Col. Henry G. Staples, Third Maine Infantry.
No. 61.—Col. Elijah Walker, Fourth Maine Infantry.
No. 62.—Capt. William L. Pitcher, Fourth Maine Infantry.
No. 63.—Maj. William H. Baird, Thirty-eighth New York Infantry.
No. 64.—Lieut. Col. Thomas W. Egan, Fortieth New York Infantry.
No. 65.—Brig. Gen. Hiram G. Berry, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.
No. 66.—Col. Orlando M. Poe, Second Michigan Infantry.
No. 67.—Lieut. Col. Ambrose A. Stevens, Third Michigan Infantry.
No. 68.—Col. Henry D. Terry, Fifth Michigan Infantry.
No. 69.—Col. Samuel B. Hayman, Thirty-seventh New York Infantry.
No. 70.—Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Corps.
No. 71.—Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.
No. 72.—Maj. Robert M. West, Chief of Artillery.
No. 73.—Capt. Jeremiah McCarthy, Battery C, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery.
No. 74.—Capt. Edward H. Flood, Battery D, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery.

- No. 75.—Capt. Theodore Miller, Battery E, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery.
- No. 76.—Brig. Gen. John J. Peck, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations May 29–June 1.
- No. 77.—Lieut. Col. Louis Thourot, Fifty-fifth New York Infantry.
- No. 78.—Lieut. Col. David J. Nevin, Sixty-second New York Infantry.
- No. 79.—Capt. John E. Arthur, Ninety-third Pennsylvania Infantry.
- No. 80.—Lieut. Col. Joseph M. Kinkead, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Infantry.
- No. 81.—Brig. Gen. John J. Abercrombie, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
- No. 82.—Col. John Cochrane, Sixty-fifth New York Infantry.
- No. 83.—Col. Julius W. Adams, Sixty-seventh New York Infantry.
- No. 84.—Col. Thomas H. Neill, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Infantry.
- No. 85.—Col. David H. Williams, Thirty-first Pennsylvania Infantry.
- No. 86.—Capt. James Brady, Battery H, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery.
- No. 87.—Brig. Gen. Charles Devens, jr., U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.
- No. 88.—Col. Charles H. Innes, Thirty-sixth New York Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.
- No. 89.—Lieut. Byron Porter, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, of operations of Tenth Massachusetts Infantry.
- No. 90.—Col. Henry S. Briggs, Tenth Massachusetts Infantry.
- No. 91.—Col. Charles H. Innes, Thirty-sixth New York Infantry.
- No. 92.—Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division.
- No. 93.—Capt. Peter C. Regan, Seventh New York Battery, Acting Chief of Artillery.
- No. 94.—Brig. Gen. Henry M. Naglee, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations May 26–June 1.
- No. 95.—Brig. Gen. Henry W. Wessells, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
- No. 96.—Maj. Audley W. Gazzam, One hundred and third Pennsylvania Infantry.
- No. 97.—Brig. Gen. Imnis N. Palmer, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.
- No. 98.—Capt. William C. Raulston, Eighty-first New York Infantry.
- No. 99.—Col. Jonathan S. Belknap, Eighty-fifth New York Infantry.
- No. 100.—Lieut. Col. Charles Durkee, Ninety-eighth New York Infantry.
- No. 101.—General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia, and resulting correspondence.
- No. 102.—Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding right wing.
- No. 103.—Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding division.
- No. 104.—Col. M. Jenkins, Palmetto Sharpshooters, commanding brigade.
- No. 105.—Col. George B. Anderson, Fourth North Carolina Infantry, commanding Special Brigade.
- No. 106.—Lieut. Col. Charles T. Zachry, Twenty-seventh Georgia Infantry.
- No. 107.—Capt. John N. Wilcox, Twenty-eighth Georgia Infantry.
- No. 108.—Maj. Bryan Grimes, Fourth North Carolina Infantry.
- No. 109.—Col. William Smith, Forty-ninth Virginia Infantry.
- No. 110.—Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland, jr., C. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, Third Division.
- No. 111.—Col. Daniel H. Christie, Twenty-third North Carolina Infantry.
- No. 112.—Capt. John R. Bagby, Fourth Virginia Battalion.
- No. 113.—Brig. Gen. Gabriel J. Rains, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.
- No. 114.—Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.
- No. 115.—Col. John B. Gordon, Sixth Alabama Infantry, commanding Rodes' brigade.
- No. 116.—Col. C. C. Pegues, Fifth Alabama Infantry.
- No. 117.—Col. John B. Gordon, Sixth Alabama Infantry.
- No. 118.—Lieut. Col. B. B. Gayle, Twelfth Alabama Infantry.
- No. 119.—Brig. Gen. George E. Pickett, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.
- No. 120.—Col. H. B. Tomlin, Fifty-third Virginia Infantry.
- No. 121.—Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.
- No. 122.—Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith, C. S. Army, commanding left wing.

No. 1.

Reports of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, and resulting correspondence.

FIELD OF BATTLE, June 1, 1862—12 o'clock.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

We have had a desperate battle, in which the corps of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes have been engaged against greatly superior numbers. Yesterday, at 1, the enemy, taking advantage of a terrible storm, which had flooded the valley of the Chickahominy, attacked our troops on the right bank of that river. Casey's division, which was in first line, gave way unaccountably and disunitedly [discreditably*]. This caused a temporary confusion, during which some guns and baggage were lost, but Heintzelman and Kearny most gallantly brought up their troops, which checked the enemy; at the same time, however, [General Sumner*] succeeded by great exertion in bringing across Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions, who drove back the enemy at the point of the bayonet, covering the ground with his dead.

This morning the enemy attempted to renew the conflict, but was everywhere repulsed. We have taken many prisoners, among whom is General Pettigrew and Colonel Long. Our loss is heavy, but that of the enemy must be enormous. With the exception of Casey's division [our*] men behaved splendidly.† Several fine bayonet charges have been made. The Second Excelsior made two to-day.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

—
McCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS,
June 2, 1862—12 p. m.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

Am delighted to hear of General Halleck's success. I have sent to learn numbers of killed and wounded and prisoners. It will take some time to ascertain details. The attack was a sudden one by the enemy in large force on Casey. On Saturday Casey's pickets rushed in without attempting a stand, and the camp was carried by the enemy. Heintzelman moved up at once with Kearny's division and checked the enemy. A portion of Hooker's arrived about dark. As soon as informed of the state of affairs I ordered General Sumner across the Chickahominy. He displayed the utmost energy in bringing his troops into action, and handled them with the utmost courage. In action, he repulsed every attack of the enemy, and drove him whenever he could get at him. The enemy attacked in force and with great spirit yesterday morning, but are everywhere most signally repulsed with great loss. Our troops charged frequently on both days, and uniformly broke the enemy.

The result is that our left is now within 4 miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall to cross with the rest of the force and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a very strong position I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fort Monroe, but the morale of my troops is now such that I can venture much, and do not

* These words in revised copy. See McClellan to Stanton, June 5, 10.30 a. m., p. 751.

† See also general report, pp. 38-43.

fear for odds against me. The victory is complete, and all credit is due to the gallantry of our officers and men.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 4, 1862.

Brigadier-General SUMNER:

General McClellan directs me to say that it is difficult for him to decide what was the exact conduct of Casey's division during the fight. The report of the corps commander differs from the information that the general had before received.

The general desires that you give him as soon as possible, in a few words, the position and condition of Casey's troops when you came onto the field, mentioning any that you believe to have acted creditably and those who did not. It is the general's impression that that division should be broken up, and such portions of it as are not completely demoralized transferred to other divisions. Before doing this, however, he wishes for your statements in the case, to enable him to do justice to all concerned. Your statements will be considered purely confidential, and will only be used to assist the general in deciding what to do, so that no one shall be treated unjustly.

A. V. COLBURN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
New Bridge, June 4, 1862—2.45 p. m.

Maj. Gen. E. V. SUMNER, *Commanding Second Corps:*

My telegraphic dispatch to Secretary of War in regard to battle of Fair Oaks is incorrectly printed in the Herald in several particulars. I am there made to say that we succeeded by great exertions in bringing across Generals Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions. I merely wrote that General Sumner succeeded, &c. I then appreciated what you had done, and wished to have it known as soon as possible. I will send you copy of my dispatch as written and sent. By some strange chance most of my dispatches in these days are changed and mutilated before publication.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

HOSPITAL NEAR BOTTOM'S BRIDGE,
June 4, 1862.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of Potomac:

GENERAL: I would respectfully request that the commanding general shall appoint a proper board of officers to investigate and report upon certain charges made against Casey's division, that the truth may be known concerning their conduct and that of others engaged in the affair at the Seven Pines on May 31 and June 1 and 2.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY M. NAGLEE,
Brigadier-General.

[First indorsement.]

Approved and respectfully submitted.

I feel confident that the general commanding could not have been possessed of the whole truth with regard to the affair of the 31st ultimo, or he would not have made the remark he did about my division. I feel that injustice has been done.

SILAS CASEY,
Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding Division.

[Second indorsement.]

JUNE 4, 1862—9 p. m.

I approve the within application of Brigadier-General Naglee and the above indorsement of Brigadier-General Casey, and respectfully request that a board of officers be named as desired.

E. D. KEYES,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

—

NEW BRIDGE, June 5, 1862—10.30 a. m.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*:

My telegraphic dispatch of June 1 in regard to battle of Fair Oaks was incorrectly published in newspapers. I send with this a correct copy, which I request may be published at once. I am the more anxious about this since my dispatch, as published, would seem to ignore the services of General Sumner, which were too valuable and brilliant to be overlooked, both in the difficult passage of the stream and the subsequent combat.

The mistake seems to have occurred in transmittal of the dispatch by the telegraph.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

[Inclosure.]

FIELD OF BATTLE, June 1—12 o'clock.

To Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary*:

We have had a desperate battle, in which the corps of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes have been engaged against greatly superior numbers. Yesterday, at 1, the enemy, taking advantage of a terrible storm, which had flooded the valley of the Chickahominy, attacked our troops on the right bank of that river. Casey's division, which was the first line, gave way unaccountably and discreditably. This caused a temporary confusion, during which some guns and baggage were lost, but Heintzelman and Kearny most gallantly brought up their troops, which checked the enemy. At the same time, however, General Sumner succeeded by great exertions in bringing across Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions, who drove back the enemy at the point of the bayonet, covering the ground with his dead.

This morning the enemy attempted to renew the conflict, but was everywhere repulsed. We have taken many prisoners, amongst whom are General Pettigrew and Colonel Long. Our loss is heavy, but that of the enemy must be enormous. With the exception of Casey's divis-

ion our men have behaved splendidly. Several fine bayonet charges have been made. The Second Excelsior made two to-day.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

CAMP AT POPLAR HILL, VA.,
June 5, 1862.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff:*

GENERAL: In the New York papers of the 2d instant I see that General McClellan reported to the Secretary of War that my division, in some unaccountable manner, was driven back, losing artillery and baggage. This statement certainly does great injustice to my division, which I doubt not was unintentional. Some of my regiments undoubtedly wavered, but the truth is, I stood with my division of about 5,000 men the attack of the enemy for about one hour under a most galling fire and without a man being sent as re-enforcement. The division was not driven from its line until it was turned on both flanks, losing the six pieces of artillery which were in the redoubt and one piece on account of the horses being shot down. We did not retire from the first line until General Heintzelman, with a portion of General Kearny's division, had come up to the second line. I managed to rally a small portion of my men at the second line, but most of the division retired to the third line. The second line could not be maintained by the troops belonging to the line, together with the re-enforcements brought up by General Kearny, and the troops retired to the third line by order of General Heintzelman.

From an examination afterward of my field of battle, from the number of graves, and the number of killed and wounded still on the ground, I am of opinion that no division that day or the next killed and wounded more of the enemy than mine.

You can well imagine that I feel much aggrieved by the remarks of the general commanding, but have that belief in his sense of justice which cannot conceive that he will fail to correct an error.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 5, 1862.

Brig. Gen. E. D. KEYES,
Commanding Fourth Corps:

GENERAL: The letter of Brigadier-General Naglee, of the 4th instant, asking for a board of officers "to investigate and report upon certain charges made against Casey's division," indorsed favorably by General Casey and yourself, has been received.

I am directed by the commanding general to say that he is fully disposed to render entire justice to Casey's division, and will be glad to embrace any opportunity to manifest this disposition.

A board of officers of high rank cannot conveniently be summoned now to "investigate and report," as requested. As soon as the exigencies of the service permit, however, it shall be done.

Meanwhile an inspector-general will be directed to proceed and make a preliminary investigation.

I am to assure you that it will afford the general commanding sincere pleasure should the facts prove such as to require a change of his expressed views, founded upon official statements, in regard to the conduct of Casey's division on the 31st ultimo.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPT., ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near New Bridge, Va., June 5, 1862.

General R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff*:

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that I have made the examination directed in Casey's division and report thereof as follows:

Strength present accounted for averages in—

First Brigade, 340 per regiment, and five regiments.....	1,700
Second Brigade, 348 per regiment, and four regiments.....	1,392
Third Brigade, 345 per regiment, and four regiments.....	1,380

Making a total in this division of..... 4,472

The numbers in Third Brigade I did not get, and those of Second Brigade are given, as reported, approximately correct. I expect a detailed report from Second and Third Brigades soon.

Reported loss in this division.....	1,845
In First Brigade 521 and in Second Brigade 553.....	1,074

Which leaves for the loss of Third Brigade..... 771

Several who were reported missing in first reports have since reported to their regiments.

From information gained from a variety of sources, within and without the division, it appears there was exhibited both gallant and bad conduct in this division in its recent engagement with the enemy at the battle of Fair Oaks, and although attacked by an overwhelming force, it poured a most destructive fire upon the enemy, as shown by the large number of his dead left on the field, and checked his advance. The first line of rifle pits were not left until flanked by the enemy's fire, but were then left in disorder. At the second line of rifle pits or trenches the men of this division rallied in part and again caused the enemy to suffer by their fire.

The actual loss of killed and wounded in this division proves conclusively that it was exposed to a heavy fire.

As reported, the men did not run when falling to the rear, but walked and were in disorder and generally had their arms, but they could not be rallied by their officers in their original organizations. Regimental line officers in some cases set their men the example of breaking to the rear.

Of the number at first reported missing several have since joined; others are said to be about in the woods. Many were supposed to have gone toward the White House.

In this division there are many worthy of praise for good conduct who suffer for the bad conduct of others.

REMARKS.

Casey's division at the recent battle of Fair Oaks was not surprised, according to reports made to me, but defective disposition of picket forces and inefficiency of officers, together with bad discipline, account for its conduct, in my opinion, in this battle.

As a division, I do not think it could be trusted by itself in another engagement with the enemy soon, believing the shock and repulse it received in the last action has too much demoralized the men and officers to safely count upon their making a firm stand.

The best disposition to make of the troops of this division under existing circumstances is to consolidate regiments, weeding out inefficient officers, and to combine them with other troops, in my opinion. I would break up the division organization, but not the brigade altogether.

Efficient officers, association with good troops, and proper encouragement will, I think, work great changes for the better in this command.

I am, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

N. H. DAVIS,

Assistant Inspector-General, U. S. Army.

McCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS,

June 5, 1862—10.30 p. m.

Hon. E. M. STANTON :

My dispatch of the 1st instant, stating that General Casey's division, which was with first line, gave way unaccountably and discredibly, was based upon official statements made to me before I arrived upon the battle-field, and while I was there by superior commanders. From statements made to me subsequently by Generals Casey and Naglee I am induced to believe that portions of the division behaved well and made a most gallant stand against superior numbers, but at present the accounts are too conflicting to enable me to discriminate with certainty. When the facts are clearly ascertained the exceptional good conduct will be properly acknowledged.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

June 6, 1862—10 p. m. (Received 4 a. m., June 7.)

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

Statement of killed, wounded, and missing of the 31st of May and June 1, 1862, in front of Richmond :

General Sumner, Second Corps, 183 killed, 894 wounded, and 146 missing ; General Heintzelman's Third Corps, 259 killed, 980 wounded, and 155 missing ; Keyes' Fourth Corps, 448 killed, 1,753 wounded, 921 missing. Total, 890 killed, 3,627 wounded, 1,222 missing. Grand total killed, wounded, and missing, 5,739.*

A nominal list will be furnished as soon as the data can be received.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General.

*But see recapitulation of revised statement, p. 762.

HEADQUARTERS GENERAL CASEY'S DIVISION,
Poplar Hill, June 8, 1862.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Fourth Corps :

CAPTAIN: A communication from Headquarters Army of the Potomac, under date of May 23, 1862, has been referred to me, desiring "an explanation in detail of the extraordinary falling off in the effective strength of Casey's division since March 30, 1862."

I had been furnished with a copy of this letter several days ago, and at once made a report to you, a copy of which was handed to Major Davis, assistant inspector-general on the staff of the major-general commanding.

In compliance with further directions from your headquarters, I had caused detailed reports to be rendered from the several brigades of my command, which were lost in the battle of the 31st ultimo, in common with the other books and papers of this division.

The material for a report in detail is no longer in my possession. I can only refer to my former report and to the monthly returns from my brigades, now nearly ready for transmission, as conveying all the information in my power to give.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,
Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding Division.

[Indorsement.]

JUNE 9, 1862.

Respectfully submitted to Headquarters Army of the Potomac.

Among the reasons for the falling off in Casey's division are, in my opinion:

1st, and principal. There were eight raw regiments in that division, and the troops had less opportunity for instruction and organization than the troops that fought at Bull Run.

2d. Until the division left Washington there was but one brigadier

3d. Great sickness, owing principally to unwholesome encampments and partly to a lack of sufficient military experience and vigilance on the part of officers.

4th. I think there has been a feeling of discouragement in that division, in which there are many excellent men, growing out of the impression, true or false, that the division has not been held in high repute.

E. D. KEYES,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Division.

CAMP IN THE REAR,
June 17, 1862.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac :

GENERAL: The action of General McClellan in regard to my communication to you of the 4th instant was not communicated to me until the 14th.

I would respectfully request you send to me at your earliest convenience a copy of the dispatches sent by General Heintzelman and others to General McClellan upon which he based his dispatch to the Secretary of War on the 1st of June respecting the battle of Fair Oaks, that

I may place on record in your office a statement of facts in direct refutation of the same.

HENRY M. NAGLEE,
Brigadier-General.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS CASEY'S DIVISION,
June 17, 1862.

Respectfully referred, with a request that the documents be furnished.

SILAS CASEY,
Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding Division.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS,
June 17, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded.

If the documents are sent I think they should be sent through me, as I am as much interested as any one.

E. D. KEYES,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Lincoln, June 20, 1862.

Brig. Gen. H. M. NAGLEE,
Commanding Brigade:

GENERAL: Your letter of the 17th instant, applying to be furnished with a copy of the dispatches sent by General Heintzelman and others to General McClellan upon which he based his dispatch to the Secretary of War of the 1st of June respecting the battle of Fair Oaks, has been received.

In advance of the rendition of the official reports to the War Department the general commanding does not deem it proper to furnish copies of papers on file pertaining to the operations of the campaign.

His dispatch of the 1st of June was, however, published by the War Department, and its contents are known to you. It is not thought that General Heintzelman's dispatches will be of any material value to you in preparing a statement of facts in refutation of matter in the general's telegram objectionable to yourself.

You are aware that a subsequent dispatch to the War Department from the general commanding suspended the judgment of the behavior of Casey's division, on the 31st of May, conveyed in his dispatch of June 1, until further investigation shall enable him to do justice to the good conduct which was displayed by portions of the division on that day.

The general commanding would be glad to receive any statement throwing light upon the occurrences of the 31st ultimo as far as Casey's division is concerned. His only desire in the premises can be to do full justice to any portion of the troops engaged.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 2.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac at the battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, Va., May 31–June 1, 1862.

[Compiled from nominal lists of casualties, returns, &c.]

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.	Remarks.	
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.			
SECOND ARMY CORPS.									
Brig. Gen. EDWIN V. SUMNER.									
FIRST DIVISION.									
Brig. Gen. ISRAEL B. RICHARDSON.									
First Brigade.									
(1.) Brig. Gen. OLIVER O. HOWARD (wounded).									
(2.) Col. THOMAS J. PARKER.									
Staff.....			3				3	No loss reported.	
5th New Hampshire.....		26	5	142		7	180		
61st New York.....	4	27	4	69		6	110		
64th New York.....	1	29	11	132			173		
81st Pennsylvania.....	1	7	3	29	1	50	91		
Total First Brigade.....	6	89	26	372	1	63	557		
Second Brigade.									
Brig. Gen. THOMAS F. MEAGHER.									
63d New York.....									
69th New York.....		1		12		1	14		
88th New York.....	1	5	1	18			25		
Total Second Brigade.....	1	6	1	30		1	39		
Third Brigade.									
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM H. FRENCH.									
Staff.....			1				1		
52d New York.....		15	8	95		4	122		
57th New York.....		3		15			18		
66th New York.....		1		5		1	7		
53d Pennsylvania.....	1	12	4	60		17	94		
Total Third Brigade.....	1	31	13	175		22	242		
Artillery Brigade.									
Capt. GEORGE W. HAZZARD, 4th U. S. Artillery.									
4th U. S. Artillery, Batteries A and C.....									
1st New York Light Artillery, Battery B.....									
1st New York Light Artillery, Battery G.....									
Total Artillery Brigade.....									
Total First Division.....	8	126	40	577	1	86	838		

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac at the battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, Va., May 31-June 1, 1862—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
SECOND DIVISION.								
Brig. Gen. JOHN SEDGWICK.								
First Brigade.								
Brig. Gen. WILLIS A. GORMAN.								
Staff			1				1	
15th Massachusetts		5		17			22	
34th New York		23	5	66		3	97	
82d New York	1	9	2	59			71	
1st Minnesota		2		2			4	
Andrew Sharpshooters				1			1	
Total First Brigade	1	39	8	145		3	196	
Second Brigade.								
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM W. BURNS.								
Staff			1				1	
69th Pennsylvania			1	2			3	
71st Pennsylvania		2	2	11			15	
72d Pennsylvania		1		7			8	
106th Pennsylvania		2	1	5			8	
Total Second Brigade		5	5	25			35	
Third Brigade.								
Brig. Gen. N. J. T. DANA.								
19th Massachusetts				1			1	
20th Massachusetts		2		18			20	
42d New York				1			1	
7th Michigan		14	3	72			89	
Total Third Brigade		16	3	92			111	
Artillery Brigade.								
Col. CHARLES H. TOMPKINS.								
1st U. S. Artillery, Battery I		1		4			5	
1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, Battery A								No loss reported.
1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, Battery B								No loss reported.
1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, Battery G								No loss reported.
Total Artillery Brigade		1		4			5	
6th New York Cavalry, Company K								No loss reported.
Total Second Division	1	61	16	266		3	347	
Total Second Army Corps	9	187	56	843	1	89	1,185	

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac at the battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, Va., May 31-June 1, 1862—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
THIRD ARMY CORPS.								
Brig. Gen. S. P. HEINTZELMAN.*								
<i>Cavalry.</i>								
Col. WILLIAM W. AVERELL.								
8d Pennsylvania								Not engaged.
SECOND DIVISION.								
Brig. Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER.								
Staff.....				1			1	
<i>First Brigade.</i>								
Brig. Gen. CUVIER GROVER.								
2d New Hampshire								} Not engaged.
1st Massachusetts								
11th Massachusetts								
26th Pennsylvania								
Total First Brigade.....								
<i>Second Brigade.</i>								
Brig. Gen. DANIEL E. SICKLES.								
70th New York	2			15		1	18	
71st New York	3	2		10		5	20	
72d New York				5			5	
73d New York	1			10			11	
74th New York	1	1		18			20	
Total Second Brigade.....	7	3		58		6	74	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>								
(1.) Brig. Gen. FRANCIS E. PATTER- SON (sick).								
(2.) Col. SAMUEL H. STARR.								
5th New Jersey.....	4	3		51		2	60	
6th New Jersey.....	5			13		1	19	
7th New Jersey.....								} Not engaged.
8th New Jersey.....								
Total Third Brigade.....	9	3		64		3	79	
<i>Artillery Brigade.</i>								
Maj. CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT.								
1st U. S. Artillery, Battery H.....								Not engaged.
1st New York Light Artillery, Bat- tery D.								No loss reported.
4th New York Battery.....								Not engaged.
6th New York Battery.....								No loss reported.
Total Artillery Brigade.....								
Total Second Division.....	16	6		123		9	154	

* Commanded Third and Fourth Army Corps combined.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac at the battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, Va., May 31-June 1, 1862—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
THIRD DIVISION.								
Brig. Gen. PHILIP KEARNY.								
Staff.....			1				1	
First Brigade.								
(1.) Brig. Gen. CHARLES D. JAMESON.								
(2.) Col. J. H. HOBART WARD.								
87th New York.....		11	5	53		7	76	
57th Pennsylvania.....	1	10	4	44		1	60	
63d Pennsylvania.....	1	22	8	71		20	122	
105th Pennsylvania.....	2	39	9	103		8	161	
Total First Brigade.....	4	82	26	271		36	419	
Second Brigade.								
Brig. Gen. DAVID B. BIRNEY.								
3d Maine.....		8	5	66		3	82	
4th Maine.....		2	1	7		1	11	
38th New York.....		1	1	13		3	18	
40th New York.....		12	2	79		3	96	
Total Second Brigade.....		23	9	165		10	207	
Third Brigade.								
Brig. Gen. HIRAM G. BERRY.								
Staff.....	1						1	
37th New York.....	1	11	6	62		2	82	
2d Michigan.....		10	2	45			57	
3d Michigan.....	1	29	9	115		15	169	
5th Michigan.....	2	29	5	100		19	155	
Total Third Brigade.....	5	79	22	322		36	464	
Artillery.								
2d U. S. Artillery, Battery G.....								} Not engaged,
1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, Battery E.....								
1st New Jersey Light Artillery, Battery B.....								
Total artillery.....								
Total Third Division.....	9	184	58	758		82	1,091	
Total Third Army Corps....	9	200	64	881		91	1,245	
FOURTH ARMY CORPS.								
Brig. Gen. ERASMUS D. KEYES.								
Cavalry.								
Col. D. McM. GREGG.								
8th Pennsylvania.....				2		2	4	

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac at the battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, Va., May 31-June 1, 1862—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
FIRST DIVISION.								
Brig. Gen. DARIUS N. COUCH.								
Staff.....			1				1	
First Brigade.								
Brig. Gen. JOHN J. PECK.								
55th New York		13	5	85			103	
62d New York	1	1		15		32	49	
93d Pennsylvania	1	19	3	81	1	21	126	
98th Pennsylvania								
102d Pennsylvania		12	5	42		10	69	
Total First Brigade.....	2	45	13	223	1	63	347	
Second Brigade.								
Brig. Gen. J. J. ABERCROMBIE.								
Staff.....			1				1	
65th New York		7		24			31	
67th New York	1	26	5	130		8	170	
23d Pennsylvania		17	7	96		9	129	
31st Pennsylvania		5		18		7	30	
61st Pennsylvania	3	65	9	143	4	39	263	
Total Second Brigade.....	4	120	22	411	4	63	624	
Third Brigade.								
(1.) Brig. Gen. CHARLES DEVENS, Jr. (wounded).								
(2.) Col. CHARLES H. INNES.								
Staff.....			1				1	
7th Massachusetts				4		1	5	
10th Massachusetts	3	24	3	92		2	124	
2d Rhode Island								
36th New York		7	3	33		5	48	
Total Third Brigade.....	3	31	7	129		8	178	
Artillery.								
Maj. ROBERT M. WEST.								
1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Battery C.		1		3			4	
1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Battery D.		1		1			2	
1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Battery E.				2			2	
1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Battery H.				6			6	
Total artillery.....		2		12			14	
Total First Division	9	198	43	775	5	134	1,104	
SECOND DIVISION.								
Brig. Gen. SILAS CASEY.								
Provost guard *.....				1		2	3	

* Not accounted for with their regiments.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac at the battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, Va., May 31–June 1, 1862—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
<i>First Brigade.</i>								
Brig. Gen. HENRY M. NAGLEE.								
Staff.....			1				1	
11th Maine.....	1	5	3	41		19	69	
56th New York.....	1	15	4	43		5	63	
100th New York.....	3	16	3	83	5	66	176	
52d Pennsylvania.....		20	7	87		5	119	
104th Pennsylvania.....	1	27	6	105	1	66	206	
Total First Brigade.....	6	83	24	359	6	161	639	
<i>Second Brigade.</i>								
Brig. Gen. HENRY W. WESSELLS.								
Staff.....			1				1	
96th New York.....	1	7	1	30	2	18	59	
85th Pennsylvania.....	2	6	3	52		13	76	
101st Pennsylvania.....		11	5	103		10	129	
103d Pennsylvania.....	1	7	2	67	1	15	93	
Total Second Brigade.....	4	31	12	252	3	56	358	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>								
Brig. Gen. INNIS N. PALMER.								
81st New York.....	2	23	5	87		20	137	
85th New York.....		9	4	45		21	79	
92d New York.....		8	4	65		28	105	
98th New York.....		4	3	38		26	71	
Total Third Brigade.....	2	44	16	235		95	392	
<i>Artillery.</i>								
(1.) Col. GUILFORD D. BAILEY (killed).								
(2.) Maj. D. H. VAN VALKENBURGH (killed).								
(3.) Capt. PETER C. REGAN.								
1st New York Light Artillery, Field and Staff.	2		1				3	
1st New York Light Artillery, Bat- tery A.		3		5		1	9	
1st New York Light Artillery, Bat- tery H.			2	6			8	
7th New York Battery.....		2		8		1	11	
8th New York Battery.....				6			6	
Total artillery.....	2	5	3	25		2	37	
Total Second Division.....	14	163	55	872	9	316	1,429	
Total Fourth Army Corps...	23	361	98	1,649	14	452	2,597	
<i>Unattached.</i>								
1st U. S. Artillery, Battery E.....		1		3			4	

RECAPITULATION.

Second Army Corps.....	9	187	56	843	1	89	1,185
Third Army Corps.....	9	200	64	881		91	1,245
Fourth Army Corps.....	23	361	98	1,649	14	452	2,597
Unattached.....		1		3			4
Grand total.....	41	749	218	3,376	15	632	5,031

No. 3.

Report of Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, U. S. Army, commanding Second Corps.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS D'ARMÉE,
Courtney's, June 9, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 31st ultimo, at 1 p. m., while stationed with my *corps d'armée* at Tyler's, I received an order from the commanding general to be in readiness to move at a moment's warning. I immediately prepared my corps and advanced the two divisions (Richardson's and Sedgwick's) to the two bridges which they had built over the Chickahominy, and ordered them to halt there with the heads of the columns on the bridges till further orders. At 2.30 o'clock p. m. I received the order to cross the river and support Heintzelman. The columns immediately moved over the river and marched rapidly to the field of battle by two roads. Sedgwick's route being the shortest he reached the field first, Kirby's battery coming up at the same time. On arriving on the field I found General Couch with four regiments and two companies of infantry and Brady's battery. These troops were drawn up in line near Adams' house, and there was a pause in the battle. The leading regiment (Sully's) was ordered to the right to protect our right flank, and the remainder of Sedgwick's division was formed in line of battle as speedily as possible, with Kirby's battery on the right. One of Couch's regiments was sent to open communication with Kearny's division on my left, and the remainder of his command was placed on the left of Sully, and these troops all did great execution in the firing. These arrangements were hardly completed when the enemy advanced upon us in great force and opened fire. Our men received it with remarkable coolness and returned it rapidly, Kirby's battery playing with extraordinary rapidity and accuracy. Great praise is due Lieutenants Kirby, Woodruff, and French. After firing for some time I ordered the following regiments, Eighty-second New York, Thirty-fourth New York, Fifteenth Massachusetts, Twentieth Massachusetts, and Seventh Michigan to move to the front and charge bayonets. There were two fences between us and the enemy, but our men gallantly rushed over them and the enemy broke and fled, and this closed the battle on Saturday. On Sunday morning, June 1, at 6.30 o'clock, the enemy attacked us again in great fury, and this time the brunt of the battle was borne by Richardson's division. This division was placed on Saturday night parallel with the railroad, and the enemy advanced across the railroad to make the attack. This was a most obstinate contest, continuing for four hours, in which our troops showed the greatest gallantry and determination, and drove the enemy from the field. I must refer to the reports of the division and brigade commanders, and I fully confirm every word they have said in praise of their officers and men. No troops ever behaved better.

I would respectfully commend to the commanding general and the Government Brigadier-Generals Couch, Richardson, Abercrombie, Sedgwick, Howard (who unfortunately lost an arm), Gorman, Burns, French, Dana, and Meagher. From all these officers I received the most valuable support.

I would also beg leave to commend my staff officers. Surg. J. F. Hammond, my medical director, manifested extraordinary zeal and ability in his difficult and arduous duties. I am indebted to Capt. J. H. Taylor, my chief of staff; Capt. F. N. Clarke, chief of artillery;

Lieut. L. Kip, Lieut. A. H. Cushing, Lieut. S. S. Sumner, aides, and Maj. A. M. Clarke, volunteer aide, for valuable services. They were at all times ready, willing, and able.

General McClellan came upon the field on Sunday before the battle closed, and after looking about expressed himself satisfied with my arrangements.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. V. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.

No. 4.

Report of Brig. Gen. Israel B. Richardson, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.

HDQRS. RICHARDSON'S DIVISION, SUMNER'S CORPS,
At Fair Oaks, Va., June 6, 1862.

DEAR SIR: According to orders received I have the honor to forward to you a statement of the services of the division under my command on the 31st of May and 1st of June, 1862.

About 3 o'clock p. m. on the 31st of May, while at General Sumner's headquarters, a message was received by the general from General McClellan that the camp of General Casey across the Chickahominy had been attacked; that the division of Casey had run, and at the same time ordering the corps of General Sumner to his assistance. General Sumner immediately informed me of this, at the same time directing me to get under arms as soon as possible, and to follow (after crossing the bridge opposite my camp) the road to this point, which road had been reconnoitered by General Sumner and myself some days before. The crossing of the river was made particularly difficult by the large quantity of rain which had fallen some hours before. Our men were obliged to wade (part of the bridge having been swept away) nearly up to their middles in water, and of course could follow but slowly. Finding that we could expedite the march much by crossing at the upper bridge (opposite the camp of General Sedgwick), I turned off in that direction the brigades of Generals Howard and Meagher and all my batteries, and crossed General French's brigade at the lower bridge. The three reunited after crossing, and finding I could not get my artillery through the deep mud, was forced to leave it, and followed General Sedgwick by another road. Getting on as fast as possible, we came up just after the firing of Generals Couch and Sedgwick had ceased, it being then dark. On reporting to General Sumner, he ordered me to take position on the line of railroad and on the left of General Sedgwick, and to communicate with pickets of General Birney's brigade on my left. I placed the brigade of General French on the railroad, three regiments of General Howard in second line, three regiments of General Meagher in third line, and one of General Howard's (the Fifth New Hampshire) as the advance guard to the brigade of General French. Our men thus arranged bivouacked for the night on their arms, and obtaining permission from General Sumner, I sent off one of General

Meagher's, the Sixty-third New York, to try and get up at least two pieces of artillery against the morning.

Sunday, June 1, at 3 o'clock in the morning, the division stood to arms. The arms and equipments of the men were examined and put in order for action. Having had three regiments (Second and Fifth Texas and Second Mississippi) bivouacked within half-musket shot of the New Hampshire regiment, and having retired before daylight without noise or confusion, nothing was seen of the enemy until about 5 in the morning. There is a large open field opposite my right front. About 1,000 yards across on the opposite side it is covered with timber, and at the time mentioned the enemy's pickets were deployed on the other side of this field and moving toward us. The head of a column of cavalry was also seen just in the edge of the woods; also some reconnoitering officers, mounted. Captain Pettit's battery had just come up, and I sought and obtained permission of General Sumner to put some of his pieces in battery against them. These pieces now opened their fire, directed by Captains Hazzard and Pettit. The skirmishers and cavalry broke and retired into the woods in rear. This no doubt was intended as the head of the real attack, to come down this open field, but no movement of the enemy in that direction after our firing ceased could be seen during the remainder of the day. While this was going on General French informed me that there was a large space of some half mile between his left and the right of General Birney which was devoid of troops, and both of us considered it of vital necessity that this space should be filled up to prevent the enemy from cutting our line in two. I conveyed this intelligence to General Sumner, and he gave me permission to move General French to the left the length of three battalions, and at the same time put one of General Howard's regiments still farther on the left and the Fifth New Hampshire in second line. This flank movement at the same time involved the necessity of the first line crossing the railroad, and this line then stood some 50 yards in front of it, in a swampy piece of ground, covered with a thick growth of timber.

Hardly had these arrangements been completed, at 6.30 o'clock a. m., when along the whole of our front line the enemy opened a heavy rolling fire of musketry within 50 yards. Near our left two roads crossed the railroad, and up these the enemy moved his columns of attack, supported on his left by battalions deployed in line of battle in the woods, the whole line coming up to us at once and without skirmishers in advance, showing that they had a good and perfect knowledge of the ground. Our men returned the fire with vivacity and spirit, and it soon became the heaviest musketry firing that I had ever experienced during an hour and a half, and the enemy interposed fresh regiments five different times, to allow their men to replenish their ammunition. The action had continued in this way about an hour. I had communicated to General French that so soon as he needed re-enforcements he should have them, and I now ordered in General Howard to re-enforce the first line with his brigade, which he gallantly did, bringing up the Sixty-first New York in person. Soon after this the whole line of the enemy fell back for the first time, unable to stand our fire, and for a half an hour the firing ceased on both sides. General Howard was wounded about the time he brought the Sixty-first into action. During the cessation of the fire I ordered forward the Fifth New Hampshire and the Sixty-ninth and Eighty-eighth New York to take their positions in the front line of battle to relieve the Fifty-second New York, Fifty-third Pennsylvania, and Sixty-first New York.

As soon as these arrangements had been made the enemy, having apparently been re-enforced, now returned to the attack. The whole of my division on the field was very warmly engaged. The action lasted about one hour longer. Our line toward the last poured in its fire and repulsed the enemy with a general charge, assisted and followed up promptly by a bayonet charge on the left and rear of the enemy's line of two regiments of General French's brigade, the Fifty-seventh and Sixty-sixth New York, led by that general in person. At the same time their retreat was precipitated by the fire of four pieces of Pettit's battery, directed by Captain Hazzard, which, at the suggestion of Captain Norvell, I had moved up against the enemy's left.

During the whole of this severe and hotly-contested battle I was ably assisted by all three of my brigadiers, with their staffs, and among those staffs I would particularly mention as worthy of distinction Captain Fisk, adjutant-general of General French, wounded; Lieutenant Plume, aide to General French, who led in some of the regiments for me in person; Lieutenant French, aide to the same general, and Dr. Grant, brigade surgeon. On the staff of General Howard, Captain Sewall, adjutant-general; Lieutenants Howard and Miles (wounded), and Lieutenant Scott, aides-de-camp. My own personal staff conveyed my orders with promptitude and delivered them with conciseness, and under my direction led in several of the regiments under the heavy-fire of the enemy to be put in position by the different brigadier-generals. Captain Norvell, assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenants Hurlbut and Draper, aides-de-camp; Lieutenant Miller, volunteer aide; Captain Fuller, assistant commissary of subsistence and volunteer aide, and Captain McMahon, of General Meagher's brigade, and staff volunteer aide upon this occasion, all did their duty nobly, and it is my duty and desire to state that the general conduct of the troops, both officers and men, was all that could be asked. I would also recommend particularly the cool and deliberate manner in which the artillery was served, and the skill and efficiency exhibited by Captains Hazzard and Pettit in directing its fire, and as a reward to faithful merit and unflinching bravery I would most respectfully solicit that the colors of the infantry and artillery of the division have the words "Fair Oaks" inscribed upon them.

In killed, wounded, and missing my division lost about 900 men and officers.* The loss of the enemy must have been at least two to one of ours. Many of their wounded were brought in by us, but we suppose the greater number were carried off by them. The number of my division engaged was about 7,000. A correct list of the killed and wounded in my division will be handed in as soon as it can be obtained. My division has buried 383 of the enemy left dead on the field. Many more were buried of which we have no account.

Your obedient servant,

I. B. RICHARDSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. J. H. TAYLOR,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

* But see revised statement, p. 757.

No. 5.

Report of Capt. George W. Hazzard, Chief of Artillery.

HDQRS. ART. BRIG., RICHARDSON'S DIV., SUMNER'S CORPS,
Fair Oaks Station, June 6, 1862.

On Saturday, the 31st ultimo, about 1 o'clock p. m., and soon after the firing at Casey's intrenched camp was first heard, I received an order from division headquarters to proceed with the three batteries under my command across the Chickahominy by the bridge which had been constructed in front of our camp at Tyler's house. On reaching the bank of the river it was found impracticable to pass the artillery, whereupon I was directed to march up the left side and cross on General Sedgwick's bridge in rear of his division. The heavy rain of the previous afternoon had rendered the high road nearly impassable for guns, and the field which we were compelled to traverse had been converted into quagmires, into which the wheels sank at once to the axles. The leading battery of General Sedgwick's division had cut up every spot by which artillery could move without first constructing corduroys. This indispensable labor detained all of our guns and a majority of Sedgwick's on the east bank till after sunset, and the night proved extremely dark, but all of our pieces were safely crossed over the river before 3 o'clock Sunday morning, June 1.

On arriving at the west end of the bridge the valley beyond was found flooded to the width of 200 yards and to the depth of 18 inches; the corduroy was floating on the surface of the water, and two ambulances which had entered the column in violation of printed orders had been abandoned in the roadway. A fatigue party of a lieutenant and 44 infantry soldiers sent from the division here reported to me, but they were unavoidably without either lamps or tools and could consequently render no assistance. Later in the night a regiment of infantry returned from the front, but they attempted nothing beyond guarding the batteries. By the greatest exertions Captain Pettit's New York battery of 10-pounder Parrott guns was about 2 a. m. dragged across the slough, and at 4 o'clock Sunday morning our cannoners had constructed a corduroy over which the remainder of our pieces passed with but little difficulty. The only assistance the infantry regiment proffered us was the loan of some shovels.

Pettit's battery (B, First New York Artillery), being in advance on account of the lightness of his guns, arrived on the battle-field of Fair Oaks about 4.30 o'clock Sunday morning, and was placed by the division commander along the road which runs north from the railroad station. In this position this battery completely defended the only open ground by which the enemy could approach our position, namely, some cleared and level fields extending west and southwest from 900 to 1,500 yards, and bounded north and south by dense woods.

Frank's battery (G, First New York Artillery) was placed 200 yards in rear and at right angles to Pettit's battery, so as to drive back the enemy should he attempt to emerge from the woods which line the southern side of the railroad.

My own battery (C, Fourth Artillery) was at first placed in reserve, but subsequently four pieces (12-pounders) were moved south to the railroad, to shell the abandoned camps of Generals Casey and Couch, which the enemy had occupied.

About 6 o'clock a. m. June 1 a body of the enemy's cavalry and infantry showed themselves in the edge of the woods and fields to the

west and southwest of our position, but a discharge of shells and spherical case from Pettit's battery drove them at once out of view. Very soon afterward a most violent infantry attack was made on our left flank, with the obvious intention of penetrating between our division and that of General Kearny. This attack was continued by the enemy with the utmost pertinacity for nearly four hours, and every regiment in the division was sent into the woods and engaged the foe before he relinquished his purpose. Toward the close of this attack I was directed by the division commander to move four of Pettit's pieces to the left, and one of the infantry regiments being withdrawn by General Richardson from the woods, a well-directed fire of shells and shrapnel being discharged through this opening in our line, no doubt contributed materially to our success in repelling this obstinate effort of the enemy to separate the two wings of our army. Very soon after the cheers of our men indicated the retreat of the foe. Pursuit, at least with artillery, was utterly impossible, the whole country being a swamp, and the soil a mixture of sand and clay on a substratum of clay perfectly saturated with water.

Ten horses were required to move our guns from one part of the field to another, and our wheel-traces and prolonges snapped like pack-thread.

The only casualties occurred in my own battery: Private Charles Griffin (attached), of Company B, Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers, was shot mortally through the chest, and Corp. Lawrence Kidd, of Company C, Fourth Artillery, was slightly wounded.

Every officer and man under my orders did his duty—no more, no less.

The firing of Pettit's battery has never, in my observation, been excelled.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. HAZZARD,

Commanding Batteries, Richardson's Division.

Captain NORVELL,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 6.

Report of Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.

ON BOARD STEAMER NELLY BAKER,

York River, June 3, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of my command as engaged at Fair Oaks Station on the 1st instant:

In accordance with orders from division headquarters the brigade marched from camp at Tyler's on the 31st, at 3 p. m. I crossed the Chickahominy at Grapevine Bridge, and bivouacked in the open field on the right of the railroad and near the station. On the 1st instant, at 4 a. m., my command was deployed in column of battalions in mass, excepting the Fifth New Hampshire, Colonel Cross, which had been moved to the front of General French's brigade as the advance guard. I formed the second line, General French being in front.

At about 5 a. m. the action commenced by the firing of the enemy's pickets on the advance guard, which was at once returned. I was

informed that there was an interval between the left of this and the right of General Kearny's division, and was directed to detach the Eighty-first Pennsylvania, Colonel Miller, to prolong the line of General French to the left, then formed on the railroad. On the execution of that order word was brought to me that the left of Colonel Miller extended in front and beyond the right of General Birney's brigade. Very soon after I was advised that the enemy was moving to the left, evidently intending to turn that flank. Almost immediately a sharp musketry fire was opened upon the left of the line. A staff officer of General French's brigade then brought word to me that the Fifty-second New York was falling back. I was directed to send the Sixty-first New York and Sixty-fourth New York to the support of General French. I took these regiments up the railroad, forming them in deployed line on this road in rear of General French's left. Here I learned that Colonel Miller, Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, was killed at the first fire of the enemy, and that the right and left wings of that regiment had become separated, and that one wing was without a field officer. I directed Lieutenant Miles, my aide-de-camp, to collect the companies of that wing and to make the best disposition of it he could. He continued with it during the day in the open field on the right of the railroad, and checked the advance of the enemy in that direction.

I immediately moved forward into the woods with the Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York. The fire of the enemy was rapid, well directed, and fatal. As I advanced the regiment to the front line I met General French. He desired me to move forward rapidly with my re-enforcements. I found his line in good order, but that its fire was not effective, the men not being able to see the enemy, as he had concealed himself in the thick underbrush and small pines which cover the ground. I directed one of his regiments to cease firing and passed with my command to its front. I led the regiments forward, pressing back the enemy to and across the old road into the camp which General Casey's division had occupied on the Saturday previous. He was in force here, and I advanced to within 30 yards of his line. At this time my horse's leg was broken, and on dismounting I received a second wound in my right arm, which shattered the bone, disabling me. I then directed Colonel Barlow, of the Sixty-first New York, who was immediately in the front, to assume command of the portion of my brigade which was engaged there, to hold the position at all events, sending for re-enforcements if necessary.

As I was compelled to retire, I ordered the command of the brigade to be turned over to Colonel Cross, Fifth New Hampshire; but on learning that he was severely wounded I put it in charge of Colonel Parker, Sixty-fourth New York. The Fifth New Hampshire, after having been drawn in from the position of the advance guard, was placed on the left of General Dana's brigade by order of General Richardson, and soon after (as I learn) I was disabled joined the brigade, being engaged nearly all the time of the engagement, behaving like good soldiers.

I commend Colonel Cross for the excellent disposition of his command, which I particularly noticed in the morning. I desire especially to notice the coolness and good conduct of Colonel Barlow, Sixty-first New York. I cannot too highly compliment all the officers in the brigade. I might do some injustice should I attempt to particularize. Colonel Miller, Eighty-first Pennsylvania, and Lieutenant-Colonel Masset, Sixty-first New York, were killed, Colonel Cross and Major Cook, Fifth New Hampshire, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bingham, Sixty-fourth

New York, were wounded. I have not been able to obtain a correct list of the company officers who were killed and wounded. For that, the casualties among the non-commissioned officers and men, the number of prisoners taken, and the ammunition expended, I respectfully refer you to the reports of commanding officers of regiments, which have not come to my hands (being obliged to ask a leave of absence), but which will accompany this. All the men behaved most gallantly. I cannot speak too highly in praise of such troops.

I am much indebted to the members of my staff for the assistance which they rendered me during the day. They were all brave in the face of the enemy, and each one of them cheerfully and faithfully performed his duties. Captain Sewall, assistant adjutant-general, rendered me prompt and valuable aid in the disposition of the troops, and was active and efficient in the various duties of the day. Lieutenant Miles, aide-de-camp, as before remarked, commanded the left wing of the Eighty-first Pennsylvania in a manner to my entire satisfaction and approval. He was wounded in the foot. Lieutenant Howard, aide-de-camp, did much in front of the line to stimulate the energy of the men by his actions and example. His horse was killed under him, and he received a serious wound in his thigh, which disabled him nearly at the same moment that I was injured. Lieutenant Scott, acting aide-de-camp, was always vigilant and brave in the performance of his duties. His horse was also killed under him during the action. Dr. Palmer, brigade surgeon, was in the discharge of his proper duties as medical director of the division. Lest I should not have another opportunity, I desire here to state that the efficient manner in which Lieutenant Balloch, who has been acting as commissary of subsistence from the organization of the brigade, has discharged those duties is remarkable. Captain Barker has always rendered me all the assistance in his power.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. O. HOWARD,

Brigadier-General, Commanding First Brigade.

Capt. J. M. NORVELL,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Richardson's Division.

No. 7.

Report of Col. Thomas J. Parker, Sixty-fourth New York Infantry, commanding First Brigade.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, RICHARDSON'S DIVISION,
Camp Victory, at Fair Oaks Station, Va., June 2, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by this brigade on the battle-field in the engagement of June 1 after the command of the brigade was turned over to me, which was about 10 a. m., previous to that time having the command of the Sixty-fourth New York Regiment, which was in the hottest part of the battle two hours or more, when I received an order to reform in the rear of General Meagher's line of battle. Soon after executing this order I was directed by General Richardson to take command of the brigade. The forces were then disposed of as follows: The Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Langley (their colonel being severely wounded), held the railroad on the left of the Sixty-ninth New York Regiment; the Eighty-first Pennsylvania, under command of Capt.

Nelson A. Miles, aide-de-camp to General Howard, held a position on the south side of the railroad in the open field opposite the head of the enemy's column and on the extreme left of the line; the Sixty-first Regiment New York Volunteers, under command of Colonel Barlow, on the line of woods in rear of the railroad, and the Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers, under the command of Capt. R. Washburn, were ordered to support Captain Pettit's battery, and took position accordingly.

The brigade fought with the greatest courage and bravery during the entire engagement, making two successful bayonet charges, driving the enemy from the field in perfect disorder, leaving their dead and wounded behind them.

Very respectfully, yours,

THOS. J. PARKER,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

No. 8.

Report of Col. Edward E. Cross, Fifth New Hampshire Infantry.

HDQRS. FIFTH REGIMENT NEW HAMPSHIRE VOLS.,
Camp near Fair Oaks Station, June 2, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the part taken by my regiment in the battle of June 1 near this place:

On the evening of May 31 the Fifth Regiment was posted as advance guard in front of the brigade of General French. Being very near the enemy we took several prisoners, and soon after daybreak an orderly, bearing a dispatch from General Pryor, of the Confederate Army, to General Anderson, was taken and sent to headquarters. Soon after this my regiment moved across the railroad and took post in the edge of the wood. Here, being fired upon by the enemy's pickets, we had several men wounded. The fire was promptly returned and the pickets retreated. We were then ordered back to a position in the first line of battle, but soon after advanced into the woods again, where we took quite a number of prisoners.

The battle had now gone on nearly an hour, when I received orders from General Richardson to move to the support of General French. While marching along the railroad I received notice that Brigadier-General Howard was severely wounded, and the command of the First Brigade devolved upon me. Finding that the three other regiments of the brigade had been some time in action and severely handled, I directed that they should move out of the woods and reform in the rear of Meagher's brigade while I advanced my regiment to occupy the ground. We moved forward in line of battle through a thick woods, and about 300 yards from the railroad track encountered the rebel line of battle, and a fierce fire commenced on both sides. Twice my line advanced in the most gallant style, and each time the enemy fell back.

The fire was now very close and deadly, the opposing lines being several times not over 30 yards apart. When about ordering another charge I was struck by a rifle-ball in the thigh and disabled. Lieutenant-Colonel Langley then took command of the regiment, and the rebels endeavoring to flank us, he brought off the regiment in excellent order, carrying most of our wounded.

I cannot speak too highly of the coolness, bravery, and good con-

duct of the officers and men of my regiment in the face of a largely-superior force and under a fire seldom experienced by troops in battle.

The loss of the regiment in killed, wounded, and missing is about 185 men and 5 officers wounded.*

Yours, very respectfully,

EDWARD E. CROSS,

Colonel Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Howard's Brigade.

No. 9.

Report of Col. Francis C. Barlow, Sixty-first New York Infantry.

CAMP AT FAIR OAKS STATION, VA.,

June 2, 1862.

SIR: At 4 a. m. of June 1, 1862, in obedience to orders from general commanding brigade, this regiment was formed in close column of division in the field to the north of the railroad at Fair Oaks Station, Va. The regiment numbered 375 men in the ranks, 42 sergeants, file-closers, colonel, lieutenant-colonel, adjutant, and 15 company officers. At about 7 a. m. we were moved to the railroad and formed in line of battle thereon, facing the south, with our right resting about one-quarter of a mile east of the station. Immediately on our left was the Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers. The two other regiments of this brigade were not in sight. The firing in the woods in our front was very brisk, and we were immediately ordered by the general commanding the brigade to advance. We advanced in a woods of tall trees, thickly interspersed with an undergrowth of young oaks, which rendered it impossible for us to see to any great distance before us. The ground in some places was muddy and marshy.

After advancing some 150 yards we came upon the Fifty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Brooke, formed in line and briskly engaging the enemy. I requested Colonel Brooke to cease firing that we might pass in front of and relieve him. This was done, and we at once advanced upon the enemy, who were drawn up in line before us and who kept up a heavy firing. After advancing some 25 yards beyond Colonel Brooke's regiment I halted the regiment and fired one or two rounds. The enemy fell back, firing, out of sight among the thick undergrowth. Not willing to deliver our fire until we could see those opposed to us I ordered the regiment to cease firing, which command was promptly obeyed. We then moved forward in excellent order some 180 yards, meeting with a heavy fire, but not seeing the enemy with sufficient distinctness to warrant, in my opinion, our halting and renewing the fire.

On arriving upon the crest of a hill within some 20 yards of the road running parallel to the railroad and directly opposite the camp of Casey's division, which the enemy had occupied, the battalion was halted, the enemy being plainly in sight by the road-side, and at once opened fire, receiving a very heavy one in return. This continued for a considerable time, and it was there that our principal loss occurred. We drove the enemy back, and he ceased firing. When we could no

* But see revised statement, p. 757.

longer see the enemy and his fire had become slackened we ceased firing, and I directed my men to sit down and rest. I considered it unwise to advance farther, as there were no regiments on our flanks and we were considerably in advance of the line in our rear, and were liable to be taken in rear or outflanked by the enemy coming up the road if we passed beyond it. We renewed fire several times, until we could see that the woods and camp in our front were clear of the enemy for a considerable distance, when we finally ceased, and they did not again appear in our front. Finding that our flanks were not supported, I sent to ask Colonel Brooke to bring up his regiment upon our line, which he did. Scarcely any firing was done after his arrival, but lines were rectified and the men rested.

A tremendous fire was soon opened upon us from the rear, which would have been murderous had we not avoided the balls by lying down. During this fire I dispatched my adjutant, Lieutenant Gregory, to carry information of our position and ask for orders, inasmuch as there was no enemy in our front for us to work upon. We refrained from firing to the rear in return, although it had been reported to me that the enemy were there, a report for which I could find no foundation. We lost few, if any, by this fire from the rear. On the return of Lieutenant Gregory, with orders from the general commanding the division for us to retire, we marched off in perfect order by the road leading to our right and returned to the field whence we started. We were not again engaged.

Just before we started on our return from the front I plainly saw a body of the enemy advancing obliquely upon our right on the other side of this road, but we had cleared the woods before they reached our position. Our wounded who were left on the ground state that the position was occupied by the enemy immediately after we left it.

The regiment under my command calmly and faithfully performed its duty. A few of the men sometimes commenced firing without orders, but my commands to "Cease firing," "March," "Halt," &c., were readily obeyed under heavy fire. A few of the men at times would crouch down during firing and shirk to the rear, but were brought up again by their officers, and were few in number. The greater part of the men stood firm and erect during the firing, and only stooped or went down when ordered to do so. I did not see one officer shrink or fail in his duty, and all deserve praise alike. Lieutenant-Colonel Masset, Captains Russell and Trenor, and First Lieutenant McIntyre, commanding Company C, were all shot dead while doing their duty firmly, calmly, and nobly. First Lieutenant Bergen and Second Lieutenant Bain, commanding Companies K and D, and their only commissioned officers, and Second Lieutenant Coultis, who took command of Company C after the death of Lieutenant McIntyre, and First Lieutenant Maze, of Company A, were wounded very early in the fight and obliged to go to the rear. Companies C, D, and K were thus left without commissioned officers, and were taken charge of by officers of other companies.

Our loss is over one-quarter our strength, as follows: Killed, 30—4 commissioned officers and 26 enlisted men; wounded, 76—4 commissioned officers and 72 enlisted men; missing 6 enlisted men, of whom 4 men and a corporal were attending to the wounded and taken prisoners in the discharge of their duty. The sixth man, Drum-Major Glodell, was taken prisoner while in the woods after the action was over. Making a total of 112.*

* But see revised statement, p. 757.

This regiment took some 10 prisoners, one of whom was an officer, supposed to be a brigadier-general. From these prisoners and from some of our wounded I learned that the force opposed to us was the Third Alabama, about 1,000 strong, supported by the Twelfth and Forty-first Virginia. At present we have for duty 1 colonel, 9 company officers, and 338 enlisted men, of whom 17 are drummers. My command thus reduced I have organized into eight companies, each of which has but one commissioned officer, the senior captain of the regiment being detached to act as a field officer. At an early hour of the day a greater part of two companies of the Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers were collected, and joined our left and remained with us till the action was over.

I have the honor to inclose a list of those killed, wounded, and missing, with the nature of the wounds received. The regiment was engaged four hours, having come out of the woods at 11 a. m.

Very respectfully,

FRANCIS C. BARLOW,

Colonel, Comdg. Sixty-first Regiment New York Vols.

First Lieut. GEORGE W. SCOTT,

Sixty-first N. Y. Vols., A. A. A. G., 1st Brig., Richardson's Div.

No. 10.

Report of Col. Thomas J. Parker, Sixty-fourth New York Infantry.

HDQRS. SIXTY-FOURTH REGIMENT N. Y. S. VOLS.,

Camp Victory, at Fair Oaks Station, Va., June 2, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the position and part taken by my regiment on the battle-field in the engagement yesterday, June 1, 1862, near this place. About 7 o'clock a. m. we were ordered to the front. On advancing through a thick woods on the south side of the railroad under a shower of balls from the enemy General O. O. Howard and his aide, C. H. Howard, were both severely wounded near our line. On arriving within about 50 yards of the enemy's line we opened fire on them. They fought desperately, being soon re-enforced, and the battle raged about two hours, both lines holding their position. We then charged bayonet on them, they falling back in disorder, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. I then received orders to reform the line in rear of General Meagher's brigade, and took that position.

About this time I was directed by General Richardson to take the command of the brigade. After this I ordered the Sixty-fourth to support Captain Pettit's battery, under the command of Capt. R. Washburn, Lieutenant-Colonel Bingham being severely wounded and Captain Washburn being the senior officer. The regiment took position according to the aforesaid order in rear of Captain Pettit's battery, supporting the same.

During the entire engagement the officers and men displayed the most determined courage and bravery, being in the hottest part of the contest, opposed to vastly superior numbers, observing good order, and obeying every command. Numerous instances of distinguished bravery in officers could be mentioned, but where all did so nobly it is difficult to determine who did best. All acted bravely, nobly, and honorably.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS J. PARKER,

Colonel Sixty-fourth Regiment N. Y. S. Volunteers.

No. 11.

Report of Lieut. Col. Charles F. Johnson, Eighty-first Pennsylvania Infantry.

FAIR OAKS, VA., June 2, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that yesterday, in accordance with orders, the regiment took up its position early in the morning on the left of French's brigade on the south side of the railroad. Almost immediately after getting in position the regiment was attacked on the right flank. On the first fire Colonel Miller fell, being killed instantly. The attack on our right was made by a superior force, representing that they were our friends. One regiment claimed to be Owens' regiment. Colonel Miller commanded the men to recover arms. In an instant a murderous fire was poured into the regiment at a distance of about 100 feet. The right wing fell back, returning the fire. Almost simultaneously the left flank was attacked by a large force, led by a man bearing a white flag. They fell back, disputing the way, firing as they retired. The right wing fell back, and was formed by their officers in an open field on the north of the railroad. A portion of the left wing, being separated from the regiment, took up a position on the railroad, and continued firing until all their ammunition was expended.

The regiment being formed, I took up a position on the edge of the woods, supporting the party on the railroad. I reported to headquarters for orders, and was ordered by General Sumner to remain in the position I then held until further orders, which I did until I received orders from General Richardson to move to our present position on the north side of the railroad, supporting the line which is on the railroad.

I have the honor to report that the officers of the regiment did their duty and behaved well. Our list of killed, wounded, and missing is as follows: Killed, 8, including Colonel Miller; wounded, 32, including Captain Lee and Lieutenants Lee and Beiber; missing, 51, including Lieutenant Belford.

Very respectfully,

CHAS. F. JOHNSON,

Lieut. Col., Comdg. Eighty-first Regiment Pa. Vols.

F. D. SEWALL,

Asst. Adjt. Gen. [First Brig., First Div., Second Corps].

No. 12.

Report of Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS MEAGHER'S BRIGADE,
RICHARDSON'S DIVISION, SUMNER'S CORPS, A. P.,
Camp Victory, June 4, 1862.

On Saturday, May 31, early in the forenoon, we of the Second Brigade, Richardson's division, Sumner's *corps d'armée*, being encamped at Tyler's farm, heard considerable firing in front. This firing continuing to increase in rapidity and loudness during the day, about 1 o'clock p. m. I took the liberty of ordering the several regiments of my command to place themselves under arms immediately, anticipating that

an order would at any moment reach me from the headquarters of the division, directing me to proceed with all dispatch to the scene of action. This order had been issued not more than ten or fifteen minutes before Captain Norvell, the assistant adjutant-general of the division, arrived at my headquarters, and directed me, by order of Brigadier-General Richardson, commanding division, to get my brigade instantly under arms and march at a moment's notice. This order, as I have already stated, had been anticipated, and fifteen minutes after Captain Norvell communicated to me the order of the general commanding our division, I directed Captain McCoy, assistant adjutant-general of my brigade, to report that my brigade was in marching trim and awaiting his further orders. These orders, which mostly had reference to the peculiar line of march over the Chickahominy which we were to observe, and which directed a slight divergence from the line of march to be preserved by the brigades under the command of Generals Howard and French, the First and Third Brigades of our division—these orders returned with Captain McCoy, and my brigade was immediately put on the march.

The march, in strict compliance with special instructions, was executed in the lightest possible marching order, the men taking with them in their haversacks only two days' cooked rations, and being disencumbered of their overcoats, knapsacks, and blankets. The march was performed with unremitting celerity, ardor, and eager readiness for action. I mention this particularly from the fact that on the line of march we met several soldiers and other parties returning from the field of action, who informed us that the Federal arms had met with a severe reverse, and that as some New York troops were implicated it was specially incumbent on us to redeem the honor of our State and the fortunes of the day.

It was between 9 and 10 p. m. when the head of our brigade entered on the scene of that day's terrible conflict, and we were apprised of the fact and it was impressed upon us startlingly by the appearance of numbers of surgeons and chaplains with lanterns in hand searching over the ground to the right and left of our advance in column for the dead and wounded, who they said were scattered in every direction around. The surgeon of my brigade, two of the chaplains, and the quartermaster of the Sixty-third New York Volunteers, First Lieut. P. O'Hanlon, were here requested to give their services in the humane search after and relief of the victims of the battle-field. In half an hour after the brigade, having carefully looked to and secured their arms, laid down on the open field, the first time to rest for that day.

A little after daybreak Sunday morning, having learned that the enemy were in full force in the wood surrounding the field where we were bivouacked, I was on the alert, and with my staff was in the saddle by 4 o'clock a. m. The Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers, under the command of Col. Robert Nugent, and the Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers, under the command of Lieut. Col. Patrick Kelly, temporarily commanding, were under arms and ready for action the same hour. The men had scarcely partaken of some hard biscuit and water when a brisk firing in front of our position informed us of the immediate presence of the enemy. General Richardson, commanding the division, at once directed my brigade to prepare for action. This order, as the march of the previous afternoon and night, was executed with the utmost alacrity and enthusiasm. Whilst in line of battle and awaiting further orders General Sumner, commanding the *corps d'armée* in which our brigade is incorporated, appeared on the ground, accompanied by

his staff, and riding in front of our ranks addressed a few words of encouragement and confidence to our men, reminding them that they had been held back ever since they joined the service, but now their time had come.

In the mean while the firing in the woods fronting the field on which, in the midst of the dead and dying of the previous day's battle, we were drawn up for action, increased in volume and intensity, and it was at this moment that I received orders to throw the first regiment of my brigade (Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers) upon the railroad a little below where it was drawn up in line of battle. This order was executed promptly and dashing, a pretty brisk fire opening on the regiment from the woods and one or two detached houses as they deployed to the left in line of battle on the railroad. Shortly after this movement had been executed by the Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers the Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers was ordered to proceed by a flank movement to the left and occupy the railroad on the left of the Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers, which regiment prolonged its line of occupation on the left of the Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers. The Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers had to push its march through a tangled under-wood, encumbered with fallen and decayed trees, interspersed with heavy patches of mire and swamp. The regiment was conducted to its position by Capt. J. P. McMahon, of my staff, who was specially detailed that morning on the staff of General Richardson, commanding division.

It appears from the report of Lieut. Col. Patrick Kelly, commanding the Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers, that a countermand was given to his regiment by some staff officer of the corps whilst it was forcing its way through the wood to take its position on the left of the Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers. This led to some slight confusion, and the two leading companies of the regiment, not having heard the countermand, deployed from the wood on the railroad, and gallantly sustained the fire of the enemy until, the countermand being recalled, they were vigorously supported by the other eight companies of the regiment. The two companies maintaining themselves so creditably until supported by the main body of the regiment were commanded respectively by Capts. William Horgan and Michael Eagan. Whilst the Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers, under command of Colonel Nugent, and the Eighty-eighth, under Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, were thus deploying to the right and left on the railroad (the one through a field intercepted by stumps and exposed to a flanking fire from the enemy on the right and the other regiment forcing its way through the swampy woods on the left), the brigades of Generals Howard and French were splendidly maintaining the front of our position in advance of the railroad and holding the enemy in check.

Thus it was that those two regiments of my brigade acted as a reserve and came to the support of those brave troops that had to stand the brunt of the battle of the 1st of June. The Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers had to display itself in an opening before they reached their position on the railroad which was exposed to the unobstructed fire of the enemy from the woods, forming a semicircle in front of the line on which the regiment was deploying. In other words, the line of battle of the Eighty-eighth was the chord of resistance to the arc of the enemy's fire. At the central point of the chord there stood a farmhouse, which during the action was used as a hospital for the wounded of the regiment specially detailed at this point and any other of either army who were wounded in proximity to it and who could be brought in.

I regard the conduct of the Eighty-eighth, under the circumstances I have mentioned and in the position I have described, as being especially effective and entitled to distinctive commendation. Had the Eighty-eighth winced from this position; had they faltered or been thrown into confusion when proceeding to the railroad; had the two companies of this regiment, which were for some minutes isolated, not sustained the fire of the enemy, I believe the issue of the day adversely to the Army of the Potomac would have been materially influenced. The conduct of the Sixty-ninth was incomparably cool. The officers and men of the regiment stood and received the fire of the enemy whilst they delivered their own with an intelligent steadiness and composure which might have done credit to, and might perhaps have been looked for in, the mature troops of more than one campaign. The creditable and memorable conduct of the Sixty-ninth on this occasion was, in my opinion, owing in a great measure to the soldierly bearing and fearless tone and spirit of Colonel Nugent, who, standing close to the colors of his regiment, over and over again repeated the order to fire on the enemy. The fire of the two regiments, in a word, was so telling, that the enemy, although in considerable force and evidently bent on a desperate advance, were compelled to retire, leaving their dead and wounded piled in the woods and swampy ground in front of our line of battle.

Our success was made manifest by the fact that the officers of the brigade engaged on the occasion were occupied soon after the cessation of the firing, and are still engaged, in the humane work of searching after the wounded and burying the dead.

For further particulars, of which I cannot pretend to be personally cognizant, I refer you with pleasure to the reports of the officers commanding the two regiments of my brigade engaged on the day in question. They themselves, it appears, find it difficult to particularize those of their respective commands who distinguished themselves by their coolness and fearlessness during the action. I myself refrain from any discrimination of the kind, lest I might do injustice to those who, equally brave and bold as those who seemed to me most conspicuous, might have been no less deserving of notice and honorable commemoration, but whose claims escaped my observation in the excitement of the engagement. I cannot, however, close this report without mentioning in sincere terms of praise the conduct of the surgeons of my brigade (those of the Sixty-ninth and Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers), as also that of the brigade surgeon, J. H. Taylor; their attention to the wounded being unremitting even in the very heat of the conflict, and whilst it was dangerous for them to discharge their duties. It is a source to me of the greatest satisfaction that the brigade which I have the honor to command can reckon with confidence on the services of such skillful, daring, and intrepid surgeons.

Were it usual in such reports to speak of them, I would have more than sufficient reason to acknowledge the courage and the heart with which the chaplains of the brigade stood by their charge in the hour of danger and consoled those who fell.

In making this report I find but one circumstance which diminishes the pleasure I feel in speaking so laudably of those whom I have the honor to command, and this circumstance is the withdrawal of the Sixty-third New York Volunteers, commanded by Col. John Burke, which regiment, between 11 and 12 o'clock p. m. of the 31st of May, on our march from the camp at Tyler's farm, were ordered by General Richardson, commanding division, to fall back and defend the batteries of the division that were impeded in the mud and could not be brought

to the front without assistance. These orders were executed by the Sixty-third New York Volunteers with promptness and full efficiency, and I but imperfectly convey the conviction of its comrade regiments of the brigade in saying that the participation of the Sixty-third New York Volunteers in the dangers of the day would have added to whatever credit the rest of the brigade has had the fortune to acquire.

I am happy to inform you that in killed and wounded the brigade has only lost 2 officers (Lieutenants King and O'Connor, Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers, of whom the former died yesterday morning and the latter lies severely though not mortally wounded) and something less than 50 men.*

The list of casualties, however, is at present necessarily imperfect. Every step will be taken to render a correct one as speedily as possible.

I have the honor to be, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS FRANCIS MEAGHER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

No. 13.

Report of Col. John Burke, Sixty-third New York Infantry.

HDQRS. SIXTY-THIRD REGT. NEW YORK STATE VOLS.,
Battle-field Fair Oaks Station, Va., June 2, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that, in accordance with orders received from the commanding general of this brigade, my regiment took up the line of march at 3.30 o'clock p. m. of the 31st ultimo. My command continued to march with the brigade until about 11.30 o'clock p. m. of the same date, when Capt. J. M. Norvell, the assistant adjutant-general of Richardson's division, informed me that General Richardson, commanding division, directed that I return with my regiment to the bridge this side of the Chickahominy, and endeavor to have the batteries of the division sent to the front without delay.

In accordance with these orders I returned with my command by the same road by which the brigade came, arriving at Dr. Trent's house about 2 o'clock a. m. of the 1st instant, where I halted my regiment for the purpose of resting. The regiment remained resting in this place about thirty minutes, when I was ordered by General Sumner, through General Burns, to proceed with my regiment to the brow of the hill opposite the main bridge crossing the Chickahominy, and there to remain and protect the ammunition trains and batteries until further orders, it being anticipated by General Sumner that the enemy would attack this position.

About 9 o'clock a. m. of this date an order came from General Sumner, through General Burns, for us to proceed with every available man to the front and re-enforce his command. Upon our arrival at the place of engagement I was informed by General Sumner that the rebels had been repulsed, and I was ordered by him to return with my regiment to its former position, where I remained until 6 o'clock p. m. of yesterday (the 1st), when General Burns ordered me to report my command to General Richardson for duty. In accordance with this order I reported my regiment to General Richardson for duty about 7 o'clock

* See revised statement, p. 757.

last night, and it was assigned by him to support Captain Pettit's battery, which position it continues to occupy.

The conduct of the officers and men under my command during all the hardships which they endured is deserving of praise, each performing his duty willingly, cheerfully, and promptly. Their only regret was that they were deprived of the honor of fighting with their own brigade.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN BURKE,

Colonel, Commanding Sixty-third Regiment N. Y. S. Vols.

Capt. JOSEPH S. MCCOY,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Meagher's Brigade.

No. 14.

Report of Col. Robert Nugent, Sixty-ninth New York Infantry.

HDQRS. SIXTY-NINTH REGT. NEW YORK STATE VOLS.,

Fair Oaks, Va., June 2, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In compliance with orders just received I have the honor to report that on Saturday last, May 31, my regiment left camp near Cold Harbor, and about midnight arrived in this neighborhood, and encamped on the scene of the battle of that day. After allowing my men a short repose, permitting them to sleep for two hours on their arms, I formed them in line of battle, awaiting for daylight and further instruction to proceed against the enemy, then supposed to be masked by the woods surrounding us. Early on that morning (about 7 o'clock a. m.), under orders from the brigadier-general, we formed in column of division at some distance from the woods, deployed, and at double-quick time advanced in line of battle to the immediate vicinity of the wood, where I halted my command and awaited future events. As my regiment was selected by General Richardson as the reserve of his division we were the last brought into action, and when we were moved (about 8 o'clock) we marched by the left flank and took position on the line of railroad on the extreme right of the other infantry regiments engaged.

For nearly five minutes the Sixty-ninth remained in occupation of the railroad unmolested, when suddenly the enemy's left wing opened a heavy fire from the woods, when I ordered them to fire, and the coolness and celerity with which the order was executed deserved great commendation. Our fire was sustained with fearful consistency until the enemy was silenced, and by checking the advance of the rebels had, I am inclined to believe, a marked effect on the fortunes of the day. Our firing only ceased with the retreat of the enemy, leaving us in undisputed possession of the railroad, which we still hold.

Our casualties, considering the dangers to which we were exposed, are very few—1 killed, 7 severely wounded, 5 slightly wounded, and 1 missing. Every officer and man present performed his duty on the eventful 1st of June with cheerfulness and pleasure, and where men only seemed desirous of emulating each other in bravery I find it impossible to name any one as more courageous or prompt than another.

I have the honor to be, captain, your obedient servant,

ROBERT NUGENT,

Colonel Sixty-ninth Regiment.

Capt. JOSEPH S. MCCOY,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Irish Brigade.

No. 15.

Report of Lieut. Col. Patrick Kelly, Eighty-eighth New York Infantry.

FAIR OAKS STATION, VA.,

June 2, 1862.

CAPTAIN: Having the honor of commanding the Eighty-eighth Regiment New York State Volunteers since 23d of March last, and commanding them in the field at the battle of Fair Oaks Station on the 1st instant, it becomes my duty to report to you the action of the regiment since leaving our late camp near Cold Harbor, which we left about 3 o'clock p. m. on Saturday, 31st of May last, and arrived about 3 o'clock a. m. at Fair Oaks Station on the following morning, where the regiment slept under arms until daylight, when the regiment was again formed in line of battle ready to receive the enemy. By order of General Richardson, conveyed to me by one of his aides, I took the regiment across a belt of wood for the purpose of re-enforcing the (I believe) Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, who were reported nearly out of ammunition, and if not immediately relieved the result might be serious. On emerging from the wood I found I had only two companies, in consequence of the regiment having been halted while in the wood by a staff officer who did not convey the order to me, who was then marching at the head of my regiment. I with the two companies continued forward to the open space now occupied by Hazzard's battery, and advanced them in line of battle toward the railroad under a heavy fire. Shortly after the rest of the regiment came up; and here I would thank Captain McMahon, of General Meagher's staff, for the assistance he rendered them in conducting them to where I was then hotly engaged and where they were much needed.

What was done by the Eighty-eighth on the occasion above referred to they leave to others to say. With regard to the conduct of the officers and men during the engagement there can be no distinction made in either, each and all having discharged their duties to my entire satisfaction. I should mention the surgeons of the regiment did most nobly. In the hottest of the action they were to be found in the field attending to the wounded. Nor should I forget to mention a drummer-boy named George Funk, who acted most heroically during the engagement, and who followed closely on the track of the retreating rebels, bringing in a prisoner, whom he delivered to General Sumner. Annexed will be found a list of the killed and wounded, amongst whom I sincerely regret to mention the name of Lieut. T. King, than whom no braver soldier stood on that field. He survived his wounds some thirty-six hours. Also Lieut. Edward P. O'Connor dangerously wounded, and for whose recovery there is every hope.

Commissioned officers killed, 1; wounded, 1; non-commissioned officers and privates killed, 5; wounded, 18. Total killed, 6; wounded, 19; aggregate, 25.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

I am, captain, respectfully, yours,

P. KELLY,

Lieut. Col., Comdg. 88th Regt. N. Y. S. Vols., Irish Brig.

Capt. JOSEPH S. MCCOY.

No. 16.

Report of Brig. Gen. William H. French, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.

HDQRS. FRENCH'S BRIGADE, RICHARDSON'S DIVISION,
Camp at Fair Oaks, Va., June 3, 1862.

CAPTAIN: When the heavy firing at about 1 p. m. on the 31st of May was heard in our front, whilst in camp near Cold Harbor, my brigade was at once placed under arms and in readiness to march as soon as orders were received from the general of division.

At about 2 o'clock p. m., after awaiting for the construction of a temporary bridge across a meadow flooded by the swollen Chickahominy, my brigade filed across through the waters in places waist-deep. This delay kept the brigade, which was the advance of the division, from participating in the action of the 31st of May. It was at 8 p. m. when I crossed the field of battle of that day, and under the immediate directions of the general of division my front was established. The regiments were permitted to stack arms, and the fatigued soldiers laid down behind them to rest.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 1st of June, Colonel Cross, commanding the Fifth New Hampshire (Howard's), who had been thrown out as the division advance guard, awaked me to point out that three regiments of the enemy had, unconscious of our presence, gone into bivouac in the woods about 100 yards on the right of my line. Communicating at once with the general of division, and receiving authority, I changed front to the right, placing my regiments *en échelon* until the break of day. I found that the enemy, under pressure of Dana, whose brigade was on my right, had deserted their position, when the line established the night before was resumed. As General Richardson had impressed upon me the importance of communicating during the night with Brigadier-General Birney on my left, this was continually done, and he was kept informed of our relative positions.

Having drawn in the Fifty-second New York, which had been placed, so as to detach it, too far from the rest of the brigade, leaving an uncovered space of three-fourths of a mile on my left, at 5 o'clock a. m. I was authorized by General Richardson to move the length of the front of three regiments to the left. This movement covered the front of attack. In a few moments after the connection of the line had thus been established (with the addition of the Eighty-first Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, of Howard's brigade) the enemy made an attack upon my whole front. My troops (with the exception of the Sixty-sixth New York), to form line of battle, had to cross the railroad through a dense thicket and swamp, which covered the approach of the enemy, who opened his first fire at about 50 yards distance. Although this attack was bold and sudden the line never swerved. The fire was returned coolly and deliberately. The first attack was at once repulsed.

After a few moments' pause the heads of several columns of the enemy threw themselves upon the intervals of the regiments on the right and left of the Fifty-second New York. For some time the most desperate efforts were made to break our line. The left of the Fifty-third Pennsylvania, consisting of seven companies, led on by the gallant Colonel Brooke, repulsed them again and again. The dashing Colonel Frank, of the Fifty-second New York, after holding them in his front and finding them turning his left flank, threw back three companies to receive and repulse the attack.

Up to this moment I had been in constant communication with the general of division, who, through his staff, had assured me that re-enforcements were at my disposal whenever called for. Entirely relieved from anxiety on this account, my battalions continued to hold their positions until their ammunition had to be renewed, when I called on Brigadier-General Howard, who, with the Sixty-first New York, was awaiting impatiently on the railroad in rear to pass my lines. This was done in the most regular manner. Taking advantage of the temporary cessation of our fire the enemy threw upon the advancing supports all their remaining fresh troops.

At this time my adjutant-general, Fisk, fell wounded at my side. Both lines, the relieving and relieved, were being shot down. Joining himself to the Sixty-first New York, Colonel Brooke, of the Fifty-third Pennsylvania, instead of retiring to the second line, continued to charge the enemy. It was now that the gallant Brigadier-General Howard was twice wounded, and the brave Major Yeager, of the Fifty-third Pennsylvania, was killed, fighting hand to hand with the enemy.

Not for one moment in the entire fight during this contest for the mastery did our lines blench. The enemy threw in fresh troops, regiment after regiment. The passage of lines, directed with ability and judgment, baffled all their efforts. About two hours had elapsed, and the second and third lines of the division having interposed in front of my left wing, I moved the right wing, consisting of the Sixty-sixth and Fifty-seventh New York, which had earlier in the action cleared their front of the enemy in a direction at right angles to the first line of battle, to feel the left and rear of the enemy's flank. After penetrating the swamps and thicket about three-fourths of a mile the skirmishers of the Sixty-sixth encountered the Forty-first Virginia. A heavy fire being opened upon them, followed by a charge with the bayonet, the enemy broke and precipitately fled, when my brigade, occupying the ground thus conquered, notwithstanding its losses in the battle, remained upon the field unbroken and exultant.

Upon the Fifty-second New York, Col. Paul Frank, and the Fifty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Brooke, devolved the honor of holding that position of my line most seriously attacked, under fearful odds, against the best troops of the enemy, directed by their ablest commanders. To Colonel Zook, of the Fifty-seventh New York, whose regiment repulsed the attack on my right and by a heavy and continued fire directed it toward the left, and to Colonel Pinckney, of the Sixty-sixth New York, who led the flanking movement around the enemy's left, contributing greatly to cause his retreat, are due whatever success attended the operations of these regiments. The conduct of the officers and men must be judged by the results of a hard-fought field. I heartily concur in the recommendations and praises of the regimental commanders.

Of my own staff, Assistant Adjutant-General Fisk was desperately wounded in the front of fire, displaying the most undaunted courage; Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp Plume was constantly engaged communicating with division headquarters and leading in re-enforcements, subjected to great exposure; Aide-de-Camp William H. French, jr., was on duty with the front of the line and shared its dangers; Brigade-Surgeon Grant was in readiness to relieve the wounded, and, undeterred by the battle around, performed his duties with coolness and ability. I respectfully request for them the favorable notice of the general commanding division. I must not omit noticing the conspicuous conduct of Assistant Surgeon Dean, of the Fifty-seventh New York, who came forward, and receiving the wounded as they fell, operated behind the

rank of file-closers unconscious of peril. The Rev. Mr. Dwight, chaplain of the Sixty-sixth New York, was on the field during the action, administering to the wounded and dying. Captain Kirk, of the Fifty-seventh New York, in charge of the guard which accompanied me during the latter part of the engagement, displayed great coolness under the hottest fire.

I have confined myself to outlines of the battle and to what came before me personally in reference to the operations of my own brigade. Although the brave troops of the second and third lines of Richardson's division, under Howard and Meagher, were near my own, the report of their actions belongs particularly to their immediate commanders; who will permit me, however, to mention the admirable coolness and conduct of Colonel Cross, commanding the Fifth New Hampshire, and Colonel Nugent, commanding the Sixty-ninth New York, and their fine regiments, under a most terrible fire and determined assault of the enemy when my brigade was to retire to replace their ammunition. The battle began at 6 o'clock and ended at about 9.30 a. m.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. H. FRENCH,

Brigadier-General of Vols. and Major Second U. S. Artillery.

No. 17.

Report of Col. Paul Frank, Fifty-second New York Infantry.

BIVOUAC NEAR FAIR OAKS STATION,
HDQRS. FIFTY-SECOND REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
THIRD BRIG., RICHARDSON'S DIV., SUMNER'S CORPS.

SIR: I have the honor to report to you that the regiment left camp near Cold Harbor May 31, 1862, between 2 and 3 o'clock p. m., occupying the left wing of the brigade, right in front, and arrived with the same in close order about 8 o'clock p. m. the same day near the railroad, about one-half mile back of Fair Oaks Station. The brigade thrown up in line, this regiment was ordered about one-fourth of a mile on picket to the front. Arriving there, I found four companies thrown out as pickets from the Fourth Maine, and a portion of the Fortieth New York Volunteers also. The former, occupying the ground across the railroad along the edge of the woods, withdrew. I formed my regiment in line of battle, according to orders received from Captain Fisk, assistant adjutant-general, on the north side of the railroad, in a wheat field, keeping the men under arms, and throwing out a picket about 100 yards on the railroad. About 11 o'clock p. m. I received orders to march the regiment on the railroad track to the brigade camp ground, and was ordered to form line in rear of the Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, almost parallel with the railroad, keeping the men in readiness.

The following morning, June 1, at daybreak, according to orders, I formed the line, changing direction to the front. About 6 o'clock received orders to form line of battle on the left of the Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, on the south side of the railroad, having the Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers on my left. About 6.30 o'clock a. m. received orders to march the regiment, left in front, regimental length, following the Eighty-first, in the same direction, farther into the woods, which order I executed, afterward facing in the old direction.

The left of my regiment leaning against a road, I immediately threw out a picket, one lieutenant, one sergeant, two corporals, and six files along the road, on the edge of the woods, about 150 yards. Received from this picket the report that extensive rebel camps were within 500 yards. On my arrival at the post I saw three lines of battle forming. Inferring from the difference in the uniforms that they were three different regiments, about one-fourth mile distance, I went back to the regiment, preparing the men for the arrival of the enemy.

About 7 o'clock a. m. the Third Georgia Regiment came up in line of battle, in four ranks, as near as from 15 to 20 paces (the woods being too thick to allow a proper aim at a farther distance), when I gave the command "Fire by file," the fire from both sides continuing about fifteen minutes. After an interval of about fifteen minutes the One hundred and fifth North Carolina Volunteers came up, taking the place of the Third Georgia at the distance of about 30 paces, formed in four ranks. I ordered "Fire by file," which lasted about one-half hour, when the enemy retreated. At this time Adjutant Gregory, of the Sixty-first New York, reported to me that General Howard, with part of his brigade, was coming up in my rear to re-enforce the left of my position. Immediately after the Third Alabama Regiment came in line of battle within a distance of about 30 paces and was received with a constant and steady fire, when suddenly I received fire from the rear. I found that part of the right wing of the Third Alabama had broken the right of the Eighty-first Pennsylvania. After Colonel Miller's death, and after the wounding of the lieutenant-colonel of the same regiment, Major Freudenberg, with a part of the left of my regiment, fell back and drove the enemy out of the woods.

The engagement with the Third Alabama lasted about one hour. Seeing that my left was exposed and entirely unprotected for the moment I advanced in line of battle within about 30 paces from the end of the woods, this movement enabling me to see all the movements of the enemy before they entered the woods, at the same time keeping my men under cover. After an interval of about fifteen or twenty minutes a fresh attack on my front was made by the Eleventh Mississippi, which lasted fifteen minutes. A few minutes before this regiment came up, but being inside the woods already, Adjutant Gregory, Sixty-first New York Volunteers, came up, informing me of the wounding of General Howard, and bringing me the order of the general to take temporary command of a part of his brigade.

Seeing the Eleventh Mississippi coming up, I asked Adjutant Gregory to report my position, with a request to allow me to repulse this coming attack. In the mean time new regiments formed on my right and left, when a new attack was made by portions of the Forty-first and Fifty-third Virginia, which lasted only a few minutes. Finding that my men had only from 5 to 6 rounds left I fell back in rear of the new lines, and gave permission to ten files to carry the wounded from the battle-field, forming the remainder of the regiment along the railroad track on the right of the Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers.

When I withdrew the regiment from the fire it was 11.30 o'clock, having been four hours in action. I have to report a loss of killed, wounded, and missing of about 140, besides Major Freudenberg, Captain Benzler, First Lieut. E. Von Schoening, Second Lieuts. William Frank, A. Pfautz, and Acting Second Lieut. E. Frank, wounded. The wounded being carried to different hospitals and from them removed by railroad to the rear, no exact report could be procured except from the main

hospital. I have to report 83 wounded, who are to be carried off to-day. The surgeon of this regiment is ordered to hand in a correct report of the wounded, which will immediately be forwarded to headquarters. The present strength of the regiment is 247 muskets and rifles on the ground. It being the first time the regiment was face to face with the enemy, and this under terribly adverse circumstances, the whole time exposed to a galling fire, repulsing five attacks, each made by fresh troops, affords me great pleasure to report to you that the regiment behaved gallantly and stood firm. The attacks of the enemy were made in line of battle, mostly in four ranks.

Private E. Oberer, Company A, being wounded in the face during the second attack, fell senseless, and according to his own statement lay about two hours, when he was taken prisoner by a sergeant and a private of the Third Georgia, and brought in camp about 2½ miles on the road toward Richmond, on the south side of the railroad. He passed on his march the rebel General Johnston and staff, who, according to a statement of the rebel sergeant, commanded the rebel forces. About 3 o'clock the same night the enemy evacuated their camps and marched toward Richmond. Private Oberer hid himself in the woods and arrived about 6 o'clock the next morning (June 2) in hospital, giving the above statement, and reporting that during his confinement he heard that of the Third Georgia the colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, and adjutant; of the Third Alabama the colonel and several line officers, and of the Eleventh Mississippi most officers were killed.

A list containing the names and rank of those who distinguished themselves will be forwarded as soon as possible. In this report I take great pleasure in mentioning Assistant Surgeon Rappold, the only regimental surgeon present, who distinguished himself highly, attending to his duties under the heaviest fire and caring for the great number of wounded transferred to the hospital.

I remain, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

PAUL FRANK,

Colonel Fifty-second New York Volunteers.

Brigadier-General FRENCH,
Commanding Third Brigade.

NOTE.—I had two horses shot under me; Lieut. Col. P. Lichtenstein had one horse shot under him, and Maj. C. G. Freudenberg had one horse shot under him.

No. 18.

Report of Col. Samuel K. Zook, Fifty-seventh New York Infantry.

HDQRS. 57TH REGT., FRENCH'S BRIG., RICHARDSON'S DIV.,
Fair Oaks, June 3, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: In accordance with orders received from Brigadier-General French the regiment marched at 2.30 p. m. with the other regiments of the brigade to support General Casey's division, then engaged with the enemy. The Chickahominy being much swollen, and intersected by ditches 5 to 6 feet deep, rendered it very difficult and dan-

gerous to ford. We succeeded, however, in a short time in crossing directly west of Tyler's, advancing as rapidly as the bad state of the roads would permit, coming up too late to take any part in the action of that day.

May 31, 1862, I received orders from General French to form my command in line of battle nearly parallel to the railroad and on the left of the Sixty-sixth Regiment New York Volunteers, within 200 yards of dense woods on our front and right, which were occupied by the enemy during the night; after which the men were ordered to sleep upon their arms in position.

At 3.30 a. m. June 1 I received orders to form my regiment and at 5.30 a. m. follow on the right of the Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers into the woods, which were very dense. We halted when the right of the regiment had passed the railroad about 30 yards and formed in line of battle. In about half an hour the enemy opened a very heavy fire upon the whole line at about 40 yards distance, killing 1 and wounding 4. The fire was instantly returned in the coolest manner, causing the enemy to fall back; whereupon we advanced at the charge, driving him entirely from his position, killing and wounding a large number, among the number several officers.

After the enemy were driven back, having no orders to follow him any distance, I halted the regiment and stood at shoulder-arms, when before we discovered him the enemy had again approached, under cover of the thick undergrowth, and opened a terrific fire upon us, killing 2, one of them Color-Sergt. Henry L. Stuart, and wounding 12. We immediately returned this second attack with vigor, and again drove the enemy back. At this moment Brigadier-General French arrived from the left of the line, and seeing our position and that of the enemy ordered me to move my command obliquely to the right, throwing out two companies 50 yards in front from the right and faced toward the left, flanking our entire line. Capt. Charles McKay was charged with the execution of this movement.

As soon as the position was taken we discovered the enemy advancing upon the front and right in great force, evidently intending to turn our right. We at once opened a rapid and continuous fire from the front and the two flanking companies, which completely surprised him, causing him after a desperate effort to break and fly in great confusion. This movement cleared that part of the woods and in my opinion contributed very materially in deciding the action of the day.

Directly after this affair I was ordered by General Richardson, commanding division, to march my command out of the woods that he might shell them. We moved across the railroad into the field we occupied the night previous, and formed parallel to the railroad, the right resting near the station. In this position two men of the right company were wounded by the enemy's sharpshooters.

At 1 p. m., in accordance with orders received from General French, I marched my command into the woods in support of General Meagher's brigade. We remained in this position one hour and a half, then moved to the left to support Hazzard's battery, Fourth Artillery, the firing having ceased three hours.

My staff were very efficient, Assist. Surg. H. C. Dean removing the wounded under a very heavy fire, and Surg. Robert V. McKim discharging his duties at the hospital very creditably.

I feel it my duty to call especial attention to Capt. W. A. Kirk, as he was present without his company, which was detached on fatigue duty at White House, and afforded great assistance to the regiment.

Both officers and men behaved in the most admirable manner, and I am gratified to express my entire satisfaction with the behavior of all. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. K. ZOOK,

Colonel, Commanding Fifty-seventh Regiment N. Y. Vols.

Lieut. J. W. PLUME,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 19.

Report of Col. Joseph C. Pinckney, Sixty-sixth New York Infantry.

HDQRS. SIXTY-SIXTH REGIMENT N. Y. VOLS.,
Near Fair Oaks Station, June 2, 1862.

SIR: On the 31st ultimo, at about 2 o'clock p. m., I received an order from you to put my regiment under arms forthwith and be ready to march immediately. At about 2.30 o'clock p. m., being all ready, by order of Brigadier-General French I put the column in motion, following immediately the lead of the general, and being the advance of this brigade as well as the division. Arrived at the Chickahominy, it was found that the river had swollen to such a degree as to render necessary some repairs to the temporary bridge which had been built there some days previously, and a halt was ordered for that purpose.

After some progress had been made to that end, and it being apparent that the river was still rising, I was directed by you to resume my march and to follow the Fifty-third Pennsylvania Regiment, to which was assigned the advance. The crossing of the Chickahominy, rendered almost impracticable by the recent rain-storm, was attended with great difficulty; for at least a half mile the men waded in the water and marsh up to their waists, and three or four intervening creeks, which were encountered in the passage, rendered it one of great difficulty and consumed a period of nearly two hours.

The crossing being successfully accomplished, the column was again put in motion. During almost the whole of the march heavy and continuous firing was heard in our front, which made it apparent that our forces were heavily engaged with the enemy. We arrived near the scene of the contest shortly after night-fall. I was soon after directed by General Richardson, commanding the division, to debouch on the field of battle and take a position immediately in line with and on the left of General Dana's brigade. Arms were stacked, and the men laid down to take a few hours' rest.

At 3.30 a. m. Brigadier-General French sent for me, and informed me that a brigade of rebels were in the woods, directly in front and within a hundred yards of us. By his direction I proceeded quietly to arouse my men, get them into line of battle, and take arms. In this position the regiment remained until the break of day.

At about 5 o'clock a. m. I was ordered by Brigadier-General French to take a position a little in advance, with my right resting on the edge of a wood. At 6.30 o'clock a. m. I was further ordered to make a flank movement to the left and my left resting on the York and Pamunkey Railroad, on the west side, to which my line preserved an acute angle. Soon after we had taken this position the enemy opened fire on our left and in front of the rail track. A heavy and continuous fire of musketry was kept up for the space of about one hour.

Brigadier-General French then ordered me to cross the railroad and advance in the woods (which were swampy and covered with underbrush) about three-fourths of a mile, so as to deliver a cross-fire on the enemy's flank. We here encountered the Forty-first Virginia Regiment and delivered our fire. General French, who accompanied us on this advance, then directed me to throw a company forward to the right to feel the enemy and one company to protect our right flank. I thereupon detailed Company A to execute a flank movement and occupy the road on our right, and Company K to feel the enemy in front and attack his flank, which was successfully accomplished. The attack was then continued by the regiment, and had the effect of discomfiting the enemy and compelling him to retreat.

In this movement a number of the enemy were killed and wounded and 9 taken prisoners. Among the killed was Captain Camp, Company C, Forty-first Virginia Regiment. I caused his body to be buried at night-fall on the left side of the road entering the woods.

I lost 7 enlisted men killed, wounded, and missing.

I was ably assisted during these movements by my field officers, Lieut. Col. James H. Bull and Maj. Orlando H. Morris, as well as by my adjutant, Burton H. Davis, all of whom behaved with great coolness and judgment. The officers of the line discharged their duties with credit, and the fortitude of the men, when under fire for an hour or more with no opportunity of returning it, is deserving of all praise. The order to move forward into the woods and deliver their fire was obeyed with great alacrity. The cheerfulness with which Company K advanced into the very flank of the enemy, delivered their fire, and received his in return deserves honorable mention.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

JOS. C. PINCKNEY,

Colonel, Commanding Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers.

Lieut. J. W. PLUME,

A. D. C. and A. A. A. G., Third Brig., Richardson's Div.

No. 20.

Report of Col. John R. Brooke, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. FIFTY-THIRD REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,

June 2, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of my regiment for the 31st of May and 1st of June, 1862:

My regiment being in front, by order of General French left camp near Cold Harbor at 2.30 p. m. Found great difficulty in crossing the Chickahominy, owing to the sudden rise in the stream. Arrived on the other side at 5.15 p. m., when I was halted by General French until the other regiments had crossed, then was marched forward with the general in front. Marched about 3 miles, when General French halted me in the road, and shortly afterward directed me to form line of battle in an open field on my right, which was but finished when he again ordered me forward on the road. After moving a short distance heavy firing was heard to the right of us. We now moved out of the road into an open field, which we crossed in the direction of the firing, passing on our way through a stream. Led by General French we came upon the field of battle.

By this time it had become very dark. We were formed on the left of the Fifty-seventh New York by General French in person, our right resting near the left of the Fifty-seventh and our left extending into the woods to within a short distance of the railroad. General French ordered me to send two companies upon the railroad as pickets to connect with General Birney's right, which was instantly done. About daybreak General French came to me personally and ordered me to change front, as there was a large body of rebel troops on our right. In about an hour he ordered me to resume my former position, which I immediately did. At the same time he ordered my two companies (the pickets) to be withdrawn. Shortly after the general ordered me to move by the left flank and follow the Fifty-second New York (which had in the mean time been placed on my left) into the woods beyond the railroad. We had moved forward until our right had passed the railroad some 50 yards, when the Fifty-second halted. I also halted.

After some time it became apparent that the Fifty-second was about to be attacked. I immediately faced my regiment to the front. The firing commenced (from the enemy) on my left, they being but a short distance from us. I passed down the line toward the right, when I found that about 100 of the right wing had fallen back, caused by the following circumstance: An aide-de-camp rode down the front of the left wing as the firing commenced, and when he reached the colors found it necessary to pass my lines. He then ordered the men to "Fall back; give way," which they obeyed, and misinterpreting the command fell back beyond the railroad, where they rallied and were brought back in good order. The error was corrected in a very few minutes.

About this time I met General French in rear of the left wing of my regiment. After standing with him some time he asked me if my ammunition was nearly gone. I told him it was, from the upper part of the boxes. He told me to stand fast until he returned, and passed back toward the railroad. In a few moments he returned, leading the Sixty-first New York, when he ordered me to have my men lie down and to let the Sixty-first New York pass my line, which was accordingly done. The men were then ordered to fill the upper parts of their boxes from the box magazine, when the general immediately ordered us forward to the right, where we continued fighting until the fire of the enemy had ceased, when we held the position we then occupied until an order came to Colonel Barlow, of the Sixty-first New York, to move out of the woods by the right flank, said orders coming from General Richardson, with instructions to communicate them to me also. I then followed the Sixty-first New York out of the woods into the field occupied by the brigade the night previous, where I again met General French, who ordered me to the position I now occupy; also directing me to replenish my exhausted cartridge boxes.

The firing during the engagement was very heavy. The time during which we were under fire was nearly four hours. The regiments opposed to us during this action were the Forty-first Virginia, Third Alabama, Fifty-third Virginia, and a regiment supposed to be the Twenty-third Alabama. Also a regiment with black slouch hats, supposed to be Mississippians.

My loss is as follows: Killed, 13; wounded, 64; missing, 17; making a total of 94.

Among the killed was Maj. Thomas Yeager, who behaved with great gallantry up to the moment of his death, which occurred during the advance of the regiment to the right. Among the wounded are Captains Church, Moody, and Eichholtz, and First Lieut. William

Mintzer, which embrace all the casualties among my commissioned officers.

I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of both officers and men of my regiment. All did well. The presence of General French during the thickest of the fight had a most inspiring effect on all, and caused them to act with greater steadiness and bravery, if possible, than before. I have to mention that I was ably assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel McMichael, whose coolness and steadiness are deserving great praise, as also Adj. Charles P. Hatch (who was taken prisoner, but subsequently succeeded in making his escape), whose coolness and steadiness during the fight rendered his assistance invaluable. My horse was shot under me.

I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,

JOHN R. BROOKE,

Colonel Fifty-third Pennsylvania.

Lieutenant PLUME,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General and Aide-de-Camp.

No. 21.

Report of Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division.

HDQRS. SEDGWICK'S DIVISION, SUMNER'S ARMY CORPS,
Birouac near Fair Oaks Station, Va., June 4, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division during the engagements of May 31 and June 1, near Fair Oaks Station, on the Richmond and York River Railroad:

Under the orders of the general commanding the corps we left our camp near Tyler's house about 2 o'clock p. m. on Saturday, the 31st, in the following order: First, Gorman's brigade, followed by Kirby's battery; Burns' and Dana's brigades, followed by Tompkins', Bartlett's, and Owen's batteries. The crossing of the stream of the Chickahominy and the contiguous swamp was exceedingly difficult and occasioned much delay, but we pushed forward in the direction of Fair Oaks Station, the point near which it was understood that Heintzelman's and Keyes' corps were then engaged. Upon debouching into the open field near Adams' house we found Abercrombie's brigade, of Couch's division, sustaining a severe attack and hard pushed by the enemy.

The First Minnesota, Colonel Sully, the leading regiment, was, by request of General Couch, approved by General Sumner, promptly formed into line of battle under a very sharp fire, and posted on the right of Abercrombie's brigade. Colonel Sully's disposition of his regiment, which covered two sides of Courtney's house, a point at which there was much danger that the enemy would outflank us before the supports ordered to his assistance could be brought up, was marked by admirable coolness and judgment. The remainder of Gorman's brigade, led by him in person, and composed of the Thirty-fourth and Eighty-second New York, supported by the Fifteenth Massachusetts, formed on the left of Abercrombie's brigade, where they became almost instantly and hotly engaged; and after sustaining, without wavering, repeated and furious charges of the enemy, finally charged him in turn with the bayonet with such impetuosity as to rout and drive him from his position.

I would here mention with pride that shortly previous to this charge Lieutenant Kirby brought his battery into action in a most gallant and spirited manner. His pieces, in charge of Lieutenants Woodruff and French, were run up and unlimbered under a very galling discharge of musketry within less than 100 yards of the enemy, and opened a terrific fire with canister and spherical case, which contributed in a very high degree to break and finally scatter his forces. Generals Burns and Dana were promptly on hand—the former with his whole brigade, the latter with two of his regiments, the Twentieth Massachusetts and Seventh Michigan, the other two, the Nineteenth Massachusetts and the Forty-second New York, having been left behind, the one on picket and the other to protect the crossing and assist the passage of the artillery. General Dana, with the two regiments first mentioned, was ordered to form in column of attack to the rear and left of Kirby's battery, but before the order could be executed it became necessary to push him to the front, where he went immediately into action on the left of Gorman's brigade, sustaining a strong attack and participating in the brilliant and decisive charge of the Thirty-fourth and Eighty-second New York, above referred to, and driving the enemy from point to point for a very considerable distance. General Burns with two regiments took post on the right of Colonel Sully, holding his other two in reserve. It was not the fortune of any of the regiments in this brigade to meet the enemy at close quarters, but all gave unmistakable evidence of being ready if ordered forward to rush to the support of their comrades with alacrity and unshrinking firmness. The One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania, Colonel Morehead, and the Seventy-second Pennsylvania (Baxter's Zouaves), held in reserve, were several times moved from their positions to different portions of the field at double-quick, evincing their eagerness to become engaged. The Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania, Colonel Owen, was thrown to the right toward evening, and held that position during the night and following morning.

Before the result of the contest in the vicinity of Adams' house had been determined I was directed by the general commanding the corps to proceed to the right and take command of that flank, where I found Colonel Sully's regiment so well posted and so judiciously supported by General Burns that little remained for me to do. As the conduct of Gorman's and Dana's troops was more immediately under the personal observation of the corps commander, it becomes unnecessary for me to enter into further details concerning their operations.

On the following (Sunday) morning the enemy renewed the attack with great fury immediately on my left and in front of General Richardson's line. Parts of Gorman's and Dana's brigades and one section of Bartlett's battery were engaged with determined bravery. This action being also under the immediate eye of the corps commander, I forbear to call attention to particulars.

After the close of the engagement on Saturday evening, the enemy having been driven from his position and the firing having ceased, General Burns was ordered to proceed with the Seventy-first Pennsylvania to unite with the Nineteenth Massachusetts and Forty-second New York Regiments and the Sixty-third New York (the last of Richardson's division) to protect our right and rear, in accomplishing which purpose his arrangements were eminently judicious and effective.

Col. C. H. Tompkins, First Rhode Island Artillery, commanding the artillery of the division, was indefatigable in bringing up his batteries. To Capt. F. N. Clarke, chief of artillery of the corps, great praise is due for his untiring energy and zeal in using all the means at his command

in hastening forward the various batteries of my division as well as of Richardson's. Captains Tompkins and Bartlett after great exertions arrived upon the field with their guns between 7 and 8 p. m. Captain Owen (to whom as well as to the artillery of Richardson's division, Major Bowe, Forty-second New York, with a portion of that regiment rendered most valuable assistance) arrived at daybreak on Sunday. The zeal and energy of these officers are worthy of the highest praise, it being a matter of such exceeding difficulty to bring artillery across the Chickahominy, which was greatly swollen by recent heavy rains, to such an extent, indeed, that the bridges previously built by us had been in great part carried away, that, as I have learned from prisoners taken during the fight, the enemy had declared it to be impossible for us to bring over a single gun.

I commend to the general commanding the corps the gallantry with which the brigadiers led their troops into action, and refer him to their reports regarding the handsome conduct of their staffs and troops, which I fully indorse.

Captain Johnson, commanding a detached company of the Sixth New York Cavalry, though not immediately engaged, rendered valuable services in various ways.

The medical officers of the division, brigade surgeons, surgeons, and assistant surgeons performed their duties with skill and untiring devotion, disregarding the great personal danger to which they were frequently exposed.

My personal staff, Capt. William D. Sedgwick, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. Joseph S. Smith, commissary of subsistence, and Lieut. Church Howe, Fifteenth Massachusetts, aide-de-camp, carried my orders from time to time to various portions of the field under the hottest fire with an alacrity and coolness highly commendable.

Capt. R. N. Batchelder, division quartermaster, was, much to his own regret, ordered to remain with the train, but his services were invaluable in pushing forward the ammunition and supplies under great difficulties so rapidly that they arrived before the least want of them had been experienced.

I have the honor to be, captain, with much respect, your obedient servant,

JOHN SEDGWICK,

Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding Division.

Capt. J. H. TAYLOR,

Chief of Staff and Acting Asst. Adjt. Gen., Sumner's Corps.

No. 22.

Report of Col. Charles H. Tompkins, Chief of Artillery.

HDQRS. ARTILLERY, 2D DIV., 2D CORPS D'ARMÉE,
Fair Oaks, Va., June 4, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report:

In obedience to the orders of General Sedgwick the artillery of this division left camp at Tyler's house at 2 o'clock p. m. on the 31st ultimo in the following order: Kirby's battery in the rear of the First Brigade (Gorman's); Tompkins', Bartlett's, and Owen's batteries in the rear of the Third Brigade (Dana's). Great difficulty was experienced in cross-

ing the open field contiguous to the Chickahominy swamp, the nature of the ground being such that the horses in many instances would sink to their girths in mud, rendering it necessary to unharness them and draw the carriages through by hand. After Kirby's and Tompkins' batteries had crossed this field the road was so cut up that it became absolutely necessary to corduroy a large portion of it. This was quickly accomplished by the men of Bartlett's and Owen's batteries, and they crossed the field with much less difficulty than the batteries which preceded them. From the entrance to the swamp to the bridge over the Chickahominy the mud and mire were less compact than in the field, and although the horses sank to their girths and the guns and caissons over the axle-trees, they were got upon the bridge, with a few exceptions, without unharnessing.

The crossing to the swamp upon this side of the river was upon a narrow causeway, and here the difficulties were even greater than upon the other. Kirby's battery was, by great exertion upon the part of himself, officers, and men, got across, and arrived upon the field of battle in time to participate in the action. It being there under the immediate eye of the commanding general renders it unnecessary for me to enter into the particulars of the part taken by this battery in the engagement. Notwithstanding the terrible condition of the causeway, rendered worse than at first by the crossing of Kirby's battery, Captain Tompkins, by great exertion of himself and command, got his battery through, and arrived upon the field of action just at the close of the engagement. Captain Bartlett also succeeded in getting one piece of his battery across, and at once proceeded to the front, arriving upon the field immediately after Captain Tompkins.

A bridge which crossed a ditch in the causeway having broken through, and the continued rise of the water overflowing a portion of the causeway, it became necessary to unharness the horses and draw the remainder of Bartlett's and all of Owen's battery through by hand. In the performance of this arduous duty valuable assistance was rendered by Major Bowe, Forty-second New York Volunteers, and 100 men of that regiment.

By early dawn of the 1st instant all the remaining artillery, with the exception of two pieces of Owen's battery, was upon the field, and at 7 a. m. the remaining section of Owen's battery arrived. The untiring energy and zeal displayed by the officers and men of the batteries of my command in overcoming the almost insurmountable difficulties of this march well merited the success which crowned their efforts and entitles them to the highest commendation.

Capt. F. N. Clarke, Fourth Artillery, chief of artillery Second Corps, was present during the entire time of crossing, and to his aid and assistance much of the success is due. Upon getting the artillery forward I reported to General Sedgwick, and received orders to place two sections of Bartlett's battery in position near Courtney's house, where Tompkins' battery had already been posted, and to send two sections of Owen's battery to report to General Burns at Golding's house.

The remaining section of Bartlett's battery was, by order of General Richardson, placed in position near Fair Oaks Station, and was the only artillery of this division engaged in the action of June 1. As the part taken by this section did not come under my immediate supervision, my station being upon the right, I would respectfully refer you to the report of Captain Bartlett, herewith inclosed.

Kirby's battery and the remaining section of Owen's battery were

held in reserve in the field near the Adams house hospital. The repulse of the enemy rendered it unnecessary to bring them into action.

I cannot refrain from taking advantage of this opportunity to express my belief that the gallantry displayed by the officers and men of that portion of the artillery of the division fortunate enough to be engaged with the enemy, and the untiring energy displayed by the others in their efforts to overcome all obstacles preventing their participation in the action, conclusively shows that they may be relied upon to meet with promptness and efficiency, at all times and in all places, the enemies of the Government.

I remain, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. H. TOMPKINS,

Colonel, Commanding Artillery of Division.

Capt. WILLIAM D. SEDGWICK,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 23.

Report of Lieut. Edmund Kirby, Battery I, First U. S. Artillery.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to your orders, received about 3.30 p. m. on the 31st of May, 1862, I took up the line of march in rear of Gorman's brigade. The roads were almost impassable for artillery, and I experienced great difficulty in getting my guns along. I was obliged at times to unlimber and use the prolonge, the cannoneers being up to their waists in water. About 4.30 p. m. I was within three-quarters of a mile from Fair Oaks Station with three pieces and one caisson, the remainder of the battery being in rear and coming up as fast as circumstances would permit. At about 4.45 p. m. I was ordered by General Sumner to place the battery in position, the right resting on a strip of woods and the left about 70 yards from Adams' house, facing nearly south and toward Fair Oaks Station. The enemy advanced through an open field, and were about 1,000 yards from the battery when I commenced firing with spherical case and shell. They immediately tried to cover themselves in the woods on my right.

I was now obliged to change the position of my guns. At the same time First Lieut. C. A. Woodruff, First Artillery, arrived with two pieces, which I ordered him to place on the left, in order to fire into the woods through which the enemy were advancing. But a few rounds had been fired before First Lieut. F. S. French, First Artillery, arrived with the last piece. In the mean time one trail had broken after the fourth discharge, rendering the piece useless. All of the spherical case and shell were exhausted. I sent two limbers to the rear, where the caissons were buried in the mud, to bring up a fresh supply of ammunition. As the enemy were beyond canister range, I fired a few rounds of solid shot to occupy them until I could obtain more shell. As soon as the ammunition arrived I ordered shell and spherical case to be fired until the enemy were within 500 yards of my right flank, when I opened with canister.

The enemy now prepared to charge my right. I advanced the left of the battery. They came down a road which was on my right when the firing commenced, and when they emerged from the woods found themselves directly in front of the battery instead of on the right, as

they expected, and were consequently subjected to a tremendous fire of canister from five light 12-pounder guns, which they were unable to stand. They retreated in disorder into the woods. I advanced two pieces—all that could be extricated from the mud—and fired a few rounds upon the now retreating enemy, when the battle ceased. During the entire action the enemy kept up a continuous fire of musketry upon us, but fortunately most of their balls too high, as the caissons and limbers were well covered by an elevation upon which the pieces were placed.

During the battle I made a complete change of front to the right, and at no time had more than five pieces engaged.

I was obliged to call upon the infantry in my rear several times to assist in dragging the pieces from the mud, which assistance was promptly rendered by the Fifteenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers. At one time three pieces were up to their axles in the mud, their trails being buried to a corresponding distance.*

* * * * *

Expended during the action 70 rounds shell, 210 rounds spherical case, 48 rounds canister, and 15 rounds solid shot; total, 343 rounds.

To the untiring exertions of Lieutenants Woodruff and French am I indebted for the presence of a greater part of the battery on the field of battle. I claim that we are indebted in no small extent for the success of the day to the personal bravery and efficiency of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of Light Company I, First Artillery.

Respectfully submitted.

E. KIRBY,

1st Lieut., 1st Art., Comdg. Light Company I, 1st Artillery.

Col. C. H. TOMPKINS,

Col. R. I. Light Art., Chief of Artillery, Sedgwick's Div.

No. 24.

Report of Capt. John A. Tompkins, Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery.

HDQRS. COMPANY A, FIRST R. I. LIGHT ARTILLERY,

Fair Oaks, Va., June 3, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to hand you herewith a report of the operations of the battery under my command in the engagement of the 31st ultimo and the 1st instant.

I left camp near Tyler's house on Saturday, May 31, at 2 p. m., and crossed the bridge over the Chickahominy River at 5 p. m. After crossing the bridge I was delayed by the difficulty of crossing the swamp for over an hour and a half, and succeeded only by the most severe exertions of my cannoneers, who were obliged to haul the guns through the mud while wading in water waist-deep. Leaving the caissons to follow, I brought the guns to the front at a sharp trot, and reached the battle-field about 7.30 p. m., just at the close of the engagement. I reported at once to General Sedgwick, and was ordered to keep my battery in the road during the night.

At 4 a. m., June 1, the battery was moved to Courtney's house, upon the right of the line, and the guns posted to command the ground

* Nominal list of casualties shows 1 man killed and 4 men wounded. Four horses were slightly wounded.

to the west of the house; the caissons were placed under cover of the woods skirting the road leading from the main road opposite Adams' house. The battery was in readiness for action during the engagement of that day, but as the enemy did not attack upon the right the guns were not used.

I have no loss of men or material to report.

I have the honor to remain, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. TOMPKINS,

Captain, First R. I. Light Artillery, Comdg. Company A.

Col. C. H. TOMPKINS, *Comdg. Artillery, Sedgwick's Div.*

No. 25.

Report of Capt. Walter O. Bartlett, Battery B, First Rhode Island Light Artillery.

HDQRS. BATTERY B, FIRST R. I. LIGHT ARTILLERY,
Fair Oaks, Va., June 3, 1862.

COLONEL: We left our camp at Tyler's house at 2.30 p. m. on the 31st ultimo, and after a great delay, in consequence of being obliged to corduroy about 20 rods of road, we crossed the Chickahominy about 6 p. m. I immediately proceeded with the right piece, and arrived at the scene of action about 7.15 p. m. The second piece, in crossing the bog on this side Chickahominy, got stuck by a horse falling in a deep hole, where he came near drowning before he could be got out. This caused a long delay, as it was nearly 10 o'clock before the piece was got out. All the carriages after this one were unlimbered and pulled through by hand with the assistance of the Forty-second Regiment. One caisson was so badly mired that it was necessary to take out the ammunition and pass it ashore. Four prolonges were broken by the cannoneers in hauling out the guns. The last gun was got up to this place just before daybreak. Soon after daylight of the 1st I was ordered by General Sumner to place two guns on the road near General Dana's brigade. One other was ordered there soon after by General Richardson, who ordered them to shell the point of woods across the wheat field, about 900 yards distant, where the bayonets of the enemy could be plainly seen. These were the first guns fired on that morning. During the day 56 shell were fired at that point and down the road across the railroad. The third piece was brought up about 9 a. m. to the point; the howitzers were placed in position in front of the First Minnesota and fired into the woods on the left in the afternoon. The howitzers were moved to the right of Battery A, and the center section of Lieutenant Bloodgood placed in their old position.

This morning seven spherical case were fired into the woods at 1,500 yards by order of General Sedgwick. All the guns remain in the same position to-night. The ammunition expended is as follows: Sixty-one spherical case, 4 shell, and 65 cartridges from Parrotts, and 5 spherical case and 1 shell from howitzers.

Yours, respectfully,

W. O. BARTLETT,

Captain, Comdg. Battery B, First R. I. Light Artillery.

Col. C. H. TOMPKINS,

Chief of Artillery, Sedgwick's Division.

No. 26.

Report of Capt. Charles D. Owen, Battery G, First Rhode Island Light Artillery.

HDQRS. BATTERY G, RHODE ISLAND ARTILLERY,
Camp near Fair Oaks, Va.

SIR: On Saturday, 31st of May, I received orders to move my battery. At about 2 o'clock we started from camp, marching behind Battery B, Rhode Island Artillery, until we came to the bridge that crosses a little stream just before entering the first woods. Here the road was very poor indeed, and therefore I took a road across the next field above, and from thence brought my battery behind Battery B, at the first corduroy road. Before my entire battery was across, however, night came on, and 7 o'clock found me with one-half my battery across the Chickahominy and the other half in the swamp on the eastern side. The remainder of the night was spent in crossing the river with the half battery, and at 3 o'clock in the morning I started for the division camp. We had more trouble in crossing the swamp beyond the river, but 5 o'clock found me across with everything, and about 6 o'clock we arrived on the ground, and General Sumner assigned me a position on the left of Kirby's battery.

I remained there while the battle was raging, and at 2 p. m. received orders to move two sections on the extreme right, to support a portion of General Burns' brigade located at that place. The battery was placed in position, one section near Golding's house and the other on the hill beyond.

I remain, sir, your most obedient servant,

CHARLES D. OWEN,
Captain, Commanding.

Col. C. H. TOMPKINS,
Commanding Division Artillery.

No. 27.

Report of Brig. Gen. Willis A. Gorman, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.

HDQRS. GORMAN'S BRIGADE, SEDGWICK'S DIVISION,
Fair Oaks, near Richmond, Va., June 3, 1862.

On Saturday, the 31st ultimo, I received orders from the general commanding to put my brigade under arms and take up a line of march as rapidly as possible across the Chickahominy in the direction of Fair Oaks Station, on the Richmond and York River Railroad, where heavy firing had been going on for a short time. On arriving at Dr. Trent's farm, and after ascertaining the position of the road leading to the point where our forces were engaged, we filed into the road, the First Minnesota Regiment in the lead, and took up the march in quick and sometimes double-quick time until we arrived at the point where the enemy had been hotly engaged with Generals Couch's and Casey's divisions, near Fair Oaks Station, the latter having been severely repulsed, while the former was holding his position with great determination with a diminished force. I was ordered to form my brigade by regiments in rear of

each other in line of battle, while just previous to this the First Minnesota Regiment, having arrived first, was ordered to take up a position on the right, its right resting upon a farm-house and its left upon a wood, in order to prevent the enemy from flanking us on the right, as he appeared there in great force. My other three regiments, the Thirty-fourth New York Volunteers, Fifteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, and Eighty-second New York Volunteers (Second New York State Militia), being formed upon the left of a portion of General Couch's division and Kirby's battery, occupied the road immediately at the angle of the woods, commanding all approaches from the right, left, and center.

We had not remained longer than ten minutes in position before heavy columns of the enemy dashed furiously upon us, evidently attempting to take Kirby's battery; whereupon I was ordered to throw three regiments of my brigade upon the enemy's flank and front, then showing themselves in the outskirts of the woods and moving in the open field.

I immediately ordered the Eighty-second New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Hudson commanding, to move forward on the left of Kirby's battery and engage the enemy as quickly as possible, which they did with great promptness and gallantry, they having to march over fences and garden palings, which they tore down before them, and among houses, still preserving their line as well as possible. Upon crossing the last fence they opened a most galling fire upon the enemy at a range of from 50 to 100 yards, causing fearful havoc among them.

I was then ordered by both Generals Sumner and Sedgwick to move forward the Thirty-fourth New York Volunteers, Colonel Suiter commanding, upon the left of the Eighty-second New York, which was promptly executed, and upon coming into position the Thirty-fourth New York, being first on the ground, opened a most deadly fire upon the enemy and received one in return not less so. I immediately ordered up the Fifteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball commanding, who had been gallantly supporting Kirby's battery, to the support of the left of the Eighty-second New York and the right of the Thirty-fourth New York, when the engagement became general from one end of our line to the other, the enemy pushing forward with the most wonderful determination, while I steadily advanced the brigade from time to time until we came to a distance of 50 yards, when General Sumner (being present with my brigade) directed me to charge the enemy with the bayonet, and gave the order to the Thirty-fourth New York in person, which was quickly repeated by myself and all my staff and by the several field officers. Muskets were promptly brought down to a charge, and the men threw themselves at double-quick headlong upon the enemy, the Thirty-fourth New York somewhat in the advance on the left and in perfect line, the Eighty-second New York on the right, the Fifteenth Massachusetts supporting the center. The enemy on the right and center gave way, but a South Carolina regiment, before the Thirty-fourth New York, brought their bayonets to a charge, and stood until that regiment was within 10 or 15 paces of them. I halted the Eighty-second New York and Fifteenth Massachusetts a little before they entered the woods, but the Thirty-fourth New York plunged into the thicket some 50 paces before I could halt them. A farther advance would have imperiled their left flank.

About this time General Sedgwick received orders to proceed to the right of our line, and I received my orders thereafter from General Sumner direct. This bayonet charge was made with a yell, which must have given the fullest evidence to the enemy that our troops were in

earnest and fired with a determination to succeed or die. The enemy were driven from the field in the greatest confusion and seeming consternation, leaving it strewn with their dead, and their wounded mingling their groans with those of our own. A considerable number of prisoners were captured, among them several of rank.

From 5 o'clock until 7.30 o'clock p. m. my brigade was engaged giving and receiving as severe a fire of musketry as ever was witnessed or heard, perhaps, by the oldest officers of the army, the severest and longest continued part of which was met by the Eighty-second and Thirty-fourth New York Volunteers and Fifteenth Massachusetts, as the lists of their killed and wounded indicate. The First Minnesota, being detached and operating on my right, was under a severe fire, which they received and returned with great coolness and gallantry, for the particulars of which and the good conduct of its officers and men I refer to Colonel Sully's report, herewith respectfully submitted. The rest of the brigade being continually under my own eye, it affords me great pleasure to speak of the gallant conduct of all the field officers of this brigade, and I am also gratified to learn from them of the unusual coolness and good conduct of all the line officers, without exception. The obedience of the men and their unbounded ardor to meet the enemy give the highest assurance to the country that they are to be depended upon in every trying emergency.

It gives me equal pleasure to commend to your favorable consideration Captain Hebard, my assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenant Raquet, aide-de-camp; Captain Brown, acting assistant commissary of subsistence, and Mr. Sproat, volunteer aide-de-camp, upon my staff. They bore my orders to every part of the line, frequently exposing their lives to the most imminent peril. At the beginning of the engagement Dr. Hand, my brigade surgeon, was on the field, exposing himself to danger, keeping close to the brigade, ready to give his professional attention to the first that should fall. While engaged in his duties he received a slight wound. The assiduous attention to the wounded of Drs. Hand, Sherman, Morton, Bates, Haven, Lewis, and Robinson, of the brigade, merits the highest commendation. The conduct of both officers and men of my brigade and the splendid bayonet charge made by them, having been witnessed by the general commanding the corps, and also by the general commanding the division, relieves me from the necessity of making this report more in detail.

After the enemy had been driven from their position the brigade advanced into the woods and occupied during the night the ground previously held by the enemy till daylight, when they pressed farther on and took position, the left resting near the railroad and the right reaching toward the Chickahominy. This engagement having ended at dark, left us in complete possession of the field, with quite a number of prisoners and small-arms, while the ground was strewn with their killed, wounded, and dying, showing the fearful havoc our infantry and artillery had made among them. By your orders my command slept upon their arms until 3 o'clock next morning, when they were in line ready to meet or advance upon the enemy.

About 7.30 a. m. Sunday, the 1st day of June, the enemy advanced in greatly increased numbers, having been largely re-enforced during the evening and night, and opened fire upon the line upon the left, composed chiefly of General Richardson's division. I was ordered then to leave the First Minnesota in position upon our right, the Fifteenth Massachusetts upon our right front, and take two other regiments to the assistance of Richardson's division. I moved the Eighty-second and

Thirty-fourth New York to the front, and sent the Eighty-second New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Hudson commanding, to engage the enemy and, if possible, to fall upon his flank, while General Meagher's Irish brigade and others engaged his center.

No sooner had they come within 120 yards of the enemy than they became engaged in a most deadly conflict, while the whole line along the railroad for nearly a mile seemed to have become one continuous blaze of musketry—the fighting being frequently at no greater distance than 50 yards, between heavy lines of infantry. This regiment of mine suffered considerably, though protected somewhat by its position in the woods. I sent the Thirty-fourth New York to support them, some 50 yards in the rear.

Never before have I seen more distinguished courage displayed, nor more determination to conquer or fall on the field, than was shown by all our troops without distinction. The Eighty-second New York, on this day as on the day previous, withstood the shock of the enemy's repeated charges, sustained by the Thirty-fourth New York, and finally, in conjunction with the Irish brigade and others of Richardson's division, had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy abandon the field and precipitately retire upon Richmond, leaving their dead and wounded upon the ground. And here the battle ended, leaving us in possession of the field and with a large number of wounded and other prisoners in our hands. Had the battles of those two days to be fought over again I cannot see where any improvement could be made either in the courage, firmness, and steadiness of the troops or their determination or the dispositions made on the field.

Just at the close of the action of the 1st instant Captain Russell's company of Minnesota Sharpshooters arrived on the field and I put them in before the enemy, where they used their weapons with effect and rendered good service. Their loss is 1 wounded. My loss amounts in killed and wounded to 201 as near as I can now report; missing, none.* I trust I may be allowed to bear testimony to the efficiency, skill, and cool courage of Lieutenants Kirby, Woodruff, and French, and the men of the artillery, whose battery my brigade supported throughout the entire action. The commanders of the regiments of my brigade desire me to congratulate the commander of the corps and of the division upon this successful achievement, and officers and men feel the highest pride that they are soldiers of the Army of the Potomac.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. A. GORMAN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. WILLIAM D. SEDGWICK,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 28.

Report of Lieut. Col. John W. Kimball, Fifteenth Massachusetts Infantry.

HDQRS. FIFTEENTH REGT. MASSACHUSETTS VOLS.,

In Camp at Fair Oaks, Va., June 3, 1862.

I have the honor to report that on Saturday, the 31st ultimo, I

*But see revised statement, p. 758.

received orders for my regiment to be ready to march at a moment's notice, with one day's cooked rations in haversacks and in light marching order. At 3 o'clock I left camp and took my position in brigade line, which was the extreme left of said line. At this time and for an hour previous very heavy firing was heard on the south side of the Chickahominy Creek. The brigade was immediately put in march, and we crossed the stream at the corduroy bridge and found the plain upon the south side partially overflowed, and we were obliged to wade through it, the water in some places coming up to the waists of the men; but they rushed through without hesitation, cheering as they went. The roads were very heavy from the recent rains, but the men pressed forward with alacrity and a portion of the way at double-quick, and I arrived on the field at about 5 o'clock, bringing in all my men. I immediately formed line of battle in rear of the Eighty-second New York Volunteers.

I had scarcely given the order to rest when a sharp fire of musketry commenced upon Kirby's battery, stationed a short distance to my right. I was ordered to go to the support of that battery, thereby relieving the Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Russell. I immediately formed line of battle in rear of the battery, and remained in that position some time. My men stood up manfully to the work, and three several times rushed forward and helped work the guns by extricating them from the mud into which they settled at each discharge.

At this time, after the fire had slackened somewhat, I was ordered to move by the left flank and to come into the rear and left of the Eighty-second New York Volunteers, and then to move forward at double-quick, passing their line to the front, and to occupy and hold the wood from which the enemy were being driven. My orders were promptly obeyed, the men charging bayonets into the woods with a terrific yell. I established my line by your command near the edge of wood, throwing out pickets to the front. The men rested upon their arms until morning without sleep, ready and anxious to renew the conflict at daybreak if necessary.

I desire to remark that my regiment behaved with great coolness and bravery during the entire action, obeying my orders as promptly as at dress parade. There was no one officer or private that showed any signs of trepidation or fear, but instead a fixed determination of all that their bayonets should drink deep of rebel blood before they should take the battery, which they attempted to do three several times, but were repulsed each time with great loss. As to the behavior of my command during this portion of the engagement I would respectfully refer you to Lieutenant Kirby, commanding the battery.

It gives me great pleasure to speak approvingly of the conduct of Major Philbrick, who had just assumed the duties of that position, showing conclusively that our confidence in him had not been misplaced; also of my entire staff. Surgeons Bates and Haven were indefatigable in their attendance upon the wounded. Chaplain Scandlin labored incessantly bringing the wounded from the field, often exposing himself to imminent danger by so doing. Too much praise cannot be awarded to Adjutant Baldwin, who got up from a sick bed against my express wishes to render me what service he could. He was scarcely able to sit upon his horse, but he remained with me during the entire battle, conveying my orders with great promptness and precision.

Where all did their duty so well it would be manifestly unjust to particularize any one or more of the line officers for individual notice,

and I will therefore say that their behavior without exception during this engagement meets with my entire approbation and approval.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN W. KIMBALL,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Capt. DANIEL HEBARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 29.

Report of Col. Alfred Sully, First Minnesota Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MINNESOTA VOLUNTEERS,
Fair Oaks, Va., June 3, 1862.

SIR: Agreeably to instructions I have the honor to report the movements of my regiment in the actions of the 31st of May and 1st of June.

We left camp at about 2 p. m. on the 31st ultimo, and marched from Tyler's house, crossed the Chickahominy, reached the battle-field near the railroad station at Fair Oaks about 4.30 p. m., my regiment leading the column. On reaching the field of action I found General Casey's division had been repulsed and that General Couch's division were hard pressed by an overwhelming force of the rebels. I here met the latter general, and was informed by him that the enemy in strong force were marching to outflank him on the right, and as I was ahead of the rest of the division some distance, not waiting for the commander of my troops, I moved rapidly to the right about a quarter of a mile, formed my regiment in line of battle, wheeled them to the right, and, charging across the field, took my position in an oblique direction, my right resting on a farm-house, my left on the edge of a woods. The enemy opened on us, but fired too high.

Soon after the First Chasseurs formed on my left and a battery on their left. The enemy left the field in my front, and, forming in the woods on my left, opened a severe fire on us, which was returned by my men. The enemy were here slaughtered in great numbers within a very few yards of our line.

Two pieces were sent late in the evening to my assistance, under command of Captain Brady, and did good execution. Other troops were also sent to strengthen our position on the right. This position we have still kept.

I would respectfully state to the brigadier-general commanding that the regiment behaved with great coolness, under as heavy a fire as I have ever seen.

We took several prisoners, among them a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and some officers of subordinate rank.

With much respect, your obedient servant,

ALF. SULLY,
Colonel First Minnesota.

Captain HEBARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 30.

Report of Col. James A. Suiter, Thirty-fourth New York Infantry.

FAIR OAKS, IN FRONT OF RICHMOND, VA.,

June 3, 1862.

In pursuance of orders I beg leave to submit the following report :

I left camp near Tyler's house on the north side of Chickahominy at about 2 o'clock p. m. on Saturday, the 31st day of May, 1862, preceded by the First Minnesota Regiment, and followed by the Eighty-second New York (Second New York Militia) Regiment, Gorman's brigade. We passed up the river about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, when we crossed, encountering great difficulties in passing the low lands adjacent to the south bank of the river, occasioned by an overflow of the banks of the stream, the men having some of the way to march through the water and mud waist-deep. We arrived on this field about 5.30 p. m. I immediately formed my command in line, its right near the house on the high ground and extending thence easterly along a post-and-rail fence toward the wood in that direction ; two pieces of artillery (a portion of Rickett's battery) being posted on the opposite side of said house ; the First Minnesota Regiment filing off and forming in line of battle on the right, their line extending along and past a piece of woods situated on the westerly side of said house and about 150 yards distant from it ; the Eighty-second New York forming in our rear, their line parallel with ours.

About this time we heard volleys of musketry on the westerly side of the house. I was ordered to forward in line over the fence, and then formed on the right into line. While I was executing the last-mentioned movement the right of my line received heavy volleys of musketry from the direction of the woods on the west side of the house, which was returned by my command as it arrived on the line. The Eighty-second New York wheeled into line on my right, its right resting upon and supporting the battery, its left on my right. The firing became general along the whole line and continued so for some time, the enemy several times emerging from the woods, evidently with the intention of charging upon and capturing the guns above mentioned, but were as often repulsed and driven back.

About 7.30 o'clock the enemy were seen to file out of the woods on the west, evidently with the intention of outflanking and turning our left. About this time the Twentieth Massachusetts Regiment wheeled into line in continuation of ours and on our left. A few well-directed volleys repulsed the enemy at this point and drove them back under cover of the woods. About a quarter of 8 o'clock I was ordered to charge the enemy with the bayonet in the woods, which they did in good order, pouring into them a withering and deadly fire as they charged, the enemy standing their ground till my command mounted the fence on the skirt of the woods, when they broke and ran in great confusion. We followed them about 20 rods, when we lost sight of them in the darkness. I was ordered to withdraw my command, which I did, and formed it in the field just outside of the wood, when we rested for the night.

My loss during the engagement was 19 killed, 76 wounded, and 3 missing.* Three of the wounded have since died.

The officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of my command

*But see revised statement, p. 758.

manifested the utmost degree of courage and bravery during the whole engagement.

I was assisted in the field by Lieut. Col. Byron Laffin, Maj. Charles L. Brown, and Adj. George W. Thompson, all of whom rendered invaluable services. Their conduct, as well as that of my entire command, throughout the engagement, cannot be too highly commended.

All of which is most respectfully submitted.

JAMES A. SUITER,
Colonel, Commanding Thirty-fourth New York Volunteers.

Brig. Gen. WILLIS A. GORMAN, *Commanding.*

No. 31.

Report of Lieut. Col. Henry W. Hudson, Eighty-second New York Infantry.

HDQRS. EIGHTY-SECOND N. Y. VOLS. (LATE 2D N. Y. S. M.),
Battle-field of Fair Oaks, Va., June 1, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the regiment under my command, after enjoying a temporary rest of a few hours since being on picket duty, were called to arms at our late camp on Goodey Creek, near Tyler's house, while at dinner on Saturday, May 31, and line at once formed, together with the rest of our division (General Sedgwick's), and after a tedious and trying march through the Chickahominy Swamp and its environs arrived at this point at about 4.30 o'clock in the afternoon, our line being at once formed, the Thirty-fourth Regiment New York Volunteers being in our front. The enemy made a dash at the front of our position, but their main attack was simultaneously made on our right flank, with the evident intention of taking our battery (Kirby's). In company with the Thirty-fourth we were at once marched double-quick to support the battery, and took our position with the battery on our right, the Thirty-fourth on our left. At this time the enemy had charged to within about 40 or 50 rods of the battery, and received a most terrific fire from my command, which evidently staggered him and caused him to fall back with heavy loss. Again and again did he renew his efforts to take our position, but every time repulsed with heavy loss.

In company with the Thirty-fourth New York Volunteers and Fifteenth Massachusetts we pressed forward, firing as we advanced, and finally drove him from the field at the point of the bayonet, and, darkness closing about us, we rested on our arms, the Fifteenth Massachusetts advancing in front of us on the edge of the timber when the enemy had retreated.

As all of my regiment, both officers and men, behaved well, it would be invidious for me to make comparisons, but I cannot let this opportunity pass without mentioning the assistance I received from every officer under my command during the action. My command entered the action with an average of 60 rounds of ammunition, and at the close had barely 6 rounds each left.

I herewith subjoin the list of casualties * in the action, in which it ap-

* Embodied in return, p. 758.

pears that my right wing suffered the most, being the point near the battery, and consequently more exposed to the enemy's fire.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

H. W. HUDSON,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Capt. DANIEL HEBARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Gorman's Brigade.

No. 32.

Report of Brig. Gen. William W. Burns, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS BURNS' BRIGADE,
Camp, Fair Oaks Station, June 3, 1862.

In obedience to the circular order of General Sumner, commanding Second Corps, I have the honor to make the following report, and also inclose the reports of the regimental commanders of my brigade :

Marching with the division from our camp near Tyler's house May 31, at 2 o'clock p. m., my brigade was second in the order of column. Arriving at Adams' farm, the leading brigade (General Gorman) was formed in the first line of deployed battalions. My brigade formed the second line of battalions in mass. Before my brigade had completely formed the enemy opened on the right of the first line. I received an order from General Sedgwick to throw two of my regiments perpendicularly to the right, to prevent the enemy from turning our right flank and getting to our line of communications, which they seemed inclined to do. I immediately deployed Colonel Baxter, Seventy-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Colonel Owen, Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, to the right, in the woods, and advanced in line of battle through the swamp entanglement about 300 yards, General Sedgwick assuming command of my other two regiments, the Seventy-first Pennsylvania Volunteers (First California), Major Smith, and the One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Morehead, continuing them in support of the first line.

After getting my line established I went back to the road for more definite instructions and met Captain Sedgwick, assistant adjutant-general, who told me to join the left of my line to Colonel Sully's right, he forming the right of the first line. I immediately sent my aide to find Colonel Sully's right, and directed the left of Colonel Baxter's to join him. Supposing this accomplished, I again went back to the road to see what changes were taking place in the order of battle. Being unable to see anything in the woods, I met Captain Sedgwick again, who informed me that my left had not found Colonel Sully's right. I immediately rode up the road, and found that the first line had changed front during the battle and was in an open field nearly parallel to my new position. Bringing my line to the open space, Colonel Baxter's left overlapped Colonel Sully's right. Colonel Owen was on his right and rear, covering the right of the road which leads from Courtney's to Golding's house. Then, night approaching and the enemy being driven back, the battle ceased.

The loss of my brigade was 5 killed and 30 wounded, including (wounded) Capt. F. H. Achuff, One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania

Volunteers; Capt. John A. Markoe and Lieut. F. H. Donaldson, First California. I am entirely satisfied with the conduct of my brigade. It has been christened under fire, and will do what is required of it.

About 12 o'clock at night I was directed by General Sumner to take the Seventy-first Pennsylvania Volunteers (First California) back toward the bridge crossing Chickahominy Creek, and with it the Nineteenth Massachusetts, Colonel Hinks, Forty-second New York, Colonel Charles, and Sixty-third New York, Colonel Burke, hold our line of communication, protecting the artillery and ammunition, nearly all of which was mixed in the bottom on this side.

On the morning of the 1st of June I was ordered back to support the attack on that morning, and arrived at the close of the battle, when I was again ordered back to the protection of the communications.

Capt. F. N. Clarke, chief of artillery, and Colonel Tompkins, Rhode Island Artillery, deserve great credit for energy and skill in getting up artillery and ammunition, which they succeeded in doing by daylight, working all night.

Capt. G. A. Hicks, assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. Thomas J. Blakeney, First California, and Lieut. H. S. Camblos, One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, my aides-de-camp, deserve my hearty approbation. Lieutenant Camblos was slightly wounded in the head. Brig. Surg. J. A. Lidell took charge of a house for his hospital, and performed the duties of his profession with a nerve and skill which confirmed his high scientific reputation and assured to him the gratitude of all.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. W. BURNS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. WILLIAM D. SEDGWICK,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 33.

Report of Brig. Gen. N. J. T. Dana, commanding Third Brigade.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., SECOND DIV., SECOND CORPS,
Battle-field, Fair Oaks Station, Va., June 3, 1862.

I have the honor to report the operations of this brigade in the battles of the 31st ultimo and 1st instant on this field as follows:

About 1.30 o'clock p. m. of the first-mentioned date heavy firing was heard at our camp at Dr. Tyler's, on the east side of the Chickahominy River, and soon afterward I received an order from division headquarters to get my brigade under arms. This was immediately done. Soon after this the division marched with my brigade in the rear. The Nineteenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers were on outlying picket on that day, and did not therefore accompany us, but the three remaining regiments, viz, the Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers, Col. W. R. Lee commanding; the Seventh Michigan Volunteers, Col. I. R. Grosvenor commanding, and the Forty-second New York Volunteers, Col. E. C. Charles commanding, each marched with promptness. Colonel Grosvenor was very ill, and left his bed to accompany his regiment, and as I did not suppose there was any probability of an action before the next day I prevailed on him reluctantly when near the Chickahominy not to cross, but to return to bed in camp, and come up early

in the morning. He accordingly left the regiment under the command of Major Richardson.

Immediately after crossing the river I received an order from you to leave my smallest regiment at the crossing as a guard to the three batteries following immediately in my rear and to move forward with the other two. I accordingly left Colonel Charles with the Forty-second New York Volunteers for that duty. At this time there was no firing in our front, but I halted a few moments to load, and soon after this the firing recommenced. I then hastened forward, quickening the pace to double-quick. On reaching the field I received an order from you to form my command in columns of divisions in rear of Kirby's battery to support the first line of battle, which was then engaged warmly with the enemy, who were posted in a wood in front. I was carrying this order into execution when I received one from General Sumner to form in line of battle, and immediately afterward an order to prolong the first line of battle, already formed, by extending on the left of it, and immediately to engage the enemy. I may be pardoned a feeling of pride when I can report that the Massachusetts men, the veterans of Ball's Bluff, and the Western men of Michigan, as yet unscathed by fire, came into action with a bearing of which their States may well be proud, and before the movement was fully executed received a withering volley from the enemy's right at short range with steadiness.

No sooner was my position taken in line than I discovered the rebel force in a slight valley in front, where he found a little cover, extending his right to outflank our force, and my arrival was not a moment too early. After replying to his first volley I immediately advanced at double-quick, dislodging him and compelling him to take to cover of woods about 150 yards in his rear. Halting a moment to reform my line I advanced again to force him through the woods with the bayonet. We received only a scattering fire from him till we came within 50 yards of the wood (it being then dark), when we were again met with a full volley. At this time I compelled the Seventh Michigan, which was on the left, to cease its fire, changed its front a little to meet a corresponding change of the enemy, and then ordered a fire by company, which was well executed in volleys. This closed the action for the day, and we lay on our arms where we stood for the night.

About daybreak of the 1st instant the enemy left the wood in front of my position and renewed his attack, by turning our left and attempting to pierce through our lines between this corps and the one next on the left. Through the bloody operations of the day this brigade held its place on the extreme right of our position, holding the left of the enemy in check. This brigade acquitted itself well and gallantly, so much so that I can hardly particularize, but justice demands the special mention of a few who came more under my personal notice. My two staff officers, Lieutenant Pierson, of the Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers, and Lieutenant Bishop, of the Nineteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, were remarkably prompt, active, and distinguished for gallantry. Adjutant Landon, of the Seventh Michigan Volunteers, severely wounded, was very conspicuous for gallantry and lofty soldierly bearing. Lieutenant Shafter, Seventh Michigan Volunteers, in charge of the pioneers, who was slightly wounded but kept the field, furnished beautiful exhibitions of gallant conduct and intelligent activity. Private John J. Brown, of Company G, Seventh Michigan Volunteers, who served with me as a bugler, was particularly cool and brave. I ask attention also to the names of enlisted men of the Seventh Michigan Volunteers mentioned for gallantry in Major Richardson's report.

I regret to report the loss of 16 killed and 113 wounded, including 4 commissioned officers,* for details of which I refer to the reports and lists of Colonels Lee and Grosvenor and Major Richardson, commanding, which are herewith inclosed. Having been so unfortunate as to have my horse killed, I ask permission to retain a captured animal which I have now in possession until I can make other arrangements.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, &c.,

N. J. T. DANA,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. WILLIAM D. SEDGWICK,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

N. B.—I omitted to report above that many prisoners were captured by my brigade, and among them Brigadier-General Pettigrew and Lieutenant-Colonel Bull, by the Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers, and an aide of General Whiting's by the Seventh Michigan Volunteers.

No. 34.

Report of Col. W. Raymond Lee, Twentieth Massachusetts Infantry.

HDQRS. TWENTIETH REGIMENT MASSACHUSETTS VOLS.,
Camp near Fair Oaks Station, June 3, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report for the information of Brig. Gen. N. J. T. Dana, commanding brigade, of Sedgwick's division, the operations of my regiment (the Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers) in connection with the combats with the insurgent forces on the 31st ultimo and 1st instant:

On the afternoon of the 31st ultimo I received your orders to get my regiment under arms for immediate movement in light marching order, with one day's rations and 60 rounds of ammunition per man. These orders were at once executed, and at 4 p. m. the regiment moved with the division as the rear battalion. Heavy firing in front was then audible. After crossing the Chickahominy River I received orders to take the advance of the New York Forty-second and to move forward with the greatest possible celerity. Between 5.30 and 6 o'clock p. m. the rifles were loaded by an order from Staff-Officer Pierson, and the march was continued at quick-step, soon changed to double-quick, at which step we came onto the battle-field a few minutes before 6 p. m.

At this time our forces were fairly engaged with those of the enemy, the artillery and infantry both being in action. The regiment came under fire, losing 2 or 3 men, immediately upon filing from the road onto the field of action just in the rear of our line of battle. Conducted by a brigade staff officer we proceeded to the left, where the battalion came into line of battle, forming on the right of the Michigan Seventh, which, with our own regiment, was the only portion of the brigade engaged on that day. The enemy's right was immediately in our front and we opened fire upon it. In a few minutes, in obedience to orders from General Dana, the two regiments—those of his brigade—moved rapidly forward to a ridge of the ground on which we were operating; the enemy's line, its right only a short distance in front of our position, then came fully under view. It was curved, offering its concavity to

*But see revised statement, p. 758.

our own line, and its extreme right was extended considerably beyond our left, the curve seeming to lap around us. Moreover it was formed in a slight valley offering great advantages—that is, a slight cover for a firing party and also protection for a flank movement designed to turn our left, advantages which the enemy were quick to avail of.

From the ridge of ground above referred to we opened a rapid and effective fire, maintained only a few moments, for the enemy soon began to fall away, the wavering of their line being converted into a disorderly rout; when, in compliance with orders from General Dana, simultaneously with the infantry battalion on our right and the Michigan Seventh on our left, the line rushed forward with loud cheers. So far as I know the enemy did not stop in their hasty retreat to fire a shot, but sought the cover of the wood-land on our left adjacent to the railroad. They partially rallied and reformed upon gaining the cover of the woods, maintaining for a few moments an ill-directed fire, and attempting, I think, to turn the left, made futile by a slight change of front to the left, executed by the Michigan Seventh and the left wing of our own regiment.

It was now getting dark and the enemy soon ceased firing, seemingly retiring. We occupied the field on which we halted after the last movement to the front all night under arms, engaged mainly in securing prisoners and collecting and providing as we best could for the enemy's wounded, who were numerous, and scattered on the field around us. Among the latter were Brigadier-General Pettigrew, of South Carolina, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bull, of Georgia. I am happy to record that the men of my regiment cheerfully gave up their blankets and rations to these wounded unfortunates who had thus come under our care.

On the morning of June 1, soon after the attack of the enemy on our center and left commenced, we took position on the right of our general center, as a part, I presume, of the reserve. With slight changes in our position, to conform to and meet the threatened movements of the enemy, the regiment remained under arms all the day and night of June 1.

Our burying party reports 13 of the enemy's dead collected on the field in front and on left of our last position after the action of May 31. Twenty-six wounded of the enemy were also collected and put under the care of Dr. E. H. R. Revere, our assistant regimental surgeon, for treatment. Seven unhurt prisoners were captured on the evening of May 31 and sent to headquarters. We also collected on the field of battle after the action of May 31 112 muskets and rifles, one box of fixed ammunition, and some other articles of public property, all of which property has been duly turned over to a proper authority.

I inclose a list of casualties (paper A)—2 killed and 18 wounded—the result of the operations of May 31 and June 1.

I have great pleasure in reporting that the officers and men of the regiment performed all their appropriate and respective duties with cheerfulness and propriety.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. RAYMOND LEE,

Colonel Twentieth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.

Lieut. E. P. BISHOP,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 35.

Report of Col. Ira R. Grosvenor, Seventh Michigan Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH MICHIGAN REGIMENT,
In the field before Richmond, Fair Oaks, Va., June 3, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with brigade orders I have the honor to submit for the consideration of the commanding general of the brigade a report of the engagement of this regiment at this place on the 1st instant. At an early hour this regiment, acting on the left of the brigade, was in line of battle, and in conjunction with the Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers and a battery of artillery held in check the left wing of the enemy during the entire day. Though much exhausted by the hard-fought battle of the day before and the sleepless vigilance of the previous night, each officer and man of the entire command seemed to vie with every other in coolness, prompt obedience to orders, and a determination to discharge the whole duty of a soldier.

Our casualties were light compared with those of the previous day, a full detail of which I will submit as soon as the same can be correctly ascertained.*

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

IRA R. GROSVENOR,
Colonel Seventh Michigan Volunteers.

Lieut. E. P. BISHOP,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Dana's Brigade.

No. 36.

Report of Maj. John H. Richardson, Seventh Michigan Infantry.

HDQRS. SEVENTH REGIMENT MICHIGAN VOLUNTEERS,
Fair Oaks, Va., May 31, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to your marching order of this date the regiment was in line and on the march. Upon returning to the regiment, having been previously detailed with 200 men upon fatigue duty, I was surprised to find the regiment upon the march, with Colonel Grosvenor at its head. Having left him in the morning sick upon his bed in his tent, not able to sit up, and had not been for the two days previous, having had a very severe attack of cholera morbus, I deemed it a duty which he owed both to himself and his command that he should have remained in his tent rather than be at the head of the regiment in saddle commanding; and it was only by your advice, as I was informed, with the many and urgent requests of his friends, that he was induced to return, there being at that time no probability of an engagement before the next morning, at which time he was to rejoin his regiment if able. After having assumed command nothing of importance occurred until within about a mile of this place, when we were ordered to the front in haste. When near this place the regiment received the order to march at double-quick, which was kept up until it reached the point indicated by you as our line of battle.

*For casualties, see return, p. 758.

Some little delay and confusion occurred in coming into line, owing to two orders being given, the second being given before the first was fully completed. As soon as formed in line and at work the regiment did good execution, which was worthy of veteran soldiers, they being exposed to a galling fire from the enemy during the engagement.

It is with extreme regret that I have to report the loss of this regiment in killed and wounded from 95 to 100, of which 14 were killed.* Among the wounded are Adjt. H. B. Landon, severely; Lieutenants Vrooman, Shafter, Hamilton, and Ingersoll, slightly. Among others several amputations will have to be made.

I cannot close this report without making particular mention of the gallantry and bravery of some of the enlisted men, of which the following are a part: Sergeant Vansickle, Company H, continued to fight after receiving a wound in the leg; William Clemens, bugler, took the first man's gun that fell out, and did good execution until killed, near the close of the action; Corporal Foreman, Company C, continued fighting after wounded in the leg, until, exhausted by loss of blood, he fainted and was taken off the field; Private Todd, Company C, fought on after being mortally wounded to the close of the action, and soon after expired upon the field; Samuel French, Company E, continued to fight after being wounded in the thigh until he fainted from loss of blood.

Herewith you will find Schedule A, containing a list of the killed and wounded so far as ascertained.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

J. H. RICHARDSON,
Major, Commanding.

Brigadier-General DANA,
Third Brigade.

No. 37.

*Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, U. S. Army, commanding
Third and Fourth Corps.*

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS,
Savage Station, June 7, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of the Third and Fourth Army Corps under my command during the engagement of the 31st May and the 1st of June.

On the 25th of May General Keyes' corps was placed under my command. He was directed to advance to the Seven Pines, on the Williamsburg road, about 7 miles from the city of Richmond. My corps was ordered to cross the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge and occupy the positions, 2 miles in advance of it, marked A and B on the accompanying map,† and to watch the crossings of the White Oak Swamp, with the roads beyond, covering our left flank and rear. On that same day I crossed the river and occupied the positions indicated. General Keyes' corps advanced. The next day, a reconnaissance having been ordered, I rode forward a mile beyond the Seven Pines, and had the positions examined to the right front.

General Casey's division was located a short distance back of the

*But see revised statement, p. 758.

†To appear in Atlas.

Seven Pines. He selected a position in front of the Seven Pines at which to throw up some defensive works. At his request I let him move forward and occupy the ground. He did so, and immediately commenced strengthening it with rifle pits and abatis.

The engineers now made a more thorough examination, and it was decided to hold a position about three-quarters of a mile in advance, as it covered a cross-road leading from the Seven Pines toward the Old Tavern, the latter strongly occupied by the enemy. General Casey moved his division forward and work was commenced on this new position. It progressed but slowly, however, on account of the incessant rains. This was on the 29th. On that day there was a sharp skirmish; Major Kelley, New York Volunteers, killed, and 2 privates wounded. On the 30th our pickets and the enemy's were again engaged. In the afternoon we had a heavy thunder-storm, with torrents of rain, continuing until late in the night and putting a stop to all work.

On the next day, the 31st, the forenoon was quiet. About 1 p. m. I first heard firing, more than there had been for several days. I sent Lieutenants Hunt and Johnson, two of my aides, to the front to learn what it was. At 2 p. m. I received a note from Lieutenant Jackson, of General Keyes' staff, informing me that the enemy were pressing them very hard, especially on the railroad, and asking me to send two brigades, if I had them at hand to spare. On this I sent orders for a brigade to advance up the railroad as a support. The one selected by General Kearny was General Birney's brigade.

Previous to this I had received instructions from the commanding general to hold the Seven Pines at all hazards, but not to move the troops guarding the approaches of Bottom's Bridge and crossing of the White Oak Swamp, unless it became absolutely necessary to hold the position in front at the Seven Pines. Believing the position in front of the Seven Pines to be a critical one, and not having entire confidence in the raw troops comprising the division of General Casey, I sought and obtained permission on Friday afternoon to advance a portion of my corps from its position near Bottom's Bridge. The order was to make such disposition of the troops of my corps as I saw fit. I immediately ordered two brigades of Kearny's division to move forward on the Williamsburg stage road and encamp about three-quarters of a mile in advance of Savage Station.

Lieutenants Hunt and Johnson returned about 2.30 p. m., having seen General Keyes, by whom they were directed to report that his front line, which was held by Casey's division, was being driven in. The road from the front was at this time filled with fugitives. I mounted my horse and rode briskly to the front. At the corner of the field, not a third of a mile from my headquarters, I saw the fugitives from the battle-field increasing in numbers as I advanced.

I had already given orders for all the available troops to advance to support those in front, as well as sent an officer to communicate with General Sumner and request his assistance. This officer met a staff officer sent by General Sumner to offer me assistance.

On reaching the front I met our troops fiercely engaged with the enemy near the Seven Pines, having lost the first position, three-fourths of a mile in advance. General Keyes was there, and from him I learned the position of affairs. Our re-enforcements now began to arrive. General Berry's brigade was sent into the woods on our left and ordered to outflank the enemy, who occupied in force General Casey's camp, and had a battery of artillery near a large wood-pile in rear of the unfinished redoubt. This position General Berry held till dark, when

General Jameson's brigade came up, the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania having gone up the railroad from Savage Station, as the main road was full of fugitives. I directed him to send a regiment to the right to support General Peck. He sent the Eighty-seventh New York, Colonel Dodge. The other two regiments, the Sixty-third and One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania, went to the left through the woods and were deployed by General Kearny's order across the Williamsburg road, and they gallantly drove the enemy out of the abatis and rifle pits, holding their position for an hour and a half. This brought the time to about 5 o'clock, at which hour the enemy received a re-enforcement of a division, and began to drive our troops out of the woods on the right of the road.

The fire had increased so much that I went to the left to order two of General Peck's regiments from where they were guarding a road leading from White Oak Swamp to support this line. I met them coming, having been ordered across by General Keyes. They went into the woods, but, together with the troops already there, were driven out by the overwhelming masses of the enemy. General Jameson rode across to rally them, but was met by a volley from the enemy. His horse fell with three balls in him. In falling the general's leg was caught under the animal. Some men of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania came, lifted the horse off, and helped the general away. General Peck's horse was shot under him, and several other officers had their horses struck or were themselves wounded at this time. Their exertions, however, partially rallied the retiring regiments, and they fell back fighting. This brought us into a narrow strip of wood along the main road.

With the assistance of my staff and other officers we succeeded in rallying fragments of regiments to the number of about 1,800 men. Part of these General Keyes took to the left of the road. I placed Colonel Hays, of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, in command of the remainder, with two companies of his regiment just returned from picket. This force I ordered to advance. They succeeded in repulsing the advancing enemy. This was late in the afternoon, and the fire gradually slackened and ceased on this part of the field. The enemy never got beyond those woods. A new line was formed in some unfinished rifle pits about one-half a mile in rear, and occupied by the troops of Generals Couch's and Kearny's divisions and such troops of General Casey's as could be collected.

When the troops on the right of the road near the Seven Pines gave way the enemy pushed several regiments across the main road, placing them between General Berry's brigade, part of Jameson's, and the portion of our troops who gave way from the right of the road. These troops, however, most gallantly held their position on the rebel right flank, and kept up such a deadly fire that no effort the enemy made could dislodge them. They remained till dark, firing away 60 rounds of ammunition to each man, then supplying themselves with cartridges from the dead and wounded. Their fire completely commanded the open space in their front, and not a mounted man succeeded in passing under their fire. When night came on they fell back about a mile, took the Saw-mill road, and by 8 p. m. joined their division. When we reoccupied their ground again the rebel dead covering their front attested their coolness and accuracy of fire.

Early in the afternoon (3 p. m.) an order was sent, on the application of General Keyes, to General Kearny to send a brigade up the railroad to his assistance. The order sent to General Kearny was to send a

brigade up the railroad to the front, and General Birney was ordered up. I learned after I arrived on the field of battle that the brigade had halted on the railroad a very short distance from the camp. I sent at least two orders for it to advance. From the reports, a few chance shots fell among the left of this brigade, but I cannot learn that it was engaged during the day. Had it gone into action between the railroad and the Williamsburg road, as I expected it would, I believe we would have driven back the enemy and have recaptured our artillery lost before I came on the field. The gallant manner in which the brigade fought when led into action the next day by the gallant Col. J. H. Hobart Ward shows what it would have done if it had taken part in the battle of the previous day. Through what misunderstanding or counter-order it was kept back I am unable to say. After the battle General Birney was placed under arrest by my order, and brought before a court-martial for disobedience of orders. The court honorably acquitted him.

General Keyes has written such an excellent report of the operations of his corps that it is scarcely necessary for me to add to it. So much has, however, been said as to the conduct of General Casey's division that it is due to him and to the troops he commanded that I should give my views. General Casey in his report says:

On the morning of the 31st my pickets toward the right of my line succeeded in capturing Lieutenant Washington, an aide of General Johnston, of the rebel service. This circumstance, in connection with the fact that Colonel Hunt, my general officer of the day, had reported to me that his outer pickets had heard cars running nearly all night on the Richmond end of the railroad, led me to exercise increased vigilance.

Between 11 and 12 o'clock a mounted vedette was sent in from the advance pickets to report that a body of the enemy was in sight, approaching on the Richmond road. I immediately ordered the One hundred and third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers to advance to the front, for the purpose of supporting the picket. It was soon afterward reported to me by a mounted vedette that the enemy were advancing in force, and about the same time two shells were thrown over my camp. I was led to believe that a serious attack was contemplated, and immediately ordered the division under arms, the men at work on the rifle pits and abatis to be recalled and to join their regiments, the artillery to be harnessed up at once, and made every disposition to repel the enemy. Whilst they were in progress the pickets commenced firing.

It is much to be regretted that I knew nothing of this until after the battle. After the firing had attracted my attention I sent two of my aides to the front for information. I received a note at 2 p. m. from General Keyes, merely asking, as I have already said, for two brigades, if I could spare them, to be sent up the railroad. With this indefinite information I ordered up every available man, and as they arrived in succession was forced to put them in action to meet pressing emergencies, without waiting to make a concentrated effort. Nothing but the great gallantry of General Kearny, who had a horse shot under him while leading the Thirty-seventh New York into action, his officers and men, and the steadiness of most of General Couch's division, saved us from a most disastrous defeat.

The defensive works of General Casey's position, in consequence of the increasing rains and the short time allowed him for labor with trenching tools, were in a very unfinished state, and could oppose but a feeble resistance to the overwhelming mass thrown upon them.

The artillery was well served, and some of the regiments fought gallantly until overwhelmed by numbers. After they were once broken, however, they could not be rallied. The road was filled with fugitives (not all from this division) as far as Bottom's Bridge. Colonel Starr's regiment, of General Hooker's division, had to force its way through them with the bayonet, and a guard placed at Bottom's Bridge stopped

over a thousand men. An officer informed me that after we had driven the enemy beyond our first intrenchments he visited General Casey's camp, and found more men bayoneted and shot within their shelter-tents than outside of them. As General Casey in his report has not designated the regiments who did not behave well, I do not feel called upon to mention them.

The One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, One hundredth and Ninety-second New York, and Eleventh Maine, General Casey says, made a charge on the enemy under his eye and by his express orders that would have honored veteran troops. The One hundred and first Pennsylvania and Eighty-sixth New York fought well.

There is one statement in General Palmer's report which it is necessary to notice.

No portion of General Hooker's division was engaged on Saturday, the first day. The heavy loss in General Kearny's division will attest how much his division felt the enemy. After General Kearny's division arrived on the field our forces did not fall back a third of a mile before they checked the enemy. The next day they drove them back, and before night a portion of Sickles' brigade, Hooker's division, occupied at least a portion of General Casey's camps, and brought off numbers of our wounded of the day before and of the enemy's, too, whom they had been compelled to abandon on the field when they retreated.

General Keyes, all the generals of divisions, and most of the generals of brigades, are especially mentioned for good conduct and activity on the field. Many lost their horses. I have already mentioned Generals Jameson and Berry, of General Kearny's division, and will refer you to General Keyes' report, where he specially refers to the exposure and gallantry of the division and brigade commanders of his corps. As all the reports I have received accompany this, it is unnecessary to report their names.

Couch's, Casey's, and Kearny's divisions on the field numbered but 18,500 men. Deducting from this force Casey's division, 5,000, dispersed when I came on the field, and Birney's, 2,300, not engaged, we with less than 11,000 men, after a struggle of three and a half hours, checked the enemy's heavy masses.

General Naglee, who is highly commended for his gallantry and activity, has not yet sent in his regimental reports. It is but just that these should be forwarded to the War Department, as an evidence of the good conduct of the officers and men of the regiments mentioned by their regimental commanders.

When I started for the field I have to regret I was obliged to leave at my headquarters Captain McKeever, chief of my staff, to attend to the forwarding of orders, &c. Shortly after I left he received an order from the commanding general to remain and keep him informed by telegraph of the progress of the battle, and thus I was deprived of his services in the battle. His services and those of Captain Moses, assistant adjutant-general, were very arduous in attending to the wounded, who were all sent to my headquarters for transportation to the White House.

When I arrived on the field I met Samuel Wilkeson, esq., the chief correspondent of the New York Tribune. I accepted his services as volunteer aide, and I wish to bear testimony to his gallantry and coolness during the battle. When the rebel re-enforcements arrived, about 5 o'clock p. m., and our troops commenced to give way, he was conspicuous in the throng aiding in rallying the men. The officers of my staff who were with me at this critical moment, Dr. Milhau, the medi-

cal director of my corps, Lieutenants Norton and Deacon, were also quite active and efficient. Lieutenants Hunt and Johnson, who also behaved with much gallantry, were absent at this moment delivering orders. Captain McKelvy, chief commissary, was very active in carrying orders, and rendered me most efficient service during the battle.

The arrival of General Sedgwick's division of General Sumner's corps on my extreme right late in the afternoon was most opportune. General Abercrombie's brigade had maintained itself most gallantly, but would have been overwhelmed by the masses of the enemy but for this timely assistance. The greatest distance the enemy, with their overwhelming numbers, claim to have driven us back is but a mile and a half. The distance was less. During the evening the troops were formed in the lines before spoken of, and the artillery so disposed as to resist a heavy force should the attack be renewed the next day.

On the next morning, Sunday, June 1, a little before 7 o'clock, firing of musketry commenced near the Fair Oaks Station. This soon became heavy, occasioned by an attack by the enemy on General Sumner's corps, on my right. I immediately gave orders for that portion of General Hooker's division to advance between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. General Hooker gallantly led the Fifth and Sixth New Jersey Regiments forward near the railroad. General Sickles' brigade followed, but finding the enemy in force to the left of the Williamsburg road turned, by my direction, a portion of the brigade to the left of this road. The ground was so boggy that the artillery, after making the attempt to follow, had to return. General Birney's brigade, on the right of General Hooker, and now under command of Col. J. H. Hobart Ward, promptly and gallantly supported the former. After some fighting General Hooker made a gallant charge with the bayonet, leading himself the Fifth and Sixth New Jersey against the rebel troops and driving them back nearly a mile.

In Sickles' brigade, the Seventy-first New York, Colonel Hall, after one or two volleys, made a charge and soon drove the enemy before them. The Seventy-third New York, Major Moriarty, advanced also on the right. The other regiments of this brigade drove the enemy in the same manner. In every instance in which our troops used the bayonet our loss was comparatively light, and the enemy was driven back, suffering heavily. Our troops pushed as far forward as the battle-field of the previous day, where they found many of our wounded and those of the enemy. Ambulances were sent for, and all that could be reached were brought in.

I call attention to the paragraph in General Sickles' report respecting the condition in which he found the field after the enemy retreated—strewn with small-arms, rebel caissons filled with ammunition, baggage wagons, subsistence stores, and forage. In one building at Fair Oaks half a dozen sacks of salt were left. These things indicate their hasty retreat.

On the next morning I sent forward General Hooker with the portion of his division engaged the day before to make a reconnaissance, which he did in a most gallant manner far beyond the position we had on Saturday. As he advanced the enemy's pickets fell back. Our pickets got to within 5 miles of Richmond. In the afternoon our troops fell back and occupied the positions we held before the battle.

Our loss on the first day was seven pieces of artillery from General Casey's division and one (the carriage being injured) from General Couch's. One of these was recovered the next day. I annex a list of

the casualties in the Third and Fourth Corps in the battle of the 31st ultimo and 1st instant.*

As the enemy selected his time and point of attack and failed in his attempt to drive us into the Chickahominy, and as he in his turn was driven back with immense loss, abandoning many of his wounded and leaving his dead unburied, we may well claim a victory, and such it certainly was.

Respectfully submitted.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,
Brigadier-General.

General R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac, New Bridge.

No. 38.

Report of Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Third Corps.

HDQRS. HOOKER'S DIVISION, THIRD ARMY CORPS,
Camp near Fair Oaks Station, Va., June 8, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that in obedience to instructions from the headquarters of the Third Army Corps the Second Brigade, the Fifth and Sixth Regiments of the Third Brigade, and Bramhall's and Osborn's batteries struck camp at White Oak Swamp Bridge about 3 o'clock on the 31st ultimo, and marched first toward Savage Station, and from thence along the Williamsburg Old Stage road in the direction of the battle, nearly 3 miles distant. The roads were heavy, but presented no serious difficulty to our advance until the column reached the Burnt Chimneys, about 2 miles from our camp, where we first encountered the throng of fugitives from the battle-field, which greatly delayed us from that point onward. Colonel Starr's regiment led the column, and I respectfully invite your attention to that part of his report which relates to the difficulties he had to surmount from this cause. In consequence of them my command was prevented from participating in the engagement on the 31st ultimo, as it was sundown when the advance arrived in sight of the field in which the conflict on that day terminated.

As this was a convenient post, we bivouacked for the night, to be in readiness on the following morning. This was Sunday, and its stillness was suddenly broken a little before 7 o'clock by an impulsive musketry fire of considerable volume, which at once discovered the position and designs of the enemy. They had chosen to renew the conflict on the right of where it had ended the night before, and my command, consisting of the Fifth and Sixth New Jersey Regiments and the Second Brigade (Seventieth, Seventy-first, Seventy-second, Seventy-third, and Seventy-fourth New York Regiments), immediately advanced in that direction in column of companies in the order in which they are named. My chief of artillery attempted to follow with his batteries, but was prevented by the miry condition of the fields through which we were compelled to pass.

Apparently the enemy were actively engaged with the troops of Sumner's corps, and in making for the heaviest fire my object was to attack in rear and to destroy him. On the route and near by the enemy

*Embodied in return, p. 759 *et seq.*

I passed on my right a brigade of Kearny's division, under Colonel Ward, standing in line of battle. The enemy were enveloped in a dense forest, which this officer assured me my troops could not penetrate, as a deep swamp extended its entire length; but as no convenient opportunity presented itself for turning it, directions were given for my skirmishers to advance, and we immediately became engaged. They were closely followed by the Fifth and Sixth New Jersey Regiments, the former on the left. The Second Brigade was not yet up, and, apprehensive that the troops engaged might be overcome, all of my staff officers were dispatched to find and press it forward. As there was delay, orders were given Colonel Ward to support my command, which were promptly responded to by that gallant officer, and his brigade was brought into action on the right of the New Jersey regiments.

From the beginning of the action our advance on the rebels along the whole line was slow, but I could feel that it was positive and unyielding. Our lines were well preserved, the fire brisk and unerring, and our troops reliant—all the omens of success. After an interchange of musketry of this character for more than an hour directions were given to advance with the bayonet, when the enemy were thrown into wild confusion, throwing away their arms, hats, and coats, and broke through the forest in the direction of Richmond. At this moment chivalry and rebellion presented a deplorable picture. Pursuit was hopeless.

This being ended, and no other fire heard on any part of the field, the troops were ordered to return to their respective camps. The engagement lasted upward of two hours, and almost all our loss occurred prior to the bayonet charge. The movements of the rebels on Sunday indicate that their purpose was to finish the business they had commenced on Saturday. The column attacked and routed were attempting to force their way over the belt of land lying between the Williamsburg Old Stage road and the railroad, in the direction of our depots in rear.

For the conduct of Ward's brigade I respectfully call your attention to the report of that officer to the chief of the division to which his brigade belongs.

It gives me great pleasure to bear testimony to the continued good conduct of the Fifth and Sixth New Jersey Regiments. Their ranks had been greatly thinned by battle and sickness, and they had been encamped in the immediate neighborhood of troops partially demoralized from the events of the preceding day; yet, on the first indication of a renewal of the conflict, I found the lines formed, and they were as ready to meet it as though our arms had been crowned with success. This is also true of the regiments composing the Second Brigade.

Brigadier-General Patterson was prevented from participating in these operations on Sunday by sickness, and his command devolved on Col. S. H. Starr, of the Fifth New Jersey Regiment, whose energy and courage were conspicuous on every part of the field.

My warmest thanks are also tendered to Colonel Ward for the promptness with which his brigade was brought into action and the gallant manner in which he fought it. Especial mention is also due to Colonel Mott and Lieutenant-Colonel Burling, of the Sixth New Jersey Regiment, for their distinguished services on this field. Here, as elsewhere, they have shown themselves to be officers of uncommon merit. To these bright names I must also add that of Chaplain Samuel T. Moore, of the Sixth New Jersey Regiment, whose care and devotion to the wounded will endear him to the remembrance of every soldier. He

was the last to quit the field. To many others no less deserving honorable mention for signal service I must refer you to the reports of brigade commanders, herewith transmitted.

While these events were developing on the right under my personal supervision the Second Brigade, under its gallant leader, Brigadier-General Sickles, was actively engaged with the enemy to the left. Soon after leaving camp in the morning this brigade had been detached from my column without my knowledge, with direction to pierce the forest on each side of the Williamsburg road. In order that its services may be known and appreciated your attention is especially invited to the report of the brigade commander, herewith inclosed. Attention is also respectfully called to the honorable mention of those officers and men who were distinguished for eminent services on this part of the field. It is a source of extreme satisfaction to me to be informed that the brave officers and men of this brigade everywhere sustained the high character they had nobly earned at Williamsburg. I tender my warmest thanks to their intrepid chief and to them. When I joined I found them in possession of the forest in our front and a portion of the camps occupied by our troops the day previous.

The following morning (Monday) with this brigade, the Fifth and Sixth New Jersey Regiments, Gregg's cavalry, and Bramhall's and Osborn's batteries, all the ground we had lost on Saturday was re-occupied and held. One piece of artillery was recovered; also several caissons and limbers—a number of them belonging to the rebels—and a large quantity of their small-arms, with other valuable property.

On marching from camp at the Oak Bottom Swamp I had been directed to leave the First Brigade, with four pieces of Smith's battery, under Brigadier-General Grover, to defend the crossing at that point, and also to detach the Seventh and Eighth New Jersey Regiments, with two pieces of artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Trawin, Eighth New Jersey Regiment, to hold the rifle pits at Bottom's Bridge. These important services were rendered to my satisfaction. As they have an intimate relation with the operations of other corps of the division I have deemed it proper to forward the reports of those officers, with the accompanying papers.

I must again express my thanks to Capt. Joseph Dickinson, my assistant adjutant-general (and among the wounded), and to Lieut. William H. Lawrence, First Massachusetts Volunteers, aide-de-camp, and Lieuts. Charles L. Young, Tenth New York, and E. L. Price, Seventy-fourth New York Regiment, officers of my staff, for the valuable assistance rendered me throughout these operations.

To the medical director of my division, Surg. T. Sim, I am under especial obligations for his provision and attention to the wounded.

I have the honor to forward herewith the list of killed and wounded. There were 7 commissioned officers wounded; enlisted men, 16 killed, 117 wounded, 9 missing. Aggregate, 149.* About 100 prisoners were taken.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Army Corps.

* But see revised statement, p. 759.

No. 39.

Report of Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations May 31-June 4.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, HOOKER'S DIVISION,
Camp at Fair Oaks, Va., June 12, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the position occupied and the duty performed by my brigade from the 31st day of May till the 4th of June last, during which time it was detached from the division:

On the 31st of May I received information that the division, my brigade excepted, would move at once to the front, and at the same time orders to remain in the position then occupied by me, and to guard at all hazards with my command the bridge over White Oak Creek and the other avenues across White Oak Swamp in that vicinity against any movement the enemy might make to turn the left of our advanced forces, and also to watch, as far as practicable with the means at my command, and report upon any movement of the enemy between my position and the James River. Two sections of Captain Smith's battery still remained under my command.

During the afternoon several horsemen were reported to have been seen on the high ground on the other side of White Oak Creek opposite to our position. On the 1st of June Captain Craven, with his company (M), Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, reported for duty, and were immediately sent out as skirmishers and vedettes, and continued to perform those duties very efficiently until relieved by order of General Keyes on the 3d instant. Though the ground was well covered to and for some miles along the principal road between the creek and James River no parties of the enemy were at any time met, but reports of small scouting parties were occasionally brought in by negroes.

On the 1st of June a communication reached my camp, through the hands of a negro, from a gunboat on the James River, and was duly forwarded to General McClellan's headquarters. On the 3d, Lieutenant Ellis, on signal duty, with a small party passed our position, with orders to communicate, if possible, with the gunboats on James River. This party had not returned up to the time of my leaving. I furnished him with a guide, but had not the means of furnishing an escort. No other incidents worthy of note occurred until the afternoon of the 3d, when orders were received to rejoin the division upon being relieved by General Casey. Pursuant to such orders, General Casey having arrived about 10 a. m. on the 4th, my brigade took up its line of march for the front at 1.30 p. m., and encamped that night in the position it now occupies.

In conclusion, I would state that for several days previous to my joining the division all the streams had been rising. Bottom's Bridge was for a while impassable on account of high water in the adjacent bottoms, and the water in White Oak Creek rose to such a height on the 4th that it was with great difficulty that my picket guard was able to get back from the other side.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. GROVER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Hooker's Division.

No. 40.

Report of Brig. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HDQRS. EXCELSIOR BRIG., 2D (HOOKER'S) DIV.,
Fair Oaks, on the Richmond Stage Road, June 7, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to orders from division headquarters, on Saturday, the 31st ultimo, about 3.30 in the afternoon, this brigade in light marching order moved from its camp at White Oak Swamp to a position on the Richmond and New Kent Old Stage road where it crosses a road leading to Meadow Station. We bivouacked in the pine woods on the right, lying on our arms, and at about 7 a. m. on the following (Sunday) morning we were ordered to follow General Patterson (Third Brigade) along the Stage road to the front, and report to Brigadier-General Hooker, commanding the division. The column was promptly formed and moved forward a few hundred yards, when I was directed by General Heintzelman, commanding the left wing, to form in line on the right of the road in a large field with thick oak undergrowth in front, forming part of Snead's plantation. Before the deployment of the column was completed, Colonel Hall's Second Excelsior being on the right and Colonel Taylor's Third on the left, I was ordered by General Heintzelman to throw two regiments on the left of the road in an opening bordered on the left and front by woods. Colonel Hall was then directed to take position on the left of the road, his right resting on the road, supported by Colonel Taylor on the left. The Fourth, First, and Fifth Regiments were already in line on the right.

These dispositions were made under an annoying fire from the enemy's skirmishers and sharpshooters, who were in the woods and undergrowth in front. Their fire seemed directed almost entirely upon mounted officers. Some of his sharpshooters were taken in the trees. Skirmishers were thrown forward to silence this fire, and the line moved forward briskly on both sides of the road under a heavy fire, to which the Second Regiment, Colonel Hall, and Fourth Regiment, Major Moriarty, immediately on the right and left of the road, were most exposed. After one or two volleys these regiments were pushed forward across the field at double-quick, and with a loud cheer charged into the timber, the enemy flying before them. Major Moriarty's horse falling in the charge, the command of the regiment devolved upon Capt. C. B. Elliott, Company I. On the left Colonel Taylor moved steadily forward in line, as if on parade, to the edge of the timber in front, where he was directed to halt. On the right the First Regiment, Major Holt commanding, and the Fifth Regiment, Colonel Graham, were advanced through the oak undergrowth, instructed to proceed cautiously, observe the enemy, and to engage him if this could be done with advantage. Penetrating the timber and crossing some swampy ground they found the enemy in an open space, drove him back at the point of the bayonet across the clearing, where he disappeared in the woods beyond. This force was composed of troops from Alabama and Mississippi, being principally the Eighth and Ninth Alabama Regiments.

The Second, Fourth, Fifth, and First Excelsior having advanced beyond the line I was directed to hold, they were recalled, Colonel Hall's right and Major Moriarty's left resting on opposite sides of the road.

The enemy having retired, I was ordered by General Heintzelman to send two regiments to support General Richardson, who was hotly engaged farther on the right in the direction of the railroad, and I accordingly hastened Colonel Graham's (Fifth) and Major Holt's (First) to that part of the field, where I am happy to learn they rendered timely and effective service, supporting Captain Patrick's [Pettit's] First New York Battery. The enemy having been driven from that part of the line, I recalled Colonel Graham and Major Holt, posting the former on the right of the Fourth and holding the First in reserve, covered by some timber in the rear on the right of the road. In this position the enemy opened a desultory and harmless fire upon my left from a field battery in front, the shot and shell falling in the woods in front and in the field to the rear.

Skirmishers were thrown out about 400 yards in front and well to the left, when Captain Rafferty, Company H, Second Regiment, was sent out to reconnoiter and ascertain the position of the battery and the force supporting it. Major Toler followed, with two companies of the Second Regiment, and reported to me that the enemy were in force about half a mile to the front and moving toward our left. Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, with six companies of the Second Regiment, was then pushed forward to establish outposts and advance to the Seven Pines, being a portion of the battle ground of Saturday. Here large numbers of our wounded, as well as of the enemy who had fallen the day before, were found and brought to the rear to a hospital which was improvised at my headquarters, in charge of a rebel surgeon, whom we took prisoner, and Surgeon Prentice, Fourth Regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Potter took many prisoners, who were sent to the rear, capturing also a spacious omnibus and four with two negroes on the box, which had brought a distinguished party from Richmond that morning to witness the battle of Sunday. I am unable to furnish you a list of the prisoners, as my staff was constantly occupied in the field and the prisoners having been immediately sent to General Heintzelman, the brigadier-general commanding the division being engaged with the enemy on the right. I respectfully refer to Lieutenant-Colonel Potter's report, herewith transmitted, for the details of his service in command of the outposts, which was gallantly and efficiently performed until night, when he was ordered to bring in his detachment. A line of pickets was thrown out at dusk, and we remained in position, resting on our arms all night. During the night the enemy fell back a mile or more on Richmond, moving their artillery and wagon train along a road leading from the left of Casey's camp.

The dashing charge of the Second and Fourth Regiments, the cool and steady advance of the Third, occurred under my immediate observation, and could not have been surpassed. The bold and vigorous movement of the Fifth and First to the right was in the main concealed from my view by the heavy timber through which they passed. The best evidence that these regiments sustained their reputation is found in the fact that they drove the enemy from his position by their sustained fire and with the unfailing bayonet.

To the commanding officers of regiments I am greatly indebted for the prompt and gallant execution of all orders and for their judicious conduct at moments when my presence in other parts of the field occasionally delayed my communications with them. Attention is respectfully invited to the full and complete reports, copies of which are inclosed, from Col. George B. Hall, Second; Col. Nelson Taylor, Third; Col. Charles K. Graham, Fifth; Maj. Thomas Holt, commanding First,

and Capt. C. B. Elliott, commanding Fourth, all of the Excelsior Brigade.

My particular acknowledgments are due to Lieutenant Tremain, Fourth Regiment, aide-de-camp and acting assistant adjutant-general, upon whom I relied for nearly all the staff duty in the field throughout the day. His arduous duties were performed with courage, zeal, and ability. Lieut. J. L. Palmer, Second Regiment, although scarcely convalescent from recent indisposition, volunteered his services for staff duty, and performed his duties with intelligence and address.

It affords me great pleasure to notice the exertions of the medical director of the division, Surg. Thomas Sim, and of Surgeon Calhoun, Fifth Excelsior, and Surgeon Prentice, Fourth Excelsior, in behalf of the large number of wounded in the battle of Saturday, belonging to Casey's and Couch's divisions, who were rescued and brought to the rear.

My loss in the action was 8 killed, 58 wounded, and 6 missing; the details having been already furnished.*

I have especially to regret Captain Nolen, Company A, and Lieutenant Laurier, commanding Company K, Second Regiment, who were seriously wounded while bravely leading their companies in a bayonet charge.

The fields were strewn with Enfield rifles, marked "Tower, 1862," and muskets marked "Virginia," thrown away by the enemy in his hurried retreat. In the camp occupied by General Casey and General Couch on Saturday, before the battle of the Seven Pines, we found rebel caissons filled with ammunition, a large number of small-arms, and several baggage wagons, besides two barns filled with subsistence and forage. The most conclusive proof of his flight is the abandonment of six or seven sacks of salt, which we found in one of the out-buildings at Fair Oaks on the left of the redoubt.

I have to apologize for the delay in forwarding this report. My command has been ever since employed in the most arduous service. It was not until to-day that I could, without prejudice to more urgent duties in the field, obtain the leisure to consolidate the reports of the commanding officers of regiments, which is all I have attempted to do in this communication. I shall have the honor to transmit a separate report of the part assigned to this brigade in the operations of the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th June.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. SICKLES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. JOS. DICKINSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Hooker's Division.

No. 41.

Reports of Maj. Thomas Holt, Seventieth New York Infantry, of operations May 31-June 5.

HDQRS. FIRST REGIMENT, EXCELSIOR BRIGADE.

June 3, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report that according to marching orders, received at about 3 p. m. on Saturday, May 31, we took up

*But see revised statement, p. 759.

our line of march at the head of the brigade column, being the first prepared to move. At 6 p. m. we encamped for the night, and on the next morning followed the Fifth Regiment into the field. By your order we deployed to the right after the brilliant charge of the Second Regiment upon the enemy. For nearly 2 miles we advanced through the dense woods, thickly interwoven with underbrush, and for the most part over deep marshes. Emerging therefrom we formed the line of battle, our men crouching low and watching for the enemy in a partially open field, studded with a growth of low pines. In a few moments the enemy was discovered lurking on our extreme left, and before we could open on them poured a flanking fire along the left of our regiment. Our men rising and rapidly rallying from the sudden attack with quick fire soon drove the enemy from his position.

After this we were ordered to the left to form a connection with the Fourth Regiment, which we could nowhere find; hence we rested in an open field near the hospital depot of the Fifth Maine Regiment, where we received orders to move to the right along the railroad for the support of a battery, which proved to be the First New York, Captain Patrick [Pettit] commanding, which was accordingly done. After the lapse of nearly two hours we marched back by your order to the ground near the brigade headquarters, where we encamped last night.

This morning at 8 o'clock we took up our line of march, following the Third Regiment, and marched over the ground lately occupied by General Casey's division, extending about 2 miles from our last position. Forming a line of battle, we marched through the swamp, having previously thrown out pickets and skirmishers into an open field to a point within 5 miles of Richmond. This afternoon at 2 o'clock I, with four companies from the right of our regiment and two companies of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, reconnoitered the ground up to the open field near which our pickets were posted, and found no enemy. I was then ordered to reform my regiment and return to the point from which it was started, and encamp for the night in the woods to the rear of the Fourth Regiment.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 THOMAS HOLT,
Major, Commanding.

P. S.—I omitted to add that when the enemy attacked us on our left flank I turned my regiment to bear upon him, and then inquired for the colonel of the Fifth Regiment, and finding him, with his lieutenant-colonel also, absent with the right wing of the regiment, I said to Captain Morey, "I want you to re-enforce me on the left." He said that Colonel Graham had command, and if I would lead that he would take charge and follow. I then gave the command to wheel his wing to the left to break it in rear of my regiment, and before this order was executed the enemy was dispersed.

Your obedient servant,

T. H.

HDQRS. FIRST REGIMENT, EXCELSIOR BRIGADE,
June 5, 1862.

P. S.—I have the honor to report the movements of my regiment from the morning of the 3d up to this date. Expecting to be relieved

on the 3d we were ordered to the rear, and while moving accordingly that order was countermanded by another to proceed to the advance at the earthworks and hold them at all hazards. We remained there during a constant rain till about 10 o'clock a. m. of Wednesday, the 4th, when we were relieved by the Sixth New Jersey Regiment. We retired then to the rear, and encamped for the night about half a mile back. We are now waiting under marching orders.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS HOLT,

Major, Commanding First Regiment, Excelsior Brigade.

Lieut. H. E. TREMAIN,

A. A. A. G., Excelsior Brig., Second (Hooker's) Division.

No. 42.

Report of Col. George B. Hall, Seventy-first New York Infantry, of operations June 1-4.

HDQRS. 2D REGT., EX. BRIG., 2D (HOOKER'S) DIV., 3D A. C.,
Camp near Richmond, Va., June 4, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: In accordance with instructions contained in circular of this date I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my regiment from Sunday last, June 1, to date:

In obedience to orders from General Sickles I marched my command on the morning of the 1st instant in advance of the brigade in the direction of the camp lately occupied by the division under the command of General Casey, then occupied by the enemy in force. Not being familiar with the names of the localities where we were engaged, I am only able to state that we continued our advance on the left of the Richmond turnpike, under the observation and direct orders of General Sickles, until exposed to a severe fire from the enemy, consisting of about four regiments, concealed in the woods directly in our front. My regiment charged upon them at double-quick time, driving them from the woods with considerable loss. At this time I received orders to halt my command.

Holding that position, I advanced my skirmishers about 300 yards, and being then supported by the Third Regiment of our brigade on my left and the Fourth Regiment on my right, I continued to advance them about 400 yards farther, where they remained (about 300 yards from the enemy) until they were ordered by General Sickles to join the regiment. Resting on our arms that night in the position above named, the regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, next morning (2d instant) proceeded on the reconnaissance ordered from division headquarters to within about 4 miles of Richmond, and upon its return the regiment occupied the woods for the night about 400 yards in advance of our position on Sunday night. On the following morning, in obedience to orders, I advanced my regiment with the brigade to the earthworks in front, where we remained until relieved this morning.

During all this time my regiment had supplied large details for picket duty, continually under the fire of the enemy's advance; also heavy details for burying the dead and carrying in the wounded both of General Casey's division and such of the enemy as were left upon the field after the battle of Saturday, 31st ultimo, and although almost exhausted

by fatigue and exposure to severe rain-storms, all orders were promptly obeyed. We also brought in a number of prisoners, among whom were several officers.

In conclusion, I beg leave to state that on Sunday, while the command was engaged, they acted with great coolness and with satisfactory results. Major Toler commanded the skirmishers at the commencement of our attack with great efficiency, and was relieved by Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, who has been almost entirely since under the direct orders of the general commanding the brigade.

The following is a correct list of the killed, wounded, and missing.*

* * * * *

I omitted to mention that during the skirmishing on Sunday (1st instant) the enemy were frequently seen to appear before my men and wave a white flag, while continuing to fire upon them.

I am, lieutenant, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. HALL,

Colonel, Commanding Second Regiment.

Lieut. H. E. TREMAIN,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Excelsior Brigade.

No. 43.

Report of Lieut. Col. Henry L. Potter, Seventy-first New York Infantry, of operations June 1-2.

CAMP OF SECOND REGT., EX. BRIG., HOOKER'S DIV.,
Field of the Seven Pines, June 3, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: After the driving in of the rebel lines by our brigade on the morning of June 1, General Sickles, commanding Excelsior Brigade, ordered a detail of one company, besides the two flank companies already deployed in front as skirmishers, to advance under my command to take observations of the enemy's lines and to learn the position of the battery that had been playing upon our lines during the morning.

A report of the movements and observations of this advanced command I beg herewith respectfully to submit.

After passing through the swamp in the rear of the field lately occupied by General Casey's command we found the enemy drawn up in large force in line of battle at right angles with the main road, crossing the road on a line with the house near which General Casey's headquarters were recently established. I posted three companies (A, B, C) as a reserve in line on the end of the field near the swamp extending from the road to the left, and advanced with the other three companies (E, F, H) as far as the road that breaks to the left from the main road, called the Saw-mill road. This road crosses the fields about half way between the swamp and where the enemy were drawn up in line of battle, and within long range of the rebel pickets. On this road I posted two companies (E, H), and with Company F, Captain Donaldson, passed through the wood to left of the field and advanced the company to a house in a field beyond this Saw-mill road, and on the right flank of the rebels as there posted. When in this position we arrested several of the enemy, two with pieces of white paper in their hats,

*Embodied in return, p. 759.

without arms; two with arms; two who claim to be residents in the neighborhood; one with the New York State Volunteers uniform on, but could not account for himself satisfactorily, and some others of which I took no note. I did not take the names or interrogate any of them, sending them directly to you to be reported to General Sickles.

On the field within the lines of my command, as above mentioned, I found a large number of wounded of both the rebel army and our own, some in the field, some under tents, and some in a house and sheds adjoining on the right of the road. I immediately communicated directly to General Sickles the distressing condition of those wounded and asked that he would send ambulances and medical officers for their relief, and to which communication I am very thankful he gave such prompt attention, all of the wounded then within our lines being removed before night.

Soon after posting my command, as above-mentioned, a stage, or omnibus, was observed passing through the enemy's lines toward their advanced pickets. I immediately detailed three files of best marksmen and advanced in the skirt of the wood until nearly in range of the rebel pickets on the road, and there halted until the stage had passed their pickets and was about to turn back, when I hailed the drivers, and informed them that if they did not turn into the field I would fire on them. After a little hesitation they obeyed, not, however, until the person inside of the stage had jumped out and escaped, though fired upon. I sent Lieutenant Leigh in charge of the omnibus, and the two drivers to report to you, to be reported to General Sickles.

At "retreat" I was ordered to withdraw my command from the advance and rejoin my regiment, and as Company F (Captain Donaldson) filed out of the field where posted beyond the Saw-mill road the rebel forces filed in, but most unaccountably did not fire upon Company F as they retired, though within short range as before observed.

Immediately after daybreak, June 2, I was ordered to take command of five companies and reoccupy the position of the evening previous. Companies A, C, E, F, and H reported to me, and as we filed through the swamp the lines occupied by the enemy of the previous evening seemed to be abandoned. I posted my command same as the evening previous, finding that during the night the enemy had barricaded the side of the road in front of the field where Company F had been posted for some 600 yards; also had thrown up a barricade of timber and wood across the road. After finding their position abandoned I immediately sent report to General Sickles to that effect, and then, taking Company A from my reserve, advanced with it to the redoubt and line of earthworks occupied by the enemy the evening previous. I was here joined by Lieutenant Latta, of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, who came up with some 6 mounted men. Scattered over the fields in tents, in the houses, and under sheds were large numbers of wounded men, both of the rebel army and our own, in the most distressing condition, many having been since Saturday, May 31, without any food or attention. From the wounded we learned that the enemy had fallen back that morning, commencing the retreat about midnight, and that their rear had not been an hour gone; in fact, in a small house in the edge of the woods to the left we found a sergeant and a private, who were asleep and not aware of the retreat of their army until prisoners. These I sent to you to be reported to General Sickles, with report of the number and condition of wounded, to which he promptly responded by sending ambulances and medical officers.

After advancing all of my command to the line of earthworks in

front of where General Casey's headquarters had recently been, and posting them under command of Captain Rafferty, of Company H, with necessary orders, accompanied by Lieutenant Latta, of Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, and some 5 mounted men, I continued to advance cautiously to the front, leaving our cavalymen in the rear of the swamp on the main road until past the swamp and nearly one mile in front of the earthworks above mentioned. Halting in the edge of the wood looking out upon an open field for nearly half a mile in extent we could see in the far front of the field some persons moving in the skirt of the wood. A few of them came up the edge of the field until about half across it, then three of them came toward where we were until within some 500 or 600 yards. Lieutenant Latta and myself then charged upon them and brought them in without resistance. They said they belonged to a new company called the Norfolk Rebel Grays. As we were returning through the swamp we came upon two more rebels with arms in their hands, who had come upon our rear by a side road. Though but two of us, with already 3 prisoners, we had no difficulty in inducing them to drop their arms and pass in ahead of us.

After joining our squad of cavalry at the rear of the swamp I sent Lieutenant Latta to report to General Sickles with the 5 prisoners, and then, taking one of the cavalymen and leaving the other three at the rear of the swamp, commenced to repair to the front of the swamp to take observance of the open field again. When nearly half through the swamp I observed a single mounted person approach. Motioning to the cavalryman behind me to take cover, I also moved into the bush until the mounted person was quite upon me, when I found it was Major ———, of the C. S. Army, and easily persuaded him to accompany me to the rear; leaving him with the three cavalymen, and again returned to the front of the swamp, and after watching the long field for nearly half an hour without seeing any movement whatever, was surprised to hear a bugle sounding the advance, followed by cavalry filing into the far front of the field. I speedily returned to the line of earthworks, and sent one of the cavalymen with the major to report to General Sickles.

Soon after General Hooker, commanding division, and General Sickles, with the Excelsior Brigade, arrived in advance. I have omitted to mention that the advance of the Excelsior Brigade was so close upon the retreating enemy that they left four of their wagons, loaded with arms, ammunition, and provisions, in the swamp, and large quantities of provisions on the road through the swamp, evidently to lighten wagons.

Shortly after the Excelsior Brigade had taken position in the earthworks in front of the battle-field of Saturday General Hooker desired me to accompany him to the front of the swamp to point out where the rebel cavalry had been seen. Just as we were returning a party of rebel skirmishers who were concealed in the swamp, fired upon the general, killing one of the horses of his cavalry escort.

After returning to the lines, about 9 o'clock a. m., June 2, the Second Regiment, Excelsior Brigade, was ordered, under my command (Colonel Hall being too ill to be on duty that day), to deploy as skirmishers on the right of the road through the swamp. The regiment was advanced through the swamp, the right halted and posted upon a large field of "slashing," in front of which passes a road extending from the right of the long field in front of the swamp to the right through the timber to the railroad in front of the pickets of General Sumner's command on the railroad. The left of the regiment was deployed down this road

to the edge of the long field in front of the swamp above mentioned about one-third of the field to the front. Across the extreme front of this field was a rebel regiment drawn up in line of battle, their colors being distinctly visible. Both regiments continued in this position until "retreat," when by order of General Sickles the Second Excelsior was withdrawn within the lines and rested on their arms during the night.

The conduct of all the officers under my command was most satisfactory. So much am I indebted to them all that I cannot particularize, and whatever credit may be due to the regiment or the details from it for its labors when under my command should be equally extended to all of the officers.

Very respectfully submitted.

H. L. POTTER,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Second Regiment, Excelsior Brigade.

Lieutenant TREMAIN,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 44.

*Report of Col. Nelson Taylor, Seventy-second New York Infantry, of operations May 31-June*4.*

HDQRS. THIRD REGIMENT, EXCELSIOR BRIGADE,
Camp near Fair Oaks Station, June 5, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: In accordance with orders this regiment broke camp near Bottom's Bridge about 3.30 p. m. Saturday, May 31, leaving behind the camp and garrison equipage and the knapsacks of the men. The regiment proceeded in light marching order toward the camps of Couch's and Casey's divisions, on the road leading toward Richmond, for the purpose of supporting those divisions, who were said to be engaged by the enemy. About 8 o'clock p. m. I arrived at a cross-road said to be 8 miles from Richmond, and receiving orders bivouacked, lying upon our arms.

On Sunday morning, June 1, the line was formed at 7 a. m. I was ordered to march, taking the road toward Richmond. After proceeding about 100 rods I received an order from General Heintzelman to form line and advance to a piece of wood to the left of the road and hold that position, which was accordingly done. I deployed two companies to the front to act as skirmishers, and remained in this position until 7 o'clock a. m. on Monday morning. About 12 m. of Sunday the enemy opened upon us from a field battery, throwing shell and shot into the woods to the front; also in rear into the field, evidently trying to ascertain or drive us from our position. This firing was kept up at short intervals for about an hour, when it ceased entirely.

About 10 p. m. Sunday night the long roll was beat to our rear, and at the same time a noise was heard as if a body of troops were moving past our front toward our left. The line was preserved during the night, the men lying upon their arms, and with this exception nothing occurred during the night.

About daylight Monday, June 2, I received orders to hold my command in readiness to march. About 7 a. m. I received orders to follow immediately in rear of a battery of Major Wainwright's artillery. In

accordance with these orders I moved forward about 8 a. m., and proceeded to the camp lately occupied by Casey's division. In obedience to orders I placed my command in the trenches as a support to the battery, remaining here until 3 p. m., when being ordered I returned in rear of the battery, and bivouacked in the woods lately occupied as a camp by a part of Couch's division.

About 8 o'clock p. m. I received an order to do picket duty with my command, to which was added two companies of the Fifth New Jersey Regiment, Third Brigade, in front and on the flanks of our position. In accordance with these orders I directed Maj. William O. Stevens to take six companies of my command and proceed to the works lately occupied by Casey's division, and make such disposition of them as in his judgment seemed most judicious. Major Ramsey, of the Fifth New Jersey Regiment, having reported to me with 100 of that regiment, I directed him to take charge of them with the four remaining companies of my command, and place a part as outposts on the road leading toward James River; also a few on our right flank, connecting with those thrown out by Major Stevens on his right, and the balance to be held in reserve at the rifle pits in front of the camp lately occupied by Couch's division and close to the battery in front of our camp. The report of Major Stevens is herewith forwarded and made a part of this report. Major Ramsey made no other than a verbal report, "that nothing was heard during the night by his pickets." The night passed with no alarms.

About 7 a. m. Tuesday, June 3, being relieved and ordered to go into camp about half a mile back, I withdrew all of the pickets. About twenty minutes afterward I was ordered with my command to the front, and placed to the right of the road leading to Richmond, and on the right of the Second Regiment of this brigade, also being to the right of the work in front of Casey's old camp. My command stood in line under arms until about 4 p. m., when I was ordered back to guard a road called the Mill road, and running to the left from the Richmond road and just in rear of Couch's old camp. I sent one company out as advanced pickets about a mile to the front; I also sent another company on the same road about a quarter of a mile as a support; also pickets on another road leading to the right from this road. Between 8 and 9 o'clock a shot was heard, immediately followed by a volley, which was soon ascertained to be a false alarm. With this exception all was quiet during the night, and nothing was seen indicating the presence of the enemy in this direction. The men lay upon their arms in a violent rain storm the night through.

About 6 a. m. Wednesday, June 4, a cavalry officer, with 10 men, reported to me to do picket duty on the Mill road, and to relieve the pickets which I had thrown forward on that road. Under my direction he threw forward his men on different roads, visiting several houses, making inquiries, &c. He reported to me that at one house he found one Confederate officer and 3 men lying wounded. I directed Surgeon Irwin to proceed to the house and attend to them. After returning he reported that he had dressed their wounds; that none were mortally wounded, but were destitute of any conveniences. I then directed him to report that fact to the brigade surgeon, that he might send an ambulance and remove them to a proper place. After being relieved by the cavalry officer, I was ordered to take my command to the front as a support to the batteries at Casey's old camp, where I remained until about 5 p. m., when two companies of my command were sent under charge of Major Stevens to relieve two companies of the Sixth

New Jersey Regiment, Third Brigade, as pickets. The balance of my command was relieved by the Eleventh Massachusetts Regiment, First Brigade, and returned to Couch's old camp, and went into camp for the first time since breaking up near Bottom's Bridge.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

NELSON TAYLOR,
Colonel, Commanding Regiment.

Lieut. H. E. TREMAIN,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen, Second Brigade, Hooker's Division.

No. 45.

Report of Maj. William O. Stevens, Seventy-second New York Infantry, of operations June 2-3.

IN THE FIELD, SEVEN MILES FROM RICHMOND, VA.,
June 3, 1862.

COLONEL: In obedience to instructions from you I started from camp at 9.30 o'clock last evening to do picket duty in front of the lines of this corps, having under my command the following companies of your regiment, viz: Company D, Lieutenant Howard commanding, 32 men; Company E, Captain Toomey, 50 men; Company F, Captain Leonard, 48 men; Company G, Captain Bliss, 48 men; Company H, Captain Doyle, 40 men; Company I, Lieutenant Fogarty commanding, 42 men; in all, 260 men. I found the redoubt and rifle pits which were formerly occupied by General Casey's division unoccupied.

The following disposition of the force under my command was made for the night: Captain Bliss occupied the rifle pit upon the right of the turnpike with one-half his company and threw out the other half as outlying pickets upon his front and right flank, the left of these pickets resting upon the turnpike. Company E, Captain Toomey, occupied the rifle pit upon the left of the turnpike. Company D was all thrown out as outlying pickets, the right resting on the turnpike and the left reaching 300 yards to the left of the turnpike; 1 sergeant and 2 men were thrown forward upon the turnpike 150 yards in advance of the right of the pickets of this company. Company F, Captain Leonard, and H, Captain Doyle, were posted in the redoubt, each occupying a face looking to the front.

Company I, Lieutenant Fogarty, was posted one-half in the rifle pit on the right side of the road, which runs in rear of the redoubt at right angles with the turnpike and in the direction of the James River; the other half as outlying pickets, the left resting on this last road and the right stretching to a point near the woods in front of the redoubt; 3 men from this company were posted one-eighth of a mile forward upon this road. All the outlying pickets were posted 200 yards in advance of the supports, were placed in pairs, the men lying flat on the ground, with instructions not to fire unless a superior force approached, and in a menacing manner.

During the night not a shot was fired by any of the command. The first part of the night a bright light as of a camp was observed, apparently 2 or 3 miles distant, in the direction of Richmond. This light diminished much afterward. At 2 o'clock this morning the sound of a drum was heard for a few minutes. It came from the direction of the

light, and was apparently from 1 to 2 miles distant. Whether it was a long roll or a call I cannot state. In the course of the night three shots were fired, which seemed to come from the pickets of the enemy. They were in a direction a little south of west from us, and the nearest was at least three-quarters of a mile away. At the first break of dawn our outlying pickets fell back upon their supports in the rifle pits, and Company D was then posted in the rifle pit on the extreme left.

At sunrise we discovered pickets from the Nineteenth Massachusetts Regiment half a mile in advance of our right wing and coming up to the old log house on the right of the turnpike. At this time I reported to you that nearly all the force might, in my opinion, be withdrawn, and by your direction I withdrew all but Company E, Captain Toomey, who was instructed to post 2 men in advance at the log house on the turnpike, 6 men on the road leading toward the James River and half a mile forward, and to hold the balance of his command in the redoubt. At daylight a few shots were fired by the enemy's pickets in front, which were probably merely a discharge of their pieces. At 8 o'clock Company E was relieved by two companies of the Second Regiment of this brigade.

During the night the men were exposed to a drenching rain, but all discharged their duty with fidelity, while I am under particular obligations to the officers for their vigilance and promptness.

The above are all the incidents which were observed of interest during the night.

Very respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM O. STEVENS,

Maj., Third Regt., Ex. Brig., Second (Hooker's) Division.

Col. NELSON TAYLOR,

Commanding Third Regiment.

No. 46.

Report of Capt. Charles B. Elliott, Seventy-third New York Infantry, of operations June 1-4.

CAMP OF FOURTH REGIMENT, EXCELSIOR BRIGADE,

June 5, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: In reply to your circular asking for a report of the operations of this regiment from June 1 to 4 inclusive, I respectfully submit the following report:

The regiment marched on Sunday a. m., the 1st instant, under command of Major Moriarty, who, after being engaged, was disabled by his horse slipping and falling upon him. The regiment was second in line in marching on the Richmond turnpike, the Second Regiment being in advance. They charged the enemy on the left of the road, this regiment doing the same and keeping on a line with them on the right of the road through a wood, and being engaged under heavy fire with the enemy, who were concealed in the woods. We continued to advance, firing continually, until the left of our line came up to that of the Second Regiment, who were then engaged. A line being formed, skirmishers were immediately thrown out, who continued to advance on a line with

the skirmishers of other regiments until ordered by General Sickles to return.

We remained at that position until next morning, when the regiment joined the reconnoitering column under command of the general commanding the division. Returning, went into camp in the woods on the left of the road a few hundred yards in front of our position of Sunday night, where we remained until next morning.

On the 3d instant, under orders from General Sickles, we marched to the earthworks in advance, and remained there until relieved on the morning of the 4th instant. I feel gratified to state that the regiment, although no field officer was present, sustained the reputation earned at Williamsburg. All details have been promptly furnished and all orders promptly obeyed, and without further mention I feel it my duty to state that the regiment throughout the time has acted as well as could be desired under the circumstances.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

C. B. ELLIOTT,
Captain Company I, Commanding Regiment.

Lieut. H. E. TREMAIN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Excelsior Brigade.

No. 47.

Report of Col. Charles K. Graham, Seventy-fourth New York Infantry, of operations June 1-4.

HDQRS. FIFTH REGIMENT, EXCELSIOR BRIGADE,
Camp near Richmond, Va., June 5, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: On the 1st instant, at 8 a. m., this regiment left camp with the Second and Fourth. Advancing half a mile these regiments deployed, one to the right, the other to the left. Shortly afterward this regiment was ordered to support the Fourth Regiment. Entering the woods it was deployed, and proceeded diagonally to the right through them a distance of about 2 miles, until the rear of the Jersey Brigade, which had been previously engaged, was reached. This regiment was then marched to the left of this brigade, under the impression that the Fourth had reached that far. Here it was formed in line of battle, the First Regiment, under Major Holt, on the left. At this time a fire was opened on us from the woods in front and was promptly returned, with a loss of 1 killed and 10 wounded on our side. A portion of the right wing then proceeded to the right and advanced in the direction of the railroad, whilst the left and the First Regiment advanced to the front. In the woods a number of dead and wounded rebels were found, but no trace of any rebel force could be discerned.

At 11 a. m. orders reached me to proceed up the railroad with this regiment and the First to support a battery which had been placed there by General Meagher. After remaining at that point about an hour under orders both regiments returned to the spot where the brigade formed in line of battle and encamped for the night. The march was a most fatiguing one, through a swamp in many places almost to the depth of the waist. Both officers and men acted with prudence and firmness.

On the 2d instant, at 9 a. m., the regiment left camp and marched to intrenchments in front of the camps recently abandoned. There it received orders to proceed by a road to the left, deploy through the woods up to a small abatis which it was supposed that the rebels had recently placed to impede the progress of our forces. After advancing half a mile it reached a large abatis constructed by our forces before the position was abandoned commanding the road to Richmond, which was occupied by the regiment, and a company commanded by Captain Harrison and accompanied by myself was thrown forward and reconnoitered a distance of a mile without discovering any signs of the rebels. During the day two other reconnaissances were made, one in company with a squadron of cavalry. One of these parties exchanged shots with the rebel pickets.

On the 3d instant, in the forenoon, the regiment occupied the position of the day before. At 3 p. m. sent out a party of skirmishers under command of Lieutenant Benard and accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Burtis, which fell in with the reserve of the enemy's pickets within half a mile of our post. Two volleys were exchanged, in which several of our men were wounded. Shortly afterward we could hear the enemy in considerable force preparing to advance. About 5 p. m. a volley was poured into the right flank of the abatis by the enemy without occasioning any loss. About 6 a. m. we could hear their men distinctly advancing in double-quick. At this time I directed the abatis to be abandoned and the regiment to form in line of battle on the left flank, in order to allow our artillery to sweep in front of our position if the enemy attempted to advance. Here we stood on arms for three hours, the enemy no doubt abandoning his intention on account of realizing the object of our movement. At 11 p. m. we were relieved by a New Jersey detachment.

I have the honor to be, general, your very obedient servant,
 CHARLES K. GRAHAM,
 Colonel.

Lient. H. E. TREMAIN, A. A. A. G., *Excelsior Brigade*.

No. 48.

Report of Col. Samuel H. Starr, Fifth New Jersey Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIGADE, HOOKER'S DIVISION,
 Camp near Seven Pines, six miles from Richmond, Va.,
 June 4, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by this brigade in the affair with the enemy on the 1st instant.

Two regiments of the brigade, the Seventh and Eighth New Jersey, were sent back as a guard for the depot of supplies at Bottom's Bridge, and took no part in the engagement. The other two, the Fifth and Sixth New Jersey, under General Patterson, marched forward from our late camp late on the afternoon of the 31st ultimo. General Patterson was very ill and unable to take active command, but accompanied us in the advance. The road and fields on both sides of the road were thronged with flying regiments from the battle ground, 2 or 3 miles in front, through whose routed and disorderly masses I was compelled to force my way with bayonet and saber.

At 7 a. m. on the 1st instant the Fifth and Sixth New Jersey marched forward (General Patterson being still very ill), and were actively engaged from about 7.15 a. m. to 9.45 a. m., two and a half hours, with the enemy, the Fifth Regiment having 4 privates killed, 3 officers and 51 non-commissioned officers and privates wounded and 2 privates missing; total, 60. I have the honor of transmitting herewith a list of their names. The loss of the Sixth Regiment has not yet been reported to me, but is considerably less.*

General Hooker was himself a witness a part of the time of the behavior of the two regiments under my command, and to him I leave the comment thereon. Credit being but reluctantly accorded this brigade for its services, its members look inward and upward for their reward.

The Fifth and Sixth Regiments have been for four days and nights under arms, in battle, reconnaissance, and in holding the most advanced position on this flank of the army. They are still under arms, and see no prospect of an hour's rest for days to come. They have been exposed night and day to deluges of rain, and have suffered every species of privation incident to an army in an enemy's country; but among the greatest of their sufferings may be ranked the intolerable stench to which they have been and are exposed, arising from the unburied dead bodies of men and horses that were and are thickly scattered over the ground for hundreds of acres around. I have caused to be buried all my men's strength and time enabled them to bury, but I suffer many to lie unburied not many hundred yards distant.

The following-named officers deserve particular mention for their coolness under fire: Maj. John Ramsey, Capts. W. J. Sewell, E. C. Hopper, and Roswell S. Reynolds, Lieuts. T. Kelly, E. P. Berry, T. P. Large, and others, of the Fifth Regiment; Col. G. Mott, Lieutenant-Colonel Burling, and Lieutenant Crawford, of the Sixth Regiment. All these came under my personal observation. For want of information I am unable to name any others of the Sixth Regiment.

Lieut. G. S. Russell, Fifth Regiment, my adjutant, was compelled to retire from the field during the action on account of illness. While in action his bearing met my approval. Captain Gould, Fifth Regiment, also from the same cause, withdrew by my permission, but bore himself well during the engagement. First Sergt. William Newman, Fifth New Jersey Volunteers, commanded the company after Captain Gould withdrew from the field, and deserves high commendation.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. H. STARR,

Colonel, Fifth New Jersey Volunteers, Commanding Brigade.

Capt. JOS. DICKINSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters Division.

No. 49.

Report of Lieut. Col. Joseph Trawin, Eighth New Jersey Infantry, of operations May 31-June 5.

HDQRS. EIGHTH REGT. NEW JERSEY VOLUNTEERS,
Near Seven Pines, Va., June 5, 1862.

SIR: By orders from division headquarters, received while Patterson's brigade was about moving to the support of the troops engaged

*See return, p. 759.

on Saturday last (from its camp in advance of the Chickahominy), I marched the Seventh and Eighth Regiments New Jersey Volunteers to Bottom's Bridge. Arriving there about dusk I was met by Col. E. Wright, of General McClellan's staff. By his directions the regiments were counter-marched over Bottom's Bridge, and took position in the intrenchments in advance. These intrenchments extended over a space of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, reaching from the railroad in a southerly direction, commanding all the approaches to the bridges across the Chickahominy. Written orders from General Heintzelman, commanding Third Army Corps, were to stay all stragglers, whether wounded or otherwise, who should attempt to reach the rear. But it was seen that at the point occupied a good stand might be made against an attacking party should our lines in front be broken and the enemy drive our forces. Hence a detachment of three companies—two from the Eighth and one from the Seventh Regiment, under Major Henry, of the Eighth New Jersey Volunteers—were posted in the intrenchments to the right, with instructions to guard the railroad. The balance of the Seventh Regiment, under its efficient commanding officer, Maj. F. Price, was assigned to the works on the extreme left, commanding the junction of the roads leading to Bottom's Bridge, with subsequent instructions to support a section of a battery in an earthwork commanding the road to White Oak Swamp. The balance of the Eighth Regiment was retained in the central works, a constant communication being kept up with the right and left.

On Saturday night, though worn with the march and counter-march over terrible roads, the men all slept on their arms.

During Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, and even until last evening, large numbers of stragglers were brought into all the works. Some of these were wounded or sick, and were as well cared for as circumstances would allow, the surgeons, Drs. Taylor and Satterthwait (Eighth and Seventh Regiments), giving them every possible attention. Some were evidently nervous from the effects of the battle; others were stragglers only, apparently from the disorganization of their regiments, broken by the conflict. The number brought in must have been as large as from 3,000 to 4,000, the large proportion being men of Casey's division. There were some officers. As rapidly as possible and as far as possible they were sent back to rejoin their regiments, having been rested and fed.

On Monday, owing to the heavy rains of recent date, or from some other cause, the Chickahominy became greatly swollen and the swampy ground in the vicinity overflowed. The bridges were all carried away, with the exception of the one over the railroad. On learning this, forces were detailed from the Seventh and Eighth Regiments of sufficient strength to rebuild the bridges. These fatigue parties were kept at work with proper reliefs day and night until this morning, when the work was finished. This work was considered of great importance, as without the bridges the supplies for the army would have been materially disturbed, as well as a possible falling back be unprovided for. As it was, on Monday evening one bridge was so far repaired as to allow the free passage of teams about six hours after their being carried away.

Yesterday two companies from the Eighth Regiment were detailed by General Heintzelman's orders as a guard for his headquarters. They are still detained there, it is supposed permanently.

The command was relieved this morning by a brigade of Casey's division, a part of which came on the ground yesterday.

This morning, by orders from the headquarters of the Third Brigade, the command was marched to its present location.

Though not having had the privilege of being engaged in the late battle with the other regiments of the brigade and division, it is felt that good service has been done the cause in the position occupied by the Seventh and Eighth Regiments while detached. Officers and men nobly responded to all calls upon them, and stood prepared to discharge fully their duty under any possible emergency.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH TRAWIN,

Lieut. Col., Eighth N. J. Vols., lately Comdg. Intrenchments.

Capt. JOS. DICKINSON,

Asst. Adj. Gen., Hooker's Div., Third Army Corps, Va.

No. 50.

Report of Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division.

HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, HEINTZELMAN'S CORPS,
Intrenched Camp, near Savage's, June 2, 1862.

SIR: On the 31st ultimo, at 3 p. m., I received an order to send a brigade of my division by the railroad to support Keyes' corps, said to be severely engaged. Birney's brigade was designated, and getting most promptly under arms, advanced accordingly.

Captain Hunt, aide to General Heintzelman, arriving from the field, made me aware of the discomfiture of most of Casey's division. The retiring wagons and a dense stream of disorganized fugitives arrived nearly simultaneously. As a precaution I ordered some picked Michigan marksmen and a regiment to proceed and occupy the dense woods bordering on the left of our position to take in flank any pursuers. I, however, soon received General Heintzelman's directions to order forward by the Williamsburg road the remaining brigade, and to retrieve the position the enemy had driven us from. I put myself at the head of the advanced regiment and set forward without delay. I also sent written orders for Jameson's brigade, camped at the *tête-de-pont* near Bottom's Bridge (3 miles in rear), to come up without delay. This order met with General Heintzelman's approval.

On arriving at the field of battle we found certain zigzag rifle pits sheltering crowds of men and the enemy firing from abatis and timber in their front. General Casey remarked to me on coming up, "If you will regain our late camp the day will still be ours." I had but the Third Michigan up, but they moved forward with alacrity, dashing into the felled timber, and commenced a desperate but determined contest, heedless of the shell and ball which rained upon them. This regiment, the only one of Berry's brigade not engaged at Williamsburg, at the price of a severe loss, has nearly outvied all competitors. Its work this day was complete. This regiment (Third Michigan) lost:

Officer killed—Capt. S. A. Judd, Company A.

Officers wounded—Col. S. G. Champlin; Capt. S. G. Lowing, Company I; First Lieut. G. E. Judd, Company A; First Lieut. S. M. Pelton, Company C; First Lieut. G. W. Dodge, Company F; First Lieut. A. J. Whitney, Company G; First Lieut. S. Brennan, Company I;

Second Lieut. D. C. Crawford, Company E; Second Lieut. Joseph Mason, Company G.

Total officers killed and wounded, 10.

Enlisted men killed, 31; wounded, 111; missing, 14.

Total loss, 166.*

One company of 50 picked marksmen lost its captain killed, its lieutenants wounded, and 26 men. I take pleasure in particularizing Col. S. G. Champlin, wounded, Lieut. Col. A. A. Stevens, Major Pierce, and Capts. I. C. Smith and E. S. Pierce, and Lieut. G. E. Judd.

The next regiment that came up, the Fifth Michigan, again won laurels as fresh as those due them for Williamsburg. Its loss then was 144. Its loss this day was:

Officers killed—Capt. Louis B. Quackenbush, Company H; Lieut. and Adj. Charles H. Hutchins.

Officers wounded—Lieut. J. J. Knox, Company D; Capt. C. H. Travers, Company E; Captain Wilson, Company G; Captain Miller, Company K.

Total officers killed and wounded, 6.

Enlisted men killed, 30; wounded, 116; missing, 7.

Total loss, 159.*

Its noble officers did their duty.

I directed General Berry with this regiment to turn the slashings, and, fighting, gain the open ground on the enemy's right flank. This was perfectly accomplished. The Thirty-seventh New York was arranged in column to support the attack. Its services in the sequel proved invaluable.

In the mean while my remaining brigade, the One hundred and fifth and Sixty-third Pennsylvania, came up, under General Jameson, the other two regiments having been diverted, one to Birney and one to Peck. It is believed that they did well, and most probably urgent reasons existed, but I respectfully submit that it is to the disadvantage of a constituted command to take men from their habitual leaders, and not to be anticipated that a brave though weak division can accomplish the same results with its regiments thus allotted out to those whom they neither know nor have fought under, at the same time that it diminishes the full legitimate sphere of the commander of the division. Of these regiments the One hundred and fifth was placed in the slashings, now vacated by the oblique advance of the Third Michigan, whilst eight companies of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan and most spiritedly headed by General Jameson, aided by his daring chief of staff, Captain Potter, were pushed through the abatis (the portions never until now occupied by us), and nobly repelled a strong body of the enemy, who, though in a strong line and coming up rapidly and in order, just failed to reach to support this position in time, but who, nothing daunted and with a courage worthy a united cause, halted in battle array and poured in a constant heavy roll of musketry fire.

The One hundred and fifth lost:

Officers killed—Capt. John C. Dowling, Company B; First Lieut. J. P. R. Cummiskey, Company D.

Officers wounded—Col. A. A. McKnight; Capt. L. B. Duff, Company D; Capt. J. W. Greenawalt, Company E; Capt. R. Kirk, Company F; Capt. A. C. Thompson, Company K; First Lieut. S. A. Craig, Company B; First Lieut. C. C. Markle, Company E; First Lieut. James B. Geggie, Company F; Second Lieut. A. J. Shipley, Company E.

* But see revised statement, p. 760.

Total officers killed and wounded, 11.

Enlisted men killed, 67; wounded, 115; missing, 63.

Total loss, 256.*

Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers lost:

Officer killed—First Lieut. Henry Hurst, Company C.

Officers wounded—Lieut. Col. A. S. M. Morgan; Adj. George P. Cortes; Quartermaster W. N. Haymaker; Capt. John A. Danks, Company E; First Lieut. T. L. Maynard, Company B; Second Lieut. Isaac Moorhead, Company G; Acting Second Lieut. G. E. Gross, Company D.

Total officers killed and wounded, 8.

Enlisted men killed, 31; wounded 88; missing, 21.

Total loss, 148.*

This was perhaps near 6 o'clock, when our center and right, defended by troops of the other divisions, with all their willingness, could no longer resist the enemy's right central flank attacks, pushed on with determined discipline and with the impulsion of numerous concentrated masses. Once broken, our troops fled incontinently, and a dense body of the enemy pursuing rapidly, yet in order, occupied the Williamsburg road, the entire open ground, and penetrating deep into the woods on either side soon interposed between my division and my line of retreat. It was on this occasion that, seeing myself cut off, and relying on the high discipline and determined valor of the Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers, I faced them to the rear against the enemy, and held the ground, although so critically placed, and despite the masses that gathered on and had passed us, checked the enemy in his intent of cutting us off against the White Oak Swamp. This enabled the advanced regiments, averted by orders and this contest in their rear, to return from their hitherto victorious career, and to retire by a remaining wood-path known to our scouts (the Saw-mill road) until they once more arrived at and remanned the impregnable position we had left at noon at our own fortified division camp.

The loss of the Thirty-seventh New York is severe, viz:

Officer killed—Second Lieut. W. J. Fennon.

Officers wounded—Capt. J. R. McConnell, Capt. A. J. Diegnan, First Lieut. James Keelan, Second Lieut. James H. Markey, Second Lieut. William Bird, Second Lieut. William C. Green.

Total officers killed and wounded, 7.

Enlisted men killed, 12; wounded, 66; missing, 2.

Total loss, 87.*

At Williamsburg its loss was 95. It there formed our extreme left. Colonel Hayman, its colonel, has ever been most distinguished. He revived this day his reputation gained in Mexico. Adj. James Henry, Capt. James R. O'Beirne, and Lieuts. W. C. Green and P. J. Smith were particularly distinguished for courage and activity.

The detached brigade under Birney had been ordered to support by the railroad side, not to attack. It accomplished this successfully, for I understand it enabled General Couch, who had been cut off with a brigade, to form the junction with the army. The Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers (Jameson's brigade), having been on fatigue, was ordered to report to General Birney, and was seriously engaged. Its loss was:

Officer killed—Maj. J. Culp.

Officers wounded—Col. C. T. Campbell; Capt. S. C. Simonton, Company B; Capt. C. S. Chase, Lieut. E. J. Rice, Company A.

* But see revised statement, p. 760.

Total officers killed and wounded, 5.

Enlisted men killed, 17 ; wounded, 57 ; missing, 23.

Total loss, 102.*

This brigade again on the following day, having been kept out in advance of the division camp, performed under Col. J. H. Hobart Ward a brilliant charge. I refer you to Colonel Ward's report. The loss of the brigade has been :

The Thirty-eighth New York Volunteers lost :

Officer wounded—Lieut. F. Walker.

Enlisted men killed, 6 ; wounded, 20 ; missing, 8.

Total loss, 35*.

Fortieth New York Volunteers lost :

Officers wounded—First Lieut. Lewis Fitzgerald, Second Lieut.

Charles H. Gesner.

Enlisted men killed, 10 ; wounded, 51 ; missing, 2 ; prisoners, 2.

Total loss, 67.*

Third Maine Volunteers lost :

Officers wounded—Captain Lakeman, Company I ; Captain Richmond, Company K ; Lieut. A. S. Merrill, Company D ; Lieutenant Haskell, Company K.

Enlisted men killed, 8 ; wounded, 65.

Total loss, 77.*

Fourth Maine Volunteers lost :

Enlisted men killed, 2 ; wounded, 8 ; missing, 1.

Total loss, 11.

The Second Michigan Volunteers, Colonel Poe, and two companies of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, having been on distant pickets, were late to join in the battle, but arrived most opportunely to resist the advanced pursuers of the enemy near our intrenched camps and aided in giving me time to organize its defenses.

The Second Michigan lost :

Officers wounded—Lieut. Col. A. W. Williams, Capt. William L. Whipple.

Enlisted men killed, 10 ; wounded, 42 ; missing, 1.

Total loss, 55.*

The Eighty-seventh New York Volunteers was detached with General Peck. I refer you to him for favorable notice. Its loss was :

Officers wounded—Col. S. A. Dodge ; Capt. T. Y. Baker, Company C ; Second Lieut. D. O. Beckwith, Company K ; First Lieut. D. A. Flandreau, Company A ; First Lieut. David C. Cloyd, Company C ; Second Lieut. H. C. Selvage, Company A.

Enlisted men killed, 9 ; wounded, 62 ; missing, 4.

Total loss, 81.*

It is perhaps within the limits of my report to mention General Peck, most distinguished, and wounded in Mexico. On the discomfiture of the right and center he rallied near the saw-mill several hundred of the fugitives, and was coming with them from there again to the field when I directed them to anticipate the enemy and man the intrenched camp. In doing this I particularize a noble regiment, the First Long Island Legion, under Colonel Adams.

I have again to dwell on the exemplary conduct of the brilliant officers of the staff. Captain Potter, General Jameson's assistant adjutant-general, who had already attracted notice at Williamsburg, was here as conspicuously gallant as extremely useful. I have to regret in the loss of Captain Smith, assistant adjutant-general of General Berry's

* But see revised statement, p. 760.

staff, the premature fate of one whose gallantry at Williamsburg made me to anticipate a career which he fulfilled in this action. My acting aide, Lieutenant Mallon, rendered me great services, and was wounded. My aide, Captain Sturges, was left to conduct General Birney. Captain Moore was sent after my artillery, and was, as usual, active.

I have again to regret that the unequaled batteries (Thompson's Second U. S. Artillery), Randolph's and Beam's, were not employed, from there being other batteries substituted.

In finishing this report I trust that you will bring to the attention of the general-in-chief that, masters of the lost camp and victorious and in full career, the fate of the center decided our own, and that the regiments were suddenly stopped by orders dispatched to them, and by hearing the fire of their support, the Thirty-seventh New York, in rear of their entire line; but undismayed and in good order they effected their retreat.

I have also to call to your attention that the loss of my regiments, only 5,000 fighting men all told, have again, within a very short period, paid the penalty of daring and success by the marked and severe loss of near 1,300 men. I have again to bring to notice for conspicuous good conduct Generals Jameson and Berry and Birney (Second Brigade). The latter acted in an independent command. The former led in person the advance of their men.

Among numerous prisoners taken was Colonel Bratton, Sixth South Carolina Volunteers, taken by Colonel Walker's Fourth Maine. The losses of the enemy were even vastly severer than our own, and in places the slain were piled in confused masses.

I add, in conclusion, that the enemy's success in the afternoon did not prevent me that very night from pushing forward Major Dillman and 200 Michigan marksmen to the saw-mill (one mile in advance), whence he boldly threw out reconnaissances in the vicinity and to the left of the late battle ground.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. KEARNY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Third Division, Third Corps.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 51.

Report of Brig. Gen. Charles D. Jameson, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, KEARNY'S DIVISION,
June 1, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in accordance with a verbal order from Lieutenant Hunt, aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General Heintzelman, I moved the brigade I have the honor to command from the camp near the Burnt Chimneys at about 2.30 o'clock p. m. yesterday and advanced to the front upon the railroad as rapidly as possible. Upon arriving at Savage Station I inquired of Captain McKeever, assistant adjutant-general to General Heintzelman, where I should take my brigade to report to General Kearny. He informed me General Kearny was up the Richmond road. I left the railroad at that

point with three regiments, the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers being ordered by Captain McKeever to move up the railroad. Upon arriving near the scene of action I rode forward to report to General Kearny. Before I succeeded in finding General Kearny I met General Heintzelman, who ordered me to send one regiment to the right to the support of General Peck and to bring the remaining two regiments forward to the point where he was then standing immediately. In accordance with the above orders I ordered Col. S. A. Dodge, of the Eighty-seventh New York Volunteers, to report to General Peck. One of General Peck's aides was present to conduct the regiment to the point where it was required. With the remaining two regiments (Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers and One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers) I filed off through the woods to the left of the Richmond road. I there met General Kearny, who ordered me to advance up the road to the abatis and deploy the Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers to the right and left of that road in the abatis, and to move the One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers to the left on to the Richmond road to the abatis, and to deploy the same to the right and left of said road.

The two regiments having been disposed of as above I ordered them to clear the abatis of the enemy, who were just then entering from the opposite side in large numbers, which they succeeded in accomplishing after a very sharp engagement of about one and a half hours. Soon after my regiments had engaged the enemy in the abatis I perceived by the heavy firing upon our right that the enemy were pressing hard upon that point. As soon as our line began to waver on the right the men occupying the rifle pits in rear of the abatis broke and ran from the field. I do not know what regiments were occupying those pits. They did not belong to General Kearny's division. As soon as I perceived the men abandoning the rifle pits I galloped to the front of them, and used every exertion in my power to prevail upon them to return and hold the pits, but to no avail. The enemy had by that time succeeded in turning our right and our troops on the right were all running from the field. Seeing I was in great danger of being cut off, with my two regiments I hastened back to withdraw them from the abatis into the woods on the left. It was with great difficulty that I succeeded in returning to my command, the enemy having entered the open field in rear of the abatis. Upon my return I found my regiments were charging the enemy through the camp in front of the abatis. I immediately ordered them to fall back and to the left as soon as possible, which they succeeded in doing with great difficulty. Before I succeeded in withdrawing my men one of the batteries of the Fourth Corps commenced shelling the abatis and camp which my men were occupying, thereby subjecting them to the fire of the enemy in front and to that of their friends in the rear. By the order of General Kearny I moved back through the woods to a road leading to a steam saw-mill (Anderson's, I believe), which road I followed to said mill, thence to the position now occupied by my brigade.

In retreating as hastily as I was obliged to under the circumstances the men became more or less scattered. I commenced immediately to reorganize my regiments, the two detached regiments having returned to the line of works now held by General Kearny's division. I succeeded in rallying between 1,100 and 1,200 men that evening, which I placed in line on the north side of the Richmond road, in rear of the small earthwork near the road, the line extending from said work to the left of the First Long Island Regiment, the right of said regiment resting on the railroad. The troops still occupy that line.

Of the conduct of the two regiments which acted under my eye during the engagement (the Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers and One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers) I can speak in the highest terms. They drove the enemy before them, never wavering in the least, and only retired from the field when ordered to fall back after being almost entirely cut off, the enemy having succeeded in turning our right. For the movements of the other two regiments (the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers and the Eighty-seventh New York Volunteers) I refer you to the official reports of Generals Peck and Birney, respectively, and to their regimental reports.

Where all the officers behaved in so gallant a manner as those of the two regiments under my command during the action yesterday did it would be almost invidious to make any distinction. Any special cases I may wish to call particular attention to I will reserve for a supplementary report. I cannot, however, close this brief report without calling to the favorable notice of the general commanding the division the gallant manner in which Capt. C. H. Potter, my assistant adjutant-general, bore himself during the action. He was under heavy fire constantly from the time he arrived upon the field, at about 4 o'clock p. m., until dark, using every exertion in his power to cheer on our men and in rallying the disorganized masses from other divisions that were running from the field. I cannot say too much in praise of the valuable service rendered by Captain Potter and the bravery and daring displayed by him during the action. I predict a brilliant future for him if he follows the profession of arms.

Lieut. J. J. S. Hassler, aide-de-camp, the only other member of my staff on the field, was not with me during the action, having taken the Fifty-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers to General Birney; therefore I cannot speak of his conduct from personal observation, but I understand he bore himself gallantly, rendering very valuable services in carrying orders for the generals of the corps and division respectively.

Accompanying this report I send you a list of the killed, wounded, and missing. The list of killed and wounded is necessarily very imperfect. Most of the missing are either killed or prisoners.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. D. JAMESON,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. W. E. STURGES,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 52.

Report of Lieut. Col. Richard A. Bachia, Eighty-seventh New York Infantry.

HDQRS. EIGHTY-SEVENTH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLS.,
Camp in the Field, June 1, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that our regiment (Eighty-seventh) left camp yesterday, May 31, according to orders, at 3 o'clock p. m. We were ordered to fall in behind the Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Hays. On their left we proceeded along the railroad track

* See revised statement, p. 760.

some 2 miles, part of the time at double-quick. The weather was sultry, and many of the men fell out exhausted and could not be pressed in again, and we entered the field with some 260 men, seven companies. Company F (50 men), having been detailed on fatigue duty during the morning, did not come up in time to join us. At the end of about 2 miles we filed across a field into a road, down which we pushed about a mile, when the men were halted near the edge of the woods and ordered to load. We then turned to the right, and were conducted by an aide of General Peck about a mile, when suddenly we were surprised by firing coming on our left rapid and scattering, as if from pickets. We immediately filed to the right in the woods about 100 paces; formed the regiment in line of battle as rapidly as possible; forwarded two companies (H and A) as skirmishers under a desultory fire from the enemy, and fifteen minutes later the enemy advanced upon us in force and drove back our skirmishers, who retreated slowly under a galling fire, passing back on the main body.

Meantime the enemy, apparently of the strength of a full brigade, continued to advance. At this juncture Colonel Dodge, who was near the left of the line, ordered me forward to change somewhat the position of the skirmishers of the right company. As soon as I got to the ground I observed the enemy were coming up on our right flank. I at once reported back to the colonel, who ordered me to press up the right, which was slowly falling back. The fire now became general, the enemy advancing steadily and in good order, pouring in a heavy cross-fire on our front and right flank. The fire on the front at the left of our regiment was specially severe, and here Colonel Dodge was wounded while energetically urging the men to stand and advance. During this time I was on the right and the major at the center pushing the men up and lost sight of Colonel Dodge, and when I returned to the left I learned of his being wounded and borne off.

Our men, overpowered by numbers, now retreated, facing the enemy and firing in as good order as could be expected under the circumstances, and reformed behind the rifle pits beyond the open field. All our line officers deported themselves with steady bearing under fire, cheering and urging on their men. I have to-day learned that our regiment was sent to the corner on the right to support the First Long Island Regiment, Colonel Adams, who was watching this point of the line. We were, of course, ignorant of their position or that of the enemy when conducted forward, and in my judgment an error was committed in allowing us to file past the front of this regiment and make up to their right in the face of the enemy, drawing their fire before we got into position, and which gave the enemy two important items of information, viz, the strength of the re-enforcement and the position we took. All this might have been avoided had we been taken in by the right flank to the rear of the First Long Island Regiment, got into position, and thrown forward our skirmishers from the rear instead of from the front.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. A. BACHIA,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Eighty-seventh New York Volunteers.

Capt. W. E. STURGES,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 53.

Report of Col. Charles T. Campbell, Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry.

ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL, PHILADELPHIA,

June 5, 1862.

SIR: I respectfully report after receiving your orders on the afternoon of May 31 I marched my regiment up the railroad a short distance in rear of the other regiments of your brigade. On arriving at the point where you left the railroad I was ordered by General Heintzelman to proceed up the road. I marched up the railroad under General Birney's command, and on reaching the open ground opposite the enemy's lines my regiment was deployed to the right as a support to one of Birney's regiments, who were deployed along the woods to the right of railroad. I was then ordered by General Birney to cross the railroad, and move to the left and join a Rhode Island regiment which I would find in the woods on the left. I did not find any force of our troops I could identify as a regiment, but plenty of stragglers, who came in reporting the enemy in force right in my front. Wherever the enemy appeared or were found they were met with determined resistance.

Marching in this position on the left flank of the enemy we engaged them briskly where they came to a stand at the road. Here Major Culp was killed and many of my men wounded. I called to a regiment posted 200 or 300 yards in my rear toward the railroad to come immediately and engage the enemy—that they were gathering in force in my front. This regiment did not heed my call, but marched off in a different direction. The fire across and up the road upon my left flank was now so very severe and the woods so dense in front between me and the main position of the enemy that I thought it advisable to throw my regiment across the road in double-quick in detachments, and secure a piece of cover of fallen timber on the enemy's right and my left of the road.

At this time I saw General Heintzelman approach. He told me to push forward into the woods—that I would be supported on the right and left. I advanced carefully, exchanging shots with the enemy at every step. When within 75 or a 100 yards of the enemy's line I came to a halt, and delivered a fire into their ranks with my whole force. The firing was then kept up briskly by both sides, neither party retreating for ten or fifteen minutes, when I was wounded and carried out of the woods to an open field in the rear. I then gave orders to my officers if they could not hold their position to fall back gradually through the woods, which order I believe was obeyed. I was left upon the field, the command devolving upon Lieutenant-Colonel Woods, who will make a further report.

In conclusion it is but just for me to say that the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Woods merits the highest commendation. The lamented Major Culp fell while bravely cheering on his men in front of the regiment. All of the officers present behaved with the utmost coolness and gallantry.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. T. CAMPBELL,

Colonel Fifty-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers.

General C. D. JAMESON,

Commanding First Brigade, Kearny's Division.

[Indorsement.]

Respectfully forwarded. Universal report speaks most highly of the gallantry of Colonel Campbell.

P. KEARNY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

No. 54.

Report of Lieut. Col. Elhanon W. Woods, Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. FIFTY-SEVENTH REGT. PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
First Brigade, Kearny's Division.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that on Saturday, 31st May, Colonel Campbell, Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, received orders to move forward to the scene of action. We left our camp at the left of the rifle pits at the Burnt Chimneys at 3 o'clock p. m.; marched past the rifle pits to the railroad, along the railroad a distance of about 4 miles; filed out at the left of the road at a camp. Here we met a staff officer or orderly who informed Colonel Campbell that he wished him to march still up the railroad to support a battery. We then marched along the railroad about 50 rods above or west of the bridge over the railroad, and came up with some other troops halted in the woods to the right of the railroad. We were halted and ordered to file into the woods at the right of the road and in rear of the other troops (said to be General Birney and his men), which was done by forming column of companies (by right of company to rear into column). We stacked arms, lay a short time, and were ordered forward. Marched 50 or 60 rods farther and were ordered off to the right of the railroad, and formed line of battle in the center of an open field, with the left on the railroad and about 100 paces to the rear of the Third Maine, which was lying along the fence at the woods on our front. We stood a few minutes. A number of shot and shell passing over us, we were ordered by Colonel Campbell to march by the left flank. We did so; marched across the railroad through an oat field, through the woods, and came out into another oat field across the Nine-mile road to the woods; formed line of battle along the fence, the right near the road. Were ordered forward by a general officer (I took it to be General Keyes) into the slashing about 15 rods; formed again; were ordered on again; marched on through the slashing to the swamp, about half way between the field and a camp in view in our front, where we encountered the enemy, the men standing and pouring a deadly volley into them.

After about five or six rounds word came that we were firing into friends, and the fire slackened for a moment. Colonel Campbell was now wounded and carried off (Major Culp having been shot dead in the field before entering the woods). Our fire was renewed and kept up until I saw the enemy past our right flank. I then gave the order to fall back. From the nature of the ground and the fallen timber it would be impossible to save the men by undertaking to fall back in regular order.

The regiment was formed again at the rifle pits, where it remained for the night, it being already dark. Colonel Campbell received the order to form line on the north side of the railroad in rear of the Third Maine from Brigadier-General Birney. I understood at the time that the order to move over to the Nine-mile road came from General Birney.

I did not see General Birney after he gave the first order to form in rear of the Third Maine.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. W. WOODS,

Lieut. Col., Commanding Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Vols.

Brig. Gen. C. D. JAMESON.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, KEARNY'S DIVISION,
June 6, 1862.

GENERAL: At your request I have the honor to forward the within statements of Lieutenant-Colonel Woods relative to the movements of the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers in the engagements on the afternoon of May 31, 1862.

Colonel Campbell was seriously wounded in the action and has been sent to the rear, and it is impossible to ascertain all the particulars in regard to the different orders received by him during the day. Lieutenant-Colonel Woods has no doubt but what it was General Keyes who gave him the order to advance after the regiment had crossed the Nine-mile road.

C. D. JAMESON,
Brigadier-General.

Brigadier-General HEINTZELMAN, *Commanding Third Corps.*

No. 55.

Report of Col. Alexander Hays, Sixty-third Pennsylvania Infantry.

CAMP, June 1, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the results of the engagement in which the regiment I have the honor to command, Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, participated.

About 4 o'clock p. m. on the 31st ultimo, by order of Brigadier-General Jameson, eight companies of the regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, were led into action. Soon after the engagement commenced Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan was seriously wounded, notwithstanding which the several companies, under their individual captains, did honor to themselves, to the country, and to the old Commonwealth from which we hail. Two companies of the regiment, having been detailed for fatigue duty on the morning previous to the action, did not participate with the others under my own command. However, they formed a nucleus around the colors of the Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, aided by a remnant of a Massachusetts regiment, and, with the colors of three regiments flying, we moved forward, by order of General Heintzelman, to relieve the Eighty-seventh New York Regiment, which had gallantly sustained the field against superior numbers. I cannot distinguish among those that passed before my notice. All did nobly, and gave me reason to be proud that I was an American.

Respectfully submitted.

ALEX. HAYS,
Colonel Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Capt. C. H. POTTER, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 56.

Report of Lieut. Col. A. S. M. Morgan, Sixty-third Pennsylvania Infantry.

CONTINENTAL HOTEL,
Philadelphia, June 5, 1862.

SIR: Though under all the circumstances I have no idea that any official report concerning the Sixty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers in the battle of May 31 will be expected of me, I wish to state to you what I know of that which transpired on that day.

After you had given the order relative to putting the regiment into line and had left us the regiment moved forward steadily through the abatis. It had not progressed very far before I found the left wing had come up to the line of the Fifth Michigan, which regiment I found was in line firing by file, the men kneeling and lying upon the ground. An extent of front equal to about three companies came up behind that regiment. On going to the left I there saw Colonel Terry, of the Fifth Michigan. After some conversation with him I started to go along the line to the right of the regiment, when my attention was attracted to the head of a column of the enemy's infantry moving down the main road already quite near to our line. I went back to point out to Colonel Terry, to whom some of his men were just calling his attention to it. He said I would have to order my regiment to fall back. I hurried toward the right to provide in the best manner possible for the emergency, and when I reached a point on the right wing of the regiment and in an open place where I could again see distinctly to the road I found the head of the column referred to was falling back, and I continued to order the men to push on. The right wing was then not quite as far advanced as the left, and nearly but not quite through the abatis. It was just at this moment that I was shot. In a few moments after I could neither stand nor walk, and had to consent to be taken from the field.

I sent Lieutenant Moorhead to inform Captain Kirkwood of the fact and to direct him to take command of the regiment. I hoped to see you as I went back, but those who were carrying me lost their way and did not bring me out on the road. I did not, of course, see Colonel Terry again, but I imagine he saw for himself that I made no change in the forward movement of my regiment. You will probably have understood this from others, but I thought it best to write to you of it. I regret very much that I was wounded so early in the action.

I was in hopes that I would be able to go directly home, but Dr. Morris, the physician whom I consulted here, forbids it for some time yet. I am, however, getting along very well, and hope soon to be entirely restored.

Allow me to congratulate you on your own escape and on the flattering terms in which I everywhere see your name mentioned.

Very respectfully, yours,

A. S. M. MORGAN,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Brig. Gen. C. D. JAMESON.

No. 57.

Report of Col. Amor A. McKnight, One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTH PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
June 2, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: A few minutes before 3 p. m. of the 31st ultimo I received orders from General Jameson to get ready to meet the enemy. At 3 p. m. we left camp, following the West Point and Richmond Railroad until we arrived opposite the headquarters of General Heintzelman, where we diverged to the left, and after pursuing the road for about 2 miles came up with the foe. Seven companies of this regiment, under my command, entered the abatis in front of the enemy at about 4 p. m. and at once commenced a brisk action. The firing was quite animated and told fearfully on the enemy, so much so that we succeeded in driving them back from their position, and also very materially interfered with the serving of a battery which they had in our front.

At this point I was preparing for a charge, when the intelligence was brought me that the rebels were driving our regiments in the rifle pits, and were at that moment actually in our rear, thereby cutting off our communication. I hastened back, and found from personal inspection that such was the case. On my return to our line I found that the enemy, emboldened by the success of their compatriots on their left, had returned to the fight in increased numbers, and were then in the act of making a charge on our position. The cry of "One hundred and fifth, charge!" immediately became general, and the men, springing from under cover of the abatis to the open ground in front, delivered a rapid, deadly fire, which caused the foe to fall in great numbers, and under which they immediately retreated, closely pursued until near the summit of the ground in advance of their position, when I ordered a halt. I thought it best to stop here because of the enemy in our rear, and because a few discharges of grape shot we had had previously suggested to me that to advance unsupported within the fire of the enemy's battery would result in our total annihilation. We took and held the camps immediately in our front, and from which we kept up a desultory fire until about 7.15 p. m., when the enemy, having been re-enforced, made another advance. From the display of numbers I would judge their force to have comprised a brigade.

At this time my command was greatly reduced. Five captains went with me into action, and of that number 1 was killed and the remaining 4 seriously wounded, and out of 11 lieutenants 2 were killed and 5 wounded. With a partial regiment so greatly reduced, our ammunition out, the firing to our right and rear indicating that our forces were retreating, there was no alternative but to give the order to retreat. To retreat seemed almost as hazardous as to advance, the enemy being both in our front and rear. We succeeded, however, in getting off in safety by moving from our left flank, and by double-quickening through the fallen timber and swamps in the woods got by the enemy undiscovered. At no time during the engagement was there any confusion. We pressed steadily forward; never lost an inch of ground from the commencement of the fight until the withdrawal of the remainder of the line obliged us to retire. We forced the enemy several times from his position, and could we have been supported would have driven him entirely off.

While the enemy was in possession of the open ground in front of the rifle pits and to our rear the firing was very destructive upon us. We were subjected to a fire from both front and rear, and being close upon the enemy's battery, a number of shells directed against it by our artillery fell short in our midst and doing us considerable damage.

I cannot speak in too high terms of the conduct of the regiment. Not a man flinched. Captain Dowling, of Company B, was killed while leading his men forward. He was an excellent officer and worthy gentleman. It will be difficult to supply his place. Lieutenant Craig, killed at the same time, was a young officer of great promise. At the siege of Yorktown he was assigned to duty in the engineer department, and the satisfactory manner in which he filled the position was shown by his being retained on that duty until the conclusion of the siege.

Lieutenant Cummiskey, of Company D, had his head blown off by a cannon ball while gallantly leading his men forward to repulse a charge of the enemy. As an officer he was unsurpassed. He had every qualification of a gentleman, and was brave and chivalrous to a fault. Captains Kirk, Thompson, Duff, and Greenawalt, with Lieutenants Geggie, Baird, McLaughlin, Markle, and Shipley, were wounded in the midst of the combat and whilst urging their men on.

The remaining commissioned officers, Lieutenants Consor, Neil, Clyde, Lawson, and Barr, were continually in the front of the fight, never flagging in their efforts, and exhibiting a courage which excited the emulation of their men. Sergeant-Major Woodward behaved with great courage, and made himself conspicuous by gallantry on several occasions.

During the engagement Lieutenant-Colonel Corbet, Major Dick, and Adjutant Gray were very active, and contributed essentially by their exertions to the steadiness of the command.

Company G was specially detailed to guard the railroad bridge over the Chickahominy River. Companies C and I were on detailed duty, and did not get up in time to go into the fight with the regiment, but were placed under command of Colonel Campbell, Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers. I presume his report will do full justice to their conduct.

Respectfully submitted.

A. A. McKNIGHT,
Colonel, Comdg. One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Vols.

Lieutenant STURGES,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Kearny's Division.

No. 58.

Report of Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HDQRS. BIRNEY'S BRIGADE, THIRD DIV., THIRD CORPS,
Harrison's Landing, July 8, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report for the information of the general commanding the division the part taken by this brigade in the battle of Seven Pines, on the 31st of May, 1862. My brigade was composed of the Thirty-eighth and Fortieth New York Regiments and the Third and Fourth Maine Regiments.

The Thirty-eighth had been detailed on the 30th May for picket duty and were being relieved when the firing on the 31st May commenced. There were only some hundred of the regiment in the action. Two companies of the Fortieth New York were detailed as guards over commissary stores, leaving my brigade only about 1,300 strong. At 3 o'clock p. m. I received an order from General Kearny to move my brigade up the railroad and report by staff officer to General Keyes. Ten minutes after 3 o'clock p. m. my column was in motion, led by the Fourth Maine Regiment, followed in order by the Fortieth New York, Third Maine, and the remnant of Thirty-eighth New York. Before I had reached the railroad, at fifteen minutes past 3 o'clock, General Kearny rode up to me and ordered me to return to the Williamsburg and Richmond road and man the line of rifle pits thrown up, called by him the second line. Upon reaching this point, he himself stationed the Fortieth New York in the rifle pits and detached a large number as sharpshooters in and around the house used as a hospital. He ordered the Fourth Maine to the right of the Fortieth, in the woods.

At this time one of my aides informed me that General Kearny had sent his acting assistant adjutant-general, Captain Sturges, with the Third Maine and Thirty-eighth New York, up the railroad. I asked General Kearny whether he had given this order. He replied that he had, but ordered me to gallop over to the railroad and stop them, and to form one in column of companies on the railroad, and to deploy the portion of the Thirty-eighth present as skirmishers on the right flank, refusing the line so as to cover that flank. He ordered me to obey no order to move from that position, except the order came through himself. He stated that the disordered troops now pouring through our lines could not be rallied; that the enemy had Casey's camp and first line of works, and the only hope of successfully stopping his progress was the second line. He ordered me to take position on the railroad, and sent Captain Sturges, his acting assistant adjutant-general, to remain with me.

I made the disposition of the Third Maine and Thirty-eighth New York ordered. I tried to stem the torrent of fugitives from the front, but it carried all before it, and they feared bayonets in front less than the fire in the rear from the pursuing enemy. I succeeded in rallying and attaching to the Thirty-eighth New York some hundred men of the Twenty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, formerly commanded by myself. One company of this regiment, under Capt. Adolph Cavada, had been on picket duty on the railroad where my line crossed, and willingly joined my command. I was under many obligations to Captains Gwyn, Cavada, and Lieut. J. B. Fassitt, of the Twenty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, for their active assistance in my efforts to reform the fugitives. At 5 o'clock p. m. Lieutenant Hunt, of General Heintzelman's staff, rode up to me and ordered me to advance up the railroad to the support of Keyes' corps. I at once moved, with the Third Maine leading, and sent my aides, Major Tobias and Captain Mindil, to withdraw the Fortieth New York and Fourth Maine from the position in which they were posted by General Kearny and to order them to follow. As I moved Colonel Campbell, of the Fifty-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, reported to me that he had been ordered to proceed up the railroad. I assumed command of his regiment and assigned him position in my column.

After advancing a mile up the railroad the firing became heavy upon my left, and inquiry from fugitives convinced me that it was part of

Couch's division, Keyes' corps, that I was ordered to support. At this time the enemy opened a scattering musketry fire from a wood that ran to the railroad, and I at once deployed my column into line of battle. Finding that the firing on the left was getting more to the rear, I led into the woods the Fifty-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers and Fortieth New York, and succeeded after a sharp contest in driving back the enemy from his attempt to turn the right flank of our troops. The loss of the Fifty-seventh was very heavy, its gallant colonel falling severely wounded, the major killed, and the list of casualties very large.

Captain Brady, of the artillery, now rode up to me and said that he came from General Couch, who sent word that his command had been cut off; that he had found a road by which to extricate his artillery through the swamp, and if I could hold the railroad and prevent the enemy from cutting him off he could extricate himself. I sent him word that I had been sent to his support, and would and could hold the railroad. At this time (about 6 o'clock) Captain Suydam, of General Keyes' staff, rode up to me and told me that General Heintzelman ordered me to advance still up the railroad. I asked him if General Heintzelman knew where I was, and that my command was then going into action between the railroad and Williamsburg road. He replied that Generals Keyes and Heintzelman were some 2 miles in the rear; that he knew nothing beyond the order. I at once made disposition to move forward, throwing out skirmishers and withdrawing the Fortieth New York Volunteers. The Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers were thrown into too much confusion in the woods to withdraw.

My skirmishers in front were constantly engaged, and in advancing we captured some 200 prisoners. When my lines reached the woods near Fair Oaks Station an oblique artillery fire from the right across my front commenced. To advance would have subjected me to this fire, and supposing that it was General Sumner who had crossed and was advancing, I sent successively three aides to report to him my position, instructions, and to ask orders. The orders from him were to connect with General French, commanding his left, and advance *pari passu*. He also sent the Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Russell, to report to me in order to strengthen my command, as the position held by me was important.

At this time Captain Hassler rode up to me from General Kearny and ordered me to return at once to the position assigned by him to me at 3 o'clock. Before obeying this order I sent my aide, Captain Linard, to him to advise him of my connection with General Sumner's command, and to state that if I withdrew there would be a gap of half a mile between his (Kearny's) right and Sumner's left, with the enemy in force in its front, ready to move through in the morning. He still ordered me to return. I placed out a strong guard, under Major Pitcher, of the Fourth Maine, and, preceding my column, went to General Kearny's tent, and explained to him the position of my brigade and the importance of the position. He concurred with me and ordered me to return. I did so, and at 10 o'clock p. m. had my connection perfect with General French. I found the railroad embankment afforded natural rifle pits, and posted my brigade behind them and bivouacked for the night, throwing out strong pickets.

The enemy were in great force in our front and made no attempt at concealment, building fires, talking loudly, and by daylight commenced preparation for the attack. With my staff under a tree I awaited

anxiously during the rainy night an attack from this quarter, and, sending around an aide, had all my command under arms and ready.

At daylight an orderly rode to me with an order from General Kearny to turn over my command to my next officer and report to him. I found him in his bed. He told me he had received an order from General Heintzelman to place me under arrest—for what offense he knew not. I asked if it could have been for advancing too far. He replied that he could not imagine what for, but said he would suspend the order for arrest, and ordered me to go to General Heintzelman and say that he (General Kearny) assumed all the responsibility of my actions on the 31st May. I obeyed this order, and sent in by Lieutenant Hunt to General Heintzelman a message that I would be pleased to have five minutes' conversation, in which I could explain my conduct. He returned with a reply that it must be in writing. As I turned to leave for that purpose, Captain McKeever, an *attaché* of General Heintzelman's staff, approached me, and asking what I wanted I told him, and he replied in a very sneering voice, "General Kearny should be sufficient of a soldier at least to know more than to have sent you here. You have no right to approach General Heintzelman."

My brigade, in the position to which it was assigned by me, did gallant service under Colonel Ward on the 1st June, and protected partly by the railroad did great execution with little loss.

In my case a court-martial was convened. General Heintzelman did not attempt to prove that he had sent me any order that was disobeyed, and after the evidence of the prosecution the court, through its judge-advocate, Colonel Gantt, suggested to me that it was not necessary to make a defense. I was honorably acquitted, and returned immediately to my command. I must here return my thanks to General Kearny for his persistent efforts to prevent the assignment of another general officer to the permanent command of my brigade during my arrest on these frivolous, unjust, and malicious charges. General Heintzelman had assigned one.

With my own brigade and division these charges, and the fulmination of them at the time by one Samuel Wilkeson, of the New York Tribune, recognized by General Heintzelman as a volunteer aide-de-camp, had no effect, but I have the honor to submit whether the code that governs our Army is not defective in not providing some redress for injuries of this kind. In this case a general officer is placed temporarily before the country in the pillory of disgrace, arrested by daybreak on the battle-field, these facts sent over the country by newspaper correspondents acting as volunteer aides-de-camp, and when the court-martial meets, this officer, of the same grade as the accused, to whom he had refused five minutes' explanation, testifies that he is entirely ignorant of the whole case. This officer is of course shielded by superior rank and age from the usual responsibility.

I am gratified that my conduct and that of my brigade met with the approval of the commanding general of the division. That my command, 1,300 strong, could have retaken all the artillery captured by the enemy, could have accomplished what Couch's and Casey's divisions failed to do, or even Sumner's corps on the right did not attempt to do, is a very great compliment to it and myself, but is, I think, undeserved.

With the knowledge now had of the strength of the enemy I believe that the advance of my brigade on the right saved, by its display of re-enforcements, the divisions of Couch, Casey, and the two brigades of our division supporting them, from complete disorder and rout,

which would have ensued had the enemy pursued their success on the 31st.

Annexed hereto are the reports of regimental commanders, with consolidated table of casualties.*

I am, your obedient servant,

D. B. BIRNEY,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. W. E. STURGES,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Kearny's Division.

No. 59.

Reports of Col. J. H. Hobart Ward, Thirty-eighth New York Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS BIRNEY'S BRIGADE,
Camp ———, June 1, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the following movements of the brigade during the past twenty-four hours:

At 3 p. m. on the 30th ultimo, under orders from General Kearny, line was formed, the left resting on a redoubt on the right of the Williamsburg road, extending across and through the woods, with the right resting at a point beyond the railroad.

At 4 p. m. orders were received from General Heintzelman, through Lieutenant Hunt, aide-de-camp, to move up the railroad and support General Couch. At this time the Fifty-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, having been detached from their brigade, were assigned by Lieutenant Sturges, General Kearny's assistant adjutant-general, to this brigade. In accordance with instructions received, the brigade advanced up the railroad and formed line in the open fields beyond the first wood, two regiments on the right of the road and three on the left, the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania connecting with the First Long Island Volunteers, Couch's division. At this point some shots were received. Again received orders from General Heintzelman, per Lieutenant Bliss, acting commissary of subsistence, to push up the railroad. This movement was executed with caution. Some shots were also received here, and the brigade was finally formed in the next open field beyond, the Third Maine and Thirty-eighth New York on the railroad by the flank, supported by the Fortieth New York and Fourth Maine on the right and left of the road as skirmishers.

Whilst thus advancing orders were received from General Kearny, per Captain Hassler, aide-de-camp, to fall back on the rifle pits in rear. Lieutenant Linnard was dispatched to see if the order was correct, and returned with a similar answer from General Kearny. The brigade did fall back, when orders were again given to advance by General Kearny in person. While advancing received information from General Couch through Captain Brady that he was being cut off by the enemy, but that if Birney held his position he could escape by a new road he had discovered. The brigade was formed in first field, regiments deployed to the right and left of the road in front as skirmishers, the pickets connecting with General French on the right and General Couch on the left. The Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Russell, reported for duty

* Embodied in return, p. 760.

with this brigade by order of General Keyes, and was assigned an advanced position on the railroad. The brigade bivouacked for the night.

The next morning at daybreak dispositions were made to repel any attacks from the enemy. The Seventh Massachusetts and Fourth Maine were stationed on the right and left of the railroad in the advanced field, their skirmishers connecting with General French and the Thirty-eighth New York, Fortieth New York, and Third Maine in an oblique line across the woods and next field, connecting with General Kearny on the left. Skirmishers were sent to the front, with instructions not to provoke an attack.

Up to this time, about 7 a. m., General Birney was in command. He having been summoned to division headquarters, the undersigned, as senior officer with the brigade, received a communication from General Birney turning over the command. Considerable skirmishing took place in front with the enemy's pickets. Several of our men were wounded, including Lieutenant Walker, Thirty-eighth New York.

About 8 a. m. General Hooker with his division appeared in my front, and marching by the flank skirted the woods between my skirmishers and main body. As General Hooker's command disappeared in the woods to the front and left the heavy firing to the left of the railroad and in advance, which had been continued for the last half hour, now suddenly ceased, and a new fire was opened in the woods to my right and diagonally to my front. I immediately changed front to face the woods from where the fire emanated, and as the enemy advanced and their fire increased I gave the order to fire and immediately thereafter to charge. This movement was most brilliantly performed, driving the terrified enemy before them. This brilliant feat was accomplished by the Third Maine, Thirty-eighth and Fortieth New York. The enemy, now retreating to the opening beyond, were met by a destructive flank fire from the Fourth Maine and Seventh Massachusetts, stationed on the railroad. The rout was complete. An attempt was made by the enemy to rally a short time afterward, but it resulted in a complete failure. Our loss was severe for the short time engaged. A list as far as ascertained is herewith transmitted. While nearly 200 of the enemy lie dead on the field and a much larger number wounded, about 60 prisoners were taken uninjured. I hope to be able by to-morrow to give a detailed account of the whole affair.

I cannot find words to express my admiration of the conduct of both officers and men in the discharge of their several duties. I would also beg leave to mention the following officers, who conspicuously distinguished themselves: Colonel Staples, Third Maine; Colonel Walker, Fourth Maine; Colonel Russell, Seventh Massachusetts; Lieutenant-Colonel Egan, Fortieth New York; Lieutenant-Colonel Carver, Fourth Maine; Major Baird and Captains Cooney and Tilden, Thirty-eighth New York; Captain Gesner, acting major, Fortieth. Lieutenant-Colonel Egan was superb. Capt. G. W. Mindil, assistant adjutant-general, particularly distinguished himself. His superior intelligence and activity were manifest everywhere. Would also state that the troops still remained in possession of the upper field.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. H. HOBART WARD,

Colonel Thirty-eighth Regiment, Commanding Brigade.

Capt. W. E. STURGES,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS BIRNEY'S BRIGADE,
Camp near Fair Oaks, Va., June 5, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to state that in my official report of June 1, made up hastily and but a few hours after the action, I inadvertently omitted to mention several occurrences of interest, which are necessary to make the whole history complete. Previous to the attack on Sunday morning I was visited by yourself, with directions from General Kearny to hold my position, and connect by skirmishers with the general at the rifle pits, and that if attacked he would re-enforce at once. The attack of the enemy was so sudden (although information was forwarded to the general without delay) and their repulse and perfect rout so rapid the re-enforcements were not needed.

In addition to the officers mentioned in my previous report, many of whom were immediately under my own observation and others spoken of by their regimental commanders, I wish to speak in the most exalted terms of the medical staff of this brigade, among whom I may be permitted to mention Brigade Surgeon Pancoast, Regimental Surgeons Berry and Hildreth, Assistant Surgeons Gesner, Gatchell, and Halsey. Assistant Surgeons Gesner and Halsey were conspicuous on the battlefield, relieving suffering humanity, our own men and the misguided rebels alike.

The aides of General Birney, Lieutenants Linnard and Ford, rendered me very efficient service, Lieutenant Ford having his horse killed while conveying orders.

In closing my final report I would beg leave to remark that the brigade which I had (and for the present have) the honor to command was much reduced in numbers by details just previous to the action. The number of men engaged in the charge upon the enemy was less than 700, while the enemy's force consisted of five regiments; the right flank being protected by the Fourth Maine, numbering about 450, and the left by detachments numbering about 250 men.

I wish I could find words to express my admiration of the conduct of the enlisted men. I cannot mention one without finding it necessary to continue the list indefinitely.

I have the honor to remain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. HOBART WARD,

Colonel Thirty-eighth Regt. N. Y. Vols., Comdg. Brigade.

Capt. W. E. STURGES,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 60.

Report of Col. Henry G. Staples, Third Maine Infantry.

HDQRS. THIRD REGIMENT MAINE VOLUNTEERS,
Camp before Richmond, Va., June 2, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of the Third Regiment Maine Volunteers in the engagement near the railroad on the 31st ultimo and 1st instant:

During the attack on the left on the 31st my command was ordered to the front by General Birney. He moved up the railroad by the flank and occupied several positions on the right and left of the road during the afternoon, resting at night in line of battle upon the first opening

on the right of the road above the bridge. On the morning of the 1st instant we were ordered into the field on the left of the railroad by Colonel Ward, then commanding the brigade. We formed a line of battle under the edge of the woods, our right toward the railroad.

The presence of the enemy in force in our front was revealed by their terrific fire opened on our skirmishers under command of Major Burt, acting lieutenant-colonel, who checked them until our main body came up. By your order we charged over the fence, and I am pleased to say that the command was gallantly executed; the regiment, cheering continually, rushed on the enemy with such impetuosity that they broke and fled at the first onset. We pursued them for a mile through woods and swamps, they endeavoring in vain to check us during their retreat by a rapid fire. When we crossed the run we met their reserve in large numbers on the top of an eminence, our brave boys still advancing threw themselves upon the ground half way up the hill and fired upon them steadily, the rebels returning our fire with terrible effect at this point, and most of our casualties took place here. After silencing their fire, by your order we retired and formed a line with the rest of the brigade, and after resting a while we again advanced, other regiments having meanwhile come to our relief. The left and left-center companies were subjected to the hottest fire, came most in conflict with the enemy, and suffered most. A list of casualties you will find inclosed.*

I am pleased to say that the whole regiment did their duty nobly and bravely, and where all behaved so gallantly no opportunity is left for individual praise. Too much praise cannot be accorded to both officers and men for their coolness and bravery.

I have the honor, sir, to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY G. STAPLES,

Colonel, Commanding Third Maine Volunteers.

Colonel WARD,
Commanding Birney's Brigade.

No. 61.

Reports of Col. Elijah Walker, Fourth Maine Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH MAINE REGIMENT,
Camp Staples, Va., Sunday, June 1, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following as the circumstances of the capture of Col. John Bratton, Sixth South Carolina Regiment:

While my regiment was advancing in line of battle in the belt of woods in front of the clearing occupied by Miss Susan Allen as her residence, I ordered that ten men (one from each company) should proceed some distance to the front to act as scouts. From the statements of these scouts—particularly of Fred. H. Rogers, of Company K—I gather the following facts: The scouts, advancing as ordered, came upon the edge of a swamp, which they could not cross at that point, and so moved to the left to find a passage over. While in this position Rogers saw a cavalryman hurrying by, who told him he had just discovered a squad of rebels near by and was going to his own regiment for help to capture them. Rogers then went in the direction indicated just to take

* Embodied in return, p. 760.

a look at them, and first seeing a man with a gun in one hand and a white handkerchief on a stick in the other, he ordered him to lay down his gun, which the man did. He next noticed the colonel, wounded, lying about 10 or 12 feet from the man, under a tree. Meanwhile five more of our scouts had gathered around and five more rebels had come up also, the latter having equipments on, but no guns, and bringing with them as prisoner a captain* belonging to the Thirteenth Pennsylvania Regiment, who expressed much joy that his captors were now in turn taken by our men, and stating that this was the second time he had been taken and rescued during the day. He also stated that his captors had treated him like a gentleman and requested that our men would treat these prisoners well in return. At this time acting Lieutenant Moses Ford, of Company F, came up with a prisoner he had taken.

During this time the regiment, instead of advancing by the front, had, unbeknown to the scouts, moved off by the right flank to the railroad. The party then returned with their prisoners to the house of Miss Allen, occupied and used by our surgeons as a hospital, and left the colonel in charge of the assistant surgeon of the Third Maine Regiment; then took the remainder of the prisoners to General Birney's headquarters; thence by order to General Kearny's headquarters, where they were delivered in charge of the division provost guard.

The released Pennsylvania captain was taken into the camp of our regiment, where he remained during the night.

The wounded colonel has since been removed, and his sword, which was left in the hands of the assistant surgeon of the Third Maine, is now in my possession. I learn also that he had a watch, which is in the hands of Assistant Surgeon Gesner, of the Thirty-eighth New York Regiment.

Including the prisoners mentioned above, I think the number of rebels taken in the vicinity by my regiment Saturday evening and Sunday morning was about 30.

Respectfully,

E. WALKER,
Colonel Fourth Maine Volunteers.

Captain MINDIL.

HDQRS. FOURTH MAINE REGIMENT, *June 2, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to render the following report of my proceedings during the fight of the last two days:

Having been ordered out with my command under arms on the afternoon of Saturday, May 31, I was first stationed in the woods in front of my encampment, the right of regiment resting on the railroad. From this position I was ordered forward, and advanced through the field known also as Eliza [Susan?] Allen's, taking position under cover of the fence at the edge of the woods and sending forward scouts to bring intelligence if the enemy were approaching in front. While here we received some shots from the enemy on the left, and one of my officers was slightly wounded in the head. We were shortly after ordered farther to the front and advanced to the edge of the next field, where we lay with our right resting on the railroad until dark, when I was ordered to detach four companies from my command and send them forward as a picket to the road crossing the railroad. I detailed for this purpose Companies G, H, I, and K, under command of Capt. W. L. Pitcher,

* John D. McFarland.

acting major, and had them stationed at the point mentioned. My next order was to draw in my pickets and place them across the railroad midway of the swamp, and with the remainder of my command to follow the Third Maine Regiment back on the railroad. Having marched back nearly to the bridge crossing the road I was ordered to return to the edge of the woods at the open field and to advance the pickets to their first position, in which situation we remained until daylight.

Soon after daylight I moved my six companies on to the railroad and sent out scouts, who returned with the information that the enemy were filing through the woods on the left. I immediately notified Captain Pitcher of this and started to communicate the intelligence to Colonel Ward, but before reaching his position firing commenced on the right, and I turned and hastened to rejoin my command. On my return I found the enemy had attacked and driven in the — Pennsylvania Regiment, of General Howard's brigade, on the right and in front of Captain Pitcher's command. He, finding the troops between him and the enemy rapidly retiring, quickly formed his four companies in rear of the fence just back of the lane. The enemy soon appeared in large force at the edge of the woods, but were repulsed and held in check by these four companies until the — New York Regiment formed in their rear in the cut of the railroad, and the commanding officer requesting Captain Pitcher to move from his front, he withdrew to the same line, took position on the left of the other regiment, and continued his fire. While the enemy were engaged by them at short range on the left they also suffered severely from the raking fire of the remainder of the regiment at longer distance. They must have sustained great loss too from the cross-fire of the whole while retiring through the slashing before the other regiments of this brigade. Many more of the rebels would have been cut down while retreating through the slashing, but General Hooker ordered our firing stopped, as he feared we were shooting among his troops, which I thought at the time and afterward ascertained to be without foundation.

During the whole affair both officers and men behaved themselves with great coolness and courage. The four left companies fired on an average 45 rounds to a man, the remainder of the regiment 10 rounds each. Captain Pitcher, in forming his command in the face of the enemy while our own men were hastily retreating and by his subsequent bearing during the entire action, showed himself the officer and soldier, and fully competent for the office (major of the regiment), of his appointment to which by the Governor of Maine he has since been notified. During the two days several prisoners were taken and brought in by my scouts from the front, among them the colonel of the Sixth South Carolina Regiment, who was wounded, and who I had placed in the hospital.

My loss (which I have previously reported) was remarkably light. I have 2 men killed, 8 wounded, and 1 missing.

I inclose with this Captain Pitcher's report as commander of the picket who were detached from the regiment until after the close of the action on Sunday.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. WALKER,

Colonel, Commanding Fourth Maine Volunteers.

Capt. G. W. MINDIL,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 62.

Report of Captain William L. Pitcher, Fourth Maine Infantry.

FOURTH MAINE REGIMENT,
Camp in Field, Sunday, June 1, 1862.

I have the honor to report as follows :

Was detailed about 9 p. m. yesterday evening with the four left companies of the regiment as picket guard, with orders to guard a point on the railroad at the farther edge of the opening, sending out scouts occasionally during the night to reconnoiter cautiously. I immediately sent out a scouting party on the railroad, who reconnoitered for a distance of half a mile beyond the opening, and during their absence received orders to withdraw to a point on the railroad at the swamp midway of the belt of woods in rear of the opening, being informed that the regiments who had been bivouacking in the rear had been ordered back ; therefore drew in my scouts and retired as ordered. About midnight I was again ordered forward to my former position, with instructions to send out pickets a half mile on the railroad and post men across the opening from the left of the railroad, which I did, retaining as a reserve at the road portions of two companies.

At earliest daybreak I sent five men to the front of the outposts, who returned, reporting that they had seen men felling trees beyond the houses in front, and I immediately sent out another party to ascertain more particularly. They reported that the men were of the enemy, and that a regiment of rebels was drawn up in rear of the slashing, and apparently deploying to the right and left, which facts I communicated to Lieutenant Linnard, of General Birney's staff. A few minutes later a major from General Howard's brigade informed me that that brigade had formed line of battle in the woods at an acute angle with the railroad, their right resting on the road at our farther outposts and their left near the opening in the vicinity of our reserve. I then drew in my pickets, concentrating my force on a lane a few rods to the left of the railroad, forming a line parallel with theirs and about 50 rods in the rear of their left. Here we remained at rest till 7.30 a. m., when, while engaged in distributing the morning rations to the men, we were startled by a sudden and terrific volley of musketry in front, which caused several companies on the left of Howard's brigade to retreat precipitately from the woods, passing by us and down the railroad. I immediately formed my line on the railroad, at the same time endeavoring to rally the retreating companies to make a stand with us. Failing in this, I advanced to a position in rear of a rail fence a short distance in front and opened fire.

Re-enforcements advancing down the railroad, by an order I changed position to the left sufficiently to allow them to form in line, and continued firing with deadly effect (as was afterward proved) till about 10 a. m., the rebel force in the mean time being compelled to retire to the woods beyond the slashing, wherein they kept up a return fire upon us with little effect, our men being protected by a slight gradation of the railroad till driven from their position by an attack on their right. Two of our men were killed and 7 wounded—most of their wounds being slight. Both men and officers under my command displayed perfect coolness and courage under the fire of the enemy. We remained

in position till the early part of the afternoon, when we were ordered to rejoin the regiment.

Truly, your obedient servant,

Col. E. WALKER.

WM. L. PITCHER,
Captain, Acting Major, Fourth Maine.

No. 63.

Report of Maj. William H. Baird, Thirty-eighth New York Infantry.

HDQRS. THIRTY-EIGHTH REGT. NEW YORK VOLDS.,
Near Fair Oaks, June 3, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 1st instant, in obedience to the orders of Col. J. H. Hobart Ward, commanding brigade, the Thirty-eighth Regiment New York Volunteers was formed in line of battle at daybreak, my right resting near the railroad and connecting on the left with the right of the Third Regiment Maine Volunteers, under the command of Colonel Staples. I was assisted in my duties by Capts. O. A. Tilden and John M. Cooney, respectively acting lieutenant-colonel and major, who rendered me efficient service in such capacities. We remained under arms until 8 o'clock a. m. In the mean time I had detached, by order of Colonel Ward, two companies, E and K, and placed them under command of Capt. O. A. Tilden, to deploy and act as skirmishers, which they did, receiving an attack in front from a large force of the enemy. They skirmished back in good order, keeping the enemy in check until within less than 100 yards of our front. I then repeated Colonel Ward's order to "Fire, charge, and give them the bayonet," which order was in turn delivered by all my officers along the line.

It gives me great pleasure to inform you that owing to the attention of my officers not a shot was fired until the command was given. After delivering our fire we charged through the woods, driving the enemy before us at every point, and at last routed him completely. We captured 12 prisoners (unwounded), and killed and wounded the enemy in great numbers. Fearing I should receive the fire of the Fourth Maine Regiment, which was stationed on the railroad at right angles with our own front, pouring a murderous fire on the enemy's left flank, I ordered a halt. I then, by order of Colonel Ward, made a detail to take my wounded to the rear, and fell back to assume the same position occupied before the action.

It is my duty to speak in the most unqualified terms of Surg. A. J. Berry and his assistant, B. Gesner, they having labored incessantly since the action began. I cannot speak too highly of their services. I would also do justice to the officers of my command, but where so much bravery was exhibited, and one vied with the other in gentlemanly and officer-like bearing, it is impossible to make any distinction. I desire to speak in the highest terms of the enlisted men. They did their duty only as good soldiers can do it. My greatest pride is in commanding such a noble body of men. I need only refer to the fact (as an evidence of their conduct) that they drove a largely-superior force nearly a mile at the point of the bayonet.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

WM. H. BAIRD,
Major, Commanding Thirty-eighth New York Volunteers.
Capt. G. W. MINDIL, A. A. G., *Second Brigade.*

No. 64.

Report of Lieut. Col. Thomas W. Egan, Fortieth New York Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS FORTIETH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
Camp at Fair Oaks, June 4, 1862.

I have to report the following movements of the Fortieth Regiment New York Volunteers in connection with the battle of Fair Oaks:

About 1 p. m. on the 31st May orders were received to form the regiment as quickly as possible. This was at once done, and with the rest of the brigade we were marched by General Birney up the Williamsburg road about half a mile, when we filed to the right and halted. Two companies, F and H, were here detailed by General Kearny to support a battery at this point, thus leaving but six companies, Companies C and K having been several days previously detailed to guard the stores at General Heintzelman's headquarters. We remained here until, in obedience to an order from General Birney, I marched the command to the right as far as the railroad, then up the railroad about half a mile, when we filed to the right in an open field and formed in line of battle. After remaining in this position about two hours we were ordered by General Birney to march back to an open field on the left of the railroad, where I sent out two companies as pickets. The balance of the command remained in line of battle all night. At daylight the two companies which had been sent out as pickets were relieved, and Company A, Captain Johnson, was thrown out as skirmishers on our left.

About 8 o'clock in the morning sharp firing commenced in the woods on our right, when, on an order from Col. J. H. H. Ward, who was then in command of the brigade, I wheeled the battalion to the right, in order to face the enemy, and under a galling fire charged over the fence into the woods, our men at the same time delivering a vigorous fire upon the rebels.

About this time a staff officer not of this brigade rode up and informed me that I was firing upon our own friends. For a time I ceased firing, and though our men were falling rapidly, not another shot was fired by us until orders were given by Colonel Ward, commanding the brigade, to advance and fire. The enemy, taking advantage of this unfortunate mistake, advanced upon us. I then ordered my men to charge bayonets, and in an instant they were advancing at double-quick, which the enemy perceiving, and not relishing the idea of cold steel, turned and fled. We continued driving them to the front, and when near the edge of the woods we received a heavy fire from the front and left. Here many of our men fell, notwithstanding which not one faltered, but with tremendous cheers continued to advance, driving the enemy entirely from the woods and scattering them in all directions, notwithstanding they made a desperate resistance. The victory was complete. In this charge we captured about 25 prisoners, including several officers.

Some idea of the severity of the enemy's fire may be formed from the fact that out of 231 of our regiment who were in this engagement our loss was 96. Every member of the color guard was either killed or wounded, and Color-Corporal Greeves, notwithstanding a severe wound in the shoulder, planted the colors far in advance of the woods, and remained there until he was recalled by myself.

Of the five companies engaged four were commanded by first lieutenants. Company B was commanded by Captain Foster, Company D by First Lieut. John Horn, Company E by First Lieut. H. J. Strait, Com-

pany G by Lieut. Louis Fitzgerald, and Company I by Lieut. George M. Bennett.

Lieutenants Fitzgerald and Gesner, who conducted themselves with great coolness and bravery in the engagement, were both badly wounded.

I desire to make special mention of Acting Maj. N. A. Gesner and Adj. Aug. J. Warner, both of whom exhibited the coolness and skill of veterans. In fact, all the officers engaged acquitted themselves handsomely in this engagement.

The humane services performed by Rev. William H. Gilder, chaplain of the regiment, during and after the engagement, deserve especial notice. The state of his health at the time would have fully justified his absence from the field, yet, though his labors in connection with the wounded frequently brought him under fire, he fearlessly and zealously performed them until every wounded man, the enemy's as well as our own, had been carried off the field and provided for.

To Asst. Surg. C. E. Halsey great praise is also due for the prompt and skillful manner in which he performed the severe and responsible duties of his profession on this occasion.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

T. W. EGAN,

Lieut. Col., Commanding Fortieth Regiment N. Y. S. Vols.

Capt. G. W. MINDIL,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Birney's Brigade.

No. 65.

Report of Brig. Gen. Hiram G. Berry, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS BERRY'S BRIGADE,
Kearny's Division, June 1, 1862.

CAPTAIN: Yesterday morning, in obedience to orders, I moved my brigade from its camping ground, some 3 miles below, to the vicinity of these works, where we bivouacked at 12 m. I placed the Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Riordan commanding (Colonel Hayman having been previously detailed by yourself as division officer of the day), in the works along the sides (west and north). At 1 o'clock I received an order from your headquarters to place my entire command in rear of the intrenchments. I had scarcely got my men into their several positions when I received an order from your headquarters to have one regiment placed in the woods on the left of the Williamsburg road on our front. I ordered out the Third Michigan, Colonel Champlin, for that purpose, preceded by 50 sharpshooters detailed from the regiment and under the command of Captain Judd. This regiment I moved across the plain, when I received an order to move the balance of my brigade to the front; also to send for all my men then on other duties in the field to report to their commander at the front. The Fifth Michigan, Colonel Terry, followed the Third Michigan, the Thirty-seventh New York following the Fifth Michigan.

The Second Michigan, Colonel Poe, was on picket duty. I ordered the colonel to concentrate his regiment on the right flank and hold it in readiness to move to the front. On my order Colonel Poe sent forward

two companies, under the command of Major Dillman, who took position on the flank of the Thirty-seventh New York and did excellent service. The Third Michigan moved into the woods about one mile in advance of this camp on the left of the road, and by gallant fighting drove the enemy for more than a mile along the left of the woods into and through the slashing. At this time the Fifth Michigan came into the field and was conducted forward by myself, and with it I relieved the Third Michigan and placed the Third in reserve to the Fifth. About one hour later a portion of regiments of other brigades came up. I formed these on the left of the troops of my brigade into the timber. We steadily drove the enemy forward so far that I had serious fears of being flanked by the enemy, as they were driving our troops down the road and plain as well as on the right of the road.

We were at this time in the woods extending from the edge of the slashings below up the woods and on the left of the camping ground of General Casey's division, completely commanding his old camp and the earthworks with our rifles. I then passed down through the slashings some 150 yards, and found the Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers and Colonel Poe's two companies, under Major Dillman, in position and at work. On my return to the front I learned that Captain Smith, my assistant adjutant-general, had been killed. We held the enemy in check, and could have driven them back farther had the center and right of our line been able to have held their position. About 5.30 p. m. I discovered the Thirty-seventh New York moving to the rear. On inquiry I found they had been ordered to fall back by the general of division to prevent being flanked and captured. I then gave orders to the other regiments to fall back also, some portions of which did not get the order in consequence of the thick woods, but all did make good their movement to the rear and came into camp in order.

This brigade has suffered severely and is much reduced. The ground we fought on was swampy and thickly wooded. It was almost impossible to keep our lines connected. The enemy repeatedly attempted to turn our left, but by the exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, Majors Fairbanks and Pierce, were as often handsomely repulsed. Colonel Poe's three companies, first concentrated, were sent by order of General Heintzelman to form a guard line across the rear of our army to prevent straggling. The balance, five companies, were reported to General Heintzelman, and went into action on the main road, under the command of Colonel Poe in person. These last-named companies suffered severely, as they fought largely superior numbers, for the particulars of which I respectfully refer you to Colonel Poe's report.

I have to say that the regiments of this command fought a hard fight in a most difficult and trying position under great disadvantages and against fearful odds. They fully sustained their former reputation as good soldiers and gallant men, and I am constrained to say did their part to secure a victory to our arms.

I have to make honorable mention of Colonel Champlin, of the Third Michigan Volunteers, who was wounded in the fight. Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens and Major Pierce, of the same regiment, did their duty nobly. I am pleased to add that Colonel Champlin's wound is not dangerous, though severe. I have to report the loss of Captain Judd, of this regiment. He commanded the body of sharpshooters. He fell at their head. This regiment's fire told fearfully on the enemy. Their sharpshooters raked the road and field with their fire.

Colonel Terry and Major Fairbanks, of the Fifth Michigan, both displayed their accustomed bravery. Their regiment fought well and gallantly, and fully maintained their previous reputation gained at Williamsburg. Colonel Poe makes honorable mention of Lieutenant-Colonel Williams and Adj. R. H. Mahon, and I wish to add Major Dillman, who it will be remembered commanded two companies on the flank of the Thirty-seventh New York. Colonel Hayman fought his regiment mostly under the eye of the division general. I would therefore refer you to Colonel Hayman's official report. Colonel Hayman mentions as worthy of special notice Lieut. James Henry, adjutant; also Capt. J. R. O'Beirne, Lieut. W. C. Green, and P. J. Smith.

It will be seen that the list of missing in my brigade is very small. The withdrawal of my men under the circumstances was accomplished without much loss. I wish to accord great credit to Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, of Third Michigan, for valuable services rendered in getting a portion of the men of the Third and Fifth Regiments well off the ground after our retreat was made difficult. The men of these regiments were unwilling to leave the ground they had won, and it was not until they had fired their last cartridges and all they could obtain from the boxes of the killed and wounded that they were willing to fall back. Being accustomed to the woods, they came into the camp in order and without losing any men as prisoners. Father Peter Tissot, chaplain of the Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers, was in the engagement, and rendered valuable service to his regiment. He had his horse killed under him. He was also in the thickest of the engagement at Williamsburg. I take great pleasure in commending him to the general of the division as in every way a worthy and model chaplain.

I would call the attention of the general of the division to the uniform good conduct of the surgeons of this brigade. They have been very attentive and industrious in rendering to those of my command who were wounded the aid so necessary. The brigade is indeed fortunate in having the services of so good a board of surgeons.

I feel particularly the loss of my accomplished and brave assistant adjutant-general, Captain Smith. A more gallant man did not exist. He fell while nobly discharging his duty.

Respectfully submitted.

H. G. BERRY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Third Brigade.

Capt. W. E. STURGES, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 66.

Report of Col. Orlando M. Poe, Second Michigan Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND MICHIGAN VOLUNTEERS,
Camp near Seven Pines, Va., June 1, 1862.

SIR: I have to report that yesterday at about 12 m., my regiment being on picket duty, I received an order, through the division officer of the day, requiring me to move the regiment by its right flank a considerable distance, and to take up a new position for a line of outposts. While engaged in doing this I received an order from General Berry in person to concentrate the regiment upon its right flank and hold myself in readiness to move into action at a moment's notice. The regiment was concentrated as rapidly as possible, but re-enforcements be-

ing urgently called for, the two companies then in hand were sent forward, under command of Major Dillman, and did excellent service, acting upon the right flank of the Thirty-seventh New York. Three companies were deployed, by order of General Heintzelman, across the road, with orders to stop all stragglers from passing to the rear. The other five companies, as soon as concentrated, were conducted by myself to the scene of action, where I reported my command to General Heintzelman, who placed me in position to support a line which was then being formed upon the right of the road. This front line, when ordered forward, did not number more than 60 men, who broke and passed to our rear without firing more than five or six rounds.

At this moment Colonel Hays, Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, urged me to advance, but seeing all our forces on the left of the road in full retreat, with the enemy close upon them, I declined to do so, as it would only be to sacrifice the small force under my command. I then moved the regiment in line of battle to the rear about 500 yards, and took up a position in a wooded ravine, which I was confident I could hold, as the ground over which the enemy would have been compelled to approach was clear, while we had the advantage of cover. At this time the enemy occupied the edge of the woods nearest us, with no troops of our army in front or on our flanks. Upon representations made by Colonel Hays, General Jameson gave me an order to move forward, which was obeyed with alacrity. We moved over the open space to within 50 yards of the enemy, all the time subjected to a murderous fire from both sides of the road. I soon found that to hold or to attempt to hold the position we were then in was utterly impossible, and with the assent of General Jameson I gave the order to retreat, which was done in line of battle and in better order than could have been expected, being the last troops to leave the field.

I can testify to the good conduct of both officers and men. All acted nobly, but I must make special mention of Lieut. Col. A. W. Williams and Lieut. Richard H. Mahon, regimental adjutant, who rendered me at all times the greatest assistance. I must mention in the highest terms Dr. E. J. Bonine, regimental surgeon, who has done his whole duty through two battles. He is invaluable to the regiment, and has rendered his department in the highest degree efficient. Annexed please find a list of our losses, which occurred in seven companies of 40 men each.*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ORLANDO M. POE,
Colonel Second Michigan Volunteers.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Berry's Brigade.

No. 67.

Report of Lieut. Col. Ambrose A. Stevens, Third Michigan Infantry.

HDQRS. THIRD REGIMENT MICHIGAN VOLUNTEERS,
Berry's Brigade Camp, Va., June 1, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report to you a brief account of the part taken by the Third Michigan Volunteers in the battle of yesterday: At about 2 o'clock p. m. your order was received to take our posi-

* Embodied in return, p. 760.

tion in rear of the redoubt upon our right, which was at once immediately complied with. We remained in this position but a short time, when we took up the line of march across the fields and parallel with the Williamsburg road, hastening as rapidly as possible toward the point where our troops had for some time previously been actively engaged. The distance, being about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the redoubt to the scene of action, was soon passed over, when Colonel Champlin received your instructions to lead his regiment at once into action—deploying at the same time in line of battle upon the left of the road, our right wing resting upon an abatis, while the left was thrown forward at a double-quick into a thicket of pines.

The engagement now became general, and it was with great difficulty that our corps of sharpshooters, under command of Captain Judd, and the five right companies of our regiment could penetrate this mass of fallen timber and dislodge the enemy from their strong position; but the steady and cool behavior of our men, and with the telling effect of the deadly aim of their rifles, soon compelled them to fall back, while our regiment pressed forward, charging through this fallen timber and driving the enemy beyond the fence in the rear of the camp of General Palmer's brigade, some 80 rods distant, where they again formed and made another stand. It was during this time that Colonel Champlin received a severe wound in the hip, which prevented him from taking further part in the action, and with his orders I now proceeded to rally the different companies of the regiment together in line for the purpose of again pressing forward and dislodging the enemy from his new position. While thus engaged the Fifth Michigan Regiment came up, and at the same time the order that they were to relieve us. Accordingly our regiment was ordered to remain at a halt, while the Fifth Michigan pushed forward and engaged the enemy. With your instruction we now advanced in support of this regiment, and during the remainder of the action the two regiments fought bravely side by side.

It was now about 4 o'clock p. m., and while the contest was as determined as ever, it was discovered that our ammunition was nearly expended, when Major Pierce, of our regiment, volunteered to undertake the task of procuring ammunition and further orders, which had now become hazardous, as there seemed to be a disposition of the enemy to turn both our right and left flanks. It was now about 5.30 o'clock p. m. The enemy crowding the forces back who were engaged upon our right, we found ourselves, together with the remnants of the Fifth Michigan and Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, isolated from our forces upon either flank. It was deemed proper by the senior officers present of the different regiments to withdraw to the rear, and I, being the senior officer present upon the ground, gave the order to fall back slowly from the field, which had now become hopeless for us to attempt to hold for the night, owing to the want of ammunition, which was done in good order, returning to the camp about 9 o'clock p. m.

In making this hasty report I have not time to particularize, as it would be impossible; as all, both officers and men, did their duty nobly. I cannot close this report, however, without mentioning the coolness and good conduct of Majors Pierce and Fairbanks—the former for gallant services rendered while in command of the left wing of our regiment, and to the latter for his great assistance rendered to me while retiring from the field. I also beg leave to call your attention to the gallant Captain Judd, who fell while bravely leading our sharpshooters in the early part of the action. He was one of the bravest of the brave. His loss will be deeply regretted by the regiment and all who knew him.

The following is a list of casualties among our officers so far as heard from.*

We have in the course of preparation a more minute report of the loss of our regiment, which will be handed in at the earliest moment.

Hoping the report may be satisfactory, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

A. A. STEVENS,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Third Michigan Volunteers, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. H. G. BERRY,

Commanding Third Brigade.

No. 68.

Report of Col. Henry D. Terry, Fifth Michigan Infantry.

HDQRS. FIFTH REGIMENT MICHIGAN INFANTRY,
Camp near Allen's, 9 miles from Richmond, Va., June 1, 1862.

GENERAL: Your acting assistant adjutant-general, Captain Smith, having been killed in the engagement, I have the honor to report to you personally the part taken in the battle of yesterday near the Seven Pines by this regiment. In pursuance of orders from your headquarters the regiment left camp for the scene of action about 3 o'clock p. m., and in about half an hour entered the woods at the point directed and under your personal guidance, with orders to support the Third Michigan Regiment, already engaged some 400 yards to the front. After getting into the woods the regiment was formed in line of battle and moved forward, and in a few moments came up with the Third Michigan, at a halt. They had ceased firing.

On stating to the major of that regiment, who was the only field officer near me at the time, that we were ordered to support his regiment, he replied that they were waiting for orders. I instantly ordered the Fifth forward and passed the Third, with the exception of two or parts of two or more companies of the Third, who advanced with us. Soon we came upon the enemy and opened on him a severe fire, which had the effect to drive him back. The regiment moved forward, halting and firing, until the standing woods on our front was clear of the enemy, who retired somewhat to the right into a "slashing," as it is called—a sort of abatis of fallen timber adjoining to and between us and a camp which had been occupied that morning by some of the troops of General Casey's or General Couch's division.

The enemy's fire from the slashing was very rapid and told upon our men with terrible effect, yet not one of them shrank from his duty or gave ground to the enemy. Twice were re-enforcements sent into the slashing by the enemy. Our cartridges ran low, and the boxes of the dead and wounded were opened and furnished a limited supply, which enabled us to continue the fire, though sparingly, until about sundown, when, fortunately for us, the firing from the slashing ceased and all was silent.

Instantly was heard very regular and rapid discharges of musketry nearly a mile in our rear, and at or about the point where we had first entered the woods. Finding the enemy thus in our rear, our ammuni-

* Nominal list omitted shows loss of 26 killed, 112 wounded, and 27 missing. But see revised statement, p. 760.

tion expended, no troops to support us, daylight fast disappearing, I directed the troops quietly to withdraw. We retired to the right and rear through the swamp, and I reached camp with the last of the regiment (Company H, under Lieutenant Wakenshaw) at nearly 8.30 o'clock in the evening. I learned the same evening that the firing we had heard in our rear toward dark was an engagement between some companies of the Second Michigan Regiment and the enemy in large force.

The regiment went into the action with less than 330 officers and men. As far as ascertained our loss is as follows: Killed, 29; wounded, 112; missing, 15; total, 156.* It is feared that most of the missing will be found to have been killed or wounded.

Among the killed are Capt. Louis B. Quackenbush, Company H, and First Lieut. Charles H. Hutchins, the adjutant of the regiment. They died where brave men ever die—at their post of duty. It will not be disparaging to any others to say that a truer soldier or a braver officer does not live than was Captain Quackenbush.

Capt. Charles H. Travers, commanding Company E, was severely, and I fear mortally, wounded in the chest near the close of the engagement. He too, who probably will never march again, was a model soldier on the battle-field. It is enough to say of him that he, like each and every commandant of a company that day, did his duty. Capt. George W. Wilson, commanding Company G, was slightly wounded in the shoulder, but will be able to resume his duties in a few days. First Lieut. John J. Knox, commanding Company D, was severely wounded in the throat, but it is believed he will recover.

The left of the line was more particularly under the eye of Major Fairbanks, who from first to last did his whole duty with great energy and gallantry. He states to me that so far as he observed all on the left seemed to vie with each other in steadiness and courage.

I cannot close this report without bearing testimony to the bravery and good conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, of the Third Michigan Regiment, who remained with a few of his troops with my command to the close of the action.

I will send in a full list of killed, wounded, and missing at once.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

H. D. TERRY,

Colonel, Commanding Fifth Michigan Regiment.

Brig. Gen. H. G. BERRY.

No. 69.

Report of Col. Samuel B. Hayman, Thirty-seventh New York Infantry.

HDQRS. THIRTY-SEVENTH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLTS.,

Camp ———, June 2, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report, agreeably to instructions from brigade headquarters, the part performed by my regiment in the action which occurred on the 31st ultimo:

The regiment moved from our last encampment to the one now occupied by the brigade early on the morning of that day. I was engaged as division officer of the day, under the orders of General Kearny, in

* But see revised statement, p. 760.

posting pickets, until I heard heavy firing in our front, when I immediately joined my regiment, which I found posted in the intrenchments at our new camp. I soon after received an order to proceed with my regiment to join the Third and Fifth Michigan Regiments, which had moved to the front and entered the timber. I had no information to guide me as to their position, and was unable to ascertain their precise locality. The regiment followed the Richmond road to a point near a farm-house, located in a clearing, under a heavy artillery fire. It then proceeded to the left until I found the Third and Fifth Michigan Regiments were in my front.

While I was endeavoring to find a position to co-operate with these regiments under a heavy fire (which I was unable to return, owing to the position of our troops in front) heavy musketry fire was opened upon my right flank, the enemy evidently designing to operate against our right flank and attack the brigade in rear. I immediately faced my regiment to the right and filed to the right, so as to change my front, for the purpose of checking the movement of the enemy on our right and rear. I was in advance of the leading company, conducting the movement, but before it was completed I observed that my left wing was moving to the front, the cause of which I did not at the time understand, but soon ascertained that this movement had been ordered by General Kearny, and that he was leading it in person to the front. I then faced my right wing to the left and followed the movement. The enemy was checked, and he recrossed the road, where he was strongly re-enforced, when he opened a terrible fire, but the regiment engaged in the unequal strife with spirit. The enemy was still moving a strong force to the right and rear obliquely to the right. The regiment retained, however, its position until General Kearny ordered it to file to the rear and incline to the right. It executed this movement, taking its wounded with it, except some few who could not be found, but who have since been nearly all recovered. The enemy did not follow, which shows that his design was abandoned, and which saved the advanced position of the brigade from being threatened in rear.

The officers performed their duty well, as will be proved by the list of casualties, which will be furnished as soon as the two companies now on picket are relieved. Two companies of the Second Michigan Regiment, under Major Dillman, followed the movements of my regiment and acted in the most soldier-like manner—worthy of the splendid regiment to which they belong. I am indebted to Maj. P. H. Jones for advice as regarded the movement of the enemy, and commend him for his general good conduct. The adjutant of my regiment, Lieut. James Henry, was particularly distinguished for his daring zeal and courage, and I commend him as worthy of special notice. Lieut. W. C. Green, who was seriously wounded, and who, before the engagement, was unfit for duty, I also deem worthy of special notice. I also recommend as worthy of commendation Capt. James R. O'Beirne and Lieut. P. J. Smith for zeal, judgment, and courage. Each company of my right wing had an officer disabled, and two of these companies were left entirely without officers, yet the enlisted men acted worthy of their native courage.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. HAYMAN,

Colonel Thirty-seventh New York Vols., Commanding.

Lieut. E. H. SHOOK,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Berry's Brigade.

No. 70.

Report of Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Corps.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS,
June 13, 1862.

SIR: The following is my report of the operations of the Fourth Corps in the battle of the 31st of May and 1st of June:

The Fourth Corps, being in the advance, crossed the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge the 23d of May, and encamped 2 miles beyond. Two days later I received orders to advance on the Williamsburg road and take up and fortify the nearest strong position to a fork of roads called the Seven Pines. The camp I selected, and which was the next day approved by Major-General McClellan, stretches across the Williamsburg road between Bottom's Bridge and the Seven Pines, and is distant about a mile from the latter. I caused that camp to be fortified with rifle pits and breastworks extending to the left about 1,000 yards and terminating in a crotchet to the rear. Similar works, about 300 yards farther in advance, were constructed on the right, extending toward the Richmond and West Point Railroad.

Having been ordered by General McClellan to hold the Seven Pines strongly, I designed to throw forward to that neighborhood two brigades of Casey's division, and to establish my picket line considerably in advance and far to the right. The lines described above are those where the main body of the troops engaged near the Seven Pines spent the night of the 31st, after the battle. Examinations having been made by several engineers, I was ordered on the 28th of May to advance Casey's division to a point indicated by a large wood-pile and two houses, about three-fourths of a mile beyond the Seven Pines (but which in fact is only half a mile), and to establish Couch's division at the Seven Pines. Accordingly Casey's division bivouacked on the right and left of Williamsburg road and wood-pile, and Couch established his division at the Seven Pines and along the Nine-mile road. Both divisions set to work with the few intrenching tools at hand to slash the forests and to dig a few rifle pits. Casey erected a small pentangular redoubt, and placed within it six pieces of artillery. The country is mostly wooded and greatly intersected with marshes. The Nine-mile road branching to the right from the Seven Pines slants forward, and at the distance of a mile crosses the railroad at Fair Oaks. A mile beyond it reaches an open field, where the enemy was seen in line of battle on the 29th and 30th days of May.

Casey's pickets were only about 1,000 yards in advance of his line of battle, and I decided, after a personal inspection with him, that they could go no farther, as they were stopped by the enemy in force on the opposite side of an opening at that point. I pushed forward the pickets on the railroad a trifle, and they had been extended by General Naglee to the open field, where the enemy was seen in line of battle, and from thence to the right bank of the Chickahominy. After a thorough examination of my whole position I discovered that on the 30th of May the enemy were in greater or less force, closed upon the whole circumference of a semicircle described from my headquarters near Seven Pines with a radius of 2 miles.

A considerable space about the fork of the road at Seven Pines was open, cultivated ground, and there was a clear space a short distance in front of Casey's redoubt at the wood-pile. Between the two open-

ings we found a curtain of trees, which were cut down to form an abatis. That line of abatis was continued on a curve to the right and rear and across the Nine-mile road.

When the battle commenced Casey's division was in front of the abatis; Naglee's brigade on the right, having two regiments beyond the railroad; Palmer's brigade on the left, and Wessells' brigade in the center. Couch's division was on the right and left of the Williamsburg road, near the forks, and along the Nine-mile road. Peck's brigade was on the left, Devens' brigade in the center, and Abercrombie's on the right, having two regiments and Brady's battery across the railroad, near Fair Oaks, thus forming two lines of battle.

Through all the night of the 30th of May there was raging a storm the like of which I cannot remember. Torrents of rain drenched the earth, the thunderbolts rolled and fell without intermission, and the heavens flashed with a perpetual blaze of lightning. From their beds of mud and the peltings of this storm the Fourth Corps rose to fight the battle of the 31st of May, 1862.

At about 10 o'clock a. m. it was announced to me that an aide-de-camp* of Maj. Gen. J. E. Johnston, C. S. Army, had been captured by our pickets on the edge of the field referred to above, beyond Fair Oaks Station. While speaking with the young gentleman, at the moment of sending him away, a couple of shots fired in front of Casey's headquarters produced in him a very evident emotion. I was perplexed, because having seen the enemy in force on the right when the aide was captured, I supposed his chief must be there. Furthermore, the country was more open in that direction and the road in front of Casey's position was bad for artillery. I concluded therefore, in spite of the shots, that if attacked that day the attack would come from the right. Having sent orders for the troops to be under arms precisely at 11 o'clock a. m., I mounted my horse and rode along the Nine mile road to Fair Oaks Station. On my way I met Colonel Bailey, chief of artillery of Casey's division, and directed him to proceed and prepare his artillery for action.

Finding nothing unusual at Fair Oaks, I gave some orders to the troops there, and returned quickly to Seven Pines. The firing was becoming brisk, but there was yet no certainty of a great attack. As a precaution to support Casey's left flank, I ordered General Couch to advance Peck's brigade in that direction. This was promptly done, and the Ninety-third Pennsylvania, Colonel McCarter, was advanced considerably beyond the balance of that brigade.

At about 12.30 p. m. it became suddenly apparent that the attack was real and in great force. All my corps was under arms and in position. I sent immediately to General Heintzelman for re-enforcements, and requested him to order one brigade up the railroad. My messenger was unaccountably delayed, and my dispatch appears not to have reached its destination till much later than it should have done. General Heintzelman arrived on the field at about 3 p. m., and the two brigades of his corps, Berry's and Jameson's, of Kearny's division, which took part in the battle of the 31st, arrived, successively, but the exact times of their arrival in the presence of the enemy I am unable to fix with certainty; and in this report I am not always able to fix times with exactness, but they are nearly exact.

Casey's division, holding the front line, was first seriously attacked at about 12.30 p. m. The One hundred and third Pennsylvania Vol-

* See Keyes to Marcy, May 31, "Correspondence, etc."

unteers, sent forward to support the pickets, broke shortly and retreated, joined by a great many sick. The numbers as they passed down the road as stragglers conveyed an exaggerated idea of surprise and defeat. There was no surprise, however. All the effective men of that division were under arms, and all the batteries were in position, with their horses harnessed (except some belonging to the guns in the redoubt), and ready to fight as soon as the enemy's forces came into view. Their numbers were vastly disproportionate to the mighty host which assailed them in front and on both flanks.

As remarked above, the picket line being only about 1,000 yards in advance of the line of battle and the country covered with forests, the Confederates, arriving fresh and confident, formed their lines and masses under the shelter of woods, and burst upon us with great suddenness, and had not our regiments been under arms they would have swept through our lines and routed us completely. As it was, however, Casey's division held its line of battle for more than three hours, and the execution done upon the enemy was shown by the number of rebel dead left upon the field after the enemy had held possession of that part of it for upward of twenty-four hours. During that time it is understood all the means of transport available in Richmond were employed to carry away their dead and wounded. The enemy advancing, as they frequently did, in masses, received the shot and shell of our artillery like veterans, closing up the gaps and moving steadily on to the assault. From my position in the front of the second line I could see all the movements of the enemy, but was not always able to discover his numbers, which were more or less concealed by the trees, nor could I accurately define the movements of our regiments and batteries.

For the details of the conflict with Casey's line I must refer to his report, and to the reports of Brigadier-Generals Naglee, Palmer, and Wessells, whose activity I had many opportunities to witness. When applied to for them, I sent re-enforcements to sustain Casey's line until the numbers were so much reduced in the second line that no more could be spared. I then refused, though applied to for further aid.

I shall now proceed to describe the operations of the second line, which received my uninterrupted supervision, composed principally of Couch's division, second line. As the pressure on Casey's division became greater he applied to me for re-enforcements. I continued to send them as long as I had troops to spare. Colonel McCarter, with the Ninety-third Pennsylvania, Peck's brigade, engaged the enemy on the left, and maintained his ground above two hours, until overwhelming numbers forced him to retire, which he did in good order.

At about 2 o'clock p. m. I ordered the Fifty-fifth New York (Colonel De Trobriand, absent, sick), now in command of Lieutenant-Colonel Thourot, to "save the guns," meaning some of Casey's. The regiment moved up the Williamsburg road at double-quick, conducted by General Naglee, where it beat off the enemy, on the point of seizing some guns, and held its position more than an hour. At the end of that time, its ammunition being exhausted, it fell back through the abatis, and after receiving more cartridges the regiment again did good service. It lost in the battle nearly one-fourth of its numbers killed and wounded. At a little past 2 o'clock I ordered Neill's Twenty-third and Rippey's Sixty-first Pennsylvania Regiments to move to the support of Casey's right. Neill attacked the enemy twice with great gallantry. In the first attack the enemy were driven back. In the second attack, and under the immediate command of General Couch, these two regiments assailed a vastly superior force of the enemy and fought with extraordinary

bravery, though compelled at last to retire. They brought in 35 prisoners. Both regiments were badly cut up. Colonel Rippey, of the Sixty-first, and his adjutant were killed. The lieutenant-colonel and major were wounded and are missing. The casualties in the Sixty-first amount to 263, and are heavier than in any other regiment in Couch's division. After this attack the Twenty-third took part in the hard fighting which closed the day near the Seven Pines. The Sixty-first withdrew in detachments, some of which came again into action near my headquarters.

Almost immediately after ordering the Twenty-third and Sixty-first to support the right, and as soon as they could be reached, I sent the Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Russell, and the Sixty-second New York, Colonel Riker, to re-enforce them. The overpowering advance of the enemy obliged these regiments to proceed to Fair Oaks, where they fought under the immediate orders of Generals Couch and Abercrombie. There they joined the First U. S. Chasseurs, Colonel Cochrane, previously ordered to that point, and the Thirty-first Pennsylvania, Colonel Williams, on duty there when the action commenced. The losses in the Sixty-second were not so great as in some of the other regiments; its conduct was good, and its colonel, J. Lafayette Riker, whose signal bravery was remarked, met a glorious death while attacking the enemy at the head of his regiment. The First U. S. Chasseurs, Colonel Cochrane, fought bravely. By that regiment our enemy's standard-bearer was shot down and the battle-flags of the Twenty-second North Carolina Regiment captured.

For further particulars of the conduct of the Sixty-second New York and the First U. S. Chasseurs, as well as for the account of those two excellent regiments the Seventh Massachusetts and Thirty-first Pennsylvania, Colonels Russell and Williams, I refer to the reports of Generals Couch and Abercrombie. Those regiments, as well as Brady's battery, First Pennsylvania Artillery (which is highly praised), were hid from my personal observation during most of the action. They acted in concert with the Second Corps, by the opportune arrival of which at Fair Oaks in the afternoon, under the brave General E. V. Sumner, the Confederates were brought to a sudden stand in that quarter. They were also present in the action of the following day near Fair Oaks, where, under the same commander, the victory, which had been hardly contested the day before, was fully completed by our troops.

At the time when the enemy was concentrating troops from the right, left, and front upon the redoubt and other works in the front of Casey's headquarters and near the Williamsburg road the danger became imminent that he would overcome the resistance there and advance down the road and through the abatis. In anticipation of such an attempt I called Flood's and McCarthy's batteries, of Couch's division, to form in and on the right and left of the junction of the Williamsburg and Nine-mile roads, placed infantry in all the rifle pits on the right and left, pushing some up also to the abatis, and collecting a large number of stragglers posted them in the woods on the left. Scarcely had these dispositions been completed when the enemy directly in front, driven by the attack of a portion of Kearny's division on their right and by our fire upon their front, moved off to join the masses which were pressing upon my right.

To make head against the enemy approaching in that direction it was found necessary to effect an almost perpendicular change of front of the troops on the right of the Williamsburg road. By the ener-

getic assistance of Generals Devens and Naglee, Colonel Adams, First Long Island, and Captains Walsh and Quackenbos, of the Thirty-sixth New York, whose efforts I particularly noticed, I was enabled to form a line along the edge of the woods, which stretched nearly down to the swamp, about 800 yards from the fork, and along and near to the Nine-mile road. I threw back the right crotchet-wise, and on its left Captain Miller, First Pennsylvania Artillery, Couch's division, trained his gun so as to contest the advance of the enemy.

I directed General Naglee to ride along the line, to encourage the men and keep them at work. This line long resisted the progress of the enemy with the greatest firmness and gallantry, but by pressing it very closely with overwhelming numbers, probably ten to one, they were enabled finally to force it to fall back so far upon the left and center as to form a new line in rear. Shortly after this attack I saw General Devens leave the field wounded. There was then no general officer left in sight belonging to Couch's division. Seeing the torrent of enemies continually advancing, I hastened across to the left beyond the fork to bring forward re-enforcements. Brigadier-General Peck, at the head of the One hundred and second and Ninety-third Pennsylvania Regiments, Colonels Rowley and McCarter, was ordered, with the concurrence of General Heintzelman, to advance across the open space and attack the enemy, now coming forward in great numbers. Those regiments passed through a shower of balls, and formed in a line having an oblique direction to the Nine-mile road. They held their ground for more than half an hour, doing great execution. Peck's and McCarter's horses were shot under them. After contending against enormous odds those two regiments were forced to give way, Peck and the One hundred and second crossing the Williamsburg road to the wood, and McCarter and the bulk of the Ninety-third passing to the right, where they took post in the last line of battle, formed mostly after 6 o'clock p. m. During the time last noticed Miller's battery, having taken up a new position, did first-rate service.

As soon as Peck had moved forward I hastened to the Tenth Massachusetts, Colonel Briggs, which regiment I had myself once before moved, now in the rifle pits on the left of the Williamsburg road, and ordered them to follow me across the field. Colonel Briggs led them on in gallant style, moving quickly over an open space of 700 or 800 yards under a scorching fire, and forming his men with perfect regularity toward the right of the line last above referred to. The position thus occupied was a most favorable one, being in a wood, without much undergrowth, where the ground sloped somewhat abruptly to the rear. This line was stronger on the right than on the left. Had the Tenth Massachusetts been two minutes later they would have been too late to occupy that fine position, and it would have been impossible to have formed the next and last line of the battle of the 31st, which stemmed the tide of defeat and turned it toward victory—a victory which was then begun by the Fourth Corps and two brigades of Kearny's division of the Third Corps, and consummated the next day by Sumner and others.

After seeing the Tenth Massachusetts and the adjoining line well at work under a murderous fire I observed that that portion of the line 150 yards to my left was crumbling away, some falling and others retreating. I perceived also that the artillery had withdrawn, and that large bodies of broken troops were leaving the center and moving down the Williamsburg road to the rear. Assisted by Captain Suydam,

my assistant adjutant-general, Captain de Villarceau, and Lieutenants Jackson and Smith, of my staff, I tried in vain to check the retreating current.

Passing through to the opening of our intrenched camps of the 28th ultimo, I found General Heintzelman and other officers engaged in rallying the men, and in a very short time a large number were induced to face about. These were pushed forward and joined to others better organized in the woods, and a line was formed stretching across the road in a perpendicular direction. General Heintzelman requested me to advance the line on the left of the road, which I did, until it came within some 60 or 70 yards of the opening in which the battle had been confined for more than two hours against a vastly superior force. Some of the Tenth Massachusetts, now under the command of Captain Miller; the Ninety-third Pennsylvania, under Colonel McCarter, of Peck's brigade; the Twenty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Neill, of Abercrombie's brigade; a portion of the Thirty-sixth New York, Colonel Innes; a portion of the Fifty-fifth New York, and the First Long Island, Colonel Adams, together with fragments of other regiments of Couch's division, still contended on the right of this line, while a number of troops that I did not recognize occupied the space between me and them.

As the ground was miry and encumbered with fallen trees I dismounted and mingled with the troops. The first I questioned belonged to Kearny's division, Berry's brigade, Heintzelman's corps; the next to the Fifty-sixth New York, now under command of its lieutenant-colonel, and the third belonged to the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, of Casey's division. I took out my glass to examine a steady, compact line of troops about 65 yards in advance, the extent of which toward our right I could not discover. The line in front was so quiet that I thought they might possibly be our own troops. The vapors from the swamp, the leaves, and the fading light (for it was then after 6 o'clock) rendered it uncertain who they were, so I directed the men to get their aim, but to reserve their fire until I could go up to the left and examine—at the same time that they must hold that line or the battle would be lost. They replied with a firm determination to stand their ground.

I had just time to put up my glass and move ten paces toward the left of the line where my horse stood, but while I was in the act of mounting as fierce a fire of musketry was opened as any I had heard during the day. The fire from our side was so deadly that the heavy masses of the enemy coming in on the right, which before had been held back for nearly two hours (that being about the time consumed in passing over less than a thousand yards) by about a third part of Couch's division, were now arrested. The last line, formed of portions of Couch's and Casey's divisions and a portion of Kearny's division, checked the advance of the enemy and finally repulsed him, and this was the beginning of the victory which on the following day was so gloriously completed.

During the action, and particularly during the two hours immediately preceding the final successful stand made by the infantry, the three Pennsylvania batteries under Maj. Robert M. West (Flood's, McCarthy's, and Miller's), in Couch's division, performed most efficient service. The conduct of Miller's battery was admirable. Having a central position in the forefront of the action it threw shells over the heads of our own troops, which fell and burst with unusual precision among the enemy's masses, as did also those of the other two batteries; and later in the day, when the enemy were rushing in upon our right,

Miller threw his case and canister among them, doing frightful execution. The death of several officers of high rank and the disability and wounds of others have delayed this report.

It has been my design to state nothing as a fact which could not be substantiated. Many things escaped notice by reason of the forests, which concealed our own movements as well as the movements of the enemy. From this cause some of the reports of subordinate commanders are not sufficiently full. In some cases it is apparent that these subordinate commanders were not always in the best positions to observe, and this will account for the circumstance that I have mentioned some facts derived from personal observation not found in the reports of my subordinates. The reports of division and brigade commanders I trust will be published with this immediately. I ask their publication as an act of simple justice to the Fourth Corps, against which many groundless aspersions and incorrect statements have been circulated in the newspapers since the battle. These reports are made by men who observed the conflict while under fire, and if they are not in the main true, the truth will never be known.

In the battle of the 31st of May the casualties on our side (a list of which is inclosed *) were heavy, amounting to something like 25 per cent. in killed and wounded of the number actually engaged, which did not amount to more than 12,000, the Fourth Corps at that date having been much weakened by detachments and other causes. Nearly all who were struck were hit while facing the enemy.

The Confederates outnumbered us, during a great part of the conflict, at least four to one, and they were fresh, drilled troops, led on and cheered by their best generals and the President of their Republic. They are right when they assert that the Yankees stubbornly contested every foot of ground. Of the nine generals of the Fourth Corps who were present on the field all, with one exception, were wounded or his horse was hit in the battle. A large proportion of all the field officers in the action were killed, wounded, or their horses were struck. These facts denote the fierceness of the contest and the gallantry of a large majority of the officers. Many officers have been named and commended in this report and in reports of division, brigade, and other commanders, and I will not here recapitulate further than that I received great assistance from the members of my staff, whose conduct was excellent, though they were necessarily often separated from me.

To the energy and skill of Surg. F. H. Hamilton, the chief of his department in the Fourth Corps, and the assistance he received from his subordinate surgeons, the wounded and sick are indebted for all the relief and comfort which it was possible to afford them.

I should be glad if the name of every individual who kept his place in the long struggle could be known. All those deserve praise and reward. On the other hand, the men who left the ranks and the field, and especially the officers who went away without orders, should be known and held up to scorn. In all the retreating groups I discovered officers, and sometimes the officers were farthest in the rear. What hope can we have of the safety of the country when even a few military officers turn their backs upon the enemy without orders? Such officers should be discharged and disgraced, and brave men advanced to their places. The task of reformation is not easy, because much true manliness has been suffocated in deluding theories, and the improvement

* Embodied in return, pp. 760-762.

will not be complete until valor is more esteemed, nor until we adopt as a maxim that to decorate a coward with shoulder-straps is to pave the road to a nation's ruin.

Respectfully submitted.

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS,

June 14, 1862.

DEAR GENERAL: You have omitted to sign your report.* Will you please sign and return it by the orderly.

General Heintzelman has expressed himself as being very much pleased with your report, and is astonished at the accuracy with which you have detailed the events of the day.

Yours, respectfully,

CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,

Chief of Staff.

Brig. Gen. E. D. KEYES,

Commanding Fourth Corps.

No. 71.

Report of Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.

HEADQUARTERS COUCH'S DIVISION,

Intrenched Camp near Fair Oaks Station, Va., June 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that between 12.30 and 1 p. m. of the 31st ultimo two or three cannon-shot of the rebels came into my camp, thrown from the front and over Casey's line. Musketry firing soon after began on his line, and in half an hour the action seemed to be general in that division. By direction of General Keyes General Peck was ordered to move to the left and support General Casey, disposing his regiments as given in his report. The One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Rowley, was already at an important junction to the left. General Devens' brigade, consisting of the Tenth and Seventh Massachusetts and Thirty-sixth New York, covered the road leading to Casey's center. The batteries of Miller, Flood, and McCarthy were in position, covering the same road and flanks, Miller having a capital position to the right and front. General Abercrombie's brigade was to the right of Devens on the cross-road leading from my center to Fair Oaks, which was full three-fourths of a mile to the right and front, running through a mass of thicket and heavy woods. The First Long Island, Colonel Adams, lay in rifle pits and supported Miller's battery; then came Neill's Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers and Rippey's Sixty-first Pennsylvania. The First U. S. Chasseurs, Colonel Cochrane, and Thirty-first Pennsylvania, Colonel Williams, lay at Fair Oaks, together with Brady's battery.

* Of Seven Pines.

It should be said that a road leads to Richmond from Fair Oaks called the Nine-mile road, and another northerly to Grapevine Bridge over the Chickahominy, on the other side of which, I understood, lay General Sumner with his corps. Neill was ordered to move up and feel the enemy, Casey's troops being more or less in front. He did so, and engaged with great vigor, twice throwing the enemy back, when he retired to his first position.

General Keyes ordered forward the Fifty-fifth New York into some pits in front to support Casey's center. His right was then being thrown back on my right, being opposed by fearful odds. General Keyes directed me to advance with two regiments from the right and overthrow the rebel left, thereby relieving the pressure on Casey's right, which movement compelled our artillery to cease firing on that flank. About 2 p. m. I advanced with Neill's and Rippey's regiments through a close wood, moving by the flank. Directing Neill where to move, and pushing on with Rippey, we at once came upon a large column of the enemy in reserve, but apparently moving toward Fair Oaks. Rippey's regiment was therefore posted perpendicularly to Neill's line, in the edge of the woods, facing to the front. They immediately engaged, but were finally compelled to retire, bringing in 35 prisoners. Here Colonel Rippey and all his field officers fell, and in twenty minutes the enemy had passed over the road leading to my center, cutting off the advance at Fair Oaks, now re-enforced by the Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Russell, and Sixty-second New York, Col. J. L. Riker, ordered up by General Keyes.

As for the movements of the main body of the division during the remainder of the battle, having been separated from it, I am compelled to refer to the reports of Generals Peck and Devens, Colonels Adams and Neill, and Major West, chief of artillery. At this moment Captain Van Ness, brigade quartermaster to General Abercrombie, volunteered to notify General Sumner of our situation. After making demonstrations to cut through and rejoin the main body it was abandoned as suicidal. At the same time large masses of the enemy were moving across the railroad to the front and right with the intention of inclosing us. Therefore, with General Abercrombie, four regiments, the battery, and prisoners, we moved off toward the Grapevine Bridge for half a mile, and took a position facing Fair Oaks. Soon Captain Van Ness brought me word that General Sumner was at hand. Upon receiving the information word was sent to Generals Heintzelman and Keyes that my position would be held until Sumner arrived. This noble soldier came on rapidly with Sedgwick's division, and when the head of his column was seen half a mile distant I felt that God was with us and victory ours.

This was about 4.30 p. m. Upon General Sumner's arrival he immediately assumed command and made most admirable dispositions. Kirby's fine battery and gallant Lieutenant Fagan with a section of Brady's were posted at the angle of the woods to our right; Thirty-first Pennsylvania and First U. S. Chasseurs [Sixty-fifth New York] on the flank; the Seventh Massachusetts and Sixty-second New York, which was driven in from the field in front, in reserve, supporting the batteries, while part of Sedgwick's force was posted to the right and front, with a section under Captain Brady and others to the left, toward Fair Oaks. Heavy masses of the rebels appeared at Fair Oaks, while large numbers from the Nine-mile road filled the woods. Desperate attempts were made to carry the batteries and center, but the destructiveness of the artillery, and the close, steady fire of the Thirty-first

Pennsylvania and the Chasseurs (the latter capturing the colors of the Eighth North Carolina), with the firm advance of Gorman's brigade and others of Sedgwick's division, drove back the enemy with great slaughter.

At this point Colonel Riker, Sixty-second New York Volunteers, fell mortally wounded, while setting an example of courage to his brave regiment. It was night, and the troops lay down in the line-of-battle order, generals and privates, where the fighting ceased. During the night the wounded of both sides were cared for by our excellent surgeons. At 2.30 a. m. General Sumner called around him his generals and gave them their orders. At daylight the extended woods were to be cleared of the rebels by a sweeping charge, the Thirty-first Pennsylvania and First Chasseurs joining Gorman's right. The work was done as ordered. General Sumner from the first ordered me to remain with him, but during the fight of the next day, as those of my division were in reserve, except the Seventh Massachusetts, which covered an open field near Richardson, it does not seem proper that anything should be said by me of those troops that fought so well on Sunday morning. Of the operations at Seven Pines I would say Flood's, Miller's, and McCarthy's batteries, under the eye of Major West, chief of artillery, with Generals Keyes and Heintzelman, did great execution, working the guns with the rapidity and efficiency of old regulars. Maj. R. M. West, First Pennsylvania Artillery, is entitled to great credit for the high discipline of his command. In retiring to a new position one of McCarthy's guns could not be brought off, the lunette being broken. Lieutenant Choate, of Miller's battery, though sick, stood by his gun until perfectly prostrated.

General Peck fought his brigade with skill and daring courage, his horse falling under him after being several times wounded. His command added new laurels to those won at Williamsburg. The Ninety-third Pennsylvania, Colonel McCarter, and One hundred and second Pennsylvania, Colonel Rowley, behaved with great gallantry, both colonels wounded. The Fifty-fifth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Thourot, was early in the action, and suffered severely.

General Devens with only two regiments held his ground firmly, pouring in a most destructive fire at short distance, the Thirty-sixth New York not retiring until ordered, while the Tenth Massachusetts, though its colonel (Briggs) was carried off severely wounded, its lieutenant-colonel sick, and was a part of the time off the field, its major going to the rear without cause, yet under the brave Captain Miller held its position until outflanked and several orders had been given it to fall back. At night it, with others of my exhausted division and Kearny's, formed the front line facing the enemy. General Devens, severely wounded, remained bravely on the field until the last shot was fired.

The force of my division engaged near the Seven Pines did not number over 5,000 infantry and three batteries. For two hours it maintained itself without re-enforcements against a victorious enemy greatly superior in numbers, and only retired, and that slowly, under positive orders, to a new position jointly with the troops of General Heintzelman's corps that had advanced to our support. The First Long Island Regiment held its ground until outflanked.

My thanks are due to Captain Walker, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenants Edwards and Burt, aides, for their zeal and assistance. The former made a daring personal reconnaissance, and had his horse shot under him by my side. Lieutenants Edwards and Burt, sword

in hand, threw themselves at the head of regiments; also Captain Urban, assistant adjutant-general to General Abercrombie. Lieutenant Edwards notified me of the proximity of General Sumner. Lieutenant Burt's horse was killed by a cannon-ball and himself severely injured while carrying an important message to General Keyes, and though cut off from me, continued on duty and succeeded in getting to me valuable information of the position of Generals Heintzelman and Keyes. Lieutenant Eccleston, an officer of great courage, did signal service, yet it was in part of such a nature that it is not deemed advisable to place it on record. He has my thanks. Lieutenant Smith, Eighth Illinois Cavalry, served me faithfully. I am greatly indebted to General Abercrombie for advice. His report accompanying this speaks for itself. The surgeons of the division did their duty well, some more conspicuously than others. Captains Walsh and Quackenbos, Thirty-sixth New York, acted with great gallantry. Scores of the officers did the same; but when regiments behave so well and accomplish so much as those of this division the list of brave officers and of men distinguished for courage would be too large for the limits of this report.

It is to be regretted that General Devens and Colonel Briggs could not furnish me with their reports. The Sixty-first Pennsylvania has as yet furnished none.

I respectfully request that the reports of the regimental and battery commanders may be forwarded to the War Department, that the sections from which the regiments came may know what their soldiers did.

I am, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

D. N. COUCH,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. Fourth Army Corps.

No. 72.

Report of Maj. Robert M. West, Chief of Artillery.

HDQRS. 1ST PA. LIGHT ARTY., COUCH'S DIV., 4TH A. C.,
Camp near Seven Pines, Va., June 5, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to transmit herewith the reports of Captains Flood, McCarthy, and Miller, detailing the operations of those batteries during the engagement of the 31st ultimo at Seven Pines.

When the division in front first engaged the enemy I was at Fair Oaks, on the right, superintending the erection of an earthwork for Brady's battery, and consequently was not present to give the preliminary orders. Coming as quickly as possible from Fair Oaks to Seven Pines, I found the batteries being harnessed and everything prepared for action. The batteries opened fire at 2.30 p. m. by direction of General Keyes, and continued with regularity and precision during the engagement. The fire was directed against the enemy's line as they advanced from the woods in front of General Casey's position, against the artillery coming into position in the clearing there, and later into the slashings in our front over the heads of our own infantry. Flood and McCarthy were operating under my own observation at the cross-roads, while Miller was to the right and in rear of the rifle pits, with supports in the pits and on his right flank.

Nothing occurred to interrupt or divert our fire until about 4.30 p. m., when we took up a position about 100 yards retired, to afford more room for disposing of the re-enforcements which were now coming in. At about this time Miller, who was operating to the right and advanced from the batteries of Flood and McCarthy, was set upon by a heavy body of the enemy, who forced back his supports a short distance and imperiled his guns. He succeeded, however, in driving the enemy back with canister and bringing his battery off in good order to the point where I now had Flood and McCarthy in position. In this position the three batteries continued their fire. The enemy's fire was well directed, but mostly too high; nevertheless he damaged us considerably. We succeeded in silencing all of his guns but three, and held our position until about 6 o'clock. At this time our supports had gone forward into action and the infantry on our right was losing ground. McCarthy's battery had suffered most. He had one piece disabled. Our infantry were losing ground on the right, and deeming it possible that our right flank might give way, in which case the batteries would be in great jeopardy, the order was given to retire beyond the woods, there to await orders. I rode to General Keyes, commanding, to report that the artillery had gone out of action. The general directed that it should return. I thereupon ordered Flood up to his second position. He came in good style and opened fire. A New York battery (one of Casey's) came up at the same time and went into battery on the left of Flood. These two batteries continued to fire for about half an hour, when the New York battery withdrew. Flood remained in position, firing until the infantry retired. Then he withdrew in good order in column of pieces (owing to the nature of the road), his cannoneers at their posts.

Thus ended the operations of this artillery for that day. General Keyes, commanding Fourth Corps, placed the artillery in position at the commencement, and continued principally to direct its firings and changes of position throughout the engagement. Much execution was done by our firing. I noted numbers of fine shots. In one instance a piece brought into position in the road was rendered useless by a percussion shell from McCarthy's battery, and a case-shot immediately after disabled a majority of the detachment which was trying to take the piece away. In Flood's battery the firing was also good and very regular. Miller, on the right, with his light 12-pounders, rendered most excellent service, firing case-shot and shell, and it has been conclusively shown that whole rows of the enemy were mowed down by a discharge of canister from a section of his guns. It is a source of deep regret that McCarthy was not able to bring away his disabled piece (a 10-pounder Parrott). It became isolated and disabled, and was abandoned after repeated efforts being made to bring it away. Our loss was not great when the length of time during which we were under fire is considered.

I report 2 men killed, 6 men wounded, 14 horses killed.

I am glad to report the good conduct of my officers and men. All stood bravely up to their work, and with a coolness and determination which promises well for the next fight. I cannot name any individual without making unjust distinctions. All had equal chances, and all acquitted themselves equally well.

I have heard a good account of Brady's battery, although nothing official has reached me up to the hour of closing this report. He was with General Couch in the vicinity of Fair Oaks, and I am reliably

informed that his battery, especially Lieutenant Fagan's section, performed important service there.

I have the honor to be, captain, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

ROBT M. WEST,
Major, Chief of Artillery, First Division, Fourth Corps.

P. S.—Since the foregoing was penned Captain Brady's report reached me, and is herewith inclosed. It speaks for itself. By this report the wounded of my command is increased to 12, and the number of horses killed, wounded, and disabled to 24.

Very respectfully,

ROBT M. WEST,
Major and Chief of Artillery.

Capt. FRANCIS A. WALKER, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 73.

Report of Capt. Jeremiah McCarthy, Battery C, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery.

HDQRS. BATTERY C, FIRST PENNSYLVANIA ARTILLERY,
June 3, 1862.

SIR: I herewith submit the following report of my battery in the late engagement of the 31st of May:

Shortly after 1 o'clock p. m. on the 31st day of May I was ordered by General Couch to harness up and have my battery in readiness at a moment's warning, which order was promptly obeyed. Shortly afterward General Keyes ordered me to send one section of my battery to report to General Peck and the other to take a position alongside of the road, which was immediately done. General Peck, not thinking it a safe place for the section, ordered it to go back and report to General Keyes, who gave orders for it to take a position on our camp ground, near the woods.

At 2.30 o'clock I opened fire with my whole battery, and keeping it up without intermission, doing good execution. About 5 o'clock the enemy were pressing on my left with their infantry and at times pouring a most deadly volley into us, but without any serious injury. Fearing that they would charge on us, I ordered the battery to limber to the rear, and took my position about 50 yards to the right and rear. I then ordered the men to fire as rapidly as possible at the enemy's battery and the infantry that were supporting it. I would have fired into the woods immediately on my left, but knowing that some of our own regiments were in there, I feared it would be doing more injury than good.

After I was in my last position about fifteen minutes the enemy seemed to concentrate their fire upon my battery, the shells striking my men and horses and breaking rammers, &c. My men by this time were greatly fatigued, nearly all hands working in their shirt-sleeves. I kept my battery there as long as I thought it was safe, the guns being so hot that they burned the thumb-stalls while on the men's thumbs. Several cartridges were also singed whilst they were being put in the pieces. I then limbered three guns to the rear and retreated back to the next field. The fourth gun could not be limbered, on account of

the lunette being mashed by one of the enemy's shells. My men were at their posts and fought with the most determined bravery. To the best of my knowledge we were fighting between four and five hours.

I could not keep an accurate account of the projectiles, fuse, &c., as requested by the chief of artillery, as we were so busily engaged. Number of projectiles fired was nearly 500.*

* * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JEREMIAH MCCARTHY,

Captain, Commanding Battery C, First Pennsylvania Artillery.

Maj. R. M. WEST,

Commanding Regiment, and Chief of Artillery, Couch's Division.

No. 74.

Report of Capt. Edward H. Flood, Battery D, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery.

SIR: In obedience to orders I submit the following report:

On Saturday, May 31, at about 1.30 o'clock, I was ordered to harness by General Couch. Before the harnessing was completed the enemy opened fire in our front of both artillery and musketry. After completing my harnessing I remained in the position I occupied for some fifteen minutes, when I was ordered by General Keyes, commanding Fourth Corps, to bring my guns in position in a line parallel with the road in front of our camp and on the right of the main road, so that my left gun would command that road, which I did. We held that position for about thirty minutes without firing, and until the artillery in front of us, belonging to General Casey's division, fell back. I then opened fire on the enemy, first firing percussion shell at an elevation of $3\frac{1}{2}^\circ$ with good effect. After firing some 15 rounds from each gun I found that the enemy had changed their position, which you, sir, also remarking, ordered me to increase my elevation to $4\frac{1}{2}^\circ$ and fire spherical case, which I did.

We held this position for about two hours in all, and I believe did good execution, when I was ordered to cease firing, the enemy having my exact range, and change my position some 100 yards in rear of the position I then held. The order to cease firing was very necessary at the time, as my guns were getting too warm to continue firing with safety. Whilst in my first position I had 1 man killed and 1 wounded. I had also three wheels broken by the fire from the enemy's artillery. The shot that broke the wheel of the limber of my right piece also wounded the driver of the wheel-horses and tore the canteen from the side of the cannoneer acting as No. 7. This I saw as it passed under my own eyes. We kept our second position for about an hour, firing spherical case at $4\frac{1}{2}^\circ$ elevation, when, my guns getting too warm to work, I retired, by order of General Heintzelman, behind the wood in rear of our camp, and there awaited further orders.

Shortly after 5 o'clock you ordered me to again advance my battery to the position last occupied before falling back and open fire, which I did. The advance of the enemy were then some 600 or 700 yards in advance of my position, and our infantry between my battery and them.

* Nominal list of casualties embodied in return, p. 761.

I therefore gave orders to fire at 2° elevation with spherical case, and continued firing at that elevation until forced to retire by our infantry falling back on us so close that to fire at all would injure our own men. I then fell back to the position occupied by my battery in our old camp previous to our advance on the 28th instant.

The conduct of both officers and men of my battery was excellent. Every man stood to his gun like a veteran, and as eager to advance the last time as they were to engage the enemy at first. I cannot, therefore, mention any one in particular, more than to say that both lieutenants, Dougherty and Hall, together with the drivers and cannoneers, were prompt to execute all orders received and were as cool as if on drill; in fact, I have seen the enlisted men not near so collected on drill as they were while the shots of the enemy were falling about them.

The list of casualties was as follows: John Sharpless, killed; William W. Breen, wounded in the foot, slightly. I also had three horses killed, lost two sets of lead harness and one set of horse equipments; also three wheels broken. I was also forced to abandon all my men's knapsacks, containing their clothing, together with the curry-combs, brushes, &c., belonging to the battery.

I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,

EDWARD H. FLOOD,

Captain, Comdg. Battery D, First Penn. Vol. Arty.

Maj. R. M. WEST,

Chief of Artillery, Brig. Gen. Couch's Division.

No. 75.

Report of Capt. Theodore Miller, Battery E, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery.

CAMP NEAR SEVEN PINES, VA.,

June 3, 1862.

SIR: According to instructions received I have the honor to transmit the following report relative to the engagement with the rebels on the 31st of May:

About 1.30 o'clock p. m. I, perceiving the division in front attacked by an apparently strong force of the enemy, prepared my battery for action. At about 2 o'clock, seeing plainly the direction of the fire of the enemy, I opened fire, directing it to the right and front of me, using spherical case-shot, the distance about 900 yards, elevating the pieces 2½°. This distance, elevation, and projectile used I think proved effective, for after about ten minutes' firing the musketry in that direction slackened, and some well-directed shells, I think 12-pounder howitzer, exploded in my battery. I thereupon changed position about 200 yards to the right and opened a cross-fire at the same elevation and direction as stated before.

All this time shell upon shell exploded at the place a few minutes before occupied by my battery. This new position I occupied for about twenty minutes, when the fire of the enemy's artillery ceased. I at once returned to my former position and changed limbers, the ammunition suitable being all expended, and recommenced firing.

About this time I saw a regiment of infantry enter the woods to my

left, but almost at the same moment a murderous fire was opened on them from within the woods, some of the balls passing through and over my battery. I ordered my left section to load with canister, which was barely done when a large body of rebel infantry came pressing out of the woods. The canister was poured into them at about 350 yards from my battery, and when the smoke had cleared away I perceived that besides the canister doing its usual work not a single rebel could be seen in that direction. Again the enemy opened his artillery on me, this time assisted by a large force of infantry, and I perceived likewise that the infantry supporting me in the commencement of the battle had changed position away from my battery. I therefore changed position once more, this time to the left and about 100 yards to the rear of my first position, changed ammunition-chests, and recommenced firing.

I was joined here by Flood's and McCarthy's batteries, and our united fire continued for upward of one hour; the distance fired at 750 yards to the left and front, using spherical case-shot and shell. During the last part of the fight I was compelled to use solid shot, my other ammunition being expended. It was about 6 o'clock p. m. when I retired from the field, McCarthy's battery retiring first, Flood's next, and I followed Flood. The wheels of my limbers and caissons and the axles of my pieces are more or less injured by musket-balls and pieces of shell, but none were disabled.

My casualties, I am happy to say, are trifling, for besides having 2 men (Privates Kempher and Lyman) temporarily disabled, the former by a splinter and the latter by the falling of a horse, and 5 horses killed, not a single man was lost.

The amount of ammunition expended is as follows: One hundred and ninety-two rounds of spherical case-shot, 40 rounds of shell, 6 rounds of canister, 10 rounds of solid shot.

The men of my battery behaved splendidly. To name individuals is impossible. One and all did their duty nobly. Both of my subalterns being sick (one present and the other absent) I was ably assisted by the regimental adjutant, Lieut. Joseph Benson, who volunteered his services. General Keyes had my battery under his eye constantly and approved all my dispositions.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THEO. MILLER,

Captain, First Pennsylvania Artillery, Commanding Battery E.

To the ADJT. OF THE CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,

First Division, Fourth Army Corps, Virginia.

No. 76.

Report of Brig. Gen. John J. Peck, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations May 29-June 1.

PECK'S HEADQUARTERS,

Intrenched Camp, near Seven Pines, Va., June 2, 1862.

On moving to the Seven Pines on the 29th of May I was ordered to occupy and guard the left flank of the encampment with my command, this being regarded as the weaker point of the line. The greater part of the day was occupied in making extensive reconnaissances in the

direction of White Oak Swamp and the Charles City road. A strong picket line was established from a mile to a mile and a half in advance. Enemy's pickets were found at many points.

On the 30th, in consequence of an attack upon General Casey's pickets, my brigade and two batteries were thrown out by direction of General Couch upon the left of General Casey's division, where they remained several hours awaiting the enemy's movements.

On the 31st, a little after 11 a. m., heavy picket firing was heard in front. The falling of several shells into the vicinity of my headquarters satisfied me that the enemy was advancing upon Casey's division.

In accordance with directions from General Couch my brigade was at once placed on the principal road connecting the Richmond Stage road with the Charles City road, for the purpose of holding the left flank. A portion of Major West's artillery was placed at my disposal and held in reserve. Being in position, with my right resting near the artillery of the division, I sent out numerous parties in every direction to gain information. At the opening of the engagement I was instructed by General Couch to send the Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel McCarter, to take position on the left of Casey's division. The regiment moved into line quickly and held its ground as long as possible, falling back with the general line on its right, but in excellent order.

About 1 p. m. General Keyes, commanding Fourth Corps, detached the Fifty-fifth New York Volunteers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Thourot, from my command and led them into position himself. This regiment was placed in support of one of the advance batteries and acquitted itself in a creditable manner. It will be a matter of deep regret to Colonel De Trobriand that he was prevented by illness from participating in this engagement. Later in the day General Keyes dispatched the Sixty-second New York Volunteers, Colonel Riker, to the support of General Couch on the extreme right.

About 3 p. m. the Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers rejoined me with colors flying, and was placed on the left of my line. At this critical juncture General Keyes sent an order for my two remaining regiments to move on the main road in support of the front, which he countermanded immediately on learning the advance of the enemy on the left and the importance of the position held by me with so small a force, unsupported by artillery.

About 3.30 p. m. Captain Morris, assistant adjutant-general, had an interview with General Heintzelman, who inquired if I could press forward on the extreme left of the line. On being informed that several roads connecting the Charles City road and the main road to Richmond led into the road held by me he appreciated the importance of the position, and directed me to hold it at all hazards.

About 4.30 p. m. Generals Heintzelman and Keyes informed me that the enemy was assailing our right flank in great force, and urged me to push forward the regiments at a double-quick for its support. I moved off at the head of the One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Rowley, followed by the Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel McCarter, across the open field, under the concentrated fire of numerous batteries and of heavy musketry from the right. These regiments came into line handsomely, pressed forward on the enemy, and contributed their best energies to sustain their comrades so gallantly contesting, inch by inch, the advancing foe. For about the space of half an hour our lines swayed forward and back repeatedly, and at last, unable to withstand the pressure from successive re-enforce-

ments of the enemy, was compelled to fall back to the woods across the main road.

Having remained near the main road with my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Stirling, until the troops had passed out of view, I pushed on in the direction of the road leading to the saw-mill. Coming up with numerous detachments of various regiments and a portion of the One hundred and Second Pennsylvania Volunteers, with the assistance of Lieutenants Titus and Stirling, of my staff, I rallied these men and was conducting them back toward the Richmond road, when I met General Kearny, who advised me to withdraw these troops by way of the saw-mill to the intrenched camp at this place.

I stated I did not feel at liberty to do so unless by his order, which he gave. I arrived at this camp about 6.30 p. m., in company with General Kearny. Finding nearly all the forces here I took position in the rifle pit with General Berry's brigade. During the night my troops were supplied with a proper allowance of ammunition, provisions were brought from the Chickahominy, the lines were strongly picketed, and every preparation made to meet the enemy.

At daylight on the 1st of June I was placed in command of the intrenchments. The force at hand was not far from 10,000 men, with a large supply of artillery. Small detachments and stragglers were collected and sent to their respective regiments. All available means were employed to promote the comfort and efficiency of the troops. Heavy working parties, relieved at intervals of two hours, were employed until the morning of the 2d extending and strengthening the whole line of works. A six-gun battery was thrown up on the extreme left of the line, covering the approaches from the Charles City road. Before morning the guns were in position. Another important work was constructed on the front, sweeping the depression running obliquely toward the timber nearest the system of works. A large force was busily engaged in slashing the timber in front and on the extreme left. Lieutenant Titus was sent with a party to obstruct all roads and fords across White Oak Swamp. I directed two squadrons of cavalry to reconnoiter carefully at intervals of two hours. Several regiments took part in a thorough reconnaissance made by General Palmer. For these results I was mainly indebted to the cordial co-operation of Generals Wessells, Naglee, Palmer, Berry, and Devens, and Colonels Neill, Innes, Hayman, and Major West, chief of artillery.

It gives me great pleasure to say that Major-General McClellan and Generals Heintzelman and Keyes rode twice along the entire lines in the afternoon of this day, to the great gratification of the troops, who received them with unbounded enthusiasm.

It is a matter of much regret that the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers was not present at the battle, being detached on special duty with General Stoneman. It was unfortunate that the exigencies of the occasion required the breaking up of my brigade organization, and, in consequence, I was only able to go into the last charge on the right with about 1,000 men. This small body, in conjunction with the brave troops hotly engaged, staggered the *élite* of the enemy, and checked his powerful efforts for gaining the main road. My effective force was reduced by detachments to 2,000 men, of whom 41 were killed, 242 wounded, and 61 missing, making a total of 344,* or about one-sixth of the command engaged.

Col. J. Lafayette Riker, Sixty-second New York Volunteers, fell while

* But see revised statement, p. 761.

repelling a charge upon one of the batteries. His bearing on this occasion, like that at the battle of Williamsburg, was marked by great coolness and unflinching determination.

Lieut. John E. Rogers, Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, was a promising officer, and fell gallantly breasting the storm.

The following-named officers were wounded, and deserve mention for their honorable conduct, viz: Capt. John W. Patterson, Capt. Thomas McLaughlin, Adjt. Joseph Browne, Lieut. William B. Kenny, of One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers; Adjt. Leon Cuvillier, Capt. J. S. Pfaumuller, Lieuts. J. Arnould, L. Israels, and Kramm, of Fifty fifth New York Volunteers; Capt. A. C. Maitland, Capt. Eli Dougherty, and Capt. J. M. Mark, of the Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Lieut. M. McCarter, Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, was probably taken prisoner and is doubtless safe.

The accompanying paper presents the names of killed, wounded, and missing. It is a long list of meritorious and brave men. They fought well, and their country will never be unmindful of their faithful and patriotic services.

Colonels Rowley and McCarter (both badly wounded) and Lieutenant-Colonels Thourot and Nevin maneuvered their commands with skill, exhibiting most commendable alacrity, cheering and leading their men on to the combat. Rowley would not quit his regiment and McCarter had two horses wounded. Major Dayton, Sixty-second New York Volunteers; Major Jehl and Captain Tissot, Fifty-fifth New York Volunteers; Lieutenant-Colonel Kinkead, Major Poland, Captains Fullwood and McLaughlin, Lieutenants Patchell, Read, and Dain, of the One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers; Captain Arthur and Adjutant Lewis, of the Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, were distinguished for their energy, coolness, and bravery under very trying circumstances. The gallant Captain McFarland, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers (very ill), was twice taken by the enemy and retaken by our troops. He came in with the wounded colonel and six men of the Sixth South Carolina Regiment as prisoners.

The officers of the medical department are entitled to the gratitude of all for their self-sacrificing and untiring devotion to the wounded.

Major West, of the Pennsylvania Artillery, I take especial satisfaction in commending for valuable services.

Privates W. C. Wall, jr., and John Aiken, jr., are mentioned favorably by their regimental commander.

Brigade Surg. S. R. Haven, Lieuts. Silas Titus and Daniel Lodor, jr., aides; Quartermaster Schultze, Commissary M. J. Green, and Mr. S. Wilkeson, of New York, who volunteered his services, were constantly employed in the transmission and execution of orders involving great personal risk.

Capt. William H. Morris, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. Charles R. Stirling, aide, deserve particular mention for gallant conduct with the One hundred and second and Ninety-third Pennsylvania Regiments in the rapid and bold advance on the right. The horses of both officers were wounded.

My horse fell with me after the third or fourth round, and no other being at hand Lieutenant Stirling dismounted and tendered me his own, which I was soon obliged to accept.

Considering the disadvantages of the position, the smallness of the force at hand, the suddenness of the attack on several vital points with overwhelming numbers, and the fact that portions of the field were not taken by the enemy and that the whole was soon recovered, this

battle must be regarded as one of the most severe and brilliant victories of the war.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN J. PECK,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. FRANCIS A. WALKER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 77.

Report of Lieut. Col. Louis Thourot, Fifty-fifth New York Infantry.

HDQRS. FIFTY-FIFTH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLDS.,
June 1, 1862.

GENERAL: At 1.30 o'clock p. m. yesterday this regiment was called out under arms, formed in line of battle, and posted by your order in front of our camp. Some minutes after line was formed General Keyes, passing in front of the regiment, said that he designed it to go and save a battery of artillery placed in the first line, and which the regiments ahead were no longer able to support. General Keyes, in again passing the regiment, spoke a few words, saying that he counted upon the "red caps," when the Fifty-fifth, led by General Naglee, charged bayonets upon the enemy at double-quick in magnificent style, and after having taken the position which had been assigned to it maintained it alone and without any support under so murderous a fire that in a few moments we had about 50 men *hors de combat*, among whom were 5 officers. Two horses were wounded, and mine fell dead under me, pierced by three balls. I think I may say that my regiment did almost more than was possible for 400 men to accomplish, that number being all its effective strength. It had saved the battery which had been confided to their care, had held the enemy at bay under a terrific fire for two hours, and even after their ammunition was expended maintained their position for half an hour, waiting for a fresh supply, which they were not able to obtain. It was only when the regiment was relieved by the Tenth Massachusetts that they retreated to their original position in a small wood near the road, in which there were intrenchments, where it was joined by Company I and 20 men of Company H, who had been detached on picket at the time the regiment advanced.

An American flag was saved by one of our officers, Lieut. Philip C. Rogers, of Company G, who while in advance found it outside the abatis. The regiment which lost the flag can recover it by applying to General Peck's headquarters. All our companies suffered severely, especially those on our left, who, notwithstanding their more than proportionate loss, conducted themselves with exemplary bravery. Our loss, as near as can at present be estimated, is about 100 men.*

I must conclude by saying that I think I have just cause to be proud of the conduct of my regiment in this hotly-contested affair, and hope that you will take due notice of the gallant conduct of the regiment.

I remain, general, very respectfully,

LOUIS THOUROT,
Lieut. Col., Comdg. Fifty-Fifth Regiment N. Y. S. Vols.
Brigadier-General PECK.

* See p. 761.

No. 78.

Report of Lieut. Col. David J. Nevin, Sixty-second New York Infantry.

BATTLE-FIELD, FAIR OAKS, VA.,

June 5, 1862.

GENERAL: On the 31st ultimo our regiment was formed in line at 12.30 p. m. for the purpose of changing our camp. Before leaving the ground we heard heavy firing on our front, where General Casey's division was encamped. We were ordered by Lieut. Daniel Lodor, jr., to move off to the left of our camp, where the Fifty-fifth, One hundred and second, and Ninety-third Regiments were drawn up in line of battle. The Fifty-fifth Regiment New York State Militia were ordered to advance by General Keyes. The Sixty-second New York State Volunteers were then ordered off to the right, to Fair Oaks Station, under General Couch. We marched to Fair Oaks Station, when we discovered the enemy crossing the road. General Couch ordered Col. J. Lafayette Riker to march his regiment down the road at double-quick and charge on the enemy. Our men went down with a cheer that broke the enemy's lines, when they went back in the woods from which they emerged.

After remaining in this position some time we were ordered back to Fair Oaks Station. We then drew up in line of battle, our right resting on the railroad, our left on the road running north. We were then ordered to move up the road leading north from the station to a clump of woods. We were then halted, our right wing thrown back so as to face to the south, our left wing facing the open field to the east. We discovered the enemy emerging from the woods on the west of us, but were informed by an aide that they were General Sumner's men. They filed along the railroad to the open space, when the enemy formed in line of battle, advanced at double-quick, when our late colonel ordered the regiment to file out of the woods by the left flank. As soon as the enemy saw our colors they opened fire on our regiment. We were immediately formed in line of battle by the colonel to the rear of Ricketts' and Brady's batteries.

Shortly after forming in line Col. J. Lafayette Riker was killed while gallantly cheering on his men to save the battery, which was threatened at the time by the enemy. In Colonel Riker's death we have sustained a heavy loss, as he was a gallant and brave officer. Maj. Oscar V. Dayton behaved with great coolness and bravery, urging the men to their duty. My officers, all of them, behaved so nobly that it would be impossible for me to make any distinction. Surg. George B. F. Simpson was separated from our regiment during the engagement, attending to the wounded that were taken to our old camp ground and to the rear. Assist. Surg. W. W. Bidlack was detached from the brigade, having charge of the hospital at the Chickahominy.

My men behaved bravely; and while they act so nobly I have no fears for the cause in which they are engaged. James H. Bradley, who was volunteer aide to Colonel Riker, displayed great coolness, and rendered valuable assistance. Capt. George C. Williams, of the Fifty-fifth Regiment New York State Militia, was with my regiment, and rendered very valuable assistance in keeping the men together. Capt. C. H. Rauerts, of Company F, and 7 of his men, who were out on picket duty and cut off from his regiment, the One hundredth New York

State Volunteers, joined in with our regiment, and rendered very good service.

Your obedient servant,

DAVID J. NEVIN,

Lieut. Col., Comdg. Sixty-second Regiment N. Y. S. Vols.

General JOHN J. PECK.

No. 79.

Report of Capt. John E. Arthur, Ninety-third Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. NINETY-THIRD PENNSYLVANIA REGIMENT,
Camp ———, Va., June 2, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In compliance with orders received from brigade headquarters on Saturday, May 31, 1862, the Ninety-third Pennsylvania Regiment left their camp at Seven Pines at 1 o'clock p. m. to take position in an open field some 500 yards in advance of their old camp. They were under the command of Col. J. M. McCarter, assisted by Capt. J. E. Arthur as lieutenant-colonel and Adjutant Lewis as major. After the regiment being formed in line of battle heavy firing was heard on our right. By direction of General Peck three companies of the Ninety-third, under the command of Adjutant Lewis, were posted along by the road to the right of the regiment. From this line a clear view could be had of the clearing in front, together with the woods on the right and left. After a few minutes the entire regiment was ordered to the extreme left of General Casey's division, being compelled to force their way through a thick woods to attain that point.

Upon coming into position, and in fact before the men could be thrown into line, the enemy, who were in overwhelming force in front, opened a heavy fire. This was answered in good style, and evidently with great effect, by the Ninety-third. After holding this position for nearly an hour our regiment was compelled to fall back a distance of 30 yards, where they again opened fire. From skirmishers who had been thrown out from our left we found that the enemy had outflanked us at that point. This was the occasion for the regiment falling back, which we continued to do, fighting at each halt, until the enemy were upon our extreme left. This position was held until the enemy again flanked us on the left, when we retired to a distance of 150 yards to a road running through the woods. The Ninety-third formed on this road to prevent a farther advance of the enemy.

After remaining in this position for some time two regiments of the enemy were seen coming toward our right at a double-quick, and knowing that a force of the enemy was on our left, and General Casey's center falling back at the same time, the Ninety-third were compelled to retire, though in good order, to the position first occupied by them. By direction of General Peck the regiment was placed in line on the left of the One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers on the edge of the woods on the right of the first position. We remained in this position for a short time, engaged in throwing up breastworks of logs and brush as a protection against the enemy's fire, whom we expected every moment to advance from the woods in front. From this position the One hundred and second and Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers were rapidly pushed forward to the right of General Casey's

line, being compelled to attain their position to pass through a perfect storm of shell and bullets. Upon attaining their position the Ninety-third opened a heavy fire upon the enemy who were in front. At this point the enemy's fire was hotter than at any other along the line. The enemy's force was much larger than our own, and they pushed forward in a most determined manner. The Ninety-third maintained their position until nearly all their ammunition was exhausted, when they were ordered to fall back a short distance to a ravine, where they made another stand, and remained until they expended the remainder of their ammunition. They then very unwillingly retired to the woods, where they took position, being unable to make longer fight except by the bayonet. The remnant of the regiment was formed in the rear of the rifle pits, where they still remain.

During the fight the horse of Colonel McCarter was killed and the colonel himself wounded. General Heintzelman supplied him with a second, which was also shot. He was a second time wounded by a shell from the enemy, and has since been sent home unfit for duty. Adjutant Lewis' horse was also shot under him. One commissioned officer was killed, 1 mortally wounded, 3 wounded, and 1 is missing, supposed to have been made prisoner.

The officers and men throughout the regiment displayed great gallantry and are deserving of all praise. Many of our killed and wounded we were compelled to leave on the field, the enemy pushing forward so fast and in such overwhelming numbers that we were unable to get them off. Accompanying is as correct a list of the killed, wounded, and missing as I am able to furnish at present. Parties are now out in search of the bodies of their comrades, and when they report I will be able to give a correct list.*

I have the honor to be, &c., your obedient servant,

J. E. ARTHUR,

Captain, Commanding Ninety-third Pennsylvania Vols.

Capt. W. H. MORRIS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Peck's Brigade.

No. 80.

Report of Lieut. Col. Joseph M. Kinkead, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. 102D (OLD 13TH) REGT. PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
Intrenched Camp, near Seven Pines, Va., June 3, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on Saturday morning, May 31, this regiment received permission to remove its camp to a more pleasant location, where water and pure air were more accessible than that which we occupied near brigade headquarters. Scarcely, however, had our shelter-tents been erected and preparations made for making ourselves comfortable when sharp firing was heard on the right, apparently in front of Casey's division. The regiment instinctively formed in line of battle, and was moved by Colonel Rowley to the edge of the wood to our right facing northward, in position to enfilade the enemy on their right. Three companies were deployed as skirmishers, under command of Major Poland, to feel the enemy.

* See p. 761.

These dispositions having been made General Peck ordered the regiment to take position with other portions of the brigade on the road running north and south across the Stage road, where the battle appeared to be raging fiercely.

After remaining here for some time under fire of the enemy's batteries, but without casualty, General Keyes approached and directed that the regiment should be moved by the right flank double-quick across the field and charge the enemy on the right. The movement commenced slowly at first, through water and mud from 18 inches to 2 feet in depth, over the timbers of a corduroy road displaced by the severe rain-storm of the preceding day and night, but on reaching the open field the full double-quick was acquired, the men closing up to their places in fine style, and when the command "By the left flank" was given the battalion went forward in a manner rarely excelled on a brigade drill. Had this charge been continued we might have been severely cut up, but could not have failed to put the enemy to rout, as they gave evidence of a retrograde movement while we were advancing.

On reaching the line of the rifle pits the command was given from the rear to halt and commence firing. By the time a dozen rounds had been fired Colonel Rowley was down, having been struck by a ball on the back of the head, stunning him severely.

Captain Patterson and Lieutenant Kenny were shot through the body, and our men lay wounded and dying in the rear of each of the six companies that were in the line. A heavy cross-fire from the right and perfect storm from the artillery in front, together with the falling back of the wounded men from the rifle pits and the division which had previously occupied the front, caused the line to break, and all efforts to rally, combined with the encouragement given by the presence of General Peck, whose bleeding horse was staggering under him, failed. The men fell back, firing as opportunity offered, under cover of the timber in the rear, and were assembled at the intrenched camp near Seven Pines, which we now occupy.

The three companies detached at the commencement and two of the companies which had been on picket southeast of the swamp reached here the same evening; the other company early the next morning.

Our loss has been, as far as heard from, 12 killed, 48 wounded, 10 missing.*

Although it may appear like making invidious distinctions, I cannot allow the opportunity to pass without calling your attention to the gallantry of our colonel, who urged the men to do their duty and stay in the ranks after he was wounded; to Captain McLaughlin, of Company II, who told his men this was "the place to maintain the reputation of Butler County;" to Captain Patterson, who, as he lay bleeding, told his men to stay in their places and not trouble themselves about him until they had gained the victory; to Captain Fullwood, who, after directing his men to take good aim and fire low, stooped to administer Christian consolation to a dying member of his company; to Lieutenant Patchell, Company D, who repeatedly rallied his company between the regimental colors and the enemy; to Sergt. George W. Workman, color-bearer, who refused to allow the colors, when he was stricken down, to be taken by any but a member of his own guard; to Corpl. Joseph Hirsch, who asked permission to carry the colors, and was killed in bearing them off; to Corpl. Charles Donahue, who brought the colors, per-

* But see revised statement, p. 761.

forated by the enemy's balls, safe to camp; to Sergt. E. Anderson, who bore the old regimental flag triumphantly after it had been perforated by a grape-shot; to Corpl. Isaac B. Curry, who was severely wounded while standing by the colors; to Sergt. William Kuhns, of Company C, who, after being shot through the leg (which has since been amputated), lay on the ground, took deliberate aim, and fired at the advancing enemy; to Privates W. C. Wall, jr., and John Aiken, jr., of Company M, two of the youngest soldiers bearing arms in the regiment (known in their own company as the "Ponies"), standing in a most exposed position in the center of the road, firing deliberately whenever they could "draw a bead" to perfection, and careful not to waste ammunition.

The three companies detached under Major Poland were handled admirably. After the advance of the enemy had passed the line they occupied they were withdrawn in a southeasterly direction, and recrossed the swamp south of the field, with every man except Captain McFarland, of Company L, who was so unwell as to be unable to keep up with his company. He was taken prisoner and retaken twice by our men, and finally wandered across the battle-field and returned to camp through the picket of the Fourth Maine Regiment near the railroad, bringing with him as prisoner the wounded colonel of the Sixth South Carolina Regiment, borne by six of his men.

Adjt. Joe Browne received a blow on the side, which, although not accounted for in the list of casualties, may yet prove a serious inconvenience in the performance of his duties.

After an inspection of the regiment and hearing the verbal reports of the different company and detachment commanders, I am perfectly satisfied that the One hundred and second or old Thirteenth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers did all that was expected of it, and, in Western steamboat parlance, will on all occasions "do to tie to."

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. KINKEAD,

Lieut. Col., Comdg. One hundred and second Regt. Pa. Vols.

Capt. W. H. MORRIS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 81.

Reports of Brig. Gen. John J. Abercrombie, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS BRIGADE,

Camp near Fair Oaks Station, Va., June 5, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to inclose herewith copies of the reports of the regimental commanders in this brigade of the battles at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks Station, May 31 and June 1, 1862. No field officer of the Sixty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers is left to make out the report of that regiment, and I therefore simply attach a statement of casualties.

At 12 o'clock m., May 31, I received notice to warn the men to fall in at a moment's notice. The position of the different regiments was at the time as follows: First Long Island Volunteers,* Colonel Adams, in rear of the rifle pits near Seven Pines, on the Richmond road; Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Neill, and First U. S. Chasseurs,†

* Sixty-seventh New York Infantry.

† Sixty-fifth New York Infantry.

Colonel Cochrane, on the road leading from Seven Pines to Fair Oaks Station and nearly in the rear of the First Long Island Regiment; Thirty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Williams, near the railroad, on the road leading from the station to Richmond; Sixty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Rippey, near the railroad, on the road leading from the depot to the Chickahominy—Trent's. The duty assigned to the last two regiments was to guard the crossing at the depot.

I received orders at 1 o'clock to take position with the First Chasseurs, Thirty-first and Sixty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Brady's battery of First Pennsylvania Artillery, near the camp of the Thirty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, to prevent the enemy from turning our right flank. Shortly afterward the Sixty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers was placed in position near the Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, then already engaged. I was by the falling back of Casey's division entirely cut off from the regiments of my brigade engaged in the center, and have to refer to the reports of the regimental commanders.

The annexed lists* of casualties show that they fought well, and from my position on the right of the railroad I could judge by the report of their guns that they fell back gradually and in good order. I have no doubt that if I could have been permitted to leave my position and closed in nearer to the right and re-enforced them with the balance of my command the enemy would have been checked. As it is, the dead of the enemy on the portion of the battle-field occupied by First Long Island Volunteers, Twenty-third and Sixty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers are the proofs I have of the gallantry displayed by those regiments. The Sixty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers mourn the loss of all their field officers, the colonel killed, lieutenant-colonel and major wounded and missing.

The cavalry outposts came in from the front, reporting that the enemy was approaching in large numbers—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—and being cut off entirely from Keyes' army corps I, with the sanction of General Couch, commanding division, sent an officer of my staff, Captain Van Ness, brigade quartermaster, to inform General Sumner of the state of affairs. Finding my position untenable, I fell back on the road from the depot to Trent's house as far as Courtney's house, about half a mile, and there formed line of battle, the Thirty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers nearest the house, behind a low rail fence, in the rear of a piece of woods. Two companies of the Sixty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers and First U. S. Chasseurs were posted on the right of the Thirty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers. The other troops on the ground at the time were the Sixty-second New York and Seventh Massachusetts Volunteers and a section of Brady's battery, formed on the left of the road. The other section of Brady's battery was placed on the right of my command, near the First Minnesota Regiment, as soon as that regiment, with the rest of the troops under General Sumner, arrived on the ground.

In concluding this report it would be an act of great injustice not to mention Captain Brady and my staff, Capt. Gustavus Urban, assistant adjutant-general, and Captain Van Ness, brigade quartermaster, Lieutenants Adams and Appleton, aides, who were, owing to the divided state of my brigade, kept constantly under fire in passing from one portion to the other of it. I must also mention among the list of my

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 761.

staff officers the Rev. Robert W. Oliver, brigade chaplain, who acted as volunteer aide, and never hesitated to carry an order in the very hottest of the fight. In retiring from my original position, the Courtney house, a few hundred yards to the right and a little in the rear, the column moved in perfect order, every man in his proper place, and remained so after having been thrown into line-of-battle order until after the close of the action, notwithstanding they were opposed (as reported by rebel prisoners) by eight regiments and a part of the rebel legion, who advanced within 25 or 30 paces of our line, and left as a memento of their rashness over 500 killed and wounded, exclusive of prisoners. No higher commendation is needed to show the services of my brigade.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. J. ABERCROMBIE,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

Capt. FRANCIS A. WALKER,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters First Division.

HEADQUARTERS BRIGADE,

Camp near Fair Oaks Station, Va., June 6, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to state that at 1 o'clock p. m. May 31, 1862, I was ordered by Brigadier-General Keyes, commanding Fourth *Corps d'Armée*, to take command of the troops on the roads leading from Fair Oaks Station to the Chickahominy (Trent's) to prevent the enemy from turning our right flank. The corps at that time being engaged with the enemy, and after being entirely cut off by the falling back of our troops on the left of the railroad, I, with the sanction of General Couch, sent one of the officers of my staff (Captain Van Ness, brigade quartermaster) to inform General Sumner of the state of affairs. Our cavalry pickets had come in before from the front, reporting that the enemy was approaching in large numbers—infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Finding my position untenable, I fell back on the road from the depot to Trent's house as far as Courtney's house, about one-half mile, and there formed line of battle—the Thirty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers nearest the house behind a low rail-fence in the rear of a piece of woods; two companies of the Sixty-first Pennsylvania and First U. S. Chasseurs were posted on the right of the Thirty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers.

The other troops on the ground at the time were the Sixty-second New York and Seventh Massachusetts Volunteers and a section of Brady's battery, formed on the left of the road. The other section of Brady's battery was placed on the right of my command near the First Minnesota Regiment as soon as that regiment, with the rest of the troops under General Sumner, arrived on the ground.

In concluding this report it would be an act of great injustice not to mention Captain Brady and my staff, Capt. G. Urban, assistant adjutant-general, Captain Van Ness, brigade quartermaster, Lieutenants Adams and Appleton, aides, who were, owing to the divided state of my brigade, kept constantly under fire in passing from one portion to the other of it. I must also mention among the list of my staff officers the Rev. Robert W. Oliver, chaplain, who acted as volunteer aide, and never hesitated to carry an order in the very hottest of the fight. In retiring from my

original position, the Courtney house, a few hundred yards to the right and a little in the rear, the column moved in perfect order, every man in his proper place, and remained so after having been thrown into battle order until after the close of the action, notwithstanding they were opposed (as reported by rebel prisoners) by eight regiments and a part of the rebel legion, who advanced within 25 or 30 paces of our line, and left as a memento of their rashness over 500 killed and wounded, exclusive of prisoners. No higher commendation is needed to show the services of my brigade.

The following is a list of casualties of the regiments of my brigade engaged under command of General Sumner :

First Regiment U. S. Chasseurs, 7 killed, 24 wounded ; total, 31.

Thirty-first Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, 5 killed, 15 wounded, 12 missing ; total, 32.

Company H, Brady's battery, 6 wounded ; total, 6.

Total killed, 12 ; total wounded, 45 ; total missing, 12 ; grand total, 69.

Horses shot, wounded, and missing are 10.

A complete list of the casualties in all the regiments of my brigade has been forwarded to the division commander.*

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. J. ABERCROMBIE,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

Capt. J. H. TAYLOR, *Chief of Staff, Second Corps.*

No. 82.

Report of Col. John Cochrane, Sixty-fifth New York Infantry.

HDQRS. 1ST U. S. CHASSEURS, ABERCROMBIE'S BRIGADE,
Camp near Fair Oaks, Va., June 3, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the movements of this regiment in the action of Saturday, 31st ultimo, at Fair Oaks.

The regiment, upon a sudden alarm of firing by the enemy, at about 1 o'clock p. m. of Saturday, the 31st ultimo, was drawn up in line of battle in front of its camp at the Seven Pines. By orders from the brigadier-general in command it proceeded by the right flank to the railroad station of Fair Oaks. There we were directed to support Captain Brady's battery, which we did, the Thirty-first Pennsylvania resting on our left. Having thrown out pickets to the front, and they reporting that the enemy were moving toward our right flank, the regiment was ordered and accordingly formed line of battle facing outward to the right, and supported by the Thirty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers on the left and the Seventh Massachusetts on the right. Three pieces of Brady's battery were advanced to the front of the line, and the Sixty-second New York (Anderson Zouaves) supported us in the rear.

Having been ordered by General Abercrombie to withdraw from our position, we moved by his command along the road leading from Fair Oaks Station to the eminence near the Courtney place. Here we awaited the approach of the enemy until, re-enforcements arriving, by order of General Abercrombie, the regiment took position in front of a belt of woods through which the enemy's forces were approaching.

* Embodied in return, p. 761.

Our right rested on the left of Colonel Sully's Minnesota regiment, and our left on the right of the Thirty-first Pennsylvania. The men took their places immediately behind the rail fence by which the wood was skirted, and, the enemy coming in sight, opened their fire upon them at about 25 yards distance. This fire was continued two and a half hours, and until the enemy was effectually repulsed. During this time the fire of the men was steady, continuous, and accurate, as I have reason to suppose from the very numerous dead found subsequently in the front of our lines. The standard-bearer of the Twenty-second North Carolina Regiment was killed by our fire, and during the night the battle-flag of that regiment was found by our men on the field in front of the regiment where its bearer fell.

The regiment slept on their arms that night in their position, and daylight of the following morning advanced in line of battle at right angles with their last position through the woods previously held by the enemy to the position which they now hold.

Lieutenant-Colonel Shaler evinced during the entire action that presence of mind and military ability for which he is so highly reputed. The conduct of Major Hamblin entitles him to great praise. The conduct of the commissioned officers was uniformly creditable. To distinguish among them is impossible, and if possible were invidious. To the rank and file is due the award of superior steadiness, the coolness of veterans, and their excellence.

The casualties were as follows: Killed, 7 (1 bayoneted while sick in camp); wounded, 24.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN COCHRANE,
Colonel, Commanding Regiment.

Captain URBAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Abercrombie's Brigade.

No. 83.

Report of Col. Julius W. Adams, Sixty-seventh New York Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST LONG ISLAND VOLUNTEERS,
June 3, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the operations of the First Regiment Long Island Volunteers since the morning of the 31st of May:

We were posted in line of battle about noon of that day by orders from brigade headquarters in the rear of the rifle pits which cover the cleared elevation upon which the camp at that date was pitched, and to support Miller's light battery, placed a short distance in the rear of our left flank, with its left resting on the Richmond road. My right rested on the swamp and pine woods, which extended some distance to the north of our position and which skirted the road leading to the Fair Oaks railroad station. This road was about 100 yards in our rear and in front of the woods which extended along its length to its junction with the Richmond road, near which point the light battery was posted. The cleared field was quite limited, being less than five acres in extent.

Shortly after 1 o'clock p. m. the enemy opened his attack upon General Casey's troops in our front and screened from view by a belt of

standing and felled timber. But a short time elapsed before the fugitives from the field in our front began to crowd through our own lines in their retreat, and in addition to the enemy's artillery fire their musketry began to tell on our ranks, and the men were exposed for nearly an hour to a fire which they were unable to return. At this juncture General Keyes, apprehending that the enemy were extending themselves on our right and threatening that flank, ordered me to take post to the rear in the belt of woods beyond the road. Subsequently, becoming satisfied by a personal examination made by my aide, Chaplain Beecher, that the enemy were in force and advancing on both sides of this road and extending himself on my right, I threw back six companies of this wing, thus forming an angle of about 60° with my front, at the same time extending that flank as skirmishers. Upon this disposition the enemy now advanced in strength, outnumbering us about five to one. We opened fire at a distance of about 50 yards, and held our position for some time and until a scattering fire upon the rear of the left wing satisfied me that our right was outflanked. The nature of the ground and the heavy timber prevented this fact from being satisfactorily determined in any other way, as stragglers or detached groups in irregular order from other regiments on our right were believed to be in occupation of that part of the wood. The order was now given to retire by the left, which was effected in mass, the enemy not venturing to follow beyond cover of the woods.

In the mean time the battery had made good its retreat. The men were rallied within a distance of 500 or 600 yards from the woods (this was about 6 o'clock p. m.) and were marched to the rifle pits in the rear, when the regiment was placed by General Kearny's orders on outpost duty.

The duty assigned to my command (that of supporting the battery) was, I trust, efficiently performed. That we suffered so severely was owing in a great measure to the locality, confining us to a narrow belt of woods, where the concentrated fire of a superior force of the enemy was necessarily very destructive.

In the hottest of the fire I was honored by the presence of Generals Keyes, Wessells, Naglee, Devens, and others unknown to me, who will bear evidence to the weight of fire with which we had to contend.

I herewith append a list of the casualties, from which it will be perceived that our loss in killed and wounded amounted to some 29 per cent. of the numbers engaged.

There were present with the regiment but nine companies, Company G being absent on detached service. The captain and first lieutenant, Belden and Sherer, remained with the regiment.

Lieutenant Rysdyk, Company K, killed, and Captains Rainals, Van Ness, and Sullivan, and Lieutenants Croft and Belknap, severely wounded, and 26 non-commissioned officers and privates killed, 126 non-commissioned officers and privates wounded, and 15 missing*—some of the latter believed to be wounded and in the hands of the enemy. The aggregate in the field 537 men.

I cannot close without calling attention to the admirable behavior of the officers and men of the regiment, and to express my indebtedness to Lieut. Col. Nelson Cross for the zeal with which he seconded me throughout the day. This duty was rendered more onerous from the fact of 10 of our officers being absent by order on detached service. I should also remark that Lieutenant King, of the First U. S. Chasseurs,

* But see revised statement, p. 761.

left the hospital, and not being able to join his regiment, served with Company F during the day in a very gallant manner.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JULIUS W. ADAMS,

Colonel First Long Island Volunteers.

Captain URBAN,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Abercrombie's Brigade.

No. 84.

Report of Col. Thomas H. Neill, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Infantry.

NEAR FAIR OAKS STATION, VA., May 31, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that at 1.30 o'clock p. m. on the 31st day of May, 1862, the Twenty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers was ordered to take post on the right of the Long Island Regiment, support Casey's division, and feel the enemy to the front. This was done immediately. A regiment of Casey's division (I think the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers) was in front of us. It went in to drive the enemy through the woods lying between the road to Old Tavern and the right of Casey's position, and was driven out. The Twenty-third then charged into the woods and drove the enemy through to the position originally occupied by our pickets on the edge of the woods, losing a number of officers and men. Subsequently General Couch, commanding division, returned and ordered the Twenty-third into the woods again. We went in, and did not encounter the enemy until we saw him drawn up in line of battle in masses, with batteries in position to bring a cross-fire upon the salient angle of the woods. General Couch led to the front in person. Being entirely unsupported, the Twenty-third was obliged to retire fighting before the overpowering numbers of the enemy, in order to prevent their seizing our colors and capturing the greatly-diminished numbers of our officers and men. This was done in good order under a withering fire of shell, shot, and musketry.

A mass of the rebels caused us to move to the left to cross the abatis and take shelter under the nearest troops. Here a murderous fire was opened, which only developed the noble courage of officers and men to the highest degree. A portion of the regiment, under command of Captain Glenn, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, having become accidentally separated in the dense woods in which we were operating, was called upon by an aide of General Heintzelman's to support a battery. Captain Glenn rallied 100 men around his company and volunteered for this service. The duty was well performed until they were relieved. Captain Hillebrand, in command of his company as camp guard, was placed in Casey's rifle pits, where he did good execution. The regiment after retiring was engaged in rallying scattered troops.

Maj. John Ely, Adj. T. K. Boggs, Capts. Edwin Palmer, W. J. Wallace, and Lieutenants Wood and McFalls were severely wounded during the action, and Capt. John F. Glenn slightly wounded. My lieutenant-colonel (Wilhelm) was by my side during the whole of the day, rendering efficient service.

I would be doing wrong not to mention the zealous, devoted, and

untiring attentions to the sick and wounded so ably rendered by Surg. A. Owen Stille and Assist. Surg. William C. Roller, faithfully assisted by our worthy and esteemed chaplain, J. G. Shinn.

The officers and men of the Twenty-third stood nobly to their colors under the severe fire to which they were exposed, proving themselves worthy of the trust of defending the honor and laws of our country.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

THOS. H. NEILL,

Colonel, Commanding Twenty-third Pennsylvania Vols.

Capt. GUSTAVUS URBAN,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Abercrombie's Brigade.

No. 85.

Report of Col. David H. Williams, Thirty-first Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. THIRTY-FIRST PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS,
Field of Battle, near Fair Oaks Station, Va., June 2, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I beg leave respectfully to submit the following report of the participation of this regiment in the engagement of the 31st May and 1st of June:

We were formed in line of battle near our camp before 1 p. m. of the 31st May, when we were ordered to move up the road on our left near where the division of General Casey and the Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, of this brigade, were engaged. We took position near the right of the Twenty-third. Here we had 2 men slightly wounded, who gallantly rejoined their companies and participated in all the subsequent events of the day. We afterward deployed upon the left of the First U. S. Chasseurs, our left extending across the railroad nearly in front of our camp at the station. Here again we had 1 man (a private from Company B) severely wounded.

From this position to the one finally taken, where the severe engagement ensued in which we participated, no incident occurred worthy of note in this report. We were posted in a well-chosen position behind a low rail fence, an open field in our rear and a wood in front, when the enemy appeared so suddenly and with such impetuosity that our skirmishers could scarcely regain their position in the battalion. The enemy first opened fire, but was met with such a withering volley that his next attempt was made with more caution and deliberation, but no better success. His ranks were renewed with fresh troops, which repeatedly charged to within 20 yards of our lines, but no valor or impetuosity could withstand the steady and well-directed fire of our men. As the enemy withdrew to form his shattered lines our fire was slackened, to be renewed with undiminished severity as he approached. The conflict was sustained for nearly two hours, when the enemy withdrew on the approach of night completely broken. It seemed that if daylight had continued but a short time the enemy could have been successfully pursued and his forces captured. Our men slept upon their arms in the ranks where the battle had been fought. At daybreak we joined the Fifteenth Massachusetts and took our new position, which we now hold.

The officers and men seemed to emulate each other in steadiness and gallantry. Captain Williams, with his company (A), performed the duty

of scouting and skirmishing with great efficiency, leading his company back to the regiment twice in the face of the enemy. Major Wetherill was cool and daring throughout the action, remaining near the left wing, regulating the fire and sustaining the men. Captain Marston, in the right wing, was conspicuous for his gallantry throughout the action, directing the fire of his men from time to time with great coolness and judgment. The adjutant, Lieutenant Grier, performed his duties in a manner entitling him to credit for his courage and earnestness. Sergeant Boswell, of Company C, who fell late in the action dangerously wounded, is deserving of notice; also Color-Sergeant Gibson, who was struck in the pit of the stomach with a spent ball, and for a moment apparently much hurt. Finally, there was little opportunity for displays of individual acts of gallantry, but all performed their duties in such a manner that their commander knows of no one that it would not be an honor to command in the hour of need and upon whom the country could not rely when and where she needs brave men. I submit herewith the report of the killed and wounded and missing.*

I have the honor to be, captain, your obedient servant,

DAVID H. WILLIAMS,

Colonel Thirty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers.

No. 86.

Report of Capt. James Brady, Battery H, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery.

HDQRS. LIGHT BATTERY H, FIRST PA. RESERVE ARTY.,
Battle-field, Fair Oaks, Va., June 2, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report my battery as participating in the successful stand made by General Couch with the right wing of Keyes' *corps d'armée*, supported by three regiments drawn from different brigades composing Couch's division, at Fair Oaks Station, near Richmond, on the afternoon of the 31st ultimo, sustaining for several hours a heavy fire from the enemy's musketry, directed from the cover of the woods in front of our battery at a distance of 50 yards, in open battery. The left section, in command of Lieutenant Fagan, was particularly noticed for the rapidity and effectiveness of its fire, repulsing the head of the enemy's column as it frequently appeared emerging from the woods charging on the battery. This section, after exhausting canister, played upon the enemy's lines with spherical case and shell without fuse, bursting the shell as it left the gun, as determined by the yellow sulphurous smoke, sweeping its broken fragments before it, eliciting the remark from the enemy that nothing could stand up before such "rotten shot."

The right section, held under my immediate command, moved down to support the center in time to check a charge of the enemy in that direction, and was the next moment ordered to the support of Colonel Sully, First Minnesota, who held the enemy's left in check. This position was soon gained, passing over a deep morass at a trot-out, receiving the enemy's compliments in a heavy cross-fire on my drivers and horses, wounding many. The position once turned we opened, throwing shell and spherical case without fuse, exploding in the enemy's

* Embodied in return, p. 761.

lines and crushing his flank, causing them to retire, leaving their dead and wounded officers and soldiers on the field. The enemy being silenced and driven off, orders were received from General Abercrombie to cease firing, complimenting our men for their good conduct. During the engagement on Sunday morning in the woods to the left of the railroad, to recover the position Casey's column occupied on Saturday, my battery was held in reserve.

Lieutenant Fagan is worthy of particular notice for gallantry displayed by him in fighting his section. After his horse was wounded he assisted setting an example to his men, who vied with him in serving their guns. Sergeant Brown, Corporals Cogan and Graham, with Privates McCaughey, Harris, Nagle, Emerson, Grow, Whittaker, McKinley, and Daniels, were particularly conspicuous during the action. Nothing could exceed in rapidity and effectiveness the canister practice of their pieces.

Respectfully, &c.,

JAS. BRADY,

Captain, First Pennsylvania Reserve Artillery.

Capt. GUSTAVUS URBAN,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Abercrombie's Brigade.

No. 87.

Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Devens, jr., U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE (DEVENS'),
Couch's Division, Keyes' Corps, June 2, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In regard to the part taken by this brigade in the action of Saturday, May 31, I have the honor to submit the following preliminary report:

In consequence of firing at the front from the line occupied by General Casey, the brigade, consisting of the Seventh and Tenth Massachusetts Regiments and the Thirty-sixth New York (the Second Rhode Island being on detached service), was put under arms at about 1.30 p. m.,* and moved forward to the cross-roads to the Fair Oaks Station, where the Tenth Massachusetts, Colonel Briggs, was first posted in front of the battery of artillery commanded by Captain Flood (Company D, Pennsylvania Artillery). After remaining in this position a short time the Tenth Massachusetts was moved forward to the left side of the Richmond road behind some rifle pits and in front of the battery on that side of the road, and the Thirty-sixth New York Volunteers, Colonel Innes, was thrown forward on the right side of the Richmond road in front of the Fair Oaks road, where the right of the regiment was screened from the terrible fire of the enemy's artillery at this point by some rifle pits; but the left was exposed, and suffered in consequence severely. Soon after an order was received directing that I should send the Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Russell, over to the right, which was immediately complied with; after which time that regiment was not under my immediate command during the action.

At about 4 p. m., the line of General Casey then having been driven

* Time not accurate either for getting under arms or moving.—E. D. K.

back in front and an ineffectual attempt to recover some portion of the ground having been made by the Fifty-fifth New York, an order was received from General Keyes that the Tenth Massachusetts should advance up the Richmond road through the felled trees and endeavor to hold the ground in front. Colonel Briggs moved accordingly up the road by the flank, and deploying, as soon as the ground permitted, across the road so as to move forward by the front, found himself immediately assailed on the left flank and rear by heavy volleys of musketry, showing the enemy to have outflanked in considerable force the position occupied by him. Colonel Briggs gallantly struggled, by changing fronts with a portion of the left wing of the regiment, to present a front to the enemy which should at least enable him to maintain his position. From the nature of the ground, entirely covered with fallen timber, it was not possible for him to effect this, and the left wing was soon thrown into much confusion from the heavy fire of the enemy thus advantageously posted in regard to it.

I had, on finding the situation of affairs, sent word to General Keyes of the position of the enemy on the left of this regiment, but, my aide returning without being able to find that officer and the left wing of the regiment being much broken, I directed Colonel Briggs to fall back and reform the regiment at the rifle pits before occupied by him. So much confusion had been created by the fire on the rear of the regiment that it was not possible for him to effect this in good order, but at a short distance behind the Fair Oaks road Colonel Briggs rallied his regiment successfully and led it forward in good order to the position indicated. Re-enforcements arrived in a short time, and were thrown forward to the left and front of the Thirty-sixth New York and Tenth Massachusetts, and the fire being now heavy on the right, supposing the Seventh Massachusetts to be engaged, I moved in that direction, accompanied by my aide, Lieutenant Storer, leaving the acting assistant adjutant-general, Lieutenant Porter, with the Thirty-sixth New York, where I had been during most of the day. Finding the attack very severe upon the brigade at my right, and that the Seventh Massachusetts was not there, after rendering such service there as was in my power, I returned toward my two regiments on the Richmond road; but the enemy had now broken through our line between the position occupied by these regiments and Fair Oaks Station and threatened seriously to cut them off.

The Tenth Massachusetts, as I am informed, had during my absence been moved toward the right by an order from General Keyes, and was, after the regiments to its right had been compelled to retreat, forced back in some disorder, Colonel Briggs having fallen by a severe, but not, as I am happy to learn, dangerous wound. The Thirty-sixth New York, Colonel Innes, maintained its position until the regiments on its right and left gave way, when it retreated in good order, moving by the left flank up the Saw-mill road to the rifle pits on Allen's farm, taking 11 prisoners from a body of the enemy who attempted to cut off its retreat.

The Tenth Massachusetts, after falling back through the woods in rear of its original line of encampment to the open space behind, was rallied most spiritedly by Captain Miller, upon whom the command, for reasons not fully explained to me, devolved after Colonel Briggs was compelled to leave the field, and in company with the ——— New York, Colonel ———, moved forward again through the woods, by the order of General Heintzelman, and made a vigorous effort to recover the ground of its original encampment. Unfortunately the effort, although

resolute and persistent, was unsuccessful, and the Tenth, with the regiment in its company, was again forced to the open field after half an hour's fighting; but the movement, although costing us many valuable officers and men, was of great service in checking the advance of the enemy, which just before had been rapid. Falling back some 100 yards, advantage was taken of a spur of the woods to again rally the regiment and make another spirited attack upon the enemy, and at this point his progress was checked, no further attempt being made by him to press forward here. As these rallies and attacks of the Tenth Massachusetts were under my own immediate supervision, I desire especially to commend the courage and efficiency which I saw exhibited by Captain Miller, its then commander, whose efforts to check the progress of the enemy and to recover some portion of the ground lost by us were most creditable to himself and the regiment.

It is due to a gallant young officer that I should state that in rallying and in leading forward the regiment, besides the support of the other officers of the regiment, Captain Miller received most spirited and valuable assistance from my aide-de-camp, First Lieut. W. B. Storer, whose services throughout the day were of most signal value. In the action seven companies of the Tenth Massachusetts, numbering about 500 men, and eight companies of the Thirty-sixth New York, numbering about 400 men, were engaged, the other companies of these regiments being on picket duty; and it will be seen from the list which I annex that the casualties were heavy, especially in the former, but I believe both regiments are entitled to the credit of having done their duty faithfully. Colonel Briggs for his resolute exertions in leading forward and rallying his men, and Colonel Innes for the firmness with which he held the position assigned him and the resolution with which, when compelled to make good his retreat to a tenable position—taking more prisoners from the enemy, who endeavored to intercept him, than he lost—are both entitled to much credit. The reports of Colonels Briggs and Innes will be forwarded as soon as received. The Seventh Massachusetts not having been under my immediate command in the action, I depend entirely on the report of Colonel Russell, which will be forwarded as soon as received.

As an officer belonging to this brigade, although on duty with the division, I take pleasure in calling attention to Lieutenant Eccleston, the provost-marshal, whose efficiency I had many opportunities of observing this day. Neither the Tenth Massachusetts nor the Thirty-sixth New York were engaged on Sunday, June 1.

I would call the particular attention of the commanding general to the invaluable services of Dr. O'Leary, surgeon of this brigade, whose faithful and untiring devotion to the wounded men and the careful and marked attention which he gave to the condition of each individual case coming under his notice is worthy of the highest commendation.

A wound from a musket-ball, received by me during the struggle in which the regiments to the right of this brigade were compelled to give way, although not so severe as to force me to quit the field on the day of action, is so far disabling as to oblige me to relinquish active duty for, I trust, a very brief period.

I am, captain, your obedient servant,

CHAS. DEVENS, JR.,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Third Brigade.

No. 88.

Report of Col. Charles H. Innes, Thirty-sixth New York Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, FOURTH CORPS,
Intrenched Camp, June 5, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report for the information of the general commanding the division the part taken by the brigade under my command in the battle of the 31st of May, subsequent to the disabling of General Charles Devens, which happened about 6 p. m. At that time, having received an order to fall back, the enemy having turned our right flank in large force, I at once ordered the Thirty-sixth New York, which was the only regiment left in the rifle pits, to fall back to the intrenched camp and take a position there. At the same time I dispatched an orderly with instructions for the Tenth Massachusetts Regiment, which soon arrived in good order, under the command of Capt. O. Miller. At the same time three companies of the Tenth, three of the Seventh, and two of the Thirty-sixth New York, that had been out on picket duty, arrived, and Captain Flood's battery, which at once went into battery. Having disposed of this force I at once turned my attention to the arrest of all stragglers and disposed of them to good advantage in the rifle pits, according to the similarity of arms.

At this time General Keyes arrived on the ground, and I reported to him the disposition I had made of the forces there. It proving satisfactory to him, he ordered me to take charge of all the stragglers that might pass through there. Shortly after Colonel Hayman, of Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers, marched in, and I communicated my instructions to him, and stated that it was very necessary to have a strong picket thrown out. I could not do it without very materially weakening my position. He at once promptly placed his regiment at my disposal and picketed our left flank and front. About an hour before day the whole command was formed in line ready for action. The Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Russell, having been temporarily detached for service on the right, with the general commanding the division, I am unable to report the part taken by them, but feel assured that they have done credit to themselves.

Lieutenant Storer, aide to General Devens, and Lieutenant Byron Porter, acting assistant adjutant-general, rendered good and efficient service, and acted with the greatest coolness and courage, being continually under fire.

Too great praise cannot be rendered to Brigade Surg. Charles O'Leary and Surgs. E. B. Dalton, of the Thirty-sixth New York Volunteers, and C. N. Chamberlain, Tenth Massachusetts Volunteers, for their devoted attention to the wounded. I desire to call to the special notice of the general commanding the division Capt. Ozro Miller, who commanded the Tenth Massachusetts Volunteers after Colonel Briggs had been severely wounded. He led his regiment in gallant style, and only left the field when ordered to fall back at dusk, which he did in good order.

Lieut. Col. D. E. Hungerford and Maj. James A. Raney, of the Thirty-sixth New York, behaved with great gallantry and coolness throughout the engagement.

I send a revised list of the casualties in the brigade with this report.*

I have the honor to be, most respectfully,

CHAS. H. INNES,

Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade, Fourth Corps.

Capt. FRANCIS A. WALKER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 89.

Report of Lieut. Byron Porter, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, of operations of the Tenth Massachusetts Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,
June 9, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to orders from General Couch I have the honor to present the following report of the operations of the Tenth Massachusetts Volunteers on the 31st of May:

Seven companies of the regiment (the other three being on picket) assembled on the color-line as soon as the firing in the front was heard, at about 1.30 p. m., and then marched up and took position on the east side of the Nine-mile road, the left resting on Captain Flood's battery, which was placed on the right of the Williamsburg road. After remaining here a short time the regiment was marched by column of companies left in front across the Williamsburg road, and placed in the rifle pits on the left of the road, the left of the regiment extending to the pines. Here several men were wounded.

After lying in the rifle pits some time orders came to go to the front in the slashing, which was promptly done. When the head of the column, conducted by General Devens, had reached about half way up the road between the felled timber a gun was discovered, which the enemy were bringing into position to rake the road. This fact being communicated to the commanding officer, he ordered the regiment to form forward into line, which was promptly done, the line extending along a cleared space in the slashing to the standing timber on the left and one company on the right of the road.

Immediately after this position had been taken and fire opened on the enemy it was found that the rebels in great force were approaching on the left, completely outflanking and overlapping the left of the Tenth. General Devens sent an aide-de-camp at once to notify General Keyes, but the rebels immediately opened a heavy fire on the left and rear of the regiment, causing some confusion. After a short resistance General Devens ordered a retreat, in the execution of which, owing to the nature of the ground, the regiment was partially broken up, but rallied on the colors as soon as the slashing was cleared, and fell back to the camp, where the line of battle was immediately formed again. The regiment was then marched back to the rifle pits under a galling fire, losing some men. After remaining in the rifle pits some time General Keyes conducted the regiment in person to a new position on the right of the road in the pines. Immediately after arriving at this new position it was found that the enemy in force was turning the right flank; two regiments at the same time attacked in the front. The Tenth opened

*Embodied in return, p. 761.

fire on the enemy in front, and being ordered to retreat, gave way slowly, firing all the time, to the rise of ground in front of the camp of the Seventh Massachusetts.

At this time Colonel Briggs was wounded and Capt. E. E. Day killed, and the command then devolved on Capt. O. Miller. After making at this point a desperate resistance against overpowering numbers and being continually flanked, the regiment again fell back, but slowly, firing as it retreated through the woods into the next opening, where it halted and closed up. General Heintzelman, who was there, placed a portion of a New York regiment on the right of the Tenth, and ordered the line thus formed to march forward and attack the enemy, who occupied the camp of the Seventh Massachusetts.

At this time it was after sundown, and although every one felt that it was a hopeless task to endeavor to drive the enemy back with the small force there, the men marched cheerfully forward, tired and exhausted as they were, to attack the rebels once more.

Before reaching the enemy the portion of the regiment on the right of the Tenth had melted away and was nowhere to be seen. The Tenth marched on, and when about half way through the woods saw the rebel lines approaching (there were two of them). At about 100 yards distance the Tenth commenced the action by pouring into the rebel ranks a tremendous volley, which opened wide gaps in their ranks and checked their advance for a time; but soon, seeing the small force opposed to them, they again advanced, although very slowly, in front. On the right of the Tenth, which was entirely unprotected, they came on faster, until they entirely outflanked it and poured in a heavy cross-fire. Then, and not until the enemy's front was within 20 yards of the line, the order to retire was given, which was executed in good order, many turning to fire a last shot as they reluctantly withdrew, having been constantly under fire from the time the regiment took its first position until dark.

In this action, the last of the day, which lasted half an hour and was over at dusk, the Tenth lost heavily, but marched off to the rifle pits in the rear in good order, cheering the colors which waved above them.

At the rifle pits they remained in line under arms all night and most of the following day.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BYRON PORTER,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Capt. FRANCIS A. WALKER, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 90.

Report of Col. Henry S. Briggs, Tenth Massachusetts Infantry.

PITTSFIELD, MASS., June 9, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken in the battle near the Seven Pines on Saturday, the 31st of May, by the Tenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, then under my command.

I received the order to have my command under arms about 10 o'clock immediately upon my return from visiting the outposts on my tour as general officer of the day about 1 o'clock p. m. I had just left the One hundred and third Pennsylvania at the deserted huts, so called, on the wood road leading southerly from the Williamsburg inter-

section of the wood with the Nine-mile road, and had been informed by Colonel McCarter, commanding the Ninety-third Pennsylvania, then in motion, that he was proceeding to the same vicinity with his command. After having reported their disposition to the general commanding the division my regiment was at first moved from its encampment to a position behind the Nine-mile road, with the left on the Williamsburg road and soon after to the left across the last-named road, and behind the rifle pits made *en échelon* of companies. The pits were full of water and could not be occupied without damaging the ammunition the men carried in their boxes and pockets. The men were required to lie down, to avail themselves of the slight cover afforded by the earth excavated from the pits. While they lay there a number were wounded by the shell and case of the enemy and some from our own battery posted immediately in our rear. From the rifle pits, which we occupied some fifteen or twenty minutes and until the fire from the front had nearly ceased, I was ordered by General Keyes to proceed with my command up the road and to form a line near the large wood-pile in front of the abatis. I proceeded at once to execute the order, and the head of my column had advanced a few yards within the abatis when I observed that the enemy had in large force formed upon the same position nearly to which I was ordered and that he was placing in position a battery to sweep the road.

The general commanding the brigade at this moment came up and was informed for the first time of my orders. At this point, on the left of the road, there was a small oblong-shaped open space about 30 yards wide, and long enough to form five of the seven companies in line fronting the enemy. Having communicated this to the general commanding brigade, I obtained authority to form in this space, and proceeded to do so, placing two of the right companies on the right of the road in the slashing in prolongation of my line. The space was so narrow that the line could only be formed on the right by files. The formation was scarcely completed when a severe fire was opened upon my left flank from the woods and underbrush, not more than 50 paces distant. It was so severe that the line was broken, and the narrowness of the open space made it impossible to change front, although I endeavored to move one or two companies to the rear so as to face the flank attacked. Finding my efforts unavailing I gave the order to retreat firing, but a considerable portion of the regiment having broken, under instructions from the general of brigade I gave the order to retreat. The only route being by the road up which we had advanced, I was compelled to leave a considerable number of dead and wounded.

Captain Day fell here, fighting in close conflict and almost hand-to-hand with the enemy. He was at first only disabled by a wound in the leg, but received a mortal shot while being borne away by his men. Captain Parsons also fell wounded in the thigh and head while in the act of repeating a command just given by me to change the front of his company. The position amounted to an ambushade, and I believe that no troops could be expected to withstand the close and overwhelming fire that surprised our left flank and rear. After being broken and retreating from this position the regiment was readily formed near its place of encampment. Soon after I was ordered to again take position behind the rifle pits before occupied. The movement was effected by crossing to the left of the road and advancing in line in good order, although in the face of the artillery fire of the enemy, under which a considerable number were swept from the ranks.

From the rifle pits, after a short interval, I was ordered to move across the road by the flank to the right, and posted near the woods to the front and right of the place of encampment. The right of the regiment soon became engaged with the enemy.

Soon after, having been informed that our own troops were being fired upon by my men, I advanced from my position in front of the center to ascertain the fact, when I was wounded, apparently by two musket-balls, which struck me simultaneously, one passing through the under part of the left and one lodging in the right thigh, and which so disabled me that I was compelled to leave the field. I was carried to the rear, and very soon after, I am informed, the regiment fell back, but was twice again reformed under Captain Miller, upon whom, as the senior officer then on the field, the command devolved, and whose gallant conduct, as I have been informed, was as conspicuous as it was effective in rallying and holding his shattered command in the face of overwhelming numbers. The severity of the loss of his company, which on the right was most exposed, attests the determined courage and good discipline of both officers and men. He was bravely supported by Captain Smart, who was left wounded in the leg, and afterward wantonly killed by a rebel soldier of whom he asked assistance. It was during one of these last rallies also that Lieutenant Leland was mortally wounded. No braver men or more faithful officers fell on that field than the three whose loss it is my painful duty to report. Lieutenant-Colonel Decker, who had for a week previous to the engagement been disabled by a severe attack of rheumatism, but who was with the regiment at the beginning, was, I am informed, soon after compelled to leave the field. Major Marsh was in the discharge of his duty with the regiment until after it had reformed upon retreating from the felled timber. Afterward he informed me he was ordered to take command of some broken detachments from other commands that appeared in the vicinity without officers.

The three companies on picket duty and which afterward came in without material loss were A, E, and K. The number of men in the action, after deducting the various details, could not have reached 500.

I beg leave in explanation of the delay in forwarding this report to say that I have been unable by reason of the long passage by sea to Boston and subsequent disability to make it earlier. Having been removed from the regiment before a complete return of casualties was made I append no list, presuming a full one has already been returned by the officer now in command of the regiment.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY S. BRIGGS,

Colonel Tenth Massachusetts Volunteers.

Lieut. BYRON PORTER,

A. A. A. G., Devens' Brig., Couch's Div., Fourth A. C.

No. 91.

Report of Col. Charles H. Innes, Thirty-sixth New York Infantry.

HDQRS. THIRTY-SIXTH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,

Intrenched Camp, June 5, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the brigade commander, the part taken by the regiment under my command in the battle on the 31st May.

Almost simultaneously with the first discharge of arms in our front, about 1 p. m., I received orders to move with my regiment to the front to the support of Captain Flood's battery, who had taken up a position on the right of the Richmond Stage road. I at once proceeded to the right and front of the battery and occupied a portion of the rifle pits in course of erection there, and held that position until about 6 p. m., when I was ordered to fall back, as the enemy had turned our right flank in large force. At this time, General Devens having been disabled, I assumed command of the brigade, and the command of the regiment devolved upon Lieut. Col. D. E. Hungerford, who led it off in good order, taking a position in the rifle pits near Battery Couch by my order.

All the officers and men of my command behaved with the utmost coolness and bravery. I make particular mention of Lieut. Col. D. E. Hungerford, Maj. James A. Raney, Surg. E. B. Dalton, Capt. James J. Walsh, Lieut. David W. Murphy, and Sergt. Maj. Charles S. Lindsay.

Inclosed please find a list of the killed, wounded, and missing.*

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, yours,

CHAS. H. INNES,

Colonel Thirty-sixth New York Volunteers.

Lieut. BYRON PORTER,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 92.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division.

HEADQUARTERS GENERAL CASEY'S DIVISION,
Poplar Hill, Henrico County, Va., June, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to directions from the general commanding the Fourth Corps I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division in the battle of the Seven Pines, on the 31st ultimo :

I occupied with my division the advanced position of the army, about three-fourths of a mile from the cross-roads at the Seven Pines, where I caused rifle pits and a redoubt to be thrown up; also an abatis to be commenced about one-third of a mile in front of the pits, and parties were employed upon these works on the morning of the 31st. Previously to occupying my last position I had occupied the cross-roads, and had there also caused an abatis to be cut and earthworks to be commenced.

On the 29th, the day on which I moved my camp forward, and also on the 30th, my advanced pickets had been attacked by bodies of the enemy; on the former day by a force of 300, and on the next by one of 400 in number. The pickets on the first day succeeded in driving the enemy back in confusion, killing and wounding a number, with a loss on my part of but 2 killed and 2 wounded. Major Kelley, of the Ninety-sixth Regiment New York Volunteers, was one of my killed. The major was in command of the pickets at this point, and by his gallant conduct animated the men to the firm resistance offered.

* Embodied in return, p. 761.

In the attack of the 30th I ordered the One hundredth Regiment New York Volunteers to move to the support of the pickets. With the assistance of this regiment, under command of Colonel Brown, they succeeded in repelling the attack, the enemy leaving 6 of his dead upon the ground.

On the morning of the 31st my pickets toward the right of my line succeeded in capturing Lieutenant Washington, an aide of General Johnston, of the rebel service. This circumstance, in connection with the fact that Colonel Hunt, my general officer of the day, had reported to me that his outer pickets had heard cars running nearly all night on the Richmond end of the railroad, led me to exercise increased vigilance. Between 11 and 12 o'clock a mounted vedette was sent in from the advanced pickets to report that a body of the enemy was in sight, approaching on the Richmond road. I immediately ordered the One hundred and third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers to advance to the front, for the purpose of supporting the pickets. It was soon afterward reported to me by a mounted vedette that the enemy were advancing in force, and about the same time two shells were thrown over my camp. I was led to believe that a serious attack was contemplated, and immediately ordered the division under arms, the men at work on the rifle pits and abatis to be recalled and to join their regiments, the artillery to be harnessed up at once, and made my dispositions to repel the enemy. While these were in progress the pickets commenced firing.

I directed Spratt's battery of four pieces 3-inch rifled guns to advance in front of the rifle pits about one-fourth of a mile, in order to reply with advantage to the enemy's artillery, which I knew was in battery in front of my picket line, and also to shell the enemy as soon as the withdrawal of the pickets and their supports should permit. I supported this battery by the One hundred and fourth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, the Eleventh Regiment Maine Volunteers, and the One hundredth Regiment New York Volunteers, of the First Brigade, and the Ninety-second Regiment New York Volunteers, of the Third Brigade. I placed Captain Bates' battery, commanded by Lieutenant Hart, in a redoubt; Captain Regan's battery in rear and on the right of the rifle pits, and Captain Fitch's battery in rear of the redoubt. The Eighty-fifth Regiment New York Volunteers occupied the rifle pits on the left and the Eighty-fifth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers those on the right. The One hundred and first Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers were posted on the right of these regiments, and the Eighty-first, Ninety-eighth, and Ninety-sixth Regiment New York Volunteers were advanced to cover the left flank. For several days the Fifty-second Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers had occupied a position on the Nine-mile road as a support to my advanced pickets on my right flank, and the Fifty-sixth Regiment New York Volunteers had held a position on the railroad. I made no change in the positions of these last two regiments.

About fifteen minutes after these dispositions had been completed I directed the advanced battery to open on the artillery and advancing columns of the enemy. In a short time after the One hundred and third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, which at the first alarm had been ordered to the support of the pickets, came down the road in some confusion, having suffered considerable loss from the fire of the rebel advance.

The enemy now attacked me in large force on the center and both wings, and a brisk fire of musketry commenced along the two opposing lines, my artillery in the mean time throwing canister into their ranks

with great effect. Perceiving at length that the enemy were threatening me upon both wings, for want of re-enforcements, which had been repeatedly asked for, and that his column still pressed on, I then, in order to save my artillery, ordered a charge of bayonets by the four supporting regiments at the center, which was executed in a most gallant and successful manner under the immediate direction of Brigadier-General Naglee, commanding First Brigade, the enemy being driven back. When the charge had ceased, but not until the troops had reached the edge of the wood, the most terrible fire of musketry commenced that I have ever witnessed. The enemy again advanced in force, and the flanks being again severely threatened, a retreat to the works became necessary.

To be brief, the rifle pits were retained until they were almost enveloped by the enemy, the troops with some exceptions fighting with spirit and gallantry. The troops then retreated to the second line, in possession of General Couch's division. Two pieces of artillery were placed in the road between the two lines, which did good execution upon the advancing foe.

On my arrival at the second line I succeeded in rallying a small portion of my division, and with the assistance of General Kearny, who had just arrived at the head of one of the brigades of his division, attempted to regain possession of my works, but it was found impracticable. The troops of General Couch's division were driven back, although re-enforced by the corps of General Heintzelman.

The corps of Generals Keyes and Heintzelman having retired to the third line by direction of General Heintzelman, I there collected together what remained of my division.

The Fifty-second Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers and the Fifty-sixth Regiment New York Volunteers were under the particular direction of Brigadier-General Naglee, and I refer to his report for further mention of them.

General Naglee behaved with distinguished gallantry through the engagement, having a horse killed under him and receiving four contused wounds from musket-balls. Generals Palmer and Wessells encouraged by their example their men to do their duty on the field. General Wessells had a horse shot under him and himself received a wound in the shoulder.

Lieutenants West and Foster, my aides-de-camp, were active through the day, affording me much service and behaving gallantly. Captain Davis, of the provost guard of my division, acted as my aide a portion of the time, rendering much assistance and conducting himself in a gallant manner. I also feel much indebtedness to my medical director, Dr. Crosby, for the energy he evinced in collecting the wounded and his promptness and skill in providing for them.

I have inclosed a list of the killed, wounded, and missing, as also the reports of the commanders of the brigades, to which I refer.

I cannot forbear mention of the severe misfortune suffered by the division and the service in the loss of Col. G. D. Bailey, my chief of artillery, who fell in the attempt to spike the pieces in my redoubt, which were necessarily abandoned. Colonel Bailey was an officer of thorough military education; of clear and accurate mind; cool, determined, and intrepid in the discharge of his duty, and promising with riper years to honor still more the profession to which he was devoted. About the same time, also, fell Major Van Valkenburgh, of the First Regiment New York Artillery, a brave, discreet, and energetic officer.

Under the circumstances I think it my duty to add a few remarks with regard to my division. On leaving Washington eight of the regiments were composed of raw troops. It has been the misfortune of the division in marching through the Peninsula to be subjected to an ordeal which would have severely tried veteran troops. Furnished with scanty transportation, occupying sickly positions, exposed to the inclemency of the weather at times without tents or blankets, and illy supplied with rations and medical stores, the loss from sickness has been great, especially with the officers; yet a party from my division took possession of the railroad bridge across the Chickahominy, driving the enemy from it, and my division took the advance on the 23d of May, and by an energetic reconnaissance drove the enemy beyond the Seven Pines.

Notwithstanding all these drawbacks, and the fact that there were not 5,000 men in line of battle, they withstood for three hours the attack of an overwhelming force of the enemy without the re-enforcement of a single man at my first line. The Fifty-fifth Regiment New York Volunteers reached my second line just before it was evacuated.

If a portion of the division did not behave so well as could have been wished, it must be remembered to what a terrible ordeal they were subjected. Still, those that behaved discreditably were exceptional cases. It is true that the division, after being nearly surrounded by the enemy and losing one-third of the number actually engaged, retreated to the second line. They would all have been prisoners of war had they delayed their retreat a few minutes longer.

In my humble opinion, from what I witnessed on the 31st, I am convinced that the stubborn and desperate resistance of my division saved the army on the right bank of the Chickahominy from a severe repulse, which might have resulted in a disastrous defeat. The blood of the gallant dead would cry to me from the ground on which they fell fighting for their country had I not said what I have to vindicate them from the unmerited aspersion which has been cast upon them.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,

Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding Division.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Inclosure.]

Recapitulation of casualties in Casey's division, May 31, 1862.

Command.	Commissioned officers.				Enlisted men.				Aggregate.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	
FIRST BRIGADE.									
General Naglee.....		1		1					1
104th Pennsylvania Volunteers.....		6	1	7	27	105	66	198	205
52d Pennsylvania Volunteers.....		7		7	20	87	5	112	119
56th New York Volunteers.....	1	4		5	15	43	5	63	68
100th New York Volunteers.....	2	3	6	11	16	83	66	165	176
11th Maine Volunteers.....	1	3		4	5	41	18	64	68
Total.....	4	24	7	35	83	359	160	602	637

Recapitulation of casualties in Casey's division, May 31, 1862—Continued.

Command.	Commissioned officers.				Enlisted men.				Aggregate.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	
SECOND BRIGADE.									
General Wessells.....		1		1					1
85th Pennsylvania Volunteers.....	2	2		4	6	53	12	71	75
103d Pennsylvania Volunteers.....	1	2	1	4	7	67	16	90	94
101st Pennsylvania Volunteers.....		5		5	11	111	2	124	129
96th Pennsylvania Volunteers.....	1	1	2	4	7	31	18	56	60
Total.....	4	11	3	18	31	263	48	341	359
THIRD BRIGADE.									
General Palmer.....									
81st New York Volunteers.....	2	5		7	24	85	22	131	138
98th New York Volunteers.....		3		3	4	27	26	67	70
85th New York Volunteers.....		1		1	9	45	21	75	76
92d New York Volunteers.....		4		4	8	65	28	101	105
Total.....	2	13		15	45	232	97	374	389
ARTILLERY.									
Colonel Bailey and staff.....	2	1		3					3
Company A, 1st New York Artillery*					3	5	1		9
Company H, 1st New York Artillery.....		2		2		6		6	8
7th New York Battery.....					3	7	1	11	11
8th New York Battery.....						6		6	6
Total.....	2	3		5	6	24	2	32	37
Provost guard†.....						1	2	3	3
Total division.....	12	51	10	73	165	878	309	1,352	1,425

* By error, Battery A gave in former report 3 killed, 6 wounded, and 2 missing, instead of above.

† Six of provost guard are previously accounted for with their regiments, making 1,425.

HEADQUARTERS CASEY'S DIVISION,
Poplar Hill, Va., June 18, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to inclose the report of the killed, wounded, and missing of the First Brigade, my division, in the action of the 31st ultimo.

I wish to add to my report of the operations of my division the following:

The number of men actually in line (including artillery) was..... 4,380
 Killed, wounded, and missing..... 1,433

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Commissioned officers.....	12	51	10	73
Enlisted men.....	165	883	312	1,360
Total.....	177	934	322	1,433

Many of the missing are supposed to be killed.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Fourth Corps.

No. 93.

Report of Capt. Peter C. Regan, Seventh New York Battery, Acting Chief of Artillery.

CAMP NEAR SEVEN PINES, *June 1, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to inclose the accompanying reports of commanders of batteries of the division, made to me in consequence of the deaths of Col. G. D. Bailey and Major Van Valkenburgh, of the First Regiment New York Artillery. The colonel was killed in the redoubt in front of your headquarters by a rifle-ball passing through his brain while giving an order to spike the guns of Company A, First New York Artillery, when the redoubt was no longer tenable and the large number of horses killed prevented the withdrawal of the guns. The major was killed in the road between two of my guns while in action and while setting an example to the men of cool, self-possessed courage under a galling and terrible fire.

I have received no report from Company A, First New York Artillery, and can only report to you the fact that their battery of six light 12-pounders were captured by the enemy. Battery H, of the same regiment, was ordered into battery to the left of the Nine-mile road in advance of division headquarters, and opened fire on the enemy. Captain Spratt was wounded in the shoulder early in the action, as was also Lieutenant Howell, and the command of the battery devolved on First Lieut. C. E. Mink, who fought the battery, assisted by Second Lieut. E. H. Clark, with spirit and bravery until compelled to retire by the repulse of his supports and the near advance of the enemy, but not until the safety of his battery compelled his retreat, with the loss of one of his pieces left in the hands of the enemy.

The Eighth New York Independent Battery, Captain Fitch, commenced firing about 1 o'clock, and fired with rapidity and effect on the advancing lines of the enemy until compelled to retire, which was done in good order, to our present encampment. Captain Thompson, chief of artillery of General Couch's division, ordered a battery forward. Captain Fitch moved again toward the front and took his position in rear of the batteries of Couch's division, where I understood he did good service and inflicted considerable injury on the foe.

The Seventh New York Independent Battery, under my command, remained in position on the right of the Nine-mile road, directly in front of headquarters, awaiting the signal to commence firing. Our own troops were in our immediate front in the undergrowth of pines, which compelled us to reserve our fire for fear of killing our own men, and were compelled to remain under a galling fire, which wounded 1 man and killed and wounded several of my horses, without the satisfaction of replying.

At a signal from Major Van Valkenburgh we limbered our pieces and moved to the left, and took our position in battery, with one section in the road and the other two in the field to the right of the road, and opened on their advancing column and for a time held them at bay. By taking cover in the woods, their left flank continued to advance within 30 yards of the battery, while they kept pouring a continuous fire of musketry and artillery and flaunting their battle-flags in our faces. To give them an idea of re-enforcements I seized our colors and rode in front of our battery. At this time the flag was twice hit and my horse shot under me. Major Van Valkenburgh gave the order to limber up the four pieces in the field. As the ground was soft and the

guns had settled nearly up to their axles, with difficulty we got the guns out and sent them to the rear, while we still worked the section in the road. It was at this time the major received his fatal shot and fell lifeless from his saddle.

At this time all the batteries had left the field and all the infantry in our immediate vicinity had been driven back. A part of the First Brigade, the Fifty-sixth New York, were still disputing the ground with the enemy on our extreme right. General Naglee ordered me to fix prolonges and fire retiring, which was done with one piece. The Garde Lafayette (Fifty-fifth Regiment New York Volunteers) came up about this time and made a gallant charge, but unfortunately got in front of our pieces and prevented us from firing when we were able to do so. First Lieut. M. V. McIntyre acted as No. 1, Corporal Hasbrouck served ammunition, and myself as gunner. The lead driver was shot dead, also No. 4, Artificer Goodsel. With two officers and one corporal as cannoneers and no lanyard or friction primers, and the regiment in front terribly cut, we retired, and shortly after received orders from you to collect the batteries and place them in position where they now are.

The officers and men under my command behaved gallantly and deserve credit for their steadiness under a wasting fire. The adjutant of the artillery, Lieut. William Rumsey, was wounded while executing the orders of our chief. We were not expecting so severe a battle so soon. I had orders about two hours before the battle commenced to harness up one section of my battery, expecting to go on a reconnaissance, but before I had barely time to give the order the order was changed, and the whole battery was ordered to be harnessed, together with all the batteries in the division. I could have saved my battery wagon and forge by sending them to the rear sooner, but did not feel justified in assuming by that proceeding that it was possible for the division to retreat. Two caissons were abandoned in consequence of the horses being killed. The battery wagon, forge, and caissons have been since recovered, with the exception of one limber of the caisson, which was taken by the rebels.

I cannot close this report without expressing my deep sense of the irreparable loss sustained by your division in the death of Col. G. D. Bailey. Modest, unassuming, and gentlemanly in his manner, united with great decision of character and personal bravery and a thorough knowledge of his profession, your division has met with a loss that cannot be replaced, and the service has lost one of its brightest ornaments.

Annexed is a list of the casualties in the artillery of the division.*

All of which is respectfully submitted.

P. C. REGAN,

Capt. Seventh N. Y. Battery, Actg. Chief of Arty., Casey's Div.

General CASEY.

No. 94.

Report of Brig. Gen. Henry M. Naglee, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations May 26-June 1.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS, NEAR SEVEN PINES,
June 20, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose the report of Brig. Gen. H. M. Naglee, who commanded the First Brigade of Casey's division in the battle

* Embodied in return, p. 762.

of May 31. His brigade was composed of the Fifty-second and One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, the Eleventh Maine, and the Fifty-sixth and One hundredth New York Volunteers. General Naglee's report did not arrive in time to be forwarded with my report of the battle. The paper he has now furnished contains matter which will lead to angry controversies, and ought not, in my opinion, to appear in its present form among the reports of the battle.

The objections to General Naglee's report are the following:

1st. It refers to the movements of the Fourth Corps, or parts of it, for several days prior to and in the battle, and it is not his province to refer to them in his report of the battle further than to give the position of the troops of his own brigade.

2d. General Naglee states that he gave orders to other troops besides his own brigade without giving the authority for so doing. To allow such a practice to subordinate commanders without stating reasons to justify it would have a most disorganizing tendency.

3d. General Naglee has referred to a line of battle formed in rear of and near to the Nine-mile road in a manner which seems to convey the impression that the line there formed was about the termination of the battle. It is certain, however, that two other distinct lines of battle stoutly resisted the enemy after the one above referred to. As General Naglee does not refer to his being near the first of the last two lines, and as I did not see him there, I infer he was not present. In the last line of battle formed during the day, and which line staid the advance of the enemy, I know General Naglee was not present.

4th. General Naglee's report conveys the idea, I think, that one division or one brigade of the Fourth Corps did nearly all the fighting on the 31st and that the other division did very little fighting.

5th. Having mentioned General Naglee favorably in my report of the battle, I respectfully request that the paper now forwarded from him as his report may be returned to me as objectionable for the reasons stated above. I will then require Brigadier-General Naglee to report the operations of his own brigade during the battle of May 31. At the same time I would intimate to him that if he desires to describe the operations of the Fourth Corps or of General Casey's division or the conduct of individuals not under his command or his own conduct generally, there will be no objection to his doing so in a separate paper.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

E. D. KEYES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS NAGLEE'S BRIGADE,
Camp in the Rear, June 19, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: Before alluding to the occurrences of the 31st of May it would probably add to a better understanding of the subject to refer to the advance of my brigade on the 24th, 25th, and 26th, a week previous.

Having crossed the Chickahominy from the railroad to Bottom's Bridge on the 20th, and made a reconnaissance from the Chimneys, near Bottom's Bridge, to within 2 miles of the James River on the Quaker road on the 23d, General McClellan ordered a reconnaissance of the road and country by the Williamsburg road as far as the Seven

Pines to be made on Saturday, the 24th, with instructions if possible to advance to the Seven Pines or the forks of the direct road to Richmond and the road turning to the right into the road leading from New Bridge to Richmond, and to hold that point if practicable. Under these instructions, with the addition of two batteries of Colonel Bailey's New York First Artillery and Colonel Gregg's cavalry, we pushed the reconnaissance, not without considerable opposition, to the Seven Pines on the day referred to, one mile and a half beyond the Pines on the following day, and to a line perpendicular to the railroad from Richmond to West Point, intersecting it midway between the fifth and sixth mile-posts on the following day, and on the day after, the 27th, extended it across to the Nine-mile road, where it is intersected by the road to Garnett's house and thence by this road, bearing to the right, our picket lines extended to the Chickahominy. This line from the river across the railroad to the Williamsburg road was about 3 miles long, and was picketed at first by the First Brigade, afterward by Casey's division, but placed more directly under the charge and protection of the regiments of the First Brigade, who were encamped along its entire length for that purpose, the picket line proposed to be kept up and its supports to the same, from the left of the above picket line on the Williamsburg road to the White Oak Swamp, being especially intrusted to General Couch.

This was the line of our advance on Saturday, the 31st of May, at 12 m., when two shells thrown into our camp first announced the hostile intentions of the enemy. No alarm was felt by any one, for it was seldom that twenty-four hours passed that we did not exchange similar salutations. Soon thereafter it was reported that an attack was impending. The usual orders were issued, and within half an hour the troops moved to positions that were assigned to them by General Casey.

Being at this time on the Nine-mile road, near a breastwork fronting the Old Tavern, then under construction, and judging from the discharges of musketry becoming frequent that something serious was intended, I hastened in the direction indicated by the fire and soon arrived upon the ground, on the Williamsburg road, about three-quarters of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, where I found General Casey, who had placed the One hundredth New York, Colonel Brown, on the left of that road, behind a field of large timber that had been cut down. On the right of the same road was placed Captain Spratt's New York battery of four pieces. On the right of this were three companies of the Eleventh Maine, Colonel Plaisted, and on the right of the Eleventh Maine were eight companies of the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, Colonel Davis. Four companies of the Eleventh Maine were on picket duty, but being driven in, formed with the Fifty-sixth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Jourdan, at his encampment in line of battle parallel with and about 800 yards in rear of the picket lines, 200 yards to the left of the railroad. Colonel Dodge's Fifty-second Pennsylvania, supporting the picket line on the extreme right, formed at his encampment on the Nine-mile road, three-quarters of a mile in rear of the large Garnett field. The remaining companies of the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania and Eleventh Maine were on picket duty along the large field in the direction of the Chickahominy.

Soon after my arrival upon the ground, about 1 o'clock p. m., the fire then being frequent and from the direction of the main Richmond Stage road, General Casey gave an order to the One hundredth New York, One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, and Eleventh Maine to charge, when, as reported by Colonel Davis—

The regiments sprang forward toward the enemy with a tremendous yell. In our way was a high worm fence, which cut our former line of battle, but the boys sprang over it into the same inclosure with the enemy, where we formed and renewed the fight. The battle now raged with great fury and the firing was much hotter than before. Spratt's battery during this time had kept up a lively fire in the same direction.

At about 3 p. m. the enemy, being largely re-enforced, pressed us in front and flank, and seeing that we could not hold our position much longer unless re-enforced, I dispatched an officer to General Casey for that purpose. The colonel of the One hundredth New York being killed; the colonel of the One hundred and fourth being severely wounded; the major mortally wounded; the lieutenant-colonel being absent; half of our men having fallen killed or wounded; the enemy, ten times our number, being within a few feet of us, one of them striking Sergeant Porter, the left guide of the One hundred and fourth, over the neck with his musket; several of the Eleventh Maine being bayoneted; receiving no re-enforcements, we were ordered with Spratt's battery to retire, but unfortunately, the horses of one of the pieces being killed, we were compelled to abandon that piece.

The enemy endeavored to follow up this success, and was advancing in closed columns, when, our troops being sufficiently withdrawn, Colonel Bailey, of the First New York Artillery, at my request, directed the fire of the batteries of Fitch and Bates, situated in and near the redoubt, to be concentrated upon the advancing mass. At every discharge of grape and canister wide gaps were opened in his ranks, which were filled as soon as opened. Still he pressed on, until, after many trials, with immense loss, finding that he was advancing into the very jaws of death, with sullen hesitation he concluded to desist at this point.

Congratulating Colonel Bailey upon his gallant conduct and good services as above described, and suggesting that, in the event of being compelled to abandon another piece, he should instruct his gunners to spike before leaving it, he went into the redoubt to give these orders, when he was shot by a rifle-ball through the forehead and died a few minutes after, the State losing a gallant soldier and his artillerymen a friend to whom they were entirely devoted.

Soon after this Major Van Valkenburgh, of the same artillery, was killed by a rifle-ball whilst actively engaged in working these batteries, and but a little while after Lieutenant Rumsey, the adjutant, in the same manner. All the field and staff officers being killed, I assumed the direction of the batteries composing the First New York Artillery.

No re-enforcements having been sent to us, and desirous of following up the success above referred to, about 3.30 p. m. I rode to the rear and led up the Fifty-fifth New York, Lieutenant Colonel Thourot, and placed it in line perpendicular to the Williamsburg road, about 50 yards in advance of the redoubt, the left resting a short distance from the road. Before getting into position they were compelled to march over the bodies of their killed and wounded comrades, and soon afterward found themselves fully engaged.

Leaving the Fifty-fifth, my attention was directed toward the right, where I found the Fifty-sixth New York with the Eleventh Maine, who after four hours' contest had fallen back about 400 yards, and were again placed by me at 4.10 o'clock in a depression in the ground about midway between the Williamsburg road and the railroad and about 300 yards in front of the Nine-mile road. Near by I found the Fifty-second Pennsylvania, which had been ordered from the right, and I placed them in echelon to the right and front of the Fifty-sixth, with the right resting upon and in rear of a large pond.

At this time the fire here had considerably slackened, but was increasing on the left. Returning in about an hour to the left I found the Fifty-fifth engaged to their utmost extent, and ascertained for the first time that the enemy had discovered, what I had long feared, that

there were none of our troops between the White Oak Swamp and a line parallel with and but 200 yards from the Williamsburg road. He had more than an hour before discovered this, and with sharpshooters concealed in the woods to the left and rear of the redoubt and rifle pits they had killed many of our most valuable officers, had picked off the cannoneers, and had killed from three to four horses out of every team attached to the First New York Artillery, and at the time of my return had driven our men from the rifle pits. No time was to be lost. Fitch's battery was ordered to the rear. The battery under Lieutenant Hart was next ordered to retire, but it was soon found that but one limber could be moved. I ordered the pieces to be spiked, but after spiking the pieces in the redoubt those on the outside of it were in the possession of the enemy. By way of precaution I had ordered the prolonges to be fixed to the sections of Regan's battery still firing up the Williamsburg road, and ordered it to retire firing until in the abatis that crosses the road, and I then withdrew the Fifty-fifth under the protection of its fire.

This regiment had fought most gallantly, suffered severely, and contributed much in the end toward saving Regan's battery from falling into the hands of the enemy; and then, the entire field in front of and including the redoubt being in possession of the enemy, who had pressed to within a few yards of us, it being necessary to support many of the wounded horses to keep them from falling in the traces, at 5.15 p. m. we brought the last sections of Bailey's First New York Artillery from the field, the air being at this time literally filled with iron and lead.

Returning rapidly to my Fifty-sixth New York, Eleventh Maine, and Fifty-second Pennsylvania, my anticipations here were realized. Being successful in turning our left flank, the enemy had opened a most destructive cross-fire upon them from the pieces near the redoubt that had not been spiked, and this, with the fire from their immediate front, was no longer to be endured, and they were withdrawn and marched down the Nine-mile road, and placed in position in rear of this road about 300 yards from the Seven Pines, when soon their services were required.

In the mean while Colonel Neill, of the Twenty-third Pennsylvania, had come upon the ground occupied by Colonel Dodge, and induced him to advance in front and to the right of the position that had been assigned to him, whilst he (Colonel Neill) occupied that which the Fifty-second Pennsylvania vacated; but these dispositions were scarcely made before the masses of the enemy broke through, and a few minutes sufficed to leave the half of Dodge's command upon the ground and to force Neill precipitately from his position.

The remaining portion of the Fifty-second—for it was now reduced to a little over 100 men—were conducted along the Nine-mile road to the Seven Pines, when, finding the rifle pits occupied, they took possession of a fence and some outhouses, and did most effective service. Afterward they crossed to the left of Couch's position, and advanced 200 yards into and along the woods to the left and in front of the Seven Pines, where they remained actively employed until near dark, when the enemy, advancing rapidly in masses to the rear of the Nine-mile road, inclined toward the Williamsburg road, sweeping everything from the field, our forces making one general simultaneous movement to the rear, which did not stop until all had arrived at the line of defense 1 mile in that direction.

The Fifty-second, having their retreat cut off, escaped by passing

through the woods to the left and rear to the saw-mill at the White Oak Swamp and thence to the line above referred to, where they rejoined their comrades of the First Brigade.

Following down the Nine-mile road, after Dodge was compelled to retreat about 500 yards from the outer section at the Seven Pines, I found Col. J. W. Adams, commanding the First Long Island, which was placed across the road, a portion of the right flank being in rear of it, with the left flank extending to the front and left. Advising Colonel Adams of the rapid approach of the enemy, of the direction he was coming, and of the position of the Fifty-sixth and One hundred and fourth on his left, he withdrew the left flank of the Long Island to the rear of the Nine-mile road, making a continuous line with the above, and the men were ordered to lie down, that they should escape the murderous fire that was incessantly pouring in from the front. Scarcely was this done when the Eighty-seventh New York, Col. Stephen A. Dodge, of Kearny's division, Heintzelman's corps, came along the Nine-mile road with rapid step, cheering most vociferously, passed the Eleventh Maine, One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania, and the First Long Island about 50 yards, received a volley, broke, and passed the whole of them, running over the backs of those lying down, the latter remaining undisturbed until ordered to rise and meet the accumulated force that was bearing all before it. Volley after volley was given and received. An order was given to charge, but 100 yards brought us into such close proximity with the enemy that a sheet of fire was blazing in our faces. The ranks on both sides were rapidly thinning, but still the great disparity in our number continued. So close were the contending forces, that our men in many instances whilst at a charge poured their fire into the breasts of the enemy within a few feet from the points of their bayonets.

This dreadful contest lasted until nearly dark. My Fifty-sixth and One hundred and fourth suffered dreadfully, lost the greater part of their officers and men, and were compelled to give way, carrying their wounded with them.

It was then, in the language of Lieutenant Haney, of the One hundred and fourth :

That I (Lieutenant Haney) and Lieutenant Ashenfelter and others led Captain Corcoran, Captain Swartzlander, and Lieutenant Hendrie off the field. It was getting dark ; it was about half an hour before dark. We went down the Nine-mile road and along the Williamsburg road. The fighting was nearly over ; our troops were all returning ; we saw the enemy not over 75 yards in our rear, and no troops between us and them. All of our forces were moving back, little regard being paid to brigade, regimental, or even company organization. Kearny's troops came, but did not stay long. Captain Corcoran becoming continually weaker, we were compelled to carry him.

Fully confirming the statements of my officers, I saw no running, and there was no panic, but all moved off together with a single purpose, and that one to make a stand upon the line of defenses 1 mile in the rear, the only one of sufficient capacity to enable us to defend ourselves against vastly-superior numbers until our re-enforcements could be brought together. Company I, Captain Merrill, and Company E, Lieutenant Sabine, of the Eleventh Maine were on picket duty along the Garnett field, in front of which several rebel regiments marched about dark. Some of the men crawled into the wheat and shot three of the field officers as they marched by. When Sedgwick crossed the Chickahominy they immediately communicated with him ; remained all night upon this picket line, with the enemy in their front and rear, and on Sunday, at 9 a. m., came in, bringing more prisoners

than the entire number of men in their ranks. Second-Lieutenant Rice, of the Eleventh Maine, was very sick in the hospital, where there were a number of the same regiment. After the fight grew warm he exclaimed, "Boys, every one of you that can hold up his head follow me." More than 20 followed him. He shouldered a musket, and all joined their regiment and fought most gallantly. Rice, after 17 rounds delivered with deadly effect—for he was an excellent shot—was severely wounded in the thigh and was carried from the field.

Company E, One hundred and fourth, Captain Harvey, Lieutenant Croll, and 58 men were extended on picket duty from the railroad to the corner at the intersection of the Nine-mile road with the road to Garnett's house, when about 3 p. m. the enemy approached, but left them unmolested after firing some scattering shots, during which time we took 13 prisoners.

After 5 p. m. the enemy again appeared in force along this entire line. With the assistance of the supports he was held in check for nearly an hour, when, finding themselves surrounded, they were taken prisoners. Captain Harvey was placed in charge of an officer with 5 men, and was marching off when a shell struck, and killing the officer, the captain, taking advantage of the confusion, made his escape. Four of the men afterward came in.

On Saturday Lieutenant-Colonel Hoyt, of the Fifty-second Pennsylvania, was in charge of the pioneers of the First Brigade and two companies of the same regiment, building a bridge which I had directed to be built across the Chickahominy, remaining upon the ground, and informing himself of the proceedings upon the extreme right. He rendered most valuable service by advising General Sumner as soon as he crossed the swamp of the precise position of our forces and those of the enemy. After which, the enemy having pressed down between the railroad and General Sumner, Lieutenant-Colonel Hoyt, with the above and some of the One hundredth New York that were driven in from the picket lines near the Chickahominy, remained with General Sumner until Sunday, and behaved well. After leaving the battle-field, at dark, the brigade, numbering over 1,000, were marched to the right rifle pits of the rear defenses, but vacated them at the request of General Kearny, and occupied those on the left, with the other brigades of Casey's division, where we remained under arms in the rain all night.

I have shown in the history of the battle of the Seven Pines the conduct of every one of the regiments of the First Brigade from the time the first volley was fired at noon until the enemy, having driven our troops from the ground near dark, cut off the retreat of the Fifty-second by the Williamsburg road, and were still annoyed by their deadly fire.

The list of casualties shows there were taken into action 84 officers and 1,669 men, and that 35 officers and 603 men were killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, being 42 per cent. of the former and 37 per cent. of the latter. Of the 93 of the Eleventh Maine that were led into the fight by Colonel Plaisted 52 were killed and wounded.

That the brigade fought well none can deny, for they lost 638 of their number. Their bodies were found over every part of the field, and where these bodies lay were found double their number of the enemy. The enemy, more generous than our friends, admit "that we fought most desperately and against three entire divisions of his army, with two in reserve that later in the day were brought in." For three and a half hours we contested every inch of ground with the enemy, and did not yield in that time the half of 1 mile. We fought from 12 m. until 3.30 p. m. with but little assistance, and until dark with our

comrades of other regiments and of other divisions whenever we could be of service, and when at dark the enemy swept all before him we were the last to leave the field.

Since the battle of Seven Pines, now nearly three weeks, a force ten times that of Casey and Couch have not been able to regain the line of outposts established by the First Brigade on the 26th of May, our present line being half a mile in rear thereof.

None of the brigade, regimental, or company baggage was lost. Some of the shelter-tents, knapsacks, and blankets fell into the hands of the enemy, which was the natural consequence of being encamped in close proximity with the outposts.

Conduct such as this, if not worthy of commendation, should not call forth censure, for censure undeserved chills the ardor and daring of the soldier and dishonors both the living and the dead.

Very respectfully, &c.,

NAGLEE,
Brigadier-General.

Lieutenant FOSTER, A. A. A. G., *Casey's Div., Army of the Potomac.*

No. 95.

Report of Brig. Gen. Henry W. Wessells, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS WESSELLS' BRIGADE, CASEY'S DIVISION,
Near Savage Station, June 3, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report the part taken by this brigade in the action of the 31st ultimo, near the Seven Pines, in front of Richmond. Between 12 and 1 o'clock p. m. our pickets posted in front were attacked by the enemy. I at once, pursuant to instructions from the brigadier-general commanding the division, sent forward the One hundred and third Pennsylvania Volunteers, Major Gazzam, to their support. As the firing soon indicated a formidable advance of the enemy I at once ordered the brigade under arms and formed the line of battle in accordance with the instructions of the division commander. The One hundred and first Pennsylvania Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Morris, was placed on the right of the Richmond road perpendicular to it, the right flank of the battalion extending into the woods and in rear of the newly-constructed rifle pits. The Eighty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Howell, in rear of the rifle pits, extended from the redoubt across the Richmond road to near the left of the One hundred and first. The Ninety-sixth New York Volunteers, Colonel Fairman, was placed in advance of the rifle pits and to the left of the Eighty-fifth. The battalions being thus disposed I took my position in rear of the One hundred and first and in such manner as to observe the Eighty-fifth. The One hundred and third being too far to the front for my immediate supervision, its movements were left to the judgment of its commander, whose report is herewith inclosed.

The increase of musketry soon told that the One hundred and third was engaged. Driven from its position, it fell back firing and again made a stand. Assailed by overwhelming numbers from the front and flank, it again fell back to a new position. Here the enemy approached from the right, and, exposed to a terrific fire from the front and both flanks, its flag-staff shot away, the regiment again fell back, followed by the enemy, who was seen to emerge from the woods in front and ad-

vance toward the One hundred and first. The enemy's fire was directed with great precision and effect on this regiment, which, however stood fast and returned the fire with coolness and rapidity. Hoping the One hundred and first would be able to maintain its position I crossed to the road in the rear of the Eighty-fifth, which was now occupying the rifle pits, amid a terrific fire from the front, and which was constantly and effectually returned. The Ninety-sixth New York Volunteers, which up to this time had gallantly maintained its position, was forced to fall back to the line on the left of the rifle pits, where it again opened fire and continued with great effect until again forced back by a terrific fire from the front and flank, enfilading completely the rifle pits occupied by the Eighty-fifth and One hundred and first. Lieutenant-Colonel Morris, One hundred and first, in order to protect his right, which was assailed by a terrific fire from that flank, caused the right wing of his battalion to change front to that direction and for some time succeeded in holding the enemy in check, until he fell severely wounded and was borne from the field, when the regiment, assailed by overwhelming numbers, was forced to fall back.

The Eighty-fifth and Ninety-sixth, having fallen back, were again formed on the left of the road in rear of the camp in the fallen timber, and delivered their fire with great effect, but being again flanked and overwhelmed, were compelled again to retire. The right wing of the One hundred and first, after retiring, deployed to the left, and passing the left wing opened its fire, and for some time maintained its position, but was at length compelled to fall back. Considerable disorder here ensued, the fallen timber and irregularity of the ground preventing the companies and battalions from preserving their alignment. Different regiments were intermingled and the line put in confusion. Colonel Howell gallantly rallied a part of his regiment and regained the rifle pits, but was again driven back. The troops fell back slowly, but with some disorder, carrying with them their arms. They were rallied, however, by the efforts of Captain Jeffries, assistant adjutant-general of this brigade, and marched all in good order (except the sick, numbering over 300, who abandoned the camp at the commencement of the action and fled in the direction of the Chickahominy River in great disorder) to a suitable camping ground, where the line was formed, ammunition sent for across the river, and information sent to Generals Heintzelman, Keyes, and Casey of the position of the troops.

After the brigade had retired I reported to Brigadier General Keyes, by whom I was directed to reform the line on the right of Devens' rifle pits, and having been driven from that position in the same manner as before, with my horse killed under me and a severe contusion in the shoulder from a musket-ball, I fell back near sunset with retreating fragments of other brigades and halted at this camp.

The casualties are as follows: Thirty-four killed; 271 wounded; 55 missing.* A correct list of the names is herewith inclosed.

The actual effective strength of the brigade, as appears from the morning reports, was 2,061. Of these 200 comprised the working party on the fortifications; a like number was detailed on picket, which, with the usual details and extra-duty men, made our actual strength in action less than 1,500 men.

During the engagement I was ably assisted by Captain Jeffries, assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenants Williams and Dawson, acting aides-de-camp, who were with me in the thickest of the fight.

* But see revised statement, p. 762.

I desire also to notice the conduct of Dr. Rush, acting brigade surgeon, who nobly discharged his duty from first to last.

Respectfully submitted.

H. W. WESSELLS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
 Lieut. B. B. FOSTER, A. A. A. G., *Casey's Division.*

No. 96.

Report of Maj. Audley W. Gazzam, One hundred and third Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. ONE HUNDRED AND THIRD PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
June 2, 1862.

CAPTAIN: At about 1 o'clock p. m. of the 31st day of May, 1862, under orders from Brigadier-General Wessells, I marched my regiment out and formed it immediately in rear of the picket reserves and about half a mile from our camp, throwing out two companies, B and G, under command of Capt. George W. Gillespie, on the left of the road, to protect that flank, the right of the regiment resting on a piece of marshy ground. When the pickets were fired on and driven in I ordered the reserve to take their place in the regiment.

The enemy now opened a heavy fire on the left and center, which was returned by my whole line. The enemy's fire now opened along the whole line, and we were also subjected to a very heavy cross-fire from both flanks. When I saw that we could no longer hold our ground, unsupported as we were, I ordered my men to fall back slowly, which they did, and formed on a road running nearly at right angles to the one on which we had entered the woods.

The overwhelming force of the enemy, which now almost surrounded us, compelled me again to retire, to prevent being entirely cut off. Owing to the nature of the ground, which was marshy and covered with underwood and fallen timber, it was impossible to retire in order.

The regiment when marched out consisted of 430 men. The remainder of the command was detailed on fatigue and picket duty, and one company of 50 men was detained in camp to relieve the pickets then on duty. The loss in killed, wounded, and missing, of which a detailed report has been made, amounts to 95 men.* We encamped for the night in the woods back of Savage Station, on the railroad.

Respectfully submitted by your obedient servant,

AUDLEY W. GAZZAM,
Major, Commanding One hundred and third Regiment Pa. Vols.
 Capt. N. L. JEFFRIES, A. A. G., *Second Brigade, Casey's Division.*

No. 97.

Report of Brig. Gen. Innis N. Palmer, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, CASEY'S DIVISION,
Camp Poplar Hill, Va., June 5, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following operations of my brigade at the battle of Seven Pines, on the 31st ultimo:

* But see revised statement, p. 762.

My command, consisting of the Eighty-first, Ninety-second, Eighty-fifth, and Ninety-eighth New York Volunteers, numbered in the aggregate about 1,200. Of this number 400 of the effective officers and men were at the commencement of the engagement on picket guard or on duty with working parties. A great portion of these did not join their regiments, as they should have done, but were permitted by the officers in charge of them to ramble about, and of course doing but little service. The sick, or those reputed sick, in the brigade numbered some hundreds, and in some companies there were no commissioned officers—in the most of them not more than one—and I estimate the whole fighting force on the ground at less than 1,000 officers and men. For this condition of my command I hold myself in no way responsible; but this matter will be the subject of a special report.

It is fair to presume that with this force it was not expected to do much more than hold in check the enemy, who advanced so rapidly that while the men were in the rifle pits they were raked by a fire from both flanks.

The disposition of the regiments was made by the order of the commanding general of the division and was as follows: The Eighty-first was deployed in the field to the extreme left of our line and in front of the woods through which the enemy made the flank movement. The Eighty-fifth occupied the left rifle pits, while the Ninety-second and Ninety-eighth were ordered to the front and to the support of the batteries.

A very short time after the Eighty-first was placed in position by myself, and while I was passing toward the right, the enemy appeared suddenly in front of them and delivered a deadly fire. The commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel De Forest, was wounded, supposed mortally; the major, McAmbly, one captain, Kingman, and several men were killed, and many officers and men wounded. The enemy's fire was returned, but the force in front was too great for new troops and they retired, leaving many of their number on the field, to the woods only a few rods to the rear. The Eighty-fifth stood their ground well in the rifle pits, and I am convinced did good execution. My regiments were so situated and the smoke was so dense on the field that it was impossible for me to see more than one regiment at a time. While passing along the line I discovered that our whole position was gradually becoming enveloped, and that unless re-enforcements should soon arrive it must be abandoned.

An unfortunate affair occurred about the time of the closing in of the enemy on the flanks. A shell thrown from one of our own batteries burst just over the rifle pits, killing and wounding several of the Eighty-fifth, which up to this time had stood its ground very well. About the same time Colonel Hunt, of the Ninety-second, who was encouraging his men to hold their position, was shot in the thigh, and he was compelled to leave the field. This occurred about 3 o'clock. I believed that it would not be possible to make the men stand much longer unless re-enforced, and I went to General Keyes to beg for some of Couch's division, which had just arrived. His reply was that he had formed a new line to the rear.

Shortly after this the divisions of Kearny and Hooker arrived, but not until the enemy had possession of the position where the engagement commenced, and which they continued to possess until they chose to retire, which was on Monday morning, more than thirty hours after the battle. I only mention this fact to show the injustice of attaching

blame to any one for retiring with a meager force from a position which was held by the enemy in spite of the large re-enforcements in Kearny's, Hooker's, and Couch's divisions. It was my misfortune to see a portion of the re-enforcements greater than my whole command retire from the field before they had scarcely felt the enemy. As it was useless to attempt to reform the brigade when the regiments were so widely scattered, the work of collecting the men generally was commenced about sundown, and on the next morning they took up their position, by the order of the commanding general of the division, at the position in front of Savage Station.

I inclose a list of casualties* in each regiment, and you will perceive that the killed and wounded alone will amount to nearly one-fourth of my whole command, and adding the missing, many of whom I suspect are wounded and prisoners, the total loss is considerably more than one-third of my force. This is sufficient to induce me to think that while the men did not, perhaps, act like veteran troops, they did as well as could be expected. For the disasters of the day those who placed a small force of the rawest troops in the army in a position where they would of necessity bear the brunt of any attack on the left must bear the blame. I take none of it to myself.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. N. PALMER,

Brigadier-General, Comdg. Third Brigade, Casey's Division.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Casey's Division.

No. 98.

Report of Capt. William C. Raulston, Eighty-first New York Infantry.

CAMP NEAR POPLAR HILL, VA., June 5, 1862.

GENERAL: I herewith transmit to you a report of the part taken by the Eighty-first New York Volunteers, of your brigade, in the engagement of Saturday, the 31st ultimo, near Seven Pines:

We were ordered into line at 12.30 p. m.; formed immediately, and were ordered to take a position in a narrow road between the woods and an inclosure of 250 yards in breadth. We remained in this position for half an hour, during which time there was a brisk fire on our right. When the firing became general we were ordered to pull down the fence and advance into the field about 40 yards, when the enemy immediately advanced to the edge of the woods and opened fire on our whole front. At the same time a volley came from the woods on our left. We returned their fire briskly, and after holding our position for some time it became evident, from the destructive fire on our left, that they were endeavoring to flank us. As we could gain nothing from the position which we then occupied, we retired to the cover of the woods, where we retained our position, firing with good effect until our ammunition was nearly exhausted and we found ourselves again being flanked on our left. We then moved to the right into a clearing beyond the woods and took a position facing the enemy.

- At this point there was a slight cessation of the enemy's fire, and we judged that they were being re-enforced. It was then that I first learned that the lieutenant-colonel commanding (J. J. De Forest) had

* Embodied in return, p. 762.

been carried from the field badly wounded, and the major having been shot in the early part of the action, I, being senior captain, was in command of the regiment. I immediately took command, and not liking the position we then occupied (the enemy, having possession of the battery on our right, were shelling our position, while we had no means of retaliating), I ordered them to the rear of the camp of the Ninety-eighth Regiment. In this position we did some good execution, but our batteries in front having been captured by the enemy, and as we were in some danger of sharing the same fate, I ordered the men into the rifle pits on the right and in rear of the slashing in front of Couch's headquarters, from which we were afterwards driven by the overpowering numbers of the enemy.

Our loss, so far as positively known, is:

Killed	26
Wounded	90
Missing	22
Total	*138

Respectfully, &c.,

W. C. RAULSTON,
Captain, Commanding Eighty-first New York Vols.

Brigadier-General PALMER,
Commanding Third Brigade.

No. 99.

Report of Col. Jonathan S. Belknap, Eighty-fifth New York Infantry.

HDQRS. EIGHTY-FIFTH REGT. NEW YORK VOLTS.,
Camp near Seven Pines, Va., June 3, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit to you the following report of the part which the Eighty-fifth Regiment New York Volunteers took at the battle of Seven Pines, May 31:

According to an order received from you the regiment was placed in the rifle pits at the left of the redoubt, near General Casey's headquarters. Our fire was reserved until the regiments of this brigade sent out to the slashing in front of us had been driven back and three rebel regiments (afterward known to be Rodes' brigade) had advanced into the open field in front of us. We then delivered a continuous and deadly fire until they halted, wavered, and fell back. Their color-bearer was several times shot down, and when they retreated to the slashing they left their colors, with their dead and wounded.

Up to this point our loss was small and the men in the best of spirits and perfectly cool. If our flank had been properly protected we could have held our position.

About this time it became evident that the design of the enemy was to mass his forces on both our flanks and turn them. I dispatched a messenger to your headquarters to see what the rebel force in that direction was. He reported that the Eighty-first New York was being driven back by two regiments of the enemy, who were advancing toward your headquarters. The same messenger also reported that the rebel flag was planted on the rifle pits on the right of the redoubt,

* But see revised statement, p. 762.

near the Richmond road. The guns at the redoubt had been abandoned for fifteen minutes. We were thus completely flanked and could hope for no support, for there was not a regiment of our troops in sight. Under these circumstances I ordered my regiment to fall back to the road in front of our encampment. Being still desirous of holding our position as long as possible, and seeing the danger of being surrounded was not as great as I had supposed, I ordered the men into the rifle pits again. They obeyed with alacrity. We held our position fifteen minutes longer, and retired only under imminent danger of being surrounded. The rebel flag was then floating over your headquarters; also in the immediate vicinity of General Casey's headquarters, on our right. The heads of the flanking columns of the rebels having thus enveloped our lines, and being exposed to a very heavy cross-fire, I deemed it best to have the men fall back under the best cover they could find. A large portion of the regiment rallied in the first piece of woods in rear of our camp, under command of Captain Clark, and formed on the left of the Eighty-first. Deeming the position insecure, Captain Clark ordered the men to fall back to the first slashing and form near the rifle pits in front of Couch's division. At that time Major King took command and led this part of the regiment into the field in front of the rifle pits. What was done at this time I am unable to state. At the same time another portion of the regiment under charge of some of the line officers joined the Ninety-eighth. These advanced, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Durkee, through the woods at the left of the slashing, received one volley, and the whole retreated.

I collected the regiment about dark near its present encampment.

Almost without exception the line officers and men behaved well, but, getting scattered in the slashing, it was impossible to get the regiment together again.

During all the former part of the action there was the utmost coolness and confidence along the whole line, and the men fired with great precision, doing terrible execution.

Our loss, so far as ascertained during the day, was 10 killed, 58 wounded, &c.*

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

JONATHAN S. BELKNAP,
Colonel Eighty-fifth New York Volunteers.

Brig. Gen. I. N. PALMER,
Commanding Brigade.

* But see revised statement, p. 762.

No. 100.

Report of Lieut. Col. Charles Durkee, Ninety-eighth New York Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS NINETY-EIGHTH REGIMENT,
June 5, 1862.

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to report that on Saturday, May 31, the Ninety-eighth Regiment New York Volunteers was engaged in the battle that occurred on that day. The regiment was placed in advance of the fort, and maintained its ground until flanked by the enemy on both sides by a superior force, when we were compelled to retire. We immediately formed behind the rifle pits and remained there until our whole force gave way, when we retired to the woods and formed again, but suddenly finding ourselves again outflanked on the left we fell back through the woods, formed again, and advanced in line of battle toward the hottest of the fight. Our friends being in front of us, and the brush being so thick we could not distinguish between friend and foe, we did not prove so effective as desired. After remaining in that position about thirty minutes we retired from the field.

Our loss in killed, wounded, and missing is 70.*

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES DURKEE,

Lieut. Col., Comdg. Ninety-eighth Regt. New York Vols.

Brigadier-General PALMER.

No. 101.

Report of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia, and resulting correspondence.

RICHMOND, VA., June 24, 1862.

SIR: Before the 30th of May I had ascertained from trusty scouts that Keyes' corps was encamped on this side of the Chickahominy, near the Williamsburg road. On that day Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill reported a strong body immediately in his front. On receiving this report I determined to attack them next morning, hoping to be able to defeat Keyes' corps completely in its more advanced position before it could be re-enforced. Written orders were dispatched to Major-Generals Hill, Huger, and G. W. Smith. General Longstreet, being near my headquarters, received verbal instructions. The receipt of the orders was acknowledged. General Hill, supported by the division of General Longstreet (who had the direction of operations on the right), was to advance by the Williamsburg road to attack the enemy in front. General Huger, with his division, was to move down the Charles City road in order to attack in flank the troops who might be engaged with Hill and Longstreet, unless he found in his front force enough to occupy his division. General Smith was to march to the junction of the New Bridge road and Nine-mile road, to be in readiness either to fall on Keyes' right flank or to cover Longstreet's left. They were to move at daybreak. Heavy and protracted rains during the afternoon and night,

* But see revised statement, p. 762.

by swelling the stream of the Chickahominy, increased the probability of our having to deal with no other troops than those of Keyes. The same cause prevented the prompt and punctual movement of the troops. Those of Smith, Hill, and Longstreet were in position early enough, however, to be ready to commence operations by 8 a. m.

Major-General Longstreet, unwilling to make a partial attack, instead of the combined movement which had been planned, waited from hour to hour for General Huger's division. At length, at 2 p. m., he determined to attack without those troops. He accordingly commenced his advance at that hour, opening the engagement with artillery and skirmishers. By 3 o'clock it became close and heavy.

In the mean time I had placed myself on the left of the force employed in this attack with the division of General Smith, that I might be on a part of the field where I could observe and be ready to meet any counter-movements which the enemy's general might make against our center or left. Owing to some peculiar condition of the atmosphere the sound of the musketry did not reach us. I consequently deferred giving the signal for General Smith's advance until about 4 o'clock, at which time Maj. Jasper S. Whiting, of General Smith's staff, whom I had sent to learn the state of affairs with General Longstreet's column, returned, reporting that it was pressing on with vigor. Smith's troops were at once moved forward. The principal attack was made by Major-General Longstreet with his own and Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's divisions, the latter mostly in advance. Hill's brave troops, admirably commanded and most gallantly led, forced their way through the abatis, which formed the enemy's external defenses, and stormed their intrenchments by a determined and irresistible rush. Such was the manner in which the enemy's first line was carried. The operation was repeated with the same gallantry and success as our troops pursued their victorious career through the enemy's successive camps and intrenchments. At each new position they encountered fresh troops belonging to it and re-enforcements brought on from the rear. Thus they had to repel repeated efforts to retake works which they had carried, but their advance was never successfully resisted. Their onward movement was only staid by the coming of night. By night-fall they had forced their way to the Seven Pines, having driven the enemy back more than 2 miles through their own camps and from a series of intrenchments, and repelled every attempt to recapture them with great slaughter. The skill, vigor, and decision with which these operations were conducted by General Longstreet are worthy of the highest praise. He was worthily seconded by Major-General Hill, of whose conduct and courage he speaks in the highest terms.

Major-General Smith's division moved forward at 4 o'clock, Whiting's three brigades leading. Their progress was impeded by the enemy's skirmishers, which, with their supports, were driven back to the railroad. At this point Whiting's own and Pettigrew's brigades engaged a superior force of the enemy. Hood's, by my order, moved on to co-operate with Longstreet. General Smith was desired to hasten up with all the troops within reach. He brought up Hampton's and Hatton's brigades in a few minutes. The strength of the enemy's position, however, enabled him to hold it until dark.

About sunset, being struck from my horse severely wounded by a fragment of a shell, I was carried from the field, and Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith succeeded to the command.

He was prevented from renewing his attack on the enemy's position next morning by the discovery of strong intrenchments not seen on

the previous evening. His division bivouacked on the night of the 31st within musket-shot of the intrenchments which they were attacking, when darkness staid the conflict. The skill, energy, and resolution with which Major-General Smith directed his attack would have secured success if it could have been made an hour earlier. The troops of Longstreet and Hill passed the night of the 31st on the ground which they had won. The enemy was strongly re-enforced from the north side of the Chickahominy on the evening and night of the 31st. The troops engaged by General Smith were undoubtedly from the other side of the river.

On the morning of June 1 the enemy attacked the brigade of General Pickett, which was supported by that of General Pryor. The attack was vigorously repelled by these two brigades, the brunt of the action falling on General Pickett. This was the last demonstration made by the enemy. Our troops employed the residue in securing and bearing off the captured artillery, small-arms, and other property, and in the evening quietly returned to their own camps.

We took 10 pieces of artillery, 6,000 muskets, 1 garrison flag and 4 regimental colors, besides a large quantity of tents and camp equipage.

Major-General Longstreet reports the loss in his command as being about 3,000. Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith reports his loss at 1,283. Total, 4,283. That of the enemy is stated in their own newspapers to have exceeded 10,000, an estimate which is no doubt short of the truth.

Had Major-General Huger's division been in position and ready for action when those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill moved, I am satisfied that Keyes' corps would have been destroyed instead of being merely defeated. Had it gone into action even at 4 o'clock the victory would have been much more complete.

Major-Generals Smith and Longstreet speak in high terms of the conduct of their superior and staff officers. I beg leave to ask the attention of the Government especially to the manner in which Brigadier-Generals Whiting and R. H. Anderson, and Colonels Jenkins, Kemper, and Hampton, exercising commands above their grades, and Brigadier-General Rodas, are mentioned.

This and the captured colors will be delivered by Maj. A. H. Cole, of my staff. I have been prevented by feebleness from making this report sooner, and am still too weak to make any but a very imperfect one.

Your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON,
General.

General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.

P. S.—Several hundred prisoners were taken, but I have received no report of the number.

RICHMOND, VA., *September 20, 1862.*

General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON:

GENERAL: I beg to refer you to my letter* of the 20th ultimo. I have waited one month, and no reply has been received from General Longstreet. As you have indorsed his erroneous statements, to my injury, I must hold you responsible, and desire to know from you if

* Not found, but see indorsement on Longstreet's report, p. 942.

you have any reason to believe an answer will be made by General Longstreet. You must perceive that by postponing an answer your published report is allowed to go down to history as true. I cannot conceive that you desire to perpetrate such an injustice, for though it may ruin me, it cannot redound to your credit. If you will investigate the case I am sure you will discover the errors of your report and correct them; but if I am thus to suffer by sixty and ninety days' delay, I must claim a court at once. I send you herewith an abstract of such parts of your report as refer to my division, with my remarks annexed, to which I invite your attention.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJ. HUGER,
Major-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,
Richmond, Va., October 2, 1862.

General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, *Richmond, Va.:*

GENERAL: I have the honor to inclose for your attention copies of a letter addressed to the President by General Huger and of the indorsement made thereon by the President.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War.

[Inclosure.]

RICHMOND, VA., *September 22, 1862.*

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War:

SIR: I inclose a communication for the President, which I request you to lay before him. I am aware at this moment he has little opportunity to attend to any individual, but trust he will at his earliest leisure give it his consideration.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJ. HUGER,
Major-General.

[Sub-inclosures.]

RICHMOND, VA., *September 21, 1862.*

His Excellency the PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES:

SIR: I send you herewith an extract of such portions of General J. E. Johnston's published report of the battle of Seven Pines as refers to my division, with my remarks appended. As General Johnston does not seem disposed to investigate the subject, and shields himself by endeavoring to make General Longstreet responsible for his statements, I have to request that you direct General Johnston to prefer charges against me for the negligences he attributes to me, and we then be examined by a court-martial. If this cannot be done, I ask a court of inquiry to examine into the facts. I am entitled to this protection to my reputation and this justice to the troops I command.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJ. HUGER,
Major-General.

[Indorsement.]

SEPTEMBER 28, 1862.

Secretary of War will communicate a copy of this application to General Johnston, that he may, if he chooses to do so, put his statement in the exact form of charges and specifications, and should he decline to adopt that course the request of General Huger, presented as an alternative, will be granted, and a court of inquiry ordered as soon as the state of the public service will permit.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Extracts of such portions of General J. E. Johnston's report of the battle of Seven Pines as refer to Major-General [Huger's] division, with General Huger's remarks.

* * * * *

General Hill, supported by the division of General Longstreet, who had the direction of operations upon the right, was to advance by the Williamsburg road to attack the enemy in front. General Huger, with his division, was to move down the Charles City road in order to attack in flank the troops who might be engaged with Hill and Longstreet, unless he found in his front force enough to occupy his division.

* * * * *

Heavy and protracted rains during the afternoon and night, by swelling the stream of the Chickahominy, increased the probability of our having to deal with no other troops than those of Keyes. The same cause prevented the prompt and punctual movement of our troops. Those of Smith, Hill, and Longstreet were in position early enough, however, to commence operations by 8 a. m.

Major-General Longstreet, unwilling to make a partial attack, instead of the combined movement which had been planned, waited from hour to hour for General Huger's division. At length, at 2 p. m., he determined to attack without those troops. He accordingly commenced his advance at that hour, opening the engagement with artillery and skirmishers.

* * * * *

Had Major-General Huger's division been in position and ready for action when those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill moved, I am satisfied that Keyes' corps would have been destroyed instead of merely defeated. (See Longstreet's report.) Had it gone into action even at 4 o'clock the victory would have been much more complete.

REMARKS.

Appended hereto are the instructions—two letters from General Johnston to Major-General Huger. No mention is made in them that General Longstreet had the direction of operations upon the right, and it will be seen from these letters that the plan of attack was not communicated to him. He, the senior officer present, was deprived of the position due to his rank and kept in ignorance of the troops he was to act with. General Longstreet's troops were not in position to commence operations by 8 a. m., and General Longstreet makes no mention of the delay by the rain of the previous night. When General Longstreet's troops moved to support General Hill's attack, General Huger's division moved down the Charles City road at the same time with three brigades of General Longstreet's division. This report con-

veys the impression that the brigades of General Huger's division were not present at all, whereas they moved to their position with three brigades of General Longstreet's division. This statement is not sustained by the above facts.

To the last paragraph I have only to say that if it did not go into action by 4 o'clock it was because General Longstreet did not require it, as it was in position and awaiting his orders. Four of the brigades had been sent for and did go into action on Saturday afternoon—three of Longstreet's and one of Huger's. The other two were in position and could have gone if ordered. The whole report ignores the presence of the troops of Huger's division at any part of the action.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
May 30, 1862—8.40 p. m.

Major-General HUGER :

GENERAL : The reports of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill give me the impression that the enemy is in considerable strength in his front. It seems to me necessary that we should increase our force also. For that object I wish to concentrate the troops of your division on the Charles City road and concentrate the troops of Major-General Hill on that to Williamsburg. To do this it will be necessary for you to move as early in the morning as possible to relieve the brigade of General Hill's division now on the Charles City road. I have desired General Hill to send you a guide. The road is the second large one diverging to the right from the Williamsburg road; the first turns off near the toll-gate. On reaching your position on the Charles City road learn at once the routes to the main roads to Richmond on your right and left, especially those to the left, and try to find guides. Be ready, if an action should be begun on your left, to fall upon the enemy's left flank.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON,
General.

P. S.—It is important to move very early.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
May 31, 1862.

Major-General HUGER :

GENERAL : I fear that in my note of last evening, of which there is no copy, I was too positive on the subject of your attacking the enemy's left flank. It will, of course, be necessary for you to know what force is before you first. I hope to be able to have that ascertained for you by cavalry. As our main force will be on your left, it will be necessary for your progress to the front to conform at first to that of General Hill. If you find no strong body in your front, it will be well to aid General Hill; but then a strong reserve should be retained to cover our right.

Yours, truly,

J. E. JOHNSTON,
General.

RICHMOND, VA., October 4, 1862.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH, *Secretary of War* :

SIR : I have just had the honor to receive your letter of the 2d instant.

I have no disposition to prefer charges against Major-General Huger. The passage in my report of which he complains was written to show that the delay in commencing the action of May 31 was not by my fault. Permit me to suggest that there can be no full investigation of this matter without Major-General Longstreet's participation.

Major-General Huger's assertion that I "shield myself by endeavoring to make General Longstreet responsible for my statements" is utterly unfounded. He certainly knows that I cannot contradict that officer's report unless upon weight of evidence against it. He makes no material contradiction of what I said of his troops. I say or imply that they arrived after 4 p. m.; he, that they reached the "designated point" before 4 o'clock.

As to investigation, General Huger knows that his own course has made any other than that which has been had impracticable. He knew that for several weeks after he read my report General Longstreet was near Richmond, yet he did not address me on the subject in question until after that officer had joined the army in Northern Virginia. When so addressed I wrote immediately, which General Huger did also. General Longstreet has lately replied to his letter.

I hope that the President will do me the favor to read the last two paragraphs.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON,
General.

[Indorsement.] •

OCTOBER 9, 1862.

TO SECRETARY OF WAR:

It may be that the expected answer of General Longstreet will enable General Johnston to relieve General Huger of the grievance as presented by the latter. Should it be otherwise, his request for a court of inquiry will be complied with as soon as the state of the service will permit.

J. D.

No. 102.

Reports of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Right Wing.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING, *June 10, 1862.*

MAJOR: Agreeably to verbal instructions from the commanding general, the division of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill was on the morning of the 31st ultimo formed at an early hour on the Williamsburg road as the column of attack upon the enemy's front on that road. A brigade was placed on each side of the road to advance to the attack, and each was supported by one of the other brigades of the same division. In advance of each of the columns of attack a regiment as skirmishers were deployed. The plan for the forward movement was that fields should be passed by a flank movement of the regiment of skirmishers, and the woods in front, once in our possession, the brigades were to advance rapidly, occupy them, and move rapidly forward. Abatis and intrenched positions were ordered to be taken by a flank movement of

the brigades or brigade in front of them, the skirmishers engaging the sharpshooters and the supporting brigade occupying the position of the brigades during the flank movement. The division of Major-General Huger was intended to make a strong flank movement around the left of the enemy's position and attack him in rear of that flank. This division did not get into position, however, in time for any such attack, and I was obliged to send three of my small brigades on the Charles City road to support the one of Major-General Huger's which had been ordered to protect my right flank.

After waiting some six hours for these troops to get into position I determined to move forward without regard to them, and gave orders to that effect to Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill.

The forward movement began about 2 o'clock, and our skirmishers soon became engaged with those of the enemy. The entire division of General Hill became engaged about 3 o'clock, and drove the enemy steadily back, gaining possession of his abatis and part of his intrenched camp; General Rodes, by a movement to the right, driving in the enemy's left.

The only re-enforcements on the field in hand were my own brigades, of which Anderson's, Wilcox's, and Kemper's were put in by the front on the Williamsburg road, and Colston's and Pryor's by my right flank; Colston's just in time to turn the enemy's flank. At the same time the decided and gallant attack made by the other brigades gained entire possession of the enemy's position, with his artillery, camp equipage, &c. Anderson's brigade, under Colonel Jenkins, pressing forward rapidly, continued to drive the enemy until night-fall.

The severest part of the work was done by Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's division, but the attack of the two brigades under General R. H. Anderson—one commanded by Colonel Kemper (now brigadier general), the other by Col. M. Jenkins—was made with such spirit and regularity as to have driven back the most determined foe. This decided the day in our favor.

General Pickett's brigade was held in reserve. General Pryor's did not succeed in getting upon the field of Saturday in time to take part in the action of the 31st. Both, however, shared in repulsing a serious attack upon our position on Sunday, the 1st instant, Pickett's brigade bearing the brunt of the attack and repulsing it.

Some of the brigades of Major-General Huger's division took part in defending our position on Sunday, but, being fresh at the work, did not show the same steadiness and determination as the troops of Hill's division and my own.

I have reason to believe that the affair would have been a complete success had the troops upon the right been put in position within eight hours of the proper time. The want of promptness on that part of the field and the consequent severe struggle in my front so greatly reduced my supply of ammunition, that at the late hour of the move on the left I was unable to make the rush necessary to relieve that attack.

Besides the good effect produced by driving back such heavy masses of the enemy, we have made superior soldiers of several brigades that were entirely fresh and unreliable. There can scarcely be a doubt about our ability to overcome the enemy upon any fair field.

The conduct of the attack was left entirely to Major-General Hill. The entire success of the affair is sufficient evidence of his ability, courage, and skill. I refer you to his report for particular mention of the conduct of his officers and soldiers. I will mention Brigadier-General Rodes, of that division, as distinguished for coolness, ability,

and determination. He made one of the most important and decisive movements on the field and held his command some hours after receiving a severe wound.

My own troops have been so often tried and distinguished on other fields that they need no praise from my lips. A truer, better body of men never marched upon a battle-field. I will mention, however, as distinguished for their usual gallantry and ability, Generals R. H. Anderson, C. M. Wilcox, George E. Pickett, R. E. Colston, and Roger A. Pryor, and Colonels Kemper and Jenkins (commanding brigades), Corse, Winston, Funsten, and Sydenham Moore, the latter twice shot, once severely wounded.

I desire also to mention the conspicuous courage and energy of Capt. James Dearing, of the Lynchburg Artillery, and his officers and men. His pieces were served under the severest fire, as his serious loss will attest. Captain Carter, of General Hill's division, also displayed great gallantry and skill in the management of his battery.

Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, in the absence of any opportunity to use his cavalry, was of material service by his presence with me on the field.

My personal staff—Majrs. G. M. Sorrel, J. W. Fairfax, P. T. Manning, and Capts. Thomas Goree, Thomas Walton, and my young aide Lieutenant Blackwell—have my kind thanks for their activity, zeal, and intelligence in carrying orders and the proper discharge of their duties.

Captain Walton was slightly wounded.

I am also indebted to General Wigfall and Col. P. T. Moore, volunteer aides, for assistance in rallying troops and conveying orders during the battle of the 31st ultimo and 1st instant.

Captain Ochiltree, of the Adjutant-General's Department, joined me on the 1st instant, and kindly aided in carrying orders during the several assaults made by the enemy on that day. I am also indebted to Col. R. H. Chilton for material aid.

Dr. J. S. D. Cullen, surgeon in chief, and the officers of his department kindly and untiringly devoted themselves to the wounded. They have none of the chances of distinction of other officers, but discharge the most important duties. I refer to his report for the conduct of the officers of his department.

Detailed reports of the major-generals, brigadiers, and other commanders and chiefs of staff have been called for and will be forwarded as soon as received.

Our loss in valuable officers and men has been severe. Colonels Giles (Fifth South Carolina), Jones (Twelfth Alabama), and Lomax (Third Alabama) fell at the head of their commands, gallantly leading them to victory.

Three hundred and forty-seven prisoners, 10 pieces of artillery, 5,000 small-arms, 1 garrison, and several regimental standards were taken.

A rough estimate of the loss on this part of the field may be put at 3,000 killed and wounded. The loss on the part of the enemy may be put at a much higher figure, inasmuch as he was driven from his positions, and some half dozen attempts to recover them were successfully repulsed.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES LONGSTREET,
Major-General, Commanding.

[Indorsement.]

RICHMOND, VA., *August 10, 1862.*

I received this day the within report. I applied for it on July 26, but could not obtain it till this date. It is respectfully returned, with my objections to its being received as the proper report of that battle:

1st. General Longstreet was not the senior officer present. We met on duty, and I inquired of him if he knew which was the senior, as I did not. He replied that he was. I told him if he knew it that was sufficient. But General Longstreet was mistaken, and the statement that he was the senior was erroneous. I was the senior.

2d. The whole of the remarks of the delay of my division are erroneous. There was a delay owing to the sudden rising of the stream on which the troops were encamped. General Longstreet's division got the road at the crossing first and my troops had to wait until they had passed. The delay after that was the time necessary to cross. I regretted the delay as much as any one and did all in my power to expedite the movement.

3d. His statement, "I have reason to believe that the affair would have been a complete success had the troops upon the right been put in position within eight hours of the proper time," is a gross error. If the proper time was 4 a. m. the troops were eight hours late, but under the circumstances that was impossible. The "proper time" is a vague expression. The idea of gross or criminal negligence is conveyed, but not proved. If he had said "possible time," there might have been some delay that greater exertion or better management would have avoided, but none other.

4th. I have applied to General Longstreet to correct the errors he has made, and desire he may have time to do so.

BENJ. HUGER,
Major-General.

List of killed, wounded, and missing [in General Longstreet's command] May 31 and June 1, 1862.

	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Aggregate.
Killed	61	755	816
Wounded	209	3, 530	3, 739
Missing	3	293	296
Total	273	4, 578	4, 851

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING,
June 11, 1862.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES LONGSTREET,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. THOMAS G. RHETT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 103.

Report of Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding division.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION, — —, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the part taken by my division in the battle of Seven Pines, on May 31 and June 1:

Two of my brigades (that of Garland and that of Rodes) were sent out on picket duty a few days before the battle. Garland guarded the Williamsburg road, while Rodes defended the Charles City road. Both of these officers made armed reconnaissances by my order and under my personal supervision. These reconnaissances satisfied me that the enemy was not in force on the Charles City road, but was on the Williamsburg road, and that he had fortified himself about the Seven Pines. The fact was further established that the whole of Keyes' corps had crossed the Chickahominy.

These facts I communicated to General Johnston about noon on Friday, May 30. I received a prompt answer from him, saying that, being satisfied by my report of the presence of the enemy in force in my immediate front, he had resolved to attack him, and directed me to serve with Major-General Longstreet and under his orders.

I was directed by General Longstreet to move with my whole division at dawn on the Williamsburg road and to lead the attack on the Yankees. I was, however, directed not to move until relieved by Huger's division.

The relieving force not having reached me at 1 o'clock, the signal guns were fired, and my division moved off in fine style, Rodes' brigade on the right of the road, supported by Rains' brigade; Garland on the left, supported by G. B. Anderson. Each wing was preceded by a regiment deployed as skirmishers. Having been long delayed in waiting for the relieving force, the right wing did not advance for a quarter of an hour after the left. This exposed Garland and Anderson to the whole Yankee force. The right wing was hurried forward and came up handsomely, preserving the line, although wading through the mud and water in places 2 or 3 feet deep. I now detached General Rains, to make a wide flank movement to take the Yankee works in reverse, while Rodes moved steadily to the front. Before he (Rodes) reached the Yankee abatis Garland and Anderson had captured a 2-gun battery, enfilading the road. A heavy column of re-enforcements was now coming up to the assistance of the Yankee general (Casey), commanding at Seven Pines. Having previously put the battery of Bondurant in position, I now brought up that of Carter, which opened just at the critical moment. The Yankee column was almost in musket-range of the gallant Col. William Smith, Forty-ninth Virginia, and his noble regiment. The Yankees came up as on a parade day, until Carter's shot and shell began to play among them, when they broke and sought shelter in the woods. An animated artillery duel now began between Carter's four guns and six Yankee guns. General Rains had now gained the rear of the Yankee redoubt and opened fire on the infantry posted in the woods. I now noticed commotion in the camps and redoubts, and indications of evacuating the position. Rodes took skillful advantage of this commotion, and moved up his brigade in beautiful order and took possession of the redoubts and rifle pits. So rapid was the advance that six pieces were abandoned by the Yankees. These Rodes had turned upon the retreating column with effect. Carter galloped up with his pieces, and these, with the captured guns, suc-

cessfully repulsed an attempt of fresh Yankee troops to recapture the works.

We had now captured eight pieces of artillery, the camp, tents, and stores of a brigade, and had successfully driven the Yankees back $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles forcing them to abandon a wide skirt of abatis, rifle pits, and redoubts. My division had beaten Casey's division and all the re-enforcements brought him, and had driven him and his supports into the woods and swamps. It was desirable, however, to press the Yankees as closely as possible. I therefore sent back to General Longstreet and asked for another brigade. In a few minutes the magnificent brigade of R. H. Anderson came to my support. A portion of this force, under Colonel Jenkins, consisting of the Palmetto Sharpshooters and the Sixth South Carolina, was sent on the extreme left to scour along the railroad and Nine-mile road, and thus get in rear of the enemy, while a portion, under General Anderson in person, was sent on the immediate left of the redoubt, into the woods, where the Yankees had hid after being repulsed by the fire of Carter's battery and the captured guns, under the direction of General Rodes. The Yankees permitted General R. H. Anderson to get within a few yards of them, when they opened a murderous fire upon him from their cover in the woods. His heroes replied with interest, and some guns, which were brought to enfilade the Yankee lines, added to their confusion, and they were soon in full retreat. They were hotly pursued, and R. H. Anderson and Jenkins, assisted by portions of G. B. Anderson's brigade, of my division, swept on the left of the road, driving brigade after brigade of the Yankees before them, capturing two more cannon, several camps, with their commissary and quartermaster's stores, and finally, after dark, halting more than a mile beyond the main works of the Yankees at Seven Pines.

While this was going on Dearing's battery had been sent up by General Longstreet, and rendered important service during the day, the officers and men behaving most heroically. I now resolved to drive the Yankees out of the woods on the right of the road, where they were still in strong force. General Rains was near them, and a written order was carried him by my adjutant to move farther to the right. I regret that that gallant and meritorious officer did not advance farther in that direction. He would have taken the Yankees in flank, and the direct attack of Rodes in front would have been less bloody. The magnificent brigade of Rodes moved over the open ground to assault the Yankees, strongly posted in the woods. He met a most galling fire, and his advance was checked. A portion of his command met with a disastrous repulse. Kemper's brigade was now sent me by General Longstreet, and directed by me to move directly to the support of Rodes. This brigade, however, did not engage the Yankees, and Rodes' men were badly cut up. By night-fall, nevertheless, the Yankees were driven out of the woods, and we held undisputed possession of all the ground a mile around and in advance of the redoubt, which had been the object of the struggle. The remaining brigades of General Longstreet—Pickett's, Wilcox's, Pryor's, and Colston's—reported to me for orders that night.

The tents and commissariat of the Yankee general (Casey) were found to be in excellent condition, and we all fared well that night. The result of the day had been most cheering. My division, weakened by one brigade, and numbering less than 9,000 men, had driven the Yankees $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles and captured their stronghold; and when it had been strengthened by two more brigades the Yankees were driven a

mile farther in, and prisoners were taken from three divisions. We had, therefore, fought with the odds against us of two to one in numbers, and this disparity rendered more formidable by abatis and earth-works.

At daylight next morning I learned that heavy re-enforcements had come up to the support of Keyes. Longstreet's, Huger's, and my own divisions had opposed to us three Yankee corps—Keyes', Sumner's, and Heintzelman's. We also learned that General G. W. Smith had been checked upon the Nine-mile road, and that no help could be expected in that direction. I therefore resolved to concentrate my troops around the captured works, in the hope that the Yankees would attempt to retake them. Orders were accordingly given to the advance brigades, commanded by Pickett, Pryor, and Wilcox, to draw in their extended lines and form near the late headquarters of General Casey.

Before these orders were received a furious attack was made upon Generals Armistead, Mahone, Pickett, Pryor, and Wilcox, and their brigades on the left of the road. Armistead's men fled early in the action, with the exception of a few heroic companies, with which that gallant officer maintained his ground against an entire brigade. Mahone withdrew his brigade without any orders. I sent up Colston's to replace him, but he did not engage the Yankees, as I expected him to do. Pickett, Pryor, and Wilcox received their orders to fall back after the firing began, and wisely resolved not to do so until the assault was repulsed. As soon as that was done Wilcox and Pryor withdrew, but Pickett held his ground against the odds of ten to one for several hours longer, and only retired when the Yankees had ceased to annoy him. The Yankees were too prudent to attack us in position, and contented themselves for the balance of the day in a desultory fire of artillery, which hurt no one, and was only attended with the gratifying result of stampeding the amateur fighters and the camp plunderers from Richmond.

The batteries of Maurin, Stribling, and Watson had been added to those of the preceding day by General Longstreet, and an occasional shot was fired in response to the Yankee artillery.

The day was spent in removing 6,700 muskets and rifles in fine condition, ordnance, commissary, and medical stores. Ten captured guns had been removed the night before. As the Yankees occupied the ground in our rear, on the Nine-mile road, General Longstreet sent me an order after dark to withdraw my whole command.

The thirteen brigades were not got together until near midnight, and the delicate operation of withdrawing 30,000 men in the presence of a superior force of the enemy had to be performed before daylight. The artillery and wagons had to pass through slushes and mud-holes over their axles, and the whole road was almost impassable for infantry. Nevertheless, we regained our own intrenchments by sunrise without leaving behind a gun, caisson, wagon, or even a straggling soldier.

The officers and men of other divisions who especially distinguished themselves will be appropriately noticed by their own commanders. It will only be expected of me to call attention to gallantry and good conduct among my own men.

Generals Garland, G. B. Anderson, and Rodes, of my division, who led the attack in front, did all that brave and skillful officers could possibly do.

The flank attack of General Rains was most opportune and important. General Garland, when his brigade was not actually engaged, reported to me with his aide and adjutant to serve in my staff. In that

capacity he rendered the most valuable services, and was much exposed. His adjutant, Meem, was killed, and his aide, Halsey, severely wounded near me. I had frequent occasion to notice the gallant bearing of these two officers.

All the regimental commanders acquitted themselves with great credit. Colonel Jones, of the Twelfth Alabama, left a sick bed to find a bloody grave on the battle-field. He was one of the very best officers and purest men in the army.

The company, as well as the regimental officers, deserve the highest praise, and the rank and file fought with a gallantry never surpassed. It is seldom that even veteran troops will endure a greater loss than one-fourth, but these noble fellows marched steadily on after one-third of their number had been struck down. The heroism shown at Seven Pines has had a most wonderful influence upon the subsequent battles around Richmond. After this decisive victory, under such disadvantageous circumstances, not a brigade in the ranks seemed to entertain the remotest doubt of our ultimate success over the besieging army of Yankees.

It is due to my gallant division to say that the great majority of the men had never before been in battle, and yet they infused a spirit into the whole army which told with powerful effect in all the subsequent engagements, ending in the total rout of McClellan.

My thanks are especially due to all of my staff, who were active, brave, and efficient. Majors Hatchford, assistant adjutant-general, and Pierson, chief of artillery; Captain Tayloe, inspector-general, and Lieutenants West, aide-de-camp; Lee, engineer officer, and Moore and Fitzhugh, volunteer aides, were in all parts of the field, and, more or less, all had personal marks of exposure. Lieutenant West had two horses killed under him and a third wounded. Several of the others had their clothes perforated by balls.

Sergeant Harmilin and his detachment of couriers were active and faithful. Courier Braden and the two Chamblins were specially distinguished. The sergeant had his horse killed under him and was himself wounded.

Two of my batteries, under Hardaway and Nelson, were left behind in our intrenchments. These gallant officers would have been worthy compeers on the field of Carter and Bondurant.

Appended is a list of the killed and wounded.* From this it appears that of the less than 9,000 taken into action nearly 3,000 were struck down. The loss was principally in the three brigades which made the front attack. Rains' brigade, which executed the flank movement, suffered but little in comparison.

The gallant charge of my division demoralized the Yankees, and our re-enforcements were not hotly engaged; the succor brought to Casey not fighting so well as his own men. This accounts for the fact that more than half of the entire loss in the two days' fight fell upon my division.

With great respect,

D. H. HILL,
Major-General.

Major-General LONGSTREET.

* Not found.

No. 104.

Report of Col. M. Jenkins, Palmetto Sharpshooters, commanding brigade.

HEADQUARTERS PALMETTO SHARPSHOOTERS,
—, 1862.

SIR: Having been placed in command of the brigade prior to getting under fire, by General Anderson's being charged with the control of three brigades, and though for a time detached with my regiment for a special service, yet from the circumstances of the fight, being called on during nearly the whole time we were under fire to control and direct the movements, first of two regiments, then of three, and afterward, for a short time, of four, I find it difficult to make, as I am called on to do, a detailed report of my own regiment only, as my attention and thoughts were directed to their combined movements as well as to the conduct of my own.

When Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill called for a regiment from the brigade to take one of the enemy's batteries, mine having been designated, I with it, and guided by Col. George B. Anderson to the left of the Twenty-eighth Georgia (one of his regiments), took position against a small abatis, with my left company deployed near the York River Railroad and my right adjacent to the Twenty-eighth Georgia. Col. John Bratton, with the Sixth South Carolina Volunteers, having afterward come up, took position on the right of the Twenty-eighth Georgia, and an advance being concerted, the regiments moved forward across the abatis under fire. Not being able, on account of the thick undergrowth, to see the enemy, I moved my regiment forward without firing and with fixed bayonets. A continuation of the forward movement brought the Sixth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers and my own together, shutting out the Twenty-eighth Georgia to the rear. The colonel of that regiment having asked a position with us, I directed him to the right of Bratton's regiment. Our advance was now continued, with little or no opposition, through the enemy's camp and across a neighborhood road leading to [the] railroad. Here the lines were halted and dressed, my left company called in, and at this time, seeing General Richard H. Anderson, I reported to him. His instructions being to advance, we went forward to the second abatis, a very heavy and difficult one to pass. At this point, the railroad being open to view and some of the enemy being seen to our left and front, I threw out as skirmishers to feel it Captain Colclough's company, and having allowed sufficient time to discover their presence, I advanced my regiment through the abatis under a very heavy fire, which was repaid with interest after crossing. Finding after crossing that the Sixth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers and mine were isolated, I instructed Colonel Bratton to keep his left touching to my right; and the enemy's line, after a stubborn resistance, having given way to our attack, I perceived that we had pierced his line, and having dressed the line, I executed, under fire from the right front, a change of front obliquely forward on right company. Directing the two regiments forward in line, we drove the enemy to the front and right, passing over their second camp and through a swamp.

At this point the enemy, heavily re-enforced, made a desperate stand, and our fighting was within 75 yards. Not pausing even to load, and pouring in my volleys at close range as I advanced, I never allowed a broken line to get through their new lines before I pushed on the new line and drove them back, losing heavily myself, but killing numbers of the enemy. Our advance continued in this steady manner, the enemy

steadily giving back. The ranks of the enemy having broken to our right and front and the fire having lessened, I halted the lines, dressed them, and then changed front obliquely forward.

Following the retreating enemy either fresh troops or heavy re-enforcements met us, and in front of their third camp offered us battle with greatly superior numbers. Without pausing our lines moved on him, and our steady advance was not to be resisted. After a most obstinate resistance and terrible slaughter the enemy gave back to our left and right across the Williamsburg road, about a mile or more from General Casey's headquarters. Following the latter and heavier body, they were again re-enforced and took position in a wood parallel and about 300 yards on the right of the Williamsburg road. With the Sixth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers and six companies of my regiment in line in the bed of the Williamsburg road and with five companies sweeping the remnant of the enemy who had retired to our left, I was fired upon by our battery near General Casey's headquarters, the fire enfilading my line in the road and leading me to believe that I had gotten too far in the enemy's rear; but on sending notice of my position to General D. H. Hill the fire was stopped. By this time my left five companies had gained the road. The fire from our battery rendered me uncertain as to the location of my command; but at this moment Maj. William Anderson, then commanding my regiment, reported to me a heavy column of the enemy advancing on me by the Williamsburg road, and being then engaged with superior numbers in my front and not wishing to retire, I determined to break the enemy in front before I could be reached by this new advance, and then by a change of front to meet them.

I sent my adjutant, Captain Seabrook, to get re-enforcements either from General Anderson or General Hill, and ordering Major William Anderson to fight the advance of the column on the Williamsburg road with my left two companies (Kilpatrick's and Martin's), I carried forward swiftly and steadily my line against the enemy. Having to pass across an open field on this advance I lost heavily, but succeeded in routing and dispersing the enemy in my front, driving them at least a quarter of a mile; then, gathering my men promptly, and finding out from Lieut. Col. J. M. Steedman, who was then in command of the Sixth (Colonel Bratton having been wounded), that one of his men had reported the Fifth South Carolina Volunteers as being in our rear at the enemy's trenches, which they had taken in gallant style, I dispatched Adjutant Gaillard, of the Sixth, to order the regiment forward as rapidly as possible.

In the mean while, Maj. William Anderson advancing down the Williamsburg road and firing upon the enemy's advanced skirmishers, they retired to the advancing column, and in the momentary check gave me time to make my dispositions to meet them. Having dressed the lines, I moved by the flank, under cover of the wood to avoid the fire of our battery to the left of the Williamsburg road, and took up line of battle oblique to the road and to the left, so as to present front at once to the enemy's advance by the road and to any rallied party that might recover from my last attack. I had formed my line of battle in the manner indicated for want of numbers to occupy a position I preferred, facing the enemy coming on the Williamsburg road, but Captain Seabrook, my adjutant, who had been sent to General Anderson for re-enforcements, reported to me the Twenty-eighth Georgia [was] about 300 yards to my rear, and I sent him to bring them up at the double-quick.

During this time we had evidence of the near approach of the enemy

by hearing their words of command and their cheers. I should have said that in my advance I had passed the enemy's artillery in two positions—in their second camp two pieces and in the Williamsburg road one piece and two caissons—but so closely were we on the heels of their troops that they could not use them upon us.

In taking up my last line I had detailed a party under my acting major (Capt. J. W. Goss) to withdraw the latter piece of artillery, and at this moment he came up and reported the enemy in line of battle, advancing at the double-quick. Strengthened by the nearness of support I advanced my line toward them also at the double-quick, and assumed a position perpendicular to the Williamsburg road in the open field along the crest of a hill, the woods immediately in front, and the enemy in line about 100 yards distant. The Twenty-eighth Georgia was placed on the right, touching to the road, my regiment, formerly on right, now in center, and the Sixth Regiment on left. The enemy poured in a heavy fire on my right eight companies, and the Twenty-eighth Georgia, their right opposite my left, and the Sixth South Carolina Volunteers, being separated by a dense swamp, not firing, the supporting regiment, under a terrible fire, gave back, notwithstanding the gallant efforts of its adjutant and color-bearer, who halted and refused to move. The enemy, encouraged, redoubled his fire on my right, cheered and advanced, and I determined to meet him. In prompt obedience the two regiments rose from their knees, from whence they had been firing upon the enemy with decided effect, and resumed their old, steady advance, firing full in the face of the foe. The two lines neared each other to 30 or 40 yards, and now the left of my regiment and the Sixth South Carolina Volunteers, passing the swamp, came full upon the enemy's right. Losing heavily, I pressed on, and the enemy sullenly and slowly gave way, leaving the ground carpeted with dead and dying. Driving them in this way, we had advanced some 200 or 300 yards, the enemy getting more and more disordered and beginning to break badly. By this time Lieut. Col. A. Jackson, in command of the Fifth South Carolina Volunteers (Colonel Giles having been killed), received my message, and in prompt response came up at the double-quick. The Twenty-eighth Georgia, seeing re-enforcements, rallied and came forward, forming on my right. Jackson, giving to the right, came up on their right, sweeping before him the rallied fragments who had collected and resumed fire from the woods to the right, and thus at 7.40 p. m. we closed our busy day, the last seen of the enemy being his broken and disordered squads of from 5 to 20, visible for one-half mile over an extensive wheat field.

Hearing on the railroad to my left the noise of troops I sent the Fifth South Carolina Volunteers to my left, but we were not disturbed, and night having settled upon the field, I posted in this extreme position, with instructions to throw out pickets, the Nineteenth Mississippi Regiment, which (guided by my commissary, Captain Dick, acting as my aide) had been sent me by General R. H. Anderson and had now arrived. I retired the other regiments to the enemy's camp in rear, where we reposed for the night, my regiment sleeping in the camp of the Tenth Massachusetts Volunteers; and having reported to General R. H. Anderson, under his instructions made arrangements for the night, and sent out details to bring in the wounded and arms, &c.

In this fight I cannot [but] allow myself to speak of the gallantry and good conduct of my men, as well as those of the other regiments of our brigade who fought with us. I was nobly seconded by my major, William Anderson, and received great assistance from my adjutant,

Captain Seabrook, and commissary, Captain Dick; as also Captain Love, commissary of the Sixth Regiment, who acted as my aide when placed in charge of the brigade and continued with me during the battle. Captain Love was wounded and the other aides had their horses shot.

My officers did their duty promptly and very efficiently, encouraging and leading their men and carrying out my orders with intelligence and spirit. To them I attribute the prompt obedience which rendered success certain.

I must also say that I received most intelligent and ready assistance at all times from the officers commanding regiments fighting with us.

We passed in our march through two abatis of fallen timber, over four camps, and artillery twice, driving the enemy from three pieces. We never fought twice in the same place nor five minutes in one place, and, steadily on the advance, were under fire from 3 p. m. to 7.40 p. m. The service we did will be evidenced by our list of killed and wounded; and I would remark that, although fighting within 100 yards nearly the whole time, there was a remarkable disproportion of killed to wounded, the enemy's aim being disconcerted by our steady advance.

In my two color companies, out of 80 men who entered 40 were killed and wounded, and out of 11 in the color guard 10 were shot down, and my colors, pierced by nine balls, passed through four hands without touching the ground.

Captain Colelough's company, which had been deployed early in the fight to feel the enemy to our left and front, after remaining on the railroad met and took prisoners two companies of the enemy who had been on picket, and with his company—aggregate, 47—took 1 captain, 5 lieutenants, and 133 privates with Enfield rifles in their hands.

Although I may not notice particular instances of gallantry where all did their duty, yet to my gallant wounded and lamented dead I must add a tribute. The wounded gave no groans of anguish as the fatal blow was received, and instead of asking to be carried from the field encouraged their comrades to press on. The dying fell with their faces to the foe, all seeming actuated by a spirit like that of the noble Captain Carpenter, who advanced by my colors until his gallant little band of 28 dwindled to 12 and ever in their front, when the fatal ball pierced his heart turned to his company and, in words fit to be the last of a dying hero and patriot, said, "Boys, I am killed, but you press on!" then yielded up his spirit to the cause.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. JENKINS,

Colonel Palmetto Sharpshooters.

Capt. R. P. CRITTENDEN,

Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., Second Brigade, Second Division.

No. 105.

Report of Col. George B. Anderson, Fourth North Carolina Infantry, commanding Special Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL BRIGADE,

June 5, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken in the action of May 31 by the brigade which from the

illness and consequent absence of General Featherston was commanded by me:

The brigade was put in motion, as ordered, by the left flank of regiments between 1 and 1.30 p. m., so as to be about one-quarter of a mile in rear of Garland's brigade. After moving a short distance, not more than half a mile, word was sent me from General Garland that he was in great need of re-enforcements. The step of the troops was quickened and they moved on rapidly, the whole advance being over ground exceedingly boggy and much of it covered with a very thick growth of trees. The Fourth North Carolina, being on the right and somewhat in advance, came first into action, emerging from the woods half a mile or more in front of the enemy's redoubt and breastworks, upon ground which, up to within 200 or 300 yards of the redoubt, was obstructed by the felling of trees. The other regiments, in the order of their positions in line—Forty-ninth Virginia, Twenty-eighth Georgia, and Twenty-seventh Georgia—came up successively into action, but the Twenty-eighth Georgia by mistake, resulting probably from the density of the woods through which it had marched, came up on the right of the Forty-ninth Virginia and remained thus during the action.

Having started the three regiments on the right fairly into action, I found myself in the woods on the left of the clearing with the Twenty-seventh Georgia, and, from the force of circumstances as the day advanced, remained on this flank during most of the action. This regiment, having formed line in the woods, engaged the enemy there and charged him over a very difficult piece of obstructed ground; but finding itself in the face of a very greatly superior force and in too advanced a position, one, in fact, which endangered its being completely flanked, it was withdrawn a short distance, its left flank thrown back, and I went into the clearing to endeavor to procure re-enforcements before again advancing. Colonel Jenkins' regiment of South Carolina Sharpshooters and the Sixth South Carolina Volunteers were sent with me, and as soon as they could be formed in line and the firing stopped sufficiently to make the signal agreed upon (a shout from the Twenty-seventh Georgia) heard the three regiments again charged in the best style over the same piece of obstructed ground above alluded to, through the woods beyond, and completely over a large camp of the enemy, taking a considerable number of prisoners and routing him completely.

The Georgia regiment, having been in action much longer than the South Carolina, and being somewhat scattered and very much fatigued, was now halted and reformed in line. The South Carolina regiments advanced some distance farther, and after a short time became again engaged with the enemy. I sent to General R. H. Anderson, who I learned was then in advance, and informed him of the position of the regiment. He came himself and conducted it with me to a position where it was placed in line of battle. I then left it and went to look after the rest of the brigade. I learn from the report of the regimental commander that it became again engaged with the enemy, suffered heavily, fought bravely, and remained on a part of the field, greatly in advance of the position occupied by our troops to the right, until it was recalled some time after night-fall.

In passing to the right I found the Fourth North Carolina under fire, but completely exhausted and very badly cut to pieces. The Forty-ninth Virginia and Twenty-eighth Georgia had retired. The circumstances under which they did so are related in the reports of their regimental commanders. I cannot give in detail the performances of the

three last-mentioned regiments, having been necessarily separated from them soon after they went into action. I know that they went in gallantly, and I know, too, from evidence more powerful than any other—the statement of their losses—that they fought hard and long. For their detailed movements I respectfully refer you to the reports of their commanders.

Being completely exhausted myself and the regiments of the brigade being exhausted and cut up and to some extent scattered, and the ground being held by fresher troops, I proceeded as the evening closed in to collect them together at a point in the rear portion of the clearing to the left of the road. After night we were ordered by the major-general commanding the division to take position in the woods in rear of the clearing, where we spent the night.

During a considerable portion of the forenoon of Sunday, June 1, the brigade was under arms and in momentary expectation of being engaged in the action which was going on, but it was not brought under fire.

The officers of General Featherston's staff accompanied me on the field and rendered me most important services.

I cannot forbear expressing my especial sense of the coolness and good conduct of Capt. G. P. Foote, assistant adjutant-general, who was by my side the whole day and at a late hour had his horse killed under him.

Lieutenant Haley, aide-de-camp, had his horse killed under him early in the action, and a few minutes after, while in the act of taking the gun and accouterments of a dead soldier to go into the fight on foot, received himself a severe wound in the face.

Maj. I. M. Partridge, acting commissary of subsistence, and Mr. A. M. Parker, volunteer aide, also rendered me great assistance and were frequently under heavy fire.

The courier party was also much exposed and acted well. Sergt. R. A. Best, of Company D, Fourth North Carolina State Troops, their leader, had two horses shot under him.

I must ask the attention of the general to the remarkably good conduct of the regimental commanders of the brigade in this affair.

Col. Levi B. Smith, Twenty-seventh Georgia, approved himself a soldier and leader of the noblest qualities. He received about the middle of the afternoon a painful wound in the thigh, but remained with his regiment for at least an hour and a half afterward, when he was compelled from weakness to leave the field. While in the act of leaving his horse was shot under him.

Both before and after his retirement Lieut. Col. Charles T. Zachry acted in the coolest and best manner.

Col. William Smith, Forty-ninth Virginia, was conspicuous, as I can testify from my own observation, for coolness and courage. His exposure of his person was perhaps almost a fault.

Maj. Bryan Grimes, commanding Fourth North Carolina State Troops, led his regiment in the thickest of the fight. His horse was shot under him not more than 100 yards directly in front of the enemy's redoubt. After three color-bearers of his regiment had been killed he bore in his own hands and brought out of action its tattered but honored flag.

Capt. John N. Wilcox, Twenty-eighth Georgia, left in command of his regiment in consequence of Lieut. Col. James G. Cain having been thrown from his horse and taken sick soon after the commencement of the engagement, and led it with coolness and gallantry until its withdrawal.

I close my necessarily imperfect report with a statement, whose dry figures may be truly said to speak with touching eloquence, of what was done and what was suffered by the brave men of this brigade on Saturday, May 31:

Command.	Carried into action.	Killed.						Wounded.								Missing.					
		Captains.	First lieutenants.		Second lieutenants.		Aggregate.	Colonels.	Lieutenant-colonels.	Captains.	First lieutenants.		Second lieutenants.		Sergeants.	Corporals.	Privates.	Aggregate.	Corporals.	Privates.	Aggregate.
4th North Carolina ..	678	2	1	..	4	6	64	77	5	7	9	10	14	241	286	..	6	6	369
49th Virginia.....	424	..	1	..	2	2	27	32	1	1	3	..	4	16	10	133	170	1	21	22	224
28th Georgia.....	371	2	..	2	17	24	12	1	6	6	80	95	119
27th Georgia.....	392	12	5	..	9	16	1	..	3	5	4	6	10	100	129	..	9	9	154
Total.....	1,865	4	2	2	14	10	117	149	2	1	11	16	18	38	40	554	680	1	36	37	866

I remain, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. ANDERSON.

Colonel Fourth N. C. State Troops, Comdg. Special Brigade.

Maj. J. W. RATCHFORD, *Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Division.*

No. 106.

Report of Lieut. Col. Charles T. Zachry, Twenty-seventh Georgia Infantry.

HDQRS. TWENTY-SEVENTH GEORGIA REGIMENT.

Bivouac below Richmond, Va., June 5, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Twenty-seventh Georgia Regiment on Saturday, May 31, and Sunday, June 1:

About 2 p. m. we emerged from the woods through which we had advanced rapidly and with great fatigue to the men, in the open field just in rear of the Fourth North Carolina State Troops and the Forty-ninth Virginia Regiment, who were both engaging the enemy. We were ordered to the left into the woods, and our line reached along an abatis of the enemy 75 or 100 yards in width. One captain (O. A. Lee, Company I) and several men had been killed before we arrived at this position. The enemy had concealed himself on the other edge of the abatis, and when we had arrived within this easy range opened a tremendous fire of musketry, with some grape and shell. We replied with greater effect upon the enemy, as shown by their dead and wounded, for a brief period, then charged over the abatis, the enemy's sense of danger on seeing our bayonets intrepidly advancing allowing him to take but little advantage of the exposure of our men in crossing such a place. Advancing beyond where the enemy had been and discovering he had flanked us, we fell back across the abatis.

Scarcely was our line well in its position before the enemy, with three fiendish yells, opened from the same place on us a terrific fire, which we returned till re-enforced by Colonel Jenkins' South Carolina regiment; then charged the abatis again. The enemy fled so rapidly we saw him no more until we had passed three of his camps.

In the first charge, or while falling back after it, the gallant Captain

Bacon fell mortally wounded. This officer's loss is irreparable. In his regular duties his attentiveness and faithfulness challenged the admiration of every member of the command. His courage, coolness, and judgment rendered his services on the battle-field invaluable. Between the first and second charge Colonel Smith was severely wounded, but kept his saddle through the second charge until about 5 p. m., when, exhausted by loss of blood, he reluctantly retired. Of the colonel's distinguished gallantry I need not speak; you witnessed it, captain. He bore himself nobly—showed himself a full man.

After passing the first camp of the enemy I was ordered to follow up Colonel Jenkins' South Carolina regiment and support him if necessary. My adjutant went hastily to the front and reported to Colonel Jenkins our proximity and purpose. The gallant Jenkins replied, "Come on, Georgia; I want you!" We moved up on his right and the two regiments advanced on a dense body of woods. As we arrived in the woods we discovered the enemy advancing in heavy force to recapture, I suppose, two pieces of artillery captured by Colonel Jenkins and now in our rear. Colonel Jenkins' regiment, to get a better position, I imagine, after advancing ten or fifteen paces in the woods, fell back quickly to the edge. My left companies unfortunately mistook the movement for a retreat, and soon along the line the cry was, "Retreat; the order is retreat!" and the whole line fell back. Just here the enemy opened at 75 yards the heaviest fire I had yet heard, and in spite of every exertion of myself and adjutant the regiment fell back 70 or 80 yards in the field.

I cannot in words do justice to Adjutant Gardner for the gallant heroism displayed by him in this crisis. Stung to the quick by the behavior of the men, but originating in an honest mistake, he dashed boldly to where our line should be, and under an awful fire at deadly range rode back and forth, waving his sword defiantly at the enemy, by every gesture and motion appealing to the regiment to follow him. His efforts were not in vain; the whole regiment dashed gallantly in on the right of the Carolinians, determined to retrieve themselves, and in fine style drove the enemy from the woods, capturing several prisoners at the edge of the field beyond. We ceased firing a little after 8 p. m. at least 1 mile in advance of any other troops save Colonel Jenkins' South Carolina regiment. Dark forced us to stop our pursuit.

Before closing this report I desire to mention Sergeant Latham, of Company D, color-bearer, and the color guard for their gallant and intrepid bearing through the entire day. Our colors were pierced twenty times. Men and officers behaved themselves heroically.

Coming out into the field to the house and tents, I had my wounded and killed brought there, and meeting my quartermaster when I rejoined the brigade, about 10 at night, I had the wounded removed to hospital in charge of Dr. Butler, assistant surgeon.

Early Sunday we were in line of battle across the abatis we charged the day before, and remained there under arms the entire day. A major, whose name has escaped my memory, from one of the Mississippi regiments, with 15 of his men, fell in with my command and conducted themselves gallantly during the entire conflict; also Virginians, Carolinians, and Alabamians, who were not able to find their respective commands, fell in with me and fought bravely.

I am, captain, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

C. T. ZACHRY,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Twenty-seventh Georgia Regiment.

Capt. GEORGE P. FOOTE, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 107.

Report of Capt. John N. Wilcox, Twenty-eighth Georgia Infantry.

JUNE 5, 1862.

Inclosed I submit a correct report of the casualties of the Twenty-eighth Georgia Regiment in the battle of the 31st:*

The force of the regiment upon entering the field of action consisted of 370 officers and men. The regiment entered the field of action in the position assigned it with the brigade under a heavy fire of the enemy's guns and remained on the field until the supply of ammunition was exhausted, when we retired to be replenished. To the best of my knowledge we remained on the field between three and four hours, constantly engaged under the enemy's galling fire.

It is necessary for me to state that Lieut. Col. J. G. Cain left the field before we were engaged with the enemy for reasons best known to himself.

It is due to Companies H and I [to state] that they were on detached service at the time, contrary to their wishes.

I cannot close this report without noticing our gallant commissary, John T. Hall, who rendered efficient service in encouraging the men and thereby retaining good order. Lieut. P. F. Crump acted gallantly. Adjutant Wicker and Sergt. Maj. J. E. Thompson rendered efficient aid in their respective positions. All the commissioned officers and men bore themselves gallantly.

Loss in killed and wounded, 121 officers and men.

JOHN N. WILCOX,

*Captain Company K, Twenty-eighth Georgia Regiment,**Commanding, as senior captain, during the engagement.*

No. 108.

Report of Maj. Bryan Grimes, Fourth North Carolina Infantry.

HDQRS. FOURTH NORTH CAROLINA STATE TROOPS,

June 5, 1862.

COLONEL: In accordance with General Orders, No. —, I have the honor most respectfully to submit the following report as embracing the action of the regiment under my command during the battle of May 31.

After marching to the field agreeably to orders, when near the Williamsburg road the enemy commenced an enfilading fire from a battery stationed in the road, concealed by the woods. I then filed my regiment to the left and brought it into line of battle, and ordered it to lie down until the other regiments of the brigade moved up. Just as the next regiment reached us a courier arrived from the front calling for re-enforcements, and you ordered me forward. The woods were very thick and water deep in ponds from recent rains, in places waist-deep. The enemy, during our advance through the woods, playing upon us with canister and shell, it was impossible to keep an accurate alignment; halted at the edge of the woods, rectified the alignment as near as possible before uncovering my men, and then ordered them to

* Embodied in statement, p. 953.

advance, which was through a thick and entangled abatis, formed by felling the trees in opposite directions, which was difficult and tedious to march through. At this time I first saw the redoubt of the enemy about half a mile in front, and somewhat to the right, of my center, which caused me to right-oblique my command. The enemy also had a section of a battery (two pieces) which was dealing destruction to my left wing, while my center and right wing were being mowed down by grape and canister from the redoubt; but the men steadily advanced in admirable order. The enemy fled from the field pieces on my left, and we then concentrated our whole attention to the redoubt. Between this entangled brush-wood and the redoubt was a plowed field, rendered very miry by the late rains, in which the men would mire ankle deep at every step; through this we continued our way. Other regiments at this time were emerging from the thicket both on my right and left, when I gave the order to charge upon the redoubt, which was done by my men in gallant style. When within about 100 yards of the redoubt my horse was killed, catching me under him in his fall. Assistance came and I was extricated uninjured, when we rushed on. When within 30 or 40 yards of the redoubt I saw that we were 200 yards in advance of any other regiment and thought best to fall back to a ditch midway between the redoubt and entangled woods, which I ordered, and the regiment retired in good order; but the color-bearer, misunderstanding the order, fell back beyond the ditch to this entangled brush. Those who had taken cover in the ditch then followed the colors, which were then halted, and all ordered to lie down, being still within 250 yards of the redoubt.

About this time our battery arrived and commenced playing upon the enemy. As an evidence of the severity of the fire of the enemy while in front of the battery 46 of my men were found killed within an area of one acre. After allowing my men time to recover from their fatigue, just then I saw my third color-bearer shot down. Captain Simonton and myself rushed up to raise the colors. Captain Simonton, reaching them first, placed them in my hands, raising them aloft, calling upon my men to rally around their standard. It was done with alacrity, and, together with several other regiments, we reached the redoubt, the enemy fleeing.

About 300 yards distant to the left I saw two regiments of the enemy drawn up in line of battle, protected and partially concealed by woods. I faced my men to the left and double-quickened them through an open field to reach a cover of the same woods, but before reaching it I saw breastworks to my right thrown up, which the enemy were leaving, and ordered my men to move by the right flank and get behind their breastworks, firing upon them during the while, which was continued until I saw a regiment of ours marching to the left to attack them. I ordered them to cease firing for fear of shooting our friends. In a short time we were ordered forward to support a regiment in front and to our right, which was done. While at this spot, of my four officers who had followed the flag through the day two were shot—Captain Simonton killed instantly and Captain Wood very seriously wounded. From here we were ordered to fall back from the breastworks, and in a short time it became dark, and orders arrived for me to retire to the road. Just before doing so I ordered them to count the number then present, which was 54, whose names should be most honorably mentioned.

Particularly conspicuous among them for coolness and deeds of daring were Lee A. Steel, of Company B; Robert Peel, of Company D,

and Robert Gibbons, of Company E. It is impossible for me to obtain the names of those who acted with more than common gallantry in the first and hottest part of the engagement, as the company officers, who had better opportunity of noticing them, are absent wounded, consequently many deserving of honorable mention would be left out. My attention during the action was particularly called to the daring and gallant conduct of the adjutant (Thomas L. Perry), whose services were invaluable to me; since died of his wounds.

No braver men died that day than Captain Barnes, of Company F, and Lieutenant White, of Company C, who were killed while leading their men up to the breastworks; but where all acted so well, with perhaps one or two exceptions, who failed to keep up, it is almost impossible to say who behaved with most gallantry, as reference to the list of casualties will show, leaving the encampment with 29 officers, 23 of them being killed and wounded.*

All else occurred under your own eye, which it is unnecessary for me to mention.

I am, colonel, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
BRYAN GRIMES,

Major, Commanding Fourth Regiment N. C. State Troops.

No. 109.

Report of Col. William Smith, Forty-ninth Virginia Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS FORTY-NINTH VIRGINIA VOLS.,
SPECIAL BRIG., THIRD DIV., ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 5, 1862.

COLONEL: In consequence of the lamented illness of our brigade officer, General Featherston, it was your good fortune to command our brigade in the fight of May 31. To you therefore, and in compliance with general orders from headquarters of the division, I proceed with pleasure to give you a narrative of the part taken by my regiment in the battle of the 31st ultimo and of the 1st instant:

On the morning of the 31st ultimo I received your orders to move by the left flank, file right, preserving such a distance from the Fourth North Carolina Regiment, on my right, as would afford me room promptly to form in line of battle. I accordingly moved, and unhappily had to make my way through a trackless forest, encountering at almost every step brush, bramble, and pond, and after a most exhausting march of upward of a mile we cleared the woods and entered the open field. Passing through this field to the right we, with the previous orders renewed, entered the next body of timber, which was either occupied in common by, or separated us from, the enemy. The Fourth North Carolina was on my right and the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Georgia on my left. Dressing by the right, we were ordered carefully to preserve our distances, that not a moment might be lost in forming in line of battle. I endeavored to obey this order literally, and in so doing was brought in contact with an enormous abatis and with rifle pits, all right in front, and with a redoubt on my right flank. Here I met with General Garland, who, stating that his

* See p. 953.

brigade had been cut to pieces, urged me forward. I gave the word, and my gallant boys dashed into the abatis, pressing forward with every possible dispatch. My men were falling fast from the fire of an unseen foe—indeed, several had fallen in the timber through which we had just passed from the shell of the enemy, and yet they gallantly pressed forward and had more than half perforated the abatis—had passed the rifle pits and were under a galling fire from front and flank—before I opened fire. Never did men behave more like veterans under such trying circumstances. We were under heavy fire upon both of my flanks and direct in front of the enemy, and also from the rear by our friends, some of whom skulked behind the brick ruins some 300 or 400 yards in my rear, and some from the bush, and galled us with their fire, until finally I had to dash back to the fellows before I could be relieved of their annoyance. Nor was this all. The Twenty-eighth Georgia, by pressing to the right oblique, had entirely lost its place in line of battle, cut through my line and fell in on my right, except about two companies, which lapped my right, and was a source of great annoyance and of some loss to me. Through the activity of my adjutant and of one of the officers of the Georgia regiment, whose name I do not know, this embarrassment was removed by placing it fully on my right. I do not particularly know what become of this regiment afterward, but, from what my adjutant informs me, it advanced from the rifle pits which it had occupied, fell into line with my command, and gallantly for an hour performed its duty until we fell back. Still pressing forward, my regiment soon cleared the abatis and entered the open field, my left flank sheltered somewhat by the woods and my right fully exposed. As I have since learned, the Twenty-seventh Georgia had fallen back, leaving my left also entirely exposed.

We had been under fire for three and a half hours, a portion of the time under a combination of four opposite fires. Our brigade had promptly relieved Garland's shattered columns, yet during my long and protracted struggle of three and a half hours I had received no succor and no command as to my progress or management. My regiment, which went into action 390 strong only, had been cut down to a mere handful. My men were without ammunition, having exhausted their 60 rounds. We had no supports at hand or in prospect, as far as I saw or was informed. The enemy was before us in force and moved with a cheer to turn my left.

In this state of things I regarded it as a military necessity that we should have fallen back, and to the order which was directed by my gallant major I firmly believe I am indebted for the preservation of the remnant of my regiment from capture and destruction. I had not recovered the ground I had lost when I went back to suppress the fire in my rear, when I met my command falling back, I am proud to say, in perfect order. Finding that my men were retiring with sullen reluctance, and ascertaining that they were without ammunition, I ordered my adjutant to promptly report to General Hill, ascertain if he could supply us, and ask for orders. In reply I was informed that the general could not supply us, and that we must fall back upon my ordnance wagon and there replenish my empty boxes. This was done in order—most leisurely order. The boxes were filled, the pocket supply secured, and then I moved my regiment back to the field, and finally to the ground on the edge of the battle-field which was selected for our encampment after it was clear. The fight was over for the day.

Early on the morning of the 1st instant your brigade, including my regiment as a part of it, was moved and placed in line of battle on a

new and exposed position, as was supposed, where it remained until we fell back early on the 2d instant.

I have said, colonel, but little of my neighbors in the field, and what little I have said may be unjust, for, ordered to move to the front, and having confidence that my superiors under any new and unexpected combinations would see that all was well, my attention was strictly confined to the duties of my own command, but there was an incident I will mention. In pressing through the abatis I crossed a battle-flag lying in the bush. I took it to be my own. I called to some one to take it, but in the din of the battle and the excitement of the forward movement I was unheard. Bidding my adjutant, who was near by, to hand it to me, I seized and bore it until, my dear colonel, your kind and thoughtful consideration transmitted me an order through Captain Foot to give up the flag. At the time a youthful stranger was hard by, probably not twenty years old, and heard the message delivered. He stepped promptly up, stated that he belonged to the Second Florida, had lost his regiment, and would like to join mine for the fight, and with my permission would gladly bear the flag, and, if need be, plant it in the cannon's mouth. Without a word I hand it to him, and nobly did he bear it; and, curiously enough, it turned out to be the flag of his own regiment, and how it reached the spot where I found it is still veiled in mystery, and probably will ever remain so.

I have said that we went in the battle with about 390 rank and file. I will now add that I had 29 company officers and 5 field and staff officers also. Of this number I received from a Minie ball a severe contusion of the thigh; Lieut. Col. J. C. Gibson received a very severe contusion of the side and quite a severe flesh wound on the left forearm. Of the company officers 3 captains were wounded—Captain Horsley supposed mortally, and not heard from since the battle; Captain Jacobs slightly, and Captain Randolph in the arm severely. Of the lieutenants 6 were wounded and 1 killed, to wit: First Lieut. James M. Anderson, commanding Company A; First Lieut. James C. Cabell, Company C; Second Lieut. R. K. Christian, Company B; Second Lieut. R. M. Spicer, Company D; Third Lieut. William W. Larkin, Company F; Third Lieut. R. S. Cabell, Company K, and Samuel A. Hill, first lieutenant Company K, killed.

The color-sergeants and color guard consisted of Sergeants Curray and Spencer and Corporals Sutphin, Stone, Jewell, and Maddox, who behaved with distinguished gallantry, and all of whom were either killed or wounded. Corporal Jewell was killed in line; Sergeant Curray, it is feared, is mortally wounded, while the others were all more or less severely wounded; notwithstanding all which they nobly bore the flag forward throughout the day, never receding for a moment until ordered to fall back about 5 p. m.

Of the rank and file 32 were killed, 158 wounded, and 22 missing.

RECAPITULATION.

At the opening of the fight my regiment in rank and file consisted of—

Men	390
Company officers	29
Field officers, commissioned and non-commissioned	5
	— 424

	Killed.	Wounded.
Field officers.....	---	2
Company officers.....	1	9
Rank and file.....	32	158
Total	33	169
		202
		222
Missing in action.....		22
		200

It will be observed, colonel, that I lost of my regiment in killed, wounded, and missing over one-half of the entire command, which was still further weakened by the necessary details to take off the wounded, so you can readily see how severely that portion of it which remained in the field was cut up; and when it is remembered that six of my companies had never been under fire before; that all steadily advanced through great and unusual difficulties, and that, too, under most trying circumstances; that my regiment promptly responded to every command; that I was but little afflicted with that curse of an army, stragglers, you will pardon me, I am sure, if I dwell with some complacency upon the valor, steadiness, and effective discipline of my command, the Forty-ninth Regiment Virginia Volunteers.

The more difficult duty now remains of specifying those who have won the claim of special merit. Among my field and staff officers I cannot discriminate. Lieutenant-Colonel Gibson, as I have stated, was twice wounded, and had his horse shot, but not so badly as to be unable to bear him from the field, which he refused to leave (although I urged him to do so) until the regiment fell back. Maj. C. B. Christian had to dismount on the outskirts of the abatis and proceed on foot with the command, which he did most gallantly. He escaped unhurt. My adjutant, Kincheloe, always calm and collected yet prompt and ready, contributed much to the steadiness of the command and cheerfully obeyed all my orders. He himself escaped, but had his horse badly shot. My sergeant-major led the advance, rifle in hand, displaying the valor, and perhaps sometimes the rashness, of youth. My horse was badly shot and died about 7 p. m. on the day of the battle.

Of my company officers I have no language of praise which I might not safely bestow, but I have no power to discriminate between them. Where all behaved so well discrimination is difficult, and would certainly be unjust. I commend them, colonel, most cordially to your most favorable consideration.

And now, colonel, I close this report, sending herewith a list of the killed and wounded; sending also a list of those in a few minutes [instances] commended for special merit, and tendering you herewith my cordial gratifications [gratulations], under the exposure to which you were constantly subject[ed], at your escape from the dangers of this bloody field.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. SMITH,

Colonel Forty-ninth Virginia Volunteers.

Col. G. B. ANDERSON,

Comdg. Special Brig., Third Div., Army of the Potomac.

No. 110.

Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland, jr., C. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, Third Division.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION,
June 3, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this brigade in the battle of Saturday, the 31st ultimo:

The brigade had been on outpost duty upon the Williamsburg road for four days and nights previous to this engagement, during which portions of it had been sent forward three times to make reconnaissance, which brought on skirmishes with the enemy. Working parties had been engaged also night and day in cutting artillery roads and preparing defenses. During the latter portion of these four days the Fourth North Carolina (Major Grimes commanding) was sent to our assistance. I mention these circumstances to let it appear, in justice to my command, that their previous labors had been heavy and wearisome when they were assigned to lead the advance on the left of our attacking forces and bring on the engagement which followed.

In obedience to your orders for making the attack I formed my brigade in the open field in front of our previous position on the left of the Williamsburg road in the following order, to wit: Fifth North Carolina, Colonel [D. K.] McRae, 180 rank and file; Thirty-eighth Virginia, Colonel [E. C.] Edmonds, 350 rank and file; Twenty-third North Carolina, Colonel [Daniel H.] Christie, 350 rank and file; Twenty-fourth Virginia, Major [Richard L.] Maury, 450 rank and file; Second Florida, Colonel [E. A.] Perry, 435 rank and file. The Second Mississippi Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel [John G.] Taylor, 300 strong, were deployed as skirmishers along the edge of the woods in front of the brigade, with general orders to keep 150 yards in advance. The foregoing estimate makes the total strength of the brigade on that day 2,065, exclusive of Captain Bondurant's battery, left subject to Major-General Hill's own orders, since, being compelled to advance by the main road on my extreme right, I could not superintend it.

In the foregoing order, upon hearing the signal, the line of skirmishers promptly advanced into the woods in front, and the brigade followed, moving by the right flanks of regiments at deploying distance and taking direction from the right, which was ordered to keep [with] in a short distance of the Williamsburg road.

Meanwhile General Featherston's brigade (Col. George B. Anderson commanding) moved a quarter of a mile in rear as a support, while General Rodde and General Rains moved in corresponding position on the opposite side of the road. My line of skirmishers had advanced only a few hundred yards when they encountered that of the enemy. The difficulties of the ground were almost insurmountable. The recent rains had formed ponds of water throughout the woods with mud at the bottom, through which the men waded forward knee-deep, and occasionally sinking to the hips in boggy places, almost beyond the point of extrication. The forest was so thick and the undergrowth so tangled that it was impracticable to see the heads of the several regiments as they moved forward, and the deploying intervals were in consequence very imperfectly preserved. Still all pushed onward with alacrity—so fast, indeed, that when the skirmishers became heavily engaged the regiments pressed upon their heels and the fire became hot along our whole front before emerging from the woods. The regi-

ments were brought into line of battle to support the skirmishers, who, without retiring behind them to reform, became in many places intermingled in their ranks, and so continued throughout the day. We drove the enemy before us out of the woods back into the abatis, where they had several regiments drawn up behind a fence to support them. I am of opinion that the line of skirmishers upon our right, on the opposite side of the road, did not advance so rapidly as our own, for Maj. W. S. Wilson, of the Second Mississippi Battalion, reports that the right of our advancing line was subjected to a fire both from the front and flank.

We had now reached the edge of the wood, where the abatis impeded our farther advance, and the troops were under heavy fire. Sending my aide, Lieutenant Halsey, my adjutant-general, Captain Meem, and a courier to order the several regiments of the center and left to move by the left flank, as previously concerted, and endeavor to turn the obstacles in front, I repaired to the right of my line to give the same orders. I now learned that Colonel McRae, suffering from previous illness, had been compelled to retire in a state of utter physical exhaustion. I had relied much upon his services in looking after the right of our long line in the woods. A portion of his regiment I found temporarily confused from causes no way reflecting upon their gallantry, and I assisted Maj. P. J. Sinclair to rally them, and they again went forward under his command (see his report).^{*} I also assisted Colonel Christie, Twenty-third North Carolina, to reform and send forward a portion of his regiment, which had halted under the impression that some order had been given to retire (see that report). About the same time, Major Maury having fallen, I assisted in keeping the Twenty-fourth Virginia to its place, some embarrassment and delay having been produced by his fall.

During this time I was without any staff or couriers, having dispatched my aide and adjutant-general to carry orders, and my unemployed couriers were either wounded, dismounted, or separated from me in going through the woods. Hurrying forward in person to the abatis, I found that as the regiments emerged from the woods they overlapped each other as they deployed, and being thus in many places huddled together, were suffering terribly from the enemy's fire. The regimental commanders, who had received my orders to move by the left flank, were unable to effect the movement in good order under the galling fire. The alternative was adopted—to push the regiments forward through the abatis against the enemy, which was done, the Second Florida on the left and in advance; the Thirty-eighth Virginia, now next on its right, only a little behind. I have mentioned the reasons which caused the other regiments to be not quite so far up at this time. But they were readily reformed (stragglers excepted), and went forward either by themselves or with other regiments now coming up to their support. I should have sent back earlier for the supporting brigade to hurry up to our support, but, as already mentioned, had no messenger to send and could not leave for that purpose myself. I trusted to Colonel Anderson's intuition as an accomplished soldier to perceive that we were hotly engaged, and, as I anticipated, he arrived upon the field just at the proper time.

Meanwhile my regiments had advanced more or less into the abatis, the Second Florida and Thirty-eighth Virginia up to the fence, and driving away the gunners and killing the horses from a section of artil-

^{*} Not found.

lery near the road. We were losing heavily, especially in field and company officers. Within the space of a few minutes the Twenty-fourth Virginia had lost its only field officer, wounded (Major Maury); the Twenty-third North Carolina all its field officers, wounded or disabled, and 8 out of 10 company commanders and 17 out of 29 officers killed or wounded; the Second Florida 2 field officers and 10 out of 11 company commanders, killed or wounded; the Thirty-eighth Virginia its colonel, temporarily disabled, but who again took the field. The entire brigade of five regiments and a battalion was in front of the fight, receiving the first shock of the enemy's force with only six field officers, two regiments without any, two more with one apiece. Add to this the list of casualties among company officers shown in the returns, and it is not surprising that regimental lines were not accurately preserved; yet nothing occurred to the disparagement of the general reputation of the troops. There were stragglers, few or many, as upon all other occasions, of course.

The supporting brigade advancing at this opportune moment, and the passage of lines being a feat in tactics which had never been practiced by any of us, large fragments of those regiments who were left without field or company officers were joined in and continued forward with that brigade. The regiments with field officers remaining (the Second Florida and Thirty-eighth Virginia especially) preserved a more distinct organization. I assisted Major Wilson to collect some of the Second Mississippi Battalion, and sent them on the left of the Twenty-eighth Georgia. Passing to the right, where Lieutenant-Colonel [R. D.] Johnston, before being wounded, had attached some of his companies to the Fourth North Carolina, I kept on the right with the mixed command up to the earthworks and rifle pits, placing them to hold the rifle pits and use them in reverse.

Arriving there, my horse, which had been shot at an early hour, became now so disabled that I was compelled to abandon him, accepting the use of Captain Manning's until required by him to go after ordnance. I then mounted an artillery horse, which was twice struck with musket-balls while I was upon him. Finding Major-General Hill, my division commander, near me, I reported to him, and rendered assistance for a time in conducting the re-enforcements now arriving to their positions and in rallying such regiments or parts of regiments as wavered anywhere on our part of the lines.

My own command, now upon the field, was intermingled, in the manner already stated, to a large extent with Colonel Anderson's brigade. The Second Florida and Thirty-eighth Virginia, having continued in the fight until a late hour, were sent back, under orders to supply their exhausted ammunition, about the same time with the Forty-ninth Virginia. These orders were given to them by Captain Meem, my adjutant-general, upon learning that they were without a supply, and the orders were ratified by me.

Riding back, at the request of General Hill, to communicate with General Wilcox, whose brigade was coming up, I found that Colonel Smith, Forty-ninth Virginia, had been directed by General Longstreet to join these regiments with his own and carry them back to the front. I of course resumed command of them myself, and now take especial pains, in justice to them, to call attention to their good conduct. The Second Florida captured the colors of the Eighth New York and 45 or 50 prisoners, with several horses; was leading the advance, and, with other troops, clearing men and horses from the section of artillery planted near the road, which the enemy never afterwards regained.

The regiment kept in the fight up to the enemy's camp on the left. (See Colonel Perry's report* of their action, part of which I saw and all of which I believe to be correct.) The Thirty-eighth Virginia captured the marker's flag of the One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania (Ringgold Regiment) and 9 prisoners, including 1 captain, and kept well up in the fight with or near the Second Florida, retiring under orders, as above stated. The casualties of these two regiments were heavy, as shown by the reports; those of the Second Florida especially so, being about 45 per cent. of their force engaged, and the Thirty-eighth Virginia not much less.

Late in the afternoon I succeeded in separating and reorganizing my command, and held it under orders in reserve. Sleeping upon the field of battle, this brigade, along with Colonel Anderson's, was held in reserve on Sunday, the 1st instant, and was not engaged, there being no need for its services.

I am happy to be able to bear testimony to the gallantry and good conduct of all the field officers of the brigade. The unusual list of casualties among them shows that they were at their posts of duty and of danger.

We have to mourn the loss of Maj. G. W. Call, Second Florida, and Maj. E. J. Christian, Twenty-third North Carolina, the latter mortally wounded, and since reported dead. These were gallant gentlemen and chivalrous soldiers. Colonel McRae, Fifth North Carolina, being compelled to retire, as already stated, from exhaustion, Major Sinclair acted very handsomely in supplying his place. Colonel Christie and Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston were both disabled while doing handsome service, Colonel Christie's horse being shot under him, and in falling throwing his rider against a tree, which bruised him severely; Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston being severely wounded at a later hour; Lieut. Col. L. G. Pyles, Second Florida, being severely wounded in the gallant discharge of his duties; Major Call already killed, and 10 out of 11 company commanders of the Second Florida killed or wounded.

The position of Colonel Perry was critical and dangerous. He discharged his duty with signal honor to himself and to my perfect satisfaction.

Colonel Edmonds, Thirty-eighth Virginia, had his horse wounded under him, and himself struck with a fragment of spent shell, causing a painful contusion, yet he left the field only for a short space, and returned to his command, which he led in the most handsome manner.

Lieut. Col. P. B. Whittle, Thirty-eighth Virginia, had his horse shot three times, and being dismounted, fought gallantly forward on foot, doing everything in his power to contribute to the result of the day.

Maj. Joseph R. Cabell, Twenty-eighth Virginia, also had his horse shot under him, and charging considerably in advance of his regiment, was the second man to place his hand upon a piece of the enemy's artillery and claim it as our own. The first man was an officer of the Second Florida, killed soon afterward—perhaps Captain Flag.

Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor and Major Wilson, of the Second Mississippi Battalion, did their whole duty throughout the day, and succeeded in reforming parts of their line of skirmishers into bodies and carrying them into the fight. I regret that circumstances did not afford their fine battalion the best opportunity for separate action on that day.

Major Maury, Twenty-fourth Virginia, had his horse shot and himself soon after wounded at an early hour while gallantly leading his

* Not found.

regiment into the fight. We felt his absence throughout the day. I refer to the list of casualties as a roll of honor for our company officers without reiterating names.

The following officers and men are brought to my attention in the reports of regimental commanders, who claim for the survivors the badge of honor to be awarded under general orders, to wit:

Thirty-eighth Virginia.—Capt. E. W. Carrington and S. S. Lucke; Lieuts. S. A. Swanson, William Norman, Charles Scott, and Color-bearer R. McDowell, dead.

Company A.—Sergeants Gardner and Turner, dead.

Company D.—Privates L. P. H. Tarpley and Cornelius Gilbert.

Company E.—Sergeant Shackelford.

Company G.—Privates Robert Holmes, Alexander Gilchrist, John D. Algood, Giles A. Burton, James Wilson, James R. Bugg, and R. D. Riggins; Corpl. Hugh N. Weatherford.

Company I.—Privates Eli D. Sizimore, Thomas L. Sizimore, Anderson Solomon, Robert W. Vaughan, Richard Wilson, John B. Gold, and James Belcher.

Company K.—Sergts. G. W. Morrison and C. C. Marshall; Privates John Burlington, E. H. Estes, R. J. Hatcher, and John R. Billings; Corpl. R. C. Fortune, killed. (The officers commanding Companies A, B, E, and F are now absent, wounded; they may have names to present hereafter.)

Second Florida.—Company A.—Sergeant Riley, distinguished both at Seven Pines and at Williamsburg; Corporal Rasson, Musician Cushman, and Privates Bradley, Bryan, Hooper, Kennedy, and Reed, special case.

Company B.—Lieutenants Jerkins and Thompson, and Privates Finley, Crosby, Colson, Tidwell, Parker, and Molphurs; Sergeant Williams, color-bearer.

Company C.—Corpl. J. B. Cason, and Privates Gahagan, Wilkinson, Cone, and Miller.

Company D.—Lieutenant Parker, who captured the colors of the Eighth New York; Sergeant Stephens, and Privates Rawls, Morrison, and Waller.

Company E.—Captain McCaslan, Lieutenant Reynolds, dead; Sergeant Roberds, Corporals Howard and Cross, and Private Burleson.

Company F.—Captain Pooser, killed, and Privates Irwin, killed, Tillinghast, Pooser, and Butler.

Company G.—Captain Flagg, killed; Lieutenants Brown and Wright, Sergeant Roberts, wounded, and Private Masters.

Company H.—Lieutenant Carlisle and Privates Papy, killed, Hollerman, wounded, A. Dupont, and Crabtree.

Company I.—Corporal Belote, wounded.

Company K.—Captain Butler, killed.

Company L.—Captain Perry, killed, and Privates Herndon, Dampier, Horton, and Wilder.

Fifth North Carolina.—Lieut. J. M. Taylor, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. I. A. Jones.

Company E.—Sergt. J. M. Miller, color-bearer, and Corpls. L. Bain and Benjamin Rollins.

Company H.—Sergt. James Goodman, for gallantry here and Williamsburg.

Second Mississippi Battalion.—Company A.—Private Sutton.

Company B.—Private Willis.

Company C.—Private Williams.

Company G.—Sergeant Weeks.

Company H.—Private Hankinson.

The field officers of the Twenty-fourth Virginia and the Twenty-third North Carolina being all absent, their lists of merit have not yet been forwarded.

Captain Bondurant proceeded under orders from General Hill down the road to support the advance of the infantry, until, encountering a heavy fire, they were ordered to find a position to the right of the road, where Captain Bondurant delivered a telling fire, first with two and then with all six pieces.

Later in the afternoon he was ordered up near the captured works to relieve Captain Carter and rake the road. He reached that ground in time to render handsome service in playing upon the enemy's re-enforcements coming up the road.

The loss of the battery was Private Knight, killed, and Privates J. A. Meek and James Spinner wounded, and 12 horses killed or disabled.

I must not omit to acknowledge the valuable services of Captain Gardner, assistant adjutant-general upon General Early's staff, who volunteered to render me his assistance. I assigned him to duty with the Twenty-fourth Virginia, with whom he went into the fight, exhibiting both coolness and discretion.

In concluding this report it becomes my duty to pay the last tribute of respect to the memory of my assistant adjutant-general, Capt. J. Lawrence Meem, whose conspicuous gallantry won the admiration of all who saw him, and added to the laurels which he had gathered at Williamsburg and on previous fields. At a late hour he was instantly killed. By his death the service is deprived of a gifted young officer and society of a favorite whom we shall long deplore.

My aide-de-camp, Lieut. D. P. Halsey, having attracted universal applause throughout my entire command by his handsome behavior, was rallying a disordered regiment and leading it forward with their colors in his hand when he received a dangerous wound in the head, which will deprive me of his valuable services for a long time to come.

Having thus most imperfectly reported the operations of my command, I forward herewith the reports of the subordinate commanders and complete lists of casualties, showing the loss of the brigade to be—

Killed outright.....	98
Wounded	600
Missing	42
Total	740

Half of the missing supposed by regimental commanders to be killed or wounded.

I have the honor to be, major, your obedient servant,

S. GARLAND, JR.,

Brig. Gen., Commanding Third Brigade, Hill's Division.

Maj. J. W. RATCHFORD,

Adjutant-General, &c.

[Inclosure.]

Succinct statement of loss.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
General staff	1	1	—
2d Florida	37	152	9
2d Mississippi Battalion	12	71	4
5th North Carolina	1	26	—
23d North Carolina	18	145	6
24th Virginia	12	86	9
38th Virginia	16	117	14
Jeff. Davis Artillery	1	2	—
Total	98	600	42

J. R. CABELL,

Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.

JUNE 6, 1862.

No. 111.

Report of Col. Daniel H. Christie, Twenty-third North Carolina Infantry.

HDQRS. TWENTY-THIRD NORTH CAROLINA TROOPS,

June 2, 1862.

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my regiment (the Twenty-third North Carolina) in the battle of Seven Pines, on the 31st ultimo:

The regiment was formed in line of battle, occupying the center of the brigade, at about 1.30 p. m., and moved at the command by right of battalions to the front, endeavoring to preserve regimental distance on our right for the Thirty-eighth Virginia. Owing to the change of direction of the road to the left, along which the right of the brigade was ordered to move and the thickly-wooded ground through which we passed, I soon found that my command and the Twenty-fourth Virginia were moving on converging instead of parallel lines. I notified Major Maury immediately, but a heavy firing in front indicating the skirmishers would soon be overpowered, I was obliged to bring my command rapidly into line of battle before he had time to gain distance for me. This caused some disorder, which embarrassed me no little, but through the energy of Majors Maury and Christian the line was completed. We were now suffering from a heavy skirmishers' fire, but pressed on through swamp and thicket, officers and men exerting themselves to the utmost to overcome the obstacles in their line of march and obeying strictly the order to reserve their fire. As we neared the edge of the abatis a terrific fire from the opposite side opened [on] us, which we returned with effect. The fight here for some minutes was stubborn in the extreme. The felled timber was an almost insuperable obstacle to a successful charge against a firm line, and I waited the auspicious moment when they should waver. At this juncture a regiment on my right was ordered to fall back and reform. The order reaching the ears of my company commanders on the right wing, they mistook it for mine, and commenced putting it into execution. That moment I felt to be pregnant with the most disastrous conse-

quences to my command, but by the quick, intelligent co-operation of Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston the movement was stopped, and we again pressed forward, drove the enemy from his strong position, and were entering the abatis when General Garland rode up and ordered me to move by the left flank. In the execution of this order the three right companies became detached, but were gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston across the Williamsburg road, and co-operating with the Fourth North Carolina, charged in the direction of the battery in the redoubt, officers and men acting nobly but suffering terribly.

Having passed the opening and the abatis with what was left of my command, with a part of the Twenty-fourth Virginia I again pressed forward, the enemy fighting but giving way. The swampy earth and thick undergrowth continued to check rapid movement. The Second Florida, on my left, was hard pressed. When the Forty-ninth Virginia came up cheering upon our right the enemy began again to give way and our line went forward. About this time my horse was shot, and in falling with him I was so much injured as to be incompetent for further service.

All the field officers and two-thirds of the company officers were now *hors de combat*, but several officers and many of the men joined other commands and fought on until night closed the engagement.

[DANL. H. CHRISTIE,
Colonel Twenty-third North Carolina Regiment.]

Captain _____,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 112.

Report of Capt. John R. Bagby, Fourth Virginia Battalion.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH VIRGINIA BATTALION,
Camp, Roper's Mill, June 6, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with an order received this morning I submit the following report of the operations of the Fourth Virginia Battalion on Saturday and Sunday, May 31 and June 1:

It is due to justice to say that the battalion, without any regular organization, having been together but a few days before they were ordered into the battle, and having had no opportunity to acquaint themselves with infantry drill, with the exception of Captain White's company, a temporary organization was effected, without authority, by the selection of Capt. C. C. Otey lieutenant-colonel [and] Capt. John R. Bagby as major.

On the morning of May 31, after a fatiguing march through mud and water of several miles, we were formed in line of battle on the right of the Williamsburg road. From thence we passed through the woods to an opening in front of the enemy's intrenchments on Barker's farm. We were then ordered to charge the enemy through some felled trees, which we did without encountering any serious resistance, and reached the enemy's intrenchments in good order, some four or five of the battalion being wounded. At this juncture one of the companies (Captain Bagby's) was ordered to take charge of three pieces of artillery left by the retreating foe. This duty was discharged, firing into two regiments of Yankees forming to attack us with considerable effect. Also a por-

tion of Captain Montague's company was detailed to assist in Captain Carter's battery, many of his cannoneers having been disabled. The battalion was then ordered forward, Captain Bagby's company again taking its position in the battalion, and [ordered] to charge the enemy in ambush among felled trees on the right of Barker's house. We passed through the enemy's tents, wheeled to the right, and upon reaching the edge of the felled trees threw ourselves on the ground, and fired upon the enemy whenever they showed themselves. After being in this position some fifteen or twenty minutes some officer in our front ordered his regiment to retire, and when they reached our position Captain Otey (acting lieutenant-colonel) gave a similar order, when we retired through the enemy's tents, and about half of the battalion stopped at the intrenchments; the balance retreated farther. The portion of the command that stopped at the intrenchments remained there until after dark, when they were ordered to the rear and bivouacked for the night. They remained in this position during the next day.

There were many exhibitions of individual bravery, but I deem it unnecessary to discriminate. The dispersion of Captain Otey's company was due to the fact their first lieutenant (acting captain) was severely wounded, another wounded, and the remaining taken prisoner, who, however, escaped upon the second retreat of the enemy.

We suffered in this battle very severely, losing in killed and wounded 6 commissioned officers and 80 enlisted men, as the accompanying report will show.*

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. R. BAGBY,
Captain, Commanding.

COMMANDER OF THE THIRD BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION.

No. 113.

Report of Brig. Gen. Gabriel J. Rains, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.

BRIGADE CAMP,
Near Richmond, Va., June 8, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to forward reports from the colonels of regiments composing my brigade of the battle of Seven Pines, and to give my unqualified approbation of the conduct of each one on that memorable occasion.

Pursuant to the instructions of Major-General Hill, on the field of battle, Brigadier-General Rodde's brigade being actively engaged with an overpowering mass of the enemy, with the two right regiments of my command, soon followed by the third and part of the fourth, we penetrated the woods, to take the enemy in rear and drive him from his batteries, now playing with fearful effect upon our troops. We found ourselves in a swamp, but pressed on with alacrity until we had gained the rear of the enemy. Here we halted, directed by kind Providence, exactly at the right place, where I made a change of front by a wheel in the thicket, and advancing found ourselves facing the foe. Some of our men had fired on what I was afraid to be some of our own troops, but it proved otherwise from the dead bodies we passed, and the enemy must have been firing there upon one another. As soon as

* Not found.

we reached the edge of the thicket, seeing the enemy in front, I ordered the fire. For a moment it ran along the line, not fairly yet in position, and was then followed by a long, loud, and continued roll of musketry for full fifteen minutes without cessation. I had heard many a volley before, but never one so prolonged and continuous.

We evidently were unexpected there, were near at hand to the foe, and struck them like an avalanche. Their shot and cannon balls came like hail into the bushes around us, but the men lay close to the ground and only rose up on the knee to fire. The enemy were in great force before us, at least ten to one, and increasing by re-enforcements, and at their fire about 100 of our men broke to the rear, but happening to be just there I easily rallied them, and they fought like heroes, and more than redeemed the act of a momentary panic.

All acquitted themselves well, and when we emerged from the woods and swept through the desolated camp of the enemy, amid their dead and wounded, their property lying everywhere around, not one article was taken by the men, who maintained their ranks like true soldiers, and ultimately passed the night in line of battle without fire or light in another part of the woods, ready to receive and check the enemy should he advance, also taking a number of prisoners.

My brigade was again called upon the next day to resist the enemy, actively engaged out of view with another part of our army, but I presume he had had enough of the fight and carnage for once and did not appear.

Our loss in the battle was more than one-seventh of the whole brigade, and of these very few not killed or wounded, and I regret being obliged to report Col. B. D. Fry, Thirteenth Alabama Regiment, severely wounded in the hand; Col. E. A. O'Neal, Twenty-sixth Alabama Regiment, badly injured by a cannon-slug, which killed his adjutant; Lieut. Col. J. M. Newton, Sixth Georgia Regiment, wounded in the leg, and Lieut. Col. R. H. Dawson, Thirteenth Alabama Regiment, hurt by the fall of his horse, killed under him. One of my aides (Lieutenant Tyler) had his horse also killed under him, but otherwise escaped; yet all these officers remained on the field of battle, bravely performing their duties to the last, and our surgeons and assistant surgeons deserve credit for the prompt and efficient manner in which their services were performed, and also the members of my staff, zealous in the discharge of their duties.

Finally, permit me to say that I am proud of my brigade, which richly merits my thanks and deserves the gratitude of our country.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

G. J. RAINS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. J. W. RATCHFORD,

A. A. G., Headquarters Third Division, in the Field.

No. 114.

Reports of Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.

RICHMOND, VA., June 7, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Third Brigade, Major-General Hill's division, on the 31st

ultimo, up to the time at which the command of the brigade was turned over to Col. John B. Gordon, of the Sixth Alabama Regiment:

On the morning of the 31st the brigade was stationed on the Charles City road, $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the point on the Williamsburg road from which it had been determined to start the columns of attack.

Between 10 and 11 a. m. I received an order through an officer of Major-General Hill's staff to put my brigade in motion under an officer of my staff, and to proceed in person by the shortest route to General Hill's quarters, then on the field, from which the attacking columns were to start. I obeyed this order promptly, and upon reporting to Major-General Hill ascertained that the order sent through the officer alluded to had been erroneously delivered—not misunderstood, for all the officers of my staff, including my volunteer aide, Lieut. Greene Peyton, heard and understood it as I did. Finding that the movement of my brigade under this order was premature, with Major-General Hill's approval I sent a staff officer to remand it to its original position. A short time after this I received a verbal order from General Hill to conduct my command at once to the point at which the attack was to be made. Hastening to execute this order, I found the brigade on the road, and after carefully giving the instructions for battle which had just been given me by Major-General Hill to the commanding officers of regiments, conducted it by the route designated in orders toward the Williamsburg road. The progress of the brigade was considerably delayed by the washing away of a bridge near the head of White Oak Swamp, by reason of which the men had to wade in water waist-deep and a large number were entirely submerged. At this point the character of the crossing was such that it was absolutely necessary to proceed with great caution to prevent the loss of both ammunition and life.

In consequence of this delay, and notwithstanding the men were carried at a double-quick time over very heavy ground a considerable distance to make up for it, when the signal for attack was given only my line of skirmishers, the Sixth Alabama and another regiment, the Twelfth Mississippi, were in position. Having received, while on the march, several messages from General Hill urging me to move forward, I warned him before the signal was given, through Captain Tayloe, of his staff, and also through an orderly, whom he had sent to ascertain my position, that I could not possibly reach the point from which we were to start within less than half an hour. When the signal was given my line of skirmishers and the Twelfth Mississippi Regiment moved to the attack and immediately thereafter the action began. Under these circumstances, as each of the remaining regiments came up I caused it to move forward to the attack, so that my brigade moved to the field of battle *en échelon* and in the following order: 1st, Sixth Alabama Regiment, Colonel Gordon commanding, deployed as skirmishers, covering the whole front of the brigade; 2d, Twelfth Mississippi, Col. W. H. Taylor, moving with its left on the Williamsburg road; 3d, Heavy Artillery Battalion, Capt. C. C. Otey commanding; 4th, Fifth Alabama Regiment, Col. C. C. Pegues commanding; 5th, Twelfth Alabama Regiment, Col. R. T. Jones commanding. The King William Artillery, Capt. Thomas H. Carter commanding, I ordered to proceed by the shortest route to the Williamsburg road, and to follow the left of the brigade along that road after the whole of the brigade had advanced.

Ascertaining the position of the right of the Twelfth Mississippi Regiment, I endeavored to move the remaining regiments rapidly into line of battle with it; but finding that this regiment was pressed, I moved the Fifth Alabama directly to its support. The ground over

which we were to move being covered with very thick undergrowth, and the soil being very marshy, so marshy that it was with great difficulty either horses or men could get over it, and being guided only by the fire in front, I emerged from the woods upon the Williamsburg road under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry with only five companies of the Fifth Alabama; the remaining companies, having become separated, had moved into the abatis in their front and on the right of the Twelfth Mississippi. Finding that the Twelfth Mississippi had moved forward into the abatis and was gallantly holding its own along its front, and my battle instructions requiring me to operate upon the right of the Williamsburg road, I ordered the left wing of the Fifth to move through the abatis and join the right, and moving toward the right myself, found the battalion of heavy artillery opposite their position in line, but halted and lying down in the wood behind the abatis, which Captain Bagby, temporarily in command, informed me was in obedience to an order from Major-General Hill. Ordering them forward, I proceeded farther to the right, and found that the Twelfth Alabama, which had moved over less difficult ground than the other regiments had, was considerably in advance of the brigade, and that, together with the Sixth, still deployed as skirmishers, it was engaging the enemy, having driven him steadily up to his intrenchments. Concentrating the Sixth, I moved both it and the Twelfth Alabama about 60 yards to the rear, in order to form the whole brigade in a continuous line preparatory to an advance upon the enemy's earth-works.

While arranging the line of battle the left wing of the Fifth Alabama Regiment, under Maj. E. L. Hobson (Lieut. Col. J. M. Hall having been wounded), in its eagerness to engage the enemy at close quarters and having misunderstood my order to move to the right, moved forward without orders into the field in front of the abatis and directly under the guns of the redoubt. After holding its position there a few minutes and finding that its movement was premature it moved back in perfect order, under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, to the front of the abatis. My line of battle was thus completed. It was formed under a heavy fire throughout its entire extent and seemed about equal in extent to that of the enemy, which was then in front of his camp and was protected by a redoubt and intrenchments.

My instructions for battle required me under these circumstances to move my command the length of a brigade to the right to give place to the supporting brigade, but having discovered soon after my arrival upon the field in front of the enemy's works some of the troops of the supporting brigade on the right of my brigade, I sent to communicate with its commanding officer, and found the whole of his brigade on the right of my own. I therefore determined to attack from the position my brigade then held, and requested General Rains, who commanded the supporting brigade, through an officer of my staff and soon after in person, to move forward his brigade through the woods, so as to protect my right flank while I attacked the enemy in front. He stated to me that he apprehended an attack on his own right flank, and declined, therefore, to move; his brigade had a few moments before occupied a line extending from my right obliquely to the front, and at the moment of our conversation was being thrown back on a line parallel to and a little in rear of that occupied by mine.

By this time the enemy began to show signs of wavering under the effects of a heavy fire from a Confederate battery on my left, which proved to be the King William Artillery, under Captain Carter. Their

battery of seven guns was in a moment after silenced and the occupants of the redoubt driven out by Captain Carter's five pieces. Captain Carter, so far as the enemy's first line of intrenchments was concerned, had achieved a victory, for upon moving forward with the whole brigade to attack the enemy, having already abandoned his guns and redoubt, fled from his intrenchments and camp to occupy a line of abatis and woods about 150 yards in rear of the redoubt, leaving behind him seven pieces of artillery, several horses, a large quantity of quartermaster's, commissary, and medical stores, including a large quantity of lemons, one four-horse wagon and team, with a large amount of baggage of both officers and men.

From this new position they opened fire upon my right regiment, the Sixth Alabama, across an open field. Finding that they outflanked smartly my right and that my left was exposed, as I saw no Confederate troops on that flank, and that the brigade would be well protected on the outside of the enemy's works and by a fence extending in front of a thin skirt of woods occupied by my right regiment, I gave orders that it should occupy and hold that line while I waited for General Rains to come up on my right and until I could examine the ground to the left of the Williamsburg road, my left flank being approached closely by woods. At the moment of our taking possession of the works I discovered a brigade of Federal infantry approaching my brigade from the woods just mentioned on the left of the Williamsburg road. The head of this column halted within 350 yards of the redoubt. I immediately caused the Fifth Alabama to occupy the redoubt and the Twelfth Mississippi to occupy the rifle pits between the redoubt and the Williamsburg road, and called for a company of the heavy artillery to turn upon the enemy's column some of his abandoned guns, an order which Captain Bagby's company promptly obeyed. But before he succeeded in opening fire Captain Carter arrived with his battery, and immediately opened fire with the first of his pieces and in a moment afterward with a second. In a few moments Captain Bagby, having succeeded in getting two of the enemy's pieces in position, opened fire upon him, and then under the combined fire of those four pieces he gave way and retired.

An attack being threatened in front, as soon as the force on the left was dispersed one of Captain Carter's pieces was, under the direction of Major-General Hill, who had just arrived, placed in such a position as to enfilade the road. At this moment, from a point 600 or 700 yards down this road and directly in front of our position, the enemy's battery opened fire upon us with considerable effect, sweeping off almost every man from Captain Carter's last-mentioned piece. This fire was at once replied to by Captain Carter's four remaining pieces and by one or two pieces of the Latham Battery, which just then arrived, under Captain Dearing.

It was at this juncture that Captain Carter and his men gave a second illustration of their extraordinary coolness and courage, the first having been given in unlimbering his pieces in an open field and attacking with success the enemy's redoubt, defended by heavier pieces than his, at the distance of 400 yards.

Finding that Confederate troops were arriving on my right and left, I ordered my brigade to move forward again, which it bravely did, though encountering a heavy fire of musketry and artillery from the enemy concealed behind a second row of abatis, woods, and fence. My two right regiments, the Sixth and Twelfth Alabama, suffered severely in this advance. The Sixth Alabama, upon moving across the

field in the edge of which they had first halted and entering the woods on the opposite side, driving the enemy before them, encountered a heavy fire of musketry upon its right and front and finally upon the rear of its right wing. Under these circumstances, and finding that my right was not supported by the brigade of General Rains, which was but a short distance behind, and which, having advanced somewhat, extended now from a point opposite the center of the Sixth Alabama Regiment toward the right and was in sight of the Sixth Alabama Regiment, I ordered this regiment to fall back to the position it had last occupied on the edge of the field, where it was about in line with the enemy's intrenchments, and where, though still under fire, it was somewhat protected.

I feel decidedly confident that if we had been properly supported in the last charge the brigade would have marched on with uninterrupted progress, because the enemy invariably yielded to a direct advance, and the men and officers of this brigade everywhere exhibited great courage and an earnest desire to close with him.

When the Sixth Alabama moved back, the right wing of the Twelfth Alabama, under command of its lieutenant-colonel—Col. R. T. Jones having been killed a few minutes before, while leading forward his men—retired with it and took position on its left behind the intrenchments. The left wing also started to retire, but at the command of its major (S. B. Pickens) promptly resumed its position, but afterward fell back to a position in front of the intrenchments. At this time a portion of the Heavy Artillery Battalion retired and, I regret to say, headed by their officers, took refuge in the ditches in front of the enemy's redoubt, a position from which I had much difficulty in dislodging them when they were called upon to man the redoubt.

I did not attempt to re-establish either this portion of the battalion or the Twelfth Alabama Regiment in the position from which they had withdrawn, because it was evident that nothing could be effected toward an advance while the right wing of the brigade was so exposed. A part of the battalion, the Fifth Alabama, and Twelfth Mississippi Regiments continued to hold their ground steadily, though subjected to a constant fire from the enemy's musketry, which inflicted a severe loss upon them. The enemy's batteries in the mean time had been silenced, but while the contest between them and our own was going on the Twelfth Mississippi and a portion of the Fifth Alabama, which were directly between these batteries, maintained their posts without flinching.

Just after the Twelfth Alabama had fallen back and about an hour after the brigade had assumed its most advanced position, during which time it had been under constant fire of musketry, re-enforcements commenced to arrive, and in assisting General Kemper to place his brigade, so that it could move forward to relieve my advance regiments, which by this time had been under fire fully three hours, I received a wound in the arm, which in a short time became so painful as to compel me to turn over the command of the brigade to Colonel Gordon, of the Sixth Alabama. I did not leave the field, though, until sunset.

The loss in the brigade, and especially in the Sixth Alabama and Twelfth Mississippi Regiments, had already been serious, but in this second forward movement, and while holding the advanced position, the loss inflicted upon it was far heavier, the Sixth Alabama having lost more than half its force.

Among the other casualties incident to the second advance I regret to say that some of the best officers of the brigade were killed. Col.

R. T. Jones, of the Twelfth Alabama, the most accomplished officer in the brigade; Lieutenant-Colonel Willingham and Major Nesmith, of the Sixth Alabama, and Capt. C. C. Otey, of the Heavy Artillery Battalion, who had been conspicuous for their gallantry and efficiency, fell while pushing forward with their men into the thickest of the fight.

As a matter of duty and with pride and pleasure I bear testimony to the gallantry and steadiness of the whole brigade. Nowhere during the war has their conduct been excelled in any particular whereof a soldier might be proud to boast. The conduct of the King William Artillery has nowhere in the history of the war been equaled* for daring, coolness, or efficiency.

It is of course impossible for me to have noticed all those individuals who among so many brave men especially distinguished themselves, but it is my duty to mention the names of some who attracted my attention and to recommend those of them who are still living as worthy to receive the badge of honor alluded to in General Orders, No. 11, Longstreet's division, May 23, 1862.

Among the living whose gallantry and coolness entitle them to distinction I beg to mention Col. J. B. Gordon, Sixth Alabama; Col. C. C. Pegues, Fifth Alabama; Col. W. H. Taylor, Twelfth Mississippi; Maj. E. L. Hobson, Fifth Alabama; Maj. S. B. Pickens, Twelfth Alabama; Capt. T. H. Carter, King William Artillery; Captains Bagby and White and Lieutenant Yeatman, of the Heavy Artillery Battalion; Capt. A. M. Gordon, Sixth Alabama; Capt. Exton Tucker, Twelfth Alabama; Private Johnston, King William Artillery, and Sergt. Robert Hall, Twelfth Mississippi Regiment.

For those that are dead I beg that the testimonial to their distinguished merit may be transmitted to their nearest relatives. Among those to whose memory it is eminently due are Col. R. T. Jones, Lieutenant-Colonel Willingham, Major Nesmith, and Capt. C. C. Otey. Captains Fox and Bell, of the Sixth Alabama; Captains Keeling and Darwin, of the Twelfth Alabama; Captain Hastings, of the Twelfth Mississippi, and Lieutenant Newman, of the King William Artillery, though not coming under my own observation, are reported to me by those competent to judge as having behaved with such coolness and gallantry as to entitle them also to the testimonial. Many others are doubtless equally deserving of honorable mention, but none of them have been formally reported to me.

My staff officers—Maj. D. T. Webster, acting commissary of subsistence; Capt. H. A. Whiting, assistant adjutant-general; Lieuts. P. T. Sutton and Greene Peyton, aides-de-camp—conducted themselves in such a gallant manner and were so efficient that it is my duty to recommend them as worthy to receive the badge of distinction. Lieutenant Sutton was wounded so severely in the arm at the close of the day as to render amputation necessary. Captain Whiting had his horse killed under him. Major Webster's horse was killed also.

The brigade was under a constant fire of musketry and artillery during five and a half hours, and hence its loss was heavy. The following statement exhibits the casualties in the different regiments and the battery:

(* On original is following note:) "This is a strong expression, and argues that the writer was conversant with the conduct of artillery in all the various actions of the war." [D. H. H.]

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
Brigade staff.....			2			
5th Alabama.....	1	28	10	171		
6th Alabama.....	9	82	22	255		5
12th Alabama.....	5	54	6	143		
12th Mississippi.....	5	36	8	144		
Carter's battery.....	1	4	1	24		
Heavy Artillery Battalion.....	3	13	3	64		
Total.....	24	217	52	801		5
Aggregate loss, 1,099.						

The total number of men carried into action was about 2,200. The aggregate number present at camp was, however, 2,587.

The Sixth Alabama lost near 60 per cent. of its aggregate force. Some of its men were drowned after having been wounded, as they fought at times in a swamp in which the water was from 6 inches to 2 feet in depth.

The right company of the Sixth Alabama was thrown back at right angles to the line of battle by Colonel Gordon to protect his rear, and engaged the enemy at such close quarters that its brave commander, Captain Bell, after having fallen wounded mortally, was able to use his revolver with effect upon the enemy. This company fought with great heroism. Its loss was 21 killed and 23 wounded out of a total of 55.

Respectfully submitted.

R. E. RODES,
Brigadier-General.

Maj. J. W. RATCHFORD,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Division.

[Indorsement.]

—, —, 1862.

This report is forwarded at the request of General Rodes, to be published with my own, which he thinks does not do justice to his brigade, and especially to Captain Carter. General Rodes thinks that the battery of Captain Carter had much to do with the evacuation of the enemy's works. The truth is, he fired but twice at the redoubts. I ordered him to confine his attention to the infantry re-enforcements coming up the road. These he broke by a well-directed fire, when exposed himself to a fire of both musketry and artillery. He afterward broke a second column advancing to retake the works, and unquestionably the day would have been lost but for his battery. However, I had a full view of the field from my position, and could see no movement toward evacuating the works till General Rains opened fire on the flank and rear. This brigade (Rains'), unfortunately, did little more. Had he pressed vigorously on the right, 500 casualties would have been saved in Rodes' brigade.

D. H. HILL,
Major-General.

No. 115.

Report of Col. John B. Gordon, Sixth Alabama Infantry, commanding Rodes' brigade.

Although Brigadier-General Rodes did not retire from the field in one hour and a half after he was wounded, and not until the firing had entirely ceased, he was compelled from exhaustion to turn over the command of the brigade. Notified that I was placed in command, I reported to Major-General Hill for orders. Under his direction I moved the brigade about half a mile to the rear, and ordered them to encamp on either side of the Williamsburg road, spending nearly the entire night with large details from the brigade in nursing the wounded whom the surgeons had been unable to remove.

I was ordered soon after the firing began Sunday morning to move the brigade forward to support the troops then engaging the enemy on the left of the Williamsburg road and to prevent the enemy from retaking his earthworks. Moving down by the right flank, we met fragments of a regiment which had been routed by the enemy retreating, officers and men, at a rapid pace and in great confusion. Every effort was made to rally them by appealing to their pride and patriotism and pointing to the example then being set by the men who had borne the burden of the day before. Rebuked by Major-General Hill, who was passing at the time, a few of them formed in rear and followed the brigade to the position designated by General Hill. Forming a line around the front of the abatis, on the left of the road, this position was held, in constant expectation of being called into action, until we were relieved by the brigade of General Colston.

Among the articles captured by this brigade was a flag, since turned over to the proper authorities; the order-book of Colonel Bailey, First New York Artillery, and the orders and correspondence of General Casey. Among the latter was a letter to Secretary Stanton in reference to the means to be adopted to hold the Confederate States in subjection when conquered. This letter has since been published.

I inclose herewith a list of the casualties of each command of the brigade.

I am, very respectfully, major, your obedient servant,

J. B. GORDON,

Col., Comdg. Third Brig., Third Div., Army of the Potomac.

No. 116.

Report of Col. C. C. Pegues, Fifth Alabama Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ALABAMA REGIMENT,
Near Richmond, Va., June 5, 1862.

In obedience to an order received I herewith submit a report of the action of the Fifth Alabama Regiment, together with a list of the casualties, during the battle of the Seven Pines, on May 31 and June 1:

Saturday, about 11 a. m., the regiment moved down the Charles City road about 1½ miles, and, filing to the left, approached the enemy's works on the right of the Williamsburg road. After passing through a dense swamp covered with water the regiment emerged from the woods in front of the enemy's camp, which was fortified with a redoubt and a long line of breastworks and rifle pits, and advanced toward it over an abatis formed by thickly-felled timber, which in some places

was almost impassable. While in the abatis an order was received to move by the right flank and approach the redoubt more in rear. I immediately moved the right wing in the direction ordered, leaving instructions with Lieut. Col. J. M. Hall to follow with the left wing.

In consequence of a wound received in the hand Lieutenant-Colonel Hall left the field before executing this order; hence the left wing remained in the abatis in front of the redoubt, being at the time under command of Maj. E. L. Hobson, where it suffered severely from the enemy's batteries and long-range guns. The right wing formed line on the left of the Fourth Virginia Battalion, and the entire line was ordered by General Rodes in person to charge the redoubt. While making this charge the left wing emerged from the abatis, took its proper place in line, and the whole regiment charged over the ditch and embankment into the redoubt, where we captured a stand of colors and six pieces of artillery. The artillery was immediately turned on the enemy, and under the management of Captain Bagby, of the Fourth Virginia Battalion, did severe execution upon the retreating enemy. This position was held by my regiment until the command was given by General Rodes to advance. The regiment moved through the enemy's camp into the open field beyond under a heavy fire of artillery and small-arms from the enemy, who was concealed in the felled timber in rear of his camp.

Here we remained one and a half hours under a galling fire and unable to return it ourselves on account of the Virginia battalion being in front. It was here my regiment suffered most severely, losing more than 100 men in killed and wounded at this particular spot. I was finally ordered to lead my regiment under cover of a wood-pile about 60 paces to the rear, where it remained until the fighting for the day ceased.

On the following day (Sunday, June 1) the regiment, with the rest of the brigade, was ordered to the support of General Mahone's command, then engaged with the enemy. In this position the enemy's artillery and musketry played upon us, but being under cover of the woods, we sustained no loss.

During the progress of the battle many instances of individual heroism and bravery occurred under my own observation, but where all behaved so well it would be invidious to discriminate. I cannot, however, forbear to mention the coolness and bravery with which Major Hobson acted throughout the entire engagement. His horse was killed while in the abatis in front of the redoubt, but he continued on foot and discharged his duties coolly, bravely, and to my entire satisfaction. My acting adjutant, Lieut. R. Inge Smith, displayed great courage and rendered me efficient service in carrying orders and assisting me with his presence and counsel throughout the action. All the captains and other officers under my command merit the highest praise. By their example they encouraged the men to the discharge of their duties. I take pleasure in stating that I discovered hardly a single instance of trepidation. Officers and men behaved bravely and were guilty of no conduct unbecoming worthy soldiers.

The list of casualties hereto appended shows a loss of 229 killed and wounded and only 2 missing and unaccounted for, which is sufficient evidence of that bravery and gallantry with which this regiment acted.

Respectfully,

C. C. PEGUES,

Colonel, Commanding Fifth Alabama Regiment.

Maj. H. A. WHITING, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

No. 117.

Report of Col. John B. Gordon, Sixth Alabama Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ALABAMA REGIMENT,
Near Richmond, Va., June 7, 1862.

MAJOR: In accordance with orders from brigade headquarters I have to report that on the morning of the 31st ultimo I moved my regiment across to the Williamsburg road by the left flank, and having reminded them of the proclamation of the infamous Butler and of the fate which awaited us if defeated, deployed them as skirmishers in front of the brigade, with the left resting on the road. They were moved forward as the skirmishers from the brigade of General Garland, deployed on the left of the road, approached my left flank. This forward movement was difficult and fatiguing in the extreme, and can only be appreciated by a knowledge of the fact that the guide, in order to move with General Garland's skirmishers, was thrown necessarily on the left, where the woods impeded the march much less than on the right and center. Passing through swamps and dense underbrush, these portions of the line came not unfrequently in contact with hedges of briars so tall and dense as to render it necessary for the skirmishers to file around them and retake their places in line by the double-quick. The enemy's advanced posts were first reached and attacked by General Garland's skirmishers, then by my left, then by my center, and finally by my right, demonstrating that the enemy's line did not extend across the Williamsburg road at right angles, but nearly parallel to the general course of the Chickahominy River. As my skirmishers entered the open field in which the enemy had erected his earthworks a regiment was moved up in line of battle covering my left wing. Upon this regiment I ordered a forward movement under their fire, in order to get within easy range for my rifles. A few rounds were exchanged and they retired to their intrenchments.

From the woods in front of my right and center and on the left of the enemy's works he had by this time thrown forward one or two regiments, protected by a heavy rail fence. My skirmishers were immediately ordered forward until within easy range, and then, lying down behind stumps and logs, they poured a most deadly fire for some minutes into the solid ranks of the enemy, when, re-enforced and assisted by the Twelfth Alabama Regiment, this line of the enemy was also driven under cover of the woods. Under this fire from the enemy some of my best officers and many men fell. Captain Fox, Company E, no less brave than accomplished, was killed; Capt. A. M. Gordon, Company D, seriously wounded.

The brigade was now being formed in line of battle just in rear of my line of skirmishers, when, upon application to General Rodes, I was ordered to form my regiment on the right of the brigade and charge with it the enemy's earthworks. These were soon occupied by the brigade. Here the troops on my left halted, but the order not having reached me, my regiment moved on into the enemy's camps and captured a stand of colors. Here an incident occurred which, though insignificant in itself, is worthy of record, as evincing the spirit of the brave men under my command. Ordered back to form on the brigade, I moved by the right-about until I reached my position, when, anxious to screen my men as soon as possible, I ordered them to lie down. A charge on the abatis and swamp was soon ordered. The command was given, "Forward (and pausing for the men to rise), march." The entire regi-

ment rose promptly and began the march to the rear under their conception of the order. Impressed with the importance of arresting the movement at once I galloped about equidistant between my line and that of the enemy, and called to my men by word and gesture to move on the enemy. Promptly facing about, and exclaiming from one end of the line to the other that the order was misunderstood, they moved at double-quick with such impetuosity that the enemy fled from his hiding places before us. Falling back, however, upon a second line, he poured a most terrific fire upon my ranks.

In this charge my fearless and efficient field officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Willingham and Major Nesmith, fell, nobly doing their whole duty. To me their loss at this trying hour was great indeed—to the regiment it is almost irreparable. Having had my horse killed just as I neared the abatis work, I was forced to discharge my subsequent duties on foot.

Entering the swamp, covered in water 2 or 3 feet deep, in which the vines, briars, and felled timber made an almost impassable barrier, we were driving the enemy steadily before us, when he suddenly moved upon my right flank a strong force bearing Confederate battle-flags and enfiladed my entire line. My adjutant was ordered immediately off to ask for support, but was shot down. Messenger after messenger was then dispatched to urge the troops in rear of my right to move down to my support.

This brigade, although within sight and but a few hundred yards distant, failed to give me any assistance whatever. Prompt succor would have enabled us to have driven the enemy, already fleeing in my front, entirely from the abatis, and have saved to the service one-half of my fallen. But to protect my right and rear it now became necessary to change the front of my right company (A), under the command of Capt. Thomas H. Bell, than whom a more gallant officer never gave his life for love of country. In a sheet of fire and within a few rods of overwhelming numbers this company stood until the last officer and non-commissioned officer, except 1 corporal and 44 of the 56 men carried into action, had fallen. Yet when General Rodes gave the order for this regiment to fall back the few survivors were loading and firing, all undaunted, amid their fallen comrades.

In my judgment history does not record an instance of greater courage and more steadiness of nerve than was exhibited by this entire regiment. Contending from the first with superior numbers, flanked on the right and unsupported by reserves, officers and men falling thick and fast, if not killed possibly to drown in the water in which they stood, there was no sign of wavering in any portion of the line.

Two field officers had fallen, three companies had not an officer spared, four others had but one, and more than half of these brave men had fallen, when, under orders, they retired to the enemy's intrenchments in the rear.

It is impossible in a report of this kind to mention the many instances of individual heroism exhibited during the day. Of Captains Flournoy and McCarty, of each man and officer who fell, I can say he died at his post.

I am, very respectfully, major, your obedient servant,

J. B. GORDON,

Colonel Sixth Alabama Regiment.

Major WHITING,

A. A. G., Third Brig., Third Div., Army of the Potomac.

No. 118.

Report of Lieut. Col. B. B. Gayle, Twelfth Alabama Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ALABAMA REGIMENT,

June 5, 1862.

On Saturday, May 31, this regiment, in company with the others of General Rodes' brigade, left camp about 12 o'clock for the purpose of attacking the enemy. After penetrating a swamp knee-deep in water we were in full view of the foe, and forthwith received a heavy fire from him. We lay on the ground in the edge of the woods for a short time, using our long-range guns to no bad purpose. An order was then received to move forward to the right. This was done without hesitation, and the right wing, having to cross an open field, received a heavy fire.

Here several of our men were wounded, but none, I believe, killed. We did not remain long in this position, for the enemy, seeing that another regiment to our right was about to flank them, retired. In a few moments the whole brigade was in line, and after making a half wheel to the left commenced to charge upon the breastworks and camp of the enemy. In this charge the men were exposed to a terrific fire, but their steady movements showed too clearly to the enemy a determination to cross bayonets with them had they remained a few minutes longer. We pushed onward, and on reaching the works that were then deserted found ourselves exposed to a severe cross-fire from the bushes on the right; kept close to the ground until orders were given to continue the pursuit, when every man rose to his feet and dashed onward. We soon came to thick brush and felled trees, in which the fleeing foe had concealed himself. Owing to these obstructions we could charge no farther. Here now we lay in the open field, while the enemy, with whom we are contending, is concealed in thick brush in front. Our brave men are falling rapidly. But do they falter? Not one! They load, rise, take deliberate aim, and fire. "I saw him fall," they would exclaim, and then repeat the same operation with equal coolness. But I soon saw that our exposed position could not be maintained; we were fighting under too many disadvantages; our men were falling too rapidly.

After remaining under this fire for more than an hour I perceived that the regiment on my right had fallen back and the foe that had engaged it was now opening a deadly cross-fire on the Twelfth. However, I had received no orders to retreat, and continued to remain longer in this hazardous position. Finally I concluded that our colonel, and perhaps our general, had fallen, and, besides, the battery in rear, while trying to protect us, would unintentionally throw shot and shell too short and mangle our own men. To stand this state of affairs any longer I knew would be death to all, so I gave the command to retreat. The left wing, not hearing the command, was rallied before reaching the breastworks; but as soon as the order was understood no further confusion ensued. This, however, was productive of much good, as the enemy was checked in his advance, the left wing not being more than 40 yards from the woods.

The Twelfth Alabama, while advancing, charged directly through the camp of the enemy. Soon after passing it, halted, laid down, and opened a heavy volley, then charged the brush. It was while in this hazardous position that our brave colonel was slain.

After falling back to the redoubt we remained half an hour, and

night having set in, retired down the road about half a mile, where we remained until morning.

The number of men carried into the fight, as near as can be ascertained, was about 408 ; number killed, 59 ; number wounded, 156. Thus more than half carried into battle were killed and wounded.

B. B. GAYLE,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

No. 119.

Report of Brig. Gen. George E. Pickett, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.

— — —, 1862.

SIR: On the afternoon of May 31, and just as the battle of Seven Pines was being opened by Major-General Longstreet, I was directed by that officer to move with my brigade to the York River Railroad, cover the same, repel any advance of the enemy up that road, and to hold myself in readiness to move to the support of our advance if needed.

About 9 p. m. received orders from General Longstreet to march my brigade at daylight and report to Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, at or near Seven Pines; moved accordingly, found General Hill at General Casey's late headquarters, just in rear of enemy's redoubt—"The Redoubt." My brigade had marched on some 400 yards in advance of this point when it was there halted. General Hill directed me to ride over to the railroad and communicate with Brigadier-General Hood, whose right was resting on that road. I asked General Hill of the whereabouts of the enemy. He said they were some distance in advance—in fact, I had no definite idea where, as I saw no one and had not had time to examine the nature of [the] ground or the position.

With two of my staff officers—Captain Pickett, assistant adjutant-general, and Capt. R. Archer, aide-de-camp—I proceeded through the undergrowth and thickets toward the railroad some 400 yards, when I was met by a party of the Louisiana Zouaves (who had evidently been on a plundering expedition) rushing past me at a most headlong speed. One fellow, riding a mule with a halter, I seized on and detained for explanation. He said the enemy were within a few yards of us and entreated me to let him save himself. I immediately rode back with him at a gallop, and as briefly as possible informed General Hill of the circumstances. He ordered me to attack, and I supposed same order was given to other brigade commanders. I rejoined my brigade at once, and by a change of front forward put it in line of battle nearly perpendicular to the railroad and advanced. Armistead on my left, and Pryor and Wilcox (the latter I did not see, but heard he was there) on my right, struck the enemy within a short distance (who opened heavily on us), drove him through an abatis, over a cross-road leading to railroad, and was advancing over a second abatis when I had discovered Armistead's brigade had broken and were leaving the field pell-mell. At this moment I was on foot and half way across the abatis, the men moving on beautifully and carrying everything before them.

I could scarcely credit my own eyes in witnessing this misfortune on my left. I immediately rode to that part of [the] field; found nothing between me and [the] railroad except the gallant Armistead himself,

with a regimental color and some 30 persons, mostly officers, with him. I saw our danger at once and dispatched a courier to General Hill, asking for more troops to cover the vacuum. Receiving no reply, and the enemy pressing forward in force, brigade after brigade, and threatening my left flank, I threw back the left wing of the Nineteenth Virginia, the left regiment, so as to oppose a front to them, dispatched a staff officer to General Hill with [a] request for troops; and after a while sent a second dispatch, similarly worded.

As a matter of course, from having been the attacking party, I now had to act on the defensive. Fortunately the enemy seemed determined on attacking and carrying my front and driving me out of the abatis, which our men succeeded in preventing, though with considerable loss.

About this time I learned [that] Pryor's brigade was being withdrawn from my right. I had in the mean time sent all my staff and couriers back to General Hill, the last message being that if he would send more troops and some ammunition to me we would drive the enemy across the Chickahominy; and I have always believed this would have been done but for the misfortune which happened to our general on the previous evening. Had he not been wounded, and been on the field with us, the result would have been entirely different. I do not mean to cast any blame on the brave and heroic Hill, for after the fall of the master spirit there seemed to be no head, and Hill, I know, was bothered and amazed with countermanding orders. No assistance, no demonstration was given or made from the other side of the railroad. A most perfect apathy seemed to prevail; not a gun was fired, and I subsequently learned from Brigadier-General Hood that he saw the enemy pouring his forces across the railroad not more than 600 or 800 yards in his front and concentrating their attack on me; that one piece of artillery placed in the railroad cut would have stopped this and drawn their attention to his front, but he said he had orders to make no movement, but to wait for orders. A forward movement then by the left wing of our army would have struck the enemy in flank—at any rate, have stopped their concentration.

At this perilous juncture, hearing nothing from General Hill, I rode as rapidly as possible to him, and explained as laconically [as I could] the position of affairs. He asked me if I could not withdraw my brigade. I said yes, but did not wish to do so; that I would leave all my wounded, lose many more men, and that the enemy would pour down on the disorganized mass, as he himself termed the troops about him. He then sent two regiments of Colston's brigade, which my assistant adjutant-general, Captain Pickett, put in position on my left, and asked me to take Mahone's brigade and put it on my right, which was done; Mahone becoming hotly engaged in a few minutes after getting in position. I had [issued] an order to my men, as far as possible, to reserve their fire. From that circumstance, I suppose, and from the fact that the enemy had become aware of the small force actually opposed to them, a brigade debouched from the piece of woods in my front and moved steadily toward my left flank. They came up to within about range, when their commander, seeing his men about to commence firing, stopped them [and] called out, "What troops are these?" Some of our men shouted, "Virginians." He then cried out, "Don't fire, they'll surrender; we'll capture all these d—d Virginians." Scarcely were the words uttered when the Nineteenth and left of the Eighteenth rose up in the abatis and fired a withering volley into them, killing their commanding officer and literally mowing down their ranks. Just then

Colston's regiments came up on the left and Mahone's on the right. The enemy retreated to their bushy cover and their fire immediately slackened.

No other attempt was made by them to advance, and about 1 p. m., I judge, by General Hill's order, I withdrew the whole of our front line, Pryor and Wilcox, and some other troops I do not remember, being in position some 400 yards in our rear. We withdrew in perfect order; not a gun was fired at us, and bringing off all our wounded. This was the conclusion of the battle of Seven Pines. No shot was fired afterward.

Our troops occupied the same ground that evening, June 1 and that night, which they had done on the one previous. General Mahone, with his brigade, occupied the redoubt, and our line of pickets was thrown well out in advance. I know this of my own personal knowledge, for General Hill sent for me about 1 o'clock at night, or, rather, morning of June 2, and I went to the redoubt in search of him, and still farther on toward our picket line. General Hill gave me special orders to cover [the] withdrawal of the troops with my brigade, which, by the way, proved a much easier task than I had anticipated. I had formed my line of battle two regiments on each side of [the] road some little distance in our rear of the redoubt. The whole of our force filed past by half an hour after sunrise. I then leisurely moved off, not a Yankee in sight or even a puff of smoke.

My brigade consisted of [the] Eighth Virginia, Lieut. Col. N. Berkeley; Eighteenth, Col. R. E. Withers; Nineteenth, Col. John B. Strange, and Twenty-eighth, Col. William Watts. Aggregate, 1,700. Loss, 350 killed and wounded; no prisoners.

Very respectfully,

GEO. E. PICKETT,
Brigadier-General.

General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.

No. 120.

Report of Col. H. B. Tomlin, Fifty-third Virginia Infantry.

JUNE 5, 1862.

CAPTAIN: On Saturday, May 31, the Fifty-third Regiment Virginia Volunteers was assigned as its position the left of Brigadier-General Armistead's brigade, and while marching from the Charles City to the Williamsburg road, with the right in front, was, upon reaching the latter road, ordered by Major-General Longstreet to remain as a reserve with him until further orders. It was then detached from General Armistead's brigade.

Early next morning I dispatched Maj. G. M. Waddill to report the above fact to General Armistead, to ascertain the position he occupied, and to report that I would join him with my regiment as soon as relieved. Maj. G. M. Waddill returned, reporting that he could not find General Armistead. I dispatched Maj. G. M. Waddill the second time and followed on as soon as relieved by General Longstreet. Upon reaching Seven Pines, Maj. G. M. Waddill indicated the direction in which General Armistead had gone, and informed me that his adjutant had sent me instructions to deploy on the left of the Ninth Virginia Regiment, then not in sight, and saying it had entered the

woods near a given point. Just before this point was reached the order was given to form column by companies and then forward into line of battle. And though this movement was executed in double-quick time, before it was executed we received a heavy cross-fire from the right and left, which was immediately returned. Seeing no enemy, and having received no other order than the one above recited, I ordered the men to lie down. Discovering troops coming toward our right wing with white bands on their hats, [I] ordered mine not to fire; that they were friends; but the fire continuing [ed] down the whole line, yet too high to do much injury. Some one, without authority, in the right wing gave the command to retreat, which was passed down the whole line by the captains, and the men fell back in great disorder into the field on which they had just emerged, reformed, and, with every company in proper position in line of battle, double-quickened it back into the woods, and shortly after crossing the road came up with the Forty-first Virginia Regiment, marching directly toward us. From this direction we received a constant fire, which we returned until some of our officers, recognizing some of the officers of the Forty-first Virginia Regiment (Maj G. M. Waddill, who was upon the left wing, while I was at that time upon the right), commanded them to march in retreat.

At this time my horse was killed, and not hearing the command nor knowing the cause, attempted to rally the men, when the officers and men, while retiring in good order—that friends and enemies were so indiscriminately mixed up together that it was most advisable to return to the open field. We returned slowly to the field, apprehending more danger from friends than the enemy. We again reformed and reported for duty to Major-General Hill. I was then ordered to report to General Pickett at the lower end of the field, and upon reaching his brigade, posted on the left, was, at the suggestion of General Mahone, assigned to his right, with instructions to prevent the enemy from flanking the battery on his right; and while moving from the right of General Mahone's brigade to the position on the right of the battery received the fire of the enemy. Left in this position some time after the two brigades and battery had retired, I followed on and joined General Armistead's brigade, which we met with for the first time during the day, placed on the outer post nearest the enemy.

I congratulate myself upon being able to report the casualties as small, to wit:

Companies.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
A			1			1	2
B							
C		1		2		1	4
D				2			2
E				1			1
F				1			1
G			1				1
H				1			1
I				2		1	3
K			1	6			7
Total		1	3	15		3	22

* On detached service at City Point.

Maj. G. M. Waddill was thrown from his horse. Adj. E. C. Hill's horse was shot in the leg, and my own horse was shot in three places that I know of and killed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. B. TOMLIN,

Colonel, Comdg. Fifty-third Regiment Virginia Volunteers.

Capt. J. D. DARDEN, *Aide-de-Camp and A. A. A. G.*

No. 121.

Report of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.

HEADQUARTERS WILCOX'S BRIGADE,
Near Richmond, Va., June 12, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade in the battle of the 31st ultimo (Saturday) and 1st instant, known as Seven Pines:

On the 30th ultimo orders were received to be prepared with ammunition and cooked rations for an early march the following morning. At 6.30 a. m. the brigade moved from its camp near Mechanicsville turnpike by by-paths across to the junction of the Charles City and Williamsburg roads, and remained at this point till 3.30 p. m. I was then ordered to move with three brigades, my own, Colston's, and Pryor's, on the Charles City road in rear of a part of Huger's division (Blanchard's and Armistead's brigades) as a support to these troops; this order was soon modified and my three brigades ordered to precede Huger's two. Having passed Huger's brigades, the march was continued but for a short time, when orders were again received, and this time to counter-march to the Williamsburg road and follow on in rear of the troops then advancing. The brigades had retraced their steps near 1 mile, and orders were again given to face about and march down the Charles City road, and to keep abreast with the firing then heard raging furiously off to our left front, and known to be on the Williamsburg road.

Again orders were received in writing to move across to the Williamsburg road, following country roads and paths through woods and fields, a guide being furnished to conduct the command. The intervening distance between the two roads was low and flat, and in many places covered with water and at one point waist-deep. The march was of necessity very slow.

It was about 5 p. m. when the head of the column reached the Williamsburg road. The leading regiment (the Eleventh Alabama, Col. Sydenham Moore, of my brigade) was ordered immediately to the front by the division commander to report to Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, who was in command of the troops then engaged on this road. Soon after the Nineteenth Mississippi (Maj. John Mullins) received similar orders. I was directed to place Colston's brigade in rear of the right flank of the troops then engaged; this being accomplished, I moved forward in command of the two remaining regiments of my own brigade (Ninth and Tenth Alabama, Lieut. Col. Stephen F. Hale and Maj. J. J. Woodward) and reported to General D. H. Hill.

The Eleventh Alabama had been ordered by General Hill to report to General Kemper; the latter ordered three companies of this regiment to dislodge the enemy holding a certain point that proved to be very

annoying to our line. Colonel Moore took command of these companies, dislodging the enemy, receiving two wounds, one of which proved mortal, his horse being killed at the same time. This affair occasioned a loss of 66 killed and wounded in a few minutes.

On reporting to General Hill he directed me to form in line with three of my regiments in the edge of the woods beyond the field in which were the captured batteries and rifle pits of the enemy. A feeble fire from the enemy continued in the woods for some ten or fifteen minutes after my line was formed and then ceased. The fire, however, on the left of the road continued until after dark, and at times with great vivacity, and on this side the enemy had been driven much farther, he not being intrenched.

My line remained as formed till 10 p. m., and was then ordered, together with Pryor's brigade, near a mile to the front on the road to relieve Anderson's brigade, who were reported to be out of ammunition. In reaching this position we passed over the ground from which the enemy had been driven through two of their captured camps and bivouacked in a third. The night was intensely dark, and as the troops moved along the cries of the enemy's wounded were heard in the woods and swamps on the right and left, in many places the water being knee-deep.

Soon after daylight the following morning a few musketry shots were heard, revealing the fact that the enemy were in our front and rear. Dispositions were promptly made for a renewal of the fight. The position held by my troops was near a mile in advance of the captured batteries and rifle pits (Casey's headquarters) of the enemy, and in an open field some 300 yards wide and 1,200 long, and through this in its longest direction ran the Williamsburg road.

The Nineteenth Mississippi had been ordered to report to General Anderson the previous evening, and had been thrown forward a few hundred yards farther on the road. Beyond the regiment a short distance was a second open field, and beyond this the enemy's pickets could be seen. Pryor's brigade had bivouacked a few hundred yards in rear of mine, but was moved near after daylight, but not until a few shots had been exchanged between the pickets.

The field in which my brigade bivouacked was inclosed by a heavy forest, filled with a thick entangled undergrowth of bushes and brambles. The ground [was] low and in many places boggy and covered with water. Having no knowledge of the ground or of the position and strength of the enemy, I did not feel justified in making an advance, but made such a disposition of my troops as to be prepared to meet the enemy in any direction he might appear, awaiting orders in the mean time. For this purpose the Nineteenth Mississippi was withdrawn to within 100 yards of the field; the Eleventh Alabama in rear and in edge of woods near the field and to the left of [the] Nineteenth Mississippi; Tenth Alabama similarly placed, but to the right of that regiment; Ninth Alabama in edge of woods also, but to the left and right angles to the Eleventh Alabama, Pryor's brigade being held free to take any position that might be threatened by the enemy.

Scarcely had this disposition of the regiments been made when musketry was heard in front of the left of the Ninth Alabama. This regiment was moved to the left; the Eighth Alabama, Pryor's brigade, put in on its left; the firing extending toward the right, the Eleventh Alabama was moved to and formed on the right of the Ninth; and the remainder of Pryor's brigade formed on the left of the Eighth Alabama, as the firing seemed to be extending also in that direction. The musketry had now

become quite brisk and covered our front on the north side of the field, except the Eighth Alabama, Pryor's brigade. This regiment changed direction to the left to assail the enemy in flank engaged with the regiments on its left, its rear being protected by a boggy marsh while executing this change of position. The enemy had now also advanced in front of the Nineteenth Mississippi, and active musketry fire now raged on my entire front.

The men were eager for the fight, and everything seemed to indicate a success as full and complete as the day previous. The Nineteenth Mississippi had already repulsed the enemy in its front, the other troops were doing well, and the engagement, now raging furiously, was going on as well as could be desired; but just at this time an order in writing was sent to me to withdraw my command, which was instantly done, my brigade retiring by the right flank and keeping in the woods, and Pryor's brigade following back directly across the open field in rear, being pursued by the enemy to the field and experiencing some loss as it entered it. The enemy did not cross the field and soon ceased firing.

The two brigades were now moved back to near the field in which were the captured batteries and rifle pits referred to above, formed in line and facing to the north side of the road. Later in the afternoon they were farther withdrawn, and finally, at 10 p. m., moved back to their camps near Richmond, reaching there early next morning.

In this battle only one of my regiments was seriously engaged the first day. The second morning all were engaged, men and officers acting well till ordered to withdraw.

Col. Sydenham Moore, Eleventh Alabama, an officer of great promise, yielding to an exuberance of courage, received two wounds, one of which proved mortal, while in command of but three companies of his regiment that had been ordered to dislodge the enemy from [an] advanced position held by them. The loss of such an officer must be seriously felt by both the service in general and his regiment, and to the former he [is] scarcely repairable. Lieut. Walter E. Winn, adjutant Eleventh Alabama, was much distinguished for his zeal and courage. Lieut. Col. Stephen F. Hale, of the Eleventh Alabama, though commanding the Ninth Alabama by special assignment, was conspicuous for the skill with which he maneuvered his regiment. His horse was wounded. Lieutenant Wayland, quartermaster Ninth Alabama, volunteered his services to me, and was of service in transmitting orders during the engagement, and much distinguished for reckless courage. Captains Tayloe and Holcombe, of Eleventh Alabama, were wounded in [the] first day's fight, the former seriously.

To my staff—Captain Harris, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Reading, aide-de-camp—I am indebted for efficient service rendered during both days' engagement.

Pryor's brigade was not engaged on the 31st, but acted well on the second day, and yielded reluctantly to the order to withdraw.

Private Rufus G. Harper, Fifth Texas, courier, acted with great coolness in bearing orders to different parts of the command on [the] second morning.

The list of casualties has already been forwarded,* amounting in the aggregate to 110 killed and wounded.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. M. WILCOX,
Brigadier-General.

* Not found.

P. S.—When the head of my column reached the Williamsburg road Longstreet said, "You have taken a good deal of time to reach this road;" for that reason I reported the orders and counter-orders, marches and counter-marches he had given, and that I had made in obedience to his orders. The order given me to retire my command on the second morning was given in writing by D. H. Hill, and for the reason, as he stated in his note, that Mahone's men had acted badly. General Johnston, in his report, states that Pickett fought well, supported by Pryor—at least I had seen what purported to be extracts from his report in the papers to this effect. Pryor was under my command, and was ordered back to me and went back with me, and Pickett, as I was told, continued the fight, not having been recalled, or in violation of orders. Seven Pines, the successful part of it, was D. H. Hill's fight. I have thought that General Huger was a little too much censured for Seven Pines by the papers.

No. 122.

Report of Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Left Wing.

RICHMOND, VA., June 23, 1862.

MAJOR: On May 28, by direction of General Johnston, I assumed command of the left wing of the army, and on the same day placed my own division temporarily under the command of the senior brigadier-general, W. H. C. Whiting.

At 12.30 o'clock on the morning of May 31, at my headquarters, on the Brook turnpike, I received a note from General Johnston, directing that my division should take position as soon as practicable upon the Nine-mile road, near the New Bridge fork roads, to support, if necessary, the divisions upon the right in an attack upon the enemy, which was to be made early in the morning. I was informed that in case my division did not arrive in time a portion of the troops composing the center would be moved forward, and I was directed in that event to replace the troops thus moved by my division. Whiting's, Hood's, and Pettigrew's brigades were placed near the fork of the Nine-mile and New Bridge roads, Hatton's and Hampton's in reserve near Mrs. Christian's farm.

As the day wore on, and nothing decisive was heard from General Longstreet's attack except occasional firing of cannon, it seemed that no real attack was likely to be made, that day at least, but between 4 and 5 o'clock heavy musketry was distinctly heard, and General Johnston directed General Whiting to move the three brigades then at that point by the Nine-mile road to Longstreet's assistance and the two brigades at Mrs. Christian's farm were ordered to move up, follow, and support them.

All the generals and staff officers were at once occupied in impressing upon the troops the necessity of moving rapidly forward. Hood's brigade was upon the right of the Nine-mile road, Whiting's upon the road and somewhat to the left, and Pettigrew's following Whiting's upon the road. The troops, notwithstanding the mud and difficulties of the ground, moved forward in double-quick time, driving in the advance pickets of the enemy upon their support, and taking and passing their camps with scarcely a perceptible halt or notice, were

only anxious to find the enemy in force, who were still making resistance in front of Longstreet and Hill.

Hood's brigade had crossed the railroad to the right of the Nine-mile road, part of Whiting's had also crossed, Pettigrew close upon it, with Hatton's and Hampton's a short distance in rear, when a fire from two batteries of artillery opened upon the advance brigades from a position on their left and rear. These batteries were supported by infantry, and the fire becoming troublesome, it was determined to take them, at the same time not giving up the forward movement in favor of Longstreet.

Night was fast approaching, and I received from General Johnston instructions to move all the troops within reach forward as fast as possible. This order was at once transmitted to General Magruder, who caused all his troops in that vicinity to be put in motion.

General Johnston was at this time near the point where the Nine-mile road crosses the railroad. I was about half a mile farther back, and the batteries of the enemy on the left were in this rear, but in front of the position where I was. As soon as General Hampton came up I directed him to take a by-road through the woods leading to the left and front; left orders for Hatton's brigade to come on by the main road, and moved forward to an open field upon the left-hand side of the road. From this point I could for the first time see the relative positions of the batteries and the different brigades. I soon learned that General Whiting's brigade was returning to attack the batteries; that Pettigrew's brigade was also moving in that direction; that Hampton had come upon it and had already attacked, and that the three brigadier-generals were all apprised of each others relative positions, and were acting in concert under Whiting's orders. The force of the enemy was not known, but it was confidently believed that we would soon capture or drive off the batteries and resume our march in support of Longstreet.

The musketry firing now rapidly increased, and after a short time, becoming impatient of the delay, I rode across the open field to the woods where the troops were engaged, and there learned from Colonel Lee, of the artillery, that General Hampton had driven the enemy some distance through the woods, but that they were being rapidly re-enforced and held a strong position, either fortified or offering natural shelter, and were fast extending beyond Hampton's left. The firing indicated that Whiting's brigade and Pettigrew's were fully occupied by the enemy in their immediate front. Hatton's brigade had in the mean time come up and was formed in the edge of the field near the Nine-mile road. Col. [C. E.] Lightfoot's regiment, of Pettigrew's brigade, was in the field in reserve.

On learning from Colonel Lee the condition of affairs in Hampton's front, I immediately ordered Hatton's brigade and Lightfoot's regiment to move forward. The troops moved across the field with alacrity, and the precision of their movement in line of battle has been seldom equaled, even on the parade ground. I had not proceeded far into the wood before meeting with General Hampton. In a few words he communicated to me the state of affairs, and instructions were at once given for putting the brigade of General Hatton and Colonel Lightfoot's regiment in close action. At the same time they were already under a deadly fire in a dense, entangled wood, struggling through the morass, covered with logs and thick bushes. The men continued to advance without firing a shot until coming up with the front line of troops, already engaged, when they too commenced firing, advancing

upon the left to within 15 or 20 yards of the line of fire of the enemy, which apparently came from the low bank of an old ditch, either a drain or foundation of a fence, very near the surface of the ground. It was already noticeable that the enemy aimed at this line. The generals of brigades, colonels, and other commanding officers were laboring under great disadvantages, the thickness of the woods and undergrowth and the smoke preventing them from seeing more than a very limited number of their men at any one time, while the roar of musketry was almost deafening. Very seldom, if ever, did any troops in their first battle go so close up to a covered line under so strong a fire and remain within such short distance so long a time.

Various attempts were made to charge the enemy, but without that concert of action almost absolutely necessary to success, and the gallant spirits who attempted it were very many of them shot down, when the rest would fall back into the line and resume the firing. On no part of the line where I was did the enemy at any time leave their cover or advance one single foot. Our troops held their position close to the enemy's line until it was too dark to distinguish friend from foe. I retired among the last, came off slowly, and was not interfered with by the enemy in any manner.

In this engagement, which lasted about an hour and a half, the four brigades of my division lost in killed, wounded, and missing 1,283, of whom 164 were killed, 1,010 wounded, and 109 missing. Brigadier-General [Robert] Hatton was killed. Brigadier-General [J. J.] Pettigrew was severely wounded and taken prisoner. Brigadier-General [Wade] Hampton was seriously wounded, but was able to keep his horse and refused to leave the field. Surg. E. S. Gaillard, medical director of my command, extracted the ball from General Hampton's wound under the close and heavy fire of the enemy. His horse was shot under him just before he dismounted to perform the operation. In a few minutes he rejoined me, and was almost immediately afterward severely wounded in the right arm, which had to be amputated. His misfortune, while it deprives the army of his services as a practical operating surgeon, will in nowise diminish his usefulness in the higher position which he has so long and so ably filled in my command, that of medical director of the Second Corps, Army of the Potomac, afterward of the district of Aquia, and later of the left wing of the army. With acknowledged skill of the very highest order in his profession, he has few, if any, equals as an administrative and executive medical officer. His perfect self-possession, coolness, manly bearing, and efficiency upon the immediate field of action encouraged and cheered all who saw him. I earnestly recommend him to the General commanding the Army and to the Government for their highest consideration.

The personal bearing and conduct of the lamented General Hatton upon the field was gallant, noble, and true to his high social and official character. He fell while bravely and skillfully leading his brigade in the extreme front of the battle.

General Hampton, on this as on many previous occasions, was remarkable for coolness, promptness, and decided practical ability as a leader of men in difficult and dangerous circumstances. In these high characteristics of a general he has few equals and perhaps no superior. I had every opportunity for forming an opinion in regard to the conduct of both of these brigade commanders in the immediate presence of the enemy.

The chivalric and accomplished Pettigrew went forward into action with that high, hopeful, and enthusiastic courage which so strongly

marks his character as an officer. Supposing himself to be mortally wounded, he refused to allow his men to leave the ranks for the purpose of carrying him to the rear. Becoming insensible, he was restored to consciousness to find himself a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. They could never have taken him alive in any other manner.

Just before dark three fresh brigades were ready to move forward into close action. By this time, too, the strong position the enemy had defended was better understood, and there is no reason to doubt that Hood's brigade of Texans, upon the right, and Griffith's of Mississippians, on the left, supported by the brigade of General Semmes, would have enabled us in one short hour more of daylight to drive the enemy into the swamps of the Chickahominy. As it was, darkness compelled us to relinquish an unfinished task, and the troops were withdrawn from the wooded swamp immediately in contact with the enemy and bivouacked in the open field within musket range of their strong defensive position without molestation.

Knowing that General Johnston's intention had been to strike a prompt, hard blow early in the morning and press the enemy rapidly in order to finish the work before their troops could be re-enforced on this side of the swollen Chickahominy and then return to our position protecting Richmond before they could make a counter-attack against the city in our rear, I felt that the late hour at which our attack was made, allowing the enemy to be re-enforced and diminishing the time for our operations, had materially interfered with the full execution of the plans of the general, and although we had driven the enemy back at all points, our success, checked on the approach of darkness, was but part of what had been hoped for.

After leaving the wood I heard for the first time that General Johnston had been severely wounded and compelled to leave the field. This unfortunate casualty placed me, as second in rank, in command of the Army of Northern Virginia, which position I held until about 2 p. m. of the next day, when I was informed by His Excellency the President that he had assigned General Robert E. Lee to that duty. A few minutes after General Lee arrived and at once assumed command.

Between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning of June 1 I had a conference with General Longstreet, and learning that he had ordered General Huger's division, which had not been engaged upon May 31, to move from the Charles City to the Williamsburg Stage road, one of the brigades of this division was directed to take position, as soon as practicable, upon the Nine-mile road, and, together with that of General Ripley, form a reserve for my division, which General Whiting commanded. The troops of the left wing and center remained substantially in the position occupied the previous day, protecting our rear and the city of Richmond from any movement of the enemy across the Chickahominy at or above New Bridge.

General Longstreet was directed to push his successes of the previous day as far as practicable, pivoting his movement upon the position of General Whiting, on his left. The latter was directed to make a diversion in favor of General Longstreet's real attack, and, if pressed by the enemy, hold at all hazards the fork or junction of the New Bridge and Nine-mile roads.

In the morning General Longstreet found the enemy in very large force in his front, pressing him so strongly that he considered it advisable not to send the brigade from General Huger's division, and later I ordered three additional brigades to his support.

Meantime the enemy threatened General Whiting's position, which was not favorable for defense, and were evidently largely re-enforced and disposed to take the offensive.

Reconnaissance made during the morning developed the fact that the enemy were strongly fortified in the position attacked by my division on the previous evening. This, coupled [coupled] with the necessity of holding that position [portion] of our line which was nearest the Chickahominy and covered Longstreet's left flank, induced me to direct General Whiting to assume more favorable ground a little in rear. This also brought his line in better relations with the troops of the center, under General Magruder, and better secured the angle made by our line in front of New Bridge. Such was the condition of affairs upon the field at the time General Lee took command.

The next morning (June 2) I was compelled by illness to leave the field.

No official reports have as yet been made by [to] me by subordinate commanders. During my absence they may have been, or, if not, probably will be, furnished through the proper channels.

General Whiting, commanding division, and General Hood, commanding brigade, acted during the battle of the 31st more immediately under the instructions and observation of General Johnston, and it is therefore not necessary for me to speak in detail of the part taken by them in the battle of that day. They were, however, both equal on that occasion to their former well-earned high reputation for skill and gallantry.

I cannot close this report without special reference to the services on this occasion of the officers of my personal and general staff. To do justice to the gallant and highly efficient conduct of each one separately would extend this report far beyond the limits within which I propose to close it. They carried orders and information in every direction with promptness and good judgment, assisted in bringing the troops into action, encouraged and at times commanded them in immediate contact with the enemy, and by their daring, gallantry, and good conduct rendered the most valuable assistance. I can in this notice only add the list of the names of those actively engaged upon the field. My personal staff—First Lieuts. James Howard and R. F. Beckham, C. S. Artillery, aides-de-camp; Capt. R. W. Carter, commanding company of courier guards at headquarters, acting aide-de-camp; Horace Lacey, of Fredericksburg, and Theodore W. Hoenniger, of Richmond, volunteer aides. General staff—Maj. Jasper S. Whiting, assistant adjutant-general, acting as engineer; Maj. Samuel W. Melton, assistant adjutant-general; Surg. E. S. Gaillard, medical director; Maj. Seth B. French, chief commissary; Maj. Barna McKennie, chief quartermaster; Capt. Charles R. Collins, C. S. Engineers.

Maj. Walter H. Stevens, C. S. Engineers, chief engineer of the Army of Northern Virginia, reported to me on the evening of the 31st, after General Johnston was wounded. This experienced, skillful, and indefatigable engineer rendered most important services in his own branch of the profession and in the general staff upon the field of battle.

Lieut. Wade Hampton, aide-de-camp to General Johnston, kindly volunteered his services to me after the general left the field, and throughout that night and the next day, as long as I continued in command of the army, he rendered me great assistance by the promptness and energy with which he discharged every duty.

I take this opportunity to call the attention of the general to the high character and important services rendered by the officers and non-com-

missioned officers and men of Captain Carter's company, of the First Virginia Cavalry. This company has been on duty at my headquarters since September last, and by their good conduct, intelligence, ability, and willingness to perform all that has ever been required of them have become a corps of efficient aids to myself and principal staff officers. They had no opportunity as a company on May 31 of charging and driving a full regiment of infantry from the field as they did on the 21st of July last at Manassas, but in their individual capacity, bearing important orders whenever called upon, they rendered very important service. I would call especial attention to the efficiency, coolness, and devotion shown by Privates B. W. Lynn, A. H. Powell, and W. T. Taylor, of Captain Carter's company. They were in the very front of the battle during the contest in the woods, and deserve the highest praise and some substantial reward or promotion for their services in this action.

Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart had been for some time attached to my command, but he was during the action of the 31st principally with that portion of his cavalry attached to the three divisions on the right, under General Longstreet. He gave me the first information received from the right after the close of the action and rendered me very important assistance during the night.

The report of killed, wounded, and missing made by Surg. John T. Darby, acting chief surgeon of my division, is herewith inclosed.* It will be seen from this that the Fourth Alabama, Second Mississippi, Fourteenth and Nineteenth Georgia, and Forty-seventh Virginia Regiments met with less loss than any others engaged. Hampton's Legion suffered a greater loss by far in proportion to its numbers than any other regiment of the division, being 21 killed and 120 wounded out of 350.

My thanks are due to Surg. John T. Darby, chief surgeon of the division, and to those under him, for their prompt, skillful, and kind attention to the wounded.

I regret that in the absence of reports from commanders I am unable to discriminate between the highly deserving and those who were not so in the different regiments engaged, and that for the same reason I am unable to furnish a detailed report of the operations of that portion of my division not directly under my eye during the engagement. Until their report shall be furnished the need of praise which is due to them must be postponed.

I have the honor to be, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. SMITH,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. THOMAS G. RHETT,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Dept. of Northern Virginia.

[Indorsement.]

RICHMOND, VA., June —, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded.

This report should have accompanied mine of the battle of Seven Pines.

J. E. JOHNSTON,
General.

* Not found.

JUNE 1-2, 1862.—Reconnaissance beyond Seven Pines, Va.

REPORTS.

No. 1.—Maj. Louis Dillman, Second Michigan Infantry.

No. 2.—Lieut. Col. Ambrose A. Stevens, Third Michigan Infantry.

No. 1.

Report of Maj. Louis Dillman, Second Michigan Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND MICHIGAN VOLUNTEERS,

June 4, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that in obedience to your orders I took five companies of your command, on the morning of the 1st instant, for the purpose of finding out the enemy's position. I posted four companies in the vicinity of the steam saw-mill in such a manner as to guard the approaches leading thereto, and with the fifth skirmished the woods in the direction of the battle field of the previous day. We discovered the enemy's pickets a few hundred yards from that locality. I posted pickets here and sent out scouts in other directions. These failed to find any traces of the enemy on our left. They, however, succeeded in capturing 10 or 12 of his stragglers, among them a captain and first sergeant, who were sent to the rear. I will also say that we found a lieutenant, corporal, and 2 privates of the Sixth Georgia Regiment at the steam saw-mill wounded.

About 8 o'clock our pickets discovered several of the enemy's battalions moving down through the woods on our right, and so near that the men were obliged to conceal themselves from view in the bushes. Soon thereafter I heard heavy firing in that quarter. This continued perhaps an hour and a half, when the enemy was seen in full retreat—in fact, there appeared to be a perfect rout. Officers and men were mingled in complete confusion, many without hats or arms, and all making to the rear with the greatest possible dispatch.

I now made a new disposition of my command, putting it in such position as I deemed would most effectually guard against a renewal of the attack on this flank. For this purpose I extended my pickets farther to the left and front.

Early in the afternoon I took one company and skirmished through the woods and over the battle-field as far as the slashing. Beyond this we saw muskets glistening in the sun, which proved to be those of the enemy, who was in some force. The battle-field presented a scene of the wildest confusion. Knapsacks, blankets, tents, hospital and commissary stores, the dead and wounded of both combatants, were strewn indiscriminately over the ground. The baggage, however, had been rifled but very little, evidently showing that the enemy had been too well engaged on both days to have much time to plunder. In the afternoon of Monday I joined my command to that of Lieut. Col. Stevens, of the Third Michigan, for the purpose of making a reconnaissance. On reaching a point half a mile in advance of General Casey's former camp I sent out scouts from each company under my command. They penetrated to the front about three-fourths of a mile, coming onto the enemy's outposts, the occupants of which fled on their approach, leaving some articles of soldiers' use, among others an officer's belt.

Having fulfilled the objects of our reconnaissance we returned to camp by the Richmond road.

I take pleasure in complimenting the officers and men of my command for the readiness with which they seconded my efforts at carrying out your instructions.

I remain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

LOUIS DILLMAN,

Major, Second Regiment Michigan Volunteers.

Col. O. M. POE,

Commanding Second Michigan Volunteers.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS,

Savage Station, June 10, 1862.

This is the report of an important reconnaissance I had made, of which I had a verbal report, but have been unable until now to get the written. The manner in which the rebels retreated shows how thoroughly they were routed.

Respectfully forwarded.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

No. 2.

Report of Lieut. Col. Ambrose A. Stevens, Third Michigan Infantry.

HDQRS. THIRD REGIMENT MICHIGAN VOLUNTEERS,

June 3, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with your orders and the instructions received from General Kearny, on the 2d instant I took 200 men, with the proper officers, and left our camp near the rifle pits at 2 o'clock p. m. for the purpose of uniting with a detachment of the Second Michigan Volunteers, under command of Major Dillman, then on outpost duty near the saw-mill, and making a thorough reconnaissance to the front, to ascertain if possible the true position of the enemy. At about 3 o'clock p. m. we united with Major Dillman's command, and proceeded to skirmish forward between the Williamsburg and Charles City roads, reaching the first line of the enemy's pickets, which was found deserted, but with strong indications of having but recently been occupied. At about 4.30 o'clock p. m., the Second Michigan Volunteers being short of rations, Major Dillman was directed to return to your headquarters to report and for further instructions.

We were now about 1 mile in advance of the battle-field of Saturday last. The main body of my command, which now numbered about 350 men, was directed to halt, while a detachment was thrown forward to scout up on two roads, one of which diverged to the right in the direction of the Williamsburg road and the other to the left and toward the White Oak Swamp. As our scouts advanced along the different roads the indications that the enemy were not far distant became more apparent. We now proceeded cautiously for the distance of about three-quarters of a mile, when we again halted and formed in line of battle.

It was now about 5.30 p. m., and we proceeded to make a more thor-

ough reconnaissance to the front, and for this purpose I detached 65 trusty scouts, under command of the proper officers of the different companies, with orders to proceed, if possible, 100 rods to the front. This was performed successfully, and resulted in discovering the second line of pickets of the enemy, who fled without firing upon our approach.

After entering several of their bough houses and securing a few articles left behind by the rebels they returned to our reserve. It was nearly sunset, and Major Dillman returning at this moment with your order for our return to camp, we at once took up the line of march, returning to the rifle pits about 8 o'clock in the evening. Major Dillman's command here halted for the night, while ours of the Michigan Third Volunteers came forward and reached this camp after a long and weary march at 10 o'clock in the evening.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

A. A. STEVENS,

Lieut. Col., Comdg. Third Regiment Michigan Volunteers.

Brig. Gen. H. G. BERRY,
Commanding Third Brigade.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS,
Savage Station, June 10, 1862.

This reconnaissance was made in concert with Major Dillman's.
Respectfully forwarded.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

JUNE 2, 1862.—Expedition to Wormley's Ferry, Pamunkey River, Va.

Report of Capt. August V. Kautz, Sixth U. S. Cavalry.

CAMP NEAR RICHMOND, VA.,
June 3, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to instructions received I have to report that I proceeded with my squadron, armed with carbines, and two squadrons of Lancers to New Castle, on the Pamunkey River, yesterday afternoon, where I found the ferry-boat destroyed by some previous party. I ascertained the same to be true at Basset's and Pipingtree, farther down the river, by sending a squadron of Lancers to each point. I arrived at Wormley's Ferry so late last evening that I could do nothing, as the boats were on the opposite side of the river, as is also Dr. Wormley's residence, where I expected to find him. I therefore returned to New Castle and encamped.

Through information obtained last evening and the aid of a slave recently escaped I was enabled to find the ferry-boat belonging to Dr. Wormley's ferry concealed in a creek near by on the north side of the river, together with the sloop Golden Gate, about 25 tons, from Norfolk, eight wooden boats, and one metallic life-boat, each capable of carrying from 20 to 30 persons. The ferry-boat would carry two teams with their horses. All these were rendered entirely useless. The sloop was burned.

A small canoe enabled me to send Lieutenant Balder and 6 men, who succeeded in arresting Dr. Wormley. I sent him immediately to the provost-marshal-general by Lieutenant Balder, who was directed also to report in person at headquarters the result of the expedition, as I was delayed several hours in destroying the boats. These boats were about a mile above New Castle by the road, on Dr. Wormley's farm, and were concealed, as the entrance of the creek was hidden by the foliage of newly-felled trees. The river was flooded and still rising to-day, and troops could not be crossed without fixing a line.

I could collect no satisfactory information that a force was organizing or existed on the north side of the river, as I supposed in my instructions. Having complied with my instructions I returned to camp with my command this afternoon.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

AUGUST V. KAUTZ,

Captain, Sixth Cavalry, Commanding Expedition.

Lieut. J. C. AUDENRIED,

Sixth Cavalry, Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., Cavalry Brigade.

JUNE 3-7, 1862.—Reconnaissance to the James River to communicate with the Union fleet.

REPORTS.

No. 1.—Maj. Albert J. Myer, Signal Officer, U. S. Army.

No. 2.—Lieut. Franklin Ellis, Acting Signal Officer, U. S. Army.

No. 1.

Report of Maj. Albert J. Myer, Signal Officer, U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

June 9, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inclose herewith the report of Lieutenant Ellis, who was detailed in charge of a party of signal officers to reach James River and to reconnoiter with reference to the practicability of opening communication with the gunboats. The service has been gallantly and skillfully rendered. It is reported practicable to signal preconcerted messages to the gunboats with rockets. The party reached James River at Westover (the plantation of John Selden), and at Wilcox's Wharf stopped by signals the steamer Express, on her way down the river with discharged United States prisoners, and boarded her. The gunboats are reported as passing Wilcox's Wharf every day. Three of them carry signal flags flying—this to indicate that they are looking out for our signals at any point on the bank.

At Charles City Court-House the people say they are without any government and are utterly cut off from information. No vedettes had been seen in that vicinity for the two weeks past. The only military organization of which the party could hear in that vicinity was the Charles City Troop, who wear citizens clothes and whose muster roll is herewith. This troop was at Turkey Island Bridge.

The inhabitants, both white and black, evidenced great terror at the approach of United States troops. The better classes were, however,

courteous after becoming acquainted with the officers. The roads were good. At the landing is a wharf, at which mail boats formerly touched. Gunboats can cover the landing and adjacent shore. The distance from our left at White Oak Swamp to the landing is between 8 and 9 miles. The officers of the party with whom I have conversed estimate that the distance can be ridden easily in an hour and a half, and state that they would feel safe in passing over the road at any time under the escort of a squadron of dragoons.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALBERT J. MYER,

Signal Officer, Major, U. S. Army.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY,

Chief of Staff, Army of Potomac.

No. 2.

Report of Lieut. Franklin Ellis, Acting Signal Officer, U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS SIGNAL CORPS,

Near Richmond, June 8, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of a march across the county of Charles City, Virginia, to the James River, made by your order, and with a view to establish signal communications between general headquarters and the Federal gunboats:

Having previously made an unsuccessful application for an escort to both Generals Hooker and Grover, I crossed the southern line of pickets (General Grover's) at White Oak Swamp on the evening of Tuesday, June 3. The party under my charge, consisting of Lieutenants Kendall, Herzog, Wiggins, and Keen, with their assigned flagmen, encamped on the first night at a deserted house about 4 miles outside our pickets, on the Charles City road. The next day was very rainy until 5 o'clock p. m., when we marched 4 miles farther, and encamped at the plantation of Barry Marston, an officer in the Confederate service. I here ascertained that a party of 7 rebel cavalry were in our immediate vicinity, and a larger party, headed by Hill Carter, jr., was directly ahead of us on the river. This rendered it necessary that our next day's march should be made with great caution, and in the morning I proceeded with only Lieutenants Herzog and Wiggins and one flagman, and at night reached the river at the plantation of John Selden, Westover.

On Friday I learned the gunboats were lying some miles farther up the river, opposite the plantation of Hill Carter, sr., which point I afterward found it impossible to reach with what force I had, as there were at least 40 of the enemy's cavalry between me and that point. I also proceeded to Charles City Court-House, where I found a depot of the enemy's corn (said to be 2,500 bushels) and a large quantity of fodder. Here I received information from a free negro that Colonel Wilcox had that morning sent a messenger secretly to the Charles City Troop, lying up the river, to come down and capture us, which induced me to face toward the camp of General Grover.

On the morning of the 7th I re-entered the Federal lines, having passed through more than 30 miles of the enemy's country, none of which had ever been traversed by a Federal soldier before, and bring-

ing with me 1 prisoner, a private of the Eighth Virginia, whom I turned over to General Casey.

I consider it entirely impracticable to signal across this country by the usual method, as the distance in a right line cannot be less than 9 miles, and in no place, except near the river bank, can an opening of a mile in extent be found. But communication with the gunboats may be had by rockets for preconcerted messages, or perhaps better still, by means of a balloon ascending from the headquarters of General Casey, at Dogget's farm.

I am also convinced that many free negroes can be found who could be fully trusted with the transmission of messages in cipher.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

FRANKLIN ELLIS,
Acting Signal Officer.

Maj. ALBERT J. MYER,
Signal Officer, U. S. Army.

JUNE 5, 1862.—Skirmish at New Bridge, Va.

Reports of Capt. Alonzo Snow, Battery B, First Maryland Light Artillery.

CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE, VA., ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Thursday, June 5, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to special orders handed me by you early this morning my battery was hitched out, and proceeding from camp took position on the left of New Bridge in a corn field about 6 o'clock. Noticing squads of rebels on the opposite bank of the Chickahominy I fired at intervals, driving them back into the woods. About 8 o'clock the rebels opened fire upon us from four batteries occupying commanding positions on the hills, those on their right and left being masked by timber, the others planted to the east of a large farm-house, and continued for two hours from smooth-bore and rifled pieces pouring upon us shot and shell, which fell thick and fast all around the battery. Their round shot flew over us, striking in the field and woods in our rear; but their rifled shot and shell, having better range, struck close in front, rear, on either flank, and between the pieces, covering the cannoneers with earth. I returned their fire, dividing it among the four batteries according to the excellence of their range, and silenced each in succession from their right to left. Those of their batteries which seemed the best were in the right and left of their line. We expended 630 rounds of shell and case-shot during the engagement. Their firing being constant, was returned as rapidly as possible to insure execution. Our position being miry, was unfavorable for maneuvering, the limbers and caissons sinking to the axles whilst passing to and fro replenishing the ammunition chests, rendering it necessary at times to unhitch the teams and draw the carriages out by hand. The command generally behaved with commendable gallantry, and being in action for the first time and that under severe fire from large odds, discharged their duties with promptitude and coolness.

I am happy to report that none of my command were injured except 2, and they so slightly as not to unfit them for duty. Two horses were killed by one shot, which also damaged the limber-chest of the

caisson and broke two wheels; another horse was shot through the shoulder, rendered useless, and, being unable to move, was killed to terminate his suffering. Some two hours after the rebel batteries had been silenced we were relieved and returned to camp. Our position was such that we were unable to ascertain what damage, if any had been done, the rebels sustained further than having been driven from their position.

Respectfully,

ALONZO SNOW,

Captain, Battery B, First Maryland Light Artillery.

Maj. E. R. PETHERBRIDGE,
First Maryland Light Artillery.

[Indorsement.]

CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE, VA.,

June 6, 1862.

The above report of the action in which they were engaged on 5th instant has been received from Captain Snow, Battery B, First Maryland Artillery. Although this was the first time they were under fire the command conducted itself very creditably throughout the two hours and a half the enemy's batteries from four positions and those masked had their guns ranged upon them. Captain Snow, Lieutenants Gerry and Vanneman are deserving of mention for the coolness they exhibited under the enemy's cross-fire.

Respectfully submitted.

EDWARD R. PETHERBRIDGE,

Major, Commanding First Maryland Artillery.

Colonel HUNT, *Commanding Artillery.*

NEAR NEW BRIDGE, VA.,

June 6, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with your request for a more explicit statement of the firing of my battery at New Bridge, on the 5th instant, with the casualties attendant, I submit the following report:

The battery was placed in position in the left of the middle road leading to the bridge, the right resting on a road to the east of the middle road and near the junction. Our line extended eastward to the left of the lower road, the center and left sections resting in a corn field. The pieces were planted at irregular intervals, owing to the nature of the ground, which was extremely miry, having an extended front of not less than 150 yards. The caissons having sunk to the axles in taking position were with difficulty withdrawn and placed on the lower road, afterward changed to the right flank and in the middle road. About an hour after we were in position the rebels opened fire upon us from a battery, masked by a point of woods, on the left of the road leading across the bridge, and which was placed so as to completely command it. I had thrown an occasional shell at squads of the enemy plainly visible in the edges of the woods, to secure the range previously to the commencement of the fire.

Immediately on their opening I commenced firing with my six 3-inch pieces with case-shot and the Dyer projectile. Unfortunately the latter did not take the rifling well, and bursted short with 8-second fuse,

and at an elevation of 6° , $6\frac{1}{4}^{\circ}$, and $6\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$. Another battery was placed in position by the enemy on the brow of a hill to the left of their first, and successively a third and fourth. Their first played directly upon my right, the second on the whole line, the third on the left and right, and the fourth altogether on my left. Their first and fourth were the best served—had our range exactly, the heaviest metal, and made the best firing. Their projectiles were conical 3-inch and round solid shot, shell, and what appeared to be bundles of short iron bars. I found the 8-second fuse the only one to be relied upon, and the Schenkl percussion shell the most certain in its results. A fuse of 15 seconds would frequently burn out more quickly than an 8, which I presume was owing to the packing, some being more loosely packed than others. The case-shot made truer flight than the fuse shell, but is open to the same objection to a less extent—the taking of the rifling. The percussion in every noticeable instance had sure flight and did execution. Unfortunately we had but few of them, and reserved them to the last. Chiefly to their efficiency I attribute the silencing of the enemy's batteries.

Respectfully,

ALONZO SNOW,

Captain, Battery B, Maryland Light Artillery.

Maj. E. R. PETHERBRIDGE,

Commanding First Maryland Light Artillery.

Approved and forwarded.

EDWARD R. PETHERBRIDGE,

Major, Commanding First Maryland Artillery.

JUNE 7, 1862.—Reconnaissance on east bank of Chickahominy River, Va.

Report of Lieut. Col. William B. Hatch, Fourth New Jersey Infantry.

MECHANICSVILLE, VA., June 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in compliance with your orders this afternoon I, with Companies D, F, and I, of the Fourth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers, scoured the woods on the east bank of the Chickahominy River from the bridge on the Mechanicsville road to Richmond to the Virginia Central Railroad bridge. I found no indication of an attempt on the part of the enemy to dam the stream, which there is about 30 feet wide, and clothed with a heavy growth of timber and underbrush.

Only 4 of the enemy have been seen on this side to-day, and their only means of crossing the river being a fallen tree, which evidently had long been lying in that position, midway between the two bridges. The officers and men of the above companies are deserving of great credit for their determination to force their way through the woods, most of the time being obliged to wade through water waist-deep. Notwithstanding this, our line of skirmishers, under command of Lieutenant Wright, was handsomely maneuvered. Along this side of the woods the ground is also low, marshy, and almost impassable.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. B. HATCH,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Fourth New Jersey.

Col. J. H. SIMPSON, *Field Officer of the Day.*

JUNE 8, 1862.—Reconnaissance on the New Market Road, Va.

REPORTS.

No. 1.—Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps.

No. 2.—Capt. William J. Gary, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry.

No. 1.

Report of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps.

HEADQUARTERS GENERAL CASEY'S DIVISION,
June 9, 1862.

CAPTAIN: The Eighty-fifth Regiment New York Volunteers and four companies of the Ninety-second Regiment New York Volunteers, with a company of cavalry, to-day made an armed reconnaissance along the New Market road on the other side of White Oak Swamp. They found traces of mounted men, who are reported to belong to the Charles City Troop of Horse, about 300 strong, and who are employed on patrol and picket duty upon the Charles City and New Market roads. They also captured a prisoner, who appears to belong to a battery in the rebel service, and who had in his possession unimportant correspondence addressed to parties in that army.

I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,
Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding Division.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 2.

Report of Capt. William J. Gary, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY,
Camp at Savage Station, June 9, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of a reconnaissance made by me on the 8th instant:

In obedience to orders received from the colonel commanding I moved with two companies, D and K, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, on the road through White Oak Swamp. At White Oak Bridge I was joined by six companies of infantry from the Eighty-fifth and Ninety-second New York Volunteers, sent out by order of General Casey, under the command of Major ———.

On our arrival at the intersection of the Charles City, New Market, and Quaker roads I ascertained from a reliable source that a small body of rebel cavalry, numbering about 20, had been there some two or three hours previous to our arrival, and that they had returned toward Richmond on the New Market road. The infantry were advanced on the different roads above mentioned as skirmishers, with the exception of two companies, who were held as a reserve at the crossing. A detachment of cavalry were thrown forward on the Charles City

road, with orders to proceed cautiously and endeavor to ascertain if the enemy were on the road. This duty was duly performed, proceeding some 3 miles, but no enemy or signs of them could be found. Two negroes were found, who stated that they had left Richmond that morning.

A full company of cavalry proceeded on the New Market road. They found no enemy, but their tracks at an earlier hour of the morning were plain, and it was ascertained from persons living on the road that a small body of rebel cavalry patrolled the road daily; also that some 200 were encamped or quartered at or in the neighborhood of New Market. We reached within $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of New Market, but did not see any of them. It was also told from credible sources in the same neighborhood that no enemy were stationed or encamped at this time at Turkey Island Bridge.

A Mr. Hare, of that section of country, was arrested, for by his own admission he had been enlisted in a rebel heavy artillery company, though he claimed to be discharged. On searching his premises letters were found which proved conclusively that he was the medium of communication between the families in that section and Richmond. Major ——— retained him and handed him over to General Casey at his headquarters.

I returned to camp with my command about sundown.

Yours, respectfully,

WM. J. GARY,

Captain, Commanding Company D, Third Pa. Cavalry.

First Lieut. J. F. SEAL, *Adjutant Third Pennsylvania Cavalry.*

JUNE 13-15, 1862.—Stuart's raid, including skirmishes at Hawes' Shop, Old Church near Hanover Court-House, Garlick's Landing on the Pamunkey, etc.

REPORTS, ETC.

- No. 1.—Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac.
- No. 2.—Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, U. S. Army, commanding Fifth Army Corps.
- No. 3.—Maj. Henry B. Clitz, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, of attack upon cavalry outposts commanded by Capt. William B. Royall, Fifth U. S. Cavalry.
- No. 4.—Brig. Gen. Philip St. George Cooke, U. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Reserve, of operations June 13-14.
- No. 5.—Brig. Gen. William H. Emory, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Cavalry Reserve, of operations June 13-14.
- No. 6.—Col. Richard H. Rush, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, of operations June 13-14.
- No. 7.—Maj. Robert Morris, jr., Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, of operations June 14.
- No. 8.—Capt. Charles J. Whiting, Fifth U. S. Cavalry.
- No. 9.—Capt. William B. Royall, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations May 31-June 13.
- No. 10.—Lieut. Edward H. Leib, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations June 13.
- No. 11.—Lieut. Richard Byrnes, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations June 13.
- No. 12.—Maj. Lawrence Williams, Sixth U. S. Cavalry, of operations June 13.
- No. 13.—Col. George A. H. Blake, First U. S. Cavalry, commanding Second Brigade, Cavalry Reserve.
- No. 14.—Lieut. Col. William N. Grier, First U. S. Cavalry, of operations June 14-15.
- No. 15.—Lieut. Joseph S. Hoyer, First U. S. Cavalry, of attack at Garlick's Landing, on the Pamunkey River.

- No. 16.—Brig. Gen. John F. Reynolds, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, McCall's division, Fifth Corps, of operations June 13-14.
- No. 17.—Col. Gouverneur K. Warren, Fifth New York Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, Sykes' division, Fifth Corps.
- No. 18.—Lieut. Col. Rufus Ingalls, aide-de-camp, of arrangements for the protection of the depot at White House during the raid.
- No. 19.—Col. Josiah Harlan, Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, of operations June 6-17.
- No. 20.—Capt. B. B. Mitchell, Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, of operations in the vicinity of the Charles City Bridge or Jones' Bridge, June 12.
- No. 21.—Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Brigade, with congratulatory orders.
- No. 22.—Col. Fitz. Lee, First Virginia Cavalry.
- No. 23.—Col. W. H. F. Lee, Ninth Virginia Cavalry.
- No. 24.—Col. William T. Martin, Jeff. Davis Legion (cavalry).

No. 1.

Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac.

McCLELLAN'S, June 14, 1862—11 a. m.

[SIR:] A rebel force of cavalry and artillery, variously estimated at from 1,000 to 5,000, came around our right flank last evening, attacked and drove in a picket guard of two squadrons of cavalry stationed at Old Church; thence they proceeded to a landing 3 miles above White House, where they burned two forage schooners and destroyed some wagons. Then they struck the railroad at Tunstall's Station, fired into a train of cars, killing some 5 or 6. Here they met a force of infantry which I sent down to meet them, when they ran off. I have several cavalry detachments out after them and hope to punish them. No damage has been done to the railroad.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

No. 2.

Report of Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, U. S. Army, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH PROVISIONAL ARMY CORPS,
Camp near New Bridge, Va., June 19, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inclose for the information of the commanding general the reports of officers engaged in contesting the advance into our lines on the 13th instant of Stuart's cavalry and pursuing them to the Chickahominy.

The first intimation I received of the approach of the enemy was 4.20 p. m. on the 13th instant, in a note from General Cooke to General Sykes. General Cooke had anticipated my orders and sent out a force to ascertain the strength of the enemy and resist his advance. I directed—in addition to what I supposed General Cooke had done, *i. e.*, taken his available force—General Sykes to send a brigade and battery to

his assistance, presuming that General Cooke would pursue with vigor. About dusk I received from General Cooke Major Williams' note, stating the enemy was in force (3,000 to 5,000), artillery, infantry, and cavalry, and shortly afterward one from General Cooke, stating that he would attack at daylight. I cautioned him to be on his guard, and stated General Sykes would join him at that time, but in the meantime to ascertain where was the enemy, and act according to circumstances; not, however, to attack with cavalry alone the combined superior force of the enemy. Also stated I wished him or General Emory to see me at 8 o'clock, if they could leave the command—this as I had reason to believe they were still in their own camp. General Emory came, and while here I received the order to send him to Tunstall's Station, and did so with four squadrons of Rush's cavalry, which I had detached from General Cooke for the purpose of sending on another road to Old Church and on the road to White House. Before daybreak I heard we were in possession of Old Church.

The reports of these officers and their subordinates will show fully what was done by their commands.

I directed Major Clitz to examine into the circumstances attending the attack upon Captain Royall and the pursuit of the enemy. I inclose his report and beg to call attention to the facts elicited.

I wish to add that General Cooke seems to have regarded his force as a reserve for the day of battle, and not therefore expected to perform any picket duty; at least no picket duty has been performed by it until ordered by me, except by Captain Royall's command. General Cooke seems to have confined his protection of our flank to scouting with one squadron from Pipingtrees Ferry to the point on Pole Creek Church road where rested General Stoneman's pickets.

I can only express surprise that General Cooke or General Emory did not join earlier their commands in front and there act as circumstances required, and that when General Cooke did pursue he should have tied his legs with the infantry command.

I have seen no energy or spirit in the pursuit by General Cooke of the enemy or exhibited the characteristics of a skillful and active guardian of our flanks.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Headquarters Army of the Potomac.

No. 3.

Report of Maj. Henry B. Clitz, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, of attack upon cavalry outposts commanded by Capt. William B. Royall, Fifth U. S. Cavalry.

CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE, VA.,

June 18, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to the letter of instruction from the headquarters Fifth Provisional Corps, dated the 16th instant, I have the honor to report that I have investigated into the facts connected with the attack upon the cavalry outposts commanded by Captain Royall, Fifth Cavalry.

I have read the reports of Generals Cooke and Emory, Colonels Rush and Warren, Major Williams, Captain Royall, Lieutenant Byrnes, and Lieutenant Leib. All of these reports have been sent in to the general commanding the Fifth Corps.

In the examination of the above officers, as well as of Captains McIntosh, Harrison, Whiting, Chambliss, and Lieutenant Brown—all of the cavalry—I failed to elicit but few facts connected with the attack by, and the pursuit of, the enemy not substantially narrated in the reports mentioned above. I shall therefore confine my report to the few additional facts which were not mentioned in those reports.

1st. In reference to Captain Royall's outlying pickets, you will find inclosed a rough map of the roads lying north and east of the Old Church and Hanover Court-House road and between it and the Pamunkey River.

I learned from Lieutenant Leib that pickets were stationed at points marked P on the map and vedettes at the points on the map marked V, and besides having one company out during the day scouting all the roads leading to Hanover Court-House. From Hawes' Shop to Atlee's Station the country was open, not being guarded by either pickets or vedettes, though Lieutenant Leib says he sometimes scouted in that direction. Captain Royall nor his officers considered that part of the country under their charge, and it was stated to me—I think by Captain Harrison—that General Stoneman had reported that Captain Royall's pickets did not join his own. There is no evidence, however, to show that any portion of the enemy did really approach through the gap thus left open.

First notice of the approach of the enemy.—Captain McIntosh stated that he was with Captain Royall when he received Lieutenant Leib's first dispatch; that it was hard to decipher, but he (McIntosh) finally made it out. The dispatch I could not obtain. Captain McIntosh fully corroborated what followed, as reported by Captain Royall, as to the steps he immediately took to support Leib. The first report Captain Royall sent to General Cooke was by Lieutenant Watkins, who stated to me that he delivered the dispatch or message to General Cooke at about ten minutes before 3 p. m. Major Williams was on the road with the Fifth and Sixth Cavalry by 3.30, and was at the forks of the Hanover road by 4.30.

General Cooke was in the vicinity of his camp until after 8 o'clock p. m., and did not reach the forks of the road until about 11 o'clock. Colonel Warren, with his infantry, arrived there about a half hour before.

There was no sign or evidence that any infantry force had passed along the Hanover road. So states Major Williams, and see Colonel Warren's report.

Lieutenant Byrnes stated to me that he was positive that he saw infantry in force on the road leading from Dr. Brockenbrough's house to the Hanover Ferry, and yet he admitted that when he first saw them he thought they were some of our own pickets (cavalry). If infantry were there none of our officers seemed to know what became of them; they certainly did not come down onto the Hanover road. Major Williams, Captains Chambliss, McIntosh, Whiting, and Arnold, and Lieutenants Watkins and Walker say that if General Cooke had arrived at the Hanover road with his cavalry when Major Williams did, and pursued with vigor, leaving his infantry supports to guard the road between Old Church and New Castle Ferry over the Pamunkey, as he

was urged to do by Colonel Warren (see his report), the enemy must have been overtaken, perhaps at the Baltimore Store, or at any rate before he could have crossed the Chickahominy.

Major Williams states that the enemy could not have passed the point where he struck the Hanover road more than an hour before he reached there.

Captain Royall wished me to state that he had verbal orders to resist any force which might approach his position. This was in addition to the written instructions from General Williams.

In reference to the movements of General Emory's command in pursuit I learned nothing more than what was contained in his report and in the report of Colonel Rush, except as to the movements conducted by Maj. R. Morris, whose report I inclose.

It may not be improper for me to state that the officers of the Fifth Cavalry evinced some discontent because they had been made to turn in their carbines.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. B. CLITZ,

Major, Twelfth Infantry.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, General Porter's Corps.

No. 4.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Philip St. George Cooke, U. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Reserve, of operations June 13-14.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

June 15, 1862.

GENERAL: The 13th instant, while in the act of writing to inform you of the change of position to Gaines' Mill, from whence I could draw green forage from the fields and meadows of the Chickahominy, and which I had ordered, I received a report by an officer from Captain Royall of the enemy having attacked him in large force. I immediately sounded "To horse," and ordered six squadrons of Emory's brigade to re-enforce him, and reported the facts to the nearest division commander, Brigadier-General Sykes, who sent me a brigade of infantry, under Colonel Warren, of the Zouaves, and Weed's battery of artillery. As I marched with these forces and my remaining cavalry (six squadrons being on this occasion taken from me) an officer, Lieutenant Byrnes, in the affair with Royall, reported that he had seen from three to five regiments of infantry, also artillery.

I joined the advance of my cavalry at Old Hanover Court-House about 10 o'clock in advance of the infantry, when I went on soon after to Old Church. I received at that time various orders from various persons to "hold my own and maintain my position;" to "watch carefully in front and rear;" "not attack a superior force," &c.

The enemy was supported by infantry, no doubt. His force was, in addition, one or two brigades of cavalry, with some artillery. I followed his trail at daydawn yesterday, sometimes on two roads, to Tunstall's Station, having found that the White House depot was safe. I arrived there about 9 o'clock. General Emory sending from there Rush's Lancers in pursuit; his following him with a regiment of infantry and a section of Weed's battery and my marching to join these

forces in the afternoon with the cavalry; the escape of the enemy beyond the Chickahominy, announced at that moment, were all reported at their occurrence. The heat was excessive, but the troops all bore it, together with the entire absence of baggage, very scant food, and night marching, with praiseworthy indifference and alacrity.

I will observe that this is the second pressing occasion in which Brigadier-General Emory has been taken away from his brigade.

My command all marched back this morning, the cavalry to Gaines' Mill, where I had ordered the baggage train to meet me, but found it had been ordered back to this old camp by General Porter; and from here I am instructed to move toward Old Church.

Whenever a thousand or two of cavalry under a bold leader has it in its power to get in rear of the army, to make a dash on its communications and depots, if it follow on the heels of the pickets into a camp of equal force, whether of light cavalry or cavalry reserve, it may chance to destroy it; and in this connection I would suggest a necessary precaution of safety on the flanks or rear of the army; that the inhabitants should be confined or restricted to their homesteads.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

P. S.—I am unable to forward a report of the scout ordered to Hanover Court-House, &c., on the 12th, in consequence of the absence of its commander, Captain Gregg, Sixth Cavalry, who I learn returned, and has been ordered somewhere. I have not yet received a report from Captain Royall, who is badly wounded.

Respectfully,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,
Brigadier-General.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY RESERVE,
June 16, 1862—1.30 p. m.

SIR: I have just received the reports of the officers connected with the attack on Captain Royall. My present duties make it impossible to connect them in a narrative report of mine at present, as your communication requires, so I herewith inclose them. I only add that Captain Royall's instructions were the original ones from the Headquarters of the Army.

I will make the report of the march to Captain Royall's relief and the pursuit of the enemy as soon as I have time. Every moment of this day has been occupied by more pressing duties.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Fifth Provisional Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY RESERVE,
Camp near New Bridge, June 17, 1862.

SIR: I report my operations on the 13th and 14th instant:

Captain Royall, Fifth Cavalry, was ordered, with two squadrons, to Old Church, May 31, to remain until relieved, under instructions of

General Williams, assistant adjutant general, with the addition that he was to report anything important to me.

At 3 or 4 o'clock Friday, the 13th, Lieutenant Watkins galloped to my quarters and reported hastily that Captain Royall had been attacked and overpowered. He had escaped the enemy through the woods. I received a strong impression—I do not remember his words—that the enemy was close upon my camp. I immediately ordered the cavalry alarm "To horse" to be sounded, and sent an order to General Emory to take or send six squadrons of the Fifth and Sixth Cavalry, which were all of these regiments present, to support Royall or meet the enemy. I forwarded the report, to the best of my recollection, to General Sykes, as the nearest division commander. These regiments were soon off, General Emory informing me that he had ordered Major Williams to command them. Looking for Rush's regiment of Lancers a few moments after, I found they had gone, and also General Emory. I supposed he had considered himself authorized to take them, and marched over to a field in rear of my camp toward the enemy with the First Cavalry, and found near there General Emory and Colonel Rush's regiment. I ordered them to positions until something more certain could be ascertained. Then information began to come in—a report from Major Williams that he had found the enemy in great force between him and Royall's position; one or two of Captain Royall's men, who reported they had retreated or escaped by the Cold Harbor road; Lieutenant Byrnes, who had been in the attack, who reported he had seen about five regiments of the enemy's infantry; also a staff officer informed me that Colonel Warren was coming with a brigade of infantry and a foot battery of artillery to report to me.

About this time I received various dispatches from General Porter, also from General Sykes, some of which I had anticipated. One from General Porter to "notify General Emory and all troops near me." Another "that he should like to see me at his headquarters, if I could leave my command, at 8 o'clock; also General Emory." I then sent through General Emory, I believe, an order to Major Williams to hold his position, that re-enforcements were coming, to collect information, &c., and sent by General Emory the information received and dispatch to General Porter.

I then ordered forward Colonel Warren, and finding that the cavalry, from the great suddenness of the movement, were without rations of forage, I sent the First Cavalry and Rush's regiment a short distance to their camp, with orders to remedy it and the First to move forward in about two hours, and requested General Emory to send forward a wagon of provisions to his brigade, which was done, and returned to my tent to get a cup of coffee, not being well and having had a long ride in the morning since taking food. I soon received an order from General Porter to send four squadrons of Rush's cavalry to report to General Sykes, which I immediately ordered or communicated (its fifth squadron had been sent forward as a picket on a road leading toward Hanover), with the copy of a dispatch from general headquarters to me to obey General Porter's orders.

Then, about dusk, I moved forward. I passed Colonel Warren's brigade within about 2 miles, and joined Major Williams at the cross of the Hanover road about 10 p. m. Found he had a picket a mile out at a defensible bridge over the Totopotomoy and a platoon. At first I thought to move in the direction the enemy had taken at Old Church, and could get no reliable information as to the enemy's strength or whether he had much infantry. Soon Colonel Warren arrived and

made me a sketch of the country in the immediate vicinity and toward New Castle. I sent him on to Old Church, with directions to send forward the cavalry to the New Castle fork of the road, just as his rear regiment, the Zouaves, passed. I sent to recall it, thinking to leave it to cover my rear on moving, and ordered its commander to send a company to occupy the bridge over the Totopotomoy at dawn of day to relieve the cavalry there—all but five men. Afterward I changed my mind, and about 2 o'clock ordered the regiment to move forward to rejoin the brigade at 3 o'clock. (I don't know by what misunderstanding or fault or by whom the company had been ordered to the bridge and not relieved when the regiment marched but overtook the regiment at Old Church before it marched, but I believe very soon after the proper time for its march to come.)

But to resume in order. I then received every few moments dispatches or orders—one informing me that "General Sykes has been directed to assume command of your force and to join you early in the morning with a large infantry force and artillery. He will also send you instructions." Another from General Porter, which I marked "Received 11.10," desiring me to "bring all the information concerning the enemy you (I) can get hold of." Another, marked "Received 11.20," desiring me to "hold my own, and maintain your (my) position. Do not attack a superior force," &c.; informing me that "General Emory had been ordered to Tunstall's Station with four squadrons;" directing me to "send two squadrons to report to General Sykes as soon as possible."

About midnight Major Doull came to me from Colonel Warren with information (for which he stated they had from previous acquaintance there peculiar facilities) that the enemy was believed to be within a mile and a quarter, near the New Castle fork of the road, beyond which I was informed there was but one road below in a pretty open country, and was so confident of it that Colonel Warren had not sent there the cavalry picket as he had been requested. Then the major kindly wrote by moonlight a dispatch for General Sykes, in substance that I had hopes to strike the enemy there at daylight, and then or later, I forget which, mentioned that the information of infantry force with the enemy was not confirmed. Perhaps too strongly expressed, I meant I could get no new information as to it. I gave orders for a march at 3 o'clock. But soon after a teamster, Private Blanchard, First Cavalry, arrived and reported to me the circumstances of the enemy's attack on the trains before sundown the previous day at Garlick's Landing; afterward another teamster. They had just come over the road where the enemy was supposed to be, and I knew that he could not be there.

Leaving, then, only a platoon of cavalry to cover my rear at the bridge over the Totopotomoy, I marched between 3 and 4 a. m., and soon joined Colonel Warren at Old Church. I intended at first to leave him at the New Castle road, where there was no larger river road, but I changed my mind and marched on with my whole command, sending a dispatch to General Sykes that I left the rear toward Hanover Court-House to his care, &c.

My dispatch in the night informed General Sykes that the orders to "maintain my position," &c., could not be considered as binding. At the moment I felt confident of a fine opportunity at daylight, and naturally I was strongly tempted to take that view of all information that would authorize me not to await a successor in command, and I had been sent word that General Sykes would march at 3 o'clock.

The whole affair now was very simple. The enemy was invariably reported from 1,000 to 2,000 cavalry, some artillery. An officer had seen their infantry. No one was positive he had none. If the enemy returned over the road, as was then believed he would, I should soon meet him. I had under 500 cavalry; if he had no infantry, I should need the infantry for anything like certain success. If the enemy did not return I know he had been 8 miles or more ahead ten hours before at least, so that cavalry alone could not overtake him, even if it should pursue to attack three times its strength in numbers, supported by artillery. (Mine was not horse artillery.)

I expected, then, to meet him every moment, or, if he had infantry and attacked White House depot, that General Emory and a few other troops I supposed might be there would detain him until I should fall upon him with my force of three arms. The infantry marched as fast as possible. The day proved excessively warm, and they and the artillery suffered. Near Garlick's it became certain that White House depot had not been attacked, and the enemy's motions could only be guessed. The cavalry got well ahead, with orders to halt at Tunstall's Station. Colonel Warren I authorized to halt at the first water near there. I joined the cavalry there soon after their arrival; found General Emory, and learned the enemy had been traced far southward. He marched to support Colonel Rush soon after my arrival with infantry, and I promised to overtake him with my cavalry, with which, after a necessary rest, I knew I could do at 3 o'clock, but with the least hope in the world of overtaking retreating cavalry with the start I knew he had. Accordingly I commenced to march at 3 o'clock, and just then received a dispatch from General Emory, 4 or 5 miles off, I believe at Baltimore Cross-Roads, that the enemy had escaped over the Chickahominy, and at the same moment another from Colonel Rush, 13 or 14 miles off, to the same effect. I bivouacked, and returned early next morning, the 15th.

I inclose the reports of Brigadier-General Emory, Colonels Blake, Rush, and Grier, Major Williams, Captain Whiting, and Lieutenant Hoyer.

Very respectfully,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Fifth Provisional Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Camp on Cold Harbor Road, June 19, 1862.

SIR: I returned the 15th instant from forty-eight hours' hard duty in the hottest weather of the season, getting no sleep for thirty-six hours, to receive after dark long orders about every half hour chiefly regarding a new duty of picketing 10 or 12 miles about the same distance off; making large detachments at midnight, and next day, after six or seven hours, constantly receiving, considering, and sending dispatches to out parties, Major Clitz called on me with the astonishing communication that he was sent to investigate some parts of my conduct. The reports had been ordered to be sent in that morning, which was impossible. Under these trying circumstances I wrote hastily a statement, which (Major Clitz not returning next morning) I sent in as a report. Thus

I made an important omission, which I must supply, and recapitulate the main facts.

About 3.30 p. m. I had in camp six squadrons of the Fifth and Sixth Cavalry (about 240 men), First Cavalry, and the Lancers. An officer coming at full speed made me such a report that I received the impression that "from 3,000 to 5,000" of the enemy were at hand. In about fifteen minutes the Fifth and Sixth Cavalry were sent to the front. The country there consists of swampy woods, narrow roads, and fences where there are openings. Then, as I was taking forward the First Cavalry, a sergeant of the Sixth Cavalry, who had been with Captain Gregg, reported to General Emory that the enemy were on a near road to the left, and a man of the Fifth Cavalry reported to me and to Captain Merritt, aide-de-camp, that the enemy were near at hand, also to the left, driving in infantry pickets, teamsters, &c. Thus my impression was confirmed, and considerable time was spent in getting the Sixth Pennsylvania in a position in a field, and I took the First Cavalry some distance on the road to the left, and waited till some information could be got.

Not long after and together came reports from Captain Royall's command that it had escaped by the Cold Harbor road; from Major Williams that the enemy was in force between him and Royall's position (this dispatch General Emory took to General Porter), and Lieutenant Byrnes, of Royall's command, who had seen from three to five regiments of infantry; and a staff officer, that a brigade of infantry and a battery were at hand to re-enforce me. I sent them forward. Rush's Lancers and half of the First Cavalry were taken from me. I passed the infantry brigade; went to Williams' position and sought information; sent on the brigade when it arrived to Old Church, where there was then a cavalry picket. The first important information I could get was from Colonel Warren, at Old Church, about midnight, that the enemy he believed to be lying about $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles in front of him. I made arrangements to attack him at daylight with my whole force. About an hour after I learned with certainty that the enemy was not there, and had been at Garlick's Landing the afternoon before. (Lieutenant Spangler, regimental quartermaster Sixth Cavalry, who was in the neighborhood with a train, states he was there about 4.30 o'clock.)

The average estimate of the enemy's force was about 1,500 cavalry, with artillery certainly. Nothing new was ascertained as to infantry, so the rest is plain. I could not overtake him with cavalry alone, of which I had under 500. If he returned, as was then supposed, I went on at daylight to meet him with my whole force.

Since an investigation has been ordered—known to all the world—I have the right to demand a thorough one, and a publication of the judgment of the case or the complete exoneration by the major-general commanding the army.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.

No. 5.

Reports of Brig. Gen. William H. Emory, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Cavalry Reserve, of operations June 13-14.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, CAVALRY RESERVE,
June 15, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with orders received last night I reached Tunstall's at 2 a. m., having with me the only part of my brigade then left me; that is, four squadrons Sixth Pennsylvania Lancers. At daybreak I was re-enforced by a squadron of the First Cavalry. At Tunstall's I found General Reynolds, with his brigade of infantry, who had come from Dispatch Station by rail. I could get no information of the force of the enemy or his direction except that derived from a sergeant of infantry, that the attack on Tunstall's Station was by about 175 cavalry, and occurred about sunset.

I set every squadron in the field separately to hunt the trail. It was not until 8 o'clock that morning that Major Morris, of the Sixth Pennsylvania (Lancers), struck the trail, and though at once discovering the enemy's force was greatly understated and very superior to his own, he pushed forward with his single squadron in pursuit. My whole care was now to concentrate my scattered squadrons, which was promptly done, and they were sent forward under Colonel Rush.

About this time a deserter came in and stated the enemy's force at four regiments of cavalry and report added a battery of artillery. I obtained through General Reynolds the support of the Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, ordered forward to support Colonel Rush, and a regiment of infantry, Colonel Hays. About the same time General Cooke came up and gave a section of artillery, and I immediately went forward to support Colonel Rush, and was thus enabled to continue the pursuit without a moment's detention, growing out of the false information on which I first acted. The main body of the enemy, however, had recrossed the Chickahominy by daybreak, and Colonel Rush, leading my advance, chased the last of their pickets over the river about 2 p. m. The information of the enemy's escape reached me near Baltimore Cross-Roads, and I there halted until I heard from Colonel Rush, who substantially corroborated the statement.

The damage done by the enemy is not commensurate with the bold spirit with which the raid was dictated. He left faster than he came, and the attempt to break up the railroad communication was an entire failure, resulting in cutting the telegraph wire, tearing up a single rail, and burning one car load of corn. At Garlick's Landing he has burned 3 schooners laden with forage and in other places 14 Government wagons. He carried off 4 Government wagons only and 53 Government mules. In the pursuit he was compelled to drop 12 of his mules, which I picked up and sent back to the quartermaster at Tunstall's. The whole business, however, is suggestive, and shows on the part of the enemy great knowledge of localities within our pickets, even that of the sutler's establishment.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. EMORY,

Brigadier-General, Comdg. First Brigade, Cavalry Reserve.

Captain KINGSBURY,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Reynolds' Brigade.

P. S.—Lieutenant Kerin, my adjutant-general, who accompanied the advance to the Chickahominy, informs me he saw no sign of wagon or gun tracks on that road. The guns must have been turned back at Old Church, and the wagons reported to be with them were probably among those burned.

I think it proper to state, what I have omitted in my report to General Reynolds, that the enemy left the hospital at Baltimore Cross-Roads at 2 o'clock in the night and committed no depredations on the hospital. These facts I had in person from the intelligent surgeon in charge.

W. H. EMORY,
Brigadier-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, CAVALRY RESERVE,
Cavalry Camp, June 16, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to orders received last night I send you my report and the reports of all the officers referred to in that order belonging to this brigade who took a part in expelling the enemy which broke into our lines on the 13th instant.

In reference to the first two paragraphs of the order, requiring the account of the inroad on Captain Royall's camp, I have no knowledge whatever. That officer, with two squadrons, was detached from my command ten days since, with orders to report to General Cooke in person. I was not favored with a copy of his instructions nor the purpose for which he was detached, and neither he nor any of the officers of his command have made any report to me, officially or unofficially, since they were detached until this time.

About 3.30 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 13th instant I heard the call to horse sounded from headquarters, which was not repeated at any of the camps. My whole command was, however, speedily in the saddle. Seeing the Fifth in the saddle, I rode to General Cooke's headquarters for instructions. I met his aide-de-camp, who directed me to send forward rapidly the Fifth and Sixth U. S. Cavalry to support Captain Royall. I gave the order in person to the commander of the Fifth, and sent a message to the Sixth U. S. Cavalry to follow, designing to give the orders to the commander of the Sixth in person as he came up. The Sixth, however, by taking a short cut, got so far ahead that I had to ride 2 miles to communicate with Major Williams, who was in command, and gave him the same instructions that I had given Captain Whiting—to push on with all possible speed.

At this moment a sergeant, commanding a picket on the road leading north this side of Bethesda Church, informed me the enemy's pickets were on that road. I detached Captain Chambliss' squadron to observe that road and drive in the enemy's pickets. Fortunately Colonel Rush, with his Lancers, had followed on without orders. This enabled me to relieve Captain Chambliss from that duty by a squadron of Lancers and send him with the force to support Captain Royall, and the body of the Lancers was held in reserve near where the roads unite until the force and direction of the enemy could be truly ascertained and until I could communicate with General Cooke. A few moments afterward I met General Cooke coming on at the head of the First U. S. Cavalry.

At this moment three important communications arrived: One from Major Williams, telling me he had found the enemy in force between himself and Captain Royall (which I handed to General Cooke); one

from Lieutenant Byrnes, stating that part of the enemy's force was composed of five regiments of infantry, which he himself had seen; the third was from General Porter, requiring General Cooke or myself, if we could leave our command, to report to him. General Cooke directed me to go over and report to General Porter and be the bearer of Major Williams' and Lieutenant Byrnes' reports. What happened at this end of the line after that I have no knowledge of whatever.

About an hour or less after arriving at General Porter's I received an order from him to go with all speed with four squadrons of Lancers to Tunstall's Station, but to approach cautiously and avoid ambuscade.

On arriving there I found General Reynolds with a part of his infantry brigade, and my operations thence in pursuit will be seen by a report which I was directed to make to him, which was done hastily and just on the eve of returning from Tunstall's Station to this camp, but see no reason for changing it materially.

W. H. EMORY,

Brigadier General, Comdg. First Brigade, Cavalry Reserve.

Lieut. JAMES P. MARTIN,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 6.

Report of Col. Richard H. Rush, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, of operations June 13-14.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY,

Camp of the Cavalry Reserve, June 15, 1862—10 p. m.

SIR: In obedience to the letter of Captain Locke, assistant adjutant-general (Brig. Gen. F. J. Porter's division), of this date, I have the honor to report, on the 13th instant, about 3.15 o'clock, "Boots and saddles" was sounded from the headquarters Cavalry Reserve, and I immediately got my regiment in the saddle and followed the Fifth and Sixth U. S. Cavalry, who were moving out of the camp ground in the direction of Bethesda Church. At this point orders from General Emory, who was in the advance, came to me to remain where I was (near Bethesda Church), and detach a squadron to guard and patrol the two roads leading westward, one above and the other below Bethesda Church. The remaining four squadrons of my regiment were then moved farther down the Old Church road and halted in a field, where we met General Cooke. We remained here some time—until nearly sunset—the First U. S. Cavalry, General Cooke, and General Emory being all present. Hearing that we were probably to be gone for twenty-four hours or more, I obtained permission to return with my regiment to camp, not a half mile distant, to get rations and forage, when I was to return and march with Colonel Warren's command toward Old Church. As we entered our camp ground we met Colonel Warren, then near sunset.

Whilst in camp, at about sunset I received an order from General F. J. Porter to send a squadron to patrol and picket the road from Cold Harbor to Old Church, and before I had time to even give the order I received another order from General Porter to report with my regiment to General Sykes. I immediately started with my four squadrons, one

having been left at Bethesda Church. I reached General Sykes' headquarters at about 9 o'clock, and then detached the squadron to patrol and picket the road to Old Church from Cold Harbor. I then waited the return of General Sykes, who was not present when I arrived. At a little before 10 General Emory arrived, with orders for me to report to him with what was left of my regiment, and soon after 10 o'clock General Emory assumed this command and we went to Tunstall's Station.

At sunrise on the 14th General Emory directed me to send a squadron to patrol the ground east of the railroad. I detached Major Morris, with one squadron, for this purpose, and in the course of a few hours received information that he had got on the trail of the enemy, several hundred strong. That was the first information I had of the enemy since the attack on Old Church. General Emory gave me orders to re-enforce Major Morris at once, and other reports soon coming in confirming his first information of the direction, force, and movements of the enemy, I sent the remaining squadron of my regiment and followed with a platoon of the Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry that had come in from White House, General Reynolds promising to re-enforce me with what cavalry he could get at White House.

It was now about 10 a. m., and I pushed on to overtake Major Morris, which I did between 1 and 2 o'clock. Various and conflicting reports were obtained of the time, place, and strength of the enemy, but from a careful sifting of all I am satisfied that the enemy, with not less than 1,500 cavalry and two iron guns drawn by six horses each, reached the section of country between Garlick's Landing, Tunstall's, and White House during the evening of the 13th, and in several detachments; that during the night they had united into one general column, with many captured and led animals and wagons, and that all had marched down between 12 and 3.30 a. m. of the 14th on the road from Baltimore Hospital toward Jones' Bridge, passing Olivet Church; that they had stopped at the Sycamore farm, near to the Forge Mill, until about 8 a. m., when they left Sycamore farm and went to the Chickahominy to cross. They repaired an old broken bridge just below the Forge Mill, using the rafters and girders of an old house for that purpose. By 2 o'clock they had passed over nearly all their column. At 2.45 I reached the Sycamore farm, and seeing smoke over the woods ahead, sent forward Major Morris, with 8 carbineers. He soon returned, reporting that a mile beyond the woods he had come up to the bridge over the Chickahominy, which was broken and burning, watched by 5 men on the other side. He fired one shot at them, when they mounted and ran. I scouted the woods for an hour all about the Sycamore farm and mill, but getting no more trace of the rebels, and feeling satisfied from all the testimony I could get that all had crossed the river, I returned with my command to Tunstall's. Three squadrons of the Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry from the White House joined me just as I started to return. I had but four of the squadrons of my regiment on this chase.

Great credit is due Major Morris for the prompt manner in which he found and followed the trail of the retreating rebels in the morning.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

RICH'D H. RUSH,
Colonel Regiment of Lancers.

Lieutenant KERIN,

Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., First Brigade, Cavalry Reserve.

No. 7.

Report of Maj. Robert Morris, jr., Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, of operations June 14.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY,
In the Field, June 17, 1862.

MAJOR: In obedience to orders received from you this day I have the honor to report that on Saturday, June 14, I was ordered by Colonel Rush to have one squadron of his regiment fed and saddled, ready to start at sunrise to patrol the country on the east side of the railroad toward Saint Peter's Church and the White House, as General Emory had just received information that the enemy, to the number of 50 or 60, that had been at the station the night previous, had left in that direction, and that I should take command of the squadron. It was then about 4.30 o'clock. I gave the necessary orders, and then reported for instructions, which Colonel Rush gave me verbally, and were as follows: To patrol the roads toward the White House and Saint Peter's Church; to search every house, arrest every white man and send him to General Emory, and if I got on the trail of the enemy to notify the general, and follow on the track; that if necessary reinforcements would be sent.

At 5 o'clock, or very near that hour, I started, taking the main road from the station, and went at as fast a walk as my tired horses and men could go (they having been in the saddle from 3.15 the previous day until 3.30 on the morning of the 14th). About 1 mile from the station I detached a lieutenant and platoon to go to the White House on a road leading there at that point, on which the prints of a few horses' feet were visible. I immediately went on with the remainder of the command until we arrived opposite to Mr. Rice's house. I went to this house with one platoon, searched the house and outhouses, found no enemy, and was informed by Mrs. Rice that none had been there. She had heard some horses passing up the road in the night.

I rejoined the command and proceeded about a fourth of a mile farther, when the road became better and was less cut up by wagons. The tracks of horses here were visible. I stopped at a house, found a man who said the enemy, about 10,000 strong, had been passing all night, commencing at about 8 o'clock. This man I sent to General Emory, and searched his house. We then went on without meeting any one until we arrived at the main road leading to Baltimore Store from the White House. Here every trail stopped, as the junction of the two roads formed a swamp or bog, and a drove of cattle was just passing from the White House toward Baltimore. The man in charge told me that none of the enemy were at the White House or had been. I then sent after the lieutenant, who had been detached, and went myself a short distance up the road toward Baltimore, where I discovered a negro, who said that the enemy, about 2,000, had been at Baltimore and destroyed the store the night previous, and left about 8 o'clock toward the Chickahominy. After receiving some letters which he had picked up and turning back the cattle I sent a verbal dispatch to General Emory that I was on the trail, and then, after questioning the negro further about the roads, I sent a written dispatch, with all the letters handed me by the negro, in which I informed the general that they had been at Baltimore; had gone toward the Chickahominy; that I wished another squadron sent to take the Baltimore road direct, whilst I took the main road from Kent Court-House to the same river.

It was then 7 o'clock or a few minutes after. I then proceeded to Saint Peter's Church, the track of horses continuing until we reached the church, where they turned off to the right. Inquiring at Mrs. Christian's and Mr. Apperson's, from whom we learned nothing except about the roads and where I was re-enforced by a squadron and a platoon previously detached, we then proceeded to Baltimore, having received an order from General Emory to keep my command together. There I was further re-enforced by another squadron and halted to obtain further intelligence. Here horse-tracks were distinctly visible, and of a considerable force. I found a negro who had just escaped from the enemy. He told me they were about 1,500; that they had encamped the night before at a place near the Forge Mill; had not got there before 3 o'clock and were there when he left, and that he was just from there; that he had heard them talk about Charles City Court-House and the Chickahominy. This man I mounted and sent with a sergeant and a dispatch to General Emory. It was then about 9.30 o'clock, as near as I can recollect. I started the column and proceeded toward the place called Forge Mill, which is about one-half of a mile from Jones' Bridge, but could not go faster than a walk, the horses being very tired.

At this time I received a dispatch from General Emory to follow on the trail as long as there was one, which I continued to do until ordered to halt until Colonel Rush joined me with another squadron. I suppose that the command was about $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 miles from the Forge Mill, and that it was about 12 or 12.30 o'clock when Colonel Rush took command. This, I believe, is all that occurred whilst I had a separate command.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBT. MORRIS, JR.,

Major, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

Maj. H. B. CLITZ,
Twelfth U. S. Infantry.

No. 8.

Report of Capt. Charles J. Whiting, Fifth U. S. Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH CAVALRY,

June 15, 1862.

SIR : Agreeably to orders received this evening from Brigadier-General Emory, I have the honor to report that on the afternoon of the 13th "To horse" was sounded at the headquarters of the cavalry reserve. It was immediately repeated in my camp, and in ten minutes my command was ready. I soon received orders from Brigadier-General Emory to go and support Captain Royall. A short distance from my camp I met General Emory, and he then instructed me to go to the support of Captain Royall, if I could, drive the enemy back, but if I found the enemy in too large force to retire and bring Captain Royall with me. The general also stated to me that the Sixth Cavalry, under Major Williams, would follow me, and upon its joining me I would be under the orders of Major Williams. Major Williams, however, had taken a shorter cut from his camp and came into the road in advance of me, so that I was under his command from that time. We reached the cross-road, where Captain Royall had been engaged with the enemy, about 4.30 o'clock p. m., and remained until 3.30 a. m., when we marched to

Tunstall's Station, arriving there about 9 o'clock a. m., and remained until the next morning at 5, when we returned to camp.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. J. WHITING,

Captain, Fifth Cavalry, Commanding Regiment.

Lieut. JOSEPH KERIN,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 9.

*Report of Capt. William B. Royall, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations
June 13.*

CAMP OF CAVALRY RESERVE,

June 15, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to state that on the 31st of May I was directed by the commanding officer Fifth U. S. Cavalry to report for detached service with the second and fourth squadrons of the regiment, commanded by myself and Capt. James E. Harrison, to the brigadier-general commanding cavalry division.

On reporting to the division commander he directed me to take post with my command at Old Church, Va., about 6 miles to the rear of the then general headquarters, to observe the movements of the enemy in the direction of Hanover Court-House, sending out daily scouts for that purpose, and to establish pickets on the main approaches to Old Church and some distance from that point in the direction of the Pamunkey River. These instructions were obeyed to the letter. One company was detailed daily to go in the direction of Hanover Court-House. On the morning of the 13th instant Lieut. Edward H. Leib was detailed for this duty. He left camp with his company (F) at an early hour. About 2 o'clock p. m. I received a message from him stating that the enemy were advancing in force from the direction of Hanover Court-House, and that he (Leib) was returning slowly toward camp. I immediately sent Lieut. William McLean, with his company (H), to support Lieutenant Leib, and prepared to follow myself with the remainder of my command, consisting of Company C, which was then being relieved from picket duty.

My command was weakened by the absence of Captain Harrison and a part of his company, who had gone by order of the general-in-chief with a flag of truce to the enemy's lines early that morning. Immediately on the arrival of Company C I ordered Lieut. Richard Byrnes to bring up the company, which was but a short time after Lieutenant McLean left. I started in person to join Lieutenant Leib. I found him about 1 mile from my camp, and he reported the enemy in force immediately in his front. This information I sent to the division commander by Lieut. Louis D. Watkins.

Wishing to satisfy myself from personal observation as to the strength and character of the enemy I ordered the command forward. I had proceeded but a short distance, not more than three-quarters of a mile, when I met the enemy's advance, which I charged and drove back. In a few minutes, however, I was attacked by a large force, consisting, I supposed, of six or seven squadrons of cavalry in front and on both flanks. My whole command did not exceed 100 men, and consequently I was driven back.

I wheeled my command twice on my retreat and arrested the overwhelming force that charged me, each time emptying three or four saddles. The last mile to camp I was not pursued closely, but on reaching my camp I was forced to turn over my command to Lieutenant Leib, having been exhausted from loss of blood from several saber wounds which I had received, instructing him not to risk another attack, but to remain there until the enemy approached, and then retire by the Cold Harbor road.

Lieutenant McLean, after fighting most gallantly, was wounded and taken prisoner. I had 4 men killed and I suppose 10 or 12 wounded. Most of the wounded were taken prisoners. Quite a number of Captain Harrison's company were captured whilst on picket, the enemy seeming to know exactly where they were posted, and I suppose cut off their retreat. Of the loss of the enemy I am unable to give an accurate account. We captured 8 or 10 horses, with their whole equipments. I know that quite a number must have been wounded, for in each of my encounters the saber was used freely by my command.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. B. ROYALL,

Captain Fifth Cavalry, Commanding.

Lieut. THOMAS E. MALEY,

Adjutant Fifth Cavalry, present.

No. 10.

Report of Lieut. Edward H. Leib, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations June 13.

CAMP CAVALRY RESERVE,

June 15, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to orders received from headquarters to make a detailed statement of the operations of my company I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 13th I was ordered by Captain Royall, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, to make with my company a reconnaissance in the direction of Hanover Court-House, and to proceed as far as that place, to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy, should he be found in that quarter. Leaving camp about 6 o'clock in the morning I advanced upon the Hanover road, throwing forward as an advance guard a non-commissioned officer and 8 men. Feeling my way cautiously I had advanced at 11 o'clock a. m. to within a half mile of Hanover Court-House, where I first caught sight of what I supposed to be the pickets of the enemy. Halting my main body and advance in a skirt of timber under cover and out of sight, I cautiously proceeded to reconnoiter in person the strength and position of the force in front. After a close observation I discovered a body of cavalry drawn up in line and numbering about two squadrons, together with a scattered advance of horsemen, amounting to about 15 men.

Having learned that a portion of the Sixth Cavalry had been sent forward in that direction I was uncertain as to whether it was they or the enemy. After halting a few moments I advanced alone to the banks of a small stream, upon the opposite side of which I could still see the horsemen in line. As I approached the stream an officer and 6 or 8 men came down the opposite side. Immediately upon seeing me they

turned about and joined the main body. I then knew them to be the enemy. Returning to my advance, I informed them that the enemy were in front, and stationing them as a rear guard I returned to the main body, and immediately sent back one of my men to inform Captain Royall that I had met the enemy and that they were about two squadrons strong.

It was then about 11.30 o'clock, and having determined to fall back, I wheeled my company by fours, and giving my sergeant instructions to retire slowly and in order, regulating his gait by mine, I returned to the rear of my command, and leaving one man to keep the enemy in sight, I gave him instructions to regulate his gait by theirs. I then detached 6 men to keep this man in sight, and returned to the front and sent forward on the road an advance of 4 men, under a non-commissioned officer, to gather in the men which I had left to guard the different roads I had passed. After this I took my position between my company and my rear guard. The enemy did not immediately follow, and finding there was no immediate pursuit, I stationed a man upon a slight eminence, where the view was extended, and told him to wait for fifteen or twenty minutes, and if the enemy were not in sight by that time to join me at once. I still continued to retire until I reached our first pickets, stationed at a cross-road where were a few houses, known as Hall's [Hawes'] Machine-Shop. Having heard from my scout I sent word to Captain Royall the enemy were not in sight, but repeated my first report, that I had seen two squadrons. After this I remained at the cross-roads and sent back my rear guard $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles on the road by which I had retired.

After remaining at the cross-roads about an hour I received an order from Captain Royall to return to camp, and withdrawing my rear guard, I cautioned the pickets that the enemy were in my rear, and took up my march toward camp. About a mile from the cross-roads I was joined by Lieutenant McLean, in command of about 30 men of Company H, Fifth Cavalry, who again gave me Captain Royall's order to return to camp. Lieutenant McLean took command, and keeping his company in front, we in this manner retired half a mile, when I was informed by pickets that the enemy were about a quarter of a mile back, advancing rapidly. I immediately sent word to Lieutenant McLean, who was in front, and also to Captain Royall, to tell them the enemy were advancing upon us. Not hearing from Lieutenant McLean I drew up in line under the brow of a hill on the side of the road, intending if my force was sufficient to charge; if not, to keep them in check with the pistol; in either event to show a bold front and conceal as long as possible the small numbers of my command. The enemy came on in a few moments in large numbers. I held them in check at least twenty minutes, emptying during that time ten saddles (the horses coming over to my command). During this time I lost no men, but had several horses wounded.

It was at this point that I felt most seriously the superiority of the enemy, who were armed with rifles and shot-guns, and had my command been furnished with carbines I would have been able to do him more injury and hold him longer in check. After I had emptied all of my pistols I drew sabers and endeavored to charge, but finding they were coming up in greatly-superior force on either flank and in front, I thought it best to fall back on Lieutenant McLean's command, which at this time was halted on the opposite side of a small bridge. From this point I again sent to Captain Royall an account of what had been done and what was then in progress. For some time I held the bridge,

and the enemy fell back. I then found they were crossing the creek above and below the bridge, in order to surround and capture my small force. I was forced again to retire, which I did for 2 miles, disputing every inch of ground. The enemy gradually ceased to pursue, and to prevent them flanking me I continued to fall back until I reached the road, which here turns toward Richmond. At this point I determined to hold my position at all hazards, deeming it certain re-enforcements must soon come up. The enemy did not again attack, and after half an hour Captain Royall arrived and assumed command.

After explaining to Captain Royall the position and force of the enemy I formed my company for a charge, if necessary, and immediately followed Captain Royall, who, with Lieutenant McLean, had advanced some distance on the road toward the enemy. In a few moments the heads of the columns were engaged, and with drawn sabers I was prepared to charge when Captain Royall, who was badly wounded, ordered me to fall back, which I did slowly, fighting at intervals for half a mile. After this the fighting gradually ceased, and I retired until we reached our camp. There, Captain Royall's wounds proving very severe, the command was turned over to me. Having sent word to General Cooke and sent out an advance to feel the enemy, at this point I was joined by Lieutenant Byrnes, with a part of Company C, Fifth Cavalry. I ordered him to form on the left of my line, and in this position I awaited the enemy for at least an hour. From this point I dispatched two non-commissioned officers—one to recall the picket at New Castle Landing and the other to turn back any wagons that might be coming from White House Landing. I also sent an express on the Cold Harbor road to ask for re-enforcements at the first camp he met. At last, in about an hour, the enemy attacked me on all sides, and such were his numbers I deemed it proper to order the command to retreat, which I am happy to say was made without loss and in excellent order.

During the engagement, and indeed during the whole retreat, which was made in the face of vastly-superior numbers, the men under my command behaved with great coolness, and I take pleasure in mentioning the valuable services of First Sergt. James T. Baden and Sergeants McMahon and Carter, who supplied to me the place of officers, my own company having no one commissioned but myself.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDW'D H. LEIB,

First Lieutenant, Fifth Cavalry, Commanding Company F.

Lieut. THOMAS E. MALEY,

Adjutant Fifth Cavalry.

No. 11.

*Report of Lieut. Richard Byrnes, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of operations
June 13.*

CAMP OF CAVALRY RESERVE,

June 15, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 13th instant Corporal Emory, of Company F, Fifth Cavalry, was sent into camp by Lieutenant Leib, reporting the enemy

advancing, and at that time within $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from our camp, at Old Church, near the bridge on the Hanover Court-House road. Captain Royall immediately ordered Company C (the only company then remaining in camp) to saddle up and the teamsters to harness up, at the same time telling me that he would go to where Lieutenant Leib was, to see if the enemy were in force. I immediately mounted the company and formed them across the road at the blacksmith's shop, about 300 yards in front of the camp. At the same time I sent Sergeant Montgomery with 6 men down the road leading past Sears' farm (which is the Hanover Ferry road) to see if the enemy were advancing in that direction. Before the sergeant returned I received orders from Captain Royall to bring my company up rapidly to his support. I ordered Corporal Emory to return to camp and to get the wagons ready to leave. I joined Captain Royall at the junction of the Richmond and Hanover Court-House roads. He then ordered the advance. We moved on at a rapid pace in the direction of the bridge on the Hanover Court-House road and advanced about 300 yards, when I heard the command in front of me to draw saber. I immediately threw down a panel of fence on the right to enable me to get into an open field and to advance in a direction parallel to Captain Royall's command, which was moving in column of fours along the road. Before I reached the head of his column a fire was opened from the timber in front of my company. I sent Corporal Evans, with 6 men, to my right and rear to see what was there. He had not advanced in that direction more than 200 yards when I saw the enemy coming out of the woods between the corporal and myself.

About this time the charge sounded. I moved rapidly to the front toward the bridge, when I saw our force withdrawing rapidly. My company being cut off from the road I found it impossible to join Captain Royall, and immediately proceeded across an open field, leaping the fence into another open field, where I drew up in line along the fence and delivered a fire. Finding that the enemy were trying to get between my company and the woods I at once retreated to the woods, and reaching it before the Confederates, took a circuitous route and reached a point on the Hanover Ferry road about 300 yards from the Richmond road opposite our camp at Old Church. Lieutenant Leib, in the mean time having arrived at camp, had his company drawn up in line near the edge of the woods. I proceeded to join him. Pickets were then sent out on the Richmond and Hanover Ferry roads, and in about twenty minutes were driven in by the enemy in force. When they arrived within sight of us Lieutenant Leib gave the command to retreat on the Cold Harbor road. This was about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The enemy followed us about a mile on this road and then abandoned their pursuit. I reached this camp about 6 o'clock p. m. Throughout the whole affair I felt the want of carbines greatly.

It is proper for me to state in connection with this report that when retreating and when about 1 mile from Old Church I saw the head of a column of infantry advancing on the road leading into the Hanover Ferry road. The pickets which were driven in saw the same body of infantry.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

RICHARD BYRNES,

Second Lieutenant, Fifth Cavalry.

Lieut. THOMAS E. MALEY,

Adjutant Fifth Cavalry.

No. 12.

*Report of Maj. Lawrence Williams, Sixth U. S. Cavalry, of operations
June 13.*

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CAVALRY,
Camp near Richmond, June 16, 1862.

SIR: Agreeably to instructions I have the honor to make the following report:

On the 13th instant I was ordered to take command of a portion of my regiment and of the Fifth Cavalry and proceed to the support of Captain Royall, Fifth Cavalry, who, it is said, was attacked, and whose camp was being threatened by the enemy. I started from my present camp about 3 o'clock p. m., and came up with the enemy's pickets about 3.30 o'clock. My advance fired upon them, and they retired in the direction of Hanover Court-House. On inquiry from a man living at the house where the pickets were stationed and where the engagement between Captain Royall's command and the enemy had taken place, I learned that he (the enemy) had passed about half an hour before—estimating his force from 3,000 to 5,000 men, with from two to four pieces of artillery. This I knew to be an exaggeration, but think that 1,000 cavalry and two pieces of artillery was what was before me. I had 380 men. Lieutenant Byrnes also reported that whilst retreating from the battle-field he had seen infantry about a mile from me (five regiments, I think) on the Hanover road, which came on to the Old Church road about a mile ahead of me. I then sent Lieutenant Watkins, Fifth Cavalry, to communicate with Captain Royall through the woods; to tell him where I was, and if attacked to fall back toward my force by a circuitous route, and that I would protect him. Lieutenant Watkins performed the order with great quickness, returned, and reported the camp burned, and that the enemy had gone past the Old Church in the direction of the White House. I ordered Lieutenant Balder to take a platoon and go on as rapidly as possible until he should come to the enemy's rear, ascertaining if possible his numbers and the direction he had taken. He returned and reported that he was still on the road toward the White House.

These facts I communicated to General Emory, but he never received that in relation to Lieutenant Balder or the enemy's being on the White House road. In the mean time I had received a communication from him, informing me that he was informed by Lieutenant Byrnes that the enemy's infantry were in force at the Old Church and to hold my then present position. I also received another from General Cooke to the same effect, with instructions to scour the roads about me and collect information. These instructions were carried out, and I remained until General Cooke joined the command with re-enforcements.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LAWRENCE WILLIAMS,
Major, Sixth Cavalry, Commanding.

Lieut. JOSEPH KERIN,
Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., First Brigade, Cavalry Reserve.

[Indorsement.]

Report of Major Williams, which he has been desired to correct and has done so. The only message I received from him was that the enemy was in force between him and Royall, and the message I sent back was

that I would support him with artillery and infantry, and that Lieutenant Byrnes, Fifth Cavalry, had brought the information. He had seen near Old Church five regiments of the enemy's infantry, which went to corroborate his information. I had left for General Porter's before his message about Balder's pursuit on the White House road reached here, and never received it till at Tunstall's.

Respectfully submitted.

W. H. EMORY,
Brigadier-General.

[Inclosures.]

MAJOR: I have handed your note to General Cooke. Keep your ground as well as you can. You will be supported with infantry and artillery. Byrnes is just in, and reports infantry in force at Old Church.

W. H. E.

Major WILLIAMS.

Royall has fallen back. I bring forward a brigade of infantry. Do not advance unless to attack an inferior force. Gain information on all roads by scouts.

Respectfully, yours,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE.

Major WILLIAMS.

No. 13.

Report of Col. George A. H. Blake, First U. S. Cavalry, commanding Second Brigade, Cavalry Reserve.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CAVALRY BRIGADE,
Camp in the Field, June 15, 1862.

GENERAL: Agreeably to orders from headquarters cavalry division I have the honor to report that upon the 13th instant I received orders "to meet the enemy," who had driven in our pickets a short time before. The brigade was immediately formed, and ordered to repair to the road in front of our camp, where it remained until late in the evening, when by order of the brigadier-general commanding cavalry division it returned to camp to procure provisions, with orders to march at 11 o'clock p. m. to a point occupied by the Fifth and Sixth U. S. Cavalry Regiments.

At the time specified the brigade commenced the march, and having proceeded about 1 mile two squadrons were detached and ordered to report to Brigadier-General Sykes. After marching about 5 miles we reached the point designated and occupied by the Fifth and Sixth Cavalry Regiments, together with artillery and infantry, under command of Brigadier-General Cooke. Here we remained until 3.30 o'clock a. m., when we took up the line of march via Old Church and left-hand or lower or river road. When in the vicinity of Old Church the cavalry and artillery took the lower road. The command was united at the junction (Turner's store), and from thence proceeded to Tunstall's Station, which point we reached about 9.30 o'clock a. m. At 3 o'clock p. m. the line of march was again resumed, and having proceeded but a short distance the command was recalled, and we bivouacked for the night at the station. Upon the following morning (15th instant)

at 7.30 o'clock we returned to camp, which point we reached at 12 o'clock m.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. A. H. BLAKE,

Colonel First U. S. Cavalry, Commanding Brigade.

Lieut. JAMES P. MARTIN, A. A. A. G., *Headquarters Cav. Division.*

No. 14.

Report of Lieut. Col. William N. Grier, First U. S. Cavalry, of operations June 14-15.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST U. S. CAVALRY,

Camp near New Bridge, Va., June, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of a march made by the First Regiment U. S. Cavalry, as a part of Colonel Blake's Second Brigade of reserve cavalry:

The regiment, composed of four small squadrons, marched from this camp at 11 o'clock p. m. on the 14th instant as a part of the Second Brigade, Cavalry Reserve, Colonel Blake in command. The regiment had not marched more than a mile or two when two squadrons of it were detached and sent to report to Brigadier-General Sykes, thus leaving the whole strength of the regiment under my immediate command but two small squadrons. After marching about 7 miles reached the point where a portion of the Fifth Cavalry had been attacked by rebel troops some twelve hours previous to our arrival; found at this point the Fifth and Sixth Regiments of U. S. Cavalry, some infantry and artillery, Brig. Gen. P. St. George Cooke, U. S. Army, in command.

At 3.30 a. m. the march was resumed, the two squadrons of First Cavalry in front as an advance guard. Arrived at Tunstall's Station about 9.30 a. m. same day. Remained at or near this point until 7.30 a. m. on the 15th, when we returned by the way of Gaines' Mill to this camp, arriving here about 12 m.

The general direction traveled I suppose to be about northeast to Old Church; thence about southeast to Tunstall's Station, distance 18 to 20 miles. Whilst I marched in advance with the two squadrons of my regiment I made inquiries of all persons I met. The information gained from them was to the effect that about 1,000 rebel cavalry with two pieces of artillery had passed during the afternoon of the day before *en route* to Garlick's Landing, on the Pamunkey River, General J. E. B. Stuart, of the rebel forces, said to be in command.

Very respectfully,

WM. N. GRIER,

Lieut. Col., First Cavalry, Commanding Regiment.

Lieut. N. W. KNEASS, A. A. A. G., *Second Brigade, Cav. Reserve.*

No. 15.

Report of Lieut. Joseph S. Hoyer, First U. S. Cavalry, of attack at Garlick's Landing, on the Pamunkey River.

FIRST CAVALRY CAMP,

Near New Bridge, Va., June 15, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, pursuant to orders received by me on the 13th instant from the colonel commanding, I proceeded to

Garlick's Landing with an escort of a non-commissioned officer and 8 men, in charge of a supply train, consisting of 14 wagons and 1 ambulance. I arrived safely at the landing above mentioned about 2 o'clock p. m. on the same day, and having obtained the required supplies I ordered the horses unsaddled, and in accordance with orders encamped for the night on the banks of the Pamunkey River, near the landing.

About 6 o'clock p. m., whilst the animals were feeding and the men at supper, a platoon of the enemy's cavalry (deployed as skirmishers) unexpectedly attacked me. So sudden was their appearance that the men were unable to mount their horses. I therefore ordered them into line, which order was promptly executed, and upon being ordered to surrender we fired upon the enemy, when they retired, carrying with them 2 wounded. A squadron of their cavalry, however, subsequently charged upon us, when we were compelled to seek the underbrush for protection.

In connection with this I would state that a supply train from the Seventeenth and Forty-fourth New York Volunteer Regiments, although attended by an escort of 15 or more men, through some neglect were without arms. Had they been armed I might have repelled their attack with greater effect. The enemy meanwhile set fire to and destroyed the train and supplies, having previously turned loose and driven off the animals. Of 15 teamsters and 8 men I report a return to duty thus far of 10. To my knowledge 3 surrendered to the enemy, while the remainder (11) are yet missing.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOS. S. HOYER,

Second Lieutenant, First U. S. Cavalry.

Lieut. Col. WILLIAM N. GRIER,

Commanding First Regiment U. S. Cavalry.

No. 16.

Report of Brig. Gen. John F. Reynolds, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, McCall's division, Fifth Corps, of operations June 13-14.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, MCCALL'S DIVISION,
Camp at Dispatch Station, June 15, 1862.

I have the honor to report that, in obedience to orders from division headquarters, I proceeded with my brigade on the night of the 13th instant up the railroad to Tunstall's Station, which place I reached just about midnight. I approached as quietly as possible, sending one regiment out to the right to occupy the hill, which commands the whole place, another through the woods to the left, the remainder moving down after the advance. On reaching the depot I found a car loaded with corn on the side track on fire and partially consumed; the telegraph poles on the cross-road thrown down and the wire severed; the bridge beyond the depot on fire. Both fires were at once extinguished, the platform of the car and part of the corn alone being destroyed. One dead body on the track near the depot run over by the train. Upon examination by Surgeon King, no shot-wound was found. Another body was afterward found in the woods with a gun-shot wound in the head. Both seemed to have been laborers (not soldiers), but could

find nothing upon their persons to identify them. No indications of the enemy's presence could be obtained at the time of our arrival, though it appears from accounts of persons whom they had taken prisoners that between 11 and 12 o'clock the small party who had them in charge in the woods to the right of the railroad left in such haste and alarm as to leave them behind. This was evidently a party left there to give information as to what time the main body would pass if pursuit was made.

About 2 o'clock General Emory arrived with Rush's Lancers, and at daylight Captain Reno, with a squadron of the First Cavalry, reached Tunstall's. Of the steps taken afterward to ascertain the force of the enemy and the direction taken by him the inclosed report of General Emory will inform you.* Though I did not assume any command over General Emory or General Cooke, who subsequently reached Tunstall's during the morning, I coincided with the measures taken by General Emory, and gave him such assistance as was in my power, by furnishing infantry supports, &c.

I inclose also the statement of a prisoner taken by my command, whom I sent to Colonel Ingalls, with the same statement.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN F. REYNOLDS,

Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding.

Brigadier General MARCY,

Chief of Staff, Headquarters Army of the Potomac.

P. S.—Two soldiers belonging to the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, who had been roaming over the country south of the railroad, were alarmed by the news of the rebel cavalry being in the vicinity, and came with my pickets. I sent them in to White House with the rebel prisoner, asking Colonel Ingalls to direct my guard where to deliver them over to their regiment as deserters.

No. 17.

Report of Col. Gouverneur K. Warren, Fifth New York Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, Sykes' division, Fifth Corps.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SYKES' DIVISION,

June 16, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that at a moment's notice the brigade was ordered under arms at 5 o'clock p. m. on the 13th instant to repel any advance of the enemy on our flanks. The notice was so brief and the danger said to be so imminent that proper two-days' provisions could not be had. After passing through the woods to the clearing in sight of Brigadier-General Cooke's camp I received orders to report to him with my command, which I did—a distance of about 4 miles from here. Captain Weed, with his battery, also joined me at this point, having been directed to report to me. General Cooke then ordered me to advance toward Old Church. On reaching the road going to Hanover Court-House I found Major Williams, with cavalry. The reports were quite conclusive that about 600 cavalry and two pieces of artillery had passed down toward the White House, dispersing Captain Royall's

* See No. 5.

force as they passed along. There was also a statement that Lieutenant Byrnes (I believe that is the name) had seen about seven regiments of infantry at the place where the pickets were first attacked (the place called Hawes' Shop), $5\frac{3}{4}$ miles from Old Church, and as these had not been seen it was inferred they passed (fording the Totopotomoy) down the road along the Pamunkey River. Knowing the country well, and convinced that it would not have allowed seven infantry regiments to display themselves at Hawes' Shop, together with the little time for observation left to Lieutenant Byrnes, I never for a moment believed we had any evidence of an infantry force.

I immediately sent Colonel Tyler's regiment down to Old Church and awaited the arrival of General Cooke with the rest. When he came and had properly examined into the nature of the information and I had drawn him a map of the country I advised him to let me move with my whole command down to Old Church, and if the information which I could get justified it about 2 miles farther on to the site of the New Castle Ferry, so as to prevent the return of the enemy's forces. This was the only point where I could command all the roads leading back.

By the time these arrangements were made it was 12 o'clock at night, the moon shining brightly, making any kind of movements for ourselves or the enemy as easy as in daylight. As soon as I set out, however, General Cooke detached the Fifth New York Volunteers to remain with him and sent one company a mile farther from me up the road toward Hanover. When I reached Old Church I was told by negroes that the enemy was holding the vicinity of New Castle Ferry, which I thought very probable, to cover his crossing the Pamunkey River. This I informed General Cooke of, but almost as soon men came straggling up the road from Garlick's Landing and reported the operations there, and that the enemy had gone on to the White House about sunset. I mounted one of these men and sent him to General Cooke at once.

It was now about 1.30 o'clock, and my men, except those on guard, lay down with their arms and got a little sleep, which was denied to most of the officers. My command was aroused at 3 a. m., but we did not get away from Old Church till 4 o'clock a. m. We soon reached the forks of the road at New Castle Ferry, and here I strongly urged upon General Cooke to leave the infantry with a portion of the artillery, where we could certainly stop the enemy from going back. We were too much exhausted to have any hope of keeping up with an efficient cavalry pursuit, even if it were a possibility ever to do it, and it was now certain that no infantry had passed down. He told me to keep on till further orders, and we did so, he remaining with our column, which was close to the cavalry. The men bore up pretty well as far as the crossing of the Mattadequin, but the roads were heavy, the men tired, and the sun intensely hot. It was impossible for all to keep up. They fell down exhausted and faint and some were sun-struck.

We reached the vicinity of Tunstall's Station, via Garlick's Landing, about 12 o'clock a. m. and halted in the shade. There we learned the enemy had left that place about twelve or fourteen hours before, and soon after that they had crossed the Chickahominy.

I received orders to return next morning to this place, but taking advantage of the moonlight and the cool of the night I set out at midnight and reached here at 7 a. m. The sick and worn-out I sent up by railroad. There are a number of the men yet behind, not having been able to get in.

The march made by this brigade (one of the regiments of which had but recently joined) under the circumstances was very severe. The men started suddenly and unprepared for it; the weather was intensely hot, and yet they marched $41\frac{1}{2}$ miles between 5 o'clock p. m. on the 13th instant and 7 o'clock a. m. on the 15th instant, being $41\frac{1}{2}$ miles in thirty-eight hours; one company of the Fifth New York Volunteers traveling $43\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

I deem it my duty to say that I do not believe from the way in which General Cooke conducted the operations that the enemy would have been prevented from returning to Hanover Court-House by taking the road along the Pamunkey River. It was impossible for the infantry to overtake him, and as the cavalry did not move without us it was impossible for them to overtake him.

Captain Royall seemed to be very much liked by people in the country, many of whom inquired kindly after him, and Mrs. Braxten sent a note to the commanding officer of the Confederate forces, which came to me and which I inclose.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. K. WARREN,

Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade.

Lieut. SAMUEL A. FOSTER,

Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., Sykes' Division.

No. 18.

Report of Lieut. Col. Rufus Ingalls, Aide-de-Camp, of arrangements for the protection of the depot at White House during the raid.

WHITE HOUSE, VA., June 19, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of the 17th instant, requesting me to furnish you with a detailed account of my arrangements for the protection of this depot on the 13th instant and the loss sustained in men and public property by the depredations of the rebels on that day within the limits of my command. I had already forwarded to General Williams the report of the services of the five companies of the Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, under the command of Colonel Harlan, with my indorsements thereon. I now submit a copy herewith.

As a protective measure simply, without having supposed the enemy would make a movement so unaccountable, one company of Harlan's regiment was sent to Garlick's Landing on the evening of the 12th, where it remained until daylight of the 13th, when it scouted up the right bank of the Pamunkey as high as Hanover Ferry, where Captain Royall, of the Fifth Cavalry, was met, who reported all quiet in front. This company returned by the road to near Garlick's, and it was there, while waiting the return of a guard sent to arrest the rebel miller, that it was overtaken by a sergeant and 4 men of the Fifth Cavalry, who had escaped during the attack on Royall, and who reported a rebel force rushing down in that direction. This company shortly afterward was overtaken by a superior force and compelled to give way slowly before it and to finally fall back to this point, exhibiting all the time as far as I can learn courage and good judgment. It reached here before sunset; so did the fugitives from the Fifth Cavalry, and all concurred in representing a large rebel force in

pursuit and already very near the depot. The danger at that moment of an attack on our shipping, railroad, &c., seemed imminent.

I had received a telegram from General Marcy informing me of the attack on Royall. I learned the fact at the same time from my own scouts. Before I could make proper reply to General Marcy the rebels had cut the connection of the wires at Tunstall's. The force here was very small, not exceeding 600 men of all arms. I could only act on the defensive. I assumed, however, that the commanding general would send back an overpowering force from Dispatch Station, which was promptly done.

With your timely advice and assistance, rendered in person, I immediately ordered out all of Harlan's cavalry, except the company just returned, with orders to occupy and reconnoiter the rail and wagon roads toward Tunstall's and to give notice of the approach of the enemy, which service Colonel Harlan directed in person in a prompt and vigorous manner. Wilson's battery, First New York Artillery, of 3-inch guns, was posted on the plain, so as to command the roads by which the enemy would make his appearance. Colonel Butler, with a portion of his regiment, the Ninety-third New York, and Captain Hildt, with two companies of the Third Regular Infantry, were posted in rear to protect the battery or skirmish forward in pursuit.

The hospital convalescents, some 250, and some returning guards, employés, and citizens cheerfully and readily volunteered their services, and were armed and kept posted near the hospital and shipping to defend the depot from violence. All the officers and persons present behaved with great merit, and I doubt not would have gallantly defended the place in case of an attack.

In addition to those arrangements I called upon the gunboats under command of Captain Murray, who responded promptly, placing the boats in position off the depot to sweep the plain of any hostile force. To aid in this a signal officer was posted on the top of the White House, to give timely and proper signals to direct the fire of the boats.

These dispositions being made, there remained nothing further during the darkness of the night but to wait. You have since learned the route pursued by the enemy; that he burned two Government schooners and some wagons at Garlick's Landing, killing 2 or 3 men, making some prisoners, and dispersing the balance; that he fired on a down-train at Tunstall's, killing 2 men, wounding 8, and making some more prisoners, but doing little or no damage to railroad or telegraph; that Generals Reynolds and Emory soon came up with a large force, gave pursuit, and followed the enemy to the Chickahominy, where farther pursuit was abandoned.

So far as this depot was directly concerned it lost the two schooners and some forage—amount unknown—and in all not to exceed 75 wagons. There were more trains lost, probably, but they were in possession of brigade quartermasters, serving with the army in front.

We are daily recovering wagons and animals which the rebels were unable to carry away. One man of the Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry was taken prisoner when he was sent in to Garlick's to assist in the arrest of the miller. There were no other casualties of which I am informed.

With a depot stretching from Cumberland to this point, with three hundred ships crowded into so small a river, containing all our supplies, a much larger force would seem necessary to its protection. I have not been pressing for troops, because I hoped we could defend

the depot with the force provided, and because I know the general commanding wishes every good soldier with him in front of Richmond.

I am, respectfully, your most obedient servant,

RUFUS INGALLS,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Aide-de-Camp, Commanding White House.

Brig. Gen. STEWART VAN VLIET,

Senior Quartermaster, Army Potomac, Hdqrs. near Richmond, Va.

No. 19.

Report of Col. Josiah Harlan, Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, of operations June 6-17.

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY,
White House Landing, June 18, 1862.

GENERAL: On the 10th June I had the honor to receive your instructions to scout the district of country lying between Hanover Ferry, north of this post, and the Chickahominy, south, and all the intervening country toward the advance, so far as necessary, and to protect the telegraph wires and railroad as far as Dispatch Station; to preserve order generally; to apprehend and, through Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls, return to the headquarters of their corps all vagrants, skulkers, deserters, and other persons found in transit without authority. Although to perform the above duty effectually would require three times the force at my disposal, I have carried out your orders with satisfaction to Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls, aide-de-camp, in command of the post, more by the effect of prestige than adequate force.

Permanent patrols were established under a provost-marshal on the 6th of June upon a beat extending 1 mile above and 1 mile below the White House Landing and across to the forest in our front over a plain 1 mile to $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide. These patrols are on duty day and night and are relieved every two hours. There has been established a picket station near Tunstall's, on the railroad, distant from my camp northwest $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3 miles, a central picket west by south, distant $1\frac{1}{2}$ or 2 miles, and on the left another picket southwest, distant $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, toward Cumberland. To Cumberland a company of 45 to 50 men was sent last night at 9.30 o'clock, with orders to station vedettes as far south as New Kent Court-House and to patrol on the right flank toward Baltimore Cross-Roads. It is believed that Colonels Lee and Stuart left Richmond about Thursday and proceeded north by west to Ashland. On Friday, the 13th, they approached toward White House via Old Church, driving in Royall's picket. Then about ——— of the First Regular Cavalry showed themselves in the rear of my scouts under Cornog, of Company B, of this regiment, out by your order of the 10th, near Hanover Ferry. Several rebels swam their horses over the Pamunkey from King William County above the ferry and joined the Richmond force, giving rise to an erroneous report that the force then moving south came from across the river. This force crossed the railroad near Tunstall's, having thrown down two telegraph poles, broken the wire, and fired into the passing train after my patrols had passed in toward camp.

That night I bivouacked with three companies a mile below Tunstall's Station. A large pile of hay and a schooner at Garlick's Landing, together with two trains of thirty (formerly reported twenty) wagons, chiefly loaded with long and short forage, were consuming by fire at the same time. A sutler of low degree was shot dead on the

premises, one or two carried off, and a sergeant in charge of one of the trains from the Eighty-third Pennsylvania was shot dead on board a schooner that had slipped her fastenings, and fortunately floated out of reach of more destructive damage.

At daylight I proceeded to the burning pile by the road, riding near 7 miles, although it was not distant more than 2 miles in a direct line from the bivouac. The major was ordered to camp with the three companies. On his arrival he received an order from headquarters to report to Colonel Rush. The party then followed the trail of Lee's guerrillas to Jones' Bridge, called also Charles City Bridge, where the enemy had just before crossed the Chickahominy, and from the best information I can achieve the rebel force is still at Charles City, within 1 mile of the Chickahominy, near Jones' Bridge, $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles above the steamboat landing at Window Shades, and 4 miles below Long Bridge. Four contrabands escaped from the vicinity of the rebel camp yesterday afternoon, and informed my scouts at Cumberland the enemy intended attacking Cumberland that (last) night, to destroy the Government property there. I sent a company at 9.30 o'clock from camp to warn the gunboats and shipmasters and to patrol toward Baltimore Cross-Roads and advance their pickets to New Kent Court-House. They will be relieved in a few hours. I have a permanent picket of 20 men, under a lieutenant, at Garlick's, which is decidedly a dangerous station, liable at any moment to attack by cavalry, who can and do swim the river from King William County anywhere between Hanover Ferry and Garlick's Mill. The guard report from that station for last night states that 6 or 8 mounted men unsuccessfully attempted a surprise. The forage remaining after the fire has been nearly all delivered to trains belonging to the advance and receipts taken for it by the lieutenant of my guard. The station (Garlick's Landing) should either be abandoned or strengthened, as the general commanding may see proper.

Lee and Stuart make no secret of their design to retrace their steps at their own convenience. I send you the report of the scouting south on the 13th, accidentally omitted. It has been acted on. I regret to learn that Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls omitted forwarding to your headquarters my reports as they were handed in to him. Last evening Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls showed me the reports indorsed by himself, which he informed me he was then about to forward by express. For this reason I have forwarded this report direct. I will send a confidential messenger into the rebel camp this afternoon and report the result to-morrow. All quiet now.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSIAH HARLAN,

Colonel, Commanding Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry.

General S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

No. 20.

Report of Capt. B. B. Mitchell, Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, of operations in the vicinity of Charles City Bridge, or Jones' Bridge, June 12.

CAMP, WHITE HOUSE, June 13, 1862.

COLONEL: Pursuant to a special order of the 12th instant I left camp at 6.30 o'clock and proceeded in the direction of Charles City

Bridge, sometimes called Jones' Bridge, on the Chickahominy, our object being to scour the country between here and that point, observe fords, and arrest any active or influential persons. I went direct to Saint Peter's Church, a distance of about 2 miles. On account of the exceedingly bad condition of the roads we did not arrive there until 8 o'clock a. m. We then took the right-hand road, leading to what is called the Baltimore Store. We then turned to the left, and proceeded in an easterly direction about half a mile, leaving a division hospital on our left; took the right-hand road, which runs a little west of south and direct to the Forge Mill, and from there to the Charles City Bridge, where we arrived at 12 o'clock m. We scoured the country and woods all along the road, visited the houses and people, but with very little success until we arrived in the vicinity of the Chickahominy. Here we learned the names and residences of J. P. Pierce, Edward Oliver Christian (a surgeon), Pearson, and Elijah Ball, who it is said are in the habit of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. We also learned that small parties of rebel soldiers were in the habit of prowling around in that vicinity. We immediately visited Mr. J. P. Pierce, who is said to be a lawyer and a very influential man. By engaging him in conversation we soon learned that his sympathies were wholly for the South. He openly declared that he would not willingly take the oath of allegiance, and if forced upon him he would not consider himself in duty bound to respect it, and upon those grounds we arrested him. We next arrested Edward Oliver Christian, whom we found just returning from Richmond or from that vicinity. We learned that he had been absent about two or three weeks, and it is generally supposed that he is connected with the rebel army, which, from his conversation, I have reason to believe. He stated that he came down the James River in a carriage without any molestation, and did not even see a picket guard or anything to in the least obstruct the free passage of friends or foes. We next arrested Mr. Elijah Ball, who declared he would stand the test before he would take any oath of allegiance to the United States. We then proceeded to Mr. Pearson's, who also declared his disgust at the idea of taking the oath. Pursuant to my orders I brought them into camp.

It now being quite late in the day, we were obliged to turn our course toward camp, which we did, not, however, until we had scouted through the country and along the banks of the Chickahominy. We found the bridges totally destroyed both at the Forge Mill and Charles City Bridge. We discovered a small foot-bridge just below where the main bridge had been destroyed, and also a skiff which was used for crossing over the stream. We scouted down the Chickahominy about 3 miles, but discovered nothing of interest except what has already been reported.

After leaving Saint Peter's Church we found the road in excellent condition and but little traveled. It is mostly through woods, the country being rather wild and thinly settled. It is well watered and beautifully shaded. I returned to camp about 8 o'clock p. m. and reported my prisoners. The weather was very warm and sultry.

I have the honor to report as above.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. B. MITCHELL,

Captain Company F, Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry.

Col. JOSIAH HARLAN,

Commanding Eleventh Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry.

No. 21.

Report of Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Brigade, with congratulatory orders.

HDQRS. CAV. BRIG., DEPT. OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

June 17, 1862.

GENERAL: In compliance with your written instructions I undertook an expedition to the vicinity of the enemy's lines on the Pamunkey with about 1,200 cavalry and a section of the Stuart Horse Artillery. The cavalry was composed of portions of the First, Fourth, and Ninth Virginia Cavalry. The second named, having no field officer present, was, for the time being, divided between the first and last mentioned, commanded, respectively, by Col. Fitz. Lee and Col. W. H. Fitzhugh Lee; also two squadrons of the Jeff. Davis Legion, commanded by Lieut. Col. W. T. Martin, the section of artillery being commanded by First Lieut. James Breathed.

Although the expedition was prosecuted farther than was contemplated in your instructions I feel assured that the considerations which actuated me will convince you that I did not depart from their spirit, and that the boldness developed in the subsequent direction of the march was the quintessence of prudence.

The destination of the expedition was kept a profound secret (so essential to success) and was known to my command only as the actual march developed it. The force was quietly concentrated beyond the Chickahominy, near Kilby's Station, on the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, and moved thence parallel to and to the left of that road. Scouts were kept far to the right to ascertain the enemy's whereabouts, and advanced guard, flankers, and rear guard to secure our column against surprise. I purposely directed my first day's march toward Louisa, so as to favor the idea of re-enforcing Jackson, and encamped just opposite Hanover Court-House, near South Anna Bridge (Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad), 22 miles from Richmond.

Our noiseless bivouac was broken early next morning, and without flag or bugle-sound we resumed our march, none but one knew whither. I, however, immediately took occasion to make known my instructions and plans confidentially to the regimental commanders, so as to secure an intelligent action and co-operation in whatever might occur. Scouts had returned, indicating no serious obstacles to my march from that to Old Church, directly in rear of and on the overland avenue of communication to New Bridge and vicinity.

I proceeded, therefore, via Hanover Court-House, upon the route to Old Church. Upon reaching the vicinity of Hanover Court-House I found it in possession of the enemy; but very little could be ascertained about the strength and nature of his force. I therefore sent Col. Fitz. Lee's regiment (First Virginia Cavalry) to make a detour to the right and reach the enemy's route behind him, to ascertain his force here and crush it, if possible; but the enemy, proving afterward to be 150 cavalry, did not tarry long, but left, my column following slowly down, expecting every moment to hurl him upon Lee; but owing to a bad marsh Colonel Lee did not reach the intersection of roads in time, and the cavalry (the Regular Sixth) passed on in the direction of Mechanicsville. This course deviating too much from our direction, after the capture of a sergeant they were allowed to proceed without interruption on their way.

Our march led thence to Taliaferro's Mill and Enon Church to Hawes' Shop; here we encountered the first pickets, surprised and caught several vedettes, and pushed boldly forward, keeping advance guard well to the front. The regiment in front was the Ninth Virginia Cavalry (Col. W. H. F. Lee), whose advance guard, intrusted to the command of the adjutant (Lieutenant Robins), did admirable service, Lieutenant Robins handling it in the most skillful manner, managing to clear the way for the march with little delay, and infusing by a sudden dash at a picket such a wholesome terror that it never paused to take a second look.

Between Hawes' Shop and Old Church the advance guard reported the enemy's cavalry in force in front; it proved to be the Fifth Regular Cavalry (formerly the Second, commanded by yourself). The leading squadron was ordered forward at a brisk gait, the main body following closely, and gave chase to the enemy for a mile or two, but not coming up with him. We crossed the Totopotomoy, a strong position of defense, which the enemy failed to hold, confessing a weakness. In such places half a squadron was deployed afoot as skirmishers till the point of danger was passed.

On, on dashed Robins, here skirting a field, there leaping a fence or ditch, and clearing the woods beyond, when not far from Old Church the enemy made a stand, having been re-enforced.

The only mode of attack being in column of fours along the road, I still preferred to oppose the enemy with one squadron at a time, remembering that he who brings on the field the last cavalry reserve wins the day. The next squadron therefore moved to the front under the lamented Captain Latane, making a most brilliant and successful charge with drawn sabers upon the picketed ground, and, after a hotly-contested hand-to-hand conflict, put him to flight, but not till the gallant captain had sealed his devotion to his native soil with his blood. The enemy's rout (two squadrons by one of ours) was complete; they dispersed in terror and confusion, leaving many dead on the field and blood in quantities in their tracks. Their commander, Captain Royall, was reported mortally wounded.

Several officers and a number of privates were taken in this conflict, and a number of horses, arms, and equipments, together with five guidons. The woods and fields were full of the scattered and disorganized foe straggling to and fro, and but for the delay and the great incumbrance which they would have been to our march, many more could and would have been captured.

Col. Fitz. Lee, burning with impatience to cross sabers with his old regiment, galloped to the front at this point and begged to be allowed to participate with his regiment (the First Virginia Cavalry) in the discomfiture of his old comrades, a request I readily granted, and his leading squadron pushed gallantly down the road to Old Church; but the fragments of Royall's command could not again be rallied, and Colonel Lee's leading squadron charged without resistance into the enemy's camp (five companies), and took possession of a number of horses, a quantity of arms and stores of every kind, several officers and privates. The stores as well as the tents, in which everything had been left, were speedily burned, and the march resumed.

Here was the turning point of the expedition. Two routes were before me—the one to return by Hanover Court-House, the other to pass around through New Kent, taking the chances of having to swim the Chickahominy and make a bold effort to cut the enemy's lines of communication. The Chickahominy was believed by my guide to be ford-

able near Forge Bridge. I was 14 miles from Hanover Court-House, which I would have to pass. If I returned, the enemy had a much shorter distance to pass to intercept me there; besides, the South Anna was impassable, which still further narrowed the chances of escape in that direction; the enemy, too, would naturally expect me to take that route. These circumstances led me to look with more favor to my favorite scheme, disclosed to you before starting, of passing around. It was only 9 miles to Tunstall's Station, on the York River Railroad, and that point once passed I felt little apprehension beyond. The route was one of all others which I felt sure the enemy would never expect me to take. On that side of the Chickahominy infantry could not reach me before crossing, and I felt able to whip any cavalry force that could be brought against me. Once on the Charles City side, I knew you would, when aware of my position, if necessary, order a diversion in my favor on the Charles City road, to prevent a move to intercept me from the direction of White Oak Swamp. Besides this, the hope of striking a serious blow at a boastful and insolent foe, which would make him tremble in his shoes, made more agreeable the alternative I chose. In a brief and frank interview with some of my officers I disclosed my views, but while none accorded a full assent, all assured me a hearty support in whatever I did.

With an abiding trust in God, and with such guarantees of success as the two Lees and Martin and their devoted followers, this enterprise I regarded as most promising. Taking care, therefore, more particularly, after this resolve, to inquire of the citizens the distance and the route to Hanover Court-House, I kept my horse's head steadily toward Tunstall's Station.

There was something of the sublime in the implicit confidence and unquestioning trust of the rank and file in a leader guiding them straight, apparently, into the very jaws of the enemy, every step appearing to them to diminish the faintest hope of extrication. Reports of the enemy's strength at Garlick's and Tunstall's were conflicting, but generally indicated a small number. Prisoners were captured at every step, and including officers, soldiers, and negroes.

The rear now became of as much importance as the front, but the duties of rear guard devolving upon the Jeff. Davis Legion, with the howitzer attached, its conduct was intrusted to its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, in whose judgment and skill I had entire confidence. He was not attacked, but at one time the enemy appeared in his rear bearing a flag of truce, and party, 25 in number, bearing it, actually surrendered to his rear guard, so great was the consternation produced by our march. An assistant surgeon was also taken. He was *en route* and not in charge of sick.

Upon arriving opposite Garlick's I ordered a squadron from the Ninth Virginia Cavalry to destroy whatever could be found at the landing on the Pamunkey. Two transports loaded with stores and a large number of wagons were here burned, and the squadron rejoined the column with a large number of prisoners, horses, and mules. A squadron of the First Virginia Cavalry (Hammond's) assisted in this destruction. A few picked men, including my aides, Burke, Farley, and Mosby, were pushed forward rapidly to Tunstall's to cut the wires and secure the depot. Five companies of cavalry, escorting large wagon trains, were in sight and seemed at first disposed to dispute our progress, but the sight of our column, led by Lee, of the Ninth, boldly advancing to the combat, was enough. Content with a distant view, they fled, leaving their train in our hands. The party that reached the railroad at Tunstall's surprised the guard at the depot (15 or 20 infantry), captured

them without their firing a gun, and set about obstructing the railroad, but before it could be thoroughly done, and just as the head of our column reached it, a train of cars came thundering down from the Grand Army. It had troops on board and we prepared to attack it. The train swept off the obstructions without being thrown from the track, but our fire, delivered at only a few rods' distance, either killed or caused to feign death every one on board, the engineer being one of the first victims from the unerring fire of Captain Farley. It is fair to presume that a serious collision took place on its arrival at the White House, for it made extraordinary speed in that direction. The railroad bridge over Black Creek was fired under the direction of Lieutenant Burke, and it being now dark, the burning of the immense wagon train and the extricating of the teams involved much labor and delay and illuminated the country for miles. The roads at this point were far worse than ours, and the artillery had much difficulty in passing. Our march was finally continued by bright moonlight to Talleysville, where we halted 3½ hours for the column to close up. At this point we passed a large hospital of 150 patients. I deemed it proper not to molest the surgeons and attendants in charge.

At 12 o'clock at night the march was continued without incident under the most favorable auspices to Forge Bridge (8 miles), over the Chickahominy, where we arrived just at daylight. Lee, of the Ninth, by personal experiment having found the stream not fordable, axes were sent for and every means taken to overcome the difficulties by improvised bridges and swimming. I immediately dispatched to you information of my situation and asked for the diversion already referred to. The progress in crossing was very slow at the point chosen, just above Forge Bridge, and learning that at the bridge proper enough of the *debris* of the old bridge remained to facilitate the construction of another, material for which was afforded by a large warehouse adjacent, I moved to that point at once. Lieut. Redmond Burke, who in every sphere has rendered most valuable service and deserves the highest consideration at the hands of the Government, set to work with a party to construct the bridge. A foot-bridge was soon improvised, and the horses were crossed over as rapidly as possible by swimming. Burke's work proceeded like magic; in three hours it was ready to bear artillery and cavalry, and as half of the latter had not yet crossed, the bridge enabled the whole to reach the other bank by 1 p. m. Another branch of the Chickahominy still farther on was with some difficulty forded, and the march was continued without interruption toward Richmond. Having passed the point of danger, I left the column with Colonel Lee, of the First. I rode on to report in person to you, reaching your headquarters at daylight next morning.

Returning to my command soon after, the prisoners, 165 in number, were transferred to the proper authority; 260 horses and mules captured, with more or less harness, were transferred to the quartermaster's departments of the different regiments, and the commands were sent to their respective camps. The number of captured arms has not been as yet accurately ascertained.

A pole was broken, which obliged us to abandon a limber this side of the Chickahominy.

The success attending this expedition will no doubt cause 10,000 or 15,000 men to be detached from the enemy's main body to guard his communication, besides accomplishing the destruction of millions' worth of property and the interruption for a time of his railroad communication.

The three commanders (the two Lees and Martin) exhibited the characteristics of skillful commanders, keeping their commands well in hand and managing them with skill and good judgment, which proved them worthy of a higher trust. Their brave men behaved with coolness and intrepidity in danger, unswerving resolution before difficulties, and stood unappalled before the rushing torrent of the Chickahominy, with the probability of an enemy at their heels armed with the fury of a tigress robbed of her whelps.

The perfect order and systematic disposition for crossing maintained throughout the passage insured its success and rendered it the crowning feature of a successful expedition.

I hope, general, that your sense of delicacy, so manifest on former occasions, will not prompt you to award to the two Lees (your son and nephew) less than their full measure of praise. Embalmed in the hearts and affections of their regiments; tried on many occasions requiring coolness, decision, and bravery; everywhere present to animate, direct, and control, they held their regiments in their grasp and proved themselves brilliant cavalry leaders.

The discipline maintained by Lieutenant-Colonel Martin in his command and referred to in his report is especially worthy of notice, as also his reference to the energy displayed by First Lieut. James Breathed, of the Stuart Horse Artillery.

I am most of all indebted to First Lieut. D. A. Timberlake, Corpl. Turner Doswell, and Private J. A. Timberlake, Fourth Virginia Cavalry; Second Lieut. Jones R. Christian and Private R. E. Frayser, Third Virginia Cavalry, who were ever in advance, and without whose thorough knowledge of the country and valuable assistance rendered I could have effected nothing.

Asst. Surg. J. B. Fontaine, Fourth Virginia Cavalry (the enemy giving him little to do in his profession), was bold and indefatigable in reconnaissance, and was particularly active in his effort to complete the bridge.

Capt. Heros von Borcke, a Prussian cavalry officer, who lately ran the blockade, assigned me by the honorable Secretary of War, joined in the charge of the First Squadron in gallant style, and subsequently, by his energy, skill, and activity, won the praise and admiration of all.

To my staff present my thanks are especially due for the diligent performance of the duties assigned them; they were as follows: First Lieut. John Esten Cooke, ordnance officer, my principal staff officer for the occasion; First Lieut. C. Dabney, aide-de-camp.

Rev. Mr. Landstreet, Captains Farley, Towles, Fitzhugh, and Mosby rendered conspicuous and gallant service during the whole expedition.

My escort, under Corporal Hagan, are entitled individually to my thanks for their zeal and devotion to duty, particularly Privates Carson, of the Jeff. Davis Legion, and Pierson, of the Fourth Virginia Cavalry.

Herewith are submitted the reports of subordinate commanders, marked A, B, and C,* and a map, D,† showing my route, and papers, E, containing recommendations for promotion, and F, containing congratulatory orders published to the command upon its return.

I have the honor to be, general, your most obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Cavalry.

General R. E. LEE,

Commanding Department Northern Virginia.

*Nos. 22, 23, and 24.

†To appear in Atlas.

[Inclosure E.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY BRIGADE,
June 17, 1862.

General R. E. LEE,

Commanding Department of Northern Virginia:

GENERAL: I have the honor to append to my report of the Pamunkey expedition the following recommendations, which were suggested more particularly by the distinguished service rendered there:

1. Col. Fitzhugh Lee, First Virginia Cavalry, for promotion as brigadier-general of cavalry. In my estimation no one in the Confederacy possesses more of the elements of what a brigadier of cavalry ought to be than he.

2. Col. W. H. F. Lee, rivaling his cousin in the daring exploits of this expedition, established a like claim to promotion to the same grade.

3. Lieut. Col. W. T. Martin to have Shannon's and two other companies added to the Legion, so as to be colonel; a grade which he has fairly won.

4. Assist. Surg. J. B. Fontaine to be surgeon of his regiment (Fourth Virginia Cavalry), now without one. Dr. Fontaine is a man of signal military merit and an adept in his profession.

5. M. Heros von Bocke, a Prussian cavalry officer, has shown himself a thorough soldier and a splendid officer. I hope the Department will confer as high a commission as possible on this deserving man, who has cast his lot with us in the trying hour.

6. First Lieut. Redmond Burke to be captain, for the important service rendered by him on this occasion.

7. Cpts. W. D. Farley and J. S. Mosby, without commission, have established a claim for position which a grateful country will not, I trust, disregard. Their distinguished services run far back toward the beginning of the war, and present a shining record of daring and usefulness.

8. First Lieut. W. T. Robins, adjutant Ninth Virginia Cavalry, would be a valuable addition to the Regular Army.

I have the honor to be, general, your most obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Cavalry.

[Inclosure F.]

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 11.HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY BRIGADE,
June 17, 1862.

The general of cavalry, profoundly grateful to Divine Providence for the signal success attending the late expedition to the enemy's rear, takes pleasure in announcing in orders his high appreciation of the bravery and cheerful endurance of the command. History will record in imperishable characters and a grateful country will remember with gratitude that portion of the First, Fourth, and Ninth Virginia Cavalry, the Jeff. Davis Legion, and the section of the Stuart Horse Artillery engaged in the expedition. What was accomplished is known to you, to the public, and to the enemy, but the passage of the Chickahominy under existing difficulties furnishes a separate chapter of praise for the whole command.

The general will certainly despair of no enterprise when he can hold such guarantees of success as Cols. Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, and Martin, and their brave and devoted commands.

The loss of the gallant and heroic Captain Latane, leading his squadron in a brilliant and successful charge, was a severe blow to us, but the enemy routed and fleeing before him will bear witness to a heart intrepid and a spirit invincible, whose influence will not be lost after death, while his regiment will want no better battle-cry for victory than "Avenge Latane!"

Proud of his command, the general trusts that it will never lose sight of what is at stake in this struggle—the reputation now its province to maintain.

By command of Brigadier-General J. E. B. Stuart:

J. T. W. HAIRSTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DEPT. OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
No. 74. } *June 23, 1862.*

The general commanding announces with great satisfaction to the Army the brilliant exploit of Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart with part of the troops under his command. This gallant officer, with portions of the First, Fourth, and Ninth Virginia Cavalry, a part of the Jeff. Davis Legion, with whom were the Boykin Rangers and a section of the Stuart Horse Artillery, on June 13, 14, and 15, made a reconnaissance between the Pamunkey and Chickahominy Rivers, and succeeded in passing around the rear of the whole Federal army, routing the enemy in a series of skirmishes, taking a number of prisoners, and destroying and capturing stores to a large amount. Having most successfully accomplished its object, the expedition recrossed the Chickahominy almost in the presence of the enemy with the same coolness and address that marked every step of its progress, and with the loss of but one man, the lamented Captain Latane, of the Ninth Virginia Cavalry, who fell bravely leading a successful charge against a superior force of the enemy.

In announcing this signal success to the Army the general commanding takes great pleasure in expressing his admiration of the courage and skill so conspicuously exhibited throughout by the general and the officers and men under his command.

In addition to the officers honorably mentioned in the report of the expedition, the conduct of the following privates has received the special commendation of their respective commanders: Privates Thomas P. Clapp, Company D, First Virginia Cavalry, and J. S. Mosby, serving with the same regiment; Privates Ashton, Brent, R. Herring, F. S. Herring, and H. F. Coleman, Company E, Ninth Virginia Cavalry.

By command of General Lee:

R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 22.

Report of Col. Fitz. Lee, First Virginia Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST VIRGINIA CAVALRY,
June 17, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the First Virginia Cavalry and four companies of Fourth Virginia Cavalry, under Captain Utterbach,

constituted my command and a part of General J. E. B. Stuart's, performing the entire circuit of the enemy's army, on the 12th [13th], 13th [14th], and 14th [15th] of the present month.

During the trip my command captured 62 horses, 7 mules, and assisted in securing 100 others, 39 cavalry saddles, 40 pistols, bridles, and quantities of minor stores; destroyed and assisted in destroying a large number of wagons and commissary and quartermaster's property of all kinds—one company alone destroying 800 bushels of corn and oats, 5,000 pounds of long forage, 4,000 pounds [of] bacon, 15 gallons [of] whisky, 200 pounds [of] sugar, 50 pounds [of] coffee, and 50 pounds of rice; charged and drove from their camp (I am happy to say) a part of my old regiment of cavalry, and burned all their tents, baggage, and stores of every description; captured a large number of prisoners—one company alone capturing 28, besides killing some of the enemy.

And in this connection I would call the attention of the general commanding to Private Thomas P. Clapp, of Captain Litchfield's company (D), who, riding up to a Federal officer who was in advance of his men, engaged him in personal combat and killed him after being wounded himself; a deed well worthy of emulation.

I have no one killed; 1 wounded, 1 missing.

I cannot conclude this brief report without certifying to the highly creditable manner in which both officers and men bore the danger and fatigue of a trip which has yet to be excelled—a noble band of circuit-riders.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FITZ. LEE,

Colonel, First Virginia Cavalry, Commanding.

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Cavalry Brigade.

No. 23.

Report of Col. W. H. F. Lee, Ninth Virginia Cavalry.

HDQRS. NINTH REGIMENT VIRGINIA CAVALRY,
Camp Lee, Va., June 17, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward a report of the part taken by my regiment in the late reconnoissance around the enemy's lines made by the cavalry brigade under your command on the 13th, 14th, and 15th instant:

[The] Second Squadron, Captain Swann commanding, made the first charge near Hawes' Shop, completely routing the enemy and pursuing him about a mile. The second charge was made by the Fifth Squadron, Captain Latane commanding, about a mile from Old Church (Hanover), up a hill, through a narrow road, with thick woods on both sides. The enemy here was strongly posted, his force consisting of two squadrons. It was here that Captain Latane was killed while gallantly leading his squadron, charging some 30 yards ahead of it. It was here that they had a hand-to-hand conflict, and my officers and men behaved with the greatest daring and bravery.

In this encounter my loss consisted of Captain Latane, killed, and Privates Brent, F. S. Herring, R. Herring, H. F. Coleman, Company E, wounded.

We killed some 4 or 5 and captured a large number, among them Lieutenant McLean. It is reported to me by some of my officers and men that there were a great many more killed and wounded. Some were in the woods, and the wounded got off in the road. We passed by so rapidly that it is impossible to state accurately the loss of the enemy.

From this time, as you know, there was no more hard fighting. We captured as we went along a large number of prisoners.

The advance guard, as you know, had barely reached the York River Railroad, when a train was reported in sight. Lieutenant Robins, in command of the advance, tried to turn the switch, but found it locked. He had obstructions placed across the track, and I hurried a squadron forward, dismounted them, and as the train came down fired into it. A great many jumped off when the firing commenced. The conductor was killed or jumped off. The obstructions proved insufficient and the train escaped. There were some killed here and a number captured.

I detached a part of two squadrons, Captain Knight and Lieutenant Oliver commanding, and directed them to go to Garlick's Landing and burn the vessels lying there, which they did very successfully, burning two transports laden with sutler's and quartermaster's stores. One escaped. Here they met with a slight resistance from a party of about 100 men, but a few shots soon brought the matter to an end, and they captured almost all of them. The rest you know. It is impossible in such a hurried march to state accurately everything that occurred.

I should like to call to your attention [to] the conduct of my adjutant, Lieut. W. T. Robins, who conducted in a very handsome manner the advance of my regiment when it was in front and the rear when in rear. He was also in both of the charges.

The officers and men all behaved with the greatest bravery and coolness. Private Ashton, of Company E, and those wounded, I think, deserve special mention.

Two squadrons of the Fourth Cavalry, under Captain Wooldridge, were attached to my command. They participated and gallantly dispersed a body of cavalry that formed on Garlick's farm. The enemy did not allow them to get very near.

Very respectfully,

W. H. F. LEE,
Colonel Ninth Virginia Cavalry.

Brig. Gen. J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry Brigade.

No. 24.

Report of Col. William T. Martin, Jeff. Davis Legion (Cavalry).

JEFF. DAVIS LEGION,
Camp Ballard, near Richmond, Va., June 17, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the services of the Jeff. Davis Legion, under my command, in the reconnaissance made by the general commanding on the 13th, 14th, and 15th instant through and in rear of the enemy's lines in front of Richmond:

My command was composed of 250 picked men. In obedience to the order of the general, on the morning of the 13th, at sunrise, I assumed

command of the rear guard, composed of the Legion and a 12-pounder howitzer, and at a later period of the day a rifled piece was added. These guns were under the charge, respectively, of Lieutenants Breathed and McGregor.

After the march began toward Hanover Court-House, excepting an occasional halt to give scouting parties an opportunity to reconnoiter, our progress was so rapid and the attack upon the enemy's pickets so vigorous and well pursued, that the rear of our column was not attacked. The impunity with which the movement was made was no doubt owing to the suddenness and boldness of the attack. During the day and late into the night my command was engaged in completing the destruction of the enemy's property commenced by those in advance, in securing prisoners and captured mules and horses, and until sunrise next morning in guarding against surprise and preventing straggling. The artillery horses, owing to the great heat and rapid marching, failed late in the afternoon, and the rifled piece, so much needed in front of the attack upon Tunstall's Station, could not be carried forward in time, though the officers and men in immediate charge of the gun exerted themselves to the utmost to reach that point before the enemy escaped. The condition of those horses, as well as the condition of the road at and near the station, greatly impeded my progress and subjected the rear guard to great danger of being cut off, the enemy having had eight or ten hours' notice from his pickets of our movement.

In the afternoon 25 non-commissioned officers and privates of the Fifth Regular Cavalry, U. S. Army, came in under flag of truce, and surrendered, with horses and arms, to the rear guard, under the impression that they were surrounded. The whole column had passed them nearly a mile. With great difficulty the guns were passed down the difficult road beyond the station.

As all the fighting was done in front, the Legion had no opportunity to take part in the series of combats and skirmishers which occurred during the day. For twenty-four hours the march continued until the whole column halted on the banks of the Chickahominy at Jones' Bridge, 25 miles from Richmond. The stream was not fordable, and after much labor and delay, that was unavoidable, an impromptu bridge was constructed for artillery, the horses swimming the stream, and by 12 m. the whole column was on this side of the river. The Legion was then intrusted with the custody of the prisoners, some 150 in number, and guarded them until midday of the 15th, when they were delivered to a guard detailed to carry them to Richmond. We returned to camp late in the afternoon of the 15th.

I would take occasion to mention the energy displayed by Lieutenant Breathed in overcoming the difficulties encountered in moving his piece of artillery, and the promptness shown in preparing for action on several occasions when there was reason to believe that the enemy were about to attack.

I have to report that my column remained during the whole march well closed up. There was no straggling from it and no plundering. Officers and men bore the fatigue with patience, and for twenty-four hours were ready on the instant to repel attack. Under all the temptations presented, with so many bad examples set, it affords me great satisfaction to say that my ranks were never broken.

In the report above I include the Boykin Rangers, Lieutenant Chestnut commanding, temporarily attached to the Legion. That company

rendered efficient service during the march from Hanover Court-House to the Chickahominy, it being the rear company.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

WILL. T. MARTIN,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Jeff. Davis Legion.

Capt. J. T. W. HAIRSTON, *A. A. G., Hdqrs. Cavalry Brigade.*

JUNE 15, 1862.—Reconnaissance to vicinity of New Market, Va.

Report of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, Fourth Corps.

HEADQUARTERS CASEY'S DIVISION,
June 16, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that yesterday a cavalry detachment ordered by me on a reconnaissance encountered near New Market a rebel picket of about 12 mounted men. They succeeded in capturing 1 of their horses and 2 carbines. They also brought in a man named Nathan Doughty, who has been engaged in collecting negroes to work on the fortifications near Richmond. I would respectfully call attention to the insecurity of this part of the line. My general officers of the day report a number of fording places not heretofore known to us. In fact, in dry weather the places across the swamp that cannot be easily forded are exceptions. A sufficient force of cavalry should be kept here, that the borders of the swamp from the Chickahominy may be constantly watched. I also request that an officer of engineers may be sent to make an examination of the swamp.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,
Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding Division.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM, *Asst. Adjt. Gen., Fourth Corps.*

JUNE 15, 1862.—Skirmish near Seven Pines, Va.

REPORTS.

- No. 1.—Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Third Corps.
- No. 2.—Brig. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
- No. 3.—Maj. John D. Moriarty, Seventy-third New York Infantry.
- No. 4.—Col. Robert Nugent, Sixty-ninth New York Infantry.
- No. 5.—Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley, C. S. Army, commanding Fifth Brigade, D. H. Hill's division.

No. 1.

Report of Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Third Corps.

HEADQUARTERS HOOKER'S DIVISION, THIRD CORPS,
Camp, near Fair Oaks Station, Va., June 16, 1862.

CAPTAIN: As the affair between the pickets yesterday appears to have been much more disastrous than was reported to me last night,

I beg leave to call your attention to the inclosed report of Brigadier-General Sickles, commanding the advance on yesterday, and also to the report of Major Moriarty, in command of the picket. Notwithstanding I had given positive instructions to have every movement of the enemy in front communicated to me, I had no knowledge of what had been going on there until a few minutes before 9 o'clock p. m. I had visited the picket during the day, and was very much dissatisfied with the manner in which that duty was performed under Major Moriarty, and so reported to his brigade commander. I deem him an unsuitable person to command a picket anywhere. His report concerning the shelling of the redoubt is full of errors. The enemy threw yesterday morning five or six shots at a man in a tree from a single field piece, not one of them going in or near the redoubt. Similar exaggerations will be found in the report that a division of troops advanced on our picket. From more reliable information I have reason to believe their number did not exceed 200 infantry and a few cavalry.

No explanation is furnished for the number reported as missing. I conclude they were taken prisoners from gross neglect. There was an unusual number of cases of drunkenness among the men in the brigade on duty yesterday, and to this I ascribe in a great measure this catastrophe. I request that orders may be given for the issue of no whisky in this division except on requisitions approved by myself.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER, *Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Corps.*

No. 2.

Report of Brig. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE,

June 15—8.55 p. m.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that my command relieved the First Brigade yesterday at 4 p. m. The pickets were relieved by a detail of 300 men, under Major Holt, and were posted by him in company with Colonel Cowdin, field officer in command of the pickets of the First Brigade. The night passed with only an occasional shot in front, and these from the enemy, who had a strong picket in the house on the Williamsburg road, where it crosses the swamp. This morning at 4 o'clock I inspected the position of the pickets from right to left, and ascended the oak tree in front, which is used as a lookout. Nothing was reported to me of the enemy as seen by myself this side of the clearing, on the left of which their field work and tents have been heretofore observed. I directed Major Holt, before he was relieved, to advance his line of pickets in front so as to extend them to this side of the clearing, and if to do this it became necessary to drive the enemy from the house at the edge of the swamp on the road, to do so. This was done. What remained of the house was burned 6 a. m., Major Moriarty relieving Major Holt with 300 of the Fourth Regiment.

During the morning the enemy opened fire upon us from what appeared to be some 12-pounder field guns in front, I should say about 1,200 yards. They had the range of our position. The first three shots

were evidently aimed at the oak tree, where we kept a man posted. The tree was struck and some branches torn away. Several shells burst within our defenses, wounding 3 of our men. This afternoon, when the storm began, the enemy were reported advancing on the left and in front. On the Williamsburg road a strong body of cavalry pushed through our line of pickets, and at the same time heavy volleys of musketry disclosed infantry in some force on the right and in front of the new redoubt. The working party stampeded the pickets on the right, Sumner's gave way, and Lieutenant Stewart, commanding my pickets on the right of the road, retired under cover, after returning a few shots. The enemy's musketry swept the field from the right diagonally, the shot reaching the grove of oaks behind the redoubt. On the left there was some firing, but inconsiderable.

I sent Lieutenant Palmer with several orderlies to communicate with the pickets and bring me reliable information of the movements and force of the enemy. He had proceeded on the right up the road only a short distance beyond the building in front of the new redoubt when he was killed and two of the orderlies wounded. As soon as I could bring in his body and the wounded dragoons I directed the pickets on the right and left of the road to unmask the guns in the redoubt, so that I might shell the woods and road in front and on the right. Before I could open fire General Sumner threw out four companies on his left up to the Williamsburg road, and my pickets in front reported the enemy moving to the left. I sent information of the demonstration on the left to General Berry, and directed Major Moriarty to hold the stockade on the road leading to our left and to keep his reserve well in hand to support the re-enforcements thrown into the stockade. In the mean time I sent word to Colonel Carr to be in readiness to co-operate with General Berry or myself if necessary. General Grover came to the front to ascertain the state of things, and informed me he would hold his brigade in readiness. No further demonstration was made by the enemy. After waiting until near 6 o'clock, Colonel Carr having meanwhile reported to relieve me, I withdrew my regiments when relieved. When I left the front my regiments had all gone to their camps except the Fourth [Seventy-third New York], which was being relieved on picket.

Major Moriarty reports to me to-night that our pickets on the left were exposed to a heavy fire just before they were relieved; that himself and 7 or 8 men are wounded, and Captain McCauley is missing and 1 man killed. Major Moriarty reports verbally that except along a portion of the front and right, where our pickets were driven in by greatly superior force, their position was the same as was held during the day and yesterday.

Major Moriarty also reports that at least a division of the enemy moved to the left about the time of the advance on the Williamsburg road and the firing on our right, and that the last movement of the enemy which was observed from the oak tree was to the right in force. He also expresses the opinion that the enemy occupy the woods on the left and in front in considerable force. Major Moriarty will report in writing to-morrow morning unless his wound should prove to be too painful.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

D. E. SICKLES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. JOS. DICKINSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

P. S.—I omitted to mention that my pickets on the Williamsburg road cut off a lieutenant and corporal of cavalry, who were on the advance of the mounted force which drove in my pickets. These prisoners have been turned over to the provost-marshal of the division, Captain Young.

No. 3.

Report of Maj. John D. Moriarty, Seventy-third New York Infantry.

HDQRS. FOURTH REGIMENT, EXCELSIOR BRIGADE,
Camp Seven Pines, Va., June 15, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I would respectfully report: Upon the morning of the 14th instant my regiment relieved the First Regiment of this brigade (Major Holt) upon picket duty in the front of the lines and redoubt upon the left of the Williamsburg road. The picket was posted from the left, where they connected with those from General Kearny's division to the right across the Williamsburg road and there joined those of General Sumner. During the early part of the day a change was made by the order of General Sickles, commanding, with the sanction of General Hooker, commanding division at the left, where the picket was. Instead of being placed around a point of wood (swampy), they were carried through the wood at the junction of the road running from the left of the redoubt in nearly a straight line to a point designated as the "pine tree," by which a large portion of the left, nearly upon the flank of General Kearny's division, was relieved, and the safety of that portion of the line enhanced. The line was well guarded up to and including the junction with the picket of General Sumner. During the morning shells were thrown from the redoubt of the enemy, also from two field batteries; several of them passing into our redoubts.

At about 12 m. the picket upon the front was established about 100 yards to the front, by the sanction of the general commanding. This was done only after making a thorough reconnaissance from the look-out, the "beech tree" (in front), as also by personal reports of Captain McCauley, Company H, and Captain Smith, Company B. During the afternoon the enemy pressed upon the right of our line in large force, both cavalry and infantry, driving in my pickets (two companies, commanded by Lieutenant Stewart, Company G, and Lieutenant Bowerman, Company E), and almost immediately they threw a large force of infantry upon our whole line of pickets. Our pickets held their ground manfully until, the force of the enemy being increased, they were compelled to fall back in front of the fallen timber, where as they came in I formed them, and from time to time, until relieved by the Fifth New Jersey Regiment, sent portions again into the wood, endeavoring to regain and hold our lost ground. We were finally compelled to fall back to the road in front of the abatis, and there held our position. I am fully convinced the force sent to hold this front is entirely inadequate for the purpose. There should not be less than 1,000 men placed in the position with any probability of holding to the outer edge of the wood in front.

Very respectfully,

J. D. MORIARTY,

Major, Comdg. Picket, Fourth Regiment, Excelsior Brigade.

Lieut. H. E. TREMAIN, *Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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